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Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: M itigating or Fueling Secessionism? Marcus Mietzner1 Since the 1960s, scholars of separatism have debated the impact of regional autonomy policies and general democratization measures on the strength of secessionist movements in conflict-prone areas. In this heated academic discussion, supporters and critics of political decentralization advanced highly divergent arguments and case studies. On the one hand, numerous authors have identified regional autonomy and expanded democratic rights as effective instruments to settle differences between regions with secessionist tendencies and their central governments.2 In their view, regional autonomy has the potential to address and ultimately eliminate anti-centralist sentiments in local communities by involving them more deeply in political decision-making and economic resource distribution. They point to cases such as Quebec in Canada, where the support for the separatist Parti Quebecois dropped from almost 50 percent in 1981 to only 28.3 percent in the 2007 elections.3 Other examples of successful autonomy regimes frequently mentioned by pro-autonomy academics and policy-makers include Nagaland in India, the Miskito 1 The author would like to thank Edward Aspinall, Harold Crouch, Sidney Jones, Rodd McGibbon, and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 2 See for instance George Tsebelis, "Elite Interaction and Constitution Building in Consociational Societies," Journal of Theoretical Politics 2,1 (1990): 5-29; John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, "Introduction: The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict," in The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation, ed. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (London: Routledge, 1993); Ruth Lapidoth, Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997); and Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000). 3 The decline of the Parti Quebecois was accompanied by the meteoric rise of the populist right-wing Action Democratique du Quebec (ADQ), which supported a maximum degree of autonomy for Quebec within the Canadian state. Indonesia 84 (October 2007) 2 Marcus Mietzner territories in Nicaragua, Galicia in Spain, South Tyrol in Italy, Gagauzia in Moldova, and Crimea in the Ukraine.4 However, an equally influential group of researchers has argued that granting regional autonomy and more democracy provides separatist movements with the resources they need to further their secessionist cause.5 According to these scholars, the implementation of policies offering greater regional autonomy allows separatist groups to gain experience in government, sharpen local identities, and prepare the infrastructure for the sought-after independent state. These authors can highlight examples like Scotland, where the separatist Scottish Nationalist Party used the Scotland Act of 1998, which gave the region increased autonomy, to grow into the largest party in the territory by 2007. Others again have introduced an analytical distinction between regional autonomy and democracy, maintaining that these two factors can influence the intensity of separatism in very different ways. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, for example, has concluded that while the implementation of autonomy provisions often reduces demands for secession, this is more likely to occur in states with low levels of democracy than in those that offer generous democratic rights and freedoms.6 Accordingly, Cunningham submits that "in order to curtail violence associated with autonomy or independence movements, governments must provide order and limit the opportunity and incentives for extra-systemic violence generally."7 In Indonesia, the debate about the interrelation between autonomy and secessionism has been the subject of a major policy discourse. At the core of this dispute are disagreements over the most effective approach to the provinces of Papua and Aceh, where separatist rebellions launched under the New Order continued well into the post-authoritarian transition after 1998. Nationalist politicians typically argued that generous autonomy offers would lead to Indonesia's disintegration, insisting that only military force could quell the rebellions. More liberal figures, on the other hand, believed that the state needed to make substantial concessions to the two provinces if it wanted to reduce their levels of anti-centralist hostility.8 As a compromise between 4 These examples are highlighted in Svante E. Cornell, "Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus—Cases in Georgia" (PhD dissertation, Uppsala University, 2002); Frans Schrijver, "Regionalism after Regionalisation: Regional Identities, Political Space, and Political Mobilisation," paper presented at the AAG Pre-Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder, CO, April 3-5, 2005; and Thomas Benedikter, "The Working Autonomies in Europe: Territorial Autonomy as a Means of Minority Protection and Conflict Solution in the European Experience—An Overview and Schematic Comparison," (Bolzano/Bozen: Gesellschaft fur Bedrohte Volker, 2006). 5 Authors who have presented this view include Milica Bookman, The Economics of Secession (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1992); David J. Meyer, "A Place of Our Own: Does the Ethnicization of Territorial Control Create Incentives for Elites to Conduct Ethno-Political Mobilization? Cases from the Caucasus in Comparative Perspective," paper presented at the Fifth Annual Convention of the ASN, New York, NY, April 2000; Dimitry Gorenburg, "Nationalism for the Masses: Popular Support for Nationalism in Russia's Ethnic Republics," Europe-Asia Studies, 53,1 (2001): 73-104; and Dawn Brancati, "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism," International Organization 60, 3 (2006): 651-685. 6 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, "Evaluating the Success of Regional Autonomy Regimes," paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, PA, August 31-September 3, 2006. 7 Ibid., p. 18. 8 Rodd McGibbon, Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?, Policy Studies 10 (Washington, DC: East West Center Washington, 2004). Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh 3 these two diametrically opposed policy approaches, both Papua and Aceh were given special autonomy status in 2001, but this neither included meaningful provisions for more democratic participation of their citizens nor a cessation of the military campaign against the rebels. International observers consequently maintained that despite Indonesia's generally successful process of democratization, Papua and Aceh were still subjected to continued military operations, restrictions on political activity, strong social control mechanisms, and widespread intimidation of voters during general elections. In his assessment for the Freedom House, for example, Edward Aspinall asserted that while "the political system [in Indonesia] is open and democratic in its basic structures, and multiple actors compete to assert influence," in Papua and Aceh "governance problems of all kinds have been amplified, and security forces have committed egregious human rights abuses."9 The half-hearted implementation of special autonomy amidst continued repression between 2001 and 2005 not only failed to reduce separatist sentiments in both provinces, but arguably made them worse. Many Papuans and Acehnese viewed the failure of special autonomy to deliver any tangible benefits as final proof that the central government had never seriously intended to improve their living conditions. Given the lingering discontent in both territories, however, the Jakarta government began to introduce important changes from 2004 onwards. To begin with, in the last days of Megawati Sukarnoputri's presidency, parliament passed a new law on local government that introduced the direct election of local government heads for the whole of Indonesia.10 While the law guarded against potential separatist candidates by requiring them to be nominated by existing national parties, the special autonomy regulations for Papua and Aceh granted both areas additional rights as far as the nomination of candidates was concerned. Overall, the new electoral framework was a remarkable departure from the previous practice, which had reduced the risk of anti­ establishment candidacies by holding the elections in local parliaments filled with politicians sympathetic towards the center. Before the new regulations could be applied, however, the government granted even more wide-ranging concessions to Aceh. Under the Helsinki agreement signed with the separatist Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) in August 2005, the Indonesian government allowed for independent candidates to contest the local elections, and even conceded the establishment of local political parties in Aceh. This article discusses the impact of the 2006 local elections in Papua and Aceh on secessionist sentiments in both provinces. Analyzing the polls within the context of the autonomy legislation for both areas and their larger socio-political setting, the discussion highlights two highly diverse trends. On the one hand, both provinces have witnessed victories of political leaders known for their past or present association with pro-independence groups. In both Papua and

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