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TP, The Trading Post. Port Vila. Three edi- between President Habibie and a team tions per week. of a hundred Papuan representatives Vanuatu Ombudsman. 2001. Digest of alerted the government to the depth Public Reports 1996–2000. Prepared by of pro-independence sentiment in Edward R. Hill for the u n d p Governance . This sentiment then found and Accountability Project (Van /97/0101) more public expression in the form and the Vanuatu Office of the Ombuds- of two mass meetings in , a man. January. Convention or Musyawarah Besar in February 2000, and a Congress in May–June 2000. The Congress, dubbed the “Second Papuan Con- gress” in acknowledgement of the West Pa p ua Papuan Congress of 1961, issued a The gap continued to widen between number of ambitious declarations, Indonesian central government rhet- each of them unacceptable to Jakarta: oric and performance on the ground a demand that Jakarta recognize the in its troubled eastern province of unilateral declaration of independence Irian Jaya during 20 0 1 . If carrots were issued by the first Papuan Congress proffered to the province, in the form on 1 December 1961; a repudiation of a law on “Special Autonomy” that of the 1962 and is due to be implemented in 2002, the subsequent 1969 “Act of Free sticks were still wielded vigorously by Choice” or p e p e r a which, in the eyes the government’s security apparatus, of the United Nations, saw former with the police and military acting in Dutch formally incor- concert with the judiciary. Among the porated within ; a rejection el e m e n t sono ff e ri nt h eS p e c i al Au t o n- of central government plans to carve omy package is an apparent conces- Papua into three separate provinces; sion on use of the name “Papua” for a fiat issued to the leadership of the the province, but the failure to satisfy Co n g ress to seek international support a widely voiced Papuan preference for for the cause of independence; and a “West Papua” and the retention in call for the immediate involvement of official usage of the alternative but the United Nations in a transfer of deeply unpopular “Irian Jaya” (Great powers to an independent Papuan or Victorious Irian) are symptomatic state. of a continued reluctance on the part A panel of Papuan leaders, the of government to engage seriously in Papuan Presidium Council (Presidium dialogue with its Papuan citizens. Dewan Papua or p d p), emerged from The fall of President in the Se c o n dC o n g re s s, he a d ed by Ch a i r- May 19 98 had us h e red in a sh o rt - l i v e d man and Vice Chairma n “Papuan Spring,” a brief eighteen- Tom Beanal. Theys, an elected chief month period during which civilian from Lake Sentani, had formerly political expression in Papua flour- enjoyed a close relationship with ished and calls for independence were Jakarta but had developed a some- relatively freely voiced. A formal dia- what ambivalent position since 1998 lo g ue held in Jakarta in Fe b ru a ry 19 9 9 as an outspoken advocate of indepen- 468 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 dence while maintaining close per- prior to Megawati’s presidency. On sonal and business relationships with 8 June 2000, directly in response to various military officers. Tom Beanal, the Papuan Congress of May–June, a leader of the Amungme community in meeting was called by the Ministry of the area of the Freeport mine, was the Interior’s Directorate for National perhaps more widely respected as a Unity and Public Protection at the genuine champion of Papuan rights, Matoa Hotel in downtown Jayapura. but early in 2000 he had decided to Those present represented all of the accept a position on the board of intelligence agencies operating in Freeport Indonesia. Papua, including the local intelligence Under the presidency of Abdur- heads from the Special Forces (Kopas- rahman Wahid, elected in November sus) and the elite Regional Reserve 1999, the Papuan Presidium Council (Kostrad). The meeting outlined what and its supporters enjoyed an unprec e- it interpreted to be a solidifying con- de n t e d latitude of political movement spiracy among Papuan leaders, and and expression. Across Papua, previ- proposed a series of possible govern- ously banned “Morning Star” flags ment responses, both public and clan- associated with the independence destine. The twenty-three-page min- movements were raised on 1 Decem- utes reporting the findings of the ber 1999, and local community secu- meeting to Minister Hari Subarno rity posts (posko) established. Wahid’s was subsequently leaked to human political and substantial financial sup- rights nongovernment organizations. port for the Second Congress played Attempts by Minister Yudhoyono and a part in his fall from power in July others to deny that the “Matoa” doc- 2001, when Wahid was replaced by ument was genuine were undermined his strongly nationalist vice president, by Minister Subarno who, when ques- . Megawati’s tioned, admitted that the meeting had new cabinet restored hard-line nation- indeed taken place and observed sim- alists and former generals to key posi- ply that there had not been adequate tions, notably Gen. (ret.) Susilo Bam- funding to pursue the plans outlined bang Yudhoyono as Coordinating in the report. Minister for Security and Political In a diagram entitled “Papuan Affairs, Gen. (ret.) Hari Subarno as Political Conspiracy,” the Matoa doc- Home Affairs Minister, and Lt. Gen. ument maps pro-independence cells (ret.) Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriy- (fraksi), each linked to a central axis, ono as the head of the new National and identifies some thirty-eight lead- Intelligence Bureau. Under their direc- ing individuals by name. Those listed tion, the hard-won concessions of include almost every notable Papuan, provinces such as Aceh and Papua from known commanders of the Free have systematically been rolled back Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua in a return to the military dominance Merdeka or o p m), through church of regional planning and administra- and n g o leaders, to the Jakarta- tion that characterized the 1970s and appointed Governor Jaap Salossa. The early 1980s. notion that these individuals might act This process was al re a dy under way in concert is absurd, though the suspi- p olitical reviews • melane s i a 469 cion that they share a common hope kwari, Tiom, and Jakarta resulted in for eventual independence is more several deaths and multiple arrests on plausible. The report set out a com- charges of subversion. Many of those prehensive plan of action for govern- arrested during this period in Jaya- ment agencies, including diplomatic pura, Wamena, Jakarta, and elsewhere initiatives designed to counter the have been held under arrest for con- Papuan Presidium Council’s inter- siderable periods of time and, even national activities, fast-tracking of when released, live under the threat economic development programs, of having charges laid against them. the promotion of official histories of The government’s diplomatic offen- Papua’s integration into the Republic, sive was pursued with equal effi c i e n c y, the creation of “civil defense” and and the Papuan Presidium Council “people’s resistance” groups (or mili- found itself progressively cut off from tias), the generation of a legal frame- international forums and avenues for work to cover repressive action, and support. The Presidium’s success in the prosecution of strong sanctions gaining observer status at the Pacific against the leaders of the “Papuan Islands Forum in 2000 was not Conspiracy.” repeated in the August 2001 Forum Certainly the broader intentions of meeting. Nauru, as the Forum host, the Matoa document appear to have had actively supported West Papua informed government responses to independence at the United Nations independence sentiments since mid- as well as at the 2000 Forum, but in 2000. On the morning of 8 October 2001 withheld visas for p d p represen- 2000 a well-planned assault by com- tatives while welcoming an official bined security forces on Papuan Indonesian government team. At the posko centers in the Wamena Valley Forum, the government’s Papuan that were flying the Morning Star flag spokesman, the State Minister for announced an end to the earlier toler- Accelerated Development in Eastern ance of political freedoms. Indonesian Indonesia, Manuel Kaisiepo, declared migrants were caught in the crossfire that human rights violations in West between the Wamena communities Papua were a thing of the past (see and the police and military, and as below for evidence to the contrary). many as thirty-seven Papuans and Australia and Papua New Guinea migrants were killed. The killing of completed this reversal of fortune the migrants, some of them teachers for the Papuan Presidium Council by whose houses had been used as sniper limiting reference to West Papua in posts by the security forces, made the Forum Communiqué to a simple headline news nationally. Preempting expression of “concern about violence the pro-independence ceremonies on and loss of life,” and welcoming 1 December 2000, five of the p d p Jakarta’s proposals for Special leaders, including Theys Eluay, were Autonomy. arrested on charges of treason, and in The future of a negotiated settle- ea ch of the reg i o n al ce n t e rs fl a g - r a i s i n g ment between Jakarta and Papua ceremonies were brutally interrupted. revolves around the question of Clashes in Fak-fak, Sorong, Mano- autonomy. Autonomy, in the form 470 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 of a degree of control over resource The most generous provisions in benefits and other local revenues and the new Law on Special Autonomy or administrative functions, had been Otonomi Khusus for Papua relate to offered by President Habibie to all of the redirection of resource revenues, the country’s regencies, thus bypass- allocating 70 percent of oil and gas ing the provinces and undermining to Papua, together with 80 percent their ability to pose a real challenge to of other natural resource revenues, Jakarta. In the two cases of Aceh and including mining, forestry, and fish- Papua, a “special” form of provincial eries (though some doubt remains autonomy was proposed, in order to over the precise arrangements for counter separatist sentiment. Two mining), and an ongoing 2 percent of competing drafts for the bill on Spe- the national general allocation fund. cial Autonomy were brought to the Given the presence in Papua of both national House of Representatives Freeport’s Grasberg copper/gold mine (d p r- r i) for consideration. The first and British Petroleum’s Tangguh had been prepared unilaterally by the natural gas field (see below), this is Ministry of Home Affairs, with little expected to result in a doubling of the or no Papuan input. Although this provincial budget of previous years. draft was endorsed by the provincial On most other matters the final bill House of Representatives (d p r d proved less flexible. The powers to Tingkat I) in Jayapura, it was ulti- appoint a Commission on Human mately rejected by the commission Rights and a Commission for Truth charged with presenting a draft to the and Reconciliation, and to control the national House. The second draft was deployment and activities of the police put together in Jayapura by a team of and army, are all retained by Jakarta. Papuan academics and provincial gov- Although provision is made for the ernment officials appointed by Gover- establishment of traditional courts nor Jaap Salossa, and represented a (Pengadilan Adat), these are to be sub- much more serious attempt to find ordinate to the national court system, some common ground between the which will continue to be regulated positions of the Papuan Presidium by Jakarta. Crucially, no place was Council and Jakarta. After lengthy found in the final bill for popular ref- negotiations between the House and erendums on changes to the Special the Governor’s team, the Papuan draft Autonomy Law or, as proposed in the was accepted as the basis for the bill governor’s draft, on the fate of Special in June 2001, but heavily reworked to Autonomy after a trial period of five eliminate all reference to the possibil- years. Although a symbolic concession ity of a referendum on Papua’s future, is made on use of the name “Papua,” and to emphasize Papua’s role as an the status of other symbols of Papuan integral part of the Republic of Indo- id e n t i t y, such as the Morning Star flag, nesia. The bill was formally endorsed remains uncertain. Permission is by the House on 22 October, and granted to use local symbols (flags plans announced for the formal pre- and anthems) but these can only be sentation of the law by the president “cultural expressions and cannot be to the governor in Jayapura on 22 used as independence symbols.” December. The key to Jakarta’s strategy is the p olitical reviews • melane s i a 471 offer to Papua of revenues from the and Aneka Tambang were suspended various “mega-projects,” including when Falconbridge withdrew, citing the Freeport copper-gold mine, British the obstruction posed to the project Petroleum’s natural gas project at by legislation banning mining in Tangguh, b h p-Billiton’s nickel pros- National Protection Forest areas. pect on Gag Island, and the plans for Despite optimistic announcements by an industrial park centered on the government officials, both national Mamberamo hydroelectric project. an dp ro v i n c i a l, little headway has be e n Freeport’s production was restored to made with the formal components of full capacity in January 2001 after the the Mamberamo project, amid doubts company forced through an agree m e n t over the technical feasibility of a large with community leaders on dumping dam in a dynamic river system, and its overburden in Lake Wanagon, the uncertainty over the scale of environ- scene of two massive accidents, the mental impacts and the political future second being fatal for four Freeport of Papua. Nevertheless, numerous workers. In April, Mama Yosepha timber and oil palm projects have Alomang, an Amungme leader who gained a foothold in the Mamberamo has campaigned actively against Free- area, riding on the coattails of the port, was awarded the Goldman Envi- larger project. ronmental Prize in San Francisco for Papuan disappointment with the her determined defense of the rights Special Autonomy legislation focuses of the Amungme and Kamoro com- on Jakarta’s mistaken assumption that munities indigenous to the area of the financial benefits of autonomy Freeport’s contract of work. Freeport will ultimately compensate for the countered this reversal by announcing lack of political freedoms and per- details of a formal Memorandum of sonal security. A “paralyzing polariza- Understanding, signed with Amungme tion” of debate within Papua, which and Kamoro rep resentatives, establish- associates “M” (Merdeka, or immedi- in g a trust fund for the two communi- ate Independence) with true Papuan ties, in an attempt to make amends aspirations, and “O” (Otonomi, or after previous, poorly implemented Autonomy) with submission to the attempts at compensation. In August will of Jakarta, had previously under- the na t i o n al en v i ro n m e n t a ln o n g o vern- mined attempts to discuss moderate ment organization, w a l h i , secured positions at the Papuan Congress. an inaugural, if limited, victory in a Even before the details of the final bill Jakarta court against Freeport on the had been released, Special Autonomy matter of insufficient disclosure about had been rejected out of hand by the the Wanagon accidents. British Petro- Papuan Presidium Council and vari- leum’s massive Tangguh natural gas ous o p m spokesmen on the grounds project in Bintuni Bay is likely to that it fell short of demands for a proceed to production in 2004, and referendum and had involved little or will ultimately produce even more no dialogue with Papuan community revenue for the province than Free- leaders. An early attempt by the gov- port. However, plans for a joint ven- ernor’s team to “socialize” their draft, ture nickel project on Gag Island at a seminar in Jayapura on 28 Ma rc h , involving b h p-Billiton, Falconbridge, was disrupted by student protests and 472 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 the walkout of many of the regional tion of East Timorese “militias.” In representatives gathered together to contrast, the new police chief, Brig.- discuss the draft. A heavy-handed Gen. I Made Magku Pastika, has attempt by police to quell these pro- proved to be an unusually liberal tests resulted in the death through appointment. injury of one of the protestors. As an Late in 2000, Minister for Defense observer remarked, if the academics Mahfud had declared the govern- of the governor’s team had failed to ment’s intention to return to a “secu- adequately socialize the concept of rity” approach in its handling of Ac e h , special autonomy among their own Maluku, and Wes t Papua, and a major students, there could be little hope redeployment of fifty-one battalions, for success before the broader Papuan or 40 percent of the entire army, to public. Papuan supporters of the con- these outer provinces ensued. Esti- cept of special autonomy (if not the mates of additional troops sent to final form of the bill), including the Papua during 2001 ranged from the governor, members of the local and army’s own figure of an increase to national legislatures, senior academics, 8,000 “nonstructural” elite police and bureaucrats, and church leaders, have military, to observers’ estimates of argued that the new law, however 15,000–20,000 new troops. Mega- compromised, is a necessary first step wati’s first cabinet meeting nominated towards satisfying Papuan expecta- the resolution of the conflicts in Aceh tions. and Papua as its most pressing goal, Levels of violence in Papua have and in her inaugural address on 16 often reflected the personal attitudes August the new President apologized and ambitions of provincial comman- to Papua for the suffering endured ders, and there was an air of cautious as a consequence of “inappropriate optimism following the appointment national policies.” During the follow- in late 2000 of Maj.-Gen. Tonny ing months, however, strongly nation- Rompis, an apparent moderate who alist policies on Papua prevailed, had put the case for a persuasive implemented largely through the rather than rep ressive response to calls agency of the military. for Papuan independence. His death Thus far, the creation of civilian in a plane crash in the Central High- “militias” has been limited to urban lands on 8 January, along with eight centers, particularly in the western others including the provincial police parts of the province, at Fak-fak and chief, F X Soemardi, and the Speaker Sorong, where the military have of the prov i n c i a lp a r l i a m e n t, Na t h a n i e l attempted to pit indigenous Moslem Kaiway, was a severe blow to advo- and Christian communities against cates for peace on both sides. In place each other. There have also been sev- of Rompis the army appointed Maj.- eral reports during 2001 of the arrival Gen. Mahidin Simbolon, a Special in Papua of well-armed and gener- Forces veteran, famous for his intelli- ously funded Laskar Jihad militants gence work that resulted in the from the conflict in Maluku. captu re of Fretilin leader Xa n a n aG u s- In Papua, as elsewhere in Indo- mao, and for his role in the organiza- ne s i a, th ea rmy supplements its income p olitical reviews • m e l a n e s i a 4 7 3 through a wide variety of business areas of the north coast, drew harsh operations. The proliferation of army criticism from human rights observe r s . and police units in Papua, and the Indiscriminate “sweeping” operations scope for rivalry over logging, alluvial conducted by army and elite police mining, and smuggling opportunities, (b r i m o b) units in these two areas has led to a corresponding rise in resulted in numerous reports of arbi- clashes between different units. A fire- trary detention, torture, and execu- fight and grenade assault involving tion, and forced large numbers of police and military took place at Serui civilians to flee to the surrounding on Yapen Island on 27 August leaving forests. two dead and six injured, and a run- Two hostage crises during 2001 ning war between police and soldiers briefly dominated national, if not in the Nabire area has claimed the international news. The first involved lives of at least two police. the 16 January kidnapping by an opm Armed resistance to Indonesian rul e unit, led by Willem Onde, of a group on the part of the Free Papua Move- of eighteen workers from the Korean- ment appears to have increased during owned logging company, pt Tunas 2001. Although internal strife contin- Korindo, operating in the Asiki area ues to dog the movement, with fatal in the reg e n c y. The crisis was clashes reported from o p m camps in resolved on 7 Fe b ru a ry with the ret u rn Vanimo in mid-July, individual com- of the last hostages, among them two manders and their units have been Korean company officials, but not able to move with surprising freedom before grave doubts had been raised and temerity within Papua. Attacks in the media about the nature of the on police or military posts, or on kidnapping. Onde had long been in Indonesian migrant workers, were close negotiation with local rep o rt ed from the areas of Be t af/S a rm i commanders, and was regarded with (3 February and 27 August), Wasior suspicion by Papuan observers and (31 March and 13 June), Timika (4 other opm commanders. Among April and 23 September), Bintuni (28 Onde’s demands was a request for August), Waropen (16 November), the military to pick up his tab at a bar and Kimaam (28 November). The that he frequented in Merauke. The township of Ilaga in the Central High- “crisis” over, Onde was flown by the lands was overrun by the Free Papua mi l i t a ry to Jakarta, where he met with Movement for five days, from 28 Sep- parliamentarians to press his case. In tember until the army reestablished September, after his return to Papua, control on 2 October. This last event two bodies with their hands bound was sufficiently embarrassing for and gunshot wounds to their chests Maj.-Gen. Simbolon to sack eight of were retrieved from rivers near his senior commanders, including his Merauke, and identified as those of assistants for intelligence and terri- Onde and his lieutenant, Johannes torial affairs. Military operations in Tumeng. Few seem to have questioned response to opm activity, particularly the general wisdom that Onde’s “tab” in the Wasior area, in Manokwari with the military had expired. Then Regency, and in the Betaf and Sarmi on 7 June, two Belgian men, Philippe 474 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002

Simon and Johan van Den Ey n d e, we re was forced off the road by another taken hostage by an o p m unit at the vehicle. Theys was abducted by at village of Paluga near Ilaga. Although least four men, but Ari escaped, call- the Belgians appear to have been tour- ing Theys’s wife to tell her of the kid- ists with an interest in documentary napping by “straight hairs” (ie, non- films, their easy passage through the Papuans). Shaken, Ari asked a passing military posts in Ilaga in search of bus to drop him at the Kopassus base, the Free Papua Movement aroused where he then disappeared. Theys was the unit’s suspicions, leading to their discovered dead the following morn- kidnapping. Two church mediators, ing, with his hands bound, seated in and Theo van den Broek, the driver’s seat of his car (though he eventually secured their release, could not drive), which had been unharmed, on 16 August. pushed into a ravine along a road In December 2000 a group of leading to the PNG border. The approximately 400 refugees, mostly autopsy found no marks of strangula- Highlanders fleeing police persecution tion, but declared that Theys had died in the Jayapura area, crossed into the of a “lack of oxygen,” presumably Vanimo area of Papua New Guinea, through suffocation with a plastic but failed to gain acknowledgment of bag, a hallmark technique of Kopas- refugee status from the PNG govern- sus killings. Despite high tension and ment. The UN High Commission on some sporadic riots, calm prevailed, Refugees had previously announced and Theys was buried in Sentani on its plans to withdraw from all of the 17 November, in a ceremony attended refugee camps by the end of 2001, by a crowd estimated at more than and the Catholic church, left to bear 10,000. much of the burden, also threatened Police enquiries very quickly came to withdraw if government support to a standstill and a report issued on was not forthcoming. In March, a 13 December by a local human rights PNG police riot squad attack on one organization, the Institute for Human of the Vanimo camps left as many as Rights Studies and Advocacy fifteen people injured. The irony of (ElsHAM), made clear the reasons the PNG government’s willingness to for this impasse. All the indications receive Afghan and Iraqi refugees in were that the killing was the work support of Australia’s “Pacific Solu- of Kopassus, who had badly botched tion” did not escape observers on their attempt to cover their tracks. either side of the border. The vehicle had passed through The event that dominated the news numerous military and police check- from Papua at the end of 2001 was points to reach the point where it was the assassination on 11 November of found, and forensic evidence (includ- p d p Chairman Theys Eluay, a murder ing matching paint on Theys’s vehicle that remained officially unsolved by and a Kopassus vehicle, and finger- the year’s end. After at t e n d i n gad i n n e r print evidence from Kopassus troops at the Special Forces (Kopassus) base who were interviewed by the police) at Hamadi, in Jayapura, Theys and his was supported by the testimonies of driver Ari Masoka were driving back numerous eyewitnesses. Kopassus to his home in Sentani when his car silence on the whereabouts of Ari p olitical reviews • m e l a n e s i a 4 7 5

Masoka has only strengthened the immediate future. There is little pros- case against them. Despite initial pect of genuine dialogue between protestations to the contrary—Maj.- Jakarta and Papua under a Megawati Gen. Simbolon, known for his pride administration, and no indication that in the dictum “No order, no action,” the other major parties are likely to be denied the involvement of any troops any more accommodating of Papuan under his command and insisted at aspirations. Much hangs on the speed first that Theys had died of a heart with which the Special Autonomy leg- attack—the combined weight of the islation is implemented and the man- police report, a public statement by ner in which this is achieved, but in provincial Police Chief Made Pastika a climate of diminished government linking Kopassus to the murder, and administrative capacity, to say noth- the findings of an internal military ing of will, the chances of an increase investigation, finally forced an admis- in levels of Papuan frustration appear sion by Army chief Endriartono very high. The most immediate prob- Sutarto that troops may have been lem for the government, obviously, is involved. finding a credible solution to the ques- Jakarta, now in damage-limitation tions surrounding the assassination of mode, has sent a notionally indepen- Theys Eluay, but little in the govern- dent commission of enquiry to settle ment’s handling of this case thus far the case, but the composition of the suggests that it will succeed in swaying team, with several active and retired Papuan opinion. military and police officers, has done Having cancelled her trip to Papua little to inspire confidence. The find- in late December to present the Special ings of the team have been neatly Autonomy legislation, Pre s i d e n t Mega- anticipated by government ministers wati instead attended a 29 December who have aired the likelihood that the military parade in Jakarta at which murder was a criminal action on the she declared, “We are suddenly aware part of rogue elements of the military, . . . of the need for forcetop ro t e ct ou r acting independently of command beloved nation and motherland from structures. Along with Willem Onde, breaking up.” “But with the laws of Theys had been identified as a mem- Indonesia as your guide,” she added to ber of the “Papuan Conspiracy” in the the assembled soldiers, “you can do Matoa document, and observers have your duty without worrying about suggested that their murders mark the being involved in human rights ab u s e s . initial steps in a systematic campaign Do everything without doubts.” of elimination of local leaders similar Among the senior officers present was to that being conducted in Aceh. Maj.-Gen. Simbolon and before them Since the assassination of Theys, a company of non-Papuan soldiers death threats have been issued over who, dressed in grass skirts and with the phone to other “Papuan Conspir- their bare chests crudely daubed with ators,” including p d p Secretary-Gen- mud, shook spears and enacted eral Thaha Al-Hamid and ElsHAM Jakarta’s necessary fantasy of savage Director Johannes Bonay. and uncontrollable Papuans. Events during 2001 offer scant grounds for optimism about Papua’s c h r i s b a l l a r d 476 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002

Re f e re n c e s Eluay Was Premeditated and Politically Motivated. Preliminary Report, issued Cenderawasih Pos. Daily. Jayapura. 13 December, Jayapura. Translation by Down to Earth. Monthly. London. t a p o l , London. Far Eastern Economic Review. Weekly, International Crisis Group. 2001. Indone- Hong Kong. sia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya. i c g Report No. 23. Jakarta and Brussels: Jakarta Post. Daily, Jakarta. International Crisis Group. Kabar Irian. Website Office for Justice and Peace. 2001. Recent < www.kabar-irian.com > De velopments in Papua: Special Au t o n o my Kompas. Daily. Jakarta. —Its Process and Final Contents. Socio- Political Notes 5. Jayapura: Office for Suara Pembaruan. Daily. Jakarta. Justice and Peace, Diocese of Jayapura. Sydney Morning Herald. Daily. Sydney. Van den Broek, Theo, and Alexandra Sza- T A P O L Bulletin. Monthly. London. lay. 2001. Raising the Morning Star: Six Months in the Developing Independence Tifa Papua. Weekly, Jayapura. Movement in West Papua. The Journal of Institute for Human Rights Studies and Pacific History 36 (1): 77–92. Advocacy (ElsHAM). 2001. The Abduc- tion and Assassination of Theys Hiyo