Governance and the Cycle of Violence in Papua: the Nduga Crisis

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Governance and the Cycle of Violence in Papua: the Nduga Crisis Volume 17 | Issue 2 | Number 4 | Article ID 5238 | Jan 15, 2019 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Governance and the Cycle of Violence in Papua: The Nduga Crisis: Richard Chauvel Abstract leaders met with President Habibie and demanded that Papua’s independence be Indonesia’s last regional conflict remains recognized. President Abdurrahman Wahid, intractable. We are reminded of this bymore than any of the otherReformasi -era demonstrations and mass detentions in 2018 Presidents, sought to accommmodate Papuan around the 1 December anniversary of Papua’s aspirations, when, on a visit to Papua to ‘Independence’ Day and the killing a day later welcome the new Millennium, he agreed that of at least 16 construction workers in the the province could be called Papua and that the central highlands district of Nduga with the Papuan Morning Star flag could be flown. military operations that followed. These events Abdurrahman Wahid funded the Papua will be discussed further in the paper after a Congress, a pro-independence mass gathering brief outline of the conflict in Papua. held in mid-2000 by the Papua Presidium Council (PDP), led by Theys Eluay. The “Papuan spring” of relatively free mobilization and expression of opinion came to an end with Keywords the detention of Theys Eluay and other PDP Papua, Indonesia, Nduga Crisis, Violence, leaders in late November 2000 and the Autonomy Law assassination of Theys Eluay by Kopassus (Special) troops a year later. Under Presidents Megawati Sukarnoputri and Introduction: Papua and the Indonesian Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono peaceful pro- state independence activity was criminalized, with activists like Filip Karma given long prison Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule has sentences for raising the Morning Star Flag. existed as long as there has been an Indonesian This approach to the governance of Papua has administration. Indeed, the assertion of the meant that Papuans have not shared in the right to establish an independent state pre- freedoms of organization and expression that dates the advent of the Indonesianhave developed in the rest of Indonesia. administration in 1963. Resistance against Indonesian rule and the struggle to establish an The Special Autonomy Law of 2001 was the independent state has been pursued by both Government’s response to Papuan demands for peaceful political and armed means. independence. It provided for broader autonomy, with greater authority and allocation After the fall of President Suharto’s New Order of revenue, devolved to the province rather Government in 1998, there was a rapid and than provided under the nation-wide broad mobilization of support for independence decentralization laws introduced by President in Papua, as there was in Timor-Leste and Habibie. Under Special Autonomy, the Aceh. In February 1999 a team of 100 Papuan provincial government had authority in all 1 17 | 2 | 4 APJ | JF areas except foreign affairs, external defense, The demographic transformation Papua has monetary policy, and the supreme court. experienced under Indonesian rule is one of the Papuan advocates of Special Autonomy hoped factors that fuels support for independence. the law would facilitate extensive self-Papuans consider that they have been government within Indonesia. Specialdispossessed and marginalized in their own Autonomy supporters in the Jakartaland. In the last census of the Netherlands government envisaged that the law would administration in 1960 Papuans constituted 3 diminish support for independence. That over 97% of the population. According to the Special Autonomy has failed is one of the few 2010 census there were 66.26% or 2,409,670 issues the Jakarta Government and Papuan Papuans out of a total population of 3,612,854 politicians agree on, even if for different in Papua and West Papua provinces. reasons and attributions of responsibility. As important as the overall demographic Although the Special Autonomy Law istransformation is, the geographic distribution considered a failure, together with theof Papuan and non-Papuan populations as well proliferation of new district governments and as the economic inequalities between them is the division of Papua into two provinces – critical. In Papua province over 84% of the non- Papua and West Papua – administrativePapua population is concentrated in the urban structures have been transformed. The number areas of Jayapura, Merauke and Nabire, of district governments has grown from 12 to Keerom, between Jayapura and the border with 42, with many of the new districts created in Papua New Guinea, and Mimika around the remote and impoverished regions in the Freeport mine. In these regions non-Papuans highlands, including Nduga, which wasconstitute a majority. In contrast, Papuans established in 2008, The political elite has make up majorities of over 90% in the 14 4 become more reflective of the plurality of districts of the central highlands. Papuan society, in comparison with the mostly coastal Papuan elite, which dominated both the There are inequalities between urban and rural PDP and provincial government in theareas throughout Indonesia. In Papua they are immediate post-Suharto years. In the provincial stark and politically salient because they are parliament in Papua elected in 2014, members aligned with and reinforce the differences from the central highlands occupy 59% of the between the predominantly Papuan highlands seats, roughly the same as the portion of and the Indonesian settler majority urban highlanders in the Papuan population. In areas. Taking the UNDP’s Human Development elections for legislatures, Papuans compete Index (HDI) as a broader measure, Jayapura, with each other and with candidates from the the capital of Papua, and Sorong, the major Indonesian settler communities, who were economic centre in West Papua, have an HDI of 2 successful in winning 25% of the seats. Under 78.3 and 76.73, respectively, which are not out the provisions of the Special Autonomy Law, of place in comparison with other urban areas the Governor and Deputy Governor have to be elsewhere in the archipelago. In the central indigenous Papuans. As will be discussed highlands of Papua HDIs are in the 40s and in further, the demographic and electoralWest Papua in the 50s. Nduga had the lowest dominance of highlanders was reflected in the HDI at 27.87. Despite the relatively generous re-election of Lukas Enembe as Governor of allocation of government revenue under the Papua. Enembe commenced his political career Special Autonomy Law, Papua and West Papua as head of Puncak Jaya, one of the newly have the lowest HDI in Indonesia at 59.09 and created local government districts in the 62.99, respectively, compared with the national central highlands. figure of 70.81.5 2 17 | 2 | 4 APJ | JF President Jokowi has shown more interest in Early in his presidency, President Jokowi made Papua than any of his predecessors. He commitments to resolve human rights abuses, campaigned in Papua as a candidate in 2014. remove restrictions on the access of foreign He won a strong majority of the vote in both journalists and release political prisoners. Papuan provinces, with levels of support among While political prisoners, including Filip Karma, the highest in the country. As President, Jokowi have been released, little progress has been has visited Papua more often than earlier made on resolving human rights cases, and the Presidents and he has visited Papua more pattern of abuses by the security forces is little frequently than any other province outside changed. Foreign journalists still must Java. negotiate Papua-specific regulations administered through a “clearing house” There was little in his background in business process by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. or as Mayor of Solo and Governor of Jakarta to Foreign journalists also have to obtain a suggest why President Jokowi should show an permission letter (surat jalan) from police interest in one of Indonesia’s most intractable intelligence, like other foreigners visiting issues. During a visit to New Zealand in March Papua.7 President Jokowi’s approach to Papua 2018, Fransiscus Orlando, a Papuan student, has increasingly been focused on economic asked the President what motivated him to development, particularly infrastructure, make so many visits to Papua. Jokowi related seemingly in the belief, like President how Papua had been neglected for far too long, Yudhoyono before him, that, if material welfare but it was part of the Unitary State of Indonesia can be improved, the difficult political, human (NKRI) and had to be paid attention. He rights and historical issues, which Papuans recalled his visit to the highland district of consider important, will somehow fade away. Nduga in December 2015. During 2017 and 2018 Amnesty International Indonesia (AII) and the International Coalition “At the time the head of the for Papua (ICP) produced detailed and highly military had advised against the critical reports of ongoing human rights visit because Nduga was the most 8 abuses. The scope and focus of the two reports dangerous region. I flew there by is somewhat different, but the analysis is helicopter because from Wamena consistent, showing the continuation of a long- to Nduga required 4 days and established pattern of human rights abuses, nights travel through the jungle. In frequently involving the security forces. Both the Nduga district there was not reports argue that the pro-independence one meter of sealed road. This activities have grown in influence and scale. made
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