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President Trump and America's 2020 Presidential Election

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President Trump and America's 2020 Presidential Election President Trump And America’s 2020 Presidential Election: An Analytical Framework March 6, 2019 © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC Trump 2020 Meets Trump 2016 ___________________________________________________________ Trump 2020 Is A Stronger Candidate Than Trump 2016… • Looking purely at Trump’s personal standing in 2016 vs. 2020, he is no worse for wear, with the greatest change in his ratings coming from the consolidation of support among Republicans after two years of providing wins for his GOP base (e.g., deregulation, conservative judges) and currently having a strong economy and jobs market …But Trump 2016 Was A Weak Candidate (Who Happened To Face Another Weak Candidate) • Trump vs. Clinton 2016 matchup had the two most unfavorable candidates in a 60-year span • According to the 2016 exit polls, 18 percent of voters who had an unfavorable view of both Clinton and Trump voted for Trump by a 17- point margin – those margins were even higher in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Florida • Trump was the “change” candidate, winning voters who wanted change by a 68-point margin • Still, Trump only garnered 46.1 percent of the popular vote © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 1 Trump’s Base Not Enough To Win ___________________________________________________________ Trump Is A Strong Weak Incumbent Heading Into 2020 Election • Trump’s political base of support – “America First” nationalists, rural farmers, and evangelical Christians – was necessary but insufficient to win in 2016 – will still be insufficient to win in 2020 • Trump’s loyal base of support is around 30 percent of voters, while an even larger base of opposition is around 45 percent of voters • Trump’s approval ratings remain historically low and in narrow range, with most Americans firmly set in their convictions of the president • Trump’s low approval ratings a function of America’s political divide – he remains the most popular politician among GOP electorate – little chance of not running for reelection or facing serious primary challenger © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 2 Race For Independents ___________________________________________________________ Trump Won Independents In 2016… • Trump won Independents by four points nationally, despite having a 32 percent favorability rating among them – key was that Clinton just had similarly low 33 percent favorability rating ...But There Are Danger Signs For Him After 2018 Midterms • After four years in office, Trump is unlikely to be able to carry the mantle of “change” among true Independents or dissatisfied voters • Trump’s approval rating among Independents in first two years averaged 35 percent, but Democrats won them by 12 points nationally in the midterm elections • According to 2018 exit polls, 10 percent of voters disapproving of both Democrats and Republicans voted for Democrats by a one-point margin © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 3 The Electoral College Outlook ___________________________________________________________ In 2016, Trump won the electoral college 306 to 232. In the race to 270 in 2020, Democrats start with a 232 to 220 edge, with 86 electoral votes rated as toss-ups The Northern Blue Wall – 46 Electoral Votes (PA, MI, WI) • The three historically Democratic states – Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin – were the biggest upsets in 2016 and will likely be biggest determinants of who wins in 2020 • The midterms and current 2020 polling in all three states show Trump is in danger of losing these states that he won by less than one percent in 2016 Florida and the Sunbelt – 109 Electoral Votes (FL, NC, GA, TX, AZ) • Florida continues to be a perennial swing state, with Arizona turning into a toss-up after electing Democratic senator in 2018 for first time in 30 years • If Independents swing against Trump and the Democratic base turns out in large numbers, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas could come into play too © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 4 Most Critical Election Variable ___________________________________________________________ Biggest Variable To Watch: Defining Democratic Nominee • Reelections are partially a referendum on the president: Incumbent approval number often matches the popular vote share they receive in reelection – sub-40 approval rating gives incumbents little chance even if they have a higher favorability rating than the challenger (e.g., 1980 election) • Reelections are also choices, where an incumbent can work to define an opponent as unacceptable even if there is an openness for change (e.g., 2004 election) • Trump’s current standing is somewhere in between Carter and W. Bush: For Trump to win in 2020, he needs to run against an opponent who has even worse favorability ratings, particularly among Independents • If the race is framed more as a referendum on Trump, he likely loses, but if he can sufficiently make the election a choice – similar to 2016 – there is an avenue for making the Democratic alternative unacceptable – Trump’s acumen for defining his opponents cannot be underestimated • Potential opponents like Joe Biden pose the greatest threat to Trump as he is largely defined and acceptable among the general electorate – bigger wildcards and opportunities for Trump are from the relative unknown Democratic candidates © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 5 Other Key Election Variables ___________________________________________________________ Given the inelastic nature of Trump’s approval ratings, there are few variables that have affected the standing of the president. Yet, there’s always a possibility future variables can have a meaningful impact. These include the following: The Economy • Despite strong economic growth and record employment levels in his first two years in office, Trump’s approval rating never exceeded 45 percent in the Gallup polls. Few are expecting such economic growth to continue in 2019 or 2020, with greater downside risk to the economic and employment trajectory. Negative economic trajectories or sentiments have quickly eroded political support in past (e.g., H.W. Bush and Carter), though Trump’s base will likely give him benefit of the doubt. The Investigations • Unless a truly bombshell revelation of direct collusion between Trump and the Russians hits, the Mueller investigation will continue to be an issue viewed through partisan lens, unlikely to sway voters one way or the other. The risk for Trump is overreach in trying to impede other federal and state investigations. The risk for Democrats is overreach in House investigations or impeachment proceedings that could be viewed as “presidential harassment.” The Trump-Pelosi Dynamic • Trump saw declining approval ratings among Independents when he shut down the government over border wall funding. Though his approval numbers quickly recovered after government reopened, the president lost his first battle with the new House speaker. Trump’s battles with Pelosi will continue as even bipartisan initiatives fail to gain momentum. © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 6 The Democratic Field ___________________________________________________________ Crowded Democratic Field Creates Uncertainty • In crowded field, plurality rules in early primary and caucus states – contenders will need to thrive in a certain lane or cobble together a coalition among the Democratic electorate (e.g., progressives, Democratic establishment, moderates, minorities, millennials) • At this point in previous election cycles, eventual Democratic primary winners were polling low – George McGovern at 5.0 percent, Jimmy Carter at 1.0 percent, Michael Dukakis at 7.5 percent, and Bill Clinton at 1.7 percent • As Democrats move leftward, primary process will set progressive policy agenda for potential 2020 Democratic administration (e.g., Medicare For All, Green New Deal, Break Up Big Tech, Wealth Tax) • Electability will trump ideological purity tests, as top priority among Democrats is beating Trump, but risk of moving too far left for general electorate remains • While not likeliest outcome, given size of the field and frontloading of primaries, there’s increased risk of brokered Democratic convention – but Democratic nominee does not need to win 50 percent of the primary votes to win the nomination © 2019 Beacon Policy Advisors LLC 7.
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