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P Olitical Reviews • Melane S I a 467 West Pa P Ua p olitical reviews • melane s i a 467 TP, The Trading Post. Port Vila. Three edi- between President Habibie and a team tions per week. of a hundred Papuan representatives Vanuatu Ombudsman. 2001. Digest of alerted the government to the depth Public Reports 1996–2000. Prepared by of pro-independence sentiment in Edward R. Hill for the u n d p Governance Papua. This sentiment then found and Accountability Project (Van /97/0101) more public expression in the form and the Vanuatu Office of the Ombuds- of two mass meetings in Jayapura, a man. January. Convention or Musyawarah Besar in <http://www.undp.org.fj/vanombud/> February 2000, and a Congress in May–June 2000. The Congress, dubbed the “Second Papuan Con- gress” in acknowledgement of the West Pa p ua Papuan Congress of 1961, issued a The gap continued to widen between number of ambitious declarations, Indonesian central government rhet- each of them unacceptable to Jakarta: oric and performance on the ground a demand that Jakarta recognize the in its troubled eastern province of unilateral declaration of independence Irian Jaya during 20 0 1 . If carrots were issued by the first Papuan Congress proffered to the province, in the form on 1 December 1961; a repudiation of a law on “Special Autonomy” that of the 1962 New York Agreement and is due to be implemented in 2002, the subsequent 1969 “Act of Free sticks were still wielded vigorously by Choice” or p e p e r a which, in the eyes the government’s security apparatus, of the United Nations, saw former with the police and military acting in Dutch New Guinea formally incor- concert with the judiciary. Among the porated within Indonesia; a rejection el e m e n t sono ff e ri nt h eS p e c i al Au t o n- of central government plans to carve omy package is an apparent conces- Papua into three separate provinces; sion on use of the name “Papua” for a fiat issued to the leadership of the the province, but the failure to satisfy Co n g ress to seek international support a widely voiced Papuan preference for for the cause of independence; and a “West Papua” and the retention in call for the immediate involvement of official usage of the alternative but the United Nations in a transfer of deeply unpopular “Irian Jaya” (Great powers to an independent Papuan or Victorious Irian) are symptomatic state. of a continued reluctance on the part A panel of Papuan leaders, the of government to engage seriously in Papuan Presidium Council (Presidium dialogue with its Papuan citizens. Dewan Papua or p d p), emerged from The fall of President Suharto in the Se c o n dC o n g re s s, he a d ed by Ch a i r- May 19 98 had us h e red in a sh o rt - l i v e d man Theys Eluay and Vice Chairma n “Papuan Spring,” a brief eighteen- Tom Beanal. Theys, an elected chief month period during which civilian from Lake Sentani, had formerly political expression in Papua flour- enjoyed a close relationship with ished and calls for independence were Jakarta but had developed a some- relatively freely voiced. A formal dia- what ambivalent position since 1998 lo g ue held in Jakarta in Fe b ru a ry 19 9 9 as an outspoken advocate of indepen- 468 the contemporary pacific • fall 2002 dence while maintaining close per- prior to Megawati’s presidency. On sonal and business relationships with 8 June 2000, directly in response to various military officers. Tom Beanal, the Papuan Congress of May–June, a leader of the Amungme community in meeting was called by the Ministry of the area of the Freeport mine, was the Interior’s Directorate for National perhaps more widely respected as a Unity and Public Protection at the genuine champion of Papuan rights, Matoa Hotel in downtown Jayapura. but early in 2000 he had decided to Those present represented all of the accept a position on the board of intelligence agencies operating in Freeport Indonesia. Papua, including the local intelligence Under the presidency of Abdur- heads from the Special Forces (Kopas- rahman Wahid, elected in November sus) and the elite Regional Reserve 1999, the Papuan Presidium Council (Kostrad). The meeting outlined what and its supporters enjoyed an unprec e- it interpreted to be a solidifying con- de n t e d latitude of political movement spiracy among Papuan leaders, and and expression. Across Papua, previ- proposed a series of possible govern- ously banned “Morning Star” flags ment responses, both public and clan- associated with the independence destine. The twenty-three-page min- movements were raised on 1 Decem- utes reporting the findings of the ber 1999, and local community secu- meeting to Minister Hari Subarno rity posts (posko) established. Wahid’s was subsequently leaked to human political and substantial financial sup- rights nongovernment organizations. port for the Second Congress played Attempts by Minister Yudhoyono and a part in his fall from power in July others to deny that the “Matoa” doc- 2001, when Wahid was replaced by ument was genuine were undermined his strongly nationalist vice president, by Minister Subarno who, when ques- Megawati Sukarnoputri. Megawati’s tioned, admitted that the meeting had new cabinet restored hard-line nation- indeed taken place and observed sim- alists and former generals to key posi- ply that there had not been adequate tions, notably Gen. (ret.) Susilo Bam- funding to pursue the plans outlined bang Yudhoyono as Coordinating in the report. Minister for Security and Political In a diagram entitled “Papuan Affairs, Gen. (ret.) Hari Subarno as Political Conspiracy,” the Matoa doc- Home Affairs Minister, and Lt. Gen. ument maps pro-independence cells (ret.) Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriy- (fraksi), each linked to a central axis, ono as the head of the new National and identifies some thirty-eight lead- Intelligence Bureau. Under their direc- ing individuals by name. Those listed tion, the hard-won concessions of include almost every notable Papuan, provinces such as Aceh and Papua from known commanders of the Free have systematically been rolled back Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua in a return to the military dominance Merdeka or o p m), through church of regional planning and administra- and n g o leaders, to the Jakarta- tion that characterized the 1970s and appointed Governor Jaap Salossa. The early 1980s. notion that these individuals might act This process was al re a dy under way in concert is absurd, though the suspi- p olitical reviews • melane s i a 469 cion that they share a common hope kwari, Tiom, and Jakarta resulted in for eventual independence is more several deaths and multiple arrests on plausible. The report set out a com- charges of subversion. Many of those prehensive plan of action for govern- arrested during this period in Jaya- ment agencies, including diplomatic pura, Wamena, Jakarta, and elsewhere initiatives designed to counter the have been held under arrest for con- Papuan Presidium Council’s inter- siderable periods of time and, even national activities, fast-tracking of when released, live under the threat economic development programs, of having charges laid against them. the promotion of official histories of The government’s diplomatic offen- Papua’s integration into the Republic, sive was pursued with equal effi c i e n c y, the creation of “civil defense” and and the Papuan Presidium Council “people’s resistance” groups (or mili- found itself progressively cut off from tias), the generation of a legal frame- international forums and avenues for work to cover repressive action, and support. The Presidium’s success in the prosecution of strong sanctions gaining observer status at the Pacific against the leaders of the “Papuan Islands Forum in 2000 was not Conspiracy.” repeated in the August 2001 Forum Certainly the broader intentions of meeting. Nauru, as the Forum host, the Matoa document appear to have had actively supported West Papua informed government responses to independence at the United Nations independence sentiments since mid- as well as at the 2000 Forum, but in 2000. On the morning of 8 October 2001 withheld visas for p d p represen- 2000 a well-planned assault by com- tatives while welcoming an official bined security forces on Papuan Indonesian government team. At the posko centers in the Wamena Valley Forum, the government’s Papuan that were flying the Morning Star flag spokesman, the State Minister for announced an end to the earlier toler- Accelerated Development in Eastern ance of political freedoms. Indonesian Indonesia, Manuel Kaisiepo, declared migrants were caught in the crossfire that human rights violations in West between the Wamena communities Papua were a thing of the past (see and the police and military, and as below for evidence to the contrary). many as thirty-seven Papuans and Australia and Papua New Guinea migrants were killed. The killing of completed this reversal of fortune the migrants, some of them teachers for the Papuan Presidium Council by whose houses had been used as sniper limiting reference to West Papua in posts by the security forces, made the Forum Communiqué to a simple headline news nationally. Preempting expression of “concern about violence the pro-independence ceremonies on and loss of life,” and welcoming 1 December 2000, five of the p d p Jakarta’s proposals for Special leaders, including Theys Eluay, were Autonomy. arrested on charges of treason, and in The future of a negotiated settle- ea ch of the reg i o n al ce n t e rs fl a g - r a i s i n g ment between Jakarta and Papua ceremonies were brutally interrupted.
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