ELSHAM LEMBAGA STUDI DAN ADVOKASI HAK ASASI MANUSIA Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, West Papua
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ELSHAM LEMBAGA STUDI DAN ADVOKASI HAK ASASI MANUSIA Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, West Papua PRELIMINARY REPORT The Abduction And Assassination Of Theys Hiyo Eluay Was Premeditated And Politically Motivated December 13, 2001 Jayapura, Indonesia Introduction The abduction and assassination of Theys Hiyo Eluay (aged 64), chairman of Papuan Council Presidium, is a consequence of the culture of militarism and impunity since West Papua was annexed by Indonesia.[1] The violence started since the time when Sukarno, Indonesia's President, proclaimed TRIKORA (Triple Command of the People) on 19 December 1961 in Yogyakarta. The three points of TRIKORA were: (1) Disband the "puppet state" of West Irian created by the Dutch;[2] (2) mass mobilisation, (3) raise the red-and-white flag (the Indonesian flag) in West Irian ". At the time, many West Papuan civilians were intimidated and killed. Following integration with Indonesia, the Jakarta government began to adopt the militaristic approach by conducting military operations in a number of areas in Papua.[3] About 100,000 (one hundred thousand) West Papuans have been killed during 38 years of integration with Indonesia.[4] The process of destruction escalated particularly rapidly when the West Papuan people demanded independence from Indonesia in 1998 after the downfall of Suharto. Scores of peaceful rallies demanding independence staged by Papuans were dealt with by violence such as the Bloody Biak Incident (6 July 1998); Sorong (5 July 1999); Merauke (16 February 2000); Nabire (28 February-March 2000); Sorong (27 July 2000 and 22 August 2000); Wamena (6 October 2000). These aspirations for independence continued to erupt and were manifested very publicly and officially in the presence of President B.J. Habibie at the presidential palace on 26 February 1999 when representatives of the Papuan people in the Team of 100 met President B J Habibie. The demand came as such a shock that the president responded by asking the Team to think more deeply about they were asking for.[5] Simultaneously, secret operations were stepped up to silence Papuan activists in the lead-up to the Second Papuan People's Congress 2000 which was held from 29 May - 4 June 2000.[6] The week prior to the Second Papuan People's Congress 2000, Vice-President Megawati made a sudden visit to Papua. She was met by demonstrations by pro independence activists throughout Papua. Megawati came away feeling "strongly impressed" by the desire for independence of the Papuan people in the various places she visited in Papua which was reflected in the report of Megawati's visit that was sent to the Muspida (joint governing board). Megawati's assessment became the basis for the report of the caretaker governor of Papua, Musiran Darmosuwito (former deputy governor of East Timor) sent by radiogram on 2 June 2000 to DEPDAGRI (Ministry of the Interior). This was further crystallized in the aspirations for an Independent Papua as expressed after the Second Papuan Congress 2000. Evidence for this is contained in a leaked 'top secret' document issued by Directorate Generals of KESBANG and LINMAS of DEPDAGRI in an official document No. 578/ND/KESBANG/D IV/VI/2000, dated 9 June 2000. The leaked document contained the concept for an "Operational Plan for Territorial Conditioning and the Establishment of a Communications Network In Dealing with the Direction of Political Developments in Irian Jaya (Papua) in favour of independence and demanding separation from Indonesia." The targets of the operation included, (1) the conditioning of regencies and towns all over Papua down to the remote areas; (2) development of a communications network making use of influential personalities and supportive organizations to carry out activities like issuing statements, public assemblies, etc; (3) international diplomacy to win the support of the UN and other countries for Indonesian sovereignty over Papua. Operational methods to be used were: (1) clandestine (infiltration), (2) provocation and arrest of Papuan independence activists, (3) development activities; (4) a Papuanization program and preventing the internationalization of the Papuan case. The operation would be conducted overtly by means of attacks on mass demonstrations and covertly (clandestine). The operation was supported by the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) at its annual session in August 2000 when it adopted a decision to the effect that the territory of Papua required serious attention. The top-secret document also included the name of Theys Eluay in the group of traditional leaders and fighters. On the same level were Tom Beanal (traditional), Yusuf Tanawani (who has since died), Rev. Herman Awom and PURL: https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/ec1aa7/ Dr. Karel Phil Erari (church leaders), Dr. Benny Giay and Agus Alua (academics), Drs. Jakobus Pervidya Sallosa (politician and now governor of Papua), Simon P. Morin (politician), John Rumbiak and Johanis Bonay (ELSHAM- Papua), Gerson Abrauw and Diaz Giwijangge (students). Reuters News Agency (dated 30 November 2000), received confirmation from DEPDAGRI that a meeting had been held to deal with the unrest which Jakarta called separatism in Papua and had been attended by 13 government bodies. The Papuan (Irian Jaya) police then translated that Operational Plan into its own Staff Analysis on Police Actions in Irian Jaya (Papua) to deal with Papuan Separatism in order to uphold the supremacy of the law, November 2000. This analysis subsequently resulted in a planned operation, called "Operasi Sadar Matoa 2000", lasting for 90 days. The targets of this operation were Papuan independence activists and the OPM and their sympathizers. This "Operasi Tuntas Matoa" illustrated the readiness and a systematic plan by the Papua Police to cope with what they called the separatist movement.[7] This Police policy was an integral part of a comprehensive state policy. These two documents clearly show that this was systematic, and involved organized measures to be conducted repeatedly.[8] Profile of Theys Hiyo Eluay and the events leading up to 10 November 2001 incident. Another element was to take extraordinary action directed against groups or certain civilians. Specifically with regard to the case of Theys Eluay, it is very clear that his abduction and death was well thought out and carefully planned. Theys, a civilian and an influential traditional leader, was the target because of his stance against Jakarta. He was a controversial figure with two faces; he sometimes appeared to be pro-government and sometimes pro-Papuan independence. To the Indonesian government, Theys used 'cultural language' whilst to the Papuan masses he spoke the language of politics. He frequently emphasized the need for a struggle by peaceful means, with politeness and love. In October 1999, speaking as "Ondofolo Besar" (Great Tribal Leader), of Sereh, Sentani, and chairman of Lembaga Musyawarah Adat (Traditional Consultative Assembly), he appointed Yorris Raweyai [9] as the chairman of the Jakarta branch of the Papua Traditional Consultative Assembly. In August 1998, when independence sentiments were sweeping through Papua, Theys together with Yorris Raweyai (chairman of Pemuda Pancasila)[10] proclaimed the concept of 'One Nation, Two Systems" for the future of the people of Papua at the building of the provincial Regional Development Bank in Jayapura. Theys was also involved in the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and during the New Order regime he served three terms as a member of Provincial Legislative Assembly in the Golkar group. But in 1996, he was not re-nominated for election and thereafter he spoke out forcefully again about independence. The climax came when, along with the Papuan people, he issued a decree and unfurled the West Papuan flag (Morning Star Flag) on 1 December 1999 and 1 May 2000. He also signed a political communiqué during the Papuan Council Conference in Jayapura on 23-24 February 2000. On 29 May-4 June 2000, he convened the Second Papuan People's Congress in Jayapura. An estimated 3,000 people from all over Papua attended this historic meeting. When the Special Autonomy Bill was ratified by Parliament in Jakarta on 20 October 2001, Theys and other executive members of the Papuan Presidium Council were all present. They would firmly reject the autonomy law by peaceful means. Theys repeatedly told journalists that special autonomy was none of his affair, that he could not accept the idea of autonomy, and could only think about independence. We are the ones, he said, who owned the wealth and the government should ask us about how to use the natural resources. It would be divided: 80 % for us and 20% for the central government. It is for us, he said, to decide how to share it out. Secondly, the Papuan People's Congress gave no mandate about special autonomy. So, what we had to do was to get our independence back. In October, Theys told TEMPO Magazine that the Papuan Presidium Council was the representative of the whole Papuan people, the little folk and the leaders, the young and old, the men and the women, those at home or abroad, the living and the dead, they all want independence for Papua. Only a handful of people think otherwise, people like Freddy Numberi [11] who only think of themselves. They deceive themselves, the people of West Papua, and God.[12] While the political elite in Jakarta were busying themselves with legislation about special autonomy, here in West Papua in October and November 2001, joint operations by TNI-POLRI patrols ("Patroli Garnizun") were being conducted at night in Jayapura and the surrounding districts to maintain security (Kamtibmas). It was just like a 'night curfew'. According to ELSHAM monitoring, the operations were conducted by personnel from the Army, the Navy, and Kopassus. In Sentani town where Theys lived, Infantry Battalion 751, which has its headquarters in Sentani, Polomo, was involved in these patrols.