THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies State, Society and Governance in Melanesia StateSociety and in Governance Melanesia DISCUSSION PAPER

Discussion Paper 2005/6

DECENTRALISATION AND ELITE POLITICS IN PAPUA

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION JAAP TIMMER

This paper focuses on conflicts in the Province For a number of reasons ranging from Dutch of Papua (former Irian Jaya) that were stimulated nationalism, geopolitical considerations, and self- by the recent devolution of power of administrative righteous moral convictions, the Netherlands functions in Indonesia. While the national Government refused to include West New decentralisation policy aims at accommodating Guinea in the negotiations for the independence anti-Jakarta sentiments in the regions and of Indonesia in the late 1940s (Lijphart 1966; intends to stimulate development, it augments Huydecoper van Nigtevecht 1990; Penders 2002: contentions within the Papuan elite that go hand Chapter 2; and Vlasblom 2004: Chapter 3). At the in hand with ethnic and regional tensions and same time, the government in Netherlands New increasing demands for more sovereignty among Guinea initiated economic and infrastructure communities. This paper investigates the histories development as well as political emancipation of of regional identities and Papuan elite politics the Papuans under paternalistic guardianship. In in order to map the current political landscape the course of the 1950s, when tensions between in Papua. A brief discussion of the behaviour of the Netherlands and Indonesia grew over the certain Papuan political players shows that many status of West New Guinea, the Dutch began to of them are enthused by an environment that guide a limited group of educated Papuans towards is no longer defined singly by centralised state independence culminating in the establishment control but increasingly by regional opportunities of the New Guinea Council (Nieuw-Guinea Raad) to control state resources and to make profitable in 1961. In addition, a flag, the Bintang Kejora deals with national and international commercial or Morning Star flag, was designed to be flown ventures. As a result, the aspirations of legislators beside the Dutch flag and a national anthem was are all too often detached from the reasons for adopted to be played and sung during official demands for more sovereignty cherished among occasions after the Netherlands national hymn. The contribution the majority of Papuans whose frustrations about After a twelve-year dispute that was reaching of AusAID to ineffective governance are ever increasing. More its peak with the threat of open military conflict, this series is generally, the conflict in Papua only partly follows this policy had to be aborted. In December 1961, acknowledged prevailing opinion about the tensions between President Sukarno issued the Trikora (Tri Komando with appreciation. ‘Papua’ and ‘Jakarta’ or ‘Indonesia’. Rakyat or ‘People’s Threefold Command’) for the Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

liberation of Irian Barat (West Irian). At the In response to the ‘Indonesian occupation’ 2 heart of this massive mobilisation was Operasi of their land a liberation organisation called the Mandala, an Armed Forces of the Republic of Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, Free Papua Indonesia (ABRI) campaign designed to put Organisation) emerged as a local movement in pressure on the Netherlands government. The Manokwari in the 1960s and, from there, spread United States and Australia were not willing to over the Kepala Burung (Bird’s Head region). It support the Dutch military forces. soon became a fragmented network of dispersed In an international climate of decolonisation, groups of guerrilla-fighters.3 Its access to weapons and after President Sukarno’s sustained pressing was limited and popular support scant. Very few of Indonesia’s claim to the territory, the United elite Papuans joined the armed struggle and the States sponsored negotiations between Indonesia vast majority of people living outside the urban and the Netherlands about the future of West centres did not feel the sense of belonging to New Guinea under the auspices of the United a nation that had been invaded by Indonesia. Nations. The resulting New York Agreement of 15 Nevertheless, disillusion with the Indonesian August 1962 outlined the transfer of Netherlands government began to grow widely among those sovereignty over West New Guinea to an interim who had enjoyed the fruits of the accelerated United Nations Temporary Executive Authority development effort of the Dutch government (UNTEA) from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, since the 1950s. to be followed by a second phase during which President Suharto’s New Order regime (1966- the intervening administration would hand over 1998) put much effort into developing the province full administrative responsibility to Indonesia. and it received more funds than all other regions of The agreement formulated the provision that the Indonesia. But the implementation of largely top- people of Irian Barat would exercise free choice down development programs often failed. At the over their future relationship with Indonesia same time, an ever-growing but relatively poorly before the end of 1969. funded military (TNI), supporting a network of The victory over what had now become the alliances for both political control and predator Province of Irian Barat was a boost to Indonesian business, has lead to the dislocation of Papuans. nationalism and became portrayed as the final On top of that, Butonese, Buginese, Makassarese chapter of decolonisation.1 The Indonesians, and Javanese immigrants began to fill manual ruling the new province under the banner of labour and seize small business opportunities. the Trikora mobilisation, were triumphant while As a result, frustration about limited access to elements of the Papuan elite empowered by opportunities in modern Indonesia intensified the Dutch began to complain about what they tensions between ‘Papuans’ and ‘Indonesians’, in saw as a blunt Indonesian takeover. Feelings of particular those who arrived in Papua through being marginalized by Indonesian bureaucrats so-called transmigration programs or the larger and immigrants from other Indonesian islands waves of spontaneous migration.4 Furthermore, filling jobs and business opportunities arose in terms of governance, the region is amongst mainly among urban Papuans. Some of the the most poorly developed in Indonesia, while educated Papuan elite were arrested or sidelined economic and ethnic differences play a significant as ‘collaborators with the Dutch’ while others and sometimes alarming role in land and resource continued to play a role in the administration. politics (Timmer forthcoming). A plebiscite called Pepera (Penentuan Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and Pendapat Rakyat or ‘Act of Free Choice’) was the presidency being handed over to his Deputy held in July-August 1969 during which 1020 President, B.J. Habibie, a spirit of ‘democratic cautiously chosen representatives from eight reform’ (reformasi) swept across the archipelago. regions voted overwhelmingly for integration In Papua it lead to what has been duly called a with Indonesia.2 Protest was heard, dissonant ‘Papuan Spring’ during which Papuan leaders speeches delivered, desperate cries in the form from all over the region carefully sought to of written notes were delivered to the United balance representations from the coast and the Nations observers, and demonstrations in highlands in a wave of national Papuan actions Sukarnopura (former Hollandia, now Jayapura), and the establishment of Papuan organisations Biak and Manokwari were dispersed swiftly by (see Van den Broek and Szalay 2001). At massive the Indonesian military. Over the following gatherings all over the region during which decades, faith in self-determination as linked to heated debates over the history of Papua and its the undemocratic implementation of the Pepera possible future (‘autonomy’ or ‘independence’) became a key ingredient in a variety of Papuan were held, the Papuan Spring “took the form nationalisms. of the indigenous Papuan people demanding Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

merdeka, or independence, from Indonesia” 163, my translation). The merdeka-leader there (Sumule 2003b: 353; Chauvel 2005: 11-20). was Marthen Indey, who was raised in Ambon, 3 Before I discuss the Papuan Spring it is necessary Maluku, and had been posted to Banda Neira, to briefly elaborate on what kinds of meanings where he became inspired by the prominent merdeka has assumed in the history of Papua. nationalist, Mohammed Hatta, who was exiled there. In 1946, Indey joined the Komite Indonesia Merdeka (KMI, ‘Indonesia Freedom Committee’) MERDEKA AND MEMORIA PASSIONIS led by the Manadonese government medical doctor, Ms Gerungan. KMI advocated the The Indonesian nationalist revolutionary independence of Indonesia, including West New understanding of ‘merdeka’ dates back to the Guinea through all legal means (Vlasblom 2004: mid-1920s growth of the nationalist movement 164). followed, after promises during the Japanese As Chauvel concludes, the nationalism of occupation, by the Indonesian revolution of this period had a narrow base and the nationalists 1945-1949. During the late 1940s, ‘merdeka ‘were culturally isolated from the great mass of became the battle-cry with which the citizenry Papuans’ (2005: 6). The majority of Papuans had was summoned to support the cause, the salute very little knowledge of Indonesia and its merdeka with which revolutionaries would greet each struggles. After the incorporation of West New other, the cry of solidarity at every mass rally, Guinea into Indonesia, people throughout Papua and the signature at the end of every Republican began to learn about merdeka as one of the chief document’ (Reid 1998: 155). As Reid (1998: 156) dictums of the New Order government. At points out, merdeka meant national independence the same time, growing resentment due to the to the revolutionaries but the people experienced failure of development promises to crystallise and it as a far more immediate and personal freedom. unrelenting military operations grew and merdeka Later, during Soeharto’s New Order government, began to take on meanings that were part of a merdeka became part of the military ideologies struggle to secure freedom against a tyrannical and plainly came to mean ‘the independence’ state. that was proclaimed on 17 August 1945 and While the OPM and a number of Papuans ritually celebrated every year since. in exile tried to keep the ideal of merdeka alive In Papua, primarily urban educated for most Papuans it became a principle that is Papuans began to absorb the idea of merdeka suggested to be in the hearts of all Papuans. as national independence since the late 1950s, When asked bluntly about ‘OPM’, Imyan people when President Sukarno became determined to of the southwestern Kepala Burung, while having incorporate Netherlands New Guinea to complete no clear ideas about its organisational structure the nationalist struggle and resistance amid the and strategies, tend to suggest that the OPM will Papuan elite against the Dutch government grew eventually complete the struggle for merdeka. (Grootenhuis 1961). Before that period, only a Further scrutiny of their worldviews, however, limited number of educated and politically active reveals that many take the view that Jesus Christ Papuans cherished ideas about merdeka. For will perform the role of bringing merdeka. He will example, in Serui on Yapen Island, Silas Papare bring wealth and prosperity to their community established the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia (not ‘Papua’) and He will re-establish the just, (‘Indonesian Freedom Party’) in 1946, of which original order in the world. Imyan refer to this members read sections of Republican papers in order in terms of Toror or Baimla, a mythological village churches on the island, while outside the world during which the Imyan were at the centre churches people exercised the exclamation of of the world and possessed all the knowledge and “merdeka”. Papare was a charismatic leader and power (Timmer 1998, 2000a, and 2000b: 302; cf. the pro-Indonesian movement on Yapen was Rutherford 2005 and Golden 2003). seriously crippled when he left for Indonesia in Taking into account the immense variety 1949 (Vlasblom 2004: 162; Chauvel 2005: 71). of cultural traditions in Papua, it should be Around the same time, also as part of a struggle no surprise that peoples’ ideas about merdeka against the Dutch government, Lukas Rumkorem, are diverse. Moreover, there are also divisions a Biak assistant patrol officer, established the within Papuan communities. Imyan villagers, Partai Indonesia Merdeka on the island of Biak for example, tend to divide into two groups: (Vlasblom 2004: 163). In Hollandia as well, one that is inclined to withdraw into autonomy “enthusiasm for ‘red and white’ [the colours (related to ideas about a past community of male of the Indonesian national flag] got hold of a initiates retreating in the forest to engage with number of schooled Papuans” (Vlasblom 2004: powerful sky beings), and another that seeks Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

to benefit from unique opportunities offered by demanded independence of Papua, the strategies 4 ‘Indonesia’ by engaging with the government developed favoured a dialogue with Jakarta short and its promises of development. What the of violence. The focus was on the suffering of two divisions share is a versatile but persistent the Papuans and numerous discussions revolved concern with effective knowledge that they around human rights. ‘HAM’ (Hak Asazi believe is held among foreigners and considered Manusia, Human Rights) became a widely used indispensable for bringing about change that term taking on a variety of meanings in different Imyan people themselves can control. These contexts but generally referred to lack of respect beliefs are expressed in terms of a felt need for for the Papuans. relative autonomy from state control when the Expressions of independence for Papua were government’s administrative grid discords with articulated by the Presidium Dewan Papua (Papuan local realities and people’s aspirations (Timmer Presidium Council) that was established during 2004b: 121-124; cf. Maclean 1994). the MUBES. Under the combined highland- This concern is in fact a crucial part of a larger coastal leadership of Thom Beanal and Theys and still more intrusive concern with denied Eluay, the Presidium formulated Papua-wide identity and lost certainties. As indicated above, supported resolutions that were adopted during in stories about the millennium, Imyan relate this the Kongres. The resolutions include the claim concern to ancient topographies that characterize that Papua had in fact become independent the essence of their past lives (Timmer 2004b: with the establishment of the New Guinea 130). The Imyan share this concern with most Council in 1961 and rejected the New York other Papuan communities and it can be said that Agreement because Papuans did not take part in a possibly shared merdeka-aspiration in Papua is the negotiations. In addition, the resolution states thus, in general terms, about deferential treatment that the Act of Free Choice was not conducted as human beings, and in principal irrespective properly (Alua 2002b: 96). More widely shared of the political or national context. In these was the opinion that ‘the land of the Papuans’ ontological ideas about sovereignty and dignity had become the plaything of international and (harga diri), merdeka is thus chiefly a response to capitalist forces and that its people had become decades-long denial of the people’s competence marginalised in Indonesian society. in learning and performing in modern colonial Underlying a strong wish for increased and postcolonial contexts. This partly explains sovereignty with predominant millenarian the unrelenting search for understanding of the characteristics, the sudden rise of Papuan suffering of the Papuans, preferably through a nationalisms at all levels of society also called into democratic dialogue with ‘Jakarta’ that was so question any extent to which Papuans had become effectively expressed during the Papuan Spring. Indonesians. The differences between ‘Papuans’ But the idea of having one’s own state, right and ‘Indonesians’ were, however, only rarely now and for all times, is seldom on the minds expressed. Both the symbolic and explicit messages of most Papuans, as it is a construct far from the broadcast during gatherings, manifestations, prayer more intrusive largely individual and communal sessions and flag raisings, emphasized the living concern with sovereignty and harga diri. memory of distress that in human rights activist During the Papuan Spring (1999-2000), circles in Papua is typified as memoria passionis merdeka took on the harga diri-meaning when (or in Indonesian: ingatan penderitaan).6 Memoria throughout the territory numerous raisings of passionis refers to the memory of trauma due the Bintang Kejora flag (which was prohibited to general social and economic marginalisation, until 1998) and concurrent praying sessions were frequent denial of dignity, and sometimes, outright organised.5 The Papuan Spring was a period terror. Events during the Papuan Spring clearly during which President Abdurrachman Wahid indicated that the memoria passionis could be allowed the Papuans to name their province ignored only at peril. Since the dawn of this Papua and to raise their national flag alongside the period memoria passionis began to be expressed as a Indonesian flag. Hundreds of prominent leaders shared Papuan history of suffering and was flung in from all over Papua found the space to organise a the face of ‘Jakarta’ when a team of one-hundred broadly supported front. They developed political leaders (Tim 100) from all over Papua presented strategies during two large gatherings: MUBES a clear demand for independence to President (Musyawarah Besar or ‘Grand Gathering for Habibie on 26 February 1999. Next, a fact-finding Discussion’) in February 2000, and the Papuan team of the Indonesian House of Representatives Congress (Kongres Papua) in May-June 2000 (see was sent to Irian Jaya in July 1998, leading to a Alua 2002a, 2002b). These gatherings proceeded wave of enthusiasm among virtually all sections of undisturbed and while the political agenda society about a dialogue. Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

The dialogue was expected to lead to at least injustice and feelings of disenchantment. By formal apologies for human rights violations, the close of 2000, ‘the developing atmosphere 5 end impunity for the armed forces, and increase of a ‘Papuan Spring’ … had been replaced by respect for the harga diri of the Papuans. At the widespread fear, silence, and renewed anger’ same time, it also unleashed often very political (Van den Broek and Szalay 2001: 91; see figure expressions epitomised in such as expressions as 1). At the same time, people began to distrust OFM (resonating with OPM) meaning: Otonomi the remnants of the Presidium and its regional – Federasi – Merdeka, indicating people’s hope that branches because of rumours about the Presidium discussion about increased autonomy for Irian Jaya accepting money from big companies in Papua would lead to the establishment of a Federal State and frustration about its leaders travelling abroad of Indonesia which would eventually culminate all the time while neglecting the issues faced by in independence for West Papua. What followed local communities. in reality, however, was an overall well-intended Papuan response to President Habibie’s offer to contemplate on independence aspirations and, SPECIAL AUTONOMY AND NEW within the term of reference, establish a dialogue BLOSSOMS between ‘Jakarta’ and ‘Papua’. The dialogue was continued during Among the most promising developments Aburrachman Wahid’s presidency but a ban on in this reformasi period was the granting of a so- flag raisings and a number of bloody military called Special Autonomy (commonly referred to attacks on protesters discouraged most Papuan as Otsus, from Otonomi Khusus) for the province leaders from continuing to seek understanding of Papua in early 2001. Otsus matches an earlier of the situation in Papua amid policy makers law for the province of Aceh but was drafted in Jakarta. The Presidium was labelled illegal by people in Papua and establishes provisions and the detention of its leaders on charges of that surpass the autonomy conditions for other treason and subversion, and the brutal murder of provinces. Otsus envisions enhanced autonomy the chair of the Presidium, Theys Hiyo Eluay, in for Papuan communities and their institutions, as 2000 marked the end of the Papuan Spring. The well as a greater share of revenues from resource killing of Eluay was orchestrated by Kopassus extraction projects in Papua, including 70 percent (TNI Special Forces). The counterinsurgency of the oil and gas industry and 80 percent from practised by the TNI began to form a major mining ventures. On top of that, Otsus entails threat to most attempts to organise people to special funds for the improvement of health defend their rights and to continue pressing services, education facilities, and infrastructure Jakarta to seek solutions to past and present

Figure 1. Drawing made by someone in Biak on 3 December 2001. It reflects the fear of the military (TNI) during the negotiations for more autonomy (Otonomi) for Papua, the passive role of the United Nations and the sidelining of the Papuans. Two and a half years earlier soldiers opened fire at a group of some two hundred demonstrators who had raised the Bintang Kejora flag in the harbour of Biak (see Rutherford 1999: 39-40). Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

that benefit rural communities for a period of could only be implemented after deliberation of 6 twenty years (see Sumule 2003c). the MRP and upon approval of the provincial Otsus was a Papuan political choice that parliament (Sullivan 2003). indicated a willingness to cooperate with the Then Deputy Governor, John Djopari, central government. It was envisioned as a stressed that the idea of pemekaran was not new necessary step towards justice for the neglected but that it had been proposed in 1999 by the people of Papua (Maniagasi 2001; Sumule 2003a, then Governor, Freddy Numberi, and his three 2003b). A technical assistance team comprising Deputy Governors: Djopari, Herman Monim, and intellectuals from Papua, whom the Governor of Abraham Atururi (ICG 2003: 3).8 Soon it became Papua, Jaap Solossa, had appointed, drafted the clear that Monim and Atururi were frustrated bill in early 2001. After extensive lobbying by because they were promised governorship for the team and a number of influential Papuans, the new provinces but that never materialised. it was accepted as Law No. 21/2001, to be Djopari later became Indonesian ambassador to implemented as of 2002.7 This initially positive Papua New Guinea and Monim retired. Atururi, answer from Jakarta was one of an insecure however, was still interested in the establishment central government after the 1999 ballot in East of a new province. Timor during which a majority voted against In contrast to Otsus, the pemekaran decree was autonomy within Indonesia. issued without consultation with the provincial Apart from a few hard-line voices government. Local communities or leaders of demanding merdeka, people in Papua expected religious and other civil society organisations positive developments from Otsus. But public in Papua were also not involved in the decision interest in Otsus dwindled when people saw making process. While Otsus had been poorly that implementation of Otsus was slow due to socialised among the people it met with support the lack of capacity of legislators and that the because it came from people whose dialogue with establishment of the Majelis Rakyat Papua (MRP) Jakarta intended to benefit the development of or Papuan People’s Assembly did not receive Papua. Supporters of Otsus saw the presidential support from Jakarta. The MRP is an essential decree as a sign that the political climate in element of Otsus as it envisions the protection of Indonesia was reverting to a New Order-style the rights of Papuans. It would assemble people government. Many began to speculate that it from customary groups, religious institutions was an attempt by Jakarta to ‘divide and rule’ and women’s groups and grant them extensive the Papuans. Distress in Papua grew when people political powers. The Ministry of Home Affairs learned that the initiative for the policy had come delayed the establishment of the MRP because from disgruntled elements in the Papuan elite in elements in Jakarta saw that the powers it cooperation with policy makers in the central granted to Papuans could endanger stability government - the Ministry of Home Affairs and in Papua. The Minister of Home Affairs, Hari the National Intelligence Board (BIN, Badan Sabarno, insisted that the MRP should only Intelijen Negara) (McGibbon 2004: 55). represent Papuan cultural values (Chauvel and The International Crisis Group (2003: 8-9) Bhakti 2004: 38). In the mean time, people in points out that BIN involvement in the revival Papua began to question whether Otsus was of pemekaran may have commenced with the yet another hollow promise made by ‘Jakarta’. lobbying by Jimmy Ijie, a Papuan from the Others remained hopeful that with the assistance Sorong region. Ijie heads the so-called Irian Jaya of, and pressure from, foreign governments and Crisis Centre (IJCC) in Jakarta and, in that international NGOs, Jakarta would eventually capacity, sent a letter to BIN urging that Law grant the MRP to Papua. No. 45 be implemented immediately. He argues These hopes basically faced a dead end after that an administratively undivided Papua would President Megawati Sukarnoputri promulgated foster Papuan nationalism (ibid: 8).9 In late 2002, a decree on 27 January 2003 on the expedition Ijie formed a team called Tim 315 consisting of of the implementation of Law No. 45/1999 people from the Sorong and Manokwari regions regarding the creation of two new provinces and a number of Papuan students residing in (West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya), three Yogyakarta and Jakarta to support Atururi to new regencies (Paniai, Mimika, and Puncak Jaya), negotiate the plan with BIN and the Ministry and one municipality (Sorong). The envisioned of Home Affairs. Apparently, a large amount of plan behind the decree is labelled pemekaran money (approximately U$320,000) was involved (‘blossoming’ or administrative fragmentation). and a number of financial rewards were promised While the division of Papua was also part of the to officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs and to Otsus Law, the procedure it outlined was that it Ijie’s IJCC.10 Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

Another possible motive for the partitioning in Papua mainly in terms of violations of human of Papua is that the creation of new provinces rights by ‘Jakarta’, which are opposed by ‘Papuan 7 and districts will increase the number of troops resistance’. This resistance is often depicted as in the territory. Each separate province may get a single actor with a uniform ethnic identity its own Military Resort Command (Korem), with driven by a uniting national consciousness. its own network of District Military Commands Papuan identity is then presupposed to exist in (Kodim). A potentially stronger military presence a bounded cultural and racial sphere defined as aroused suspicion, as it may not only increase ‘Melanesia’ as opposed to ‘Indonesia’ or ‘Asia’.11 repression but also facilitate connections with This is hardly conceivable considering the vast local businesses with which the army is involved. variety of cultural backgrounds and centuries- As a result, much of the goodwill that was created old histories of connections between Papua and among Papuans during the dawn of reformasi the Moluccas (see below). Only a few recent turned to disappointment. At the same time, anthropological and historical studies of Papuan the awareness that elements of the Papuan elite communities relate to these histories and include were involved in the pemekaran policy nourished discussions about the integration of Papuans into already widespread distrust of those Papuans who Indonesia and its concomitant internal tensions were making careers in the formal sector or the (Oosterhout 2000; Rutherford 2003; Stasch 2001 armed forces, ‘infecting them with the Indonesia and 2003; Timmer 2000a, 2000b, and 2003).12 virus’, as the popular expression runs. This virus Rutherford, for instance, points out that the of Indonesia refers to untrustworthy behaviour high degree of integration of the Biak-Numfor of Papuan legislators that is also captured under region into Indonesia illuminates ‘a sociocultural another popular expression, KKN or Korupsi, economy that stands cheek by jowl with the Kolusi, Nepotisme (Corruption, Collusion and discourses of Papuan separatism and Indonesian Nepotism), which dates back to the New Order nationalism, yet radically undercuts them both’ period. Swiftly, the previous expression ‘OFM’ (2003: 4). developed into ‘OPM’, now referring to a new The lack of attention to the variety sequence: autonomy (Otonomi), Pemekaran, and of and changes in Papuan worldviews since eventually independence (Merdeka). decolonisation is astonishing as newly emerging Ideally, the devolution of power entailed identities and related concerns and strategies lead in the pemekaran policy should be a promising to tensions in and between local communities move as it can enhance good governance at the and shape to a large extent the politics of the local level. This obviously requires an increase in elite. In the virtual absence of a middle-class administrative capacities, development planning and very limited private investment in human and program management. Currently, government development and the delivery of services, the officials in the region are inclined to acknowledge powerful elites in Papua are to be found in the local demands to become tuan di atas tanahnya administrative sector and in religious institutions. (‘the ruler of one’s own country’) but they also Therefore, Papuan political power is in the hands tend to be hungry for power after decades of of these new bureaucratic and religious elites. curtailing bonds to the centre. Elite politics and Christian and Muslim leaders in Papua the responses among local people largely revolve recognise that religion is an important source around these issues. Decentralisation leads to of inspiration for the people and that religious a diversification of political concerns that are institutions, being the largest and most organised connected with local identities, which in turn civil society organisations in Papua, should play tend to become more extreme. an important role as mediators between the government and communities (see Giay 2001). In this paper, I focus on certain members of PAPUANISATION AND ADAPTATION the bureaucratic elite as influential actors in determining the future of the region. In particular Present-day conflicts in Papua include disputes I discuss one of the most striking aspects of the over natural resources and economic and political present-day politics of this elite in Papua, that power struggles, and frictions between peoples is, the ways in which leaders gain popular and of different ethnicities, religions, and between central government support and play out regional immigrants and locals (ICG 2002; Amnesty differences in power politics related to the wave International 2002). Studies of ‘the conflict in of recently established provinces and districts. Papua’, however, commonly focus on Jakarta The varied ethnic and political landscape in policies and armed forces operations. Most reports Papua is accentuated by the timing and nature of produced by Papua watchers portray developments contact with outside powers. In pre-colonial times, Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

contact with regional others and internal and Whereas many members of the old Papuan elite 8 in-migration were perhaps the most significant created by the Dutch were marginalized, the new factors in demographic, social and cultural generations of educated Papuans (still largely from change in Papua. Papuan communities have coastal regions) found their way into the civil always been very mobile and today people are on service. Participation of Papuans in administration the move due to urbanisation, village formation, and commercial ventures was however still displacement, job migration, resettlement, and so restricted. The Indonesian government was afraid on. More generally, many coastal groups looked that Papuans would gain too much of a voice in for centuries towards the east. In particular the the administrative sector while banking facilities coastal communities of the Kepala Burung and are few and tend to privilege Javanese, Buginese, the Cenderawasih Bay maintained trade and Moluccan and foreign investors. Moreover, the marriage relationships with the Moluccas and commercial infrastructure is poorly developed Islam spread along certain coastal stretches.13 In and bureaucratic approvals for trade are painfully contrast, people in the highland regions lived slow, in particular for Papuans. relatively isolated in mountain valleys with little It was only in the late 1990s that sincere direct but extensive indirect trade networks efforts were made to Papuanise the formal sector. extending to the coast (Ploeg 2001). Today, around 35 percent of the labour force Cultural differences between the mountains in the government is Papuan, which is a poor and the north and the west coast changed markedly reflection of the demographic reality in which with the advent of Christian missionisation and approximately 60 percent of the population Dutch administration during the 20th Century. is Papuan.14 Nevertheless, over the last few Mission activity, followed hesitantly by the years more Papuans have become legislators government, affected the Cenderawasih Bay, both at the district and provincial levels. Amid the Kepala Burung, the north coast and coastal many people from elsewhere in Indonesia, the stretches such as Mimika and Merauke along provincial bureaucracy is chiefly dominated by the southwest coast, while most groups in the coastal Papuans from the Cenderawasih Bay highlands and communities in the southern islands of Biak and Yapen, Sentani, and, more plains remained ‘untouched’ until the 1960s. recently from the Sorong and Ayamaru regions Encounters between highland people and the of the Kepala Burung. Widjojo (1998:3) signalled state and church intensified after the Indonesian in this respect that the biggest problem facing government took over the territory from 1963 Irian Jaya was social and cultural polarisation (see Ploeg 2001; Hays 1993). and domination of the formal sector by ethnic Shortly before and after the Second World Biak, Ayamaru, Serui and Sentani. In contrast War, economic development was limited, while to the provincial bureaucracy, in the district at later stages new political developments took governments in the highlands and south coastal place. The rapid expansion of administration regions, the local population is more strongly and education had a major impact on the coastal represented, notwithstanding the presence of a people in Biak, Manokwari, Yapen en Sentani, significant number of decision makers from Biak and to a lesser extent in the Kepala Burung and and Yapen in the Cenderawasih Bay, the Sorong Fak-fak. Papuans from these regions absorbed region of the Kepala Burung, and a few Javanese Dutch teachings at high schools in Netherlands and Moluccans. New Guinea and were exposed to European life Particularly among the recently ascending styles, while some were given the opportunity to Sorong and Ayamaru elites, there is a remarkable enjoy education in Europe and the Pacific. The acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing figures have remained modest since the early politics. The acquired skills and knowledge of the 1960s, with only about ten thousand Papuans present-day bureaucratic elite enables a number (of a total population estimated at around one of influential people to establish links with million) in government service, while a smaller Jakarta, which primarily serves their own benefit. number were employed in the private sector Highlanders and people from the south-coastal (Report on Netherlands New Guinea 1961; regions (Mimika, Merauke) are often consumed Groenewegen and Van de Kaa 1964; Timmer with envy about the power enjoyed by people forthcoming). from the Kepala Burung and the Cenderawasih Later generations grew up in the context of Bay. Underlying this foremost regional cleavage the Indonesian nation-state, undertook studies at in Papua is the serious lag in development Indonesian institutions and made careers in the of most regions of the highlands.15 Moreover, Indonesian civil service, equipping themselves because of isolation and due to ongoing, often with the skills and language of modern Indonesia. poorly orchestrated, TNI action, the highland Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

region is currently the chief nursery of Papuan Senior High School in Biak. He made a career in resistance to the Indonesian government. This the navy and became a Lieutenant Colonel and 9 Papuan resistance also translates into regional member of intelligence agency (BAKIN – Badan tensions as highlanders regularly challenge both Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, currently BIN). He the provincial government and coastal Papuans also served in the Paspanpres or the ‘Security from Biak, Sorong and Sentani, where they are at Guard for the President’. While still a Lieutenant times accused of collaboration with ‘Indonesia’. Colonel, he was assigned as head of the Sorong This tension highlights one of the main divisions District in 1992. After one five-year term in within the Papuan nationalist movement, Sorong, he went to Jayapura to become one of the which is illustrated by Rutherford (2003: xviii), three Deputy Governors under Freddy Numberi. recounting a joke in which a highlander tells His term as Deputy Governor allowed him to rise another that when Papua gains independence in the military ranks and he earned his first star. all Biaks will become foreigners (amberi) while During the reformasi period, and marking the highlanders will become Biaks. end of the military’s New Order dwifungsi (‘dual As mentioned earlier, during the massive function’ of the military conflating national gatherings during the Papuan Spring, Papuan defence with nation building), General Wiranto, leaders managed to balance representations the then Chief of the Armed Forces, demanded from the highlands and the coast and Papuans all active military personnel who were occupying felt united in their memoria passionis. With the civilian positions to choose whether they wanted advent of pemekaran, the tensions between elites to continue in the army or pursue a career from Biak, Yapen, Ayamaru and Sorong as well as as legislators. Atururi chose the latter as he between ‘the coast’ and ‘the highlands’ intensified. aspired to become Governor of Irian Jaya but, as A recent Indonesia briefing by the International indicated, in 1999 he lost to Jaap Solossa. Crisis Group outlines that the new pemekaran Like Atururi, Solossa enjoyed Dutch policy, alongside a certain level of support for education at primary and secondary level in Otsus, ‘has generated intense acrimony within Teminabuan and Manokwari respectively, and the governing elite in Papua between those who then Junior High School in Sorong. After the stand to gain from the division … and those who transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia, benefit more from the status quo’ (ICG 2003: 1). he continued his education at Senior High Chauvel notes that ‘[t]he jockeying for position School-level in Manokwari before studying Civil that this policy unleashed suggests that regional Administration at Universitas Cenderawasih in and tribal interests remain politically salient’ Jayapura for his undergraduate degree. Later, (2005: xi). when he served as a member of the National Parliament, he used his spare time to pursue a Master Degree in Development Economics at THE PROTAGONISTS Universitas Gajah Mada. He continued this specialisation at postgraduate level at Universitas As indicated above, the pemekaran option Padjadjaran in Bandung with research on Special was supported if not stimulated by a number Autonomy for Papua. In May 2005 he received of Papuan delegates who met with President his doctorate. Dr Solossa has a large circle of Megawati, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and acquaintances, especially from the Ayamaru and BIN throughout 2002. In particular, malcontent Sorong elites, who became unhappy with Atururi Papuan political elements were mobilized by during his term as District Head in Sorong. In a the above-mentioned Ijie, and Marine Brigadier similar vein, Atururi is currently supported by General (retired) Abraham Atururi, who had lost elements of the Kepala Burung elite who are not against the current Governor, Jaap Solossa, during happy with the current District Head, John Piet the election campaign for governorship in 1999 Wanane, who is from the Ayamaru region. (ICG 2003: 8-9). Atururi had enjoyed Dutch Despite growing controversy over the status of boarding school at primary level in Serui, Yapen the province, the Minister of Home Affairs, Hari during the heyday of Dutch efforts to develop Sabarno, inaugurated Atururi as the Governor Netherlands New Guinea. He is still in touch of West Irian Jaya in November 2003, leading with most of his schoolmates from that time and to a barrage of regional criticism. The Speaker is able to mobilise their support for his political of the Papua provincial legislature and supporter aspirations, which indicates the importance of of Solossa, John Ibo, said that the inauguration the social networks built during education. After contradicted a recommendation issued by the the Dutch left New Guinea, Atururi attended People’s Consultative Assembly during its latest the Navy National Academy after he finished annual session and urged Jakarta to revise the law on the division of Papua. Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

Atururi arrived in Manokwari in February 2003 Tribes’. When Anggaibak announced the official 10 to start work on the establishment of the new establishment of the province in late August provincial headquarters. On his way from Jakarta 2003, riots broke out during which five people he stopped in Jayapura to present to Speaker were killed and dozens were injured. Anggaibak’s Ibo an official BIN statement signed by its head, alliance met with opposition from a youth group Lieutenant General (retired) Hendropriyono, of the Amungme people led by Thomas Uamang, saying that Atururi had the authority to establish Yopie Kilangin and Yohanes Deikme, with the West Irian Jaya (Timmer 2004a: 411). Exactly a support of the Amungme and other ethnic year later, the Constitutional Court ruled against groups around Timika. This regional conflict a lawsuit from a Special Autonomy Defence about pemekaran is an extension of older disputes Team that sought to undo the division of Papua. between the communities close to PT Freeport Supported by Governor Solossa and elements of Indonesia copper and gold mining operations the Papuan elite in Jayapura, the Defence Team that relate to the misuse of company funds and had argued that the establishment of the new collaboration of community leaders with the TNI province served the interests of the Megawati in the region (Leith 2003; Ballard 2002; Widjojo Sukarnoputri-led Indonesian Democratic Party of 2003).16 Exposing tensions between highland and Struggle (PDI-P) which intended to weaken the north coastal people, and in an attempt to gain a dominant Golkar Party in the region through the share of the riches of the Freeport mining venture, pemekaran plan. The Team suggested that the PDI- elements of the elite in Biak argued that Biak P had economic interests in the Bintuni Bay where would be a better location for the new province’s British Petroleum is establishing the Tangguh capital in April and May 2004. They proposed liquefied natural gas plant (ICG 2003: 9). The that Admiral Henk Wabiser should be appointed Team added that both the TNI and BIN had also a as acting Governor (Chauvel 2005: 77). lot to gain with the province as the two institutions Tensions at the regional level also played have economic interests in maintaining a high a role in the establishment of West Irian Jaya. level of TNI presence in the region. New districts in West Irian Jaya like Fak-fak and The Constitutional Court concluded that Raja Ampat (which is rich in forest and nickel the establishment of West Irian Jaya remained resources) felt uncomfortable with what they valid although Law No. 45/1999 was no longer feared as domination by those from the Sorong effective. Eight of the nine judges argued that and Ayamaru regions and opted to remain within the Otsus Law took effect after the new province the Province of Papua. Furthermore, during and regencies were designed and that the law had Atururi’s lobbying for the establishment of West annulled no state institution. The court ruling Irian Jaya, customary leaders in the region had an was seen as a victory for Atururi and left many interest in the division plans, as it would lead to in Jayapura, Sorong and elsewhere in Papua the establishment of twenty-eight new regencies, confused. While the media reported the decision including Teluk Bintuni, which would offer them as a win-win solution for all conflicting parties an opportunity to occupy new administrative in Papua and Jakarta, John Ibo noted that it positions. The importance attached to the will lead to increasing disorder and growing loss creation of the Teluk Bintuni regency is related to of confidence in Jakarta’s commitment to the the above-mentioned operations of the Tangguh problems in Papua (Timmer 2005: 454-455). plant in the Bintuni Bay. The new regency, and One of the effects of the above-mentioned the new province of West Irian Jaya of which differences between the Sorong-Ayamaru elite it is part, will be abundantly rich in natural which is often suspected of conspiring to control resources. Papua as ‘SOS’ (Semua Orang Sorong – ‘all- The pemekaran decree amplified cleavages Sorong’) and ‘disadvantaged’ highland tribes and within the Papuan elite, one group of which ‘backward’ south coastal plains peoples, was the favours Otsus as a means for the development of significant local support for the establishment of Papua as a whole and is lead by Governor Solossa, a separate province of Central Irian Jaya in the who is supported by a number of civil society Timika area. This new province was advocated by organisations and prominent Papuan intellectuals. the head of the district of Timika, Clemens Tinal, Others were keen to establish their own provinces and the head of the Timika legislative council, and districts to claim their own power positions Andreas Anggaibak. As Anggaibak said himself, and secure access to natural resources. Ethnic he was encouraged by BIN to go ahead with the tensions along regional fault lines intensified as establishment of the new province (Chauvel the pro-pemekaran players in Papua demanded and Bhakti 2004: 41). In the region he enjoyed a share of the fiscal transfers from the central support from a group called ‘Group of Seven government and wanted to increase control over Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

the territory’s riches. The resulting disunity among to function in a single legal framework. Today, influential people in the Papuan bureaucratic elite the Papua New Guinea government still faces 11 weakened the support for Otsus and eased the the difficult challenge of binding a variety of implementation of the pemekaran law (McGibbon distinct communities into an effective political 2004: 61). and ideological organisation (LiPuma 1995; Douglas 2000; May 2001 and 2003). The present situation in Papua appears to suffer from a similar AUTONOMY AND ITS incompatibility between models of governance OPPORTUNITIES structured upon institutional principles of modern statehood and a variety of everyday political and social realities. Otsus aims to counter this, but Within the plans for the establishment of new the formidable challenge facing decentralising districts and new provinces, almost no provision governments is beyond most administrators’ has been made to ensure that new government imaginations and was not anticipated by the policies are adjusted to local circumstances and legislative or executive bodies that enacted and meet the aspirations of the people. The majority implemented the pemekaran law. of government officials are accustomed to working Previously, the political and governmental with top-down programs and accountability situation in Papua was characterized as based procedures that rarely involve the communities on an ‘outside’ and ‘Indonesian’ government who figure as subjects in the plans and reports. ruling a majority of Papuans through models of The New Order government with its ambition governance current in Java and not embracing or to impose a layer of ‘Indonesianness’ all over the fully appreciating ‘Papuan ways of doing things’. archipelago propagated the idea that the lives While there were a fair number of Papuans in the of citizens in such remote and ‘underdeveloped’ bureaucracy at all levels, and a few Governors in regions as Papua had to be transformed according the period from 1963 were ethnically Papuan, to fixed formats. The results are often unsettling, local communities saw the regional and provincial in particular when long-standing community- government as dominated by Javanese. As more based ways of doing things and local ways of Papuans began to occupy seats in the formal resource management are disrupted. While sector, ideas about the government changed to development plans for Papua were designed a sense of domination of ‘Indonesian politics’ to improve the living conditions of so-called endorsed by Papuan elites. ‘isolated people’ (masyarakat terasing) they often Many criticise provincial leaders because they lead to estrangement. This, in turn, stimulated promise local communities development and a tendency to reflect nostalgically on one’s own access to resources while they actually profit from unique non-state units such as the kinship group arrangements with elites in Jakarta, TNI and and the ‘customary people’ (masyarakat adat) Javanese and foreign investors. This obviously – whose rights should be restored. leads to an unstable situation as political support Currently, decentralised governments at the at the local level will soon dwindle and break district levels face the daunting task of finding along regional or ethnic fault lines. Since ways to overcome deep-seated feelings of distrust administrative procedures lack transparency, the towards the state, and to develop programs that widespread feeling among Papuans that their own acknowledge the complex varieties and recent elite cannot be trusted will no doubt increase. changes in Papuan society. Newly recruited Significantly, many in Papua believed that personnel are for the most part educated at national democratic elections would bring schools for public administration with curricula the solutions deemed necessary. Presidential that accord with the New Order and its top-down elections in September 2004 were a victory for philosophy. As such, they are ill equipped to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly know as adjust themselves to new democratic and open- SBY) who defeated Megawati Sukarnoputri on minded ways of governance. charisma, a purported no-nonsense approach Reflecting on the colonial context in the to reversing the stagnating reform and growing Australian-administered Territory of Papua and corruption, and the promise to peacefully resolve New Guinea in the 1960s, Lawrence (1969) the tensions in Papua and Aceh. In Papua, the argues that the difficulty of establishing a Western elections proceeded without major disturbances type of legal system is that the groups concerned, and voter turn-out was high. One of the main that is, the Australians and the New Guineans, reasons for the widespread participation in the represent quite different, specialized social elections was disillusionment with President systems. Both systems had their own idiosyncratic Megawati Sukarnoputri’s lack of commitment processes of social control that were not expected Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

to Papua. Since SBY advocated support for legislator, district head, head of a department 12 Otsus and promised to foster democracy, many and so on, individuals not only gain influence considered a future under him more promising. over state resources but they also enjoy relative The elections in Papua clearly demonstrated the freedom to make profitable deals with resources general will to support a civilian-led government extraction ventures. These businesses engage in and the rule of democracy in Indonesia (Timmer the largely unregulated exploitation of minerals, 2005: 448-450). oil, fish, and forest resources. Most Papuans want to become modern A striking example is rampant logging and Indonesians and find democratic solutions for the illegal trade of merbau (kayu besi) that is the problems they are facing. There is, however, threatening the pristine forests of the region. a tension between those who seek, find and use (EIA/Telapak 2005; Down to Earth 2002). opportunities offered in the formal and commercial Merbau is a luxurious dark hardwood that is the sectors and those who are denied such prospects. main target of a billion-dollar trade route from Papuan communities’ responses to a corrupt Papua to the booming cities of China’s Yangtze administration and dishonest behaviour of their River delta. Another unsettling example is the own elite are varied. In many of the locations involvement of the TNI and government officials where large-scale resource extraction takes place, in the gathering and trade of gaharu (eaglewood) such as Freeport mining in the Mimika region and that is sold for high prices to the Arab world the Tangguh project in the Bintuni Bay, as well as (SKP Merauke 2004).17 One of the results is that logging and fishery businesses, local communities wealth is taken away from the bottom up while organise themselves against neighbouring groups opportunities for advancement are redistributed and their elites who also claim natural resources inside and outside Papua within limited elites by and compensation. the provision of gifts, commercial opportunities, One effect of this development is the and so on. Politically and economically, Papua emergence of eccentric and charged revitalizations begins to show signs of the privatisation of the of customary structures and the establishment of state and the criminalization of the behaviour of customary organisations (masyarakat adat). The power-holders. expectations of monetary flows that resource development projects might bring, and the related competing claims over land and resources, CONCLUSION pose problems for local people who no longer know whom to trust and through whom to raise The post-Suharto reformasi period in Papua their voices with outside companies and the was marked by revivals of optimism about government. At the same time, the government change and expectations of imminent far- and the companies find it increasingly difficult reaching sovereignty. The prospect of justice, to deal effectively with the dispersed forms of the acknowledgement of the ‘true history of Papuan leadership. Papua’, and increased respect for the Papuans, On top of the resulting frustrations and alternated with strong disappointment and tensions between groups and a growing gap mounting resentment towards ‘Jakarta’ due between local communities and the formal sector, to renewed harsh and poorly controlled TNI criminal and predatory business is increasingly operations. Amid a persistent undercurrent of entrenching itself in the instruments of the distrust towards the national government many state. The ways in which this also affects local in Papua showed a remarkable ardour for entering sentiments and discourses on identity, autonomy into a bargaining process (albeit often with high and independence, and leads to new regional and opening bids, alarming policy makers in Jakarta). ethnic alliances, may show parallels to situations Hopes of justice being done to the Papuans were in African countries as described by Bayart, Ellis again visible during the recent national elections and Hibou (1999), among others. However, as in which the people of Papua went to the polls Fraenkel (2004) points out, comparisons between in high numbers. Also, the Otsus and pemekaran governance in the African and Pacific (and supported lobbies indicate that many in Papua Asian) regions may prove to be very useful but want to participate actively in a political economy should be done cautiously. A careful comparison of dependence on and engagement with Jakarta. between Papua and Africa is beyond the scope Dependence is constructed and maintained of this paper, but let me make the point that the as much by Papuans who support a dialogue most obvious parallel between Papua and certain with ‘Jakarta’ and are eager to cast votes during regions in Africa is, as said, the criminalization of democratic elections, as by political actors who the state in Papua. In the capacity of provincial try to convince Jakarta of the need to recognise Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

the grievances of the people of Papua, or merely circumstances they claim to address. seek to profit financially from this relationship. To remain critical of what is going on in Papua, 13 On the other hand, both the ‘indigenous Papuans’ policy makers (as well as Papua watchers) should and those generally labelled as ‘immigrants’ – the be careful not to fall into the classical mistake of divisions between the two can never be clear, let seeing that there is a united Papuan cause that alone desirable – have for a number of reasons is frustrated by ‘Indonesia’. In fact, there has quite a strong urge to live their lives largely never been an en masse Papuan effort to struggle autonomously. This is due to their memoria for secession from Indonesia or a ‘compact, passionis and disappointment about the central self-conscious, and organized community’ as government’s policies towards Papua. When the Chauvel (2005: 3), among others, observes. need to distance oneself from unreliable elites There have always been strong divisions within and decentralisation goes astray, people begin to Papua even when people organise in civil society revitalise traditions of relative freedom allegedly organisations, government bodies, or alongside enjoyed in the past. activist circles abroad. What most Papuans have At the level of local communities, throughout in common though is a memoria passionis and history, people have been subject to forms of the experiences of development programs and destabilisation as a result of interactions with democratisation efforts dogged by unfulfilled others and they continuously developed new promises and failures. During the Papuan Spring strategies with locally specific inventiveness. this shared history was expressed Papua-wide This offers proof that Papua, so often said to be in terms of a demand for the straightening of governed by age-old traditions, is in fact a place Papuan history and enhanced respect for the of inexorable social and cultural change. The Papuans. But the attempts of organising people historical conditions underlying these processes into a united front were undermined by military are centuries-old trade, family and religious links operations and the pemekaran decree that was between West New Guinea and the Moluccas supported by elements of the Papuan elite. and particular exchanges in knowledge and goods What remained was Otsus; but this promising between groups in the highlands. Papuan peoples’ reform policy was frustrated by Papuan and potent histories of relative autonomy and their Jakarta politics surrounding the pemekaran decree recent experiences with the church, the colonial which brought to the surface a spate of old and government and Indonesian institutions are enduring regional, political and personal tensions extremely diverse. Generally, local institutions in the region. The pemekaran plan provided have been internally negotiated in response to opportunities for disenchanted Papuan leaders the administration and the church. At the same and subsequently unleashed regional and ethnic time, from the district level up to the provincial sentiments as well as mutual distrust among bureaucracy and the national parliament, Papuan Papuan leaders. leaders and politicians increasingly usurp the Finally, with respect to the increasing powers of the civil service. Less promising is prominence of the informal economy in Papua, it that the district and provincial levels of the is important to realise that since the New Order administration, in particular, have become period, major parts of domestic Papua operated intertwined in personal patronage systems. more as an unofficial or ‘unconventional’ The voices for more autonomy in Papua are economy than an economy of wage earners, generally not about Papuan nationalism but are formal institutions, and legal contracts. While it cast in opposition to the dominance of the state. is true that a formidable number of people earn The state has not brought what Papuans expected government wages, most rural people trade and and is thus challenged by social, ethnic, religious exchange goods in and between communities and regional identities. Most Papuans treat the in order to survive. Erring decentralisation and state with a high degree of suspicion. Only when the limited presence of meaningful development the promise of commitment to and respect for programs trigger fractionalisation when people their demands and aspirations is in the air, do begin to compete for political and economic they want to engage with the state. Currently, resources. Self-interest in this context is the result there are two points of contention among the of a realistic view that relates to current and past vast majority of people in Papua. One is that the development promises. People know that outsiders unpredictability of ‘Jakarta’ as the model of the come and make promises about financial rewards, state that the central government is propagating roads, bridges, sago factories, logging activities, to Papua is unclear, and the other is frustration fish factories and so on, which are unlikely to be over the wealth and influence of Papuan elites sustainable. In these circumstances, elites and whose agendas are often too detached from the local people have a realistic view to get what they Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

can while they can. Hence what is often seen as ENDNOTES 14 greediness is a response to the ongoing deferral of development alongside failing policies that 1 aim to enhance services to the people of Papua. See Soekarno (2000). In a region that is abundantly rich in natural 2 See Pepera (1972: 82-83) and Vlasblom (2004: resources, whose people do not share equally in 479). For an account of the Pepera based on archival the profits of resource development projects, and materials and concluding that it was a sham, see where many people’s dignities have been denied Saltford (2000). in violent ways for a long period of time, this kind 3 A reconstruction of the origin and development of response is understandable. In other words, of the OPM can be found in Vlasblom (2004: 469, ‘disorder’ in Papua is not merely a condition chapters 9, 10 and 11). Less thoroughly researched created by ‘Jakarta’ or as a state of dereliction; it is the Indonesian-language account by Djopari (1993). is a condition that offers opportunities for people in Papua who know how to play the system. 4 Since the Indonesian government began to stimulate economic development in the region, an older Dutch colonial programme of population distribution from highly populated regions such as Java and Bali to Papua and other less populated regions was continued. Among policy makers, this so-called transmigrasi (‘transmigration’) was seen as a way to boost the development of Papua, but the programme AUTHOR NOTE proved to be largely unsuccessful (see Pouwer 1999: 173-174). 5 Jaap Timmer was a Research Fellow of the See van den Broek and Szalay (2001) for an overview of the turbulent events in Papua from 1999 to 2000. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project at the Research School of Pacific and 6 See Hernawan and Van den Broek (1999). The Asian Studies, ANU. He is presently at the concept of ‘memoria passionis’ was introduced into Centre for Pacific and Asian Studies, Radboud Papua by the Office for Justice & Peace (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian) of the Catholic Diocese University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He has of Jayapura and is also the title of a series of annual a broad regional interest in Southeast Asia and reports on the social and political situation in Papua the Southwest Pacific, with particular emphasis (see www.hampapua.org). on Papua/Irian Jaya, the Malukus and Papua 7 See Sumule (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) for overviews of New Guinea. In addition to his research, he the establishment of the team, the production of the has undertaken consultancies for international bill, the amendments, and its passing through the NGOs and government agencies on programs People’s Consultative Assembly in Jakarta. for emergency aid, conflict resolution, special 8 In fact, the pemekaran model was devised in the early autonomy, and development in Eastern Indonesia. 1980s by then Irian Jaya Governor Busiri Suryowinoto Jaap Timmer is the author of Living with Intricate and Minister of Home Affairs Supardjo Rustam. The Futures: Order and Confusion in Imyan Worlds, idea was to Papuanise the bureaucracy, beginning Irian Jaya, Indonesia. Nijmegen: Centre for Pacific at the district level, and create six provincial levels and Asian Studies, 2000. based on the administrative areas demarcated by the colonial Dutch government (ICG 2003: 2). The plan was shelved largely because there were not enough qualified locals to fill the required positions. In 1999, the division of the province was proposed again by the transitional government of President Habibie as a way to speed up the pemekaran of the province. However, the law was suspended after sweeping resistance in Papua, where the provincial ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS government and a majority of the people feared that it would spread discord among the people of Papua. 9 I thank Chris Ballard, Mike Cookson, J. Budi To illustrate his position in the Papua conflict, Jimmy Ijie wrote a preface to an IJCC publication Hernawan, Hank Nelson, Anton Ploeg, Henk of the Indonesian translation of an essay written by Schulte Nordholt, Agus Sumule, Dirk Vlasblom, the Russian Gavriil Kesselbrenner in 1961 about and Muridan Widjojo, who read earlier versions the international politics surrounding the status of of this paper and provided invaluable editorial West New Guinea. In his preface, Ijie stresses that comments. Kesselbrenner’s analysis highlights that Irian Jaya is a rightful part of Indonesia. He also stresses that Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua

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Recent Political Events in Vanuatu 1997/1: Sinclair Dinnen, Law, Order and State in Papua New Guinea 1997/2: Tomasi Vakatora, Traditional Culture and Modern Politics 1997/3: ʻI Futa Helu, Tradition and Good Governance 1997/4: Stephanie Lawson, Cultural Traditions and Identity Politics: Some Implications for Democratic Governance in Asia and the Pacific 1997/5: Peter Larmour, Corruption and Governance in the South Pacific 1997/6: Satish Chand, Ethnic Conflict, Income Inequity and Growth in Independent Fiji 1997/7: Sam Alasia, Party Politics and Government in Solomon Islands 1997/8: Penelope Schoeffel, Myths of Community Management: Sustainability, the State and Rural Development in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 1997/9: Philip Tepahae, Chiefly Power in Southern Vanuatu 1998/1: John Haglegam, Traditional Leaders and Governance in Melanesia 1998/2: Binayak Ray, Good Governance, Administrative Reform and Socioeconomic Realities: A South Pacific Perspective 1998/3: Eric Wittersheim, Melanesia Élites and Modern Politics in New Caledonia and Vanuatu 1998/4: Bronwen Douglas, Sinclair Dinnen and Anthony J. 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Gendered Negotiations of Identity, Christianity and Citizenship in Vanuatu 1998/7: Raymond Apthorpe, Bougainville Reconstruction Aid: What are the Issues? 1999/1: John Rivers, Formulating Policy for Community Relations Programs 1999/2: Lissant Bolton, Chief Willie Bongmatur Maldo and the Incorporation of Chiefs in the Vanuatu State 1999/3: Eugene Ogan, The Bougainville Conflict: Perspectives from Nasioi 1999/4: Grace Molisa and Elise Huffer, Governance in Vanuatu: In Search of the Nakamal Way 2000/1: Peter Larmour, Issues and Mechanisms of Accountability: Examples from Solomon Islands 2000/2: Bronwen Douglas (ed), Women and Governance from the Grassroots in Melanesia 2000/3: Bronwen Douglas, Weak States and Other Nationalisms: Emerging Melanesian Paradigms? 2000/4: Philip Hughes, Issues of Governance in Papua New Guinea: Building Roads and Bridges 2000/5: KJ Crossland, The Ombudsman Role: Vanuatuʼs Experiment 2001/1: Peter Larmour, Westminster in the Pacific: A ʻPolicy Transferʼ Approach 2001/2: Caroline Graille, From ʻPrimitiveʼ to Contemporary: A Story of Kanak Art in New Caledonia 2002/1: Abigail Makim, Globalisation, Community Development, and Melanesia: The North New Georgia Sustainable Social Forestry and Rural Development Project 2002/2: Sinclair Dinnen, Building Bridges: Law and Justice Reform in Papua New Guinea. 2002/3: John Barker, Missionaries, Environmentalists, and the Maisin, Papua New Guinea 2002/4: James Weiner, Abby McLeod and Charles Yala, Aspects of Conflict in the Contemporary Papua New Guinea Highlands 2002/5: Judith Bennett, Roots of Conflict in Solomon Islands–Though Much is Taken, Much Abides: Legacies of Tradition and Colonialism 2003/1: Tim Curtin, Hartmut Holzknecht and Peter Larmour, Land Registration in Papua New Guinea: Competing Perspectives 2003/2: Alan Tidwell and Andy Carl, Perspectives on Conflict and Post Conflict 2003/3: R.J. 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