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Mr Chamberlain & Munich: the Truth about a Policy

by ALLEN HUTT Lab 0 u r GORDON SCHAFFER Research GEORGE DARLING Department SIXPENCE

"PEACE FOR .OUR TIME"

MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND MUNICH: THE TRUTH ABOUT A POLICY

By ALLEN HUTT GORDO SCHAFFER GEORGE DARLING

Issued by 'HiE LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT PREFATORY NOTE iV September 30th, l~fr. Chamberlain came back from lWlmich Q with the proud boast that he had seatred "peace for our time." l'Vithin a very few days the reaction of sudden relief had passed and the nation turned to examine the" peace" more close!;'. Doubts and criticisms came not on!;' from Socialists and malcontents, not ontJfrom peace organisations and Liberal bodies, bu: from mall)' infinentia] Conservatives. And soon the Premier himself was admilling that " peacefor our time" was something of an orersratement made in the momentary flllsh of acbieuement. I t is certain!;' a strange peare; a peacewhich, as all Mr. Chamber­ lain's sllpporters agree, means rearmament at a more desperate rate than ever before; a peace which requires the conscription of our people and the restriction ofour democratic rights. In our belief this peace doesnot even deserve the modest claim which has been made for it-that it affords a short respite from war, dllring which we m'!)' set our costtJ bllt illefficient defences ill order. This " peace" m'!)' well enable Hitler to wage u/ar where previollstJ he dared ontJ threaten. It means dead!;' danger, not meretJ to the far-awtD' colonies and "British interests" for which llfr. Chamberlain is pledged to fight, bu: to the livillg standards of the British people and their right to maintain them.

LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT.

2 CHAMBERLAIN'S SEVEN MONTHS HE t at Munich on September 29, 1938 Herr Hitler, W Signor Mussolini, Mr. 1 [eville Chamberlain and 1\1. Daladier set their signatures to the Four-Power Agreement dismembering , a new and more perilous chapter began in the story of post-war Europe. The Pact of Munich consummated the first stage in a programme deliber­ ately and clearly set down when the Rome-Berlin axis between the Fascist States was forged. It marked, too, the realisation of a policy steadfastly pursued by Mr. [eville Chamberlain during his sixteen months as Prime Minister and his seven months in virtual control of the Foreign Office-a policy, to which he adhered in face of opposition representing all sections of the nation, aiming to end the era of collective security, and to substitute a new system based on co-operation between Britain, France and the Dictator States. For those seven vital months while Mr. Chamberlain con­ troIled foreign affairs, democracy had been on the defensive on two fronts-Spain and Czechoslovakia. Both were vital for peace. Each brought to the forefront the issue of collective security against aggression by dictators, who made no secret of their intention to secure world domination by force of arms. In both instances, the weight of British influence, the prestige of her vast armaments were thrown on the side of the aggressors. They were used to force the Popular Front Government of France into line with British policy. CoIlective security, which the " 1 ational" Government in its 1935 election manifesto declared to be the only method of avoiding war, was jettisoned and cynically ignored. Four threads run through the story of these seven months: (1) There was the attempt at the cost of incredible humilia­ tion to secure co-operation with Fascist Italy, which had left the League in December, 1937. While this plan was being carried through, Britain watched the breach of every pledge which Mussolini had made, saw British ships bombed and British seamen killed by Italian aeroplanes, acquiesced in Fascist intervention in Spain amounting to a virtual invasion, (2) There was a steady march of Hitler's policy towards domination in Central Europe, leading to the annexation of Austria and to the final tragedy of Czechoslovakia. 3 (3) Through these months in which events rushed to the finale at Munich, there was a complete refusal by the British Government to announce clearly its policy in regard to Czecho­ slovakia. Week after week in the House of Commons prominent Conservatives, as well as Opposition members, pleaded that war could be averted only if Britain made clear that she would stand by France and Russia in the event of a German attack, or that she was unable to give her support and Czechoslovakia must act accordingly. (4) Evidence was made public to show that while he refused to make his pos!tion clear to the British people and to the world, Mr. Chamberlain had long decided on the line of action which was ultimately to find expression at Munich. * * * Mr. Chamberlain was a comparative newcomer to foreign policy when he succeeded Mr. Baldwin in the premiership in May, 1937. Mr. Anthony Eden, a League supporter, had become Foreign Secretary after the enforced resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare. But events had moved swiftly. Sir Samuel Hoare was soon back in the inner Cabinet circle. Lord Halifax, with a roving commission as Lord President of the Council, was interesting himself largely in foreign affairs. Sir John Simon, another ex-Foreign Secretary, who had aimed the first death blow at the League when he gave moral support to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, was very near the Prime Minister. In January, 1937, there had been a "gentleman's agree­ ment " with Italy, in which Mussolini had declared that he had no territorial ambition in Spain; by the end of the year Mr. Eden's patience was wearing thin. The open despatch of Italian troops to Spain, and the flagrant anti-British propaganda from Rome, had reduced the agreement to a farce. It was an open secret that Mr. Chamberlain was at logger­ heads with his Foreign Secretary, and it was no less apparent that steady pressure was being brought to bear upon Downing Street by circles friendly to Fascism. The Banker, a solid City of London publication, had drawn attention to the latter fact in February, 1937: .. We regret to have to admit that from a small but rather influential circle in the City of London there flows a constant stream of propa­ ganda in favour of credits for Germany. These propagandists say 4 that a loan to Gennany would be a two-fold investment. We could buy off German aggression, and, by propping up an admittedly desperate and faithless tyranny, we could prevent Germany from falling into Communism." The position of the Fascist powers had been made perfectly clear. Marshal Goering's Nazional Z eilung wrote in November, 1937: " The time will soon come when we shall put into execu­ tion rhe agreement made in Berlin between Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler. To the former, Spain, to the latter, Central Europe." It was in these circumstances that in November, 1937, Mr. Chamberlain made his first move to secure" ." Over the head of Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax paid a " private and unofficial " visit to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The pretext was an invitation to the International Hunting Exhibition at Berlin. Lord Halifax was with Hitler for five hours, and after­ wards saw Mar shal Goering and Dr. Goebbels. The only official statement was to the effect that Anglo-German relations were discussed, and in the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain said that he was satisfied the visit had been valuable in " furthering the desire felt in both countries for closer mutual understanding." It was unofficially stated that Hitler had demanded a free hand in Austria and Czechoslovakia in return for a six-years' truce regarding colonies. Mr. Geoffrey Mander, Liberal M.P., asked bluntly in the House of Commons whether this was a fact. He was shouted down with cries of" Order." Mr. Chamberlain declared that no pledge had been given by Lord Halifax. This dialogue followed: MR. ATTLEE : " May we take it that no commitments of any kind will be made without the House having full opportunity of dis­ cussion."

.:\ IR. CHAMBERLAIN: U Of course." MR. GALLACHER : "Will it not be too late? " In September, 1938, when the fate of Czecho slovakia was ealed in the cabinet room at Downing Street, Mr. Chamberlain refused the appeal of the Labour Opposition that the House shoul d be recalled before vital decisions were taken. Uneasiness at the implications of the Halifax -Hitler move continued to grow. Then, on November 25th, Mr. Chamberlain said that the visit of Lord Halifax would be discussed during a visit of the French Premier and Foreign Minister on November 29th. There was no agreement or understanding and none was 5 contemplated which " might affect the security of France or of airy other COll1ltlY to lI'hich France IIJas allied fry Treaty or Pact." But was it without significance that, immediately after these talks, Foreign Minister Delbos made a hurried tour of Poland, Rou­ mania, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary? Was it to counteract the fears among France's allies, resulting from the Halifax-Hitler conversations? On December I st, Mr. Neill\!cLean returned to the attack in the House of Commons. He asked whether the Halifax conversations had dealt with the return of German colonies, the abandonment or restriction of the League's policy of collective security, the reform of the Covenant of the League, the aims of Germany in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and what views Lord Halifax was authorised to express on behalf of the British Government. The Prime Minister refused, in spite of appeals, to give any further information. Still later, after Mr. Eden had resigned, J\Ir. Churchill said in the House of Commons that a friend from Vienna had told him that Lord Halifax had given cause to believe that England would not object to German authority over Austria. "There is not the slightest truth, I am certain, in that statement," 1\1r. Churchill added: " Lord Halifax is a man of honour. ..." Dictators Demand Eden's Dismissal At the beginning of 1938, Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, was moved to a new post as Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Government. There were rumours that he opposed the new trend in foreign policy. Mr. Eden demanded an indication from Italy that obligations, already entered into, would be fulfilled, before negotiations for a new agreement began. The Prime Minister was insistent on immediate talks with Rome. While the Cabinet was thrashing out the problem, the controlled press of Italy and Germany launched a violent campaign against Mr. Eden, the two Dictators in effect declaring in unmistakable terms that "Eden must go." Mr. Chamberlain accepted his Foreign Secretary's resig­ nation on February 20th in order to begin conversations with Mussolini. From Berlin next day The Times reported: "The man in the street here is convinced that Mr. Eden resigned because of the attacks made by Herr Hitler yesterday." Said the Manchester Guardian: "European and American democracies interpret Mr. Eden's resignation as a surrender to the dictator­ ships." 6 The debate in the House of Commons on Mr. Eden's resignation made clear to the. world that Mr. <;hamberlain intended to take control of foreign policy and that It was to he based on collaboration with the two Fascist powers. He said that he was seeking a general appeasement throughout Europe. I( the four principal powers, Britain, France, Germany and Italy, could be brought into friendly discussion, into a settlement of their differences, the peace of Europe would be saved for "­ generation. 1\1r. Eden said that the immediate issue leading to his resignation was whether official conversations should be opened at once with Rome. In his conviction, the attitude of the Italian Government did not justify such a course. Propaganda against Britain by Italy was rife throughout the world. He was pledged not to open conversations with Italy until hostile propaganda ceased. There had been glorification of victories by Italian troops in Spain. " This is the moment for this country to stand firm. Agreements that are worth while are never made on the basis of a threat, a ' now or never' demand. Nor in the past has this country been willing to negotiate in such con­ ditions." Lord Cranborne, Mr. Eden's Undcr-Secretarv at the Foreign Office, who followed his chief into the wilderness, used stronger language. "Conversations with Italy now," he said, "would not be a contribution to peace but a surrender to blackmail." On Mr. Eden's departure, Lord Halifax became Foreign Secretary. As a result of the Cabinet reshuffle, Mr. R. 1\. Butler, Under-Secretary to the Minister of Labour, was moved to a similar position in the Foreign Office and his place unexpectedly filled by 1\1 r. Lennox-Boyd, who had always been an avowed supporter uf General Franco. Though it was announced at the time of his appointment that he would resign his connections with pro-Franco organisations, his name was still used on the notepaper of Franco's propaganda body" Friends of Nationalist Spain" after he had joined the Ministry. Mr. Lennox-Boyd coupled with his admiration for General Franco an expressed contempt for the League of Nations. Yet there was some surprise when, within a week or two of his appointment, he interpreted what he believed to be the Prime Minister's mind to his constituents at Biggleswade. According to The Times (March 13): 7 .. Mr. Lennox-Boyd said he could countenance nothing more ridiculous than a guarantee that the frontiers ofCzechoslovakia should not be violated, when half the people in that country could not be relied upon to be loyal to the Government of that country, and from what he knew of Mr. Chamberlain he did not think he would make a move to give a guarantee of that kind. Germany could absorb Czechoslovakia, and Great Britain could remain secure." This speech from the new Minister was taken abroad as confirmation that Mr. Chamberlain had decided to support the .. free hand in the East of Europe for Germany." It caused joy in Berlin, dismay in Paris and Prague. The matter was raised in the House of Commons, during questions, on March 21st. Mr. Chamberlain produced the time-honoured device ofblaming the reporter. He said that Mr. Lennox-Boyd did not accept the report as correct. On the adjournment, however, Mr. Lennox-Boyd withdrew this plea and apologised to the House for his indiscretion. Mr. Attlee pleaded for a definite statement from Mr. Chamberlain denying that the speech represented his views. There was no response to the appeal, and Mr. Lennox­ Boyd remained a Minister.

II SETTLING" SPAIN - FOR FRANCO With Mr. Eden out of the way, negotiations in Rome for the promised Anglo-Italian agreement were pressed forward. Mussolini made no secret of his expectation to finish the civil war in Spain by Easter. There were repeated questions in the House of Commons as reports of the extent of Italian inter­ vention came through. Only the British Government appeared unaware of the facts. The Prime Minister stonewalled all attacks. On March 14th Mr. Attlee pointed out that, while the Anglo-Italian conversations were proceeding, munitions and iorces were pouring into Spain to assist the rebels. "Does anybody doubt," he asked, " that Hitler and Mussolini are acting in concert?" Mr. Chamberlain replied that recent events " appeared to have taken place with men, arms and equipment already in Spain." "Supposing it be true that that which suddenly seems to have altered the situation in favour of General Franco does presage what I may call a complete victory, can it be said that that is due to the accession of fresh forces and munitions to his side? " On March 24th Mr. Chamberlain repeated the Italian pledge that "Italy has no territorial, political or economic aims in 8 Spain or in the Balearic Islands." lie added that the British Government placed full reliance upon the intention of the Italian Government to make good their assurances. Sir Archibald Sinclair reminded the Prime Minister that Signor Mussolini had given another assurance-that there had been no breach of the ' on-Intervention Agreement. It was strange, thought Sir Archibald, that if this were true the national directorate of the Italian Fascist Party should have passed a resolution only the previous day stressing with pride" the valour of the legionaries who are once again an essential factor in the victory in Spain." In this atmosphere, with Franco's troops pressing hard against the Republic, the Anglo-Italian Agreement was finally signed. As Mr. Chamberlain later explained to the House of Commons, he had worked to secure such a result for nearly a year, and one of his first actions after becoming Premier was to send a friendly message to Mussolini suggesting an agreement between the two countries. The pact, in effect, merely reaffirmed previous agreements which Mr. Eden at the time of his resigna­ tion made clear had been repeatedly broken. Its most interesting feature was that both parties agreed that it would not become operative until a " settlement" was reached in Spain. News­ papers all over the world expressed the view that this " settle­ ment " meant a victory for General Franco. Mr. Chamberlain, however, would not define this rather vital word on which an agreement between two Great Powers depended. Answering Mr. Attlee in the House on May 2nd, he said: "I prefer not to give a definition of it.... It may be that later on we shall get nearer the time when we can give a definition." Mussolini was not so modest. At Genoa, on May 13th, he said that there must he a victory for Franco before settlement could be arrived at. As Fascist intervention in Spain became more and more blatant during the summer, the fear that the British Government was willing to suffer any humiliation in order to placate its friends in Rome and Berlin grew amongst all sections of British democracy. Again and again details of German and Italian penetration in Spain, many of them vouched for by reports in the Government press, were brought up in the House of Commons. On every occasion Government spokesmen either evaded the protests or professed themselves without knowledge of events which appeared perfectly obvious to informed ob- servers. 9 To the man in the street, the most flagrant sign of the dictators' contempt for Britain was the continued bombing of British ships. It seemed that the Union Jack in Mediterranean waters constituted an invitation to Franco's bombers rather than a protection. It was admitted by pro-Government newspapers that the machines were Italian and that they flew from Rome via the Franco base of Majorca. Even the port of Gandia-a British port under concession agreement, as British in fact as any con­ cession port in China-was subjected to bombing. The'news­ papers of Herr Hitler were not as slow as Mr. Chamberlain in discovering the nationality of the bombers, The Frank!lIrter Zeitllng of July 11 announced, in fact, that the aircraft sinking vessels in Republican ports were Italian. By June 21st, Mr. [oel Baker was able to summarise the position to the House of Commons in these terms: "Of 140 vessels engaged in the Spanish trade in the last twelve months, ten have been sunk, ten have been captured and detained, 28 have been damaged more or less seriously.... The actual number hit cannot be less than 50, and in addition a large number have been damaged more or less seriously.... Nearly 60 people have been killed and wounded.... Two non-intervention officers have been killed." British Shipou'liers Are "Profiteers" Opposition spokesmen poured scorn on the Government's action in sending notes to Burgos which General Franco studiously ignored. Mr. oel Baker recalled that the previous February Mr. Eden had said that the Government reserved the right to take appropriate " retaliatory action" in the event of recurrence of attacks. .. The late Foreign Secretary left his office," said Mr. Baker. .. The Prime Minister has gone back to the system of claims and protests. I am bound to say I prefer the spirit of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Simon) in the matter of the Metro-Vickers' engineers (arrested in Moscow for alleged wrecking).... In retro­ spect the perils do not seem so grave in comparison with the deaths of 21 sailors and the wounding of many more. The Chancellor, on that occasion, said this: ' I ask myself this question. What would you have the British Government do when they have this information ahout fellow subjects of their own who arc in this peril? Would you have them do nothing? Would you have them conduct polite enquiries without taking any other steps? '" Mr. Chamberlain's speech in reply to Mr. Baker shocked the country. He claimed that the ships engaged in trade with the 10 Spanish Republic were making "portentous profits" and declared that had attacks been made by Spanish Government aeroplanes upon ships carrying aid to General Franco the Labour Party would have said that" people who take these risks must look after themselves." There were surprised interruptions at this point: " Yes," retorted the Prime Minister. "That is what we say about people who take these risks." Following this speech, Lord Cecil resigned the Government whip as a protest against the Prime Minister's policy. His letter of resignation was couched in unmistakable terms. "It is admitted by the Prime Minister that the attacks were illegal, that in fact the British subjects killed were murdered. Yet the British Prime Minister declines to take any action, economic or military, to protect British lives and property.. .. I do not believe that any other British Prime Minister has ever made a speech like that of Mr. Chamberlain. It seems to me inconsistent with British honour and international morality." On July 2nd, the Prime Minister found a new excuse for General Franco. In a speech at Kettering, he said: "Perhaps after all Franco's airmen do not always rigidly adhere to their instructions." Every statement that has been made by observers at Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante, and other ports that have been bombed, have shown without doubt that in bombing British ships Franco's airmen must have been adhering rigidly to their instructions. But it suited Mr. Chamberlain's purpose to twist the facts. He concluded with these significant words: "It remains true that as long as this war goes on and British ships arc carrying cargoes into the ports of the Spanish Gooernment, so long the danger of incidents of this kind will remain." In view of the tacit encouragement by the British Prime Minister, it was hardly surprising that Mussolini's bombers should continue their deadly work. Having consolidated the Republican lines, the Spanish Government was fighting against shortage of food; the attacks on shipping carrying succour to the women and children were thus a clear attempt to win by blockade what arms and men had failed to achieve. British shipowners began to voice urgent protests to the Foreign Office. They received support from all sections of the nation. Finally, when the House of Commons was dismissed for its three months' holiday on July 29 there was general rejoicing as Mr. Chamber­ lain announced that agreement had been reached with General Franco by which there was to be an investigation into the 11 bombing of British ships and that compensation would be paid when attacks were proved deliberate. Within a week, however, this optimism was rudely shaken. The Foreign Office informed the British shipowners that there was no promise to pay compensation. There were excited comings and goings in Whitehall since, even after six months of Mr. Chamberlain's foreign policy, it was surprising to find a Government department challenging the word of the Prime Minister. So the Foreign Office issued a new statement. They said that: "In accepting the plan as a whole it was clear General Franco had accepted that part of it which referred to compensa­ tion." Since this conclusion was open to the Foreign Office when the original declaration was made that no pledge had been given by General Franco, it appeared that the Foreign Office was engaged in extricating the Prime Minister from yet another accusation of bad faith. In any case the investigation was to be in private and on rebel territory, and the British Government expressed the view that evidence from eye-witnesses in Government Spain was not desirable." The shipowners were in fact to be placed in the same position as the Czech observers at Munich, for they were even refused a round-table conference to discuss the situation. It only remains to add that at the end of October, 1938, it was revealed that General Franco had finally refused to pay any compensation whatsoever. Moreover, the Chamberlain Government allied itself with the extreme reactionaries in France in putting pressure on the French Government to close their frontier with Spain entirely, and thus, in effect, help Italy and Germany to starve out the Spanish Government forces. The French Government were unwilling, because a victory for Germany and Italy in Spain would give them another frontier to defend in wartime, and German officers were already supervising the building of aero­ dromes along that frontier. But eventually, on July 6th, they gave in. Finally, notification of the Pact was rushed through Parlia­ ment in November during the closing days of the Session, the excuse being that 10,000 war-weary Italians had been withdrawn. Airmen, technicians, 90,000 Italian troops remained. Lord Halifax showed the depth to which British prestige had sunk 12 when he told the House of Lords: "Signor Mussolini has always made it plain that he was not prepared to see General Franco defeated."

CLIVEDEN AND THE CZECHS During these months public attention was drawn to the group of aristocrats, politicians and financiers who were known to be sympathetic to . Comment was made on the political parties given by Lady Astor at Cliveden House, her luxurious home. It was said that visitors to these parties included Lord Londonderry, former Minister for Air, who boasted in the House of Lords that he prevented the abolition of the bombing aeroplane during the Geneva Dis­ armament Conference and who, with Lady Londonderry, had acted as host to Herr von Ribbentrop. The Hon, J. J. Astor, chairman of The Times, and his editor, Mr. , Mr. J. L. Garvin, editor ofLord Astor's newspaper the Observer, Lord Lothian and Lord Swinton, Minister for Air, were also reported to be associated with the week-end discussions. 1t was stated that Lord Halifax, Sir John Simon, and Sir Samuel Hoare were visitors. The allegation was widely made that the group, which soon became labelled " the Cliveden Set," was pursuing a deliberate policy of swinging Britain away from the League towards co-operation with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. During the week-end of March 27th, the Prime Minister and Sir Thomas Inskip were guests at Cliveden House. On April l Oth Reynolds News published details of the party. In the light of recent developments they are of startling interest. The newspaper said that the " Cliveden Set" was urging the Prime Minister to introduce" universal service "-the new name for industrial and military conscription. "The plan," the news­ paper added, "is to take this step as soon as the growing strength of the Dictators has created the necessary mentality in the country. Three ministers for' Citizen Defence,' , Industrial Defence' and ' Propaganda' will be appointed. Mr. Chamber­ lain himself is designated as leader of the campaign which will be for a revival of ' national strength' and 'national ideals.' He will ask for support from political, industrial, religious and cultural sections of the nation." The report went on to state 13 that the foreign affairs' programme: discussed at Cliveden stipulated: .. Aid for France in the event of aggression to be dependent on commitments endorsed by Britain. In other words, the Pacts with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are to be abandoned. .. Agreement with Italy, reopening of discussions with Hitler, and settlement with Japan on the basis of' legitimate' Japanese expansion and self-determination of the Chinese. (' Self-determina­ tion ' has a new and more ominous meaning since Munich.) .. , Mediation' in the Spanish war, on the basis of the anticipated Franco victory. .. Emasculation of the League as a preliminary to the return of Germany, Japan and Italy . .. The calculation is (the newspaper concluded) that having stabilised the Fascist grip on Europe, the Government can exploit the growing strength of the Dictators to blackmail the people into , universal service.' Hitler will then be given a free hand for his openly declared policy of further extension of Nazi influence in Central Europe and in the Baltic leading to his threatened attack on the Soviet Union." In the light of the events which followed it can be said that so far this programme has been carried into effect with meticulous accuracy even to the appointment of a Minister of Propaganda, announced in the World's Press News of October 9th. But in the spring British democracy was reluctant to believe that there could be so sinister a motive behind the friendship shown by the Prime Minister to the dictators. It was not generally believed that, however powerful pro-Nazi forces might be in England, the head of the British Government would attempt to force upon the country a policy so inconsistent with the ideal of collective security for which the nation had voted in 1935. Plot Against Peace Is Revealed There was, therefore, anxiety and indignation among all parties when, in the middle of May, London correspondents of the American and Canadian press sent to their newspapers statements purporting to represent views of the British Govern­ ment which were entirely at variance with declared policy. Mr. Geoffrey Mander, Liberal M.P., raised the matter on the adjournment of the House on June 20th, reading a report sent by Mr. Joseph Driscoll to the Montreal Star, which claimed to .. shed official light" on the .. real British attitude" in foreign affairs. 14 Mr. Chamberlain, not concealing his annoyance with Mr. Mander, declared: " I am not going to attempt to deny or to affirm anything in connection with a statement in this paper or a statement in any other paper, at this time or at any other time on matters of this or any other kind. That is my final word." But it was not the final word. The next day during a foreign affairs debate, Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberal Opposition, produced this quotation from the same interview: "Perhaps the most dangerous spot in the world is Czecho­ slovakia. What do the British in authority think about it? These Brirish.think there is little danger of immediate war in Europe. To the query: Will France and Russia fight for the Czechs? They answer: How can they fight? Nothing seems clearer than that the British do not expect to fight for Czechoslovakia and do not anticipate that France or Russia will either. That being so, then the Czechs must accede to the German demands if reasonable. " Having signed the Italians on the dotted line, Britain would now like to contact the Germans. This brings up the question of a Four-Power Pact, but the British prefer to label it something else because a Four-Power Pact might signify to some a Dictators' Committee to dictate to the rest of Europe. It is admitted that Britain would like to swing Germany and Italy into a working agreement with Britain and France to keep the peace of Europe. Soviet Russia is excluded on the ground that it does not work well in harness. with a proviso that some day Russia, if she behaves, may also be admitted to membership." Sir Archibald drew attention to the statement that" Czecho­ slovakia must accede to the German demands if reasonable," and declared: " If that were so, and I thank heaven it is not, what would it matter if the demands were reasonable or not? The Czechs would have to submit anyway.* In truth, I think that from the point of view of peace, no more dangerous state­ ment of British policy could go out." Challenged, the Prime Minister protested "against any assumption that because he did not deny that he gave the inter­ view that therefore he was admitting it." Mr. Mander asked whether the interview was not given at a luncheon given for the purpose by Lady Astor, who intervened with the words:

* The report in the Nell' York Times (May 14th) suggested this plainly: " Mr. Chamberlain to-day, without prejudice naturally to the rights of the interested parties to judge for themselves, certainly favours a more drastic measure. namely, separation of the German districts from the body of the Czechoslovak Republic and the annexation of them to Germany." 15 "I would like to say that there is not a word of truth in it," but on June 27th had to make a "personal explanation" to the House. She said that her denial had been taken as a denial of the accuracy of the interview. She continued: " This, of course, is not the case. ...I never had any intention of denying that the Prime Minister had attended a luncheon at my house. The Prime Minister did so attend, the object being to enable some American journalists who had not met him to do so informally and thus to make his acquaintance. What I did deny and still deny is the suggestion that what took place on this particular occasion was an interview. An interview, I remind the House, is a meeting with a view to the communication of information intended specifically to be made the subject of articles in the press or newspapers. I trust that I have now removed any misapprehension that there may be in the minds of members." Lady Astor's solution of the riddle "when is an interview not an interview" is hardly relevant. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that in May when the British Government was refusing every appeal for a clear statement of its intentions regarding Czechoslovakia, the Prime Minister was already openly declaring his policy to his immediate circle. This policy, to be perfectly blunt, was the policy to be carried into effect at the Munich Four-Power Meeting.

AUSTRIA SOUNDS THE ALARM Already in the debate on :1\1r. Eden's resignation 11r. Chamberlain had gone further than any British Government spokesman since the war in separating foreign policy from the League. "Does anybody believe," he asked, "that the League, as it is constituted to-day, can afford collective security? The situation has completely changed since the last election. We must not try to delude small weak nations into thinking that they will be protected by the League." That was at the end of February. It was enough for Hitler. On March 12 Germany invaded and annexed Austria-in time, be it noted, to prevent the holding of a plebiscite for or against uniting with Germany. As the Premier himself said in Parliament on March 14th, " Great Britain and Austria were both signatories, as was the ';erman Government, of Treaties which provided that the ..ndependence ofAustria was inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League." Nevertheless the cold fact remains that the British Government did not lift a finger to save 16 the .independence of Austria, except for verbal protests which were brushed aside by the German Government as " inadmis­ sible." The very day before Germany marched (March 11th) Mr. Chamberlain, on his own admission, had a long conversation at luncheon with von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister on the subject of Austria. In these circumstances it was of little use for the Premier afterwards to deny rumours that the Govern­ ment " had given consent if not encouragement to the idea of the absorption of Austria in Germany." The facts told their own story. But these events raised very sharply the danger to Czecho­ slovakia, which lay next in Hitler's line of advance to the conquest of Europe. Hitler's pawns in this attack were the , inhabiting the frontier districts of Czechoslovakia. Though for seven hundred years they had lived with the Czechs in a single State, bound by the natural mountain frontier, yet under the old Austrian Empire they had enjoyed a privileged position as members of the ruling race. After the war the position was reversed, and the Sudeten Germans resented the change. In the economic crisis of 1929-31 the Sudeten areas, which were industrial exporting districts, were hard hit and recovered slowly (as did their counterparts in England, the" Distressed Areas "). Germany under Hitler prevented their recovery by refusing to import manufactured goods as she had hitherto done. An extreme German nationalist party grew up, playing on the poverty of the Sudetens, promising them their old status as members of the superior" ordic" race, and, more practical, promising closer trading arrangements with Germany, but not, be it noted, separation from the Czechoslovak State. This was the " Sudeten German" party. Led by Konrad Henlein, this party, as the world knew, was developed by the German Nazis as a useful tool in their drive to conquer Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chamberlain on March 14th told the House that Field-Marshal Goering on March 11th had given a general assurance to the Czech minister in Berlin, which was renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler, that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German­ Czech relations; while on larch 12th the Czech minister was informed by von Neurath that Germany considered herself 17 bound by the German-Czechoslovakian Arbitration Convention of 1925.* But these assurances did not convince Parliament. In the debate which followed, members of all parties were keenly aware of the peril of Czechoslovakia. All asked when the blow would fall. Mr. Attlce called attention to the fact that Gerrnanv's action was taken while Britain was pursuing friendly conversa­ tions with the German Government through Herr von Ribben­ trop. Mr. L. S. Amery, former Conservative Dominions Secretary, pleaded for a clear statement from the Government.

U One thing that will mean war." he declared, " is for us to go on half encouraging Czechoslovakia, half encouraging France with the idea that we shall stand behind her, half encouraging Germany to think we shall run out, and then, at the last moment, in a revulsion of sentiment, coming in for what may be the greatest disaster that Europe and the world have known. Let us either make up our minds that we must stand out, and let everybody concerned know it, or let us say to France, Czechoslovakia and Germany, in language as plain and simple as we can make it, that the first German soldier or aeroplane to cross the Czech border will bring the whole might of this country against Germany." Mr. Churchill repeated Mr. Amery's plea, but the Govern­ ment would not be drawn. Mr. Butler replying to the debate would do no more than repeat a statement made on February 21st by Sir John Simon: "the obligations of His Majesty's Government towards Austria and Czechoslovakia are those which every member of the League of Nations assumes towards all its fellow-members. Apart from these, His Majesty's Govern­ ment has given no special guarantees towards either country."

Prunier Rejects Soviet Peace Plan During the debate one note was struck by the Prime Minister which did not betray his expressed anxiety for inter­ national co-operation. He rejected a proposal made by the Soviet Union after the annexation of Austria that a conference of the peace-loving powers should be held to consider action to deter aggressors. .. The Soviet proposal," declared Mr. Chamberlain, .. would appear to involve less a consultation with a view to settlement than a concerting of action against an eventualiry that has not yet arisen.

• It was this treaty to which the Czech Government vainly appealed when British and French pressure forced them to agree to the dismember­ ment of their country. 18 Its object would appear to be to negotiate mutual undertakings in advance to resist aggression, which His Majesty's Government, for their part, are unwilling to accept. Apart from this, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the indirect but none the less in­ evitable consequence of such action as is proposed by the Soviet Government would be to aggravate the tendency towards the establishment of exclusive groups of nations which must, in the view of the Government, be inimical to prospects of European peace." Two months later, before the Austrian conquest had been thoroughly digested, Hitler was compelled by the internal tension ofhis regime to move into position for a quick onslaught on Czechoslovakia. Troops were massed on the frontier and invasion was expected on May 21st. The Czechs, however, called up reserves and manned the frontier defences with striking speed and efficiency. France and the Soviet Union immediately announced their determination to carry out their pledges to defend Czechoslovakia, and the British Ambassador in Berlin drew the attention of the German Government to the British obligations to France if she carried out her pledge to the Czechs. Faced with the" collective security" strength of Britain, France and Russia, Hitler was forced to withdraw. But this proved only a temporary setback to the Cliveden plans. Henceforth the energies of Mr. Chamberlain and his associates were to be devoted to sapping the firm resistance of Czechoslovakia and bringing the utmost pressure on France to desert her Czech allies. It was clear throughout that Hitler could not have faced a war with Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in order to gain the Sudeten areas. The shortage of raw materials, especially oil, iron ore and food­ stuffs, the strength of the French and Czech lines offortifications, the number of fronts on which he would have had to fight, and above all, the weak economic and political position inside Germany itself made such a project impossible. Hitler's aim was that long since announced in 111ein Kampf: to split the opposing forces in order to attack them one by one. INNER CABINET TAKES CONTROL Democratic opinion had every reason to feel uneasy when Parliament rose at the end of July and the pro-Fascist Inner Cabinet was in unchecked control. The situation in Central Europe was on the eve of its final deterioration into extreme crisis, but the British Government still refrained from the 19 specific and unambiguous statement of policy that was urgently needed. Indeed, when Sir John Simon made a widely-heralded pronouncement at a much later and more critical stage (his speech at Lanark on August 28) he did no more than repeat the Prime Minister's statements in the debate on March 24th. Mr. Chamberlain then said that Britain was committed to the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression and "we also had obligations to Portugal, Iraq and Egypt." In the case of Czechoslovakia, feeling that British " vital interests are not concerned in the same degree," the Government were " unable to give the prior guarantee suggested," although should war break out over Czechoslovakia countries other than those immediately concerned would probably soon be involved. In quick succession The TimBS had followed up the Cliveden line by dropping editorial hints (June 3 and June 14) on the possibility of cession of the Sudeten areas to the Reich. In the House Government replies to questions had significantly stalled on the very points of Czech territorial integrity which were later to become the essential issue. On June 15th, the Prime Minister himself told Mr. Vyvyan Adams that he was " not prepared to lay down conditions," when asked" whether he will make it clear that His Majesty's Government do not entertain frontier revision as a possible contribution to a solution of the problem of minorities in Czechoslovakia?" Mr. Adams nevertheless persisted: "\Vould not any such a revision effectively destroy the strategic integrity of Czechoslovakia," he asked, and " is it not important in our own interests to preserve intact this bastion of democracy?" To which Mr. Chamberlain returned no answer. \Vas that not an eloquent silence? On June 27th the Prime Minister was asked whether he would seek from the German Government " an assurance that they are not contemplating any action comparable to their seizure of Austria" in view of Dr. Goebbels' widely publicised statement six days before" to the effect that it has been seen in Austria that one race cannot be separated into two countries and that it would soon be seen somewhere else." Under­ Secretary Butler limited himself to saying that the statement " attributed to Dr. Goebbels " (it was quoted verbatim in The Times Berlin report) "does not appear in the official reports of his speech "(!) Nor had anxiety been allayed by the mystery surrounding certain visrs to London of high Nazi personages. Konrad 20 Henkin, Hitler's Sudeten "leader", came across in May and was introduced to anti-Nazis like Mr. Churchill and Sir Robert Vansittart, among others, to whom he explained that he was really a " moderate" and that his proclaimed demands were to be regarded rather as necessary demagogy. * On July 19th Captain Wiedemann, confidential envoy of Hitler, visited this country and had long private conversations with Mr. Chamber­ lain and Lord Halifax. In official circles it was put about that he had brought a special message from the Fuehrer to the Prime Minister, indicating that Hitler was ready to talk about a Four-Power Pact directly the Czech-German "dispute" was " out of the way." Thereupon Lord Halifax left for Paris (on the Royal visit) and at once appears to have sounded the French Government concerning the Prime Minister's "original and hardy idea "-the phrase is Mr. Garvin's-to send Lord Runci­ man to Prague as "arbitrator." This cool suggestion was rejected by the Czechs and the French, who a month before had protested that Anglo-French intervention in Prague was merely aiding Henlein to raise his terms. So in the end Lord Runciman went as " mediator," his impartiality supposedly attested by the fact that, as it was said, "his mind on the subject in dispute is as a white sheet." On the adjournment of the House the Prime Minister declared that Lord Runciman had been appointed" in response to a request from the Government ofCzechoslovakia." This was simply not true, and there has never been a suggestion of any documentary evidence for the statement. Mr. Chamberlain added, " with regard to the rumour that we were hustling the Czech Government, there is no truth in it. . . . Our anxiety has been rather that the Czechoslovak Government should be too hasty in dealing with the situation of such delicacy." That also was hardly an accurate representation of the facts, since it was generally known that since March the British pressure on Prague had been persistent. The Prime Minister's peroration was one of optimism-" the atmosphere is lighter ... throughout the continent there is a relaxation of that sense of tension." Hardly were those words spoken when the British Government

* For certain details we are indebted to Miss Grant Duff's admirable Europe and the Czechs (Penguin Books), especially chapter xiv. 21 received the news that extensive military preparations amounting to partial mobilisation were afoot in Germany,

Pro-Fascist Inner Cabinet Takes Charge Mr. Chamberlain's soothing syrup was administered as the rising of the House left full power in the hands of the Inner Cabinet (whose pro-Fascist policy has already been demon­ strated), It may be held that his intention was to induce a feeling of confidence where there was indeed no basis for it. It was certainly interesting that the suggestion of a change of policy in not" hustling" the Czechs should coincide with the sudden desire on the part of the Henleinists to play for time in their "negotiations" with Prague, This in turn was hardly un­ connected with the German mobilisation, and the need to complete it before intransigence was resumed, There was something that stuck in a later editorial phrase in The Times (August 30) when, in a comment on one of Hitler's conventional passes at his British friends, it was said that" British policy is complementary" to that enunciated by Hitler, The key to the situation remained in London, No informed and unprejudiced person doubted that the Henleinists were acting throughout without any intention of achieving an agreed settlement with the Czech Government; and, in accordance with Nazi tactics, every concession made to them was the occasion for the raising of their demands. Refusing conciliatory Czech offers in November, 1936, and rejecting the more specific offer of a new minority policy in February, 1937, they began a storm-trooping campaign of provocation and terror in the Sudeten areas which culminated in the issue bv Henlein of the notorious Eight Points at KarIsbad on April 24th, 1938, The essence of the KarIsbad points lay in the demand for " full self-government" for the Sudeten areas, in terms which meant the erection of a Nazi state within the Czechoslovak Republic, and for the "revision" both of any "aim to make of Czechoslovakia a bulwark against the Germans," and of Czecho­ slovak foreign policy in general, i.e., the breaking ofthe alliances with France and the Soviet Union and the destruction of the.: last democratic barrier to German aggression eastwards. No more need be said of these preposterous demands than that they were of a kind " which no government could accept 22 at the dictation uf a minorirv " (Tbt Times, September 7th;. 1 evertheless they were pur forward to the Czech Government by Henlein as the Sudeten counter to the Czech offer of a new Nationality Statute coupled with wide measures ofadministrative reform. From this point onwards it became evident that the description of Lord Runciman as a" mediator" was a polite way of saying that he was an instrument for applying the Prime Minister's pressurc not to the aggressor but to the victim. It was noticed that Lord Runciman's social activities constantly took him into intimate contact with Sudeten sympathisers. .. The English week-end has been regularly spent hobnobbing with German aristocrats who arc sore with the Czech Govern­ ment because of its land reforms, while he has made the worst impression by being seen on a number of occasions in company with the Princess Hohenlohe, who is reputed to be a favourite emissary of Hitler. He has not accepted Czech invitations ,. (, om' Statesman, September 3rd).

Lord Runciman's pressure induced the Czechs to make, on l\UgUSt 21, a further concession. This was the so-called Third Plan, proposing the division of the country by nationalitie into a series of autonomous cantons or departments somewhat on the Swiss model. Simultaneously the Czech authorities announced the appointment of Sudeten Germans to a series of important official posts in their districts hitherto held by Czechs. Czech feeling was that this represented the limit of concession in the interests of their democracy; but the Henleinist reply was on the basis of alleged " incidents" to issue an inflammatory manifesto on August 26th announcing that their members were free " to act in self-defence when attacked" and to that end to bear arms. Of these convenient" incidents" there was always a crop at every stage, just when it appeared that the Henlein p;rq had no option but to get down to negotiations. These combina­ tions of drunken brawls and provocation were throughout, especially in the German press, " distorted out ofall resemblance to the facts, and some seem to have been invented" (The Til/US, August 30th). . .othing daunted, Lord Runciman encouraged Henlein to make a special trip to Hitler on September 1st, bearing a message from his lordship to which the Fuehrer did not deign to reply. Upon Henlein's return, however, "it became clear that the Sudeten leaders insisted upon complete satisfaction of the 23 eight Karlsbad points" (as 1\.1r. Chamberlain later put it). Accordingly "tremendous pressure "-the phrase is that of ..\1. Bechyne, then Czech Deputy-Premier-was applied on September 3rd by the British Minister and Lord Runciman for the virtual concession ofthe Karlsbad points. They told President Benes that it was" vital" to " go forthwith and unreservedly to the limit of concession." Three davs later the Czech Government therefore produced the Fourth Pl~n which Lord Runciman him­ self thought " embodied almost all the requirements of Karls­ bad," and to which the British and French Governments gave their approval. But at this point a SudetenNazi leader announced that the Karlsbad points were "only the beginning of the settlement. They are not the last demands but only the first that the Sudeten Germans will make."

Cliveden Reveals Its Hand It was at this point, when the! [azis' ! [uremberg congress had just opened, that The Times followed up its previous broad hints with the notorious leading article of September 7th. Despite its editorial statement on August 30th that there was " no excuse for suggesting" that the Sudeten Germans "arc the victims ofintolerable oppression," it now urged the necessity of ceding the Sudeten areas to the Reich. .. It might be worth while for the Czech Government to consider the project which has found favour in some quarters, of making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous State by the secession of that fringe of alien populations who are contiguous to the nation with which they are united by race." This leading article dropped on Europe like a bombshell. For this proposal went beyond the open demands voiced by Henlein and Hitler. The Foreign Office was constrained to issue a denial that the statement represented the policy of the British Govern­ ment-a denial that reads ironically enough to-day. Actually there was no cessation of the British pressure, although the Czech government and people made it quite clear that it was impossible for them to concede more than the Fourth Plan, which, in the view of many, had already gone far beyond the safe limit of concession. On the eve of Hitler's final Nurem­ berg speech, it was openly stated that the British government considered the Fourth Plan still open to modification (The Times, September 12th). Encouraged by the British attitude, the 24 Henleinists "very much exaggerated "-according to Mr. Chamberlain-another "incident" at Moravska Ostrava "in order to provide an excuse for the suspension, if not for the breaking off, of negotiations,"* and when the Czechs took action to satisfy the Sudeten outcry, still further " incidents" at Eger, on September 11th, were" provoked and instigated."* Everyone knew, of course, that the Henleinists "were playing under orders for time" holding off for the climax of Hitler's concluding speech at Nuremberg, a "manoeuvre" by which " Germany's reponsibility is increased" (The Times, September 8th). Democratic opinion throughout the world was growing alarmed as the object of the manoeuvres became apparent. The British Labour Movement gave expression to this fear in a manifesto drawn up by the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, and the executives of the Labour Party and Parlia­ mentary Labour Party, which was carried by an overwhelming majority at the Trades Union Congress on September 8th. " Every consideration of democracy forbids the dism emberment of the Czechslovakian State by the subjection of the Sudeten-German regions to Nazi Government control. British Labour emphatically repudiates the right of the British or any other Government to use diplomatic or other pressure to compel an acceptance of such a humiliation . ... The British Government must leave no doubt in the mind of the German Government that they will unite with the French and Soviet Governments to resist any attack upon Czecho­ slovakia.... Whatever the risk. involved, Great Britain must make its stand against aggression." The manifesto demanded the recall of Parliament. Twice during the critical days which followed Mr. Attlee pressed this request on the Prime Minister. Each time Mr. Chamberlain refused and on September 20th made the significant statement " to call Parliament together now and to require me to take part in debates while these negotiations are still in progress would make my task impossible." During the week of Congress, British Labour was voicing a feeling which was finding expression in all countries. Even The Times of September 8th admitted, editorially, that world opinion, not only in the great democracies-America in par­ ticular-but also in Poland, Hungary, and even Italy was harden­ ing against Nazi aggression. * The phrases are from Lord Runciman's report. 25 SIGNAL FROM NUREMBERG On Monday, September 12th, Hitler made his anticipated concluding speech at • 'uremberg. To the western democracies his language was insolent and provocative. He charged them, specifically including Britain, with trying to obstruct "settle­ ment" in Czechoslovakia. * He then proceeded, in accordance with common Nazi form, to make a new and higher bid. He now demanded for the Sudetens " the free right of self-determination which every other nation also possesses"; and he bluntly con­ cluded that if they" cannot obtain rights and assistance by them­ selves they can obtain both from us." That speech was a signal. The very moment that Hitler's tinal words came over the radio the Henleinists began a pre­ arranged putsch, giving over the north-western Sudeten districts to mob violence, looting and disorder. .l ext day a special correspondent of the Dairy Telegraph toured the whole of the areas affected and telegraphed from Karlsbad "What I have seen leaves no room for doubt that these were not sporadic disorders, but a concerted attempt at a Henleinist revolution to overthrow Czechoslovak rule here, precisely as was done in Austria last March. The difference is that on the previous occasion the German army marched; on this occasion it did not, although the Henleinists say they expected such action. ... The pre-arranged signal for the outbreak was the conclusion of Hitler's speech." The correspondent witnessed " extraordinary vandalism among the fashionable shops" in Karlsbad and observed in a working-class suburb that of "a great many humble Jewish shops not one seemed to have escaped attack and plunder." The shopkeepers" were in a pitiful state ofpanic." In Eger, where" the destruction was terrible, bands of maraud­ ing Henleinists were looking for further loot." \t the trade union headquarters here the correspondent "saw where Henleinist

• This ironically contrasted with the anxiety of Mr. Chamberlain to limit British "warnings" to Germany to private personal messages to Nazi ministers in order, as he told the House of Commons, on September 28th, to avoid any "representation which might havc been interpreted by the German Government as a public rebutl, as had been the case in regard to our representations on May 21st"­ representations which had, of course, helped to restrain Nazi aggres­ sion. The Fuehrer clearly had no such delicacy about administering , " public rebuff" ro his faithful British friend! 26 bullets from last night were lodged in the wall. I inspected all the wreckage and talked to the plucky trade unionists who had held the storm troopers at bay with walking-sticks and barricades." This outbreak-which in two days had a casualty list of 21 killed and 75 wounded, the majority being Czech officials and isolated gendarmes-was too much for the extreme restraint of the Czech authorities. Stalldrecht, a form of martial law, was proclaimed in the affected areas and armed police reinforcements were sent in. The effect was instantaneous. To quote the Dairy Telegraph correspondent again: in Karlsbad the sight of a lorry load of police with rifles and bayonets "was sufficient to cause the rabble to disperse"; in Eger, with the arrival of similar reinforcements "the storm troopers with their swastika armlets vani shed like magic without being threatened in any way"; finally, " I lay particular emphasis on the fact that the mere sight of a police helmet suffices to restore order, because it is part of the Henleinist propaganda to suggest that the Czech authorities ha e lost all control. This is absolutelv untrue." Indeed the terror and destruction of the Monday ~ight had been encouraged by the fact that, " apparently in accordance with the wishes of forei gn advisers," the Czechs " gave orders that no resistance was to be offered to the rioters." (Dail), TeJel,raph, September 14th). Henlein at once seized on these events as the pretext for formally breaking off negotiations with Prague, and in the evening of September 13th, despatched a six-hour ultimatum to Premier Hodza demanding the withdrawal of martial law, the withdrawal of State police from all Sudeten districts, and the confining of troops to barracks. This impudent ultimatum was very properly ignored by the Czech government; as the Dairy Telegraph wrote in a leading article (September 14th), to surrender to such demands "would be to otter ample warrant for the charge that it could no longer carry out the elementary duty of any government, and to invite the chaos that would furnish an excuse for intervention." A proclamation was then issued by Henlein, duly echoing his master's voice. Hitler's sudden declaration at Nuremberg two days before was now taken up by his Sudeten henchman, who stared that even the Karlsbad eight points were no longer enough and that the situation called for self-determination, with a plebiscite. Upon which Henlein incontinently fled to Germany where, under Hitler's 27 protection, he shortly proceeded to organise a filibustering legion under the title of the Sudeten Freikorps. At this point it became evident that the Henlein leadership of the Sudeten Germans was rapidly weakening. The sudden intransigence following Hitler's changed line, the flight to Germany coupled with the immediate and bloodless restoration of order by the Czechs, was speedily to have its effect. On September 15th, before Henlein was believed to have left Czechoslovakia, a further proclamation was issued in his name from Berlin, carrying the self-determination demand to the final point of a demand for the secession of the Sudeten areas, at the same time declaring that all Sudetens should consider them­ selves absolved from any obligations towards the Czechoslovak State. To this treasonable outburst the Czech government replied by ordering the dissolution of the Sudeten Party and the arrest of those ofits leaders who were known to have incited to revolt. That was on the afternoon of September 16th, and it looked as if the whole Henlein racket was cracking up, for the same evening two of its supposedly more moderate leaders, Herren Kundt and Sebenkowsky, were manoeuvring for a new Sudeten people's party to negotiate an agreement for autonomy. The Sudeten Agrarian and Catholic Parties, who had some time before gone oyer to support of Henlein, now declared that since the" suicide" of the Henlein party by its demand for secession, they would associate with the new grouping in continuing nego­ tiations with the Government on the basis of the Fourth Plan. This potential Sudeten split, following the revelation of Henleinist weakness over the abortive putsch, threatened the whole Hitler plan with fiasco, menacing the Fuehrer's already delicate position. Just at this moment Mr. Chamberlain created a sensation by announcing his intention to fly to visit Hitler at Berchtes­ gaden, which he did on September 15th. Tremendous press publicity was concentrated on the flight and the Premier's enterprise in undertaking it, and this served to divert popular attention from his purpose in seeking the interview. The proposal was received with delight in Berlin, with amazement in Prague. At Berchtesgaden,according to Mr. Chamberlain's account "Herr Hitler made it plain that he had made up his mind that the Sudeten Germans must have the right of self-determination and of returning if they wished to the Reich. If they could not 28 achieve this by their own efforts, he said, he would assist them to do so." The Premier claimed" that my visit alone prevented an invasion, for which everything was ready"; a statement that was hardly in accord with the Henleinist collapse or the information on German troop movements around the frontiers then reaching the British and French general staffs, which understood the German estimate to be that these con­ centrations would not reach completion for a week or ten days (DailY Telegraph, September 14). The Berlin Henleinist proclamation demanding cession of the Sudeten territory had been issued just before the Prime Minister met Hitler at Berchtes­ gaden (a neat arrangement of a fait accompli). And when he returned to London next day he and the Cabinet received a report in person from Lord Runciman that cession of the Sudeten territory was "inevitable" and "it should be done promptly." So that the formal official repudiation of The Times leader of September 7th had survived for but a week.

TRAITORS AT WORK As the week-end of September 17th-18th brought signs of Czech resistance to the Nazi threats. The advocates in France and Britain of capitulation to Hitler redoubled their efforts. In France M. Flandin, former Prime Minister and notorious pro-Nazi, and other politicians connected with big business, brought all their social and political influence to bear on members of the French Cabinet, especially Foreign Minister Bonnet. When the situation was discussed by the French Cabinet, Bonnet concealed from his colleagues vital passages in the report of Chief of Staff General Gamelin, which stated that the French army was "absolutely certain of a victorious war if unhappily it were to occur." Later it came out that Bonnet had " at a particularly critical moment given a wrong conception to the Cabinet of the part Russia would have played had France made up her mind to defend Czechoslovakia" (Manchester Guardian, September 22nd). That is, he suggested that the Soviet Union would not support France. The trickery had its effect. The French Cabinet, losing their heads and unable to take any decision, placed the fate of Czechoslovakia in the charge of Mr. Chamberlain, who seized the opportunity with both hands. 29 In England, M. Bonnet's fairy tales were repeated and ex­ aggerated. Fantastic stories of the "weakness" of the Red Air Force were spread about to stampede those who wanted resist­ ance to Hitler. These stories were given currency by Colonel Lindbergh, who had then just visited the Soviet Union, and who has since been decorated with the highest German order at the personal request of the Fuehrer himself. The stage thus set, on Sunday, September 18th, the British Cabinet reached agreement with MM. Daladier and Bonnet on the "Anglo-French plan." This conceded to Germany the following key points: (1) Transfer to Germany of areas with over 50 per cent Sudeten inhabitants. (2) The renunciation of the Franco-Czech and Czech-Soviet Treaties, to be replaced by an unspecified " international guarantee" of the independence of Czechoslovakia. In these fateful discussions the report of Lord Runciman was used with terrific effect on the wavering M. Daladier. The " mediator" had come right down on the side of Henlein and Hitler by advocating the ceding of territory. His written report (White Paper Cmd. 5847) dropped a strong hint that the Czechs should suppress all anti-Fascist forces­ " those parties and persons in Czechoslovakia who have been deliberately encouraging a policy antagonistic to Czecho­ slovakia's neighbours should be forbidden to continue their agitations" and recommended that they should accede to Hitler's demand for the breaking of their pact with the Soviet Union. These recommendations read like a curious paradox when set against Lord Runciman's own findings in the self-same report. He clearly established the facts that self-determination was not the issue in August (it had only been made so by Hitler's Nuremberg speech), that the Sudeten disorders were provoked by the Henleinists, and that the Czech government bore no responsibility for the final break, which rested on the Henlein leaders and their supporters" outside the country." But in spite of his advocacy of "self-determination" Lord Runciman opposed a plebiscite, claiming that this would be "sheer formality. A very large majority of the inhabitants desire amalgamation with Germany." This categorical conclusion had no foundation in fact whatever. No sooner was the cession of 30 the Sudeten areas accomplished than authoritative observers on the spot transmitted reports sugge~ting the soundness of the opinion expressed by Lord Lloyd In the House of Lords on October 4th-that an absolutely just plebiscite would, in the view of experts, show that 75 or 80 per cent of the Sudeten Germans would vastly prefer autonomous treatment within the Czech state than to be outside. It will suffice to cite two such observers, the special correspondents of The Times and the Daily Telegraph. "Here in the twin towns of Tetschen-Bodenbach people have been waiting silently in groups in the streets all day. They arc by no means all joyful at the prospect of being suddenly included in the German Reich. Those to whom I talked-men and women of all classes-seemed bewildered, almost stunned, at the sudden turn of events. 'W'e shouted and worked for local autonomy; we did not expect this. It has been done over our heads. Last night we went to sleep in Czechoslovakia: to-day we wake up to find ourselves in Germany.' "-The Times (October 3rd.) " Everywhere it is mainly youth that is showing excitement or even interest. I have talked to scores of married people in the Sudeten areas-business people, tradesmen, artisans-and their main feeling is one of bewilderment and uneasiness. It was repeated to me many times: '\X'e never expected this. We do not know what to do. \"'hat will happen to our business and our money-all closely bound to Prague. Arc we to eat German bread? We thought of autonomy. not of this.' "-Tbl Times (October 4th.) .. In Bruex I met a big manufacturer who said: 'I am a good German patriot and voted for Henlcin, But like all those, except the wild youths, who voted for him, we gave him a mandate only to secure our autonomy, to give the German language full equality with that of the Czechs in all branches of public life and to open the way to fuller state employment. Never was the question ofour annexa­ tion by Germany put before us and we would never have voted for it. In all the confidential conferences of German industrialists, where we considered the possibility of new developments in the state, we never considered for a moment the possibility of the destruction of our thousand years common life with the Czechoslovaks.''' " A German reservist in Czechoslovak uniform said ' .•• I have often worked across the frontier in Germany and know well how untrue is the glowing picture painted by the Henleinists of conditions for the workers over there. Above all, no one is free to open his mouth, as we always have been under the Czechs. I and my family all voted for Henlein at the last election because we believed he would help us to get more employment. But never did we want to be torn away from the Republic.''' -Daily TIl,graph (October 3ed).

31 The Telegraph correspondent concluded: "Everywhere I heard the same story except from a few half-grown lads in Dux. Not one of those to whom 1 spoke, quite at random, were Jews. All feared and did not want the ." Lord Runciman presumably based his recommendations on a complete acceptance of the views of such" half-grown lads." Their value can be estimated from their remarks to the Daily Telegraph corres­ pondent; thus one rejoiced at winning" freedom" from the Jews who had" sold us into Czech slavery." "When I reminded him that for a thousand years Czechs and Germans had lived together in this area without intervention of the Jews, he and his friends looked puzzled. They said: ' Anyway, the Jews were responsible for it all. You can hear it any day on the Berlin and Leipzig radio.' " * * * Such were the merits of the" case" for the Anglo-French Plan's amazing surrender to Hitler-and at such a moment. Democratic opinion was outraged. On Monday, September 19th, the National Council of Labour issued a statement "viewing with dismay proposals for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia with the brutal threat of armed force and without prior consulta­ tion with the Czechoslovakian Government." The statement characterised the proposals as a " shameful betrayal of a peaceful and democratic people." In France indignation ran even higher. Pertinax wrote in l'Ordre that Britain and France had endured "diplomatic defeat unprecedented in history," adding that" a terrible lesson has just been inflicted on the two \,'estern democracies.... If they do not appreciate this, and that quickly, their downfall will come inevitably." American comment was pungent. ., This is the end of the whole system of security built up in the post-war treaties," declared the .Vew York Times, " because a demonstration will have been given that force alone is the determining factor in the relationship between nations"; such a solution, the same paper added the following day, " is bound to spread war instead of peace." The New 'o rk Post and the Herald Tribune wrote in a similar tone. Dominion views were also bitter. In Australia the Sydney i1lorning Herald wrote "The strategical effect of the partition 32 means that Hitler has been handed the fruits of a successful war without tiring a shot. The backbone of Central Europe has been handed over to him. Germany will attain almost complete self­ sufficiency, at present unattainable ... aggressive Hitlerism henceforth will dominate Europe, with Britain and France sheltering in dwindling importance behind the Maginot line. i '0 nation henceforth will trust alliances. The small powers will compete for Hitler's favours." In South Africa the Rand DailY ii/ail commented: "Great Britain apparently proposes to dis­ regard her obligations, presumably from motives ofconvenience. Surrender is no policy for dealing with dictators." The Cape Arglls anticipated "calamitous consequences" from the plan and added, "A stand before things have gone too far, before there becomes rooted in the dictator a conviction that he is divinely appointed to rule the world, would mean peace; a stand made later, when further passes have been sold, would mean war."

Franco Praises Chamberlain In this chorus of criticism there was, however,. one note­ worthy voice of praise. An official communique issued after a Cabinet meeting at General Franco's headquarters in Saragossa stated that the Franco" Government" " registers satisfaction at the serene attitude of the Duce and the Fuehrer, and also that of the British Premier." j\ suggestive trinityI The Czechs, stunned by this deciding of the case against them, in their absence, by their bound ally and supposed friend, not unnaturally asked for time to consider demands of such gravity. They invoked the German-Czech Arbitration Conven­ tion of 1925. Although Mr. Chamberlain himself had previously told the House of Commons that this Arbitration Convention would always be borne in mind, the British and French ministers in Prague were at once instructed to exert the severest pressure on the Czech Cabinet to secure their immediate and unconditional acceptance. The French Minister, M. Delacroix, was instructed by Foreign Minister Bonnet, " on his own initiative and certainly without consulting the whole Cabinet" (News Chronic/e, September 22nd), to deliver a virtual ultimatum "on behalf of the French Government, that if the French-British proposals were rejected this country would take no active step to tie Herr Hitler's hands" (The Times, September 22nd). As to the British

33 Minister, Mr. 'ewton," there is no doubt that he acted in agreement with the French" (Nm's Chronicle, September 22nd). So great was the anger in Paris over this astonishing procedure that half a dozen ministers were on the point of resigning. So peremptory was the British and French attitude that President Benes was summoned from his bed at 2 a.m. to receive the British and French ministers. The Czech Cabinet met immediately. "Even after the diplomatic visits and while the all-night sitting was in progress pressure was applied bv telephone calls" (Dail), Telegraph, September 22nd). Itwas reliably stated that the points of the Anglo-French ultimatum were, among others, that if Czechoslovakia refused the terms "she would be branded as responsible for all consequences which might follow," that if" war resulted, France gave notice in advance she would not fulfil her obligations" and finally " Great Britain would not be responsible for any of the conse­ quences of Czechoslovakia's refusal to accept" (Dail;' Telegraph, September 22nd). It is not surprising that a hard-headed Tory like Lord Lloyd should later tell the House of Lords that this ultimatum was applied in a manner "almost third degree," adding that" if the language was anything like what had been reported he would hang his head in shame." Meantime, on September 20th, Hitler had received Hun­ garian and Polish representatives at Berchtesgaden, arranging with them that they should press their demands for Southern Slovakia and Teschen respectively. This they did the following day, so that Britain and France were able to present a further ultimatum to the Czechs on the grounds that" they were now faced with a united front of Germany, Hungary and Poland. These powers, it was stated, threatened immediate invasion if there were any further delay in acceptance. The President and the Premier were, it is reported, even told that anything short of unconditional acceptance of the London terms would result in the full partition of Czech?slovakia and its disappearance from the map of Europe." (Dai(J' Telegraph, September 22nd). During the morning and afternoon of Wednesday, September 21st, there came a rally in favour of resistance. But eventually at 3 p.m. " in response to the continued pressure from Britain and France, a Note was despatched accepting the London proposals as a basis for negotiation, subject to the consent of Parliament." And then (Oh, Democracyl) " at four p.m. came fresh pressure 3<4 (rom the French and British governments insisting that the consent of Parliament should not be asked" (DailY Telegraph, September 22nd). The Czech Cabinet capitulated to what they themselves described as " unbelievable pressure." On September 21st, on the eve of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Godesberg, the three executives of the Labour Movement issued a further statement condemning in the most forthright terms the" shameful surrender to the threats of Herr Hitler." " \\'ith every surrender to violence, peace recedes. If var is to be averted and civilization saved, the peace-loving nations must make an immediate and concerted effort to restore the rule of law." That evening Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden, and Sir Archibald Sinclair all went on record deploring the Government's policy of surrender. So that Thursday Me. Chamberlain hastened off to his second meeting with Hitler, bearing news of the surrender that he and his French friends had forced upon the Czechs. But the Czech people, led by the working class, had a word or two to say; and the Nazis were not at the end of their hand either. On the \\Tednesday evening, news of the surrender brought what the Prague correspondent of the DailY Telegraph described as " a great national and patriotic upheaval ... carried out with rare and touching dignity." On top of this spontaneous demon­ stration a leaflet was widely circulated calling on the citizens and the Republic to hold fast, signed by many influential M.P.s of all parties, secretaries of trade unions and leaders of cultural and economic bodies. This leaflet said: "The die is not yet cast. Czechoslovak democracy has not capitulated because a people does not capitulate. The Government is not the nation. We have not lost a single rifle, a single gun, aero­ plane, or any of our fortifications. On the contrary, we have gained enormous strength in the resolution of the people now formed, never to yield to the Nazis. Away with capitulators, the friends of the Nazis, the internal enemies of our Republic! The democrats of the whole world will stand by those who fight for truth, for honour and for their own possessions. Wle will show the world our readi ­ ness to defend ourselves. " Parliament alone has the right to decide the fate of the Republic. We demand the immediate summoning of Parliament, which will refuse the shameful surrender. " Long live the Czechoslovak Republic, its splendid loyal Army, and the Army's commander and founder, President Edouard Benes I 35 "Firm stands the President, firm stands the Anny and firm stands the nation I Do not be silenced by anything or anybody; do not believe a word uttered by the capitulators. Raise your voices against them and sweep them away I " Next morning a general strike against capitulation broke out at all the big factories. "Bearing the national colours the workers marched into Prague in disciplined columns" and the announcement of the Hodza Government's resignation "was made to an enormous crowd of 250,000 patriotic demonstrators who had gathered outside the Parliament buildings to demand a new cabinet . . . the scene of enthusiasm that ensued was in­ describable. There have been no such demonstrations in the Republic's history since those which accompanied the restoration of national liberty in 1918" (Daily Telegraph, September 23rd). Hitler Terrorists At Work For their part the Nazis, having now organised the so-called Sudeten Freikorps, which began to carry out provocative raids across the frontier into Czech territory, developed a press campaign of lies and abuse almost without precedent. The new Czech Government were described as " deputies of Stalin," the Premier General Sirovy as " a Siberian robber chief," President Benes as a " murderer and a monstrous liar." W'ild "atrocity" stories were poured out by the column, it being alleged that Sudeten Germans were being terrorised in the frontier districts by" Hussite mobs" and " a brutal Czech soldiery." From Godesberg Mr. Chamberlain sent a communication to Prague appealing for the avoidance of incidents. "It would appear," wrote the Prague correspondent of the Daily Telegraph (September 24th) " that Mr. Chamberlain is not aware that the recent skirmishes were not incidents between Czech and German citizens of this Republic, but were deliberately launched from German soil." "Every German account ofthe frontier incidents is refuted by eye-witnesses here," reported The Times from Prague on September 22nd, the fact being that" storm troopers who were masquerading as Sudeten Germans had come over the frontier at several points and what terror there was was their work-in one town alone, Graslitz, over 200 men were kidnapped, having been chosen from picked lists and taken over the frontier in lorries" (The Times, September 24th). There was method in this madness. The Berlin corres­ pondent of the Daify Telegraph reported on September 23rd that 36 " when the German army marches ... the world will be told that Herr Hitler is once more saving Europe from Bolshevism. These are the well-tried Nazi tactics, and it is known that Dr. Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, told German newspaper editors last week that Germany would use the same methods in the case of Czechoslovakia as she did in Austria last March." Accordingly Hitler bid up his hand and presented the Prime Minister with the famous Godesberg ultimatum. This demanded that areas much larger than the Sudeten districts proper should immediately be occupied by German troops, and that no fortifications, arms or goods should be destroyed or taken out of the areas before they were handed over. The Czechs rejected the intolerable terms, which they described as an " ultimatum of the sort usually presented to a vanquished nation and not a proposition to a sovereign state which has shown the greatest possible readiness to make sacri­ fices for the appeasement of Europe." The Czech Note added, its expressions grimly prophetic of the final Munich terms and their working out in practice: " The proposals go far beyond what we agreed to in the so-called Anglo-French plan. They deprive us of every safeguard for our national existence. We are to yield up large portions of our carefully prepared defences and admit the German armies deep into our country before we have been able to organise it on the new basis or make any preparations for its defence. Our national and economic independence would automatically disappear with the acceptance of Herr Hitler's plan. The whole process of moving the population is to be reduced to panic flight on the part of those who will not accept the German Nazi regime." "\Ve rely upon the two great Western democracies, whose wishes we have followed much against our own judgement, to stand by us in our hour of trial." While the Prime Minister was stilI at Godesberg, the Czech Government was officially informed that "the French and British Governments cannot continue to take the responsibility of advising them not to mobilise." The Czech mobilisation was carried out with record efficiency and the frontier fortifications manned. From Prague the special correspondent of The Times (September 26th), sent this dispatch: " No one who was there to see could ever forget the quietness and dignity with which the Czechoslovak nation took up their arms on Friday night. At ten minutes to the hour the city seemed as usual; the Wenceslas Square seemed as bright and as busy as the Haymarket. 37 Then came the sudden warning from the loudspeakers; the call to the Colours of most classes of men under 40; the appeal for steady nerves. .. There was a long shout of approval from the crowd, and a sudden stirring in the traffic. In ten minutes the whole face of the streets was changed. The traffic had mainly disappeared; the taxicab drivers had gone immediately to report with their machines. Private cars had been requisitioned. The streets darkened suddenly as the crowds, stretching from wall to wall, pushed along quickly and quietly where a few minutes ago had been the bright stream of traffic. The only vehicles were lorry loads of troops in khaki or of reservists still in mufti; each was cheered wildly as they pushed ahead. Then came the private cars and the taxis, again filled with soldiers, again cheered. Then came tramcars, soldiers standing inside and out. .. The crowds never wavered. They were excited, but disciplined, resolute. Each one had his job to do, and they were going to do it. , At last it has come,' they shouted to each other. 'It's war,' they said. 'Now we shall show them.' '\Xtell, it had to come.' "

THE WORLD PROTEST By that week-end, September 24th-25th, the forces of democracy were rallying everywhere to resit Nazi aggression. Meetings organised throughout the length and breadth of Britain by the National Council of Labour, reached a grand total of 2,500. Editorials, and columns upon columns of indignant letters from readers, in newspapers ranging from the Conservative DailY Telegraph and Yorkshire Post to the Liberal Nanchester Guardian and News Chronicle, not excluding the suburban Dai!J' Mirror, testified to the solidarity of all democratic forces in Britain before the Hitler menace. Even The Times, sensitive to the public feeling, opened its columns to letters such as that from Mr. L. S. Amery, Tory imperialist M.P., demanding that at last we " stand up to a bully." At Geneva the Soviet Union, through 1\1. Litvinov, had once again repeated her pledges to Czechoslovakia and for the first time a British cabinet representative, Lord de la \Varr, discussed the situation with the Soviet Foreign Commissar. There was still, however, no response to the Soviet invitation to the necessary military consultations, and in London no contact between Lord Halifax and the Soviet Ambassador until the very day of the final betrayal. 38 The new hardening in the democratic position effectively scotched the German-inspired menaces from Poland and Hungary which had been used to secure the initial Czech capitulation. The Polish bluff was called by the presentation of a sharp Soviet note threatening immediate denunciation of the Poles' 'on-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. if they attempted to take Teschen. Czechoslovakia's partners in the Little Entente, Roumania and Jugoslavia, signified their readiness to carry out their obligations to the Czechs if Hungary marched. Telegraphed appeals from President Roosevelt to the principal powers con­ cerned, and later to Hitler alone, were a further important sign of the mobilising of world opinion. In France the friends of Hitler were on the run bv the Friday. Next day came the beginning of mobilisation, with the recall of reservists which, the Paris correspondent of The Times reported on September 26th, "has been obeyed in a spirit of calm determination, far more impressive than the ignorant ebullience of 1914 ... nowhere was there any sign of flinching from an expected necessity." In this new atmosphere of determination the world awaited Herr Hitler's speech at the Sports Palace in Berlin on the evening of Monday, September 26th. That speech continued the violent attacks on President Benes, declaring that the Godesberg Memorandum was simply the "practical" execution of the Anglo-French plan and bawling" so far as the Sudeten German problem is concerned my patience is at an end." At the same time Hitler proclaimed that it was the \'{Testern democracies which " are the most sanguinary warmongers," turning to intervene in British internal affairs with the remark "let us all hope that those who are of the same mind [as the Nazis] will gain the upper hand among the British people." Mr. Chamberlain's immediate reaction to this insolent and provocative speech-delivered immediately after Sir Horace \Vilson had been specially despatched to Berlin to beg the Fuehrer not to make things too hard for the Prime Minister­ was to declare that the British Government was "morally responsible" for seeing that the Anglo-French plan was "carried out with all reasonable promptitude" (The Times, September 27th). After the event there seems something strangely ironical about the issue, at the same time as Hitler's speech, ofan authori- 39 tatrve statement through the Foreign Office that if "a German attack is made upon Czechoslovakia the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance, and Britain and Russia lJlill certainty stand b;' France." This was the first time that a British official statement had made any reference to united action between the three great democratic Powers. And even at this stage the declaration was merely formal, as was shown by the subsequent official Soviet statement (October 5th) that "no consultations and especially no agreements between the Govern­ ments of the U.S.S.R., France and Great Britain in regard to the fate of the Czechoslovak Republic and concessions to the aggressor have taken place. Neither France nor the United Kingdom had consultations with the U.S.S.R. and only informed the Soviet Government regarding accomplished facts." Independent authorities have since stressed this last point as of key importance for the understanding of the realities under­ lying Mr. Chamberlain's policy. Demonstrating that " an un­ ambiguous stand" by Britain, France and Russia, could have secured an honourable settlement, Mr. J. 1\1. Keynes, the historic critic of the Versailles Treaty, has pointed out that" such a stand has been consistently refused." " The Prime Minister was never preparing for the actuality of war. The total omission of any reference even to the possibility of military action by this country in the correspondence published in the White Paper, the avoidance of conversations with Russia, the reluctance and extraordinary delay in ordering the mobilisation of the Flcet* are not consistent with any other explanation. Neither the Prime Minister nor Herr Hitler ever intended for one moment that the play-acting should devolve into reality." "The actual course of events," Mr. Keynes added, "has been dictated by the fact that the objectives of Herr Hitler and Mr. Chamberlain were not different, but the same." The same point was independently made by Mr. Robert Dell, outstanding foreign affairs expert, who wrote from Geneva to the Nen: StatCSl/latl (October 8th), reporting the views of three eminent diplomats. These gentlemen all pointed to " the refusal of the British and French Governments to agree to military conversations with Russia, although on their own

•A point stressed by Mr. Duff Cooper, who resigned from the Admiralty in protest against what he called the policy of surrender to Naz i .• bluff. bluster and blackmail." 40 showing Russia would be their ally in the event oi war. That refusal continued even when the British and Fr ench Govern­ ments had begun making war preparations. It would have been impossible had those preparations been meant seriously. It is now clear that the y were not." 1\1r. Dell concluded:- .. Is it not clear that th e Briti sh and French publics have been the victims of ano ther ramp of th e same character as the famous Abvssinian ramp in 1935 ? The British and French military prepara­ tion s were an extremely expensive srage -s-scr with the twofold purpose oi frightening the British and French peoples into capitulating to the G odesberg ultimatum and oi enabling Chamberlain, Daladier and Bonnet to pose as the men who saved Europe irom war." Yet though the British Government had no real intention of going to war, nervous tension approaching panic was bcing spread throughout the country. On the Saturday notices that gas masks were being given out were posted, flashed on cinema screens. There was a ru sh for the cheap, ill-fitting masks. \'\'holesale digging of trenches began in available parks and squares, often without estimates, always at great expense. As the technical paper illllnicipal Engineering wrote the week after, " Can anyone with a proper knowledge of the facts seriously advocate these earth holes as protection against enemy bombing? They were bad substitutes for the shelters which should have been dug long ago." Profiteers Reap Their Harvest London provided trench accommodation for 6 per cent of the population (providing that two millions were evacuated). Battersea (allowing for wholesale evacuation) had 4 per cent, Manchester had six. Profiteering began immediately. Pick­ axes went up from 3s. to lOs. Spades from 2s. 6d. to T». 6d. Seaside sand from 6s. 6d. to 8s. 6d. a ton. Sandbags from ltd. to lOd. Timber from £15 to £23 per standard. Corrugated iron from £18 to £24 a ton. Perhaps the most ironic of all the Government instructions was to those with children too young to wear gas masks, to .. wrap the child completely in a blanket and run to the nearest gas proofshelter." For most families there were not even trenches within easy reach: the only shelters were a few private ones. The obvious inadequacy of the Government's A.R.P. arrange­ ments only served to frighten people more. 41 In this state of affairs Mr. Chamberlain gave his solemn broadcast on Tuesday night, September 27th, Playing on the fears of his hearers, he declaimed: "How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."> He then declared " I see nothing further I can usefully do in the way of mediation," and thus succeeded in leaving on the minds of his tens of millions of hearers the impression that there was the gravest possibility of war and that he alone stood between them and it. Within five hours Mr. Chamberlain was carrying mediation to the point of final betrayal. Next day, September 28th, he told the House of Commons (at last recalled) that in the small hours of that \'ery morning he had received a further com­ munication from Hitler, to which he replied with the following personal message-" I feel certain that you can get all essentials without war and without delay. I am ready to come to Berlin myself at once to discuss arrangements for transfers with you and representatives of the Czech Government, together with representatives of France and Italy if you desire." At the same time Mr. Chamberlain sent a second personal message to Musso­ lini, hoping that he would be willing to be represented at such a conference, and stating bluntly" I have already guaranteed that Czech promises shall be carried out." It is clear, therefore, that it was Mr. Chamberlain who initiated the four-power conference, formally summoned by Hitler to meet in Munich the next day. It is clear also that this conference had merely to register th~ capitulation conveyed in the opening sentence of the Prime Minister's final message to Hitler. What Mr. Chamberlain had not told the House of Commons was that the previous day the sinister M. Bonnet had instructed the French Ambassador in Berlin to propose to Hitler an extension of the Anglo-French plan to accord with the Godesberg ultimatum. Mr. Robert Dell avers in the com­ munication quoted above that Mr. Chamberlain "must have known" these facts; and he adds that "without any doubt

• The same line was taken in a propaganda leaflet widely circulated in France by Nazi agents, which began "\X'hat is Czechoslovakia? You do not know." Curiously enough, this leaflet bore the name of a Hamburg printing firm. 42 ~1. Bonnet was working with M. Flandin and the other ad ocate; of the abandonment of Czechoslovakia.* The agreement reached between Mr. Chamberlain, Hitler, Mussolini and M. Daladier on September 29th at Munich­ based, according to Mr. Chamberlain himself, on ~ memorandum prepared in advance by the Duce .and Count Ciano, who had incidentally spent some hours with the Fuehrer before the arrival of the British and French Prime Ministers-simply put into practical terms the Godesberg ?emands. German occ,:pa­ tion of the Sudeten areas was to begin on October l st, as Hitler had demanded; but instead of the absurd bluff of a general occupation of these areas on one day, there was substituted a practicable programme of military occupation extending in all over ten days. All Czech" installations" (including industrial plants and fortifications) were to be left intact under penalty. All the detailed questions of evacuation, fixing of frontiers, determination of areas for plebiscites, transfer of populations, were handed over in general terms to an international commis­ sion on which a Czech representative was allowed to sit side by side with the four partitioning Powers. The French and British governments repeated the Anglo-French Plan mumbo-jumbo ofa " guarantee" for the "new boundaries of the Czechoslovak state," which Germany and Italy cynically offered to join" when the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities has been settled," in other words, when dismemberment was complete. " The Czech representatives were not consulted at any stage in the proceedings" wrote the 1 eu: Slalesmafl on October 8th, "they waited with their maps while their enemies and their false friends divided up Czechoslovakia, on the basis of old maps provided by Hitler, Finally, they were given a two hours' ultimatum for Dr. Benes and told to take the details of the Munich' settlement' as fast as possible to Prague." The Czech Government briefly announced that they "found no other

• It m~y be added here that 1\1. Flandin, openly described in the French democratic press as an agent of Hitler and a traitor to his country, telegraphed congrarulations to Herr Hitler after the Munich Con­ ference. This action "has aroused astonished resentment in every sphere of political opinion" (The Times, Octoher 5th). And in reply the Fuehrer telegraphed to his French accomplice .. I offer you my grateful sentiments for your energetic efforts.... I have followed them with sincere interest and I hope they will have wider consequences.., 43 means but to acc"pt" these decisions "

Dictators' Power was Tottering The fact was that the internal position of both Fascist dictators had been extremely difficult. The Rome correspon­ dent of The Times (September 26th) reported that "Signor Bocchini, the chief of police, lately drafted a confidential report ior Signor Mussolini on the very definite anti-German swing which has taken place in Italian public opinion, especially in the North, since the .Anscblnss," The correspondent commented on the cryptic nature of the Duce's speeches that week-end:- " He is clearly trying to cope with a state of mind, among part of the Italian people, at any rate, which views war with reluctance, especially a war in Germany's cause. Enthusiastic shouts which have greeted his speeches in all the towns visited come largely from children and young men of the Fascist formations. They do not represent the feelings of the older and more thoughtful people. The Duce is now evidently compelled to take the moral of this part of the population into account." Meanwhile the position of the Fuehrer was developing irom the difficult into the critical stage. The opposition, not only among the working class, had been gaining new strength. 46 The political corr<.:spond<.:nt of the Neus Chronicle (September 28th) noted that " s <.: n~ r a l ~\'~~ks ago it was known to t~e British govern ment that the pO ;,slb.ill~Y .of war had a~oused ~I,scont<.:nt in c<.:rLlin German areas . Claiming after MUnich that Europe had been saved from "\rmag<.:don " J\1r. Chamberlain himself solemnly read to the House of Commons on October 6th a letter from a German professor saying " Never again! That is the main idea not only among the professors but also among the ,mdents who did not share the experiences of 1914 and who heard noth ing about it. That is the idea of the rich and of the poor. It is even wh at the army thinks. As an officer of the Reserve I know what I am spea king about." This, said the Prime Minister, was" typical of the feeling of Germany." It is generally testified, too, by such varied so urces as the lV m's Chronicle and Erening. lV elN among others, that the mass marches oi troops through Berlin on the evening of Tuesday, September 27th, met with not a cheer but with glum and brooding silence on the part of the population. And after Munich? Let the Berlin correspondent of the f)dily Telegraph (O ctober 3rd) speak-" There can be no doubt that the result ofthe Munich conference has enormously strength­ ened Herr Hitler's hold on his own people. For the past few week s the morale of the German nation as a whole had been growing steadily worse, and more open grumbling was heard than at any time since the Nazi Party gained power. Now all this has been silenced by a resounding success." Mr. Chamberlain's capitulation delivered over the Sudeten districts to L 'azi terror-concentration camps, beatings, shoot­ ings, Storm Troopers running amok. On October 6th the lV erN Chronicle reported the setting up of the first concentration camp at Bodenbach, in the former castle of Count Thun. " It is reported that firing can be heard night and day from the Castle where, as soon as Czech troops left the district, armed F.S. men (Henleinists) provided with typed lists of all Social-Democrat members came and collected persons whom the Czechs had ordered to stay to vote in case of a plebiscite. Democrats have been dragged from their flats and houses, and even torn from motor cars on the bridge leading to Czech oslovakia, and their fate after that is unknown save for the sinister sounds of continual firing from the castle." The Prague correspondent of the Daily Telegraph (October -lth) reported grimly that the fate of the anti-Nazis "can be imagined from the fact that it has now been discovered that the 47 head of the Police Registration Bureau, Herr Kolbeck, a , .azi, has for years been preparing a black list of social democrats, Czechs, Communists and Jews, ready for the day of vengeance." Heartrending stories poured in of refugees being turned back by the desperate Czech authorities, of a wave of suicides like those in Austria after the Anschluss. The [azis, declaring that Germany is " not prepared to renounce its claims to any Ger­ man," peremptorily demanded the return of Sudeten Socialist and Communist refugees. That their motive was simply sadistic vengeance was evident from a broadcast by Henlein in which he declared that his political opponents would receive no mercy. "\\'e shall imprison them," he proclaimed, "until they turn black. All those who fled and have been subsequently returned will be treated in the same way."

Upon Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier rests responsibility for these horrors; in the dispatch last quoted the Prague corres­ pondent of the DailY Telegraph said "so far as is known, the refusal of the French and British delegations even to see Dr. Mastny, the Czech Minister in Berlin, before decisions were taken has resulted in no provision whatever having been made at Munich for the 300,000 to 500,000 inhabitants of the Sudeten areas who have every reason to dread the coming of the Nazis."

Simultaneously the increased German pressure forced the resignation on October 5th of President Benes and the recon­ struction of the Czech Cabinet in a pro-Fascist direction. The new Czech Foreign Minister, 1\1. Chwalkowsky, member of the most reactionary and Germanophile section of the reactionary Agrarian party, was a diplomat whose career had been divided between Rome, Berlin and Tokyo, and who had constantly expressed his opposition to the Benes policy of co-operating with the \X'estern democracies and the Soviet Union. Another striking appointment was that of Herr Feierabend as Minister of Agriculture, also a Germanophile, a sympathiser with the Henlein movement and a frequent visitor to Berlin. Shortly . after the formation of this new Government the Communist Party was banned in the Czech State, while the first act of the new autonomous Government of Slovakia had alreadv made "Communist activity" illegal and had encouraged and­ Sernitism. Moves for ending the independence of the trade unions and their Fascist transformation were reported. 48 o wonder the Berlin .V achtatlsgabe editorially expressed the opinion " which is generally held here, that the policy of the new Czechoslovak government will be directed against Soviet Russia and tow ards Germany rather than the other way about, as has hitherto been the case, and speaks of a ' new outpost against Mo scow ' "(Berlin correspondent of The Times, October -th.) Might it only be against the Soviet Union? The revulsion of feeling in Czech goverlll:nent circles mean.t t?at for some" it is no longer Ge rmany but France and Britain who are held responsible for the country's ruin," according to the Prague corresponden t of the DaiO' Telegrapb (October 4th) who further reported a bitter comment by a Czech officer. "The Germans (thi s officer said) are doing everything to ensure that the fighting powers of the Czechoslovak army remain unimpaired. Perhaps they think th at the Czechoslovak army may one day be of use to them in helping to secure the liberation of the German minority in Poland or in Alsace-Lorraine." On top of the political defeat of the \X'estcrn democracies in Central and Ea stern Europe, there were immediate signs of equi valent economic setback. Hot on the heels of Munich carne the announcement that Germany's new trade drive in South­ Eastern Europe was making substantial strides. Discussions in Belgrade opened by Dr. Funk, German Minister for Economics, have led to the drafting of a new German-Jugoslav Trade T reaty ofa mo st comprehensive kind. It appears that this Treaty will in effect make Jugoslavia a colony for German capital and, as Dr. Funk aptly said, economic policy could not be separated from general political policy. This represents a particular set­ back for France, the traditional financier of Jugoslavia. In addition Dr. Funk is extending his efforts throughout the Balkan States and has even reached the point ofconcluding with Turkey, Britain's special sphere of concern, arrangements for special credits totalling £12,500,000. On October 17th, Dr. Funk pro­ claimed that Jugo slavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, "politically friendly as the y are, form a kind ofBalkan axis reaching from the German frontier to the Black Sea." He added that the Economic Ministers of all three countries had accepted invitations for early visits to Berlin. 49 British Export Trade .Ifell

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