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Local Security Governance in Libya Perceptions of Security and Protection in a Fragmented Country

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Local Security Governance in Libya Perceptions of Security and Protection in a Fragmented Country Local security governance in Libya Perceptions of security and protection in a fragmented country Floor El Kamouni-Janssen CRU-Report Hamzeh Shadeedi Nancy Ezzeddine Local security governance in Libya Perceptions of security and protection in a fragmented country Floor El Kamouni-Janssen Hamzeh Shadeedi Nancy Ezzeddine CRU-Report October 2018 October 2018 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Cover photo: Bi’r al Ashhab, Libya © Wikimedia Commons, Mujaddara Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright, trademark and / or other laws. Should a user download material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, or the Clingendael Institute, for personal or non-commercial use, the user must retain all copyright, trademark or other similar notices contained in the original material or on any copies of this material. Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed, distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes, but only by mentioning the Clingendael Institute as its source. Permission is required to use the logo of the Clingendael Institute. This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute ([email protected]). The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may present trademark and copyright infringement issues: links that involve unauthorized use of our logo, framing, inline links, or metatags, as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL. About the authors Floor El Kamouni-Janssen is a Research Fellow at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. Floor’s research concentrates on security and stability in the Arab region, and specifically the political economy of Libya. In her work she focuses on the policy implications of regional trends and developments including migration and human smuggling, armed group dynamics, and violent extremism. Hamzeh Shadeedi is a Research Assistant at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. In this capacity, he focuses on local governance and security settlements in Libya. He also has an interest in security dynamics, political settlements and culture in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. Nancy Ezzeddine is a Research Assistant at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. She primarily contributes to the Levant research programme, seeking to identify the origins and functions of hybrid security arrangements and their influence on state performance and development. Nancy’s research is characterized by a mixed-methods approach, involving both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Follow us on social media @clingendaelorg The Clingendael Institute The Clingendael Institute Email: [email protected] Website: www.clingendael.org/cru Contents Acknowledgement 1 Executive summary 2 Introduction 4 2 The political context of (in)security in Libya 8 a. The national players 8 b. Local security provision 11 3 Characteristics of security provision in Libya 16 4 Key survey insights 26 5 Suggestions for policy 36 Annex Methodology brief 42 Bibliography 46 Acknowledgement It would have been impossible to put together this report without the help of a number of people who graciously shared their time, expertise and networks. The research was conducted primarily for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of Clingendael’s Sahel research programme. Our appreciation goes to Marianne Peters and Marjolein Jongman for their patience and support. The authors are grateful to Clingendael colleagues Fransje Molenaar and Anca-Elena Ursu for their relentless efforts to carry out relevant and reality-based research. Your analytical input and research assistance have been indispensable. Research that collects local perspectives on governance in Libya cannot be done without access to a network of local counterparts. A very special thank you therefore goes to the Libyan Coalition for the Constitution (LCC – a group of 12 Libyan non- governmental organisations and their partner organisations), whose members are committed to strengthening local governance and building a stable and prosperous Libya. You have been an inspiration and your help in designing and conducting this survey is greatly appreciated. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Anne-Marie Brinkman and Douwe Edwin Buis (Bureau Ensemble) and Isam Saidi who introduced us to the LCC, and who shared their own experiences, energy and knowledge with us in the process. Lastly, the report greatly benefited from excellent peer reviews by Isam Saidi, Mark Micallef (Senior Fellow at The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime), Megan Price (Head of the Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law), Erwin van Veen and Fransje Molenaar (both Senior Research Fellows at the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit). Thanks to all of you. It remains to be emphasised that responsibility for the contents of the report, and any errors or ommissions, is the authors’ alone. 1 Executive summary Libya currently has no central government that is legitimate, effective or both. As a result, alternative informal power settlements have taken shape across the country, and these have begun to provide core government functions. In many areas in Libya, the ‘state’ is present through its formal institutions, but has to share authority, legitimacy and capacity with informal power brokers such as tribal elders, military councils and militias. This research presented in this report focuses on local security governance in Libya, which is in the hands of a mix of political, armed and social actors with distinctive roots and interests and with various levels of authority, legitimacy and effectiveness. It specifically looks at how protection and security are organized, and by whom. More than an analysis of local actors and their relationship with the central state, this report offers an exploration of citizens’ experiences and perceptions of local security provision. To grasp such perspectives, the report is based on a household survey on safety and security conducted in various municipalities in Libya. The survey results demonstrate the need to stretch the understanding of how local governance functions beyond formal institutions. A majority of the 144 respondents says that local actors provide security in their municipality, not national ones like the governments in Tripoli and Tobruk. Moreover, security is provided by a combination of formal actors, like security directorates, as well as informal ones, like tribes. Many respondents also say that armed groups are most powerful, and sometimes necessary for protection, but that does not earn armed groups much legitimacy. Instead, respondents overwhelmingly say that formal bodies, like the municipal council and security directorates, are considered most legitimate. Tribes are also trusted as a backstop safety net, particularly in municipalities with homogenous power structures. The report therefore emphasizes that, in order to be effective and conflict-sensitive, any policy and programming in Libya requires up-to-date knowledge of local power arrangements and the political economies in which programmes are implemented. Besides formal bodies, trusted informal security providers should be taken into account as well, particularly when they work with municipal councils. It is advisable that the international community holds on to its commitment to engage with democratically elected civilian bodies and focuses its attention on existing security institutions like the security directorates, not in the least because a majority of Libyans wants that. But at the same time, it can be argued that in practice policy programming requires contact and engagement with the full spectrum of local governance providers, even with informal groups that are unaligned with the internationally backed government and 2 Local security governance in Libya | CRU-Report, October 2018 which may have dubious track records, in order to achieve tangible results. This is not to say that the power of non-state armed groups should be left unaddressed. Because most respondents see informal armed groups (militia) as one of the main problems of Libya, breaking the power of informal armed groups, for example by disconnecting economic opportunity from armed group membership, should be an essential part of policy programming. Finally, this report argues that the international assistance community should tune in to Libyan community organizations from across the country to understand local governance configurations, and to harvest their ideas on legitimate security governance. Map of Libya 3 Introduction This report aims to provide an insight into how the fragmentation of power in post- Qadhafi Libya has shaped different local security governance structures across the country, and how these are perceived and experienced by ordinary Libyans. Security is the most basic service that Libyans require and is seen as a prerequisite for restoring stability and for extending the presence and improving the effectiveness of governance in Libya.1 But in the absence of a unified and effective central government, alternative informal power settlements have taken shape across the country, and these have begun to provide the core functions that the missing state should assume. Such forms of local governance stem from the fact ‘that local communities are not passive in the face
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