Update of the Situation in and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Restricted Use and Circulation

Update on the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations

This report has been produced by UNHCR from information obtained from a variety of publicly available sources, analyses and comments. The report is intended for reference for those involved in the asylum determination process and concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum claims lodged in various jurisdictions. The information contained does not purport to be either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed nor conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Incomplete, inaccurate or incorrect information cannot be ruled out. The inclusion of information in this report does not constitute an endorsement of the information and the views of third parties included in the report. Neither does such information necessarily represent statements of policy or views of UNHCR or the United Nations.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Geneva June 2005

1 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms...... 5 I. The Situation in Afghanistan...... 6 1. General Background ...... 6 2. Political Developments ...... 8 The Transition Process ...... 8 The Emergency ...... 10 The Constitutional Loya Jirga and the Constitution...... 11 The Presidential Elections ...... 13 Preparations for Parliamentary Elections...... 15 The New President and Nomination of Cabinet...... 17 Political Parties ...... 18 The Justice System ...... 20 3. The Security and Human Rights Situation...... 22 General...... 22 The Presence and Role of International Security Forces ...... 24 The Formation of Afghan Security Forces...... 25 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ...... 27 Commanders ...... 28 Transitional Justice...... 29 4. The Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Situation...... 31 Food Security ...... 32 and Drinking Water...... 32 Education ...... 33 Mines and Unexploded Ordinance ...... 33 Land and Housing...... 34 The Situation in Urban Centers ...... 36 The Situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) ...... 37 5. Return of Afghans from Neighbouring and Non-Neighbouring Countries...... 37 Assisted Voluntary Repatriation Summary ...... 38 Returns From and ...... 39 Returns From Non-Neighbouring Countries ...... 40 General Considerations on Return ...... 41 II. International Protection Considerations With Regard to Afghan Asylum-Seekers and Refugees...... 43 1. General Considerations...... 43 2. Considerations for Specified Groups Relevant to the Determination of Refugee Status Under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ...... 44 Afghans Perceived as Critical of Factions or Individuals Exercising Control Over an Area ...... 44

2 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghans Associated with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan ...... 45 Journalists...... 47 Afghans Associated With the or Other Groups Opposed to the Current Transition Process...... 48 Afghans in Areas Where They Constitute an Ethnic Minority...... 49 Afghans Belonging to Religious Minorities (Ismailis)...... 50 Afghans Belonging to Religious Minorities (Hindu/Sikh)...... 50 Converts ...... 51 Women of Specific Profiles ...... 52 Homosexuals ...... 55 Afghans Working for International Organizations and International Security Forces ...... 55 Landowners...... 56 3. Considerations Concerning Exclusion on the Basis of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees...... 56 Members of the Security Forces of the Communist Regimes...... 57 Specific Commanders and Members of Afghan Armed Factions and Militia Forces...... 58 Specific Members and Commanders of the Taliban Movement...... 58 4. Considerations Relating to Complementary Forms of Protection ...... 59 5. Humanitarian Considerations...... 61 Unaccompanied Females...... 61 Single Parents With Small Children and Without Bread-Winner...... 61 Unaccompanied Elderly...... 61 Unaccompanied Children ...... 62 Victims of Serious Trauma (Including Rape)...... 62 Physically Disabled Persons...... 63 Mentally Disabled Persons...... 63 Persons with Medical Illness (Contagious, Long Term or Short Term)...... 63 6. Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative...... 66 7. Considerations Relating to Cessation on the Basis of Article 1 C (5) of the 1951 Convention...... 68 Annex 1 – Afghan Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Returnees: Global Trends ...... 71 A. Refugee Population...... 71 B. Asylum Applications...... 72 C. Asylum and Refugee Status Determination...... 73 D. Others of Concern to UNHCR...... 73 Annex 2 – List of Candidates (With Two Candidates for Vice-Presidents Each) for the Presidential Elections and Election Results...... 78 Annex 3 – Short Biographies of the Members of the Afghan Cabinet...... 81 Annex 4 – List of Political Parties, Unofficial Translation of Their Names to English and the Status of Registration With the Ministry of Justice (November 2004)...... 86

3 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 5 – State Information Service (Khadamate Ettelaate Dowlati; “KHAD”)...... 92 1. Introduction...... 92 2. The Political Role of KHAD...... 93 3. KHAD’s Tasks...... 94 4. KHAD’s Structure ...... 95 5. KHAD Influence in Justice and Legal System ...... 99 6. KHAD Detention Centers ...... 100 7. KHAD During 1992- 2001 ...... 101 Annex 6 – Chronology of Displacement From and Within Afghanistan Between April 1978 and March 2002...... 105 Annex 7 – Bibliography...... 118 Annex 8 – Maps...... 123 1. Complementary Forms of Protection – Afghanistan – May 2005...... 123 2. Ethnic Composition ...... 124 3. Afghanistan – IDP Caseload - May 2005 ...... 125 4. Afghanistan – UNHCR Assisted Repatriation – March 2002- December 2004 ...... 126

4 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

List of Acronyms

AIHRC – Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission ANBP – Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme AREU – Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit BICC – Bonn International Centre for Conversion CSO – Central Statistics Office of Afghanistan GDI – Gender-related Development Index IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons IED – Improvised Explosive Devices ICBL – International Campaign to Ban Landmines ISAF – International Security Assistance Force MICS – Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey MRRD – Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNDAF – United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP – United Nations Development Programme UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCA – Office for Coordinating Relief in Afghanistan UNSMA – United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan

5 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

I. The Situation in Afghanistan

1. General Background

Afghanistan is a land-locked country of 647,500 square kilometers. It shares borders of 5,529 kilometers with six neighboring states: Pakistan (2,430 km, (1,206 km), Iran (936 km), Turkmenistan (744 km), Uzbekistan (137 km) and China (76 km). The country is mountainous with only 12 % of arable land, 3 % of land under forest cover and about 46% under permanent pastures.

Exact population figures are not available, but estimates put the number of the population at 24 millions Afghans, the majority of whom reside in rural areas (71,2%). Some 28,8% are living in urban areas and the population growth rate is estimated to be 2,5% per year.1 Until recently, an estimated 80 to 85% of the Afghan population was estimated to depend directly or indirectly on agriculture, a feature which may now be changing. About four million Afghans still live abroad, the majority in the two neighboring countries of Iran (close to 1 million registered Afghans) and Pakistan (3, 04 million as at March 2005).

The country is administratively divided into 34 provinces (with 2 new provinces, Panjshir and Daikundi) and 397 districts.2 Based on the existing legal system, the administration is organized as follows:

• A province is the largest administrative unit led by a Governor (Waali), generally appointed or confirmed by the central authority. Governors report to the Minister of Interior. One Governor, the Governor of , Habiba Surabi, is a woman. • Districts (Woluswali) and municipal wards are decentralized administrative units within a province, normally headed by district administrators. 34 provinces and 361 districts and municipal wards (as well as district centers without ward) are, according to Presidential Decree No. 36 of 05 June 2004, recognized as electoral constituencies.3 • Villages form the basic communities within every district, nahiyas in the cities, which are sub-divided into neighbourhoods (gozars).

1 United Nations Development Programme, Afghanistan – National Human Development Report 2004, UNDP, 21 February 2005. See www.undp. org.af/nhdr_04/NHDR04.htm. 2 68 of the districts can, at present, not be mapped, as the exact boundaries are not yet determined; Decree of President Karzai, No. 36, 5 June 2004, for determining electoral constituencies (Hawzah) of the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People of the National Assembly); see Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2; Article 11 of the Electoral Law enacted by Presidential Decree No. 28 on the Adoption of the Electoral Law, 27 May 2004, see www.unama-afg.org/. 3 However, the delimitation of district electoral boundaries revealed disputes over the definition of districts in Afghanistan and difficulties in reconciling established pre-war administrative districts with de-facto districts, which were established during the war and to which administrators had been appointed. The Cabinet therefore recently decided that the National Assembly would need to settle this complex issue. As a result, district council elections were postponed, see Report of the Secretary-General, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for International Peace and Security”, A/59/744, dated 18 March 2005. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD5 (forthcoming).

6 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Social institutions at community level in Afghanistan vary from region to region in function and structure and are commonly referred to as jirga or shura. These structures were and continue to be convened as ad hoc groups of respected persons within a community, district, province and national level for functions such as resolution of disputes, organization of collective action and matters of national interest. Such shuras or jirgas can also represent tribes, two or more communities or interact at district, province and national levels with government authorities.4

The new Constitution of Afghanistan officially recognizes shuras/jirgas and accords them constitutional status, at the district and at provincial level. According to the provisions of the Constitution, these structures will be established as district and provincial councils through free, general, secret and direct elections of their members for a period of three years and will be involved in local administration, albeit their functions not as yet further defined. Nomadic population participation is also guaranteed and will be regulated by law.

The Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) is the highest organ of the manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan. Based on the Constitution, a Loya Jirga is composed of the members of the National Assembly as well as chairpersons of the provincial and district councils. The Ministers, Chief Justice and members of the Supreme Court can participate in the sessions of the Loya Jirga without the right to vote. A Loya Jirga can be convened,

• when there is need to take decision on the issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and supreme interest of the country, • to amend the provisions of the Constitution • to prosecute the President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Official languages are (Persian dialect), spoken by 50% of the population and Pashtu (38%).5 The Constitution further stipulates that Turkic languages; Uzbeki,

Turkmen as well as Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri (alsana) are – in addition to Dari and Pashtu – the third official languages in areas where the majority speaks them. These languages as well as other dialects are spoken by about 12 % of the population.

In terms of ethnic composition, which is considered to have become an increasingly defining feature during the Constitutional Loya Jirga and also the presidential elections, Afghanistan’s population is rich and diverse:

4 For further details on the functioning of these jirgas or shuras, see also a report by the International Legal Foundation, “The Customary Laws of Afghanistan” – September 2004 http://www.theilf.org/ reports.html 5“From among the languages of Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani, Pamiri (alsana), Arab and other languages spoken in the country, Pashto and Dari are the official languages of the state,” Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 16, Year 1382 (4 January 2004); see Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2.

7 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

• The are the largest group (about 38%) and are divided into two main subgroups of Durrani and Ghilzai (besides further sub-groups and tribes within these two). While most of the Pashtuns are settlers, some of them, the Kuchis, lead a semi-nomadic or nomadic life, based on animal husbandry. • The (about 25%) are Persian (Dari)-speaking Afghans. • (about 19%), (about 6%), Turkmen, Baluch, Pashai, Nuristani, Aymaks, Arab, Qirghiz, , Gujur, Brahwui and others (12%).

The new Afghan constitution refers to these different ethnic groups, which “comprise the nation of Afghanistan”6 and stipulates “equality among all ethnic groups and tribes.”7

Islam is the official , as stipulated in Article 2 of the Constitution.8 It is practiced by a majority of Sunni Muslims (84%) as well as by the Shi’a (including a smaller group of Ismaili). Afghanistan is home to minority Hindus and Sikhs. Followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of the new Constitution and laws.9

2. Political Developments

The Transition Process

A combination of US and coalition-bombing, ground military actions, which started on 7 October 2001, military support to Afghan factions and other commanders belonging to and the retreat or hand-over of power by the Taliban to local groups resulted in the effective collapse of the Taliban regime. Some Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements escaped, largely into border-areas with Pakistan, where they set-up bases and re-grouped. There, military activities in response to infiltration of anti-government elements are continuing by US and Coalition-forces, at times jointly with Afghan national forces.

On 13 November 2001, the Taliban left and by the end of November 2001, this withdrawal had created a power vacuum in many parts of Afghanistan. Mujaheddin factions, mainly the members of the Northern Alliance that were fighting against the Taliban, re-occupied territories and governmental institutions that they controlled before the Taliban. The entry into Kabul of the Northern Alliance forces constituted the de-facto occupation of the capital by a single group, the Jamiat-e-Islami party. However, under pressure from the international community, the Northern Alliance agreed to take part in planned talks, under UN-auspices, in Bonn with other delegations, considered to represent segments of the Afghan population, in particular those involved in Afghan peace – initiatives. The UN Talks in Bonn (Petersburg) which started on 27 November

6 Art. 4, Constitution of Afghanistan, see Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2 7 Art. 6, Constitution of Afghanistan, see Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2. 8 “The religion of the state of the Islamic is the sacred religion of Islam.” 9 “Followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law”, Article 2, second sentence, Constitution of Afghanistan.

8 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

2001 under the Chairmanship of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, resulted in the signing of the “Agreement on Provisional “Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent Government Institutions” (Bonn Agreement) by the delegations to the UN Talks.10

The Bonn Agreement regulates the future political framework of Afghanistan and provided the legal framework for Interim and Transitional periods and an outline for the process towards a new Constitution, Presidential election and establishment of permanent government structures in Afghanistan, including new security forces. The agreement also provides for the formation of an independent human rights commission, a civil service reform commission and a judicial reform commission. The Security Council in its Resolution 1383 (2001) of 6 December 2001 endorsed the “Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent governmental institutions”.11

As a first step in the transition period outlined by the Bonn Agreement, the leader of Jamiat-e-Islami and former , , officially transferred power to the Interim Authority and its Chairperson, . The Interim Administration was inaugurated on 22 December 2001 and worked until 21 June 2002. It included 28 members (including two women), who each headed a Ministry.

The Bonn Agreement foresaw the establishment of several commissions, that is, a judicial Reform Commission12, a Civil Service Commission13 and the Afghan Indepen- dent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), an independent human rights commission with the primary functions of human rights monitoring, investigation of human rights violations, and human rights institution building.14 The main objective of establishing the commission was to create an effective, credible and sustainable national independent

10 A copy of the Agreement was submitted by the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, S/2001/1154, 5 December 2001. See Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2 and CD5. 11 United Nations Security Council, “Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent governmental institutions”, S/RES/1383 (2001), Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5. 12 No. 153, “Formation of the Judicial Reform Commission and its duties” dated 11.08.1381 (2 November 2002), Working Translation, on www.idlo.int/afghanlaws/. 13 The Civil Service Reform Commission was established by Presidential Decree No. 257, dated 23 June 2002 (2/3/1381). The Commission was later renamed the ‘Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission’ and its mandate revised by Presidential Decree No. 26 of 16 June 2003 (20/3/1382) on organizing and implementing the Administrative Reform Programme within Ministries and other governmental agencies and a regulation on the functions and activities of the Commission passed. Its mandate includes the lustration and vetting, disqualification of unqualified officials, formation and reorganization of government institutions, recruitment, transfer and remuneration of staff, establishment of improved standards for working conditions, training of staff and arbitration of salary and employment disputes. The Commission is required to remain neutral with respect to political, regional and ethnic linkages and to work towards a civil service sector free of corruption and preferential treatment. This proved very difficult to date, but the new Constitution provides a strong basis for the reform of the civil sector. Decrees No. 26 can also be found on www.idlo.int/afghanlaws/. 14 The “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions”, 5 December 2001; Section C, Article 6.

9 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

human rights institution15 and an enhanced national capacity to promote and protect human rights. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was further defined through the issuance of a presidential decree16 in June 2002, and was anchored in the new Constitution of Afghanistan.17 Legislation to replace the decree is being prepared. According to the decree: The Commission shall be charged with developing a national plan of action for human rights in Afghanistan, and with human rights monitoring, investigation of violations of human rights (…), in accordance with the terms of the Bonn Agreement, and applicable international human rights norms, standards and conventions (...).18 The AIHRC has meanwhile established seven regional and three provincial offices throughout the country, to promote the rights of women and children, provide human rights education, work on transitional justice and documenting and follow-up on human rights complaints received by its investigation and monitoring department. They have become a very active player, regularly raising human rights issues and making recommendations to address these, including through a verification of political rights campaign, jointly with UNAMA, during the pre-election period.19

The Emergency Loya Jirga

As foreseen in the Bonn agreement, within one month of the establishment of the Interim Authority, a Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga was established to organize the traditional assembly. The Emergency Loya Jirga (ELJ) took place between 11 and 19 June 2002 with some 1700 participants, the majority of whom were elected and 400 selected by the Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga in cooperation with the United Nations. The Emergency Loya Jirga voted for Hamid Karzai to chair the transitional administration, but all other members of the government were not subject to vote, which many delegates objected to. After difficult negotiations, the new government was named by Hamid Karzai and the Emergency Loya Jirga officially ended the interim authority and established a new Transitional Authority (named Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan). The UN Security Council welcomed the successful convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga and noted with particular satisfaction the large participation of women, as well as the representation of all ethnic and religious communities.20 Others noted that the process

15 To be constitutionally established as a national human rights institution meeting the international standards contained in the Paris Principles (United Nations Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions, General Assembly resolution of 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/134, 4 March 1994; Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5). 16 Decree of the Presidency of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan on the Establishment of an Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, 6 June 2002, www.aihrc.org.af/decreeofp. htm 17 Article 58, Constitution of Afghanistan. 18 Decree of the Presidency of the Interim Administration of Afghanistan on the Establishment of an Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, 6 June 2002; Article 2. 19 See www.aihrc.org.af. 20 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1419(2002), 26 June 2002, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5.

10 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

was “marred by intimidation, violence, bribery, and harassment of delegates by local warlords.”21

The interim administration moved towards the compliance of Afghanistan with international law. During the interim phase, the country signed the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against women (CEDAW) and the Rome Treaty, establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the national level, laws adopted by previous regimes that were contradictory to the principles of human rights were abrogated.22 The government, within this transition period, is faced with the huge challenge to overcome the lack of tradition of a central Government in Afghanistan, where authority has traditionally been and remains widely dispersed among tribes, factions and local military strongmen, who draw support along ethnic lines.23

The Constitutional Loya Jirga and the Constitution

After a process of national consultations, a Constitutional Loya Jirga took place in mid December and led to the adoption of a new Constitution after three weeks of negotiations, on 3 January 2004. By adopting the traditional council format, it was possible to involve all factions and to achieve a high degree of confidence in both the process itself and the outcomes.24

The constitutional process had international support and involved a wide range of political actors and Afghan citizens. As foreseen in the Bonn Agreement, a Constitutional Drafting commission was convened in November 2002. A public consultation process under the auspices of the larger Constitutional Review Commission began work in June 2003, before a published draft was available and continued the process until July 2003.

Based on the Presidential Decree on convening the Constitutional Loya Jirga,25 of the 502 delegates to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, 52 were presidential appointments and 450 were elected by district representatives who had themselves been elected prior to the Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002. Some 15,000 of these district representatives were re- registered, and served as the electorate that voted for the Constitutional Loya Jirga delegates. The average national registration was 82 percent, though this varied from provincial highs of 96% in Khost and Samangan to 59% and 61% in Zabul and Kandahar respectively. The delegates were from every province, and from communities such as Kuchis, Hindus, Sikhs, refugees, IDPs and the disabled as well as other minority groups.

21 Sedra Mark, “Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan”, by Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Bonn 2002, Paper 25, p. 7 22 Decree No. 66, dated 16.11 1380 (6 January 2002), by President H. Karzai. 23 Sedra Mark, “Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,” BICC Paper 25, Bonn, 2002. 24 Under the Afghan Constitution agreed in January 2004, the Loya Jirga remains the “highest manifestation of the people of Afghanistan”. 25 Presidential Decree on the Convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, dated 14.04.1382/15. July 2003; see www.unama-afg.org under non-UN documents, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

11 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Women’s political participation increased with women delegates comprising approximately 20 per cent of the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

The Loya Jirga reached early consensus on some 120 of the 160 Articles of the draft constitution, but it saw difficult debate and hard bargaining on a number of issues. Many of these were issues such as the structure of the government, including central and regional authority, the role of the courts in the constitutional review and the powers of the judiciary versus the executive and parliament. The government structure provided for in the draft included a directly elected president, a prime minister, a two-chamber parliament (National Assembly), and the constitutional court, while President Karzai and many other Afghans were pursuing the establishment of a presidential system. Other issues related to local and national identity, including various language-related issues. The majority of the Pashtun delegates were particularly intent on redressing some of the perceived political marginalization over the last two years.

In the end, in order to arrive at a text that all could accept, the delegates made compromises and concessions and ratified the Constitution. One main discussion was the government system of a strong presidential versus a strong parliamentary system, with the Pashtun delegates for the former and non-Pashtuns favoring the latter.26 As a result, the proposed strong Presidential system was revised to give the National Assembly greater oversight over Presidential appointments of ministers, in particular. Another debated issue was the dual nationality of ministers with a call for a ban on dual citizenship from large numbers of delegates.27 This was also resolved by compromise, in that a minister holding dual citizenship nominated by the President will have to pass a parliamentary vote. A major debate during the Constitutional Loya Jirga concerned the status of Islam in Afghanistan’s future constitution,28 including the role of women. As a result, while the Constitution stipulates equality of men and women and requires an unqualified respect of international human rights obligations, it also stipulates that “no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan”.29

It further stipulates, in its chapter on the judiciary, that the courts shall rule, “in pursuance of jurisprudence” and “within the limits set by [the] Constitution”, where there is no provision in the Constitution or laws.30 Some are concerned, that these provisions could “facilitate punitive adultery laws and could be used to block measures to protect women’s equal rights in divorce and inheritance.”31

26 Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 3, July 2004, p. 11. 27 Charlotta Gall, New York Times, 31 December 2003. 28 See Barnett R. Rubin’s analysis op. cit. 26. 29 Article 3, Constitution of Afghanistan. 30 Article 131, Constitution of Afghanistan, except for personal matters involving followers of the Shi’a sect, where there jurisprudence shall be applied in such cases 31 Human Rights Watch, “Between Hope and Fear – Intimidations and Attacks against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan”, October 2004. See www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan1004/

12 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The Presidential Elections

Based on the Bonn Agreement, presidential and parliamentary elections were due to be held within two years of the convening the Emergency Loya Jirga, i.e. not later than 11 June 2004 with UN support to the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. In order to fulfill this commitment, the UN and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan established a Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), an independent institution comprised of national and international members, with the mandate to conduct voter registration and hold elections.

An Interim Electoral Commission and Joint Electoral Management Body were established by Presidential Decree on 11 November 2003 to facilitate and organize the registration of voters and the election process. An Electoral Law was passed by the Cabinet on 27 May 2004, the first of its kind in the history of the country. Further legislative measures adopted to pave the way to elections included a Law on Political Parties, a Law on Mass Media32, Regulation on the Participation of Political Parities in Registration, Regulations Governing the Registration of Political Parties33 as well as a Presidential Decrees on Arrangement for Holding Elections during the Transitional Period and on Electoral Constituencies.34

Starting in December 2003, the JEMB-run voter-registration process established some 4,200 registration sites throughout the country, which issued a total of 10, 5 million Afghans with voter registration cards. Of the total number of persons registered, about 41, 3% per cent are women. Both, presidential elections and parliamentary elections were scheduled to take place in September 2004, subject to availability of funds, satisfactory levels of voter registration and the maintenance of security. The electoral system chosen was that of single non transferable vote.35 On 9 July 2004, the JEMB announced that presidential and parliamentary elections would, after all, be held on different dates. The presidential elections were scheduled to take place on 9 October, with parliamentary elections scheduled the following year in Sawr, which is April/May 2005. This decision came after consultation with representatives of political parties registered with the Ministry of Justice, with the president and cabinet ministers as well as numerous delegations, elders, Ulemas and representatives of local communities. Many expressed concern with regard to a lack of progress in disarmament, particularly the potential impact this would have on parliamentary elections.

32 The Law on Mass Media was approved by Decree No. 4, dated 31 March 2004 and can be found on www.unama-afg.org under Non-UN documents. 33 Most election-related laws can be found on www.unama-afg.org/docs/Docs.htm as well as on www.jemb.org/eng/legislation.html 34 Decree No. 36 on Determining Electoral Constituencies (Hawzah) of the Wolesi Jirga, of 16/3/1382 (5 June 2004), see www.jemb.org/eng/legislation.html 35 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary General, A/58/868 of 12 August 2004, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5.

13 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

In accordance with electoral law, 23 individuals, including one woman, announced their candidacy for presidential elections and introduced two “running mates” for vice- presidents on 29 July 2004. The final list of eighteen eligible candidates was confirmed by JEMB and announced on 10 August 2004. The public was given the opportunity to register their objections. Three out of 23 candidates were rejected by the Electoral Body and two withdrew their candidacies. Candidates were required prove they had the support of at least 10,000 voters.

President Hamid Karzai introduced Ahmad Zia Massood instead of Defense Minister, Marshal Fahim, and , the head of the Hezb-e-Wahdat as his two vice- presidential running mates. Yunos Qanuni resigned from his post as education minister and announced he would challenge Hamed Karzai. Both Defense Minister Fahim and Foreign Minister Abdallah Abdallah pledged support for Qanuni. Meanwhile other leading members of the Northern Alliance, including former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, and the leader of Ittehad-e Islami, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, expressed support for Hamid Karzai and choice of his first running mate Ahmad Zia Masud (also Rabbani’s son-in-law).36

Positive developments during voter registration and preparations were contrasted by an increasingly tense security situation. While the overall pattern of incidents has not dramatically changed, attacks have increased in frequency and escalated in gravity. The main targets of these attacks have been national security forces, electoral and government officials, and staff of national and international organizations, in addition to reports of threats and political repression experienced by the general population.37 There was a sharp rise in the number of attacks on elections workers and voter registration centers, particularly in the southern and southeastern parts of the country in the run up to the presidential election. During the nine-month voter-registration campaign, 12 election workers were killed and 30 wounded.38 In one incident alone, in Uruzgan, a further 16 Afghan civilians returning home from registration, were killed.39 In response to the rise in the level of violence, the Afghan Defense Ministry increased the number of military personnel from 13,000 to 16,000 ahead of the presidential election, to work alongside ISAF and Coalition forces.40 Security for the elections was closely co-ordinated between the Ministries of Interior and Defense, the National Security Directorate, ISAF, Coalition forces and UNAMA.

The elections passed without major security incidents and overwhelming participation by Afghans throughout the country. Initial confusion on election-day was caused by

36 Afghan Islamic Press, , 26 July 2004 37 Human Rights Watch, “The Rule of the Gun – Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-up to Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections”, September 2004. See www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/ afghanistan0904/. 38 Special representative for Afghanistan, “Statement to the Security Council by Jean Arnault, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan”, 25 August 2004. See www.unama- afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2004/04aug25.htm. 39 Jawid Ludin, Afghan Government Spokesman, News Conference, Kabul, 10 August 2004. 40 Defense Ministry Spokesman General Zaher Azimi, Radio Afghanistan, 1 August 2004.

14 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

technical problems with the indelible ink to mark voter’s thumbs. The ink used in many polling stations could be washed off. However, after some hours of interruption of the voting process in some polling stations, the elections continued. The JEMB announced that they would establish an independent panel to investigate allegations of fraud and examine complaints. Election-observer missions, such as the OSCE Election Support Team concurred with the decision to proceed with the elections and stated that demands to nullify the elections were not justified. “Such action would also put into question the expressed will of millions of Afghan citizens who came out to vote, carried out voter registration and manned the polling stations despite great personal risk.”41 In the days following the elections, all candidates accepted this approach. The counting therefore proceeded, with questionable ballots being quarantined and subjected to scrutiny.

On 3 November 2004, Hamid Karzai was officially declared the winner of Afghanistan’s first-ever democratic presidential election with a five-year mandate. The announcement was made by the Joint Electoral Management Body, after the 3-member independent panel concluded that any irregularities that existed “could not have materially affected the overall result of the election.” Hamid Karzai received 55.4% of the 8,024,536 valid votes cast.42 As he was elected with more than 51% of the votes, a second round of elections was not necessary. Three other presidential candidates benefited from significant levels of support, namely Yunous Qanouni (16.3%), Haji Mohammad Muhaqiq (11.7%) and (10%). Of the other 14 candidates, three received between 1% and 2% of the vote. One of these was the only female candidate, Masouda Jalal, who received 91,415 votes, representing 1.1% of the electorate.43

In many of the provinces there was strong support for candidates of the ethnic group corresponding to that of the majority of the population in the province. This indicates that voting took place along ethnic lines and presents a challenge for the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

Preparations for Parliamentary Elections

To complete the transition period, as outlined in the Bonn Agreement, parliamentary elections are yet to take place. They comprise of elections for the two houses of parliament, the National Assembly, namely, elections for the Wolesi Jirga, the House of the People, and the formation of the Meshrano Jirga, the House of the Elders, of which two thirds of its members will be indirectly elected through provincial and district councils and one third of its members will be appointed by the President.

According to the Constitution, 44 the National Assembly of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan will be the highest legislative organ and manifest the will of the people and

41 Statement by the OSCE Election Support Team, Kabul, in “Voter Registration and Elections Update”, p. 19, 10 October 2004. See www.elections-afghanistan.org.af also can now be accessed through www.jemb.org under “Presidential elections”. 42 www.afg-electionresults.org now accessible also through www.jemb.org under “Presidential elections”. 43 Karzai, “Vote empowered Afghan women, real winners are the people”, AFP, 28 October 2004. 44 See Chapter Five, Articles 81 to 85, Constitution of Afghanistan.

15 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

represent the entire nation. The Wolesi Jirga, in particular, will be the body to discuss, approve or reject laws, make decisions on the state budget, question ministers, review and investigate actions of the Government.

The Wolesi Jirga will have 249 seats allocated among the 34 provinces in proportion to their population with 10 seats reserved for representatives of the nomadic Kuchi population of Afghanistan.45 The members of the Wolesi Jirga will be elected through free, general, secret and direct ballot. The electoral system will be that of a Single Non- Transferable Vote. According to this electoral system, voters will select one candidate from those listed in the ballot and the candidates with the highest votes will fill the seats allocated for their constituency, that is, their province of residence. 68 seats have been reserved for women, with at least two women from each province, except for provinces with only one seat in total. While political parties will have the opportunity to endorse candidates, the candidates will run as individuals.

The Meshrano Jirga will comprise 102 members, 34 of whom will be indirectly elected by Provincial Councils, 34 by District Councils and 34 will be appointed by the President. Provincial Councils will elect one member to the Meshrano Jirga for a four year term. The President will appoint 50% women as well as two members from the handicapped community and two members of the Kuchi community. For the establishment of the House of Elders, there have to be direct elections of Provincial Councils and District Councils, who then, in turn, elect representatives to the House of Elders. The Provincial Councils will advise the provincial administration and co-operate in the development of the province. Its size will be determined by the population of the province and will be between 9 and 29 members, who will be directly elected. As for District Councils, given the difficulties in delimiting district electoral boundaries, the Cabinet decided that the National Assembly would need to settle this complex issue.46 Therefore, District Council elections will be delayed and the Meshrano Jirga may be formed without the 34 District Council representatives.

Preparations for parliamentary elections started early in 2005 with the formation and appointment through Presidential Decrees of the Independent Election Commission (IEC),47 which together with four international electoral experts forms the Joint Electoral

45 The Wolesi Jirga will be composed of 249 seats of which 10 seats have been reserved for representatives of the Kuchi (nomadic) population. The remaining 239 seats have been distributed proportional to the population of each province, with a minimum of 2 seats per province. Population figures for each province are based on estimates obtained by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) of Afghanistan. The seat distribution can be found on www.jemb.org. 46 “In view of the technical obstacles in holding District elections this year, the date for those elections will be established once the elected Wolesi Jirga has resolved the outstanding issues relating to the formation, recognition, and boundaries of districts”, JEMB Decision 2005-3, dated 19 March 2005. See www.jemb.org/eng/Decision%202005/2005-3.pdf. 47 Decree No. 24 by the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan On the Formation of the Independent Election Commission, dated 24 January 2005, Decree No. 23 of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Structure and Working Procedure of the Independent Election Commission, dated 24 January 2004, www.jemb.org/eng/Legal%20Framework/Decree%20on%20the%20Establishment %20of%20the%20IAEC%20(English)2005.pdf.

16 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Management Body (JEMB). The election date for both the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People of the National Assembly) as well as the Provincial Councils was set for Sunday 18 September 2005.48 The revised electoral law was passed.49 Following the candidate nomination period in May 2005, the final list of candidates for the Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Councils was announced by the JEMB on 12 July 2005.50 Candidates must be citizens of Afghanistan or have obtained citizenship at least ten years ago, must not be convicted of a crime against humanity, or a crime, or have been deprived of their civil rights by a court and be at least 25 years old (Wolesi Jirga) or 35 years old (Meshrano Jirga). Article 15 of the Electoral Law further specifies the following candidacy requirements: Individuals shall not be qualified to candidate themselves for presidential, national assembly, provincial, or district council elections, unless they have resigned from their positions as Chief Justice, Members of the Supreme Court and Judges, Attorney General and Public Prosecutors; Ministers and their Deputies, Governors and their Deputies, and District, Administrators, Mayors and Nahia Administrators, Members of Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and the General Directorate for National Security, General Directors and Directors of Ministerial Departments and Government Offices at the Central and Provincial Level; and Electoral Officials. In addition, Individuals who practically command or are members of unofficial military forces or armed groups shall not be qualified to candidate themselves for the elections. Candidates are required to present 300 (for Wolesi Jirga) and 200 (for Provincial Council) signatures of voters respectively from their constituency and sign a Code of Conduct. A further period for updating voter registration is taking place, inter alia, to allow Afghans who have returned to Afghanistan since the registration of voters closed prior to the Presidential Elections to register.

The New President and Nomination of Cabinet

The inauguration of President Hamid Karzai, as the first elected President of Afghanistan, and his two vice-presidents, Ahmed Zia Massoud and Abdul Karim Khalili, took place on 7 December 2004 in a ceremony in Kabul, which was transmitted live by radio and television and followed by thousands of Afghans across the country. The formation of the new Cabinet took almost two months. On 23 December 2004, President Hamid Karzai announced the new Afghan Cabinet of 27 Ministers.51 The list of the 27 Ministers reflects an ethnic balance: It includes 10 Pashtuns, 8 Tajiks, 5 Hazaras, 2 Usbeks, 1 Turkmen and 1 Baloch. 52 Three ministers are women. The cabinet is largely comprises educated individuals without “personal followings”, and, with the exception of two ministers, no

48 JEMB Decision 2005-3 dated 19 March 2005 See www.jemb.org. 49 The Electoral Law can be found on www.jemb.org. 50 The final list of candidates can be found on www.jemb.org./cnlists/provisional/index.html. 51 See Annex 3 for short biographies of the members of the Afghan cabinet. 52 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Fifty-ninth session, A/59/744-S/2005/183, 18 March 2005. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD5 (forthcoming).

17 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

former commanders. While it was generally well received in the Afghan media, some consider that it “signals the predomination in the elite of English-speaking Pashtuns”:53

• , Commerce and Senior Advisor to the President • Dr. , Foreign Affairs • Ali Ahmad Jalali, Interior • Gen. , National Defence • Dr. Zalmai Rassool, National Security Adviser • Noor Mohammad Qarqin, Education • Dr. Anwaar-ul-Haq Ahadi, Finance • Dr. Mir Mohammed Amin Farhang, Economy • Dr. Enayatullah Qasemi, Transport • Amirzai Sangeen, Communications, Pashtun • Mir Mohammed Sediq, Mines and Industries • Moahmmed Ismail Khan, Energy • Suhrab Ali Safari, Public Works • Yusuf Pashtun, Urban Development • Obaidullah Ramin, Agriculture and Food • Mohammed , Justice • Dr. Sayed Amir Shah Hassanyar, Higher Education • Dr. Sayed Makhdoom Rahin, Information and Culture • Dr. Sayed , Public Health • Prof. Nematullah Shahrani, Haj and Religious Affairs • Abdul Karim Barahawi, Borders and Tribal Affairs • Masooda Jalal, Women’s Affairs • Sayed Ikramuddin Masoomi, Labor and Social Affairs • Mohammed Azam Dadfar, Refugees and Repatriation • Sediqa Balkhi, Martyrs and Disabled • Haneef Atmar, Rural Rehabilitation and Development • Habibullah Qaderi, Counter-Narcotics

Political Parties

According to Article 35 of the Constitution, citizens have the right to form social organizations and political parties, provided their program and charter are not contrary to the principles of Islam, the provisions and values of the Constitution and that their organizational structure and financial sources are made public. Furthermore, they are prohibited from having military or paramilitary aims and structures or affiliation to foreign political parties.

53 Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, Abby Stoddard, “Afghanistan 2005 and beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability”, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, April 2005, see www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cru_paper_barnett.pdf

18 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The Political Parties Law54 further prohibits the formation of a party based on ethnicity, language, Islamic school of thought and religion. A party set up in accordance with provisions of the law shall not be dissolved without lawful reasons and the decision of an authorized court. The relatively strict implementation of the Political Parties Law has – with exceptions - been a useful tool in disarmament and demobilization of former Mujaheddin groups and Islamic parties, many of which continue to maintain armed structures. Without registration, they cannot participate fully in the future political life of the country.

An increasing number of applications for registration of political parties have been approved by the Ministry of Justice and a growing number have received accreditation.55 One of difficulties in the registration process is the implementation of the prohibition on political parties, which incorporate military elements. While there is widespread consensus that this is an important principle that must be applied, the vetting process has been slow and cumbersome and not always successful. Only recently, several significant Islamic parties have been registered, including the Jonbesh-i-Melli Islami Afghanistan, which was officially registered by the Ministry of Justice on 18 April 2005.56 Also recently registered were the the Jamiat-e-Islami, with Ustad Rabbani as the Party Leader, as well as the Party of Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf, re-named as Tanzim Dawat-e-Islami-e- Afghanistan.

At the request of the government of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan and with the endorsement of the Berlin Conference, UNAMA and AIHRC have conducted an assessment of the exercise of political rights throughout the country, beginning in 20 June 2004 until the Presidential Elections. This so-called “joint verification of political rights” has resumed for the period leading up the the parliamentary elections.57 The following observations were recorded: Generally, only 12% of the candidates for parliamentary elections have recorded an affiliation to a political party. This notwithstanding, a significant number of candidates who have registered as independent candidates appear or are known to have links with political parties. This is partly attributed to biases against political parties for the role they have seen to have played in the past. Generally, the verification teams report self- censorship among candidates and the general population, in particular in areas under the influence of one political party. There seems a common understanding that activities undertaken by less influential groups are tolerated to the extent that they do not challenge the main parties.

54 Political Parties Law adopted on 14 October 2003 by Presidential Decree No. 73 and printed in the Official Gazette No. 812. An unofficial English translation can be found on www.unama-afg.org. 55 See Annex 4 for a list of political parties, unofficial translation of their names to English and the status of registration with the Ministry of Justice and regularly updated lists on political parties can be found on http://www.jemb.org some 72 parties were accredited by the Ministry of Justice. 56 AINA TV, 18 April 2005. 57 All joint AIHRC-UNAMA verification of political rights reports can be found under www.unama- afg.org, including the latest such report, “AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Verification of Political Rights – Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections - First Report, 13 April to 3 June”.

19 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

• In the east, the improved environment has led to a number of political parties opening offices in Nangarhar. One of the registered parties submitted several complaints regarding the intimidation of its representatives in Nangahar. There is little political activity in Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman. • In Bamyan most political parties reported plans to open sub-offices, despite security concerns. In Bamyan, commanders have moved in complying with efforts to disband illegal armed groups to allow them to take part in the elections, • in accordance with the Electoral Law. In Sharistan and areas of Daikundi, systemic human rights abuses by commanders and factional rivalry have diminished confidence in the political process. Self sensorship is reported in areas under the influence of one political party, including in Daikundi. • Of the six registered parties operating in the Western region, two have registered complaints with the provincial verification team against the provincial government, for refusing to allow them to open offices in Herat. Moreover, none of these parties have opened a branch office in Herat, despite the fact that they have offices in other parts of the country. Most have noted that the environment in the area is neither secure nor conducive for such activity. • In the Northeastern region, registered political parties have commenced activities, albeit with a degree of caution, and appear to be testing the ground for political participation. There are now at least nine such parties which have set up operations in the past months. However, their operations are discreet and they generally abstain from overt political activities. • Political activities appear to be flourishing in the North- to date there are 47 political movements active in the region. However, the overall political alignments are very much divided according to the main factions. Parties that fall outside of this are tolerated to the extent that they form alliances with, and avoid challenging any of the main players. • Despite a relatively open environment for political actors in the Southeast, in Paktia there is little awareness or interest in political parties. In areas outside of Gardez and Paktika, the general public seems to be unaware of political parties and electoral activities other than the registration process. However, six individuals, three of whom are women, have reported that they will run as independent candidates for parliamentary election. The situation in Khost and Ghazni is also generally better for political activities.

The Justice System

Efforts to reform Afghanistan’s justice system are underway. Given the nature of the judicial reform process and the challenges this presents, this is a long process. “The justice system suffers from severe and systematic problems related to limited public resources, the legacy of decades of violent conflict, the absence of strong State institutions, especially in rural areas, corruption and significant problems of basic

20 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

capacity and infrastructure.”58 Similarly, the administration of justice suffers from serious problems, including institutionalized corruption, violations of due process and systemic inequities that negatively impact women, children and minorities. Obstacles to a fair and impartial administration of justice are seen in the lack of political will to enforce the law, powerful, patronage relationships and other factors that allow politically empowered individuals and groups to circumvent their legal responsibilities. Broader challenges are the lack of definition of the relationship with traditional and customary conflict resolution-mechanisms and the lack of confidence in the justice system.

A survey carried out between April and June 2003 showed that citizens have little confidence in legal professionals.59 A total of 1,479 Afghans participated in this survey from eight locations across the country. Of these, 1,104 people were individually interviewed using a questionnaire and a further 375 participated in group discussions. Results showed that the first place for decision making and problem-solving is through the shura/jirga mechanism. When the community was unable to make decisions or resolve problems most respondents (87%) said they would approach the government, including the judiciary, although during group discussions concerns were expressed over the ability of local government to deliver fair decisions due to corruption and nepotism.

In terms of the current state of the judicial system, nine % of the courts and 12% of prosecutors’ offices are run by administrative personnel only. Of the total number of prosecutors, 44% are in Kabul, 30% are in provincial capitals and only 26% of the prosecutors are in the districts. Whilst 31% of judges are based in Kabul, 23% are in provincial capitals and 46% are located in the districts.60 Studies61 show that the majority of disputes outside Kabul are dealt with by customary justice mechanisms. This indicates poor access to courts in large parts of the country, aside from the question as to whether court-decisions could actually be enforced. Any effort to create a comprehensive rule of law strategy therefore requires “an open collaborative engagement between locally constituted systems of customary law that generally have a high degree of legitimacy and official legal structures, which tend to elicit limited respect” 62 , notwithstanding the serious concerns which exists from a human rights perspective with regard to customary law in Afghanistan.

58 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sixty-first session, E/CN.4/2005/122, 11 March 2005. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming). 59 Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, “Speaking Out, Afghans Opinions on Rights and Responsibilities”, from the, November 2003. 60 Securing Afghanistan’s Future, Considerations on Criteria and Actions Strengthening the Justice System, see www.af/resources/mof/recosting/draft%20papers/pillar%203/justice%20-%20annex.pdf. 61 International Legal Foundation, “Customary Law of the Pashtun Areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan”, September 2004, www.theilf.org/ILF_cust_law_afgh_10-15.doc, Feinstein International Famine Center Youth and Community Program, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans”, 2002-2003, Tufts University, June, 2004. http://nutrition.tufts.edu/pdf/research/famine/HSL_Afghanistan _Sum.pdf. 62 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sixty-first session, E/CN.4/2005/122, 11 March 2005. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming)

21 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The new Constitution foresees a three-layer judicial system comprising of a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and Primary Courts.63 The Supreme Court of Afghanistan is the highest judicial organ in the country and upon request of the Government or the Courts can review compliance of laws with the Constitution, legislative decrees, international treaties and conventions, and interpret them, in accordance with the law.64 This will require a change in the current court-system.

3. The Security and Human Rights Situation

General

The security situation in Afghanistan remains characterized by different threats to life, physical integrity and overall stability, as follows:

• The active threat of and destabilization by anti-government elements, including the Taliban and its supporters in parts of the south, south-east and eastern provinces and counter-insurgency activities by Coalition forces. • The continued presence of controversial figures in Afghanistan’s landscape and insufficient physical protection from abuses by local commanders, with limited possibilities for redress. • Localized tension and conflict between armed Afghan factions over control, which are indicative of the continued political instability in the transition period. • Limited ability of the central government, the developing Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police forces and traditional governance structures to address violence and the threat thereof against civilians.

During 2004, the overall security situation has deteriorated steadily in parts of the country with a significant and constant increase in security-incidents and acts of armed violence, including in areas previously considered among the safest, 65 a trend that is largely attributed to the electoral process and growing political tensions due to the struggle for power. The military operations against anti-government and Taliban / Al-Qaida groups by Afghan Army and Coalition forces contribute to the overall insecurity, particularly in the South and East of the country and result in frequent clashes between coalition and militia forces, which lead to civilian casualties.

Violent incidents include targeted killings, armed clashes, explosive attacks by rockets and so-called Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), attacks and ambushes. As a result, access of humanitarian and development actors, particularly of the UN to the country has been declining with, at present, with 89 out of a total of the over 350 districts of

63 Article 116, Constitution of Afghanistan. 64 Article 121, Constitution of Afghanistan. 65 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/868 of 12 August 2004, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5.

22 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghanistan considered wholly or partially high risk. 66 High risk means a hostile environment which humanitarian assistance organizations are recommended not to enter.

A total of 169 districts are classified as either high risk or as medium risk, where access is only feasible with military/police escorts or specific additional security arrangements. Within this pattern, the situation has evolved negatively in the more risky areas with a tangible increase in the number of incidents and their toll.67 Particularly some areas of the South, South East and East are out of reach for the central government authorities and are largely off-limits for humanitarian work since the end of 2003.

Complementing the security map by the UN which defines the risks for humanitarian agencies, experiences of conflict or insecurity by rural Afghans are different. Afghans living in many of the areas considered Low Risk by and for the UN report high levels of insecurity and conflict, primarily in the North, the West and the Center of the country.68

Analyzing the security situation, an immediate cause is the post-conflict environment in which weapons remain abundant and a process of disarmament of the numerous illegal armed groups has not yet started.69 As a result, commanders and warlords continue to use weapons to exercise power, fight over control of resources and economic influence. The power and influence of factional commanders is considered greater today than at the beginning of the Bonn process and the production of opium poppy is exponentially higher.70

The overall security situation in 2005 had remained relatively calm, as the severe winter season presented a significant impediment to the operations of extremists, terrorists, factional forces and criminal (including narcotics) elements. Targeted attacks against Afghan National Army and Government institutions are on the rise again. In the last three months alone, about 465 suspected insurgents, 43 Afghan policemen and soldiers, 125 civilians and 29 American troops, including 16 persons in a helicopter crash, have died in the fighting 71 In a recent briefing to the UN Security Council, 72 Special Representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Jean Arnault reported that Afghanistan’s national security was going through a “negative evolution” and that the country was confronted with an escalation of both the number and gravity of incidents that affect

66 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper, “Minimal Investment, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan”, June 2004 www.areu.org.af. 67 Briefing by Mr. Jean Arnault, Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, to the UN Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan, 27 May 2004. See www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ sc8105.doc.htm 68 Feinstein International Famine Center, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002-2003, Tufts University, June 2004. 69 International Crisis Group, “Elections and Security in Afghanistan”, Asia Briefing No. 31, 30 March 2004. See www.crisisgroup. org/home/index.cfm?id=2554&l=1. 70 AREU, “Minimal Investments, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan”, Briefing Paper, June 2004, www.areu.org.af. 71 Charlotte Gall, “U.S. Troops Still Missing After Crash in Afghanistan”, New York Times, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2 July 2005. 72 See www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN%20Docs/_sc/_briefings/05jun24.htm.

23 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

several provinces. He stated that the situation was especially worrying in the southern provinces and in Pashtun regions bordering with Pakistan.73

The Presence and Role of International Security Forces

As stipulated in the Bonn Agreement foresees, an UN-mandated international force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was and remains deployed in Afghanistan. The tasks of ISAF are to assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and surrounding areas, but a progressive expansion was not excluded. ISAF was originally established for 6 months74 and since then regularly renewed, last by resolution 1563 (2004) for 12 months beyond 13 October 2004. At present, it comprises of about 6,500 troops, based in Kabul, involving 35 countries.

Other than ISAF, there are Coalition Forces – Combined Forces Command and Operation Enduring Freedom, comprising, as at 15 June 2005, some 20,100 troops. Together, they are considered an exceedingly small number of foreign troops compared to other post conflict situations.75

An ISAF expansion has been slow in materializing, but has been happening in the form of so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Only its military elements are integrated in the ISAF chain of command. The objectives of the PRTs are to help the Government of Afghanistan extend its authority, to facilitate the development of a secure environment in the regions, including the establishment of relationships with local authorities, and to support, as appropriate, security sector reform activities, within means and capabilities, as well as the reconstruction effort.

There are, at present, 22 PRTs operating in Afghanistan – 13 under the Coalition, 9 under ISAF.76 More PRTs are planned, and it was agreed at the Istanbul summit in June 2004 that progressively more of them will be placed under NATO (ISAF) control.77 This was reconfirmed during a North Atlantic Council Seminar on Afghanistan – The Way Ahead on 20 January 2005, which concluded that PRTs are “a good and efficient concept to provide assistance to the Afghan authorities across the country, and that further assistance

73 For further details, see Report of the Secretary-General, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’’, A/59/744, dated 18 March 2005, Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD5 (forthcoming). 74 United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1386 (2001). See Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5 (forthcoming) 75 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/59/370, 21 September 2004. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming) 76 ISAF PRTs are in Mazar-i-Sharif (UK), Maimana (UK), Herat (Italy), Farah (US), Faizabad (Germany), Kunduz (Germany), Baghlan (The Netherlands), Qala-i-Naw (Spain), and Chagcharan (Lithuania). Coalition PRTs are in Gardez, Bamyan, Asadabad, Khost, Sharana, Ghazni, Qalat, Tirin Kot, Parwan, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Lashkargah and Metharlam. 77 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “NATO flag raised in Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana”, www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/07-july/index-e.htm.

24 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

provided by ISAF PRTs in support of DDR, counter-narcotics and maybe ANA training should be an important part of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan…”.78 This form of expansion of international forces’ presence in Afghanistan has generated criticism and concern among a number of humanitarian actors. The PRTs “…have seriously undermined the humanitarian neutrality and impartiality the NGOs working in Afghanistan have taken 15 years to build up, and it is now highly dangerous for the aid community to work anywhere where PRTs exist.79“ This is contrasted by statements that “… the provincial reconstruction teams are one of the success stories of international engagement in Afghanistan and their expansion should be regarded as priority. However, there are real differences between the approaches adopted by the various PRTs as well as between the Afghan perceptions of NATO’s ISAF forces and those which are part of Operation Enduring Freedom. We recommend that all PRTs be placed under ISAF control as soon as possible.”80

During a meeting on 10 May 2005 of representatives of the Constitutional Loya Jirga and jehadi leaders, called for by President Hamid Karzai, the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, including envisaged permanent US military bases in the country were discussed. While the consultations concluded that the presence of foreign forces is still required 81 and recognized that the President enjoys the privilege to decide how to establish relations with the world, decisions on such matters of national interest were referred to the future parliament. That these are issues which will require further consultations and that there is no consensus in the country, became evident during a wave of demonstrations and security incidents in May 2005, which were partly directed against the presence, but more so, the reported and alleged behaviour of US military forces.

The Formation of Afghan Security Forces

In long term, Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police considered to be fully established, replacing the Afghan Military Forces and commander structures and keep stability in Afghanistan. In order to implement relevant provisions of Bonn Agreement and establish ANA, a number of presidential decrees were issued,82 including on the distinction between civil and military institutions and therefore the prohibition for persons in office to maintain two functions. Commanders remain reluctant to join the national army and continue to keep their own forces and it was also difficult for the Transitional Administration to bring about some reforms in the Ministry of Defense of

78 North Atlantic Council Seminar on Afghanistan – The Way Ahead, Summary Report, SG (2005)0109, 7 February 2005. 79 See www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2004/05/mil-040527-rferl01.htm [last accessed in December 2004]. 80 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against ”, Seventh report of session 2003-2004, p. 67. 81 Mohamed Mohaqeq, interview on the meeting by AIPNA, 10 May 2005. 82 Decree No. 176 dated 24/9/1381 (15.12.2002) on the division of the responsibilities and distinguishing the competencies of the civil and military institutions, Decree No. 175 dated 24/9/1381 (15.12.2002) on the practical commencement of the rehabilitation and reconstruction process of the national army, collection of arms demilitarization process and Decree No. 172 dated 1381/9/23 (14/12/2002) on the foundations and rehabilitation of National Army. The decrees can be found under http://www.unama-afg.org/docs.

25 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghanistan, to create an ethnically balanced leadership. In order to prevent forced recruitment by the local commanders, respond to the nature of military service in the new army of Afghanistan, and make this service for the first time in history of the country a voluntary military service, a Presidential Decree on “Voluntary Military Service” was issued.

ANA’s formation started in May 2002 and projected to grow up to target strength of 70,000 soldiers by 2007. The training of ANA soldiers began at the early stage of the transition has reached the strength of about 25,000 soldiers and officers with 16,000 men in five corps in Kabul (Central Corps, designated as 201 Corps), Gardez (203 Corps), Herat (207 Corps) and Mazar-i-Sharif (209 Corps), with a Corps in Kandahar being established. 6,000 recruits are undergoing training, which will enable ANA to reach its target of 70,000 troops in December 2006.83 Positive steps have been several emergency deployments of ANA forces to trouble spots to intervene to address conflict.84

Similarly, efforts to train and deploy Afghan National Police (ANP) forces have been intensified, as the need is acute and the existing force lacks training and equipment as well as strong command and control structures. 53,400 personnel has received training85 and the target is a core of 47,500 national police, 12,500 border police and 2,500 highway police by the end of 2005.86An in-depth reform of the existing structure as well as an expansion of the force to 62,000 persons are planned to be fully trained and deployed by 2009. An Afghan Airforce is planned to be set up by 2007 and officers are undergoing training. Both ANA and ANP are considered indispensable for national security and the protection and promotion of basic human rights. However, there potential success is considered undermined by “…low salaries, recruitment and promotion based on connections rather than professional qualifications, corruption and other factors that contribute to inefficient command and control.” It is also reported that ANP suffers from the retention of officers previously associated with factional commanders and others implicated in past human rights violations.87

83 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/744, dated 18 March 2005, Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD5. 84 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/868, dated 12 August 2004, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD 5. 85 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security report, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/744, dated 18 March 2004, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD 5. 86 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, report, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/868 of 12 August 2004, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5. 87 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sixty-first session, E/CN.4/2005/122, 11 March 2005. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5.

26 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Parallel to the efforts of building Afghan security forces, a programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Afghan Militia Forces (AMFs) was established, as well as a programme for the cantonment of heavy weapons. A Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) was established by a President decree with its main purpose being to phase out and replace the re-emerged factional armies, militias and armed groups by a national police and a national army dedicated to the service and protection of the population. UNAMA, the Afghan Ministry of Defense as well as a group of government, in particular Japan, were tasked with the DDR programme. The plan was to disarm some 40,000 armed people out of an estimated 100,000 so-called AMF before the elections, originally scheduled for September 2004. All heavy weapons, including tanks and artillery were also to be subject to cantonment.

24 October 2004 marked the one-year anniversary of Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP), which is the name of the DDR programme in Afghanistan.88 After an initial difficult period, there has been more rapid progress towards the end of 2004 as the programme now finds support in the Western region and Abdul Rashid Dostum agreed to disband the forces affiliated with the Jonbesh-i-Melli Islami, to lay the ground for the registration of the party. As at mid May 2005, ANBP has disarmed and demobilized over 48,000 men (including officers), of whom over 46,000 have entered the reintegration phase. Under its Heavy Weapons Programme, more than 90% of all known working or repairable heavy weapons in Afghanistan are now under guard. Disarmament is completed in the following regions: Kandahar, Gardez, Kunduz, Jalalabad and Mazar- i-Sharif. Well over two thirds of about 170 AMF military units have been officially decommissioned. It is estimated that less than 10,000 Afghan militia forces remain to undergo the programme by 30 June 2005.89 This indicates that the figures of Afghan Militia Forces were much lower than originally anticipated. The progress in the DDR process and the reintegration of factional forces remain, however, uneven.

While forces in the North are part of the demobilization process, other forces loyal to the former Minister of Defense, including in Kabul and Parwan remain slow to proceed with DDR programme.90 Planning is now completed on how to address forces not registered with the Ministry of Defence that is the illegal armed groups, of which there are a significant number in the country, loyal to commanders. A pilot programme of “Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups” (DIAG) will be piloted soon.

88 For Weekly Summary Reports, see www.undpanbp. org. 89 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/744, dated 18 March 2005, Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD5 (forthcoming). 90 United Nations General Assembly, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/868 of 12 August 2004, Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD5.

27 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Commanders

Afghanistan’s political landscape remains characterized by “local and regional power …exercised by a variety of armed actors, commonly referred to as warlords. These warlords’ local commanders wield authority through a combination of arms, mutually supportive relationships with other armed actors, social networks and ethnic allegiances.91” This is the result of decades of armed conflict, ethnic allegiances and the prolonged absence of a centralized State, as well as, the support in weapons and cash which the US-led coalition gave commanders to fight the Taliban, which was then used to “remobilize patronage networks” and “seize control of assets” such as land, custom- posts, business as well as smuggling routes. “This mutually reinforcing personal control of armed groups and economic assets meant warlordism.” 92 The power of these commanders varies and they are often opposed to the formal State system, partly because their authority is “bound to local power structures involving ethnic and tribal allegiances.” 93 There are commanders who exercise authority economic and military authority over sizable areas as well as local commanders who do so over a very small area, but often they are linked through factional networks to other, more influential, actors.94 Commanders continue to pose a threat to national security and human rights, in particular in light of their involvement in, what is considered, a rapidly expanding drug trade.95

Concern has been expressed by observers that such individuals and groups have been allowed to gain access to political power and are now, in several areas, within or parallel to the local administration.96 In its Common Country Assessment, the United Nations considers the continued influence of non-statutory forces and persistence of incidents of armed violence the most significant threat to security for Afghans, causing a general climate of impunity and limited power of sanction by the central state.97 Parts of the country remain under the control of armed commanders and by groups engaged in illicit drug trade.98 As a result, local commanders continue to act with near impunity and use their positions to for factional and personal interest. The power and influence of armed

91 United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan”, M. Cherif Bassiouni, A/59/370, dated 21 September 2004. See Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming). 92 Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan”, Journal for Democracy, Volume 15, Number 3, July 2004, p 9, www.nyu.edu/pages/cic/pdf/JOD%20published.pdf. 93 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sixty-first session, E/CN.4/2005/122, 11 March 2005. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming). 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Rama Mani, “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan”, AREU, December 2003. www.areu.org.af/publications/Ending%20Impunity%20and%20Building%20Justice.pdf. 97 United Nations Development Programme, Common Country Assessment for the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, United Nations System, Kabul, October 2004. See www.undp. org/rbap/Country_Office/CCA/Cca-Afghanistan2004.pdf. 98 Secretary-General The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, E/CN.6/2005.5, dated 22 December 2004, Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming).

28 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

political groups, commanders and militias extends into the formal and informal justice systems, leaving Afghans in many areas of the country with little ability to access justice.99

Afghans in a number of areas of the country therefore continue to face abuses at the hands of local commanders, the most common of which are the extortion of money or economic assets by way of illegal taxation,100 forced recruitment and forced labor101 or payment in lieu as well as land occupation and confiscation. Illegal taxation by local commanders and warlords continues to be a major human rights issue and is having an impact on rural food security, with vulnerable local people being forced to give away a proportion of their crop or limited resources to illegal militias and local strongman. The illegal taxes, often in the form of “ushur” (one-tenth of the harvest, in kind or cash) are demanded even before the harvest, or not linked to harvest, and some of those demanding them, are central government appointed officials, placed there to maintain law and order. Inability or unwillingness to pay or comply by the demands of such commanders leads to serious abuses, that is, harassment, physical abuses, threat with property confiscation, detention as well as ill-treatment.

Transitional Justice

Afghanistan has ratified eight international treaties concerning human rights:

1. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP- AC) on the involvement of children in armed conflict was ratified on 24 September 2003, entered into force 24 October 2003. 2. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified on 5 March 2003, entered into force 4 April 2003. 3. The Optional Protocol of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-SC) on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography was ratified on 19 October 2002 and entered into force 19 October 2002. 4. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified on 28 March 1994 and entered into force 27 April 1994. 5. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was ratified on 1 April 1987 and entered into force 26 June 1987.

99 Feinstein International Famine Centre Youth and Community Program, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans”, Tufts University USA, June 2004. See www.nutrition.tufts.edu/ pdf/research/ famine/HSL_Afghanistan_Sum.pdf. 100 One recently documented example can be found in International Regional Information Network (IRIN ) “Regional commanders continue with illegal taxation”, Baghlan, 10 November 2004, see www.irinnews.org/Advsearch.asp?RecordJump=20&QuickSearch=&SelectRegion=any&SelectCountry=A FGHANISTAN&SelectTheme=Human_Rights&LookFor=AND&StartDate=7/13/2005&EndDate=1/1/200 4 101 There are also indications that the increasing poppy production encourages land grabbing and forced labor by warlords, Liz Alden Wily, Rural Land Conflict and Peace in Afghanistan, AREU, February 2004 p. 4, See www.areu.org.af/.

29 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

6. The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) was ratified on 6 July 1983, entered into force 5 August 1983. 7. The International Covenant on Economics, social and cultural Rights (CESCR was ratified on 24 January 1983, entered into force 24 April 1983. 8. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) was ratified on 1 January 1983, entered into force 24 April 1983.102

Afghanistan has retained the death penalty and Afghan courts continue to hand down death sentences, despite a formal moratorium on executions imposed by President Hamid Karzai in 2003. In April 2004, the courts carried out the first known execution since the fall of the Taleban. Abdullah Shah, a military commander from Paghman, was executed by firing squad.103 According to Amnesty International a woman accused of adultery was condemned to death by local court and then killed within approximately 48 hours in 2005. “It is alleged to be the first incident of the execution of a woman for committing adultery since the removal of the Taleban regime in late 2001. According to eyewitnesses, the 29-year old ….was dragged out of her parent’s house in Urgu District, Badakhan province by her husband and local officials before being publicly stoned to death. The man accused of committing adultery with her is alleged to have been whipped a hundred times and freed”.104

As mandated by Presidential Decree, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) conducted national consultation on ways to address past human rights abuses. From January to August 2004, AIHRC consulted 4,151 individuals and convened 200 focus group discussions with over 2,000 participants to share their views on human rights abuses and how restore justice. Consultations took place in 32 of the 34 provinces as well as in Iran and Pakistan. The report, summarizing the findings and recommendations of the national consultations, “A Call for Justice”, was released on 29 January 2005. Of the people consulted, the majority (69%) identified themselves or their immediate family-members as victims of human rights violations during the conflict. They considered that human rights abuses have persistently occurred throughout the last two and half decades of war and continue today. 16% indicated that they are the victims of human rights violations during Soviet times in Afghanistan, 18% during Mujaheddin times, 11% during the Taliban and 17% during all periods. The respondents were of the opinion that continued impunity has given perpetrators of abuses the opportunity to commit further abuses with no fear of prosecution. The majority of the respondents have a profound perception of justice and a large number of those consulted support the adoption of a series of measures, such as criminal justice and removing war criminals

102 See www.unhchr.ch/TBS/doc.nsf/NewhvVAllSPRByCountry?OpenView&Start=1&Count=15&Expand =1.8#1.8. 103 Amnesty International, “Afghanistan breaks promise to suspend death penalty,” AI, October 2004, web.amnesty.org/wire/October2004/Afghanistan. 104 Amnesty International, “Afghanistan: Stoning to death -- human rights scandal,” AI, 26 April 2005, ASA 11/005/2005 web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA110052005?open&of=ENG-AFG.

30 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

from government positions. 76.4% of the Afghans who participated in the national consultations stated that bringing of war criminals to justice will increase stability and bring security in the country, while 7.6% stated that brining war criminals to justice will decrease stability and threaten security. Of the participants in the national consultations, 40% demanded the prosecution of notorious perpetrators, 8% proposed compensation, 15% reconciliation, 5% truth seeking, 26% recommended the adoption of all mentioned measures. 90% of the participants of the national consultation requested the removal of human rights violators from public offices. The report proposes a short term vetting program with the focus on its several dimensions reflecting the types of positions in which human rights abusers my be found. These are (1) political appointments, such as cabinet posts and governor positions, (2) civil service appointments, both appointments and removals requiring a structure that is cognizant of due process concerns, (3) elected officials, such as members of the national assembly, who are expected to accord with certain ethical and human rights standards, (4) institutional reforms. The national consultation’s report “A call for Justice” recommends a national strategy on transitional justice including measures such as the political commitment to justice, vetting, institutional reform and criminal justice. AIHRC hopes that the government will implement the strategy with support from the UN, members of the international community and AIHRC. The first step will be to convert the strategy into a concrete action plan that will be implemented. In general, the report presented recommends that the President take actions symbolic and substantive to address the abuses of the past, including building monuments, supporting criminal investigations and prosecutions, and arranging for reparations for the victims, as well as vetting public officials to keep perpetrators of abuse out of power. These recommendations are supported by many, including the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, who considers the removal of factional commanders and individuals associated with past human rights violations from positions of public authority a key government priority.105

4. The Socio-Economic and Humanitarian Situation106

In February 2005, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Islamic Government of Afghanistan released the first Afghanistan National Human Development Report. 107 The report presents a comprehensive analysis of the human security and development situation in Afghanistan and calculates the human development index. With

105 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Sixty-first session, E/CN.4/2005/122, 11 March 2005, Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5. 106 In this respect, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) that was conducted by UNICEF in 2003 is quite indicative of the continuing needs of the population. The survey was carried out in 32 provinces and 6 major cities. In particular, women, children and other groups with special needs may find themselves in vulnerable circumstances upon return and their needs should therefore be given due attention when deciding on return. See www.childinfo.org/MICS2/newreports/afghanistan/afghanistan.htm. 107 United Nations Development Programme, “Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 2004 – Security with a Human Face – Challenges and Responsibilities”, UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 21 February 2004. See www.undp. org.af/nhdr_04/NHDR04.htm.

31 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

the report, Afghanistan was placed in global development comparison. The index ranked Afghanistan 173 out of 178 countries. President Karzai expressed concern about the results of the findings, particularly the fact that childbirth deaths and illiteracy rates in Afghanistan were among the highest in the world, which was “understandable but not longer acceptable.” The report illustrates both positive developments but continuously low standards of human development. continues to be one of the main challenges for the country.

Food Security

The Human Development Report outlines that some of the main determinants of human poverty in Afghanistan are poor levels of health and education among the economically active members of households, high dependency rates in households, a lack of employment opportunities, low productivity of family plots, poor basic infrastructure and the lack of comprehensive social policies and safety nets in the country. Traditionally, in Afghanistan’s agrarian society, large families and strong reliance on kin solidarity were considered viable strategies of risk control and income diversification. However, the value of this strategy is eroding. The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) provides a picture of the extent of in Afghanistan, while studies (see below) are underway to assess urban poverty. The NRVA measures poverty based on food consumption, i.e. the percentage of people who consume less than 2100 kcal per day, the minimum diet of a healthy adult. Statistics from the 2004 NRVA indicate 36% of the Afghan population is food insecure. More than half the people in nine provinces are food insecure: Bamyan (51%), Faryab (52%), Kabul (55%), Kunar (55%), Zabul (57%), Logar (58%), Paktika (60%), Kandahar (66%), and Nimroz (96%). Food insecurity and poverty are closely linked to drought and Afghanistan has suffered the longest and most severe drought in its known climatic history.108 Grain prices have increased by 50% during the year 2004, a positive trend for wheat producers but an added hardship for the 36% of Afghans below the poverty line. Acute stands at 10%, chronic malnutrition stands at 50%.

Health and Drinking Water

The average life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44,5 years at birth, which is at least 20 years lower than in neighbouring countries. 57% of the population is below 18. Infant and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world and currently stand at 115 per 1,000 and 1,600 per 100,000 live births respectively. One out of five children die before the age of five and one woman dies from pregnancy related causes every 30 minutes. Less than 15 per cent of deliveries are attended by trained health workers.109 Less than

108 Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Analysis of Drought Impact in Afghanistan, Summer 1383 (2004), Summary for the Cabinet, MRRD Vulnerability Analysis Unit. www.mrrd.gov.af/vau/Downloads/Analysis%20of%20Drought%20Situation%20in%20Afghanistan%2024 %20Aug%202004%20Cabinet%20brief-Eng.pdf 109 United Nations Development Programme, “Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 2004 – Security with a Human Face – Challenges and Responsibilities”, UNDP and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 21 February 2004. www.undp. org.af/nhdr_04/NHDR04.htm

32 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

40% of Afghan children receive life-saving vaccinations. In terms of access to health- care, Afghanistan’s poor health care system has a very strong urban bias in its existing infrastructure. Overall, there are only 210 health facilities with beds to hospitalize patients and with the exception of 4 provinces, the ratio of doctors per 10,000 persons is less than 1 doctor. Overall, only 23% of the Afghan population has access to safe water, 18% in rural and 43% in urban areas. Access to adequate sanitation is even lower, with an estimated 12%.110

Education

Afghanistan’s literacy rates are one of the lowest among developing countries. Only 28,7 per cent of Afghans over the age of 15 years are able to read and write. Almost half of the men and 85% of women in Afghanistan are illiterate. The Taliban exclusion of girls from school worsened the gender disparity. Nearly 80 per cent of Afghanistan’s 6,900 schools were damaged or destroyed. A “back to School” campaign has seen more than three million students return to school and enrollment in schools has continuously increased.

Enrollment of boys and girls was 81% and 64% respectively in urban areas and 62% and 31% in rural areas. Access to education is extremely unequal across the country with about one third of the schools located in only the five provinces with urban centers.

Mines and Unexploded Ordinance

Despite continued progress made by the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) and its implementing partners over the past decade, Afghanistan is still believed to be one of the most severely contaminated countries in the world. MAPA continues to discover, at a rate of 12 to 14 km2 per year, areas that were mined years ago but remained inaccessible due to armed conflict. The known mine and UXO contaminated area is estimated to total approximately 810.7 km2 in 206 districts of 31 provinces. Of this total, 157.7 km2 affects high-impacted communities. The areas affected include important agricultural land, irrigation systems, residential areas, grazing land and roads.111

In 2002, the ICRC recorded 1,286 new casualties from landmines, UXO and cluster munitions, of which 154 people were killed and 1,132 injured. However, it is believed that approximately 50% of mine victims die before reaching a medical facility so are unlikely to be reported. The ICRC data does not include casualties who died before reaching medical assistance; consequently only 11.9% of the recorded casualties were deaths.112 Of the recorded casualties in 2002, about 91 % were male. Children under 18 years of age accounted for more than half of the new casualties, 685 (53%) and 1,144

110 Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, “Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward”, 17 March 2004. See www.af/recosting/index.html. 111 United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACA), Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan, Strategic Plan 2003-2012. See www.af/resources/aaca/cg+adf/national _security_wg_mine_action/ MAPA%20Strategic%20Plan%202003-12.doc. 112 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Landmine Monitor Report 2003 See www.icbl.org/lm/2003/afghanistan.html.

33 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

(89%) were civilians. Casualties were reported in 29 provinces with the highest number in Kabul province (18%).

Land and Housing

Land, housing and property rights, both in terms of landlessness as well as problems with regard to the recovery and ownership poses a serious challenges and obstacles to the return of refugees and their reintegration. The situation with regard to land and property in Afghanistan is described in several studies.113

Rural areas: Afghanistan’s fertile land is limited, constituting only 12 percent of total area Afghanistan and there is a high degree of rural landlessness and near-landlessness. Around 40 percent of arable land is owned by less than 10 percent of the population. Up to 36 percent of owners have their land under a form of mortgage that is to the full advantage of creditors, resulting in high and increasing indebtedness and increasing vulnerability. Formal land records are unreliable, where they exist. Traditional or statutory controls relating to boundaries between arable and pastoral lands have broken down, resulting in rampant encroachment, contestation and environmental degradation.

This situation is aggravated by the fact that there are inconsistencies among and within bodies of law, often resulting in a generally unclear legal status both in formal and informal justice systems. The weak rule of law renders application or enforcement of the law unlikely at this point. 114 The power and influence of armed political groups, commanders and militias extends into the formal and informal justice systems, leaving rural Afghans at the mercy of these groups and with little ability to access justice.115 The widespread and severe environmental degradation of land in Afghanistan compounds these issues of water, land and access to natural resources. Conflict, drought, population movements, population growth and lack of local and national policies have contributed to erosion, deforestation and desertification.116

Urban areas: The situation with regard to land tenure in urban areas indicates similar problems and challenges. 117 Property law is outdated and disregarded, there is no consistency in the recognition of ownership by the authorities, multiple ownership is a

113 See, inter alia: Liz Alden Wily, “Rural Land Conflict and Peace in Afghanistan”, AREU, February 2004, UN-Habitat, “Preliminary Study of Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City’’, March 2003, See www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/out/siryo/ project_b/01/Afghan%20Land%20Report.5%20Aug%2003.pdf and www.areu.org.af/publications/ Rural%20Land%20Relations%20in%20Conflict.pdf. 114 Liz Alden Wily, Rural Land Conflict and Peace in Afghanistan, AREU, February 2004 p. 6. See www.areu.org.af/publications/Rural%20Land%20Relations%20in%20Conflict.pdf. 115 Feinstein International Famine Centre Youth and Community Program, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans”, Tufts University, USA June 2004. p.55. See www.nutrition.tufts.edu/pdf/research/famine/HSL_Afghanistan_Sum.pdf 116 Ibidem, p. 147. 117 United Nations Human Settlements Programme, UN-Habitat, “Preliminary Study of Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City’’, March 2003. See www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/out/siryo/ project_b/01/Afghan%20Land%20Report.5%20Aug%2003.pdf.

34 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

problem due to the sales of State owned apartments and plots as well as the sale without regard for inheritance rights of others. The municipal property administration is inconsistent and the existing master-plan outdated and not corresponding to realities It is against this background, that land and property issues pose a serious challenge for many Afghans, including many returnees, both in terms of livelihoods as well as in terms of respect for their rights and legal safety.118

• Given the centrality of land-ownership in income-generating and sustaining livelihoods, the large numbers of returnees who claim to be landless, either because they never owned land or because they were forced to sell it prior to fleeing the country, poses an obstacle to return. Given instances of illegal occupation of government-land, as well as the difficulties in determining with certainty whether land is government owned or not, a general freeze on the allocation of government land has been ordered by Presidential Decree.119 Exceptions are possible to obtain, in the context of urban housing through the High Commission on Urban Development and Housing, but no formal criteria for housing schemes have been developed as yet. • The limited size of land holdings is another land-related problem. This is particularly the case for returnees who can not return to the same land, as families have grown in exile and the land they own no longer sufficient to cover their needs. • The livelihood of many landless Afghans depended on sharecropping arrangements, which some find difficult or impossible to ensure and re-negotiate. A number of returnees have reported such arrangements to have become more exploitative, thereby reducing their levels of income. • Land occupation and confiscation of land by powerful local commanders or members of the majority ethnic group in areas of return has been reported by returnees or stated as an obstacle to return by refugees. Returnees therefore face difficulties in recovery of property upon return from exile. A particular feature of such land occupation is the use of traditional pasture land for cultivation purposes, thereby depriving or seriously jeopardizing the return of refugees and IDPs, whose livelihoods were based on animal husbandry. • In numerous instances, disputed ownership of land and property and difficulties of recovery arise as a result of more than one person claiming property rights to land or houses, due to the fact that different regimes have issued land titles for the same property to different owners. • There have been cases of evictions, in which Afghans, including returnees have been evicted, without compensation from houses and land they were occupying. The evictions were the result of influential commanders and persons claiming to own or having purchased the property.

118 UNHCR, Land issues in the process of repatriation of Afghan refugees, 2003. See www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewSingleEnv/3B07ED5A3C73A0F4C1256E 1500490450/$file/land+issues+within+repatriation+process.pdf. 119 Presidential Decree on Non-Distribution of Intact and Uncultivated State Owned Land, Decree No. 99, dated 24 April 2002 (4/2/1381).

35 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The Situation in Urban Centers

The estimated number of urban dwellers in Afghanistan is 6.4 million – 30 per cent of the total population, mainly concentrated in the cities of Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad.120 Most cities are currently experiencing a steady influx of urban returned refugees and internally displaced persons, and by 2015, the number of urban residents in Afghanistan is expected to double, growing at a rate twice as high as the average growth rate in rural areas.121

Afghanistan is considered one of the most destitute nations in the world in terms of human development. Thus, rapid urban growth is very likely to lead to an increase in the number of poor and vulnerable populations, thereby posing great challenges to urban planning and development. 122 There are some key differences in difficulties facing residents in urban environments compared with the rural population that can increase levels of vulnerability and susceptibility to poverty and destitution. Difficulties identified in urban vulnerable populations indicate the absence of vital social networks amongst urban poor, in comparison with rural communities. In terms of reliance on family members, studies have identified the household and the extended family as the basic social network in Afghanistan.

However, a recent study did not find any indication of existing traditional systems of sharing and redistribution in the extended urban family, as has been confirmed for rural areas.123 A further major difficulty is the almost total reliance on a cash-based economy and the precarity of employment with heavy reliance insecure casual and daily labor function as sources of income.124 UNHCR conducted, during September to December 2004, returnee monitoring in the cities of Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad, interviewing over 1,200 returnee households in different districts of each city. The large majority of those interviewed returned to where they were living before exile with about 11% in total who returned to urban areas rather than their places of previous residence. Reasons given for not returning to areas of origin were, in order of priority, security and lack of economic opportunity. In terms of sources of income, the largest number of interviewed returnees (45%) stated that daily wage labour has been the main and first source of income in urban areas after their return. Self-employment/small business was named as the second option to secure income (12%). 11% of the returnee households in urban areas indicated not having any regular source of income. Vulnerability to income failure is the result of almost complete immersion in the cash economy and the reliance on urban labor markets. For unskilled and less literate labor force, access to opportunities is usually limited to the informal sector which is very competitive. Job opportunities for unskilled persons are unreliable, irregular and subject to high seasonal variance and people with less competitive power, such as the elderly, people with disabilities and other

120 Government of Afghanistan (GoA). Securing Afghanistan’s Future. Kabul: GoA. 2004. Urban Annex., see www.af/recosting/index.html. 121 Ibid. 122 Schutte Stefan, Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies From Three Cities; Working Paper Series. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004, p. 3. See www.areu.org.af. 123 Ibidem, p. 32. 124 Ibidem, p. 11.

36 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

health problems, and women in general are particularly susceptible to loss of income and indebtedness.

The Situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Most of Afghanistan’s IDPs have been able to return home during the last three years, mainly due to improved security and reduced impact of drought. Of an estimated 1 million IDPs at the beginning of 2002, only some 140,000 remain in camps and settlements mainly in the South and some 20,000 live mostly in urban areas.

Despite the successful return of more than 800,000 IDPs since 2001, a caseload with particular difficulties remains mainly in camps in the Southern Afghanistan, some in Maslakh (Herat). They are mainly nomadic Kuchis who have lost their live stocks during the drought and some 30,000 Pushtoons from the North West (Faryab, Badghis, Jowzjan, Sar-e-Pul). At present four camps remain in Southern Afghanistan: Zhary Dasht, Panjwaj, Maiwand and Mukhtar, accommodating a total of some 130,000 IDPs. Zhary Dasht, was built by UNHCR in August 2002 with a view to relocate IDPs away from the difficult border areas (Waiting area and Spin Boldak). An operation to finally close the Spin Boldak camps started in June 2004, when the IDPs were given the options to stay on, settle nearby, return or is relocate to Zhary Dasht. Almost half relocated to Zhary Dasht, a few returned and the remaining ones opted to stay in or nearby Spin Boldak.

In 2004, the return of some 90.000 IDPs was planned, however due to a renewed drought in the main potential return areas (North-West and South), and due to instability in Faryab, Sar-e-Pul and Badghis, the return of IDPs remained limited to some 18,000 persons in 2004. For 2005, there are indications that a sizeable number of IDPs notably from Helmand – but also from Kandahar – will wish to return to their places of origin.

5. Return of Afghans from Neighbouring and Non-Neighbouring Countries

Following the collapse of the Taliban regime, Afghans started to return spontaneously in large numbers, estimated somewhere in the order of 200,000 to 300,000 persons, between January and March 2002. UNHCR assisted voluntary repatriation from Pakistan started on 1 March 2002,125 from Iran on 9 April 2002. In the first year of UNHCR assisted repatriation, altogether over 1,8 Million Afghans returned (including 1,565,066 from Pakistan, 259,792 from Iran and close to 10,000 Afghans from other neighboring and non-neighboring countries). In 2003, the number of returns remained lower with altogether 475,556 Afghans (332,183 returning from Pakistan, 142,280 returning from Iran) returning with assistance from UNHCR and its partners.

125 UNHCR OCM Afghanistan, The analysis of trends in voluntary repatriation is published in the “Operational Information Summary Report, 2002 – 2005”, prepared by UNHCR OCM Afghanistan, 2005. See www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_summaries/may_05/ summary2.pdf

37 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Overview 2002 2003 2004 2005 TOTAL Pakistan: 1,565,066 332,183 383,322 6,762 2,287,333 Iran: 259,792 142,280 377,147 3,373 782,592 Other 9,679 1,093 401 23 11,196 Countries: Total: 1,834,537 475,556 760,870 10,158 3,081,121

In 2004, the numbers of returns picked up again, considerably, compared to 2003 with 760,870 Afghans having returned under the assisted repatriation programme between January and September 2004 with almost equal numbers returning from Pakistan (383,322) and Iran (377,147). The comparatively large increase of returns from Iran was largely due to a series of measures introduced by the government of Iran and the returnees from Pakistan comprise Afghans who have been living in the so-called “new camps”, established in 2001, which are being closed.

So far, in 2005, the rate of return has been significantly lower than for the same time period in 2004: Numbers of daily returns from Pakistan and Iran in March of this year were down to less than a quarter (around 20%) in comparison with daily return rates for March 2004.126 One possible contributing factor to the lower numbers of people deciding to return during the early part of the year could be the exceptionally harsh winter conditions which prevailed throughout February and March.

Assisted Voluntary Repatriation Summary

Since 2002 to the end of March 2005, returned refugees from Pakistan and Iran were in the following locations during exile:

Pakistan Iran NWFP - 52% (1, 183,078) - 37% (291,984) Islamabad and Punjab - 22% (505,812) Sistan va Balochistan – 17% (131,615) Balochistan - 16% (355,685) Esfahan – 10% (79,480)

Some significant trends with regard to voluntary repatriation are the following127:

126 According to “Operational Information Summary Report, 2002 – 2005”, prepared by UNHCR OCM Afghanistan, 2005, (Section 1.) average daily returns from Pakistan in March 2004 were 844 persons whereas in March 2005 average daily returns were 202 persons. For Iran, average daily returns for March 2004 were 123 persons whereas in March 2005 the number has decreased to 24 persons. See www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_summaries/jun_05/summary2.pdf 127 www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/emergency_assistance/refugee/unhcr_repatriation/repatriation_jun_05 .xls.

38 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Returns From Iran and Pakistan

• Of the total number of returnees from both Iran and Pakistan, 32% returned to destinations in Kabul province, followed by Nangarhar (15%). • The majority of Pakistan returns have been to Kabul (34%), Nangarhar (20%), Baghlan (7%) and Kunduz (6%) Provinces. • The highest returns from Iran have been to Kabul (28%), Hirat (14%), Farah (7%) and Parwan (5%) Provinces. Returns to Hirat province centred mainly in urban areas. The drastic increase in 2004 in the return rate from Iran (by almost 160% over 2003), was largely due to the introduction of a series of policy measures by the Iranian authorities which lead to uncertainty among the Afghan population and induced the return of many. • In terms of destinations, the return is very uneven. Of the 34 , six provinces alone absorb 64% of the returnees, while eight provinces have seen very little UNHCR assisted refugee return between March 2002 and December 2004. This is largely indicative of continued insecurity and with it, very limited investment into development, in many of the areas which have seen little return. • Of the returnees, 53% were male and 47% female Afghans and the majority (56,5%) were children, that is, under the age of 18. • In terms of the educational profile of the returnees, 81% had not received education (including basic literacy) and only 19% had received education and in terms of skills profiles, 23% of the returnees brought back skills, a significant proportion in agriculture, followed by construction and carpet-weaving and business.

With regard to the dynamics of return, interviews with returnees conducted between July, August and September 2004 at encashment- and transit-centers in Afghanistan 128 indicated the following pattern:

• A noticeable difference between the returns from Iran in previous years and this year is the fact that an increasing number return after longer periods in exile. The majority of returnees in 2002 and 2003 had left Afghanistan in 2000/2001, the largest number in 2004 have returned after 6 years in exile, followed by a similarly large group who returned after 20 years in exile. Most of the returnees from Pakistan, particularly those returning from urban areas, confirmed that they have been residing in Pakistan for the past 15 to 20 years.

• The non-renewal of the so-called Amayesh cards, the documentation of registration issued to Afghans in Iran by the authorities, has had a larger than expected impact on the life of Afghans in Iran and on their decision to return. 67% of the returnees

128 A total of 1,390 returnees (men and women) from Pakistan were interviewed between July and September at encashment centers in Mohmand Dara, Kabul and Gardez. A total of 779 returnees (men and women) from Iran were interviewed at DC2 and GTC transit centers in Herat and in Kabul during the same period. Findings have been summarized in a note entitled “Main trends in the return of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran”, UNHCR Afghanistan, October 2004.

39 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

interviewed held expired Amayesh cards and 49% stated that the expiry of the Amayesh card influenced their decision to return. Documentation or the lack thereof, on the contrary, has had little impact on Afghans in Pakistan or on return.

• For part of the returnees from Iran, interviewed by UNHCR and the Ministry of Repatriation and Refugees (20%), no change in their motivation to return was observed – it remained motivated by their desire to return to their home country and cited reasons such as an improvement of the security and political situation in Afghanistan, the wish to participate in the reconstruction process or the repatriation assistance and was unrelated to the situation in Iran. This year, however, 80% of the returnees interviewed at encashment centers provide reasons unrelated to the situation in Afghanistan for their decision to return. Among the reasons most frequent cited by returnees, often in combination were the non-renewal of Amayesh-cards, the introduction of high education fees (including primary education), which they are unable to afford, the inability to renew lease-agreements or rent houses, increased difficulties of finding or continuing employment, often linked to expiry of Amayesh- cards and others.

• 70% of returnees from Pakistan, interviewed on their way home, declared that their decision to return was taken without any pressure and/or constraints. Their decision to return was based largely on the improvement of the security situation in their respective areas of origin and return in Afghanistan.

Returns From Non-Neighbouring Countries

• The return of asylum-seekers and refugees from countries other than Iran and Pakistan was down by over 50% in 2004. The vast majority returned from Russia (35%), Turkmenistan (15%), and India (13%).

• The total number of assisted returnees, based on tripartite agreements or under regular government programmes, as of 1 January 2004 from Switzerland, Austria, Australia, Germany, Denmark, Norway, UK, Finland, Netherlands, Greece, Sweden, Indonesia, Belgium, Italy and France stands at 743 persons.

• The total number of returnees assisted by UNHCR based on its Geneva based VARI project from India, Uzbekistan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and others is 401 persons.

• The total number of deportations in 2004 stands at 484 persons. From Denmark 7, Australia 3, Germany 5, Netherlands 3, Norway 3, Tanzania 1, United Kingdom 349, UAE 80, Saudi Arabia 27 and Ukraine 10.

In terms of the framework for UNHCR assisted voluntary repatriation, UNHCR and the Afghan government continue to operate within tripartite frameworks. With Iran, a Joint Programme signed in Tehran on 16 June 2003, extended the tripartite framework until 20

40 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

March 2005 and its renewal is agreed. A tripartite agreement between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and UNHCR was signed in Brussels on 17 March 2003 will provide the framework for return until March 2006.129 In addition, and unique to the operation in Afghanistan, tripartite frameworks for the return of Afghans, including parameters for the phased and coordinated return of persons determined not in need of international protection and without compelling humanitarian needs, have been concluded with France,130 the United Kingdom,131 the Netherlands132 and Denmark.133

General Considerations on Return

In this regard and given the differences with regard to the situation in Afghanistan, UNHCR advises against the return of such persons to areas other than their places of origin or previous area of residence. This position is in line with Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40, which states that:

UNHCR facilitates voluntary repatriation only when return is possible to previous places of residence in the country of origin. In UNHCR’s experience, return to areas other than the refugee’s place of origin or previous residence may impact adversely on the protection situation of the returnees themselves, which of others in the place of return, and more generally on the processes of stabilization, reintegration, and reconciliation.134

The same principle applies to the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection. The Executive Committee in Para. (l) of its Conclusion No. 96 (LIV) of 2003 on the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection, which:

Stresses the importance of ensuring the sustainability of returns and of avoiding further displacements in countries emerging from conflict, and

129 Agreement between the Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Repatriation of Afghan Citizens in Pakistan, Islamabad, 17 March 2003, See www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ afghan?page=policy. 130 Tripartite Agreement between the Government of the French Republic, the Government of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan and UNHCR, 28 September 2002, Paris. See Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD2 (forthcoming). 131 Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Transitional Islamic Administration of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and UNHCR, Kabul, 12 October 2002, See www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ afghan?page=policy. See Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD2 (forthcoming). 132 Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan, the Government of the Netherlands and UNHCR, 18 March 2003, The Hague, See www.unhcr.ch/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=policy. 133 A Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 18 October 2004 in Copenhagen. 134 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Voluntary Repatriation, Global Consultations on International Protection, EC/GC/02/5 of 25 April 2002, p. 7. See Refworld, Issue 13, CD 1.

41 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

notes that phasing returns of persons found not to be in need of international protection can contribute to this;135

In the context of Afghanistan, the traditional family and community structures of the Afghan tribal system constitute the main protection and survival (coping) mechanism. The support provided by families, extended families and tribes is limited to areas where family or community links exist, in particular in the place of origin or habitual residence. Return to places other than places of origin or previous residence, may therefore expose Afghans to insurmountable difficulties, not only in sustaining and re-establishing livelihoods but also to security risks. While there has been significant progress on the reintegration front of returnees to Afghanistan, the needs continue to be immense and urban centers continue to be faced with numbers of returnees which are difficult to absorb.

135 Executive Committee Conclusion No. 96 (LIV) of 2003 on the return of persons found not to be in need of international protection, p. 2. See Refworld, Issue 13, CD 1.

42 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

II. International Protection Considerations With Regard to Afghan Asylum-Seekers and Refugees

1. General Considerations

Three years after the Bonn Agreement,136 Afghanistan is still a country in transition toward democracy and stability. To conclude the transition, outlined in the Bonn Agreement, parliamentary elections for both Houses, the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) and the Meshrano Jirga (House of the Elders) are yet to take place. The parliamentary elections for the Wolesi Jirga and provincial councils are scheduled for 18 September 2005. They are aimed at ensuring a balance of power through democratically elected representatives from all provinces and districts of Afghanistan. Otherwise, the Central Government’s influence in the provinces will remain fragile at best. Afghanistan is also in transition from conflict to peace. Military operations continue in parts of the country with the presence of numerous non-official armed forces.

During this transitional period until the country as a whole is more stable, many Afghans will need international protection as refugees under the 1951 Convention. Afghans who have been granted international protection in the past will continue to need it while the country undergoes fundamental changes, which are expected eventually to bring about the much needed stability and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. Others will require complementary forms of protection from indiscriminate human rights abuses and generalized violence in parts of the country.

In determining the protection needs of Afghans today, the re-emergence of past and new commanders in many parts of the country necessitates the examination of possible risks emanating from non-State actors.137 The analysis of an application should include a full picture of the asylum-seeker’s background and personal circumstances and the prevailing situation in his or her area of origin or previous residence in Afghanistan. This assessment should include consideration of the existence and strength of family and extended family links and community networks (or their absence) in order to identify possible traditional protection and coping mechanisms vis-à-vis the current de-facto local authorities. It is thus important to establish for each case the profile of nuclear and extended family members, their location, their previous and current social status, and their political and tribal affiliations in Afghanistan or abroad.

136 “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent Government Institutions”, S/2001/1154 of 5 December 2001. See www.unama-afg.org/docs/ _nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/bonn.htm 137 According to paragraph 65 of the Handbook on Criteria and Procedures for Determining Refugee Status – “persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of a country. It may also emanate from sections of the population that do not respect the standards established by the laws of the country concerned (…) Where serious discriminatory or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.” See also, Agents of Persecution—UNHCR Position, External, 14 March 1995.

43 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

2. Considerations for Specified Groups Relevant to the Determination of Refugee Status Under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

Based on currently available information regarding Afghanistan, UNHCR is able to provide for a number of groups specific considerations that are relevant to the determination of refugee status as defined within Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

The fact that a category is identified herein does not, in itself, suggest that all persons falling within the category should be recognized as refugees under the 1951 Convention. Information on some categories is provided as UNHCR and other actors have and continue to receive numerous requests for information on persons with such profiles. Similarly, an Afghan who is not within a category identified herein may nevertheless fall within the scope of Article 1A of the 1951 Convention or have a need for a complementary form of international protection.

Afghans Perceived as Critical of Factions or Individuals Exercising Control Over an Area

Afghans expressing their political opinions are at greater risk of persecution, if these opinions are perceived as critical of the interests of local and regional commanders and powerful factions. Risks continue to exist (and may increase in the period leading to Parliamentary elections now postponed to September 2005) for persons known to have political affiliations different from those of persons linked to armed factions exercising de-facto power at the local level.

Human Rights Watch reported that some of the delegates to the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirgas in 2002 and 2003 received death threats or their houses were attacked.138 Similar threats to political activists occurred during the electoral campaign

138 Human Rights Watch, “The Warlords are Plotting a Comeback”, , 10 June 2002. “A Human Rights Watch mission to southern Afghanistan late last month uncovered numerous instances of warlords subverting the election process through threats, beatings, imprisonment and intimidation. In the provinces of Kandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan, Helmand and Nimroz we heard of warlords selecting their own delegates and forcing them on the population.” The most visible indication of violence and intimidation was the process of election of candidates for the mentioned Loya Jirgas. Forces under Ismail Khan’s command arrested candidates in almost every district of Herat and in several neighbouring provinces. This pattern was repeated across Afghanistan, as commanders and military strongmen attempted to subvert the process in their favour. “Loya Jirga Off to a Shaky Start”, Human Rights Watch, 17 June 2002 A woman delegate, who asked to remain anonymous, told Human Rights Watch, “We are hostages of the people who destroyed Afghanistan. They [the warlords] are trying to hold us hostage to their power.” Consistent with reports from many others, the delegate went on to describe efforts to coerce delegates. “There are petitions being circulated and we are pressed to just sign them without reading them, to agree with what is being said about who should be a candidate or chairman or have positions in the government. But we aren’t given a chance to read these decisions, they just say ‘sign it.’” During the sessions of both Loya Jirgas in Kabul, major commanders without being elected as delegates entered/were allowed participating in the Loya Jirga sessions, and some others were in contact with the delegates and allegedly threatening those who called for their exclusion or opposed their agenda. Similarly, persons questioning the role of Islam in the State, the

44 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

for the Presidential election. The role of the Mujahhedin in the past and future of the country’s government is at a point of contention that may create risks. While the last two years have seen an increase in the formation of political parties throughout the country, uneven conditions have been observed for the exercise of political rights in the regions. Whereas conditions have been conducive for a wide variety of political activities in Kabul, in other areas political activities are discouraged or curtailed. The space for political rights is restricted by the factional elements in power and the extent to which they tolerate political activities and freedom of expression.139 There is also a large degree of self-censorship practiced by political parties and by political or civil society activists. Decades of conflict have created a culture of fear, leading many parties to operate clandestinely.

The exercise of political rights is also a problem of physical safety of individual Afghans especially in the rural areas. Violent attacks carried out by the Taliban and anti- Government forces have contributed to a deterioration of the security situation in the eastern, central, southeastern and southern regions where a number of Afghan civilians, particularly those involved in the electoral process, have been targeted and killed. Commonplace in some of these areas are so-called “night-letters” warning civilians in general or specific individuals not to vote for or support the current US-backed Government. Persons at risk include Afghans raising the issue of past crimes and gross human rights violations committed during the period between 1992 to 1996, those denouncing ongoing human rights violations in parts of the country, those critical of powerful factions and local commanders as well as those affiliated with “Western” organizations or perceived as propagating “Western” values.

Afghans Associated with the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

A large number of former People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (“PDPA”) members as well as former officials of the Khad (the intelligence service) are working in the Government, including the security apparatus. A congress of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in late 2003 which led to the creation of Hezb-e-Mutahid-e- Mili (National United Party) with 600 members and other former PDPA officials have founded several other new parties.

While many former PDPA members and officials of the Communist Government, particularly those who enjoy the protection of and have strong links to currently influential factions and individuals, are safe from exposure due to their political and professional past, a risk of persecution may persist for some members of the PDPA, later re-named Watan (Homeland). The exposure to risk depends on the individual’s personal circumstances, family background, professional profile, links, and whether he was

promotion of women rights as well as criticizing for gross human rights violation were intimidated in particular by members of different Islamic parties and their armed groups.” See also news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/3937891.stm. 139 See AIHRC-UNAMA Joint Verification of Political Rights, First Report, 15 June - 7 July 2004. See www.aihrc.org.af/jvoprfr.htm.

45 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

associated with the human rights violations of the Communist regime in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1992.

Some former high-ranking members of PDPA without factional protection from Islamic political parties or tribes or influential personalities are at greater risk of persecution. They include:

• High ranking members of PDPA,140 irrespective of whether they belonged to the Parcham or Khalq faction of the party. They will be at risk only if they are known and had a public profile. This includes (i) high ranking members of Central and Provincial Committees of the PDPA and their family members; and (ii) high ranking members of social organizations such as the Democratic Youth Organization and the Democratic Women’s Organization.

• Former military officials, members of the police force and Khad (security service) of the Communist regime also continue to be at risk, not only from current power- holders but more so from the population (families of victims), given their identification with human rights abuses during the Communist regime.

• Members of the following parties if they openly promote these parties led by former leaders of PDPA, particularly in rural areas of the country: 1. Hezb-e-Mutahid-e-Mili, (National United Party) led by Noor Ul Haq Uloomi, 2. De Afghanistan De Solay Ghorzang Gond, (Peace Movement Party of Afghanistan) led by Shahnawaz Tanai, 3. Hezb-e-Mili Afghanistan, (National Party of Afghanistan) led by Abdul Rasheed Aaryan, 4. Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mili Afghanistan (National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan) led by Abdul Rasheed Jalili.

When reviewing the cases of military, police and security service officials as well as high-ranking Government officials of particular ministries it is imperative to undertake an analysis of the potential applicability of exclusion clauses of Article 1 F of the 1951 Geneva Convention. To some extent, many of these previous Afghan officials were involved, directly or indirectly, in widespread human rights violations. See also Section on Exclusion, below.

140 The PDPA was founded in 1965 and split in to two factions in 1967: Khalq (The People), led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and Parcham (The Banner), led by Babrak Kamal. Khalq was more rural-based, mostly comprising of members of the Pashtun tribes. Parcham was more urban oriented and was dominated by Dari speakers. In 1977, the two factions reunited under Soviet pressure. In 1988 the name of the party was changed to Watan (Homeland) Party. The PDPA based government collapsed in 1992 when, following the Peshawar Accords, Mujaheddin troops entered Kabul and the last President of a ‘Communist’ government in Afghanistan, Mohammed Najibullah (previously head of the secret service Khad) had to seek refuge in a UN-building in Kabul where he stayed until he was killed by Taliban troops entering Kabul in September 1996.

46 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Journalists

The new Constitution of Afghanistan and the new Media Law of March 2004 guarantee the inviolability of freedom of expression and the right to print and publish without prior submission to State authorities.141 This is a positive development since the previous Press Law introduced in February 2002 was not comprehensive, had some provisions on penalising “insult” that could be arbitrarily interpreted and contained 37 crimes which potentially affect journalists.142

Realities of the Afghan society and the problems with the law led to a number of journalists being threatened, detained, beaten or harassed during the last two years. Some of these journalists were followed and threatened by commanders.143 Journalists working for newspapers and radio and TV stations have also been harassed by Government officials.144 Due to serious threats to their life, some of them had to leave the country.145 The climate of fear among journalists is widely considered a major challenge. There is limited understanding of freedom of expression, which is exacerbated by a climate of intimidation resulting from the dominance of strong political and armed factions as well as the absence of rule of law. This leads journalists to self-censorship on sensitive issues and to present their work as moderate and mainstream. In particular, conservative forces have tried to exercise media control by threatening and physically attacking journalists.146

Reporting critical of local officials is considered to lead to reprisals against journalists.147 As a result, journalists may be exposed to a risk of persecution by non-State agents if they publish opinions critical of the Mujaheddin, disclose human rights abuses, corruption and bribery, or express views on religion, secularism, and freedoms at odds with conservative social norms.

141Article 34, Constitution of Afghanistan. 142 See portal.unesco.org/ci/ev.php?URL_ID=3979&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201& reload=1093342661. 143 One of the editors of a major newspaper claimed to have been put under surveillance and threatened for having published an article in which he accused the Mujahideen of destroying and looting Kabul. 144 On 12 November 2003, in a public statement, the Union of Afghanistan’s Journalists called on judicial authorities to investigate the incident of harassment, abuse and beating of radio and television actors and journalists by the officials of District No. 9 in Kabul. Reportedly, the administrative and security officials of District No. 9 in Kabul City, who were afraid of criticism directed at them because of their shortcomings, were angered when they saw the critical play on television and acted angrily and irresponsibly. Based on the freedom of press, the union of journalists expressed its support for the journalists, who were illegally harassed and beaten. 145 In May 2003, two journalists were jailed for writing an article entitled “Islam plus the State equals Dictatorship”. They were only released due to international pressure, but both are reported to have left the country. 146 Common Country Assessment for the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, United Nations System, Kabul, December 2004, See www.undp. org/rbap/Country_Office/CCA/Cca-Afghanistan2004.pdf. 147 See AIHRC-UNAMA-Joint Verification of Political Rights – Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections – First Report, 19 April – 3 June 2005.

47 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghans Associated With the Taliban or Other Groups Opposed to the Current Transition Process

The Taliban movement first appeared in Afghanistan in late 1994. The core of the Taliban was educated in madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan which adhere to the Deobandi orthodox legal and state doctrine and promote taqlid, the obedience to the Koran in its original letter. The political aims of the Taliban were to re-establish security in Afghanistan, to create a truly Islamic State, to disarm the population and to implement a strict interpretation of Shari’a law throughout the country. The movement was led by Mullah Mohammad Omar, the commander of the faithful (Amir al Momineen). The country was ruled by a Supreme Council (Shura) in Kandahar under Mullah Omar’s leadership. The Taliban were far from being a monolithic movement and included a wide spectrum of Afghans, ranging from relative moderates to extreme hard-liners. Decisions on the overall policy and military matters were taken within an exclusive circle at the top of the movement, which remained in close contact with Mullah Mohamed Omar in Kandahar, but implementation was different from one locality to another and from one period to another.

It can be presumed that most of the “rank and file” Taliban has already returned to their communities of origin, either in Afghanistan or in Pakistan. Many former Taliban fighters have been released from detention on grounds that they were conscripts and “innocent,” starting in 2002 and in smaller groups since. There are also attempts to include a number of moderate Taliban in the political process to further national unity.148 To this end, a Commission, headed by Sigbatullah Mojadeddi, has been established, which follows issues of reconciliation, including questions related to amnesties for specific Afghans wishing to return to and participate in the political process in Afghanistan. However, the country has seen surges in the level of violent incidents in some parts directed against the transition process, against the Government and its institutions, which is largely attributed to remnants of the Taliban as well as segments of the Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar). The factions openly oppose and try to disrupt the process toward democracy, and object in particular to the presence of US military forces in Afghanistan. Active association with Taliban or other anti-Government elements may therefore entail serious consequences for the individual concerned, including arbitrary and prolonged detention, ill-treatment and torture, intimidation and extortion by military forces. There are reports from the Eastern and Southeastern regions that Afghans are falsely accused of supporting active Taliban networks. The accusers may be local commanders or members of security forces intent on extorting money from influential and rich Afghans. The co-operation, in many instances, of these local commanders, with Coalition forces to counter remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida, has increased the real and perceived authority of these.149 In other

148 See, for example, “Going Straight”, The Economist, 2 December 2004. 149 General Assembly, Report of the independent expert of the UN Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan, A/59/370 of 21 September 2004, in which the independent experts states that he has received testimony that commanders used their connection to Coalition forces to threaten and extort money and goods from local residents, for example, by threatening to call in bombing raids unless they were given land, animals and money, or by turning individuals over to Coalition forces as

48 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

instances, accusations may be a means to take revenge against an Afghan individual for private reasons.

When reviewing the cases of persons associated with the Taliban and similar groups, it is imperative to undertake an analysis of the potential applicability of exclusion clauses of Article 1 F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. To some extent, many of these individuals were involved, directly or indirectly, in widespread human rights violations. See also Section on Exclusion, below.

Afghans in Areas Where They Constitute an Ethnic Minority

While attempts are made to address the problems faced by Afghans belonging to ethnic minorities and there have been improvements in some areas, the situation of ethnic minorities may still give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in other areas. While there have been no reports of renewed large-scale displacement of ethnic minorities, confiscation and illegal occupation of land by commanders have caused displacement in isolated situations. Discrimination, at times serious and at times amounting to persecution, of Afghans belonging to ethnic minorities by local commanders and local power-holders continue in some areas, in the form of extortion of money through illegal taxation, forced recruitment and forced labor, physical abuses and detention. Other forms of discrimination concern access to education, political representation and civil service.

Afghans of Pashtun ethnic origin from areas of Northern Afghanistan,150 in particular Jowzjan, Sar-i-Pul and Faryab, as well as from the provinces of Kapisa and Logar are at greater risk of persecution upon return. Similarly, while most Afghan Gujurs from Baghlan were able to return, Afghan Gujurs from Takhar continue to face serious difficulties. Afghans of Hazara ethnic origin from areas of the West and South of Afghanistan might also be exposed to discrimination, including discrimination amounting to persecution. Generally, asylum claims of Afghans originating from areas where they are the ethnic minority continue to require particular attention, especially during the electoral process for parliamentary elections in September 2005.

suspected Taliban or Al-Qaida members in order to punish personal enemies and to extort money from residents. Refworld 2005, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming). 150 Pashtuns are Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, but are a minority in the north. The Pashtun presence in the North is mainly the result of a deliberate policy of settlement carried out in earlier centuries. Since the demise of the Taliban, reports have emerged of Pashtun villagers and civilians facing harassment, intimidation and discriminatory treatment, as well as acts of violence, banditry and persecution at the hands of local warlords and other members of the factions controlling the North. Among the reprisals and abuses faced are the looting of villages and livestock, theft and confiscation of humanitarian assistance, ill- treatment and beating, extortion of money, arrest and detention and release following the payment of ransom, harassment (including rape) of women. See, for background information: “Afghanistan: Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes – Abuses against ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan”, Human Rights Watch, April 2002. See Refworld 2004, Issue 13, CD 4.

49 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghans Belonging to Religious Minorities (Ismailis)

The Ismailis are a Muslim minority group that split from the Shias in the year 765 A.D.151 They are estimated to comprise 2% of the total Muslim population of Afghanistan and living mainly in parts of Badakhshan, Baghlan, Bamyan, Maidan/Wardak and Takhar. Their political leadership in Afghanistan is the family of Sayeed Kayan. Kayan is the name of a valley in Baghlan province. During the Najibullah regime, the head of this family was the governor of Baghlan province. His son was commander of a military division, which continued to exist throughout the Mujaheddin years. Ismailis fought along-side the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and suffered reprisals when the Taliban captured the areas they previously controlled. After the fall of the Taliban, the Jamiat-e-Islami prevented the Ismailis from re-forming the military structures that they previously maintained.

Conservative elements of the Afghan population, both Sunni and Shia, regard the community of Ismaili with suspicion, often because of their more liberal approach to religious duties and social norms, including with regard to women. While Ismailis are not generally targeted or seriously discriminated, they continue to be exposed to risks in some areas of the country. In Doshi and Tala-wa-Barfak Districts of Baghlan Province, Ismaili land and property was occupied or confiscated and then sold by local commanders. They have been unable to reclaim their property. The Baghlan provincial court and other provincial authorities have refused to dispense justice for Ismailis in land- related cases. They face illegal taxation and extortion by local commanders. In Tala-wa- Barfak District, cases of rape of Ismaili women have been reported, with perpetrators facing impunity.

Afghans Belonging to Religious Minorities (Hindu/Sikh)

According to available information, there are an estimated 600 Sikh and Hindu families (about 3,700 persons) living in Afghanistan today with small but steady numbers of individuals and families returning, particularly from India. The majority live in Kabul (185 families), in Jalalabad (160 families) and Kunduz (100 families), others live in Ghazni, Kandahar and Khost. Previously, there may have been as many as 200,000 Sikhs and Hindus living in Afghanistan. Most of eight Sikh and four Hindu temples in Kabul were destroyed or used as military bases during years of fighting. Today, there are three temples operating in Kabul. In Jalalabad, there are two Sikh temples and one Hindu temple.

The Sikh and Hindu communities complain of experiencing harassment. They face intimidation and verbal as well as, at times, physical abuse in public places. In terms of

151 Religious succession is basic to Shi’a/Sunni differences, dividing the Shi’a into two distinct groups as well. The two major Shi’a communities in Afghanistan are the Twelvers, also called Imami, and the Ismaili sometimes called the Seveners. The Imami Shi’a (Qizilbash, Bayat and Hazara) recognize twelve successive Imams, beginning with Ali and ending in AD 874 with the disappearance of the twelfth (Imam Mahdi) who will return as a messianic figure at the end of the world. The Ismailis are recognizing only the first six Imams and the Seventh whose name was Ismail, which explains their being named Ismailis.

50 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

property, many homes and businesses were lost or occupied during the fighting. The property of some Sikhs and Hindus in Kabul is still occupied by commanders. In both Jalalabad and Kabul, the community representatives have expressed concerns that they will not be able to accommodate returning families. While Hindus and Sikhs do have access to recourse to dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court, in practice the community feels unprotected. Particularly where their property is occupied by commanders, Hindus and Sikhs have generally chosen not to pursue matters through the courts for fear of retaliation.

With regard to education, parents are hesitant to send their children to mainstream schools, as the children continue to face verbal and sometimes physical harassment. In Kabul, the community has started its own school located near the religious temple (Daramsal). The subjects taught in this school are Punjabi, Dari, religious studies and mathematics. While the Punjabi language teacher is paid by the community, the Dari and mathematics teachers are sent by the Department of Education. At present, the school has only 120 students in first and second grade. A common complaint from the community is that although they have raised their concerns about accommodation and education with various ministries and with representatives of the international community, they believe that no action has been taken to alleviate their problems. A positive development for the Sikh community has been that it was represented at the Loya Jirga and a member of the community is in the Electoral Commission. With regard to freedom of religion, the Sikh community suffers from the inability to cremate their dead due to the lack of support by the authorities and occupation of sacred places for ritual cremations.

Converts

The risk of persecution continues to exist for Afghans who have converted, or are suspected or accused of having converted, to Christianity or Judaism. The current Constitution of Afghanistan does not provide sufficient protection for converts. Article 2 of the Constitution states “Followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.” The boundaries of the law however are open to interpretation. The situation for converts is further compounded by the fact that Article 3 of the 2004 Constitution states that “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the sacred religion of Islam and the values of this Constitution.”

In Islamic law as interpreted today in Afghanistan, conversion is punishable by death throughout the country. The judicial system in Afghanistan is also largely comprised of conservative Islamic judges who follow Hanafi or Jafari doctrines recommending execution for converted Muslims. Conversion to Christianity is seen by family members and tribes as a source of shame and embarrassment for them in the community. Converts are likely also to face serious problems by the members of their families and their communities. Converts would face strong pressure to reverse their decision and to repent. In case of refusal, family members could resort to threats, intimidation, and in some cases physical abuse that could amount to persecution. However, there is no report of any

51 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghan being executed by court order for conversion. Small communities of Afghan converts are believed to practice Christianity in secrecy.

Women of Specific Profiles

The new Afghan Constitution sets forth, “The citizens of Afghanistan, whether men or women, have equal rights and duties before the law.”152 Pursuant to Article 44, the State has the responsibility to “devise and implement effective programs for balancing and promoting education for women…” Afghanistan acceded to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)153 in 2003 and has established institutional mechanisms to address gender issues. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) was created in 2002. With regard to political rights, efforts were made to ensure the participation of as many women as possible in the Presidential election in October 2004. The voter turn-out of women was high, 40% of eligible voters.154 The Constitution guarantees seats for women in both parliamentary houses.155

These positive legal and institutional developments notwithstanding, Afghanistan was ranked lowest in the world on the UNDP Development Report’s Gender-related Development Index (GDI)156 and women continue to face serious discrimination and violations of their rights. Women and girls are particularly affected by the overall security situation, which limits their freedom of movement to reach schools, health-care facilities and work.157 A majority of women are banned by their male family members, tribal and religious leaders from working outside their homes and many girls do not have access to education. At least 11 incidents that affected girls’ schooling, including arson and explosive attacks have been confirmed. Some attacks on women Government officials, journalists, potential candidates, teachers, NGO activists and humanitarian aid workers seem to have had the specific goal of intimidating them and undermining their efforts to strengthen women’s status in society.158 Restrictive cultural norms continue to severely affect Afghan women.159 This includes engagement and marriage at early ages, forced marriages, so-called honor killings and using girls or women as chattel to settle disputes (Bad). Women and girls continue to be abducted for forced marriage for debt release and as a means of dispute settlement or the cessation of blood feud. They are also victims of honour-crimes or death-threats when they try to escape from forced or arranged

152 Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 22, 2nd sentence. 153 5 March 2003. 154 See www.jemb.org. 155 Article 83 of the Constitution foresees at least 2 females from each province for the House of the People and Article 84 tasks the President to appoint 50% women for the third of the members of the House of Elders to be appointed. 156 Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace, and Security, Security Council Briefing Notes: Gender Issues, Afghanistan, October 2003, p. 1. 157 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on the Status of Women, “The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan,” Report of the Secretary General, Forty-ninth session, EC/CN.6/2005/5, 22 December 2004, Refworld, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming). 158 Ibid. 159 www.un.org/womenwatch/afghanistan.

52 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

marriage.160 There are reports of domestic violence, and women remain deprived of basic civil rights, including in cases of divorce, custody and with regard to inheritance rights.161

The freedom of movement of women is severely limited, especially in rural areas. In most villages, women are restricted to family compounds except for necessary movements to water points. In some rural areas, tribal culture provides women with marginally greater freedom of movement for example to work in the fields. In urban areas, freedom of movement is less restricted but normally requires a male escort (mahram). Single women of marriageable age rarely move alone because they risk exposure to harassment and social disrepute.

In terms of access to education, enrollment in schools of girls has significantly and steadily increased with a rate of 64% of girls attending school in urban areas and 31% in rural areas. However, only about 9% of those attending primary schools proceed with further education. The cultural attitudes of the society are a determining factor in the access of women to education. Even where there is no outright denial of access to education for girls and women, other reasons such as the absence of girls’ schools, the distance to the school, or the absence of female staff are obstacles. In many areas, young girls of marriage age are generally not allowed to continue their education. There are several instances in Paktia, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar and other Provinces where girl’s schools have been bombed or burned by terrorists.162

Marriage is generally arranged in Afghanistan and females do not participate in the decision making process. The term “forced marriages” is used to describe the situation in which a family “gives” its daughter to an economically or socially more privileged individual, either as partial repayment of a financial debt or to realize a financial gain, particularly if the family is poor or destitute. Under-age marriages remain a common practice, as well as exchange marriages, whereby the girl from one family is married to a boy from another, and in exchange, his family is married into his wife’s family. Cousin marriages are one form of this exchange marriage. The reason for this phenomenon is general poverty. Dowries for girls range between $400 and $1600, which most single men can not afford. Exchange marriages are also common in order to pay debts or resolve disputes. In some areas of the country, it is common practice for a widow to marry a family member of the late husband, including against their will. Where a widow does not remarry, her husband’s family takes on the decision-making role in relation to her family. Although often deemed a burden, the family of the husband maintains a strong sense of’ownership’ of the sons of the widow and her deceased husband. Sons with rights to paternal inheritance can pose a threat to uncles, particularly where the land has been divided over generations and is too small for subsistence farming. As such, widows display a high level of vulnerability to exploitation and poverty. Generally, women

160 Ibid. 161 Human Rights Watch, “Between Hope and Fear – Intimidation and Attacks against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan,” October 2004. See www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan1004/. 162 Shahabuddin Tarakhil and Hafizullah Gardish, “Girls’ Schools become Targets”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 24 June 2004. http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/arr/arr_200406_123_1_eng.txt.

53 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

returnees, widows and female-headed households face numerous obstacles, including forced eviction and illegal occupation of land, difficulties in claiming inheritance, increased speculation on housing and land, forced marriage of widows to ensure that land and property remain within the family and their inability to access courts.163 This is exacerbated where they have been disconnected from their own families or the families of their late husbands.

Women without effective male or family-support and single women of marriageable age are rarities in Afghanistan, and are always viewed with some suspicion. Afghan women returning from Western countries may be subjected to social opprobrium or harassment from unwanted suitors. They face a high risk of being married off by their families against their will. Single women are likely to be ostracized by the Afghan community or fall prey to malicious gossip which could destroy their reputation or social status. This exposes them to an increased risk of abuse, threats, harassment and intimidation by Afghan men, including at risk of being kidnapped, sexually abused and raped. In majority of these cases, the Government is not in a position to protect women.

Any woman who works in the public sphere of life, smokes or dresses in non-traditional clothing runs a high risk of being perceived as “loose” or even as a prostitute. She has crossed gender boundaries, which customarily defines the woman’s place as in the home. Return to Afghanistan, be it to urban or rural areas, therefore invariably means to conform to conservative and traditional standards of behavior in order to be safe. Pressure to conform is very strong, both from within families and communities, as well as by the public. The conduct of women in the workplace is carefully watched. Interaction with the opposite sex is frowned upon and can put Afghan women and their reputation in trouble. A “westernized” woman would only be able to continue to live the life that she was accustomed to abroad if she enjoys strong social protection. That would be more possible in Kabul than in the Provinces. Women returning from Iran have expressed frustration at the lack of available public and social opportunities and activities for women. In Iran, they were allowed to go out by themselves to shop, walk in the park, visit relatives and engage in other social activities. Such possibilities hardly exist in Afghanistan. Many women do not wish to wear a burka or chador but give in to these pressures out of fear of harassment or bringing shame to their families.

In urban areas, there are increasing numbers of Afghan women who have returned from USA, Europe, and UK to live and to seek work. A number achieve it but there is much adjustment to be made. There is no public entertainment that accepts women together with men. Women cannot travel freely without male escorts. Dress and behavior are conservative. Women’s rights activists face threats and intimidation, particularly if they speak out about women’s rights, the role of Islam or the behavior of commanders.164

163 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on the Status of Women, “The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan,” Report of the Secretary General, Forty-ninth session, EC/CN.6/2005/5, 22 December 2004, Refworld, issue 14, CD 5 (forthcoming). 164 Human Rights Watch, “Between Hope and Fear – Intimidation and Attacks against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan”, October 2004. Supra.

54 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The threat to the physical safety of women often comes from within the family. Family disputes often revolve around the position of women as it has direct implications on family honor. Women also continue to be imprisoned for social or sexual offences, such as refusing to proceed with a forced marriage, escaping an abusive marriage, or involvement in extramarital relationships. Women continue to face prison for these “crimes.” Authorities point out that sometimes such detention is necessary to protect the women from violent acts of revenge by their family members.

Against this background, the following categories of women are at greater risk of persecution if they return to Afghanistan: • Single women without effective male or community support. • Women perceived as or actually transgressing prevailing social mores, including women rights activists. • Afghan women who have married in a country of asylum without the consent of their family or have married non-Muslims and are perceived as having violated tenets of Islam. • Afghan women who have adopted a Westernized way of life and unable or unwilling to re-adjust.

Homosexuals

There is only limited information on the issue of homosexuality, given that this subject is taboo in Afghanistan. It is, however, reported that – in the past and particularly during the conflict - commanders, tribal leaders and others kept boys for sexual and other purposes. As one study has termed it, “the prevalence of sex between Afghan men is an open secret”. The practice of using young boys as objects of pleasure seems to have been more than a rare occurrence. Such relations were often coercive and opportunistic in that more influential, older men are taking advantage of the poor economic situation of some families and young males, leaving them with little choice. There are also a few documented cases of abduction of young boys for sexual exploitation by men.

Open homosexual relations, however, are not possible to entertain. Homosexual persons would have to hide their sexual orientation. Homosexuality is generally outlawed under Islam and punishable by death as a Hudood crime.

Afghans Working for International Organizations and International Security Forces

Afghans working with international organizations and international security forces where there are anti- Government insurgent activities or infiltrations of Taleban and Hezb-e- Islami forces continue to be at risk, as they constitute, what is often referred to as “soft targets”.165 This is particularly the case in some of the Southern provinces such as Zabul,

165 Habiburahman Ibrahimi and Shahbuddin Tarakhel. “Aid workers in peril”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting at Reliefweb, September 9, 2003. See www.reliefweb.int.

55 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Uruzgan, and Helmand, in the East in Kunar and Nuristan, as well as the Southeast such as in Khost, Paktia and Paktika provinces.

Reasons in the increase in targeted attacks and threats against Afghans working for international organizations and security forces, includes the perceived association with international forces, and the central and local administrations, perceived by some as “US- backed” as well as the association with the electoral process through voter registration during the Presidential and in the upcoming Parliamentary elections. Leaflets warning Afghans not to work for the aid community, including NGOs, have regularly been found in these areas.166

Landowners

There may be circumstances in which Afghan landowners may be exposed to a risk of persecution by non-state agents. The risk is acute in circumstances where houses have been occupied by powerful commanders and restitution is being pursued by a land- owner, including where there is a court decision for the return of the property. In such circumstances, the rightful owners are at greater risk if they do not have political, tribal or family protection and the authorities are unable to protect their rights (including the enforcement of a court-decision).

3. Considerations Concerning Exclusion on the Basis of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees

There is a requirement, in the cases of Afghans of specific profile, to carefully assess the applicability of exclusion clauses of Article 1 F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, given its history of serious human rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law by all sides of the long history of conflict.

Guidance in applying the exclusion clauses can be found in UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection HCR/GIP/03/05 of 4 September 2003 and the accompanying Background Note. Given the possibly serious consequences of exclusion, it is important

166 For example, In Kandahar, leaflets were distributed in Kandahar area, threatening to kill “one by one” any Afghans working for the US military there. In Logar Province, leaflets showing the photo of a DACAAR victim killed in Ghazni province were found with threatening statements. In November 2003, leaflets were also found in Wardak Province that warned Afghans working with NGOs of the consequences. These security threats have prompted several NGOs to cut back their activities in the provinces. The Red Crescent Foreign Relations and Planning Director for the Red Crescent for example, confirmed that the attacks have placed severe limitations on the operations of his organization outside of Kabul. See also Habiburahman Ibrahimi and Shahbuddin Tarakhel. “Aid workers in peril”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting at Reliefweb, www.reliefweb.int, 9 September 2003. In addition to the threats that specifically target NGO workers, they could become victims to organized crime, which has become prevalent in the major cities such as Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kabul. Afghans working for aid organizations, particularly Afghan, are perceived to be wealthy and well-off. They could therefore be also subjected to robberies and the kidnapping of their family members in order to force them to pay a ransom. Human Rights Watch. “Afghanistan: Escalating Attacks on Aid Workers and Civilians.” See www.hrw.org.

56 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

to apply them with great caution and only after full assessment of the individual circumstances of the case. For exclusion to be justified, individual responsibility must be established in relation to a crime within the scope of Article 1 F. Such responsibility flows from the person having committed or made substantial contributions to the commission of a criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the criminal conduct. Applicable defences as well as proportionality considerations should form part of the decision-making process

It is particularly noteworthy that the fact that a person was at some point a senior member of a repressive regime, such as regimes in Afghanistan, or a member of an organization involved in unlawful violence (as many of the armed factions) does not in itself entail individual liability for excludable acts. Also ex-combatants should not necessarily be considered excludable, unless serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law are indicated in the individual case.

It is against this doctrinal background, which the following categories of cases are described, which – in UNHCR’s view – require a careful assessment of the applicability of exclusion clauses.

Members of the Security Forces of the Communist Regimes

When reviewing the cases of military, police and security services officials, as well as those of high-ranking Government officials of particular ministries during the Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, , and Najibullah regimes,167 it is imperative to carefully assess the applicability of the exclusion clauses in Article 1 F of the 1951 Geneva Convention. This includes cases of former members of Khad (Khadamate Ettelaate Dowlati), the State Information Service.168

For individual cases of military officers of the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as security services, it is relevant to assess their involvement in operations in which civilians were subject to arrest, disappearances, torture, degrading treatment and punishment, persecution and extrajudicial summary killings,169 such as, for example, the mass killings after the coup and the harsh reprisals against resistence to the decrees on land-reforms, issued under Hafizullah Amin’s regime. Also, the role of such officials in

167 This period of recent Afghan history started with a military coup on 27 April 1978, which brought to power a government dominated by the PDPA, continued during the Soviet occupation which started on 27 December 1979 and lasted until the fall of the Najibullah government on 15 April 1992. 168 Please see Annex 5 for further information on the Khad, its structure and division of tasks. 169 See among other sources: Amnesty International, Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, September 1979 ASA/11/04/79, UN Commission on Human Rights reports on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan by Special Rapporteur Prof. Felix Ermacora, Helsinki Watch, “Tears, Blood and Cries: Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Invasion 1979 – 1984, 1984. See www.hrw.org/reports/1984/afghan1284.pdf.

57 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

military operations requires a close assessment, many of which were in violation of international humanitarian law, by deliberately targeting civilians.170

Specific Commanders and Members of Afghan Armed Factions and Militia Forces

During the period of the armed resistance against the communist regimes and the Soviet occupation from 27 April 1978 until the fall of Najibullah in April 1992, the activities of members of armed factions need to be assessed carefully. Many activities amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, both against combatants of rival factions as well as against civilians: Political assassinations, reprisals and extrajudicial killings, as well as rape, including of Afghan civilians for reasons such as working for Government institutions and schools or transgressing Islamic social mores. Other violations included extra judicial executions of prisoners of war and attacks on civilian targets.171

The human rights situation and security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated again markedly, even before the interim Government, headed by Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, as agreed in the Peshawar Accords of 26 April 1992, was established in Kabul. The conflict for power in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan began between the various factions. This period of competition and armed conflict for power and control between the factions (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan between 1992 to 1996) was accompanied by serious violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law.172

Among others, specific commanders and members of the following Islamic parties with armed factions require a close assessment: Hezb-e-Islami, (Hekmatyar and Khalis), Hezb- e-Wahdat (both branches/or all nine parties that formed Hezb-e-Wahdat), Jamiat-e-Islami (including Shura-e-Nezar), Jonbesh-e-Melli-Islami, Ittehad-e-Islami, Harakat-e-Inqilab- e-Islami (lead by Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi) and Harakat-e-Islami.

Specific Members and Commanders of the Taliban Movement

Similarly, the need to consider the application of the exclusion clauses in relation to individual members and military commanders of the Taliban will be triggered where there indications of their participation in serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law or their involvement in terrorist activities. The pattern of deliberate attacks on civilians by Taliban forces, summary execution and massacres and the

170 Information can be found, inter alia, in Helsinki Watch and Asia Watch: “By all Parties to the Conflict: Violations of the Laws of War in Afghanistan”, 1988, Asia Watch “Afghanistan. See www,hrw.org/reports/1988/afghan0388.pdf. “The Forgotten War – Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws of War since the Soviet Withdrawal”, 1991 as well as in UN Reports on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan. See http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/afghanistan/. Relevant information for all periods can also be found under http://afghanistanjusticeproject.org/warcrimesandcrimesagainst humanity19782001.pdf. Some relevant information on events, which lead to the displacement and flight of Afghans, can be found in the “Chronology of Displacement” in the Annex 6. 171 Ibid. 172 See reports by Amnesty International, US Department of State and others.

58 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

deliberate land systematic destruction of livelihoods through a “scorched earth” policy and forcible relocation are amply documented.

4. Considerations Relating to Complementary Forms of Protection

Persons, who do not fall within the 1951 Convention criteria, may nevertheless be in need of international protection. UNHCR’s competence and mandate is generally understood to cover, apart from Convention refugees, persons who are outside their countries because of a serious threat to life, liberty, or security in the country of origin due to generalised violence resulting from armed conflict or serious public disorder.

For example, persons fleeing indiscriminate violence and the accompanying disorder in a conflict situation, with no specific element of persecution, or no linkage with a specific ground, might not fall under the 1951 Convention refugee definition but may still require international protection. Such persons would fall within UNHCR’s mandate, and, should be granted complementary forms of protection by States applying such forms of protection, if rejected for refugee status.

In the context of Afghanistan, UNHCR advocates for international protection, which would include complementary forms of protection, being extended to persons originating from areas where any or several of the following features have been reported or observed within the past months:

• Heavy and continuous or intermittent fighting between insurgent elements on one hand, and the Coalition and/or the Government on the other. • Indiscriminate and consistent attacks by insurgent elements, including the consistent use of indiscriminate types of warfare (IED on the roads, missile attacks, bombs). • Systematic acts of intimidation by insurgent elements. • Systematic and wide-spread forced military recruitment and forced labor. • Factional fighting and rivalries, involving sporadic and localized fighting and visible competition over a particular region and/or area • Systematic and heavy illegal taxation, involving threats to life, security and liberty in case of refusal.

With regard to the situation, as it presents itself in May 2005, this would apply to the following areas:

1. Areas where (non-formal) armed groups continue to be present and active, factional fighting has taken place intermittently, and where high levels of indiscriminate actions by commanders are reported, such as illegal taxation for different reasons, forcible recruitment to armed groups or for labor purposes or payment of money instead, illegal occupation and confiscation of immovable property. These are, in particular:

59 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

• Panjau, Saighan, Shiber and Waras districts of Bamyan • Chak, Sayed Abad, Dai Mirdad, Jalrez, Markaz-e-Behsud and Behsud I districts of Maidan/Wardak • Alasay, Nijrab and Tagab districts of Kapisa • Siagird district of Parwan • Sarubi district of Kabul • Khawar, Azra, Mohammad Agha districts of Logar • Nawa, Giro, Gilan, Ab Band, Andar, Zana Khan, Qarabagh, Waghaz and Ajrestan districts of Ghazni, • Kiti, Kijran, Gizab, Sharestan, Miramur, Khider, Ashtarlai, Sangtakht, Bandar districts of Daikundi, • Chakhansur, Charburjak, Kang, and Khashroad districts of Nimroz • Adraskan, Chisht-e-Sharif, Farci, Karukh, Shindand and Koshk-e-Kohneh districts of Herat, • Ghormach, Jawand, Morghab and Qades districts of Badghis, • Anar Dara, Bakwa, Bala Blouk, Gulistan, Khak-e-Safid, Lash Jaween, Parchaman, Qala-e-Kah districts of Farah, • Taiwara, Lal Wa Sar Jangal, Pasaband, Sharak and Tulak districts of Ghor, • Alinegar, Alishing, Dawlat Shah and Mehterlam districts of Laghman, • Tala wa Barfak districts of Baghlan provinces. • Charbolak, Chimtal, Kishindih (including Zareh), Shortepa districts of Balkh. • Kohistan, Pashtun Kot, Almar, Sherintagab, Khwaja Sabzposh, Dawlat Abad, and Qaisar districts of Faryab. • Khwaja Dukoh, rural parts of Shibirghan, Mardyan Darzab (including Khosh Tepa), parts of Aqcha districts of Jawzjan. • Archi districts of Kunduz. • Said Abad, parts of Sayyad, Sozma Qala districts, parts of provincial capital of Sari Pul.

2. Areas of Nooristan (eastern parts), parts of Kunar (Sarkani, WataPoor, Chapa Dara), parts of Nangarhar (Khogyani and districts bordering Pakistan), parts of Laghman (Ailising, Dawlat Shah, Alinegar), parts of Khost (Tani, Terezai, Gurbuz), parts of Paktia (Zurmat, Dand-e-Patan, Jaji, Shahi Kot (Arma district), parts of Paktika (Barmal, Urgon, Sarubi, Nika, Zirook, Muta Khan, districts bordering Khost, Ghazni, Zabul provinces and Pakistan), parts of Helmand (Khanesheen, Garam Seer, upper Hilmand: Musa Qala, Kajaki, Zamin Dawar, Baghran), Kandahar (Miansheen, Khakrez, Shorawak, Parts of Shawali Kot, Arghestan, Maroof, Reg, parts of Spin Boldak, Maiwand and Panjwaye), Zabul (except Shar-e-Safa, Shajoy, Jaldak), Uruzgan (all the province except central parts of Trenkot) and Ghazni provinces where infiltration of anti-Government elements is reported, and military activities of ANA, US and coalition forces are ongoing. As a result, civilians are at risk of being indirectly affected by the ongoing military operations of these forces and the counter-strikes by insurgent elements, or, may also be directlyaffected through reported search-operations, investigations, arrests and through (false) denunciations.

60 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

5. Humanitarian Considerations

In addition to the categories of Afghans that are in need of international protection, there are certain Afghan individuals currently outside Afghanistan, for whom return would not constitute a durable solution and would endanger the physical safety and well-being of the persons concerned, given their extreme vulnerability. In the context of return to Afghanistan, extremely vulnerable cases can be divided into two broad categories:

(i) Individuals whose vulnerability is the result of a lack of effectively functioning family- and/or community support mechanisms and who cannot cope, in the absence of such structures. (ii) Individuals whose vulnerability is the result of a lack of effectively functioning Government and other support mechanisms and treatment opportunities.

Against this background, UNHCR strongly advises that, at least temporarily, solutions be identified in countries of asylum and that exemptions to obligations to return are made for certain Afghans on humanitarian grounds, included but not limited to those within the following categories:

Unaccompanied Females

Single females who do not have family or other close relatives in Afghanistan who are willing to support them should be allowed to remain in countries of asylum, where support mechanisms are in place and a less difficult social environment for their well- being exists. Long term solutions are not available for most single females in Afghanistan unless they have effective male family or community support. Their vulnerability is the result of social traditions and gender values in Afghanistan, where women cannot live independently from a family. Where there is no family to care and protect them, single women can only be accommodated temporarily in shelters run by some NGOs in Kabul and Herat, which have a negative social reputation as hosting criminals or prostitutes and constitute but a short-term “safe haven”.

Single Parents With Small Children and Without Bread-Winner

Single parents (especially women) with small children who do not have the support of relatives or the community) and no member of a household with the ability to act as the breadwinner, will be unable to sustain their lives in Afghanistan.

Unaccompanied Elderly

Elderly people who lack support of relatives or their community of origin often experience extreme hardship in Afghanistan. For the most part, elderly people who cannot work or provide for themselves are dependent on normally existent family support. In the rare cases that they do not have family or a social safety net, they are at

61 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

greater risk extreme hardship. Communities may provide “ashar” (one or two days of voluntary work) for elderly vulnerable individuals or such individuals may spend days and nights at mosques, living on charity of those attending prayers at the mosque. Otherwise, they are on their own and without any options to obtain support from public sources. There are no shelters or homes for elderly persons, either in Kabul city or other locations in Afghanistan. In UNHCR’s view, elderly people without support should be permitted to remain in the country of asylum unless family-members can be traced in Afghanistan.

Unaccompanied Children

Afghanistan acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2002 and has strengthened legal provisions to protect children. However, in the current situation, characterized by weak rule of law and governance structures, the presence of local commanders, high levels of criminality with reports of incidences of child trafficking, as well as child labor and forced recruitment, many children continue to be exploited. Many children are working on the streets of Kabul, Jalalabad, and Mazar-I-Sharif with numbers increasing. The child labor force in Afghanistan is predominately boys aged 8-14 with a smaller numbers of girls 8-10 years old. The main reasons that children work are poverty- related.173 The few existing orphanages in Kabul and marastoons in other main cities, mostly run by the Government and the Afghan Red Crescent Society, are no durable solution for unaccompanied and separated children. They have very strict criteria for temporary admission. Boys 15 or over are not admitted.

Children and adolescents under 18 years of age who do not have families, close relatives or extended family support in Afghanistan are therefore at risk of becoming homeless and risk further exploitation. Where family tracing and reunification efforts have not been successful and special and coordinated arrangements cannot be put in place to facilitate safe and orderly return, UNHCR recommends that such children be allowed to remain in the country of asylum.

Victims of Serious Trauma (Including Rape)

There is no form of psycho-social trauma support in Afghanistan. The concept of ‘counseling’ as a profession does not yet exist. All trauma is, if at all, dealt with by discourse with family and friends. Many Afghans, however, are seriously traumatized given their experiences of war and human rights violations. Of particular concern, in this regard, is the situation of women, many of who have suffered sexual violence including ape.174 In addition, for both women and men who have suffered sexual violence, strong

173 Global Movement for Children Afghanistan Working Group. Lost Chances: The changing situation of children in Afghanistan 1990-2000, June 2001. 174 Any manifestation of what might be termed ‘depression’, including that resultant from past or current psychological trauma, is currently treated by Afghan doctors by drugs. Doctors lack diagnostic as well as allopathic resources, thus depression is often compounded by overdoses of valium or other medication. Physical conditions that require specialist care are unlikely to find this in Afghanistan. Rape is only rarely a legally recognized category; women tend not to be treated equitably to men before the law. But are judged

62 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

cultural taboos surrounding disclosure as a victim inhibit discussion, even with close family members. In more conservative areas, identification as a victim of rape or other sexual abuse can lead to family rejection and social ostracism, therefore it is reasonable to conclude that some victims of this form of trauma may fear return to Afghanistan on the basis that they will be discovered as a victim and face further persecution.

As a general humanitarian principle, where such trauma constitutes “compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution”, it should be properly recognized even if a substantial improvement in conditions in the country of origin has taken place at the time a decision on the application is taken. 175 Otherwise, traumatized Afghans who are in need of treatment and counseling, which is not available in Afghanistan, should be allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds.

Physically Disabled Persons

Physically disabled Afghans who cannot work or live on their own in Afghanistan, should not return unless they have family or community support. Examples are persons permanently disabled by diseases such as polio or meningitis, land mine victims, persons injured during the war, accident victims and persons with severe handicaps or birth defects, including blind, deaf and mute persons.

Mentally Disabled Persons

Mentally ill persons who need long term treatment or special care will not be able to cope in Afghanistan unless they have family to take care of them. There are no specialized institutions and personnel. This is particularly true for severe mental illness such that the person cannot be self-sufficient.

Persons with Medical Illness (Contagious, Long Term or Short Term)

For some medical cases, return to Afghanistan is not recommended, unless family- or community support and care is available during the treatment period. For others, there may be no treatment possibilities in Afghanistan for the time being. Examples are those with HIV or AIDS and injuries or conditions requiring sophisticated surgical procedures (i.e. transplants), which are not available in Afghanistan.

The following diseases and other serious medical conditions cannot currently be treated in Afghanistan:

according to customary law, whereby a victim of rape is more likely to be judged a prostitute and thus face prosecution as the perpetrator of the violation. Male victims of rape are not discussed. Sexual abuse of children is known but not acknowledged. There is no in-country support for rape victims. 175 See UNHCR, “Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the ‘Ceased Circumstances’ Clauses)”, HCR/GIP/03/03, 10 February 2003. www.unhcr.ch. See Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2.

63 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Name of disease(s) Doctors not Instruments not Medicines not available available available Cardiovascular system diseases Congenital heart X X diseases Valvular heart X X diseases Gastrointestinal system diseases Liver cirrhosis X X Urinary system diseases Renal failure X X Blood diseases Thalassemia X X X Hemophilia X X Leukemia X X X Immune system diseases AIDS X X Encephalopathies Post X X X encephalopathy Cerebral palsy X X X Hydrocephalus X X CVA (Cerebral X X Vascular Accident) All Cancerous X X X diseases Post organ X X X transplantation Viral diseases X

The following surgical operations cannot be performed and post-operative is unavailable in Afghanistan:

Type of surgical operation Doctors/professional staff Equipment not available not available Micro-neurosurgery X X Heart surgery X X Vascular surgery There is only one expert in X Kabul who can do peripheral vascular surgery Radiotherapy for the X X treatment of cancer All kinds of organ X X transplantation

64 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Dialysis X X Tempanoplasty (ear) X X Surgery for macular X X diseases (eye) Keratoplasty (eye) X Posterior vitreactomy (eye) X X Keratorefractive surgery X X (eye Pupilorplasty (eye) X Phaeko cataract surgery X X (eye)

The following medicines are not available in Afghanistan:

1. Antineoplasms 2. Antiviral drugs 3. Immunoglobulins 4. Blood factors 5. Immunosuppressant: most importantly Cyclosporine, Cellcept, Imuran, Azatuprine 6. Some antibiotics: Imipenemcilastatine, Neomycine Sulfate, Piperacillin, Pralidoxine Chlorid 7. Acnocoumarol (Anticoagulant Agent) 8. Acetylcysteine (Antidote (Acetonaminophene) 9. Colfusecril palmitate (Pulmonary Surfactant) 10. Some hormones: Corticoptopine (Hypophysical Hormone), Parathormone (Parathyroid Hormone) 11. Desoxycorticosterone Pivalate (Mineralocorticoid) 12. Dimercaprol (Antdote (Au, As, Hg, Pb) 13. Fluorometholone (Ophthalmic Gloeocorticoid) 14. Pentaerythritol Tetramitrate (Vasodilator/Anti Angina) 15. Prostaglandin E1 16. Oruinine (Anti ) 17. Finasteride (Antiandrogen) 18. Isoproterenol (Antiarythmia)

The following diagnostic examinations cannot be undertaken in Afghanistan:

1. MRI 2. CT Scan (only one machine available in Kabul) 3. Echocardiography (only one machine available in Kabul) 4. Determination of level of hormones and electrolytes 5. Angiography 6. Bronchoscope 7. Diagnostic test for poliomyelitis

65 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The following chronic diseases are treatable in Afghanistan but the patient requires family care and support, which varies based on the condition of the patient:

1. Leprosy 2. Myocardial infarction 3. TB 4. Bone fractures 5. Complicated diabetes 6. Complicated COPDs (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Diseases) 7. Osteomyelitis 8. Mental diseases 9. Juvenile Rheumatic Arthritis 10. Severe burns

It is worth mentioning that these patients need family care both in hospital and at home. The common tasks that a family member or relative (care taker) of the patient should perform are as follows:

• The hospitals may provide only about 30% of the medicine required. The caretaker is required to purchase about 70% of the medicine in bazaar. • The care taker should assist and accompany the patient in movement (going for laboratory tests, going to toilet, etc) • Change and clean the cloths, clean the patient and his/her bed. • Stay by the bed of the patient and inform the doctors when the condition of the patient deteriorates and there is need for doctor. • The food provided by the hospitals is not a sufficient food in terms of nutritious ingredients. The care-taker needs to provide additional food and fruits for the patient.

In Afghanistan, patients are hospitalized for short periods, because of the limited space for patients in hospitals. When patients come out of a life-threatening condition, they are discharged. The family or relatives are required to take care of the patient at home.

6. Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative

The application of an internal flight or relocation alternative concept, as part of a holistic assessment of refugee status comes into play in situations where the well-founded fear of persecution relates to only a specific part of the country of origin. Given the fragmented nature of power and control in parts of Afghanistan, an examination of the availability of internal flight or relocation alternatives may appear to be warranted. UNHCR however continues to recommend against the application of the internal flight or relocation alternative in the context of Afghan claims, for reasons noted below.

The assessment of whether or not there is a relocation alternative in the individual case requires two main sets of analysis – its relevance and its reasonableness. For both, the

66 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

personal circumstances of the individual applicant and the conditions in the area to which the internal flight or relocation alternative is proposed must be examined.176

With regard to the “relevance” of an internal flight or relocation alternative, it is of particular importance to assess the willingness and the ability of the State to protect from risks emanating from non-State agents. Local commanders and armed groups act as agents of persecution in the Afghan context that have set themselves above the law, both at the local and central levels.177 In some cases, they are closely associated to the local administration while in others they may be linked to and protected by more powerful and influential actors, including at the central level. As a result, they largely operate with impunity, with the State authorities being unable to provide protection against risks emanating from these actors. In most instances, the State is still unable to provide effective protection against persecution by non-State actors. The links to other actors may, depending on the circumstances of the individual case, expose an individual to risk beyond the zone of influence of a local commander, including in Kabul. Even in a city like Kabul, which is divided into neighbourhoods (gozars) where people tend to know each other, the risk remains, as news about a person arriving from elsewhere in the country travel fast.

Additional to the “relevance” of internal relocation to the individual case, it must also be “reasonable” for a claimant to relocate to that location in order to overcome his or her well-founded fear of persecution elsewhere in the country of origin. It is particularly with regard to this “reasonableness analysis” that UNHCR continues to advise against resort to the notion of an internal flight or relocation alternative in the Afghan context, considering elements of safety and security, human rights standards as well as options for economic survival during the relocation journey and upon arrival at the destination of relocation.178 The traditional family, extended family and community structures of Afghan society continue to constitute the main protection and coping mechanism in the current situation. It is these structures and links on which Afghans rely for their safety as well as for economic survival, including access to accommodation and an adequate level of subsistence. The protection provided by families, extended families and tribes is limited to areas where family or community links exist and without them, a relatively normal life without undue hardship at another location than one’s place of origin or residence is unlikely. As documented in studies on urban vulnerability, the household and the extended family remains the basic social network in Afghanistan and there are indications that existing traditional systems of sharing and redistribution function less in the extended urban family.179 It would therefore, in UNHCR’s view, be unreasonable to expect any

176 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative within the Context of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention/and or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/04, 23 July 2003, p. 3, www.unhcr.ch. See Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2. 177 Astri Suhrke, et al. Conflictual Peace building: Afghanistan Two Years after Bonn, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004, p. 41. 178 Ibidem, p. 6. 179 Schutte Stefan, Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies From Three Cities; Working Paper Series, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. May 2004. p. 32. See www.areu.org.af.

67 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Afghan to relocate to an area to which he or she has no effective links, including in urban areas of the country.180

UNHCR continues to advice against the application of the internal flight or relocation alternative in the examination of claims of Afghan asylum-seekers for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

7. Considerations Relating to Cessation on the Basis of Article 1 C (5) of the 1951 Convention

Under Article 1C of the 1951 Convention, refugee status may cease either through the actions of the refugee (sub-paragraphs 1 to 4) -such as by re-establishment in his or her country of origin- or through fundamental changes in the objective circumstances in the country of origin upon which refugee status was based (sub-paragraphs 5 and 6). The latter are commonly referred to as the “ceased circumstances” or “general cessation” clauses.181 When interpreting the cessation clauses, it is important to bear in mind the broad durable solutions context of refugee protection informing the object and purpose of these clauses. Accordingly, cessation practices should be developed in a manner consistent with the goal of durable solutions. Cessation should not result in persons being compelled to return to a volatile situation, as this would undermine the likelihood of a durable solution and could also cause additional or renewed instability in an otherwise improving situation.

UNHCR’s Executive Committee has developed guidance in the form of Executive Committee Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII) (1992), which is further elaborated upon in Guidelines on International Protection. 182 A key element of the assessment is the

180 The Kabul City Vulnerability Mapping Exercise completed by “Action Contre le Faim” in 2004 indicates that some specific parts of the City, notably the Central Bazaar area, had experiences an extremely high housing density; with 51% of the families there living in a single room. It also illustrates that families have to deal with a very high level of insecurity at the household level, as 33.48% of the main income earners relied on daily wage. The irregularity of their income, and therefore ability to pay rent, constitutes a main source of concern. In Kabul and its surroundings, rents vary from an average of US $50 dollars rent for a basic one room without any facilities to 3000 dollars in the prominent areas of Kabul such as Wazir Akbar Khan. Recently, Kabul prices have escalated to an average of rental at 300% of professional monthly income, even in the outskirts of the city. In rural areas, it is not possible to rent. People own their homes; war and increased family size means that most houses are over-populated and land free of encumbrances – landmines, clear ownership rights – is extremely rare. In urban areas, there is often a shortage. With an average salary of US $ 20 dollars, families are unable to afford even the average rents of US $ 150 dollars. 181 A strict interpretation of Article 1C(5) and (6) would allow their application on an individual basis. Yet Article 1C(5) and (6) have rarely been invoked in individual cases. States have not generally undertaken periodic reviews of individual cases on the basis of fundamental changes in the country of origin. These practices acknowledge that a refugee’s sense of stability should be preserved as much as possible. 182 UNHCR, Guidelines for Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the “Ceased Circumstances” Clauses), 10 February 2003 (available on Refworld 2004, issue 13, CD2) (which resulted, inter alia, from an expert meeting held as part of the Global Consultations on International Protection in May 2001), and on ExCom Conclusion

68 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

fundamental, stable and durable nature of the changes which have taken place in the country of origin, and the extent to which the causes of displacement are addressed. Where the changes have taken place “violently”, that is by the overthrow of a regime and military means, (as in Afghanistan), a longer period of time is generally required in order for the changes to consolidate and national reconstruction to take root.

What follows are some of UNHCR’s observations with respect to the viability of applying the cessation to refugees from Afghanistan:

Fundamental character of change: The process of political transition in Afghanistan, which began with the fall of the Taliban regime in late 2001 and the subsequent signing of the Bonn Agreement, marked the beginning of a fundamental change in the country with which the causes of displacement are gradually being addressed. For this process towards stability to become irreversible, hence for the changes to be deemed fundamental, it is UNHCR’s view that only upon the successful completion of this transition, an assessment on the viability of general cessation can be made. An important reason for this caution is the fact that Parliamentary elections have not yet taken place. The opportunity for Afghans to choose their representatives from all provinces and districts to participate in government will have a very positive effect on the currently very fragmented country. These elections, if concluded successfully, are seen as key for the stability of the country and the completion of the transition process.

Linked to the causes of displacement, and an end to hostilities, the return to a situation of peace and stability as well as a complete political change are important indicators of a fundamental change and therefore for the application of general cessation. With military action to address anti-government insurgency ongoing in several provinces, some of which are not entirely in control of the government and its forces, armed hostilities have not ceased. While progress is being made, the national police and the Afghan National Army (with minimal external support) do not manage to exercise exclusive authority in many parts of Afghanistan and are not expected to be completely deployed until 2007 and 2008 respectively. The DDR programme has made notable progress but has not been completed, and not much has been done as yet to tackle the problem of unofficial militias (so-called Informal Military Forces or IMFs). It therefore cannot be concluded that a situation of stability has been reached.

Enduring nature of change: It is recommended that developments which bring about significant and profound change are given time to consolidate, particularly where the changes have taken place violently through the overthrow of a regime. Given the difficulties in progressing towards genuine reconciliation in post-conflict situations involving different ethnic and political groups, the human rights situation and peace- arrangements need to be carefully monitored. As outlined above, one important aspect is the successful completion of the transition process through parliamentary elections (Lower House and Upper House through provincial and district council elections), as

No. 69 (XLIII) (1992) on Cessation of Status. See Refworld, issue 13, CD 1, UNHCR Information – ExCom – Conclusions on International Protection.

69 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

these would establish the degree to which representative national and local political institutions can bring the various segments of a fragmented and ethnically diverse society together into a non-violent framework of governance. Among others, important aspects to assess the nature of change are a significant reduction of violations of human rights, by local commanders and armed elements as well as an end to serious discrimination of ethnic minorities.

Restoration of national protection: A crucial aspect in determining whether circumstances have changed so as to justify cessation under Article 1 C (5) is whether a refugee can effectively re-avail him or herself of the protection of the country of origin. Indicators for the restoration of national protection are more broadly the respect for human rights, but in particular marked progress towards the re-establishment of functioning government and basic administrative structures, including a justice system in the country which is accessible and able to operate without discrimination. For Afghanistan, given its social and ethnic structures, the degree to which these structures extend beyond the central government level into the provinces, is an important factor to consider. In UNHCR’s view, local government and administrative structures are not yet functioning with a reasonable degree of reliability and continuity and are, in particular, not yet sufficiently independent from those exercising armed or economic power. Similarly, access to effective remedies in the formal legal system or within traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is very limited or, in cases where the complaint involves influential persons or persons linked to commanders, non-existent. The latter groups are able to act with near impunity in Afghanistan.

70 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 1 – Afghan Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Returnees: Global Trends183

A. Refugee Population

Afghanistan continues to be by far the largest country of origin of refugees under UNHCR care. By the end of 2004, 2.1 million Afghan refugees were reported by 78 asylum countries, constituting 23 per cent of the global refugee population. Despite continued repatriation, the number of Afghan refugees dropped by only two per cent during the year. This is mainly because the return data includes persons who were not registered as refugees before returning. Box 1: Refugees from Afhanistan, 2004

Ninety-two per cent of all the refugees from Country of asylum Begin year End year 184 Afghanistan are hosted by Pakistan (960,000) Pakistan* 1,123,600 960,000 and the Islamic Rep. of Iran (954,000) – 46 per cent Islamic Rep. of Iran 834,700 952,800 each. The third largest asylum country for refugees Germany** 47,000 38,600 from Afghanistan is Germany (38,600), followed Netherlands** 26,400 25,900 by the Netherlands (25,900), United Kingdom United Kingdom** 21,700 22,500 (22,500) and Canada (15,200) (see Box 1). Out of Canada** 14,600 15,200 the 2.09 million refugees, some 1.93 million are United States** 9,600 9,800 being assisted by UNHCR. India 10,300 9,800 Australia** 7,200 8,000 Denmark** 6,400 6,400 During 2004, some 5,700 asylum seekers from Other 34,500 36,400 Afghanistan were recognized as refugees or allowed Total 2,136,000 2,085,500 to remain for humanitarian reasons, primarily in * Figure subject to revision. Includes only camp refugees. Austria (900), Australia and the United Kingdom ** UNHCR estimate with some 800 each, and the Netherlands (500).

In addition, 5,180 refugees from Box 2: Resettlement arrivals of Afghans, 1995-2004 Afghanistan were resettled during the 10,000 year according to official government statistics, mostly by Canada (2,120), 8,000 Australia (970), USA (960), New Zealand (600), Sweden (310), and 6,000

Finland (220). During 1995-2004, a total 4,000 of 41,000 Afghan refugees were resettled (see Box 2) During 2004, UNHCR 2,000 facilitated the resettlement of some 2,710 Afghan refugees from previous countries 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 of asylum, notably from the Islamic Republic of Iran (820), Pakistan (550),

183 Prepared by PGDS/DOS, UNHCR Geneva. 184 UNHCR figures for Pakistan only include Afghan refugees living in camps. According to a 2005 Government census, the latest estimates available, there were an additional 1.9 million Afghans living in urban areas in Pakistan, some of whom may be refugees.

71 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Kyrgyzstan (430), Russian Federation (350), India (190), and Uzbekistan (124). UNHCR has assisted in the resettlement of some 24,400 Afghan refugees since 1995.

Some 940,000 Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan during 2004, some 515,000 returned from the Islamic Republic of Iran and some 424,000 returned from Pakistan. During 2003 some 645,000 refugees returned to Afghanistan, whereas in 2002 almost 2 million refugees returned. During 1995-2004, a total of 5.1 million refugees returned to Afghanistan.

Almost 990,000 out of the estimated Box 3: Repatriation of Afghans, 1990-2004 2.09 million refugees from 2,000,000 Afghanistan live in camps, primarily 1,600,000 the refugees in Pakistan, while 920,000 reside in urban areas. 1,200,000 Among the camp population, 16 per 800,000 cent are children below the age of 5 and another 42 per cent between 5 400,000 and 17 years. Fifty-two per cent of 0 the 990,000 refugees living in camps 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 are women.

In the beginning of 2005 the Government of Pakistan together with UNHCR carried out a census on the Afghan population in Pakistan. The results from the census showed that a total of 3,049,000 Afghans resided in Pakistan of which 1.1 million lived in camps and 1.9 million outside camps in rural or urban areas. Of the 3 million Afghans, which include both refugees and non-refugees, 19 per cent were under the age of five, 82 per cent were Pashtuns, and 80 per cent arrived between 1979 and 1985. Most of the Afghans reside in the North West Frontier Province (62 %), followed by Balochistan (25 %). Some 17 per cent of the Afghans intend to return to Afghanistan Box 4: Asylum applications lodged by Afghans in when asked; of those intending to Industrialized countries, 1980-2004 60,000 return during 2005 78 per cent are residing outside the camps. 50,000

40,000 B. Asylum Applications 30,000 Industrialized Countries 20,000 During the period 2000-2004, 10,000 Afghans constituted the second largest nationality seeking asylum 0 4 8 4 0 4 8 8 90 9 0 0 9 9 9 0 in industrialized countries 1980 1982 1 1986 19 1 1992 1 1996 1998 2 2002 20 lodging some 141,100 claims, six per cent of the total number of claims. Since 1980 a total of some 317,500 Afghans have applied for asylum in industrialized countries.

72 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

The flow of asylum seekers from Afghanistan to industrialized countries has decreased significantly over the past few years. The number of new applications in industrialized countries by Afghan asylum seekers in 2004 was the lowest since 1993. The highest number of applications was lodged in 2001, when more than 54,000 Afghans applied for asylum in the industrialized countries.

The distribution of the 317,500 new asylum applications lodged by citizens of Afghanistan since 1980 shows that Germany received the largest number of claims (102,100), followed by the Netherlands (39,000), the United Kingdom (35,000), Austria (32,000), Denmark (28,900), and Hungary (13,300). In 2004, countries receiving the largest number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan were the United Kingdom (1,590 (cases)), Norway (1,060), Germany (920), Sweden (900), Austria (760), and the Netherlands (690).

Non-Industrialized Countries

During 2004, non-industrialized countries received 4,490 new asylum applications by citizens of Afghanistan. During the period 2000-2004 some 274,000 Afghans applied for asylum in the non-industrialized countries of which 252,000 applied during 2000. During the period 2000-2004 the majority of these claims were lodged in the Islamic Republic of Iran (245,880), Pakistan (7,370) and Uzbekistan (5,300).

C. Asylum and Refugee Status Determination

In 2004, some 34,870 asylum claims submitted by citizens of Afghanistan were adjudicated globally. Of the adjudicated claims, some 15,760 (45%) were rejected on substantive grounds while 13,380 (38%) were closed (rejected) following a substantive decision. Of the 21,490 claims which were decided on substantive grounds, 3,310 were grants of refugee status (15%), 2,420 were grants of humanitarian status (11%), and 15,760 (74%) were rejected. Recognition rates varied greatly, depending on the country of asylum, the type of asylum application and the level in the asylum procedure. The number of undecided asylum claims decreased during 2004, from 25,970 at the beginning of the year to 16,970 at end-year (see Table 3).

D. Others of Concern to UNHCR

At end-2004, Afghanistan hosted some 159,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs). The number of IDPs decreased during 2004 from 184,200 at the beginning of the year. In addition to the IDPs, some 27,400 returned IDPs are of concern to UNHCR.

Finally, around 100,000 Afghans in a refugee-like situation in the Russian Federation are of concern to UNHCR.

73 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Table 1. Refugee population from Afghanistan by country of asylum, 1990-2004 Data for 2004 is provisional and subject to change. All figures as at 31 December of each given year. The origin is listed if the total number of refugees is 100 or more at end-2004. Figures between 1 and 4 have been replaced with an asterisk.

Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Pakistan* 3,253,000 3,098,000 1,627,000 1,476,876 1,053,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 1,200,000 2,000,000 2,197,821 1,226,569 1,123,647 960,041 Islamic Rep. of Iran 3,061,110 3,186,616 2,900,666 1,850,000 1,623,331 1,429,038 1,414,659 1,411,759 1,400,722 1,325,724 1,482,000 1,482,000 1,104,909 834,699 952,802 Germany ------52,28946,97538,576 Netherlands** - - 610 1,003 2,050 3,644 7,830 12,003 15,958 20,256 23,629 26,024 26,001 26,433 25,907 United Kingdom** 237 192 156 130 110 820 1,260 1,915 3,450 4,645 5,675 15,065 20,305 21,718 22,494 Canada** ----4,3994,5755,0566,0466,7547,9229,11511,37112,95714,61615,242 United States** 11,488 10,388 8,686 7,728 6,169 4,992 3,804 2,651 1,872 2,587 4,322 7,426 8,932 9,601 9,778 India 11,946 9,766 11,002 24,421 22,362 19,916 18,607 17,456 16,058 14,473 12,760 11,972 11,371 10,283 9,761 Australia**------2,1992,2372,4283,1154,3586,2626,9437,2408,037 Denmark** 192 235 260 404 547 748 1,021 1,255 1,537 2,290 3,525 4,816 5,766 6,369 6,437 Uzbekistan - - - 8,000 8,000 2,597 2,823 3,075 1,061 1,002 8,348 9,569 5,716 5,470 5,238 Sweden** 378 512 556 682 841 833 1,237 1,320 1,443 1,451 2,318 2,732 3,185 3,425 3,903 Norway** ------631585591,0981,7992,2843,3093,693 Tajikistan - - 3,000 300 695 620 1,161 2,164 3,622 4,531 15,354 15,336 3,427 3,304 3,304 Hungary** - - - 15 30 ----6016945811,3191,7052,497 Austria** ------3224016791,0491,2701,5952,482 Bulgaria - - - 208 382 475 542 205 94 222 786 1,565 1,733 1,829 1,908 Switzerland - - - 447 474 455 457 1,085 551 1,184 1,204 1,446 1,365 1,598 1,524 Russian Federation------1212343765135214911,4931,5411,488 Finland** ------521183516619321,1011,342 Ukraine ----2,770-2,5003,0303,8291,8911,6851,5871,5721,5101,290 France** -----1,2941,2771,2361,1581,1191,1901,2841,2561,1671,220 New Zealand**-----*5551421814345626181,142 Turkmenistan - - - 400 400 3,000 3,100 5,450 1,115 1,442 1,450 1,515 1,263 1,224 1,030 Kazakhstan - - - 2,000 2,000 3,500 3,500 1,648 2,081 2,296 2,460 2,353 2,250 657 670 Belgium**------224224182232275357248541536 Belarus ----1,607--3859199368454478459534 Syrian Arab Rep.------66127172407428425360 Romania**-----1074375222278295295298280 Kyrgyzstan - - - 1,200 1,200 - 105 162 568 708 804 922 871 648 258 Italy** 394 121 107 46 48 52 52 44 43 37 66 149 183 186 242 Czech Rep.**------125151166174192199216240172 Azerbaijan------***8172243257171148 Greece** - - - 13 13 - - - 33 57 131 154 137 135 145 Slovakia**-----119191129157180187193183165122 Others 350 471 110 703 741 2,441 2,372 1,037 1,177 1,263 988 1,235 1,329 1,141 919 74 Grand Total 6,339,095 6,306,301 4,552,153 3,374,576 2,731,169 2,679,133 2,674,236 2,676,674 2,667,115 2,601,691 3,587,336 3,809,767 2,510,294 2,136,043 2,085,522

A dash indicates that the value is zero or not available. *D t l i l d f lii i D t bj tt i Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Table 2. New asylum applications lodged by citizens from Afghanistan in industrialized countries, 1980-2004 2004 data provisional and subject to change. USA and UK: number of cases. USA only includes INS/DHS data. The country is listed if the total number of applications is 100 or more. A dash (-) indicates that the value is zero or not available. Figures between 1 and 4 have been replaced with an asterisk.

Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total Australia ------61846091,3262,16128541274,450 Austria 31 31 68 161 14 36 31 25 79 120 91 79 80 143 181 141 766 723 467 2,206 4,205 12,955 6,651 2,357 757 32,398 Belgium - - 34 * 8 25 15 21 17 45 23 36 17 74 62 83 101 112 200 401 861 504 326 329 287 3,585 Bulgaria ------14-- - -67622612776751,0818645254264,252 Canada ------801752402783025604733783353805114884632041511525,170 Cyprus ------**12105280162 Czech Rep.------9562832781071332681,2602,3121,1213562750155,852 Denmark ------27 * 272 145 12,616 75 620 511 330 268 239 262 332 534 3,732 3,749 1,186 664 285 25,850 Finland ------* --10* 9 *117552431252751166421 France - 116 196 181 199 230 164 168 96 180 133 103 106 84 110 95 89 122 149 167 244 270 260 353 164 3,979 United Kingdom8682431639-----205200-- -5806751,0852,3953,9755,5559,0007,2052,2801,58535,006 Germany 5,466 3,610 2,047 687 1,198 2,632 3,055 1,586 1,462 3,650 7,348 7,337 6,351 5,506 5,642 7,715 6,217 6,033 3,768 4,458 5,380 5,837 2,772 1,473 918102,148 Greece 916* * - *13965897510617342021164461,4591,2385613824,561 Hungary ------1991043051,0772,2382,1854,3112,3484693813,274 Ireland ------*-- - *116 813727724106214 Italy - 256 70 60 5 5 * 7 * 26 9 * 11 * 6 24 22 - 63 99 524 299 137 70 74 1,773 Japan ------5 8183521786 *-174 Lithuania ------6126205717179207 Netherlands - 16 - - 34 - - 66 47 263 568 297 352 1,503 2,527 1,912 3,019 5,920 7,118 4,400 5,055 3,614 1,067 492 688 38,958 Norway ------9 20 95 54 19 13 21 25 9 10 * 16 45 172 326 603 786 2,050 1,059 5,335 Poland ------15-- -73488632331555299415595251573,711 Romania ------2713332922827873516*1,486 Spain - -209**2139-10- - -31*10293527284373181214426 Slovakia ------1293131586546244,3151,6696273938,882 Slovenia ------**247667*5335 Sweden ------15016673106613043241481763303513745935278119035,397 Switzerland 93 69 125 64 33 28 45 80 71 134 234 233 278 144 172 114 198 215 245 363 433 530 237 218 207 4,563 Turkey - - 9 335 21 - 14 * 22 73 75 15 - 7 35 - 20 * 27 133 81 431 47 77 341 1,771 United States------102110-22327829721919814513721915923221827414152243,028 Others --*----*-* ---- - * - 71413215716109153 Grand Total 5,685 4,196 2,614 1,518 1,552 2,959 3,397 2,133 2,278 4,937 21,902 9,075 8,562 8,649 10,237 12,287 13,033 16,973 19,271 25,202 34,828 54,402 28,458 14,101 9,272 317,521

75 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Table 3. Applications and refugee status determination by country of asylum, 2004 Origin: Afghanistan Figures between 1 and 4 have been replaced with an asterisk.

Cases Cases Indicators pending Decisions during the year pending Recognition Change at the Applied at the rates in Country or territory beginning since Recog- Huma- Otherw. end of Ref. pending of asylum (residence) T1 L2 of the year 1 Jan. nized nitarian Rejected closed Total the year status3 Total4 cases ArgentinaGFI*------1....0% Australia G AR 345 576 728 - 62 7 797 122 92% 92% -65% FI 34 127 100 - 7 * 109 167 93% 93% 391% Austria G FA - 757 744 158 110 5,397 6,409 - 74% 89% .. Azerbaijan G AR - 40 - - 40 - 40 - 0% 0% .. FI - 254 - - 41 - 41 213 0% 0% .. JR-7--7-7-0%0%.. U FI 940 47 36 - 260 11 307 680 12% 12% -28% Belarus G FI 162 73 17 49 16 118 200 35 21% 80% -78% Belgium G AR 372 43 14 - 283 34 331 84 5% 5% -77% FI - 287 24 - 39 * 67 - 38% 38% .. Bulgaria G FI 332 426 * 78 79 174 333 425 1% 50% 28% Canada G FI 175 152 100 - 34 26 160 153 75% 75% -13% Chile GFI-*-----1...... Côte d'Ivoire V FI 13 7 - - 8 - 8 12 0% 0% -8% Cyprus GAR-*-----2...... FI 58 80 - - * - * 135 0% 0% 133% U FA 10 * 6 - * * 10 1 86% 86% -90% Czech Rep.GAR------...... FI 23 15 7 - 14 5 26 12 33% 33% -48% Denmark G AR 208 - 45 15 210 - 270 81 17% 22% -61% FI 91 285 33 * 190 - 227 78 15% 16% -14% Ecuador G FI * - - - * - * 1 0% 0% -67% Finland G FA - 166 * 31 - 5 38 - 6% 100% .. France G FI - 164 43 - 181 - 224 - 19% 19% .. RA - 34 28 - - - 28 - 100% 100% .. Germany G RA 824 181 49 57 112 608 826 152 22% 49% -82% NA 1,705 918 46 232 1,883 174 2,335 353 2% 13% -79% Greece G FI 440 382 * 7 215 54 277 545 0% 4% 24% Hong Kong SAR, China U FA * * * - * * * 3 50% 50% -25% Hungary G AR 46 11 - - 10 - 10 1 0% 0% -98% FI 40 38 19 39 * 13 74 4 31% 95% -90% Iceland GFI**-----3....200% India U AR 7 30 9 - 17 - 26 11 35% 35% 57% FI 81 127 93 - 44 12 149 59 68% 68% -27% Indonesia U FA * 40 31 * - * 35 8 97% 100% 167% Ireland G AR * 19 * - 11 * 16 5 27% 27% 150% FI 20 106 16 - 16 * 36 90 50% 50% 350% Islamic Rep. of Iran U FI 21 29 * - 22 * 26 24 8% 8% 14% Italy G FI - 74 14 50 38 - 102 - 14% 63% .. Japan GAR24------24....0% FI * - - - * * * - 0% 0% -100% JR20----15155....-75% Jordan U FI - * * - - - * - 100% 100% .. Kazakhstan G FI - 96 69 - 27 - 96 - 72% 72% .. Kuwait UFI366- - -5537....3% Kyrgyzstan G FI 109 95 36 - 19 21 76 128 65% 65% 17% Lebanon U FA - * - - * * * - 0% 0% .. Libyan Arab JamahiriyaUFI-*-----1...... Lithuania G FI 16 9 - 5 - 13 18 4 0% 100% -75% LuxembourgGFI-6------...... Malaysia U FA 6 31 9 - - * 10 27 100% 100% 350% Mozambique G FA * - * - - - * - 100%76 100% -100% Netherlands G AR 113 - 37 20 54 67 178 134 33% 51% 19% FI 470 688 64 393 565 184 1,206 618 6% 45% 31% JR3,129------2,036....-35% Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Cases Cases Indicators pending Decisions during the year pending Recognition Change at the Applied at the rates in Country or territory beginning since Recog- Huma- Otherw. end of Ref. pending of asylum (residence) T1 L2 of the year 1 Jan. nized nitarian Rejected closed Total the year status3 Total4 cases New Zealand G AR 11 * - - * * 5 6 0% 0% -45% FI------...... Norway GAR---*97-100-0%3%.. FI - 1,059 25 358 739 20 1,142 - 2% 34% .. Oman UFA16------16....0% Pakistan U FA 12,759 2,380 121 - 3,444 4,410 7,975 7,164 3% 3% -44% Philippines G FI * - - - - * * - .. .. -100% Poland G AR - - - - 18 - 18 - 0% 0% .. FI 85 57 * 23 121 * 149 - 1% 17% -100% Rep. of Korea G FA * * - - * * * - 0% 0% -100% Rep. of Moldova G FI 5 - - - - * * 4 .. .. -20% Romania GFA-*-----1...... Russian Federation G FI 234 638 29 - 590 - 619 253 5% 5% 8% Saudi Arabia U FA 15 * - - - 8 8 8 .. .. -47% Serbia and Montenegro U FI 7 * * - 7 - 9 - 22% 22% -100% Sierra Leone U FI * * - - - * * 1 .. .. -50% Slovakia G FI 469 393 - - 59 449 508 354 0% 0% -25% Slovenia G FI - 5 - - * - * 2 0% 0% .. South Africa G FI 22 ------22 .. .. 0% Spain G - 14 * * 32 13 47 - 3% 6% .. Sri Lanka U FA * - * - - - * - 100% 100% -100% Sweden G AR 120 - * 21 165 8 197 578 2% 13% 382% FI 757 903 16 134 820 82 1,052 594 2% 15% -22% Switzerland G FI 189 207 60 205 106 41 412 195 16% 71% 3% CA- - -83- -83-0%100%.. Syrian Arab Rep. U FA 21 46 8 - 5 - 13 54 62% 62% 157% Thailand U FA * - - - - * * 1 .. .. -50% Turkey U FI 44 341 27 - 28 - 55 330 49% 49% 650% TurkmenistanUFI*8 - -9 -910%0%-50% Ukraine G AR 57 91 * - 12 37 50 98 8% 8% 72% FI 101 320 49 - 25 183 257 164 66% 66% 62% U FI - 120 9 - 30 - 39 81 23% 23% .. United Kingdom G AR - - 325 - 2,595 150 3,070 - 11% 11% .. FI - 1,585 44 453 2,107 386 2,990 - 2% 19% .. United States G IN 74 24 26 - 21 11 58 44 55% 55% -41% EO 154 48 58 - 35 75 168 101 62% 62% -34% Uzbekistan U FA 928 159 66 - 65 529 660 426 50% 50% -54% Grand Total 25,967 14,848 3,306 2,420 15,764 13,381 34,871 16,973 15% 27% -35%

Notes 1 Type of procedure: G=Government; U=UNHCR; V=Various/unknown. 2 Level in the procedure: FI=First instance; AR=Administrative Review, JR=Judicial Review; CA=Cantonal regulations; EO=Executive Office of Immigration Review; IN=Immigration and Naturalization Service; NA=New applications; RA=Repeat applications. 3 Number of cases recognized divided by the total number of cases recognized, granted humanitarian status and rejected. 4 Number of cases recognized and granted humanitarian status divided by the total number of cases recognized, granted humanitarian status and rejected.

77 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 2 – List of Candidates (With Two Candidates for Vice-Presidents Each) for the Presidential Elections and Election Results

(Order of candidates as they were displayed on the ballot paper.)

Abdul Latif PEDRAM, writer and political activist, is the Candidate of Congra-e-Milli Afghanistan (National Congress of Afghanistan (1.4%) • Haji Ahmad NIROW • Mohamad Qasim MASOMI

Hamid KARZAI, Independent (55.4%) • Mohamad Karim KHALILI, the leader of Shia Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan. • Ahmad Zia MASOUD, brother ofslain Ahmand Masood and the former ambassador to Moscow

Humayon Shah AASIFI, Independent (0.3%) • Tajor KAKAR • Mohamad Shah Ismat ALLAI

Mir Mohammad Mahfuz NEDAHI, the former acting minister of mines and industries, Independent (0.2%) • Sayid Mohammad Arif IBRAHIM KHIL • Mohamad Hakim KARIMI

Mohammad MOHAQEQ, former panning minister, Independent (11.7%) • Nasir Ahmad INSAF • Faiaz MHIR AAIN

Sayed Ishaq GAILANI, the Candidate of Nuhzat Hambastagi Milli Afghanistan (The National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan) (1.0%) • Mohamad Ismail QASIMYAR, chairman of the Emergency Loya Jirga. • Baryali NASRATY

Abdul Satar SIRAT, a former justice minister, Independent (0.4%) • Mohammad Amin WAQAD, a former deputy leader of Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) lead by former prime minister Gulboddin Hekmatyar, • Abdul Qadir AMAMI-GHOWRI

Abdul Hafiz MANSOOR, director of Payam-e-Mujahed news paper, Independent (0.2%) • Mohammad Iqbal MANIB • Mohamad Ayub QASIMI

78 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Ghulam Farooq NEJRABI, the Candidate of Hezb-e-Istiqlal Afghanistan (The Independence Party of Afghanistan) (0.3%) • Abdul HANAN • Abdul FATAH

Ahmad Shah AHMADZAI, a former deputy prime minister, Independent (0.8%) • Obidullah OBID • Abdul Manna URUZGANI

Abdul Hasib AARIAN, Independent (0.1%) • Dil Aqa SHAKIB • Mohammad Zaman AHMADYAR

Wakil MANGAL, Independent (0.1%) • Mohammad Yunus MOGHIL • Dina GUL

Abdul Hadi KHALILZAI, Independent (0.2%) • Khdadad URFANI • Noor MANDOKHUL

Mohammad Abrahim RASHID, Independent (0.2%) • Sayid Mohamad HADI HADI • Hamid TAHIRI

Mohammad , the former education minister, Candidate of Nuhzat-e-Mili Afghanistan (The National Movement of Afghanistan) (16.3%) • , former interior minister • Sayed Husain Aalimi BALKHI

Masooda JALAL, Independent (1.1%) • Mir Habib SAHILY • Sayid Mohammad Aaliam AMINI

Sayed Abdul HADI DABIR, Independent (0.3%) • Abdul RASHID • Dad MOHAMMED

79 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Abdul Rashid DOSTUM, former deputy defense minister, President Hamid Karzai’s adviser on security and military affairs, the leader of Junbesh-e-Mili Islami Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), Independent (10.0%) • Shafiqa HABIBI • Mustafa Kamal MAKHDOM

80 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 3 – Short Biographies of the Members of the Afghan Cabinet

Ab. Raheem Wardak, Defense Minister, Pashtun: Ab. Raheem Wardagk, son of Ab. Ghani was born in Maidan/Wardak province in 1323. After graduation from Habibia High School, he joined the Cadet University. He has further studied in the United States and at the Ali Naser Academy of Cairo in Egypt. After the fall of the communist regime he was a member of the security committee of Kabul City, Chief of the Army Staff, and Director of the Military Officers Society, Director of Education Commission, Deputy Defense Minister, Director of Disarmament Program and Director of Reform of National Army.

Dr. Sayed Makhdoom Raheen, Information and Culture Minister, Tajik: Dr. Sayed Makhdoom Raheen was born in 1325 in Kabul city. He obtained a PhD from Tehran University in 1352. During the interim government of Hazrat Mujadiddi he was a special advisor. In 1988 he was a leading figure in the National Islamic Movement. He was appointed as the Minister of Information and Culture during the interim administration. He was elected as the Director of the Council of Kabul residents in September 2003. He was given a medal of freedom of expression and culture by the Father of the Nation in 2004.

Dr. Mohd. Amin Fatemi, Public Health Minister, Pashtun (Sayed): Dr. Mohd. Amin Fatemi was born in Ningarhar in 1952. He has a medical diploma of MD from Ningarhar Medical College (1977). He also participated in an advance academic program in Bonn, Germany and has an STD from the High Institute of Public Management in Karachi; he has a certificate in health care and one in “New ways for health policy in developing countries” from the Boston University the US (1995). He was the Public Health Minister from 1993 to 1995. From 1992 to 1994 he was a member of the executive board of WHO.

Dr. Ameer Shah Hassanyar, Higher Education Minister, Hazara: Dr. Ameer Shah Hassanyar s/o Ghula Hasan was born in Panjab District of in 1321. He obtained a bachelors degree from the Agricultural Faculty of Kabul University. He has masters in ecology from the Governmental University of New York in the US and a Doctorate in Agriculture from Colorado University of the US. Between 1371 and 1375 he served as the Director of Kabul University. He is a member of Educational Council of Kabul University, Grand Council of Protecting the Islamic System in Afghanistan. He is also a member of the cultural council of the Information and Culture Ministry.

Mohammad Sarwar Danish, Justice Minister, Hazara: Sarwar Danish, son of Mohammad Ali was born in a religious family in 1340 in Daikundi Province. He received higher education in , Syria and Iran. The earned the following degrees: Bachelors in Law, Certificate in journalism, Bachelors in Islamic Culture and Education, Masters in Islamic feqah and PhD (not completed yet) in the same field. From the beginning of 2004, after Daikundi was announced to be a province, he was appointed as the first governor of the Daikundi province.

81 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Suhrab Ali Safari, Public Works Minister, Hazara: Suhrab Ali Safari s/o Haji Safar was born in 1945 in Behsood District of Maidan-Wardak Province. He went to the Engineering Faculty of Kabul University between 1961 to 1965 and continued in Poland, from 1977 to 1982, and has a doctorate degree. He is fluent in Dari, Pashto, English and Polish and knows a little German.

Sediqa Balkhim, Martyrs and Disabled Minister, Hazara: Sediqa Balkhi, daughter of Sayed Ismaeel, was born in 1329 in a religious and educated family and has earned a bachelors degree in Islamic Studies. She also followed religious studies in Iran during the years of migration.

Obaidullah Rameen, Agriculture and Food Minister, Tajik: Obaidullah Rameen was born in 1331 in Baghlan Province. He earned his bachelors degree from Kabul University in 1355 and from 1356 to 1357 he studied in the Agriculture Promoting Bank. He was an inspector in the Agricultural Bank from 1354 to 1357, Director of the Banks’ Cooperative from 1360 to 1362 and Director in the Promoting Bank from 1382 to 1383. He was also the Director of the “Center of Traders and Crafts Workers” NGO and the acting Director of “Agricultural Unity of Afghanistan”.

Dr. Mir Mohammad Amin Farhang, Economy Minister, Tajik: Dr. Mir Mohammad Amin Farhang, son of Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang, was born in an educated family in Kabul in the year 1940. He earned his bachelors degree in economics from Kabul University. He earned his Masters Degree from Köln University in Germany. In 1982 he went to Germany. After the fall of the Taliban regime he was appointed as Minister of Reconstruction on 22 December 2001.

Mir Mohammad Sediq, Mines and Industries Minister, Tajik: Mir Mohammad Sediq, son of Mir Ghulam Sakhi, was born in 1945 in Sheikhan of Mirbacha Kot district of Kabul. In 1971 he obtained a bachelors in engineering from an American University in the US and then a PhD. He is a member of the American Engineers Unity and has served in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Puerto Rico and the US.

Dr. Masooda Jalal, Women’s Affairs Minister, Tajik: Doctor Masooda Jalal, daughter of Alhaj Tellah Mohammad, was born in Gulbahar of Kapisa district in a middle-class and educated family. She is originally from Jerm district of Badakhshan. She obtained a degree from Kabul’s Medical Institute in 1367. In 1375 she worked for UNHCR and afterwards, she was health advisor and national programme officer of WFP.

82 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Abdul Karim Barahawi, Border Affairs Minister, Barahawi: Abdul Karim Barahawi, son of Mohammad Mobin, was born in Chahar Burjak district of Nimroz in 1334. He got his degree in 1355 in the field of weapons’ technique, and served in Corps No. 7 of Reeshkhor. In Dalwe of 1357, after the Soviet invasion, he left his service and joined the . He was later appointed as the Governor of Nimroz and commander of the fourth border brigade.

Alhaj Mohmmad Ismael, Energy Minister, Tajik: Alhaj Mohmmad Ismael, son of Haji Mohammad Aslam, was born in 1327 in Naser Abad village of Shindand district of Herat province. He graduated from the Cadet University in 1349. He was serving as Amir of the South-Western parts of the country in 1360. In 1369, after the formation of interim government he acquired the military rank of a general and was appointed as the Governor and Commander of Corps No. 4 of Herat province. After the fall of the Taliban he became the Governor of Herat and Commander of Corps No. 6.

Hidayat Amin Arsala, Commerce Minister, Pashtun: Hidayat Amin Arsala was born in Kabul in 1942. He continued his education to PhD in the field of economics in USA. From 1989 to 1992 he was serving as the Minister of Finance of the Transitional Government of Afghanistan outside Afghanistan. In 1993 he was appointed as Foreign Minister of Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban he served as Vice-Chairman and Finance Minister of the interim administration, then as the Vice- President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and as well as the Chairman of the Independent Civil Services and Administrative Reform Commission.

Eng. Habibullah Qaderi, Counternorcotics Minister, Pashtun: Eng. Habibullah Qaderi, son of Haji Ahmad Qaderi, has a degree in mechanical engineering from India. Since 2002 he has served as the Chief Advisor of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation. He has worked for a period of 12 years with UNHCR and was a lecturer at Nebraska University. He was the teacher in charge of the TOEFL test and has also served as an engineer in a Pakistani company in Karachi.

Dr. Zalmai Rasool, National Security Advisor, Pashtun: Dr. Zalmai Rasool, son of Professor Dr. Abdul Qayoom Rasool, was born in 1323 in Kabul. He has doctorate in medicine from Paris, France. He was the Chief of the Staff of H.M. Father of the Nation, Mohammad Zahir, in Rome, Minister of Civil Aviation and Tourism during the interim government and National Security Advisor of Afghanistan.

Dr. Enayatullah Qasemi, Transport Minister, Hazara: Dr. Enayatullah Qasemi, son of Ahmad Ali Qasemi, was born in Kabul. He graduated from Lornswel School of New Jersey in the US in 1996. Then he has earned his bachelors in economics from Bord University in the US.

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Foreign Affairs Minster, Tajik: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, son of Ghulam Mahyyod- Din Zmaryalay, was born in1339 (1960) in a religious family in Kabul. He joined the Medical Faculty in 1356 and obtained his degree in 1362. He worked as an advisor to Ahmad Shah Masood. From 1992 to 1996 he was the

83 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Chief of the Staff and spokesman for the Defense Ministry. In 1997 he became Deputy Foreign Minister. In 1999 he was Acting Foreign Minister. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, he was appointed Foreign Minister during interim and transitional periods.

Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar, Refugees and Repatriation Minister, Uzbek: Dr. Mohammad Azam Dadfar, son of Haji Baba Jan Khan, was born in 1325 in Andkhoy district of . He is a medical doctor and graduated in 1352 from Kabul Medical Faculty. In 1360 he went to Germany and worked their as a Doctor. From 1375 to 1377 he was pursuing advanced course for certificate in Petersburg of Germany.

Amirzai Sangeen, Communications Minister, Pashtun: Amir Zai Sangeen s/o Amir Gul Gul Shah Khail was born in Urgoon district of Paktika province. In 1972 he earned degree in Electronics and Communication from the Southern London University of the UK. He was one of the founding members of Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. He was working as the Senior Advisor to the Minister of Communication from February 2003.

Dr. Anwaar-ul-Haq Ahadi, Finance Minister, Pashtun: Professor Doctor Anwaar-ul-Haq Ahadi, son of Abdul Haqhas, earned his bachelors and masters degrees from the American University of Beirut in Lebanon in Economics and Political Sciences; he has also earned a professional masters degree in Fiscal Affairs and Management from the post-graduate faculty of North Western University and has then earned PHD in the field of Political Sciences. From 2002 up to his new appointment, he was working as the Director of Da Afghanistan Bank (Central Bank of Afghanistan). He is the head of Afghan Milat (Afghan Nationalist Party).

Nematullah Shahraani, Haj and Islamic Affairs Minister, Uzbek: Nematullah Shahraani, s/o Ebadullah Shahraani, was born in Jerm district of Badakhshsan province in a religious family. After earning bachelors degree in 1343 he joined Kabul University as a member of teaching committee. In 1346 he went to Egypt and earned masters degree from Al-Azhar University and returned home in 1349. In 1355 he went to the United States and studied law at the George Washington University for a year and a half. After the Emergency Loya Jirga, he was appointed as Vice President of the Transitional Government. He was also the director of the Drafting Commission of the constitution.

Sayed Ikramuddin Masoomi, Social and Labor Affairs Minister, Tajik: Sayed Ikramuddin Masoomi, s/o Sayed Masoom, was born in 1332 in Ashkmash district of Takhar. He obtained a Bachelors in Science from Kabul University. He worked as the Director of Enterprises of the Finance Ministry, as Deputy Finance Minister and Governor of Takhar and Badakhshan Provinces.

84 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Noor Mohammad Qarqeen, Education Minister, Turkmen: Noor Mohammad Qarqeen, s/o Haji Mohammad Qul, was born in 1332 in Tepa of Qarqeen district of Jawzjan province. He started studying at the Law Faculty of Kabul University in 1351 from where he graduated. In 1380 he was appointed as a member of the cabinet of the Interim Administration and was appointed as the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs. He resigned from his post on 7th September of 2004 and was the director of electoral campaign of H.E Hamid Karzai during presidential elections.

Mohammad Hanif Atmar, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Pashtun: Mohammad Hanif Atmar, son of Mohammad Asef Atmar, was born in 1347 in Laghman province and has a degree in rural development studies from the UK; he obtained a masters degree in the areas of international relation and post-war development from the York University in the UK. He has done a diploma in Information Technology and Computer in the UK. After the fall of the Taliban he was appointed Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development.

Ali Ahmad Jalali, Interior Minister, Pashtun: Ali Ahmad Jalali is a former army officer. He has returned from the US where he was head of the Pashto and Persian service for Voice of America.

Mohd. Yosuf Pashton, Urban Development and Housing Minister, Pashtun: Mohammad Yousof Pashtun is an engineer, was appointed as the Minister for Urban Development and Housing by President Karzai in the Transitional Administration, and subsequently, at the end of 2003, as Governor of .

85 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 4 – List of Political Parties, Unofficial Translation of Their Names to English and the Status of Registration With the Ministry of Justice (November 2004)

1. Parties with Accreditation Certificates:

1. The Republican Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Jamhuri Khwahan-eAfghanistan) led by Sebghatollah Sanjar. Liberal democratic.

2. The Youth National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-eHambastagi-ye Melli-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Jamil Karzai.

3. The National Unity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Wahdat-e Melli-yeAfghanistan) led by a former minister, Abdul Rashid Jalili.

4. The Independence Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e Esteqlal-e Afghanistan) led by Dr Gholam Faruq Nejrabi. Publishing organ: Esteqlal-e Eslami.

5. The Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Refah-e Afghanistan) led by Mia Gol Wasiq. Spokesman Dr Asef Khayrkhwah. Interested in public welfare, ready to consider coalitions.

6. The National Unity Party of Afghanistan’s Islamic Tribes (Dari: Hezb-eMelli-ye Wahdat Aqwam-e Eslam-ye Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Shah Khogiani. Based in Nangarhar Province.

7. The Labour and Development Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Kar wa Tawse’a-ye Afghanistan) led by Zolfeqar Omid. Previously functioning under the name of the National Reconciliation Party of Afghanistan.

8. The National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Nahzat-eHambastagi-ye Melli-ye Afghanistan) led by Sayed Eshaq Gailani.

9. The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Dari: Mahaz-e Melli Eslami-ye Afghanistan) led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani.

10. The Freedom and Democracy Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Nahzat-e Azadi wa Demokrasi-ye Afghanistan) led by Abdul Raqib Jawid Kohestani.

11. The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Harakat-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan) led by Shaykh Mohammad Asef Mohseni. Shi’i party.

12. The Islamic Justice Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Adalat-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan) led by Qazi Mohammad Kabir Marzban.

86 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

13. The Human Rights Protection and Development Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Hefazat az Hoquq-e Bashar wa Enkeshaf-e Afghanistan) led by Barialay Nasrati.

14. The National Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Melli-ye Afghanistan) led by Abdul Rashid Arian.

15. The Peace and National Unity Party (Dari: Hezb-e Solh wa Wahdat-e Melli-ye Afghanistan) led by Abdul Qader Emami-Ghowri.

16. The People’s Prosperity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Sa’adat-e Mardom-e Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Zobayr Piroz.

17. The People’s Mission Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Resalat-e Mardom-e Afghanistan) led by Nur Aqa Ru’in.

18. The National Congress Party (Dari: Hezb-e Kangara-e Melli-ye Afghanistan) led by Bashir Ahmad Bizhand. Spokesman: Abdul Latif Pedram.

19. The Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Wahdat-e Eslami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan led by the former planning minister Mohammad Mohaqeq.

20. The Understanding and Democracy Party (Dari: Hezb-e Tafahom wa Demokrasi-ye Afghanistan) led by Ahmad Shahin.

21. Party of Freedom of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Aazadee Afghanistan) led by Abdul Malik

22. People’s Islamic Resurrection Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Rastakhaiz-e-Islami Mardum-e-Afghanistan) led by Said Zahir

23. Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezbe-Wahdat-e-Islami Mardum-e-Afghanistan) led by former Wahdat commander and Minister of planning of Afghanistan Haji Mohammad Muhaqiq.

24. People’s Prosperity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Falah-e-Mardum-e-Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Zareef

25. (Dari: Hezb-e-Sahadat-e-Mili Wa Islami Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Usman Saligzada

87 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

2. Parties That Have Been Approved and Have Applied for Accreditation:

26. The National Unity Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Tahrik-e Wahdat-eMelli-ye Afghanistan) led by Soltan Mahmud Ghazi. Pro-monarchy.

27. The United Afghanistan Party (Dari: Hezb-e Afghanistan-e Wahed) led by Mohammad Wasel Rahimi.

28. The Peace Movement Party of Afghanistan (Pashto: Da Afghanistan Da Sole Ghorzang Gond) led by former defense minister Shahnawaz Tanay. Tanay was a member of the Khalq faction of the now defunct communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

29. The People’s Islamic Movement Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Harakat-e Eslami-ye Mardom-e Afghanistan) led by Agriculture Minister Sayed Hosayn Anwari.

30. The National Unity Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Harakat-e Melli-ye Wahdat- e Afghanistan) led Dr Mohammad Nader Atash.

31. The Afghan Nation (Pashto: Afghan Mellat). Also known as the Social Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Pashto: Afghan Tolanpal Wolaswak Gond), led by Anwar al-Haq Ahadi, the president of the Central Bank. Nationalist.

32. National and Islamic Peace Party of the Tribes of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Sulh-e-Mili Islami Aqwam-e-Afghanistan) led by Abdul Qahir Sharyatee

33. National Alliance Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Paiwand-e-Mili Afghanistan) led by Said Mansoor Nadiri, the leader of Ismailis of Afghanistan

34. Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Hambastagi Afghanistan) led by Abdul Khaliq Nihmat

3. Parties That Have Been Approved But Did Not Apply for Accreditation:

35. The Liberal Freedom Seeking Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e Libral-e Azadikhwah-e Afghanistan) led by NIL

36. The National Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Nahzat-e Melli-ye Afghanistan) led by Ahmad Wali Masud, the Afghan ambassador in London.

37. The Islamic Organization of Young Afghanistan (Dari: Sazman-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan-e Jawan) led by Sayed Jawad Hosayni.

38. Liberal People’s Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Libral-e-Aazadee Khwa-e-Mardum- e-Afghanistan) led by Ajmal Sohail 39. National Islamic Peace Party of Afghanistan (Pashtu: De Afghanistan De Solay Mili Islami Gond) led by Shah Mahmood Popalzai

88 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

40. Afghanistan Society calling for and Sunat (: Jamahat-ul-Dahwat ilal Qurhan-wa-Sunat-ul-Afghanistan) led by Mawlawee Samiullah Najibi

41. Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami Afghanistan), led by the former leader of Hezb-e-Wahdat, and Vice President of the President of Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan Mohammad Karim Khalili

42. People’s Aspiration Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Aarman-e-Mardum-e- Afghanistan) led by Ilhaj Saraj-u-din,

4. Parties That Have Not Gone Through the Registration Process:

43. Islamic Society Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Jamihat-e-Islami Afghanistan) led by Ustad Rabani

44. Islamic National Fighter’s Party of Afghanistan (Pashtu: De Afghanistan De Mili Mubarizeenu Islami Gond) led by Amanat Ningarhari.

45. Justice Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Adalat-e-Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Hassan Fairoz Khail

46. National Welfare Party (Dari: Hezb-e-Refah-e-Mili) led by Mohammad Hassan Jahfaree

47. National Liberator Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Aazadee Bakhsh-e-Mili Afghanistan) led by Shams Ul Haq Naib Khail

48. National Peace Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Nuhzat-e-Mili Sulh-e-Afghanistan) led by Said Samiullah Sadat

49. Islamic Party for the Progress of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Islami Tamadun-e- Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Nabee Nafeh

50. People’s Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Mardum-e-Afghanistan) led by Ahamad Shah Asar

51. Public Opinion’s party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Afkar-e-Aama-e-Afghanistan) led by Nameless Signature

52. The Welfare Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Refah-e-Afghanistan) led by Mir Mohammad Asif Zaheefee

53. United National Party (Dari: Hezb-e-Mutahid-e-Mili) led by former PDPA or Watan party member Noor Ul Haq Uloomi

54. Homeland Party (Dari: Hezb-e-Maihan) led by Pohandoy Mohammad Rahim

89 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

55. Solidarity Party Islamic Rights Defenders of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Itifaq-e-Uqooq Khwahan-e-Islami Afghanistan) led by Said Abdul Qahar

56. Invitation to Islam Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Tanzeem-e-Dahwat-e-Islami Afghanistan) led by Abdul Rab Rassol Sayaf, the former leader of Itehad-e-Islami Party,

57. National Liberation Front of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Tanzeem-e-Jabha-e-Mili Nijat-e- Afghanistan) led by Sibghatullah Mujadidee, the former President of Afghanistan,

58. Islamic Revolutionary and National Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Harkat-e- Inqilabee Islami Wa Mili Afghanistan) led by Ahamad Nabi, the son of Mawlawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, the leader of this party during the holly war,

59. National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mili Islami Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Akbaree, one of the leaders of Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami led by and later on by Mohammad Karim Khalili.

60. People’s Sovereignty Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Nuhzat-e-Hakimyat-e-Mardum-e- Afghanistan) led by Hayatuallah Subhanee

61. Moderate Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Itidal-e-Afghanistan) led by (Nil)

62. National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Junbish-e-Mili Afghanistan) led by Abdul Rasheed Dostum, Uzbek commander, former deputy defense minister and military advisor to President Karzai,

63. National Association of Peace Supporters of Afghanistan (Dari: Majmah-e-Mili Fahaleen-e-Sulh-e-Afghanistan) led by Shams ul Haq Noor Shams,

64. National Stability Party (Dari. Hezb-e-Subat-e-Mili) led by Abdul Rauof

65. Islamic Party (Dari. Hezb-e-Islami) led by Arghandiwal

66. National Unity Party of Tribes of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Mili Aqwam-e- Afghanistan) led by Nasrullah Barekzai

67. National Islamic Moderate Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Aetedal-e-Mili Islami Afghanistan), led by Qara Big Hezat Yaar , the former Jamiat-e-Islami commander and the head of Afghan Crescent Society

68. National Islamic Stability Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Sobat-e-Mili Islami Afghanistan) led by Mohammad Samih Kharotee

90 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

69. National Independence Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Isteqlal-e-Mili Afghanistan) led by Taj Mohammad Wardak, the former Minister of Interior and the governor of Paktia province,

70. National Progress Party of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Taraqee-e-Mili Afghanistan) led by Doc. Asef Baktazh,

71: Islamic Unity Party of Nation of Afghanistan (Dari: Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami Melat Afghnistan) led by Qorban Ali Horfani.

91 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 5 – State Information Service (Khadamate Ettelaate Dowlati; “KHAD”)

1. Introduction

Other names in chronological order: Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan (AGSA); Workers’ Intelligence Institute (KAM); General Directorate of State Information Service or Active members of PDPA; Ministry of State Security (WAD); Directorate of State Security; Directorate of Intelligence Service; and General Directorate of National Security.185

This body was established in 1987 for the first time by Noor Mohammad Taraki after the Saur Revolution. at which time it was functioning under the name of AGSA (De Afghanistan De Gatu De Satani Idara) Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan. Hafizullah Amin changed its name to KAM (Kargari Estekhbarati Muasessa) the Workers’ Intelligence Institute, when he overthrew Noor Mohammad Taraki in 1979. KAM was dissolved with the establishment of Babrak Karmal’s regime and the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and a new body, “Department of PDPA Activists, KGB and Russian Advisors”, was established in early 1980. During this time the Department was functioning under Dr. Najibullah as the director and Dr. Karim Baha as the deputy. Based on the developments in the situation and the Department’s achievements, it became the General Directorate of State Information Service at the end of 1980, reporting officially to Prime Minister’s office. The mentioned Directorate functioned in reality as a powerful independent ministry and, in January 1986, this is what it became, as the Ministry of State Security, or WAD (Vizarat-i Amniyat-i-Daulati).

Within a few weeks after the collapse of KAM, a new Department was created, with a core of 40 members. The mentioned people were sent to the in two groups of 20 and trained as the new secret police, to conduct activities against subversive organizations and to infiltrate Mujaheddin groups. Subsequently this body became the most effective instrument of the regime; a centre for political influence and intelligence Service country-wide, as well as conducting anti-banditry and operational activities. KHAD was modeled on the KGB and closely advised by it. After becoming General Directorate of State Information Service, all its staff members were sent by its Personnel Department to Tashkent for special trainings on a rotational basis for four to six month periods. There were also courses for the second category of leadership staff of KHAD that were conducted in Moscow and provided training on special skills. It is noteworthy to mention that during this time, due to economic problems, many youth were joining this body and its staff members were increasing day by day. KGB advisers were present in order to assist KHAD staff members in the implementation of their programs and advise on important issues. KHAD brought in a younger generation of Parcham activists and somehow incorporated sympathizers from the army and police, since

185 The above mentioned cover the names of the mentioned agency from Noor Mohammad Taraki time until now.

92 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

these two ministries were run by and composed mainly of Khalqi members of the PDPA. It was from this power base that Dr. Najibullah, prepared his bid for power and replaced Babrak Karmal following the Kremlin decision. The extraordinary crisis facing the regime in December 1979, and the special role of the Soviet KGB in consolidating the Afghan state, therefore gave KHAD a far greater role in the overall construction of the PDPA institutions than that normally occupied by a security organization. It became a central player in the political situation of Afghanistan.

2. The Political Role of KHAD

KHAD became an important political institution during the 1980s, and was considered as key to the PDPA. As the successor to AGSA and KAM, KHAD was nominally part of the Afghan state, and firmly under the control of the Soviet KGB (see Internal Security, ch. 5). A system of conducting intelligence activities in all spheres of life inside and outside the country was established, particularly in the areas where opposition groups were functioning. Links were made with different actors in order to encourage support for the administration system, educational and cultural programs run by the State. As an example of one of their activities, the staff members of KHAD infiltrated groups of Mujaheddin, created differences in their positions and worked towards their dissolution or encouraged allegiance to the government.

Aside from its secret police work, KHAD had a presence in all government, intellectual and educational institutions, including Kabul Polytechnic Institute, universities, schools, and civil and military institutions where its members conducted their activities, including ideological education. KHAD ran “Parwareshgahe Watan”; an orphanage, where war orphans were educated by Afghan and Russian teachers and some of them were sent to former USSR republics for this purpose. In fact, the PDPA in general and KHAD in particular, had the responsibility to train the Afghan youth; a generation who were expected to be loyal to the Soviet Union.

The structure of KHAD was designed by the ruling Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland all of whom had the aim of consolidating the activities of three security institutions; KHAD, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, and ensuring a leadership loyal to the policies of the government of Afghanistan. However, aside from achieving the aim of a consolidation of the security organs, this policy had the effect of creating internal conflict between Khalqis and Parchamis and fueling the political rivalry between Said Mohammad Gulabzoy in the Ministry of Interior and, Dr. Najibullah, who gained in power. In late 1985, Najibullah was promoted and became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPA and later in 1986 he became the President of Afghanistan. In this capacity he was able to exercise party and state authority over all security organs, including those attached to the Khalq-dominated defense and interior ministries.

93 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

3. KHAD’s Tasks

• Detecting and eradicating domestic political opposition to the government; • Subverting armed resistance by creating divisions between Mujahidden leaders, exacerbating disputes within the Mujaheddin groups and eventually encouraging allegiance to the government; • Penetrating opposition groups abroad through operative strategies with the aim of creating mistrust among the Jehadi individuals and groups that were working in secret; • Persuading influential people to join Mujaheddin groups inside and outside the country in order to report back to KHAD on their activities and to further KHAD’s agenda; • Providing military intelligence to the armed forces; KHAD maintained operative military units (paramilitary groups) to undercover military actions, comprising one anti-terrorist unit and three special KHAD battalions; • Co-opting religious leaders. KHAD funded an official body known as the Religious Affairs Directorate (later on this became the Ministry of Religious Affairs) and recruited pro-regime Ulama and mosque attendants to spy on worshippers;

In order to consolidate the regime, KHAD’s operations, conducted by skilled intelligence agents, penetrated all aspects of life inside Afghanistan and abroad, and succeeded in achieving the Ministry’s objectives, particularly through the infiltration of opposition groups.

KHAD’s activities reached beyond the borders to Pakistan and Iran. Agents operated effectively within exile resistance organizations, refugee camps, and indigenous opposition groups in these two countries. Based on intelligence information, the Mujaheddin entering Afghanistan individually or in groups for subversive acts were defeated and suppressed and the leaders of Mujaheddin parties were disunited. Rebellious tribal leaders and Pashtun separatists that were living along the Durand line were supported financially by KHAD. The organization also offered support to Pakistan opposition movements, such as the outlawed Mazdoor Kisan (Workers’ and Peasants’) Party and Zulflkar Ali Buto, an extremist party formed by two sons of executed Pakistani Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The later was based in Kabul until 1983, when the PDPA regime in a conciliatory gesture to Islamabad decided to expel it. Al Zulfikar was allegedly responsible for terrorist acts, including assassinations inside Pakistan and the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul in March 1981. KHAD also reportedly subsidized several hundred Baluch separatists who engaged in subversive activities in Pakistan’s Baluchestan areas. These actions and defections which were aimed at posing threat to the Pakistani government were sufficiently large so as to give that country’s president, Mohammad Zia ul Haq, thoughts about offering sanctuary and aid to the Mujahiddin resistance. They entered refugee camps east of the frontier, stirred up trouble between the volatile, well-armed refugees and the local population, and carried out assassinations of guerrilla leaders. The hand of KHAD was evident in much of the violent infighting that occurred between Mujaheddin groups.

Little was known in the mid 1980s of KHAD operations in Iran.

94 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

4. KHAD’s Structure

During Najibullah’s times KHAD maintained around 20,000 staff members (with the exception of the National Guard forces, which had two-fold subordination). Initially KHAD was divided into two sectors - Surveillance and Investigation; and other units described below:

Staff structure

Minister Two first and second deputy ministers The directors of all KHAD’s General Departments were also Deputy Ministers: General Department of Cadres and Personnel General Department of Political Affairs General Department of Documentation and Relations General Department of Logistic and Finance General Department of Fight against Banditry

The organigram of KHAD departments in Kabul

Riyosati Avval-Department no. 1: Worked mainly within the Ministry Foreign Affairs and diplomatic offices of Afghanistan inside and outside the country. This department introduced its secret officers for appointment in MoFA and in diplomatic posts (embassies and consulates) of Afghanistan and collected information from abroad. The department was situated in Seh Rahi Alawoddin, Kart-e-Seh, District 3 of Kabul city.

Riyaosati Hawza-e-Awal - Department of KHAD for Kabul province: This department consisted of two sections 1) for urban areas 2) for rural areas. The main office was situation in Bibi Mahro area of district 10 of Kabul City, with one unit in each of the 11 districts of Kabul city (supervised by the urban section), and one unit in each of the rural districts of Kabul province. The activities of both units were a) collection of information on secret organizations and structures, b) fighting against this organization, c) 24 hour patrols in the areas of responsibility. The units were functioning openly and had offices in the buildings of district officers or close by.

The following other section were also functioning under this Department: - Mudiryat-e-Panj (Section no. 5) also functioned openly towards combating banditry, turning armed groups and their support towards the government, and signing protocols and agreements of cooperation with them. - Mudiryat-e-Haft (Section no. 7) functioned openly in Kabul city and conducted ideological and cultural work within the government and educational institutions (schools, universities etc.). - Mudiryat-e-Umumi Char (Section no. 4) was operative openly in coordination with the General Department of no. 4 of KHAD (Riyosati Char-Department). The main

95 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

tasks were to fight against corruption, other economic and financial crimes and to protect public property. - Mudiryat-e-Umumi Tahqiq (General Section of Investigation) was responsible for criminal identification, collection of supporting documents and investigation of accused persons.

Riyosati Dowom-Department no. 2: The main task of this department was the surveillance of foreigners and investigation of potential contacts with the members of opposition groups in Afghanistan. The Department worked in close co-operation with the MFA of Afghanistan.

Riyosati Seh, Department no. 3: The main task of this department was surveillance of all staff members of KHAD that were misusing their functional competencies and committing crimes. This was done in close consultation with the Minster of KHAD.

Riyosati Char-Department no. 4: This department was responsible for combating economic crimes, the investigation of corruption, smuggling and drug-trafficking cases in order to protect public property. The security officers of this department operated in different state agencies such as inter alia, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry, Banks and Other Economic Objects and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation.

Riyosati Umumi Panj – General Department no. 5: The Department’s main task was counter-insurgency activities. The Director of this Department simultaneously acted as a Deputy Minister. It was located near Darul-Aman Palace in Kabul, and had in its structure two other departments: a) Riyosati 54 or Department no. 54 and b) Riyosate 52 or Department no. 52 both of which tackled the problem of banditry since the country was divided for this purpose into zones. In addition to these two departments, the Mudiryat-e-Umumi Sefer Chehl (General Section no. 040) was responsible for the provision and positioning of explosive material and equipments in identified areas. This section was considered as once of confidential sections of the mentioned department. The mentioned tasks were carried out through the agency networks and groups with whom the KHAD had specific arrangements.

Therefore the main tasks of Department no. 5 were to gain the support of armed groups, orientate them towards the government, sign protocols of cooperation with the aim to create disputes within the Mujaheddin groups and to defeat them, as well as the execution of members of the opposition at any level. The Department is reported to have been particularly involved in the arrest and torture of people suspected of involvement in coup attempts. This Department had offices in 28 provinces of Afghanistan. Its personnel were reportedly responsible for dozens of extrajudicial executions following the coup attempt of General Shah Nawaz Tanai the then Minister of Defense of Afghanistan on 6 March 1990.

96 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Riyosati Shash-Department no. 6: This Department provided security for international organizations, embassies and foreign delegations in Afghanistan. It also was responsible for surveillance of foreign citizens in the country; personal information and reports on individuals were submitted to this department. The Department had offices in 29 provinces but its staff operated throughout Afghanistan.

Riosati Haft-Department no. 7: The Department was responsible for monitoring television and radio broadcasts relating to political analyses and other propaganda and monitoring the print media. The Department exerted direct influence over intellectuals, educational institutions members of opposition groups or Afghans that were not supporting the policies of the regime. Members of this Department collected information and documents defaming opposition groups, filming their crimes for propagation purposes. They also filmed the activities of the government institutions, political leaders and military activities and broadcasting them through the TV and Radio. Journalists were granting scholarships for training in these activities, in the Soviet Union. The Department was located in the Shashdarak area, district no. 9 of Kabul City.

Riyostai Hasht-Department no. 8, Riyostai Noh-Department no. 9: Both of these confidential Departments were lead and supervised directly and strictly by the Minister. There is very little knowledge about where their offices were situated and what kind of activities they were conducting, except amongst high-level government officials.

Riyostai Dah-Department no. 10; Riyosati Hefozat wa Amniyat, Department of Security and Protection: This Department provided security for the high ranking government officials, including the President.

Riyosati Yozda-Department no. 11: This department was responsible for coordinating the activities of the paramilitary forces. The performance of this department was under strict directive of the Minister.

Riyosati Duozda-Department no. 12: The Department conducted operations along and across the Pakistani frontier and established links with tribal communities and influential actors in these areas in order to encourage support for the regime in Afghanistan; Tribal leaders were invited on missions to Afghanistan to meet in secret with senior officials, using financial and military resources of the with Riyosati Umumi Panj. The Department’s links with the border communities helped to create disputes within the Mujahideen resistance in these areas.

General information

1. KHAD had its provincial offices in areas where staff members from different departments and sections were conducting their activities. Operational deployment levels varied from province to province.

97 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

2. All the departments and military units of KHAD in Kabul city and in the provinces rented houses and buildings for their meetings with their agents and members of networks, and for payment of salaries. 3. KHAD’s influence and power was most pervasive in the capital. Kabul was reportedly divided into 182 residential blocks, designed to improve control of its inhabitants. Reports indicate that each block had more than 100 informers paid by KHAD. The secret police had its own headquarters with electronic equipment on the roof to monitor the communications of foreign embassies.

For the management of affairs and coordination of activities, KHAD also included the following operational departments:

Riyosati Hashtadu-Noh-Department no. 89: This department conducted regular analysis of terrorist activities (which included those activities prosecuted by KHAD, Mujahidden and other opposition groups) and was responsible for dissemination of intelligence to all concerned departments, based on the Minister’s instruction.

Riyosati Yaksadu-panj-Department no. 105; Technical Department: The Department secured communication between the relevant departments, military units and offices of KHAD and supplied technical equipment.

Riyosati Mukhabira-Department of Communication: The Department was responsible for the installation of monitoring and surveillance equipment, for the provision of communication services between the KHAD offices.

Riyosate Umumiy Tahqiq-General Department of Investigation; The department dealt with the investigation of the political crimes and delivered the accused criminals to the Offices of the Attorney General.

Riyosat-e Imshah or Shefer- Decipher Department: The Department was primarily responsible for deciphering correspondence between the main departments and field offices, since for most cases the communication took place in the code- form.

Mudriat-e Umumi Lam Seewopanj –General Section no. L-35: The Section was involved in the collection of statistics and documentation from agents, their networks and groups of Mujaheddin that held special agreements with KHAD.

Mudriat-e-Umumi Lam Chehelopanj- General Section no. L-45: The Section was responsible for analytical research of the military, economic and political situation in the country and producing reports.

98 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Riyosati Fieldigeri – Department of the Secret Post; Post Service:

Riyosate Umumi Siyasi; General Political Affairs Department: The Head of this Department acted as a Deputy Minister. The Department was responsible for the issuance of ideological propaganda concerning party work among KHAD personnel, and had its officers in each departments, military units and offices of KHAD.

Rioysati Umumi Kadr wa Personnel; General Department of Cadres and Personnel: The Department was involved in staffing issues (recruitment of the new staff members, appointments, promotions, replacements). The Director of this Department acted as a Deputy Minister.

Riyosati Asnod wa Ertibot; Department of the Documentation and Relations: This was the secretariat office in the Ministry, responsible for dissemination of information to all KHAD departments, units and offices.

Riyosati Logistic wa Mali; Logistics and Finance Department: The Director of the Department acted as a Deputy Minister. This Department was working in two areas: supplying items to military units and paying the salaries to staff members of KHAD throughout Afghanistan.

Riyosati Uparasiun; Operational Department: The Department was responsible for planning and co-ordination of military operations that were launched jointly with the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, mainly through Riyosati KHAD-e-Nezami (Department of KHAD in MoD) and Riyosati KHAD-e-Sarandoy (Department of KHAD in MoI). The latter departments were also responsible for the identification and arrest of those military and police officers that were cooperating with the Mujaheddin groups.

5. KHAD Influence in Justice and Legal System

After December 1979, the justice and legal system came entirely under the control of KHAD and its Soviet advisers. Surveillance, disappearances and mass arrests continued, and torture became a routine part of the interrogation process.186 Trials were held before the KHAD’s Revolutionary Court in the Sedarat detention center.

It was the KHAD, rather than the court, that determined innocence or guilt. The court confirmed the KHAD’s “guilty” verdict and determined the sentence in accordance with the recommendations of KHAD. There was no appeal from the decision of the Revolutionary Court.

186 According to Amnesty International, among the twelve Riyosat interrogation centres, 5 were known for the systematic use of torture: Riyosati Avval, Riyosati Chor, Riyosati Panj, Riyosati Haft, Riyosati Umumiy (Main directorate). The personnel of these five Riyosats were reported to bypass even the limited safeguards for detention and interrogation contained in Afghan law at the time.

99 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

6. KHAD Detention Centers

KHAD operated several detention centers in the capital, which were located at KHAD headquarters, in the Ministry of Interior, in the Ministry of Defense, in some of the Departments described above and also in some of the provinces. It was reported that although the use of torture was widespread under the Taraki and Amin regimes, KHAD was the first to employ it in a systematic manner at its network of detention centers in Kabul and in other parts of the country. Torture was both physical and psychological. Treatment included deprivation of food and sleep, beatings, burning victims’ bodies with cigarettes, immersion in water, confinement in shackles for long periods, and electric shock treatment. Detainees were sometimes threatened with execution or forced to watch the torture of their relatives. Victims included people of both sexes ranging from adolescents to adults in their early sixties. Quite often, detainees were confined incommunicado for months and even years. Following the investigations, the detainees were taken to military bases and kept in about 29 KHAD detention centers including two blocks in Pul-i-Charkhi jail and Sedarat KHAD headquarters in Kabul city.

According to the 1991 Human Rights Watch Report 187 the internment and treatment of prisoners during this time was as follows:

Prisoners who have not been sentenced are detained in one of a number of detention centers and “supervision houses.” According to the Minister of State Security, there are 21 detention centers throughout the country and three in Kabul. These three include Blocks 1 and 2 in Pol-e Charkhi Prison, Sedarat and the WAD headquarters at Shashdarak. There are also detention centers in every province. In previous years, interrogation was also reported to take place at a number of unofficial interrogation centers, including the Ministry of the Interior, which is operated by the Sarandoi, a security force under that Ministry; and at least five offices in Kabul: Offices numbered Three, Four and Five; the Ahmad Shah Khan house, a house in Wazir Akbar Khan; and the KHAD office in the Howzai Barikat district. In Qandahar, in addition to the KHAD headquarters, interrogation and torture was reported to have taken place at Darwazan and the building.

However, after the announcement of the policy of national reconciliation in 1986, Dr. Najibullah issued several decrees requesting WAD (the new title of KHAD) Departments to secure the participation of people’s representatives (wakils and maliks); representatives of the Office of the Attorney General and of the Watan party (the newly named PDPA) while planning for the arrest of suspected people. By doing so, the authorities of the WAD officials were restricted in their arrest and treatment of prisoners; influential community leaders and Watan Party officials were now informed of the activities of WAD in the internment and sentencing of individuals and were able to appeal to the President for clemency for death penalty and for reduction of sentences. The visits of these ‘people’s representatives’ to detention centres also had a mitigating influence on the treatment of detainees, so that the

187 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in Areas of Afghanistan Under the Control of the Republic of Afghanistan, Part IV, Report 1991.

100 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

previous policy of torture could not continue in the same way as it had at the beginning of the regime.

7. KHAD During 1992- 2001

After the fall of Najibullah regime, all aspects of security, political economic and administrative life came under the control of the Mujaheddin. Uneducated Mujaheddin commanders were appointed to direct important security institutions. Many KHAD or WAD agents now worked for the new Directors of the intelligence services but under a different authority. Instead of the structure and functioning of one Ministry, as had been the case with KHAD, each commander and faction in the areas of their control had their own intelligence service structures, investigation and detention centers, and jails. Some of their private jails continue to function to this day, amongst reports that interment and torture is still practiced. Many other KHAD or WAD staff members were killed, arrested or left the country during the Mujaheddin regimes. During the Taliban the name of the WAD was changed to Intelligence Service Department, but it did not function. Instead it was replaced by authority given to commanders and ordinary members in the Taliban movement – decisions taken by them were considered to be the decision of Mullah Mohammad Umar, the Supreme Leader of the Taliban movement. The Taliban commander’s authority and the authority of the staff of the Religious Ministry effectively paralyzed the security and law and order departments.

National Security Directorate

After the establishment of the Interim Administration in December 2001, the Intelligence Service Department (formerly WAD, and KHAD) was renamed the National Security Directorate (NSD). Since the in November 2001 this has been controlled and staffed by the Panshiri Shura-i-Nazar. President Karzai has highlighted the establishment of the national army and police and reform of the NDS as being among his top priorities for the transitional period.

Heads of KHAD (in Chronological Order):

Asadullah Sarwari, De Afghanistan De Gatu De Satani Edara, (AGSA) or Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan: April 1978 to September 1978),

Assadullah Amin, Korgori Estekhboroti Muasessa (KAM) or Workers’ Intelligence Institute, September 1978 to January 1979),

Dr. Najibullah, Khadamate Ettelaate Dowlati (KHAD) or State Information Service, January 1980 to April 1986),

Ghulam Farooq Yaqoubi, Wozarat-e-Amniyat-e-Dawlati (WAD) or Ministry of State Security, April 1986 to March 1992,

101 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Yar Mohammad, Estekhbarat-e-Islami Afghanistan, or Islamic Intelligence Service of Afghanistan, April to June 1992,

Mohammad Fahim Qasim, Estekhbarat-e-Islami Afghanistan, or Islamic Intelligence Service of Afghanistan, June, 1992to October 1996, continued as such after the fall of Mujaheddin regime by Taliban under the government of Burhannuddin Rabani,

Eng. Mohammad Aref Sarwari, Riyosat-e-Umumi Amniat-e-Mili, or the General Directorate of National Security, during the Interim and Transitional State of Afghanistan,

Amruddin Saleh, current General Directorate of National Security

102 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

KHAD Structure at the Level of the Ministry:

Minister of State Information Service

First Deputy Second Deputy Deputy Minister Deputy Minister Deputy Minister Deputy Minister Deputy Minister Head of General Head of General Head of General Head of on Banditism Department of Department of Department of Documentation Affairs, Head of Cadres and Political Affairs Logistic and and Relations General Personnel, Finance Department Department # 5

KHAD structure at the level of Kabul City Department # Department of Department # Department # Department # Department # Department # Department # 1 Kabul 2 3 4 5 6 7 Security or Hawza-e- Awal

Sub Sub General department # department # Section # 040 54 52 General Urban Section General Section for Other independent Offices in the 11 Rural areas, Offices in general sections # districts of Kabul city the rural districts of 4,5 and 7 for Kabul Kabul province city

103 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Other structures:

Department # 8 Department # 9, Department # 10 Department # 11 Department # 12 Department in Department in secret and under secret and under secret and under MoD MoI close supervision close supervision close supervision of the Minister of the Minister of the Minister

Internal structures:

Communication Department # Department of Investigation Secret posts General Section # L - Section # L - department 89 deciphery department Department Section # R 35 45 105

104 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 6 – Chronology of Displacement From and Within Afghanistan Between April 1978 and March 2002

Years Key events causing displacement Location Who was displaced? Estimated Where displaced number or to (if known) level of displacement 1978 Enactment of decrees on offences From all over the Landlords, tribal, religious Thousands Iran, Pakistan against the revolution, equal rights country and political leaders, of people and some other for women and land reforms, limiting ordinary Afghans countries a land lord ownership to 30 hectares of irrigated land April 1978 to Saur Revolution and establishment of From all over the Religious, tribal leaders and Thousands Pakistan, Iran December 1979 Khalqi regime of PDPA. Violence by country especially members of political parties of people and other the State occurred nationwide and Kabul, Herat, including PDPA Parcham countries locally by the landlords, religious and Kunar, northern branch tribal leaders in the form of region, Kandahar, extrajudicial killings, mass arrest and Helmand, Zabul fighting and Uruzgan August 1979 Revolts, largely uncoordinated Western, Eastern Ordinary Afghans 150,000 Pakistan and Central 3,0000 Iran provinces 15 September Hafizullah Amin overthrows Noor From Kabul and Taraki supporters and to Thousands Iran, Pakistan 1979 Mohammad Taraki, the first PDPA provincial capitals some extent ordinary and some other President of Afghanistan Afghan civilians countries 24 December Russian invasion with the Kabul, Herat, People from the rural areas, Millions Pakistan, Iran 1979 deployment of about 50,000 Soviet Kunar, Zabul, majority of the members of and other troops, heavy artillery and helicopters Kandahar, religious and tribal groups countries within one week and attacks against Helmand, (Civilians mainly from the the military positions loyal to Uruzgan, Faryab, rural areas, who were not Hafizullah Amin Nimroz, Jawzjan, safe due to military conflict Sar-e-Pul, Balkh, between the Soviet + pro- Kunduz and communist regime forces of

105 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Baghlan and some Afghanistan and military other provinces in groups of Mujahiddin the north 27 December Hafizullah Amin is overthrown by From Kabul and Amin’s supporters Hundreds, in Rural areas of 1979 Babrak Karmal and his installation as provincial capitals addition to the country, Iran, the new President; Violence by the Hezb-e- Pakistan and State, State supporters occurred, Islami some others locally by the landlords, tribal and members and religious leaders and reactions by the ordinary Mujahiddin groups Afghans 1980 – 1992 Continued factional fighting between Laghman Civilians Hundreds Pakistan and Hezb-e-Islami, Jamiat-e-Islami-e- inside the Islami and Harakat-e-Islami and country murders of several commanders 1982 – 1992 Forced military recruitments of youth Areas under Youth and their families Thousands Pakistan, Iran by the government government and other control countries 1985 Gathering of Mujahiddin leaders in From the rural People who were in Hundreds To Iran and Pakistan for the formation of an areas of contacts with the Pakistan alliance against Soviet presence in Afghanistan Mujahiddin groups and Afghanistan commanders 1986 Fall of Kunar to Mujahiddin Districts of Kunar PDPA associates and Thousands Jalalabad, Kabul ordinary Afghans 1986 Use of Stingers rockets by Provinces Ordinary people as a result Hundreds Inside the Mujahiddin groups, supplied by the bordering Pakistan of intensified fighting country US 1986 to 1989 Establishment of Dr. Najibullah’s Kandahar, Movement of people from Small Pakistan, Iran regime; National Reconciliation Helmand, Zabul, the frontlines and areas numbers and other policy; less participation of the Soviet Uruzgan where fighting intensified countries troops in the military operations 1989 to April Withdrawal of Russian troops and Jalalabad, Khost, Civilian population Thousands Mainly to 1992 heavy fighting in Nangarhar, Khost, Kandahar and Pakistan and

106 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Kandahar and Zabul provinces Zabul Iran 1991 Fall of Khost to Mujahiddin groups Khost, Paktia PDPA supporters, ordinary Thousands Kabul and Afghans Pakistan

1991 – 1992 Tension and conflict between Abdul In provential Some members of Hundreds To Kabul and Rashid Dostum and Juma Asak loyal centers mainly in PDPA188, high ranking other regions of to Najibullah and formation of Mazar, Hairaton, government officials and the country Junbesh-e-Mili Islami Afghanistan Shebirghan and some Afghans of Pashtun which included majority of local Maimana ethnic origin Uzbek, Turkmen, Arab and Ismaili commanders of the north. Fall 1991 to 1992 Fighting between commanders loyal From Zindajan, Ordinary people and some Hundreds Iran and other to Najibulklah, Juma Asak and Ghoryan, Kohsan, of Mujahiddin districts of Herat Mujahiddin in Zindajan district of Enjil, and Guzara Province Herat province districts, Herat province

1992 Establishment of Qari Baba (Harakat- Ghazni People affiliated with Hundreds Inside the e-Inqlab-e-Islami) and several other PDPA country, Iran and commanders of Hezb-e-Islami, Hezb- Pakistan e-Wahdat, Itehad-e-Islami in Ghazni province 1992 Establishment of commander Khano, Helmand province PDPA and pro PDPA social Hundreds Pakistan and Mullah Ghafar (Harakat-e-Inqlab-e- organizations members, Iran Islami), Rayis Baghran (Hezb-e- their families, military and Islami, Itehad-e-Islami and Taliban), police officers and ordinary Hafizullah Khan (Hezb-e-Islami population Hekmatyar), Zabet Mirwali (Hezb-e- Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami) regimes in Helmand

188 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was renamed in July 1990 in its Congress to Watan (homeland) Party.

107 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

1992 Establishment of Younus Khalis Pakita, Khost and PDPA affiliated Afghans Hundreds Pakistan (Hezb-e-Islami, Harakat-e-Inqlab-e- Paktika Islami and Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar) regimes, lead by Commander Jalaluddin Haqani, Mawlavi Mansoor, and some other commanders

1992 to October Continuation of the factional fighting All provinces Affected civilians Hundreds in Pakistan, Iran 1996 and gross human rights violations by addition to and other the local commanders in all provinces those countries. until establishment of Taliban control mentioned above as a result of specific conflict 1992 until now Establishment of Junbesh-e-Mili Kunduz, Takhar, PDPA and pro PDPA Thousands Mazar-e-Sahrif, Islami (Dostum) and Jamiat-e-Islami Baghlan and members of social Tajikistan, Iran commanders regime in Kunduz, Badakhshan organizations, military and Pakistan Takhar, Baghlan and Badakhshan staff. provinces

February 1992 Food blockade by (Hekmatyar) Hezb- From all parts of Civilian population Hundreds Jalalabad, Iran e-Islami the city and Pakistan March 1992 Establishment of Shura-e-Nezar North of Kabul, Members of PDPA party, Thousands Inside the regime in Parwan, Kapisa provinces, Parwan and Kapisa high ranking government country and Iran and in the north of Kabul province provinces officials, ordinary Afghans and Pakistan. (partially by Hezb-e-Islami Hekmatyar)

108 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

March 1992 Establishment of Hezb-e-Wahdat and Bamyan, Maindan/ Afghans of ethnic origin Thousands Inside the Harakat-e-Islami Muhseni Wardak Daikundi, other than Hazara country and Iran commander regimes in Bamyan, parts Ghazni and and Pakistan of Maidan/Wardak, Daikundi, Ghazni Uruzgan provinces and Uruzgan provinces

March 1992 to Rape, killings and torture of Sunni Districts 3, 5,6,7 of Female students of Kabul Hundreds Other parts of March 1995 civilians (Tajiks and Pashtuns) by Kabul city university and other the city, Hezb-e-Wahdat and Harakat-e-Islami Afghans Jalalabad, Iran commanders and Pakistan April 1992 Establishment of commander Turan Maidan/Wardak People loyal to Ittehad-e- Hundreds Inside the Amanullah (Hezb-e-Islami) and Haji Islami and Harakat-e- country Musa (Harakat-e-Inqlab-e- Inqlab-e-Islami Islami)regimes in Maidan/Wardak after fighting and defeat of Hezb-e- Wahdat and Harakat-e-Islami

April 1992 Fighting and attacks of fighters of Affected districts Ordinary people, members Thousands Iran, Pakistan, Shia parties in Kabul city’s districts 6,7,5,3 Kabul city of PDPA party, other social of people some former No. 6 and 7, and looting government and Paghman organizations189 USSR and other properties and establishment of their countries regimes in districts 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Kabul City

April 1992 Establishment of 45 checkpoints by Pul-i-charkhi, People mainly from Hundreds Pakistan and different commanders on the 150 Km Sarobi, (Kabul) villages close by the Jalalabad road between Kabul and Jalalabad Qarghaii highway

189 Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan, Democratic Women Organization of Afghanistan, Pioneers Organization of Afghanistan, Farmers Cooperative of Afghanistan, National Front of Afghanistan (renamed to Peace Front of Afghanistan during Najibullah regime), Labors Organization of Afghanistan etc.

109 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

(Laghman) Sorkhroad (Nangarhar)

April 1992 Establishment of Mashreqi Shura of Nangarhar, Members of PDPA and pro- Thousands Pakistan local commanders of four eastern Laghman, Kunar PDPA social organizations, provinces and Nuristan their families and ordinary provinces Afghans

April 1992 Establishment of a Council of Kandahar, Members of PDPA and pro- Thousands Pakistan and Commanders in the Kandahar: Gul PDPA social organizations, Iran Agha Shirzai (Muahz-e-Mili-Islami), their families, military and Mullah Naqib (Jamiat-e-Islami), police officers and ordinary Mullah Sarkateb (Hezb-e-Islami population Hekmatyar), Ustad Abdul Halim (Itehad-e-Islami), Amir Lalai, (Muhaz-e-Mili), Haji Maghash (Jabha-e-Nejat-e-Mili)

April 1992 Establishment of Jan Mohammad Uruzgan PDPA affiliated Afghans Hundreds Pakistan and (Hezb-e-Islami) in Uruzgan Iran

April 1992 Establishment of regime of Mullah Zabul PDPA affiliated people and Hundreds Pakistan Salam Rocketi and Hamidullah Tokhi ordinary Afghans (Etehadi Islami) in Zabul province April 1992 Establishment of Karim Brahawi’s Nimroz Only PDPA members, pro Thousands Iran regime in Nimroz province PDPA groups, their families, military and police officers April 1992 to Establishment of Ismail Khan’s Herat, Farah, Ismail Khan opponents, Thousands Iran and August 1993 regime Nimroz, Badghis PDPA affiliated Afghans Pakistan and Helmand

110 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

April 1992 to Establishment of joint regime of Kabul and Parwan PDPA affiliated and Thousands Mazar-e-Sharif 1994 Junbesh-e-Mili Islami (Dostum) and ordinary people and Pul-i- Jamiat-e-Islami (Ustad Atta Khumri Mohammad) in Balkh and Samangan provinces

April 1992 until Establishment of Junbesh-e-Mili Mazar, Balkh, and Opposition groups of Hundreds Inside the now Islami regime in Jawzjan, Faryab, Centre of Uzbek and Turkmen country, Sar-e-Pul , Samangan Mujahiddin Pakistan and Iran April 1992 until Establishment of Hezb-e-Wahdat Samangan, Sar-i- PDPA affiliated and Thousands Inside the now (lead by Muhaqiq) commanders’ Pul, Balkh and ordinary Afghans country, Iran and regime in parts of Samangan, Sar-i- Baghlan provinces Pakistan Pul, Balkh and northern Salang high way.

June 1992 and Conflict between Ittehad-e-Islami and Districts No. 2, 3, Civilian population Thousands Jalalabad, continued for Hezb-e-Wahdat forces in the west of 5, 6, 7 of Kabul Pakistan and several months Kabul City and Paghman Iran district June 1992 to Continued rocket firing of Kabul city From all parts of Civilian population Thousands Jalalabad, September 1995 by Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) forces Kabul city, Pakistan and intensified in from Charasyab particularly the Iran August 1992 South

December 1992 Abdul Rashid Dostum deployed Districts 9, 10 Civilian population Thousands Jalalabad, forces to Kabul airport, district 9 and Pakistan and fought against the Shura-e-Nezar Iran forces. December 1992 Fighting between Ittehad-e-Islami Districts No. 2, 3, Civilian population 75000 Jalalabad, (Sayyaf )and Hezb-e-Wahdat 5, 6, 7 of Kabul refugees and Pakistan and (Mazari) forces in West of Kabul City and Paghman 500,000 Iran

111 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

district IDPs 19 January 1993 Fighting between forces of Shura-e- Khoshal Khan, Civilian population Thousands Jalalabad, Iran continued for Nezar, Itehad-e-Islami and Hezb-e- Afshar areas of and Pakistan several months Wahdat in the west of Kabul and district 5 and other capture of Afshar area parts of district 2,3,4,5,6 and 7 of Kabul city 11 and 12 Residents fleeing during the night West of Kabul Civilian population Thousands Other parts of February 1993 the city

July 1993 Fighting between commanders of Border districts of Ordinary Afghans Hundreds Inside the Ismail Khan (Jamiat-e-Islami) and these two country, Iran and commanders of Helmand province provinces Pakistan and capture of some parts of Helmand by Ismail Khan

Spring 1993 to Serious drought followed by internal From Badghis and Ordinary people Thousands IDP camps in Fall 1996 conflict amongst local commanders Ghor province Herat Province

September 1993 Assassination of commander Jalalabad city A significant number of Hundreds Pakistan Shamlai, the Deputy Governor of Kuchis and traders Nangarhar Shura 1 January 1994 Junbesh-e-Mili Islami (Dostum) and Residential areas Civilian population Thousands Jalalabad, Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) fiercest of Kabul city Pakistan and fighting for Kabul (artillery and Iran rocket attacks) 1994 Fighting between Junbesh-e-Mili Mazar-e-Sharif Civilian population Thousands Inside the Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami in Mazar- country and Iran e-Sahrif and Pakistan 1994 Emergence of Taliban movement, Kandahar, Zabul, Members of Mujahiddin Thousands Pakistan and fighting against Mujahiddin groups Uruzgan, Helmand Iran and capture of Kandahar in provinces

112 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

November

August 1994 to Gradual introduction and All areas under the All Afghans that were not Tens Iran, Pakistan November 2001 enforcement of strict interpretation of Taliban control able to cope with the Thousands Central Asia and Islamic Code of Conducts and tight except the north Taliban policies other countries Islamic policies by Taliban through eastern provinces their religious police and Panjsher valley February 1995 Capture of Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Members of Mujahiddin Hundreds Pakistan Maidan/Wardak and Ghazni by Helmand, groups and their family Taliban Maindan/ Wardak members and Ghazni 13 February 1995 Capture of Charasyab military base Charasyab district Militias of Hezb-e-Islami Hundreds Sarobi, Jalalabad of Hezb-e-Islami by Taliban of Kabul province and their family members and Pakistan

6 March 1995 Massive offensive of Shura-e-Nezar West of Kabul Civilian population of Thousands Jalalabad, Iran forces against Hezb-e-Wahdat forces City particularly Hazara and Pakistan ethnicity 11 March 1995 Occupation of Hezb-e-Wahdat West of Kabul Hezb-e-Wahdat militias, Hundreds Central positions in the city by Taliban and their family members and highlands and fighting between Shura-e-Nezar and Afghans of Hazara ethnic Iran Taliban forces; capturing the west of origin from the area Kabul by Shura-e-Nezar forces October 1995 Fall of Herat and establishment of Herat, Badghis, Members of Jamiat-e- Thousands Iran, Pakistan, Taliban regime Farah, Ghor Islami (Ismail Khan) and Indonesia and provinces ordinary population other countries

December 1995 Intensified rocketing of Kabul From different Civilian population Hundreds Panjsher, residential areas by Taliban districts of Kabul jalalabad, city Pakistan and Iran

113 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

1996 – 2001 Unbearable policies of Taliban All areas in ER Civilian population plus Hundreds of Pakistan Mujahiddin associates thousands 11 September Capture of Jalalabad by Taliban Jalalabad, Members of Mujahiddin Thousands Mainly to 1996 Laghman, Kunar groups and ordinary people Pakistan End of Fall of Kunar and Laghman to the Kunar and Mujahiddin groups and Hundreds Pakistan September 1996 Taliban Laghman their family members September to Taliban advance and rocketing of Sarobi villages Ordinary people and militia Hundreds Kapisa province October 1996 Kabul members of 45 Mujahiddin and Pakistan commanders checkpoints 26 September Fall of Kabul to the Taliban Kabul Members of Shura-e-Nezar, Thousands Parwan, 1996 movement Jamiat-e-Islami, Itehad-e- Panjsher valley, Islami northern provinces October / Fighting in the north of Kabul, Kabul, Parwan, Ordinary people, members Thousands Iran, Central November 1996 Parwan and Kapisa provinces and Kapisa, provinces of Mujahiddin groups Asia, Pakistan establishment of Supreme Council for and Panjsher the Defense of Afghanistan (SCDA) valley with the membership of anti Taliban forces 1997 Establishment of Taliban regime in Kunduz Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen Thousands Inside the Kunduz and other Afghans affiliated country and Iran with Junbesh-e-Mili Islami, and Pakistan Jamiat-e-Islami and Wahdat parties 1997 Fighting in Parwan, Kapisa and Shamali plains, Ordinary population, Hundreds Iran, Pakistan, Shomali plains of Kabul provinces, some districts of Afghans of Hazara, Tajik and former Jalalabad forcible displacement of Tajik, Parwan province and as well as Pashtun thousands IDP camps, Ex Hazara and some Pashtun population ethnic origin Soviet Embassy (evictions and scorched earth policy) compound 1997 Serious drought in Zabul, Ghor, From the Kuchis and other Afghans Thousands Kandahar, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, mentioned Helmand, Herat,

114 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Nimroz, Herat, Ghazni, Pakia, Khost provinces other provinces, Bamyan, Wardak, Logar, Paktika, Iran and Badghis, parts of Kabul, and Parwan Pakistan provinces 19-25 May 1997 Revolt within Junbesh-e-Mili Islami Faryab, Jawzjan, Junbesh-e-Mili Islami, Thousands Inside the and instability in Balkh and some Balkh Jamiat-e-Islami and Hezb- country, Iran and other provinces with the support of e-Wahdat affiliated people Pakistan the Taliban to General Malik in and ordinary Afghans. Faryab and massacres of Taliban prisoners 9 September 1997 Inter-factional fighting in Mazar with Mazar and some Members of Junbesh-e-Mili Hundreds Inside and the return of Dostum from Turkey other northern Islami militia, their family outside the provinces members and Afghans of country Uzbek ethnic origin March 1998 Fighting between Junbesh-e-Mili Hairatan district, Civilian population Hundreds Inside and Islami and Hezb-e-Wahdat its neighboring outside the commanders in Hairatan and in areas and Mazar-e- country response to this Wahdat attacks in Sharif Mazar against Junbesh-e-Mili Islami positions July – August Taliban advance in the northern Faryab, Jawzjan, Afghans of Uzbek, Thousands Inside the 1998 provinces Balkh, Mazar-e- Turkmen, Hazara country, Iran and Sharif, Samangan, ethnicities and those Pakistan Pul-i-Khumri, affiliated to the parties Kunduz previously holding power 8 August 1998 Capture of Mazar-e-Sharif by Taliban Mazar-e-Sharif Affiliated people of parties Thousands Inside the and persecution of people mainly (Junbish, Jamiat, Wahdat) country, Iran and Hazaras and Uzbeks there. and civilian people mainly Pakistan Hazaras and Uzbeks. September 1998 Capture of Bamyan by Taliban Bamyan Wahdat militias, their Thousands Inside the central family members and highlands and civilians Iran and

115 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Pakistan November / Fighting at the Murghab frontlines Murghab of Herat Civilian population Thousands Herat city, December 1998 between Taliban and Northern and its neighboring Maslakh Camp Alliance forces. districts Spring 1999 until Serious drought and factional conflict Faryab, Badghis, Civilians Hundred IDP Camps in now and Ghor thousands Herat Province Summer 1999 Fighting in Shomali plains, north of Shamali plains Civilian population of 14,500 Jalalabad and ex Kabul mainly Tajik and Pashtun -Soviet embassy ethnicities compound Fall 1999 Fighting in Panjsher Valley Parwan province Civilian population of Tajik 100,000 North and north- including Panjsher ethnicity eastern valley provinces Fall 1999 – 2000 Continuation of fighting around Civilian Tajik and some Thousands Takhar, Kunduz (Taloqan) (Khanabad, Pashtuns people. Badakhshan, Imansahib and Pakistan other districts) Tajikistan, Pianj/Islands, Summer 2000 Fighting in Shamali plains, Parwan, North of Kabul, Civilian population of 50,000 Kabul, Kapisa provinces and Panjsher valley Parwan, Kapisa mainly Tajik ethnic group Jalalabad, and Panjsher Ghorband of valley Parwan province and Pakistan Winter 2000 Fighting in Bamyan and , Bamyan, Maidan/ Civilian population of 60,000 Kabul, Pakistan Taliban made several attacks on Wardak, Baghlan mainly Hazara and Tajik Bamyan province, Shaikh Ali and provinces ethnicities Lolenge districts of Parwan and Behsud I and II districts of Maidan/Wardak province and counter attacks by Hezb-e-Wahdat on Taliban forces in Jalriz, Nirkh districts of Maidan/Wardak 2000 – 2001 Continuation of fighting around Takhar province Civilian population and Thousands Badakhshan

116 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Takhar province (Bangi, affiliated people of parties province, other Eshkamish, (mainly Jamiat) districts of Taloqhan, Takhar, Baharak, Farkhar, Tajikistan, Pianj Khwajaghar, / Islands, districts) Pakistan 2001 Continuation of fighting in Panjsher Parwan provinces Civilians Thousands Inside the valley country, in Pianj and Amu Darya islands, Tajikistan, Iran and Pakistan 9 September 2001 Murder of Ahmad Shah Masood Panjsher valley People affiliated with Hundreds Border areas and north-eastern Shura-e-Nezar and Jamiat- with Tajikistan, provinces e-Islami elsewhere inside the country and Pakistan September Attack by CF on Taliban Kandahar, Members of Taliban Hundreds of Pakistan, Iran, 2001 to December Helmand, Zabul, regime, their supporters, thousands and internally 2001 and Uruzgan and ordinary population displaced November 2001 Capture of Northern Region by the Faryab, Jawzjan, Mainly Afghans of Pashtun Tens South / West of Taliban opposition groups SarePul, Balkh, and Gojor ethnic groups Thousands the country and Samangan, Pakistan / Iran Baghlan, Kunduz, Takhar provinces November 2001 Fall of Taliban and Americans’ Nangarhar and Civilian population Hundreds of Safe rural areas bombs Laghman thousands in the country and Pakistan February 2002 Forceful displacement of Pashtuns by All northern Civilians Thousands South of the Northern Alliance Forces: Uzbek, provinces country and Tajik and Arab commanders Pakistan

117 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Annex 7 – Bibliography

Action Contre la Faime and World Food Programme, “Nutritional and Mortality Survey,” (Herat and Kabul), Kabul, ACF/WFP, 2000.

Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Joint Verification of Political Rights,” AIHRC-UNAMA, First Report, 15 June to 7 July 2004.

Afghanistan Network on Food Security, “The Decline Towards Crisis: Afghanistan’s Deteriorating Drought Situation,” Monthly Food Security Bulletin, August 2004; see also: United Nations and Government of Afghanistan Joint Appeal, September 2004.

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, “Minimal Investment, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” AREU Briefing Paper, June 2004.

Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, “DDR Progress Report in Afghanistan,” ANBP, 24 October 2004, Weekly Summary Report No. 51, 13 November 2004.

Alden Wily Liz, “Rural Land Conflict and Peace in Afghanistan,” AREU, February 2004

Amnesty International, “Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan”, September 1979, ASA 11/04/79.

Astri Suhrke, “Conflictual Peace Building: Afghanistan Two Years After Bonn,” International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004.

Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document,” Center on International Cooperation, New York University.

Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 15, Number 3, July 2004.

Christopher Ward and William Byrd, “Afghanistan’s Drug Economy,” The World Bank, December 2004.

P. Clarke, United Nations Office for Coordinating Relief in Afghanistan (UNOCA), United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) and the World Bank, December 1999, “Food Security in Afghanistan: 1999 to 2000”, Afghanistan Outlook, Vol. 2, Kabul.

Constitution of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, January 2004. Website: http://www.afghan-web.com/politic/currentconstitutionenglish.pdf

Delegation to UN Talks in Bonn, submitted by the Secretary General to the Security Council, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment of permanent Government Institutions” (“The Bonn Agreement”), S/2001/1154, 5 December 2001.

Ermacora Felix, “Tears, Blood and Cries: Human Rights in Afghanistan since the Invasion 1979- 1984”, Helsinki Watch, 1984.

118 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Feinstein International Famine Center Youth and Community Program, “Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002-2003”, Tufts University, June 2004.

Habiburahman Ibrahimi and Shahbuddin Tarakhel, “Aid Workers in Peril”, Institute For War and Peace Reporting, 9 September 2003. Website: http://www.reliefweb.int

Helsinki Watch, “By All Parties to the Conflict: Violations of the Laws of War in Afghanistan,” 1988.

House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, “Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against Terrorism,” 7th Report of Session 2003-2004.

Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, “Speaking Out, Afghan Opinions on Rights and Responsibilities,” November 2003.

Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Escalating Attacks on Aid Workers and Civilians,” 27 June 2002.

Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes – Abuses against Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern Afghanistan,” April 2002.

Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: The Forgotten War – Human Rights Abuses and Violations of the Laws of War since the Soviet Withdrawal,” Asia Watch, 1991.

Human Rights Watch, “Loya Jirga Off to a Shaky Start”, 17 June 2002.

Human Rights Watch, “The Warlords are Plotting a Comeback,” 10 June 2002.

Human Rights Watch, “Between Hope and Fear – Intimidations and Attacks against Women in Public Life in Afghanistan”, October 2004.

Human Rights Watch, “The Rule of the Gun – Human Rights Abuses and Political Repression in the Run-Up to Afghanistan’s Presidential Elections,” September 2004.

Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security, “Security Council Briefing Notes: Gender Issues, Afghanistan”, October 2003.

International Crisis Group, “Elections and Security in Afghanistan,” International Crisis Group, 30 March 2004.

International Legal Foundation, “Customary Law of the Pashtun Areas of Southern and Eastern Afghanistan,” 2003.

Mark Sedra, “Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,” BICC Paper 25/2003.

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “Analysis of Drought Impact in Afghanistan,” MRRD Vulnerability Analysis Unit, Summer 2004.

119 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, World Bank, “Rural Poverty in Afghanist4an: Initial Insights from the NRVA 2003,” MRRD and the World Bank, February 2004.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “NATO flag raised in Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimana,” NATO, Brussels, 2004. Website: www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/07-july/e0701a.htm

Rama Mani, “Ending Impunity and Building Justice in Afghanistan,” AREU, December 2004.

Refworld 2004 Issue 13 and Refworld 2005 Issue 14 (forthcoming) CD-Roms.

Save the Children Sweden, “Lost Chances: The changing situation of children in Afghanistan 1990- 2000”, Global Movement for Children, Afghanistan Working Group, June 2001.

Schutte Stefan, “Urban Vulnerability in Afghanistan: Case Studies from Three Cities,” Stefan Schutte, AREU Working Paper Series, May 2004.

Shahabuddin Tarakhil and Hafizullah Gardish, “Girls Schools become Targets,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 24 June 2004.

United Nations Children’s Fund, “Afghanistan – Progress of Provinces, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003”, Afghanistan Central Office of Statistics and UNICEF, 2003.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan,” E/CN.4/1986/24, 17 February 1986.

United Nations Development Assistance Framework, “United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Afghanistan, 2006-2008,” United Nations, Kabul, 2005.

United Nations Development Programme, “Afghanistan: National Human Development Report 2004 – Security with a Human Face – Challenges and Responsibilities,” UNDP, 2004. Website: www.undp.org.af/nhdr_04/NHDR04.htm

United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on the Status of Women, “The situation of women and girls in Afghanistan,” Report of the Secretary General, Forty-ninth session, EC/CN.6/2005/5, 22 December 2004.

United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/58/868 - S/2004/634, 12 August 2004.

United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” Report of the Secretary-general, Fifty-ninth session, A/59/744 - S/2005/183, 18 March 2005.

United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan,” A/59/370, 21 September 2004.

United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan,” M. Cherif Bassiouni, A/59/370, 21 September 2004.

120 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Complementary Forms of Protection”, Global Consultations on International Protection, EC/GC/01/18, UNHCR, Geneva, 4 September 2001.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees” (“The Ceased Circumstances Clause”), HCR/GIP/03/03, UNHCR, 10 February 2003.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Guidelines on International Protection: Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,” HCR/GIP/03/04, UNHCR, 23 July 2003.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Land issues in the process of repatriation of Afghan refugees,” UNHCR, 2003.

United Nations High Commissoner for Refugees, “Operational Information Summary Report, 2002- 2003,” UNHCR, OCM Afghanistan, 18 January 2004.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme, “Preliminary Study of Land Tenure Related Issues in Urban Afghanistan with Special Reference to Kabul City”, UN Habitat, March 2003.

United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan, “Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2003-2012”, UNMACA, 2003.

United Nations System, “Common Country Assessment for the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan,” Kabul, October 2004.

R. Waldman and H. Hanif, “The Public Health System in Afghanistan,” AREU, Kabul, 2002.

Afghanistan: Relevant Websites

1. Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC): www.aihrc.org.af Reports include: “Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Annual Report: June 2003- June 2004;” “A Call for Justice – A National Consultation on past human rights abuses in Afghanistan,” January 2005.

2. Afghanistan Information Management Service: www.aims.org.af

3. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit: www.areu.org.af

4. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: www.undpanbp. org

5. Elections: www.jemb.org

6. International Crisis Group: www.icg.org Reports include: “Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections”, Asia Report No. 88, 22 November 2004.

7. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Official Website: www.af

121 Update of the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations June 2005 – Restricted Use & Circulation

Other Government Websites are the following: Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) 2005: http://www.adf.gov.af Afghanistan National Development Strategy: http://www.ands.gov.af Afghan Constitution: http://www.constitution-afg.com Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.afghanistan-mfa.net Ministry of Finance: www.mof.gov.af Ministry of Communication: www.moc.gov.af Government Procurement Unit: www.af/aaca/procurement Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development: www.mrrd.gov.af Ministry of Agriculture: www.agriculture.gov.af/ Ministry of Justice: www.moj.gov.af

8. United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan: www.unama-afg.org

9. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Afghanistan: www.undp. org.af

10. WomenWatch: www.un.org/womenwatch/afghanistan

122 GIMU / PGDS Geographic Information and Mapping Unit Complementary Forms of Protection- Afghanistan - May 2005 Population and Geographic Data Section

TAJIKISTAN TURKEMNISTAN UZBEKISTAN

BadakhshanBadakhshan BadakhshanBadakhshan CHINA

KunduzKunduz Northern JawzjanJawzjan BalkhBalkh TakharTakhar Region

SamanganSamangan FaryabFaryab BaghlanBaghlan PAKISTAN D:\OCM_OICU\MI\AFG\Repatriation\House\WORK_House.WOR

SariSari PulPul NuristanNuristan BadghisBadghis ParwanParwan KapisaKapisa KunarKunar

BamyanBamyan LaghmanLaghman KabulKabul WardakWardak NangarharNangarhar HiratHirat GhorGhor LogarLogar

PaktyaPaktya

GhazniGhazni UruzganUruzgan KhostKhost

PaktikaPaktika FarahFarah PaktikaPaktika ZabulZabul

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF IRAN NimrozNimroz KandaharKandahar HilmandHilmand MILITARY ACTIVITIES

COMMANDERISM

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd. Geographical data provided by AIMS. Data Date & Source: PMG Protection Unit, BO Kabul - May 05 HIC/ProMIS

NOTE:

This Map a reprodacted from the "National Atlas of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" which was published in December 1984.

The boundaries and names on the maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. for farther information contact HIC/ProMIS e-mail: [email protected] GIMU / PGDS Geographic Information and Mapping Unit Afghanistan - IDP Caseload - May 05 Population and Geographic Data Section

TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

BadakhshanBadakhshan CHINA TakharTakhar JawzjanJawzjan KunduzKunduz BalkhBalkh

Hirat SamanganSamangan 12 583 FaryabFaryab BaghlanBaghlan SariSari PulPul

NuristanNuristan BadghisBadghis ParwanParwan KapisaKapisa KunarKunar

BamyanBamyan LaghmanLaghman D:\OCM_OICU\MI\AFG\IDPs_&_Refugees\IDP_Movement\WORK_IDP_Move.WOR BamyanBamyan KabulKabul LaghmanLaghman

WardakWardak HiratHirat GhorGhor NangarharNangarhar LogarLogar Caseload by District PaktyaPaktya 43199 to 54994 (2) GhazniGhazni KhostKhost 23800 (1) UruzganUruzgan 11631 to 12584 (2) 3600 to 6416 (1) 25 to 2015 (27) PaktikaPaktika FarahFarah Region IND FarahFarah ZabulZabul PAKISTAN North 5 120 South 121 993 Southeast 13 316 East 0 West 16 030 ISLAMIC Region Central 3 600 REPUBLIC Total 160 059 NimrozNimroz OF IRAN Province District IDP_Caseload HilmandHilmand KandaharKandahar Kandahar Maywand 54 994 Kandahar Panjwayi 43 199 Hilmand Lashkar Gah 23 800 Hirat Hirat 12 583 Khost Khost 11 634 Total 146 210 Top 5 Districts Data Date & Source: SO Mazar: May 05, Kandahar: Gardez: Hirat: FO Kabul 05. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd. Geographic data provided by AIMS. GIMU / PGDS Geographic Information and Mapping Unit Afghanistan - UNHCR Assisted Repatriation - Mar 02-Dec 04 Population and Geographic Data Section ?? TURKMENISTAN UZBEKISTAN TAJIKISTAN

Badakhshan Jawzjan 11 556 CHINA 83 883 Kunduz Takhar 174 463 57 071 Balkh 89 332

Samangan Baghlan Faryab 13 148 187 299 54 572 Sari Pul PAKISTAN 26 862 Nuristan 155 Badghis Kapisa D:\OCM_OICU\MI\AFG\Repatriation\Return_Country\WORK_Return_Country.WOR 7 955 Parwan 37 651 Kunar 142 352 Bamyan Laghman 28 132 19 943 Kabul 60 505 Wardak 981 460 23 042 Nangarhar Hirat 450 738 123 275 Logar Country of Asylum Ghor 48 611 10 269 CoA Individuals Ghazni Paktya 101 365 Pakistan 2 280 571 Uruzgan 23 826 Khost 25 955 8 390 Iran 779 219 Other 11 226 Total 3 071 016

Zabul Region IND Farah Paktika 10 813 3 314 61 090 North 698 186 South 229 432 Southeast 136 895 East 539 530 West 202 589

Region Central 1 253 059 ISLAMIC Unknown 99 REPUBLIC Nimroz Total 3 059 790 25 561 Hilmand Kandahar Number of Individuals Top_5_Prov Individuals OF IRAN 55 294 111 809 981460 (1) Kabul 981 460 450738 (1) Nangarha 450 738 101365 to 187299 (6) Baghlan 187 299 54572 to 89333 (7) Kunduz 174 463 Parwan 142 352 155 to 48612 (17) Total 1 936 312 Top 5 Provinces

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Sources: UNHCR, Global Insight digital mapping - © 1998 Europa Technologies Ltd. Data Date & Source: Assisted Volunatry Repatriation Forms (VRF), Pakistan 1 Mar 02 - 31 Dec 04, Iran 9 Apr 02-31 04.