DOCSLIB.ORG

Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua (SSGM Discussion Paper 2005/6 by Jaap Timmer)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua (SSGM Discussion Paper 2005/6 by Jaap Timmer) THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia StateSociety and in Governance Melanesia DISCUSSION PAPER Discussion Paper 2005/6 DECENTRALISATION AND ELITE POLITICS IN PAPUA ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION JAAP TIMMER This paper focuses on conflicts in the Province For a number of reasons ranging from Dutch of Papua (former Irian Jaya) that were stimulated nationalism, geopolitical considerations, and self- by the recent devolution of power of administrative righteous moral convictions, the Netherlands functions in Indonesia. While the national Government refused to include West New decentralisation policy aims at accommodating Guinea in the negotiations for the independence anti-Jakarta sentiments in the regions and of Indonesia in the late 1940s (Lijphart 1966; intends to stimulate development, it augments Huydecoper van Nigtevecht 1990; Penders 2002: contentions within the Papuan elite that go hand Chapter 2; and Vlasblom 2004: Chapter 3). At the in hand with ethnic and regional tensions and same time, the government in Netherlands New increasing demands for more sovereignty among Guinea initiated economic and infrastructure communities. This paper investigates the histories development as well as political emancipation of of regional identities and Papuan elite politics the Papuans under paternalistic guardianship. In in order to map the current political landscape the course of the 1950s, when tensions between in Papua. A brief discussion of the behaviour of the Netherlands and Indonesia grew over the certain Papuan political players shows that many status of West New Guinea, the Dutch began to of them are enthused by an environment that guide a limited group of educated Papuans towards is no longer defined singly by centralised state independence culminating in the establishment control but increasingly by regional opportunities of the New Guinea Council (Nieuw-Guinea Raad) to control state resources and to make profitable in 1961. In addition, a flag, the Bintang Kejora deals with national and international commercial or Morning Star flag, was designed to be flown ventures. As a result, the aspirations of legislators beside the Dutch flag and a national anthem was are all too often detached from the reasons for adopted to be played and sung during official demands for more sovereignty cherished among occasions after the Netherlands national hymn. The contribution the majority of Papuans whose frustrations about After a twelve-year dispute that was reaching of AusAID to ineffective governance are ever increasing. More its peak with the threat of open military conflict, this series is generally, the conflict in Papua only partly follows this policy had to be aborted. In December 1961, acknowledged prevailing opinion about the tensions between President Sukarno issued the Trikora (Tri Komando with appreciation. ‘Papua’ and ‘Jakarta’ or ‘Indonesia’. Rakyat or ‘People’s Threefold Command’) for the Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua liberation of Irian Barat (West Irian). At the In response to the ‘Indonesian occupation’ 2 heart of this massive mobilisation was Operasi of their land a liberation organisation called the Mandala, an Armed Forces of the Republic of Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Indonesia (ABRI) campaign designed to put Organisation) emerged as a local movement in pressure on the Netherlands government. The Manokwari in the 1960s and, from there, spread United States and Australia were not willing to over the Kepala Burung (Bird’s Head region). It support the Dutch military forces. soon became a fragmented network of dispersed In an international climate of decolonisation, groups of guerrilla-fighters.3 Its access to weapons and after President Sukarno’s sustained pressing was limited and popular support scant. Very few of Indonesia’s claim to the territory, the United elite Papuans joined the armed struggle and the States sponsored negotiations between Indonesia vast majority of people living outside the urban and the Netherlands about the future of West centres did not feel the sense of belonging to New Guinea under the auspices of the United a nation that had been invaded by Indonesia. Nations. The resulting New York Agreement of 15 Nevertheless, disillusion with the Indonesian August 1962 outlined the transfer of Netherlands government began to grow widely among those sovereignty over West New Guinea to an interim who had enjoyed the fruits of the accelerated United Nations Temporary Executive Authority development effort of the Dutch government (UNTEA) from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, since the 1950s. to be followed by a second phase during which President Suharto’s New Order regime (1966- the intervening administration would hand over 1998) put much effort into developing the province full administrative responsibility to Indonesia. and it received more funds than all other regions of The agreement formulated the provision that the Indonesia. But the implementation of largely top- people of Irian Barat would exercise free choice down development programs often failed. At the over their future relationship with Indonesia same time, an ever-growing but relatively poorly before the end of 1969. funded military (TNI), supporting a network of The victory over what had now become the alliances for both political control and predator Province of Irian Barat was a boost to Indonesian business, has lead to the dislocation of Papuans. nationalism and became portrayed as the final On top of that, Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese chapter of decolonisation.1 The Indonesians, and Javanese immigrants began to fill manual ruling the new province under the banner of labour and seize small business opportunities. the Trikora mobilisation, were triumphant while As a result, frustration about limited access to elements of the Papuan elite empowered by opportunities in modern Indonesia intensified the Dutch began to complain about what they tensions between ‘Papuans’ and ‘Indonesians’, in saw as a blunt Indonesian takeover. Feelings of particular those who arrived in Papua through being marginalized by Indonesian bureaucrats so-called transmigration programs or the larger and immigrants from other Indonesian islands waves of spontaneous migration.4 Furthermore, filling jobs and business opportunities arose in terms of governance, the region is amongst mainly among urban Papuans. Some of the the most poorly developed in Indonesia, while educated Papuan elite were arrested or sidelined economic and ethnic differences play a significant as ‘collaborators with the Dutch’ while others and sometimes alarming role in land and resource continued to play a role in the administration. politics (Timmer forthcoming). A plebiscite called Pepera (Penentuan Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and Pendapat Rakyat or ‘Act of Free Choice’) was the presidency being handed over to his Deputy held in July-August 1969 during which 1020 President, B.J. Habibie, a spirit of ‘democratic cautiously chosen representatives from eight reform’ (reformasi) swept across the archipelago. regions voted overwhelmingly for integration In Papua it lead to what has been duly called a with Indonesia.2 Protest was heard, dissonant ‘Papuan Spring’ during which Papuan leaders speeches delivered, desperate cries in the form from all over the region carefully sought to of written notes were delivered to the United balance representations from the coast and the Nations observers, and demonstrations in highlands in a wave of national Papuan actions Sukarnopura (former Hollandia, now Jayapura), and the establishment of Papuan organisations Biak and Manokwari were dispersed swiftly by (see Van den Broek and Szalay 2001). At massive the Indonesian military. Over the following gatherings all over the region during which decades, faith in self-determination as linked to heated debates over the history of Papua and its the undemocratic implementation of the Pepera possible future (‘autonomy’ or ‘independence’) became a key ingredient in a variety of Papuan were held, the Papuan Spring “took the form nationalisms. of the indigenous Papuan people demanding Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua merdeka, or independence, from Indonesia” 163, my translation). The merdeka-leader there (Sumule 2003b: 353; Chauvel 2005: 11-20). was Marthen Indey, who was raised in Ambon, 3 Before I discuss the Papuan Spring it is necessary Maluku, and had been posted to Banda Neira, to briefly elaborate on what kinds of meanings where he became inspired by the prominent merdeka has assumed in the history of Papua. nationalist, Mohammed Hatta, who was exiled there. In 1946, Indey joined the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KMI, ‘Indonesia Freedom Committee’) MERDEKA AND MEMORIA PASSIONIS led by the Manadonese government medical doctor, Ms Gerungan. KMI advocated the The Indonesian nationalist revolutionary independence of Indonesia, including West New understanding of ‘merdeka’ dates back to the Guinea through all legal means (Vlasblom 2004: mid-1920s growth of the nationalist movement 164). followed, after promises during the Japanese As Chauvel concludes, the nationalism of occupation, by the Indonesian revolution of this period had a narrow base and the nationalists 1945-1949. During the late 1940s, ‘merdeka ‘were culturally isolated from the great mass of became the battle-cry with which the citizenry Papuans’ (2005: 6). The majority of Papuans had was summoned to support the cause, the salute very little
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Available Here
    Seri Memoria Passionis No. 19 MEMORIA PASSIONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 MEMORIA PASSIAONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 ii MEMORIA PASSIONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 diterbitkan oleh: OFFICE FOR JUSTICE SEKRETARIAT KEADILAN AND PEACE DAN PERDAMAIAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF JAYAPURA KEUSKUPAN JAYAPURA 2008 iii MEMORIA PASSIAONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 MEMORIA PASSIONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 Penulis: Tim SKP Jayapura Editor: Hanif Suranto layout & desain cover: Muid Mularnoidin Korektor: Nadjib Abu Yasser Cetakan Pertama 2008 Hak Cipta © SKP JAYAPURA Perpustakaan Nasional RI: Katalog Dalam Terbitan (KDT) SKP Jayapura, Tim MEMORIA PASSIONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 Cetakan Pertama, Jakarta: SKP JAYAPURA , 2008 xxii + 424 halaman; 14 x 21 cm ISBN 979-9381-03-7 SKP JAYAPURA: Jl. Kesehatan No. 4 Dok II Jayapura Phone / Fax.:(62) (967)-534993 Website: www.hampapua.org Email: [email protected] iv dipersembahkan bagi mereka yang dibungkam karena menyuarakan kebenaran v MEMORIA PASSIAONIS DI PAPUA TAHUN 2006 vi DAFTAR ISI Kata Pengantar––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––xiii Daftar Singkatan––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––xv Bab I KEKERASAN DAN KETAKUTAN DI AWAL TAHUN–––––––xxii Papua Aktual Januari – Maret 2006 Penulis : A.F. Sari Rosa Moiwend BAGIAN I LINTASAN PERISTIWA HAK ASASI MANUSIA––––––––––1 A. Situasi Hak-Hak Sipil dan Politik––––––––––––––––––––––1 A.1 Irian Jaya Barat (IJB) VS Otsus–––––––––––––––––––––––1 A.2 Hiruk Pikuk Pilkada Gubernur Papua A.3 Kasus 16 Maret 2006 A.4 Catatan Mengenai Kebebasan Warga B. Situasi Hak-Hak Ekonomi, Sosial dan Budaya B.1 Kesejahteraan B.2 Hak Atas Kesehatan: Wabah HIV-AIDS B.3 Perlindungan Terhadap Perempuan dan Anak B.4 Hak Atas Pendidikan B.5 Pengurasan Sumberdaya Alam B.6 Penyelengaraan Pemerintahan BAGIAN II ANALISIS LINTASAN PERISTIWA A.
    [Show full text]
  • State Societyand Governancein Melanesia
    THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia StateSociety and in Governance Melanesia DISCUSSION PAPER Discussion Paper 2005/6 DECENTRALISATION AND ELITE POLITICS IN PAPUA ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION JAAP TIMMER This paper focuses on conflicts in the Province For a number of reasons ranging from Dutch of Papua (former Irian Jaya) that were stimulated nationalism, geopolitical considerations, and self- by the recent devolution of power of administrative righteous moral convictions, the Netherlands functions in Indonesia. While the national Government refused to include West New decentralisation policy aims at accommodating Guinea in the negotiations for the independence anti-Jakarta sentiments in the regions and of Indonesia in the late 1940s (Lijphart 1966; intends to stimulate development, it augments Huydecoper van Nigtevecht 1990; Penders 2002: contentions within the Papuan elite that go hand Chapter 2; and Vlasblom 2004: Chapter 3). At the in hand with ethnic and regional tensions and same time, the government in Netherlands New increasing demands for more sovereignty among Guinea initiated economic and infrastructure communities. This paper investigates the histories development as well as political emancipation of of regional identities and Papuan elite politics the Papuans under paternalistic guardianship. In in order to map the current political landscape the course of the 1950s, when tensions between in Papua. A brief discussion of the behaviour of the Netherlands and Indonesia grew over the certain Papuan political players shows that many status of West New Guinea, the Dutch began to of them are enthused by an environment that guide a limited group of educated Papuans towards is no longer defined singly by centralised state independence culminating in the establishment control but increasingly by regional opportunities of the New Guinea Council (Nieuw-Guinea Raad) to control state resources and to make profitable in 1961.
    [Show full text]
  • 188 Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua INDONESIAN
    RADIKALISASI DAN DIALOG DI PAPUA Asia Report N°188 – 11 Maret 2010 DAFTAR ISI RINGKASAN IKHTISAR ....................................................................................................... i I. PENDAHULUAN .............................................................................................................. 1 II. RADIKALISASI GERAKAN MAHASISWA PAPUA ................................................. 2 A. PERKEMBANGAN SETELAH JATUHNYA SOEHARTO ....................................................................... 2 B. FOKUS PADA FREEPORT ............................................................................................................... 4 C. PEMBENTUKAN KNPB ................................................................................................................. 5 III. AKSI KNPB ....................................................................................................................... 9 A. AKSI DI NABIRE ........................................................................................................................... 9 B. SERANGAN 9 APRIL TERHADAP POLSEK ABEPURA .................................................................... 10 C. PEMBAKARAN KANTOR REKTOR UNIVERSITAS CENDERAWASIH ............................................... 11 D. PENGGEREBEKAN RUMAH VICTOR YEIMO ................................................................................. 12 E. MEMUTUS HUBUNGAN DENGAN MASA LALU ............................................................................ 12 IV. PUNCAK
    [Show full text]
  • ELSHAM LEMBAGA STUDI DAN ADVOKASI HAK ASASI MANUSIA Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, West Papua
    ELSHAM LEMBAGA STUDI DAN ADVOKASI HAK ASASI MANUSIA Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, West Papua PRELIMINARY REPORT The Abduction And Assassination Of Theys Hiyo Eluay Was Premeditated And Politically Motivated December 13, 2001 Jayapura, Indonesia Introduction The abduction and assassination of Theys Hiyo Eluay (aged 64), chairman of Papuan Council Presidium, is a consequence of the culture of militarism and impunity since West Papua was annexed by Indonesia.[1] The violence started since the time when Sukarno, Indonesia's President, proclaimed TRIKORA (Triple Command of the People) on 19 December 1961 in Yogyakarta. The three points of TRIKORA were: (1) Disband the "puppet state" of West Irian created by the Dutch;[2] (2) mass mobilisation, (3) raise the red-and-white flag (the Indonesian flag) in West Irian ". At the time, many West Papuan civilians were intimidated and killed. Following integration with Indonesia, the Jakarta government began to adopt the militaristic approach by conducting military operations in a number of areas in Papua.[3] About 100,000 (one hundred thousand) West Papuans have been killed during 38 years of integration with Indonesia.[4] The process of destruction escalated particularly rapidly when the West Papuan people demanded independence from Indonesia in 1998 after the downfall of Suharto. Scores of peaceful rallies demanding independence staged by Papuans were dealt with by violence such as the Bloody Biak Incident (6 July 1998); Sorong (5 July 1999); Merauke (16 February 2000); Nabire (28 February-March 2000); Sorong (27 July 2000 and 22 August 2000); Wamena (6 October 2000). These aspirations for independence continued to erupt and were manifested very publicly and officially in the presence of President B.J.
    [Show full text]
  • Papers Presented at the Seminar on the Act of Free Choice
    Papers presented at the Seminar on the Act of Free Choice Papers presented at the Seminar on the Act of Free Choice Held in The Hague 15 November 2005 on the occasion of the book launch of P.J. Drooglever, Een Daad van Vrije Keuze. De Papoea’s van westelijk Nieuw-Guinea en de grenzen van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht (An Act of Free Choice. The Papuans of western New Guinea and the limits of the right of self determination) Edited by P.J. Drooglever Institute of Netherlands History The Hague 2008 Het Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis maakt deel uit van de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek. Andere publicaties in de ing-Congresreeks: K. Kooijmans e.a. (red.), Bron en publikatie. Voordrachten en opstellen over de ontsluiting van geschiedkundige bronnen (Den Haag 1985) Bob de Graaff en Joost Jonker (red.), The Optimum Formula for a Foreign Policy Document Series. Proceedings of the second conference of editors of diplomatic documents, The Hague 16 and 17 Jan. 1992 (Den Haag 1992) Augustus J. Veenendaal Jr. en Johanna Roelevink (red.), Unlocking government archives of the early modern period (Den Haag 1995) P.J. Drooglever en M.J.B. Schouten (red.), De leeuw en de banteng. Bijdragen aan het congres over de Nederlands-Indonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950, gehouden in Den Haag van 27-29 maart 1996 (Den Haag 1997) D.E.H. de Boer, J.W. Marsilje en J.G. Smit (red.), Vander Rekeninghe. Bijdragen aan het symposium over onderzoek en editie-problematiek van middeleeuws rekeningenmateriaal, gehouden in Utrecht op 27 en 28 februari 1997 (Den Haag 1998) Jan A.F.
    [Show full text]
  • Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation
    Policy Studies 14 Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation Richard Chauvel East-West Center Washington East-West Center The East-West Center is an internationally recognized education and research organization established by the US Congress in 1960 to strengthen understanding and relations between the United States and the countries of the Asia Pacific. Through its programs of cooperative study, training, seminars, and research, the Center works to promote a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community in which the United States is a leading and valued partner. Funding for the Center comes from the US government, private foundations, individuals, corporations, and a number of Asia Pacific governments. East-West Center Washington Established on September 1, 2001, the primary function of the East-West Center Washington is to further the East-West Center mission and the institutional objective of building a peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific community through substantive pro- gramming activities focused on the theme of conflict reduction in the Asia Pacific region and promoting American understand- ing of and engagement in Asia Pacific affairs. Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaption Policy Studies 14 Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaption Richard Chauvel Copyright © 2005 by the East-West Center Washington Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation by Richard Chauvel ISBN 1-932728-27-9 (online version) ISSN 1547-1330 (online version) Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 293-3995 Fax: (202) 293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org The Policy Studies series contributes to the Center’s role as a forum for dis- cussion of key contemporary domestic and international political, eco- nomic, and strategic issues affecting Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 14－Indonesia Aceh Peace Accord And
    Chapter 14 INDONESIA Republic of Indonesia Area: 1.86 million km2 (April 2005) Population: 217.85 million (June 2004 estimate) Capital: Jakarta Language: Indonesian Religion: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism Government type: Republic Chief of state: President Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO (since October 2004) Currency: rupiah (IDR) (US$1 = Rp 9,704.7; 2005 average) Fiscal year: Calendar year (from FY2001) 411 Aceh Peace Accord and the “Oil Shock” KAZUHISA MATSUI and YURI SATO ndonesia has been faced with many calamities, including the Indian I Ocean earthquake and tsunami in December 2004, repeated occur- rences of bird flu (which has caused 20 deaths as of February 2006), out- breaks of dengue fever and malaria, the first reoccurrence of polio in 10 years, the problem of malnourished children in some regions, the crash accident of Mandala Airlines in September, disasters and accidents such as landslides and floods, and skyrocketing oil prices. Given all of this, it deserves special mention that the Aceh Peace Accord, a matter of concern for many years, was actualized, due in part to the effects of the earthquake and tsunami. Exposure of corruption developed into an investigation of the top level of the Supreme Court, and direct elections of heads of local governments were held, in continuation from the 2004 direct presidential elections, without any major confusion. The Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) administration increased its stability, engaged in full-scale diplo- macy, endeavored to promote trade and investment, and worked to boost the image of the administration. The economy in 2005 grew at 5.6 percent, which exceeded the 5.1 per- cent growth of the previous year and satisfied the goal of 5.5 percent in the medium-term development plan.
    [Show full text]
  • Download This PDF File
    Jumal Pusat Penelitian Politik Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia P2P Jurnal Penelitian Politik LIPI merupakan media pertukaran pemikiran mengenai masalah masalah strategis yang terkait dengan bidang bidang bidang politik nasional lokal dan internasional khususnya mencakup berbagai tema seperti demokratisasi pemilihan umum konflik otonomi daerah pertahanan dan keamanan politik 1 uar negeri dan diplomasi dunia Islam Berta isu isu lain yang memiliki arti strategis bagi bangsa dan negara Indonesia P2P LIPI sebagai pusat penelitian milik pemerintah dewasa ini dihadapkan pada tuntutan dan tantangan baru balk yang bersifat akademik maupun praktis kebijakan khususnya yang berkaitan dengan persoalan dengan otonomi daerah demokrasi HAM dan posisi Indonesia dalam percaturan regional dan intemasi onal Secara akademik P2P LIPI dituntut menghasilkan kajian kajian unggulan yang bisa bersaing dan menjadi rujukan ilmiah pada tingkat nasional maupun internasional Sementara secara moral P2P LIPI dituntut untuk memberikan arah dan pencerahan bagi masyarakat dalam rangka membangun Indonesia bare yang rasional adil dan demokratis Karena itu kajian kajian yang dilakukan tidak semata mata berorientasi praksis kebijakan tetapi juga pengembangan ilmu ilmu pengetahuan sosial khususnya perambahan konsep dan teori teori baru ilmu politik perbandingan politik studi kawasan dan ilmu hubungan internasional yang memiliki kemampuan menj elaskan berbagai fenomena sosial politik baik lokal nasional regional maupun intemasional LIPI Mitra Bestari Prof Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar
    [Show full text]
  • The Indonesian Military After the New Order
    Sukardi_pbk-prelims.fm Page i Wednesday, February 16, 2005 8:02 AM THE INDONESIAN MILITARY AFTER THE NEW ORDER Sukardi_pbk-prelims.fm Page ii Wednesday, February 16, 2005 8:02 AM The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) is a research and service institute located in Copenhagen where it collaborates closely with Copen- hagen University and the Copenhagen Business School as well as with Lund University in Sweden and the wider Nordic Asian Studies com- munity. Funded in part by the governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden via the Nordic Council of Ministers and in part directly by the Nordic scholarly community, NIAS works to encourage and support Asian Studies in the Nordic countries as well as actively partici- pating in the international scholarly community in its own right. In so doing, NIAS has published books since 1969 and in 2002 launched NIAS Press as an independent, not-for-profit publisher aiming at a premium reputation among authors and readers for relevant and focused, quality publishing in the field of Asian Studies. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publications, an established academic press, has issued more than 1,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of re- search about Southeast Asia from within the region.
    [Show full text]
  • Papua Update
    Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report Part Title: PAPUA UPDATE: Report Part Author(s): Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report Title: PAPUA UPDATE: Report Subtitle: THE LATEST ON OTSUS PLUS Report Author(s): Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (2014) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep07802.1 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to this content. This content downloaded from 103.18.181.133 on Mon, 13 Jul 2020 07:05:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms PAPUA UPDATE: THE LATEST ON OTSUS PLUS 27 February 2014 IPAC Report No.7 This content downloaded from 103.18.181.133 on Mon, 13 Jul 2020 07:05:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms contents I. Overview .........................................................................................................1 II. Developments Since November 2013 .........................................................2 III. Strengthened Papuan Political Identity
    [Show full text]
  • West Irian and the Suharto Presidency: a Perspective Bilveer Singh
    73 West Irian and the Suharto Presidency: a perspective Bilveer Singh Introduction For Suharto, like many others, the struggle over West Irian1 was regarded as part of the unfinished business of Indonesian nationalism to end the much detested Dutch colonialism in the then Dutch East Indies. The fact that the Dutch surrendered all of its colonial territories at the Round Table Conference except West Irian only emboldened nationalists such as Su- harto that the struggle was worth pursuing, was winnable and that it was only a matter of time before the Dutch would capitulate. That the Dutch would hold on to West Irian for another twelve years was something un- foreseen and every passing year represented defeat and humiliation, this more than anything else was responsible for the unanimous decision that if West Irian could not be recovered through diplomacy, just as was the rest of Indonesia, then perjuangan or military struggle should be pur- sued. This directly involved Suharto in the West Irian issue, where just as in the struggle against Dutch colonialism prior to this, he was among those in the forefront leading the military struggle to win independence for Indonesia. In this context, Suharto’s involvement in the West Irian issue can be un- derstood from two different strategic positions he held, namely, first as the Commander of the Mandala Command tasked to militarily defeat the Dutch in West Irian and second, as Indonesia’s President, where his policies had a direct bearing on the future of the territory and the peo- ple therein. For the convenience of discussion, the role of Suharto and the West Irian issue can be examined through a number of phases.
    [Show full text]
  • GENERATING REFORMS and REFORMING GENERATIONS Military Politics in Indonesia’S Democratic Transition and Consolidation
    GENERATING REFORMS AND REFORMING GENERATIONS Military Politics in Indonesia’s Democratic Transition and Consolidation By SIDDHARTH CHANDRA and DOUGLAS KAMMEN* INTRODUCTION VER the course of thirty-two years, Suharto’s Indonesia occupied Odifferent positions on a spectrum of nondemocratic regimes rang- ing from authoritarian (Brazil, 1964–74 and Uruguay, 1973–85) to “sultanistic” (Idi Amin’s Uganda, 1971–79 and Rafael Trujillo’s Do- minican Republic, 1930–61).1 Suharto’s New Order began as a typical hierarchical military regime (1965–74), took on additional characteris- tics of bureaucratic authoritarianism (1975–88), and during its last decade came increasingly to resemble a sultanistic regime (1989–98). As the nature of the regime changed, so too did the political position of the military. While Suharto was careful to maintain control over the appointment of senior officers and sought to prevent the military from becoming an independent political actor, the military nonetheless en- joyed a reasonable degree of administrative freedom, particularly in the appointment and promotion of lower- and middle-ranking officers.2 In 1997–98, as protests intensified over Suharto’s handling of the * The authors would like to thank the three anonymous referees, the editors of World Politics,Paul Hammond, Phil Williams, and participants of seminars at the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for Inter- national Security Studies at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. All errors are the responsibility of the authors. 1 See Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Reviews of Political Science 2 (1999), 124, for a classification of regimes in which the military plays a role; and Juan J.
    [Show full text]