Beyond the Paths of Heaven the Emergence of Space Power Thought
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Beyond the Paths of Heaven The Emergence of Space Power Thought A Comprehensive Anthology of Space-Related Master’s Research Produced by the School of Advanced Airpower Studies Edited by Bruce M. DeBlois, Colonel, USAF Professor of Air and Space Technology Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama September 1999 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Beyond the paths of heaven : the emergence of space power thought : a comprehensive anthology of space-related master’s research / edited by Bruce M. DeBlois. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Astronautics, Military. 2. Astronautics, Military—United States. 3. Space Warfare. 4. Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College. School of Advanced Airpower Studies- -Dissertations. I. Deblois, Bruce M., 1957- UG1520.B48 1999 99-35729 358’ .8—dc21 CIP ISBN 1-58566-067-1 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii OVERVIEW . ix PART I Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture 1 An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation . 3 Stephen E. Wright 2 After the Gulf War: Balancing Space Power’s Development . 63 Frank Gallegos 3 Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Security Space Architectures . 103 Christian C. Daehnick PART II Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives 4 Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary . 185 David W. Ziegler PART III Space Control Perspectives 5 Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance . 249 James G. Lee iii Chapter Page 6 When the Enemy Has Our Eyes . 303 Cynthia A. S. McKinley PART IV High-Ground Perspectives 7 National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Access . 365 William W. Bruner III 8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Space Vehicle . 437 Michael A. Rampino 9 The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction? . 507 Gregory Billman INDEX . 569 Illustrations Figure 1 World Market Share of Large Jet Airplane Deliveries . 9 2 Space System Cycles . 129 3 Offensive Counterspace Options . 285 4 Offensive Counterspace Options for Tier-One Nations . 286 5 Offensive Counterspace Options for Tier-Two Nations . 287 iv Figure Page 6 Offensive Counterspace Options for Tier-Three Nations . 288 7 The Dual Track Technology Progression (Film-Based and Digital Processing) . 310 8 Warfare—the Human Expression of the Battle for Ascendancy . 322 9 The Forms of Modern Warfare (Categorized by Mankind’s Development of Group Lethality Tools) . 323 10 SPOT Control and Data Reception Network . 341 11 Current RLV Concepts . 445 12 Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons Delivery within Three Days . 468 13 Space Regions and Environs . 518 14 Earth and Moon Gravity Wells . 519 15 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics of Home-Based Terrestrial Forces . 529 16 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics of Deployed Terrestrial Forces . 532 17 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics of Engaged Terrestrial Forces . 536 18 Continuum of Operations and Characteristics of Space Power versus Terrestrial Forces . 543 Table 1 Aerospace Industry Sales (millions of current dollars) . 7 v Table Page 2 Trade Balance of Selected Commodities (billions of dollars) . 8 3 US Government Research and Development Expenditures (millions of current dollars) . 12 4 Changing Aircraft Production Costs . 35 5 USSPACECOM Lessons . 69 6 USCENTCOM Lessons . 72 7 Persian Gulf War Space Power Shortcomings and Issues . 75 8 Advantages of Space Systems . 109 9 Perceived Disadvantages of Space Systems . 111 10 Space System Terms and Definitions . 112 11 Space Architecture Elements . 114 12 Space Architecture Attributes . 115 13 Command-Oriented Architecture Priorities . 118 14 Demand-Oriented Architecture Priorities . 119 15 Space Architecture Determinants . 131 16 Constellation Implications, Command-Oriented Architecture . 132 17 Launch Vehicle Implications, Command-Oriented Architecture . 133 18 Constellation Implications, Demand-Oriented Architecture . 134 19 Launch Vehicle Implications, Demand-Oriented Architecture . 135 vi Table Page 20 Theater RSTA Description . 138 21 Theater RSTA Qualitative Requirements . 140 22 Command-Oriented Architecture for RSTA Requirements . 142 23 Demand-Oriented Architecture for RSTA Requirements . 148 24 Space-Capable Nations by Tier Groups . 257 25 Existing and Projected Landsat Ground Stations . 258 26 Existing and Projected SPOT Ground Stations . 261 27 Qualitative Measures of Various Civilian Satellite Systems . 265 28 Ground Resolution Requirements for Object Identification (in meters) . 266 29 Landsat and SPOT Spectral Band Applications (in microns) . 269 30 Civil/Military Uses of Multispectral Imagery . 270 31 Planned Imagery Systems 1995–2000 . 329 32 Resolution Required for Specific Military Tasks . 331 33 Some Means of Denial . 336 34 SPOT Direct Receiving Stations . 340 35 Attributes of Proposed RLV Concepts and One Popular TAV Concept . 446 36 Summary of Attributes of a Notional RLV . 452 vii Table Page 37 CONOPS A and B RLV Capabilities . 454 38 Cumulative 2,000-Pound Weapons Delivery within Three Days . 468 39 Summary of Analysis . 485 viii Overview Bruce M. DeBlois Major issues have plagued the US military space community for years. Foremost among these issues is the relationship between air and space. At a recent airpower conference, military leaders from the western powers presented discussions of airpower and space issues with a pervasive underlying assumption: that the next logical step from the exploitation of airpower and space capabilities was the merging of the two environments toward the exploitation of “aerospace” power.1 The current distinction between air and space rests on the fiscal and technical inability to merge them—an inability that is soon to be overcome. Conferees dismissed environmental distinctions between the two on the grounds that there is no absolute boundary between air and space.2 In Paths of Heaven, the chapter titled “Ascendant Realms: Characteristics of Air and Space Power,” I examine this assumption from the perspective of 21 different military characteristics and conclude it to be invalid. The reasons extend well beyond an inability—fiscally and technically—to merge the two realms. Similarities based upon functions and the lack of a distinct boundary are offset by distinctions in the physical environments. The physical laws of air and space are profoundly different. A vehicle flying on a cushion of air is not equivalent to a vehicle in free-fall orbit. Aside from the issue of access due to huge differences in energy requirements, the airborne vehicle is maneuverable and allows for flexible operations while the space-borne platform is fixed to a high-velocity orbital path. The latter expends little energy to stay in a fixed orbital position, allowing it a duration capability well beyond airborne vehicles. The issue is not whether the two environments can be merged technically, but given that they can be merged, should they be merged. An analogy is useful to illustrate the argument. ix Land and sea forces maintain a two-dimensional perspective and relatively slow pace of operations. The amphibious mission certainly illustrates the fact that there is no absolute boundary between land and sea for military purposes. Fiscal and technical capability to merge the two environments in an attempt to exploit surface power exists. In spite of these similarities, land power and sea power have not been merged as surface power because of environmental differences. The question is not whether to make a land/sea capable vehicle or system, but whether they should be the mainstay of a military surface capability. The answer is a resounding no. Given limited fiscal resources, the choice between making either 1,000 land/sea vehicles or making 490 land vehicles, 490 sea vehicles, and 20 land/sea vehicles is trivial. A land vehicle will out-perform a land/sea vehicle on land, and a sea vehicle will out-perform a land/sea vehicle at sea. Most missions are either at land or at sea; only a few cross the hazy boundaries. It makes sense to invest in the best capability for the environment in which the mission will be performed. Doctrine, organization, and strategies flow from the environments and the systems employed to exploit those environments. Hence land power is distinct from sea power. Surface power would be a less optimal approach. The same argument holds true for air and space power. Air and space forces maintain a three-dimensional perspective and relatively fast pace of operations. The similarities end there. Although there is no absolute boundary between air and space, no physicist would refute the fact that once the fuzzy boundary is transcended, the nature of the environment changes radically. Fiscal and technical capability to merge the two environments in an attempt to exploit aerospace power is emerging, but should it be pursued? Again, environmental differences drive the answer. The question is not whether to make an aerospace capable vehicle/system, but whether we should make many as the mainstay of a military aerospace capability. The answer, again, is a resounding no. A space vehicle will out-perform an aerospace vehicle in space: A typical aerospace vehicle will carry the baggage of air capability, such as wings, into space.