Hero Or the Zero1

“Hero or the Zero” Chapter 1 A True Story By COL GREGORY MARSTON (ret) Aviation is an exciting profession that has short, intense, high-energy periods that are often followed by fairly routine and even boring phases of flight. Yet, it is important to remember always that you’re flying a machine at relatively high speeds and/or high altitudes versus other man-made equipment like a car. Your happy little pilot bubble can be interrupted in a Nano- second by the rare, heart-stopping, bowel-loosening, emergency that must be dealt with correctly, quickly and coolly or you may die. Sometimes you die, even if you do everything right! This story is about one such moment. I was leading a routine flight of two A-37B “Dragonfly” aircraft on a cool, clear and very dark, early morning at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (DMAFB) in Tucson, Arizona on January 3rd, 1985. The A-37 was a relic from the Vietnam War, a small, green/grey camouflage, two-seat, two-engine, jet aircraft that was used for Attack (dropping bombs) or Forward Air Control (FAC – shooting rockets). As the solo Instructor Pilot (flying in the left seat) the plan was for me to takeoff first, followed 10 seconds later by my wingman (a student in the left seat and his Instructor Pilot in the right side). After takeoff, my wingman he would rejoin on me for a Close Air Support (CAS) training flight. I would lead the two-aircraft flight out to one of the massive bombing ranges located in southern Arizona. On this huge range complex, we would split up and I would act as the “fighter” for the student who was learning to be a new Forward Air Controller (FAC). He would guide me to the targets, which were actual convoys, using real vehicles, fake buildings and “villages” located all over the range. You would use the live weapons that we carried all over this vast and rugged range area. My engine run-up for takeoff was very good because of the cooler winter temperatures; I released my brakes, accelerated down the runway and quickly approached the takeoff speed of about 120 knots. I pulled back on the control stick (a metal pole with a handgrip and other weapons buttons on the top of it) and established the takeoff attitude of a couple degrees of nose up attitude. Due to its bulbous nose, and while the jet was in the takeoff position, I could not see the runway directly ahead of me for a few seconds. While I waited for it to lift off the runway, there suddenly there was an explosion, followed by the aircraft gyrating left and right. I was now violently skidding down the runway at about 120 knots (137 miles per hour) on a three- wheel (or maybe less) tricycle landing gear in my 12,000-lb. aircraft. I could not eject, because my ejection seat was not powerful enough at this speed. A lot of things happened at once. I immediately applied the BOLD FACE or RED BOX procedures for an Aborted Takeoff. A BOLD FACE procedure was an emergency considered serious enough to threaten the pilot’s life and / or to cause severe damage or destruction to the aircraft. The Bold Face emergency also required immediate, swift and correct action – which is why it was memorized. Every USAF pilot had to know all the planes Bold Face procedures “Verbatim” (word for word) for his aircraft and had to be able to perform them quickly without consulting any checklist. Abort means that you are stopping the aircraft on the runway instead of taking off. An aborted takeoff is dangerous because the aircraft is at its’ heaviest weight, including fuel and weapons, at a very high speed, with much of the runway already behind the pilot because of the takeoff roll. !1 There were about ten or so of these Bold Face procedures for the A-37B. Bold Face emergencies must be memorized and recited exactly, word by word. Knowledge of these Bold Face procedures is tested every month for every pilot. That test involved writing all these Bold Face emergencies aircrafts on a sheet of paper, which was then checked for complete accuracy. Any mistake, even by missing one word, in this test would cause the pilot to be grounded for that day. We also practiced the Bold Face procedures and other emergencies in an aircraft cockpit mockup on a regular basis. ABORT {BOLD FACE} Throttles –idle (Lowest power setting) Speed brakes – Open (make the speed brake plate deploy downward) Wheel brakes – as required (use brakes as necessary to stop the aircraft) I could not eject because I was not at 100’ altitude above the ground. Even with this wild emergency a small, little internal voice asked, “Did I overlook something to cause this event – was it a mistake or a crime? “ONE MISTAKE AIR FORCE” The U.S. Air Force (USAF) had lost over 2250 aircraft in the long American involvement in the Vietnam War (1963-1973). As in every other major conflict since World War II (WWII), there was a severe drawdown or shrinking of military forces after Vietnam. The USAF was no exception – it contracted dramatically and there was little money to buy new aircraft. The USAF leadership wanted to keep as many aircraft as they could and also change the “culture” of this military branch after the wild combat flying days of that conflict. Active Duty USAF operational flying units began the transformation in the 1970’s (when I started my career) with a very strict attitude toward safety and flight discipline. The flying culture became what we grimly called the “One Mistake Air Force” – which meant if you make one critical mistake, your career is over. The USAF has always had strict accountability for its flying squadrons. It was because we were flying high-performance, multimillion dollar aircraft for our nation. We had to train to fight the next war - that could come tomorrow, next week or never and yet do it in a safe manner. We were the tip of the spear for our nation, if they needed us, and as pilots we were the warriors for the Air Force. In the doldrums years after Vietnam War, the emphasis was on being very cautious and safe. The generals backed up this conservative flying approach by holding commanders strictly liable if there was an accident in their squadron. This USAF accountability meant that if a flying unit had a preventable aircraft accident, failed or did poorly on any USAF inspection, had a significant sexual harassment complaint, if the commander was convicted of an Inspector General (IG) complaint, or if anything bad happened to the squadron, the unit leaders would usually be fired. Mistakes were not tolerated. Any problems and the leadership could pay for it with the sacrifice of a minimum of one commander’s career - and it frequently would be more than one commander. In my first five years in the active duty USAF, I unfortunately was in several flying Wings where a single accident unhappily caused the firing of the entire leadership chain from the Wing Commander down to the Squadron commander. This was a tough atmosphere for operational leaders because almost no amount of positive kudos accumulated in a career could stop the quick “lynching” that followed an accident, incident or negative event. 20+ year careers vanished in an instant when one of your knucklehead pilots did something stupid, dumb, against regulations, etc. Paranoia was very high for the commanders that I served under in those days. We talked about safety, a lot. We had to listen to the USAF top brass drone on about the mythical ‘zero accident’ Air Force – in which there were no accidents across the Air Force for a year. Of course, the only possible to achieve this ridiculous goal was if we stopped flying as a !2 service. In reality, flying and training for combat in USAF fighter aircraft was a complicated, dangerous and high-pressure occupation. As pilots, we just wanted to fly and fight. We wanted to train realistically for combat, while not making any mistakes which could end your career. “MEET the WING COMMANDER” As a young pilot, I and all the other newbie flyers, always had a tense, introductory meeting with the Wing Commander in every USAF Wing I flew in. The Wing Commander held the rank of Colonel and was the overall leader for the wing. He was always a pilot and it took twenty years or more for him to rise to this high level in the Air Force leadership. The Wing Commander was the top boss with control over all the aircraft, personnel, buildings, and equipment for a flying wing. So, when he talked – we listened. At this point in my career, I looked at this leader with some awe and fear. During this initial meeting with the Wing Commander, they often preached the same concept. In the ultra-conservative years after the Vietnam fiasco, most of these Wing Commander gave what I called the “mistakes versus crimes” talk. Stated differently by these various wing commanders, the message was essentially the same. Any major mistake made while flying, resulting in an accident or incident, was possibly survivable, career- wise IF (and only if) you were following USAF rules and regulations. There are a lot of rules and regulations. On the other hand, a flying mistake that had any direct violation of any regulations, guidelines or policies and you would be sacked immediately as a pilot.

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