"PEACE FOR OUR TIME" Mr Chamberlain & Munich: the Truth about a Policy by ALLEN HUTT Lab 0 u r GORDON SCHAFFER Research GEORGE DARLING Department SIXPENCE "PEACE FOR .OUR TIME" MR. CHAMBERLAIN AND MUNICH: THE TRUTH ABOUT A POLICY By ALLEN HUTT GORDO SCHAFFER GEORGE DARLING Issued by 'HiE LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT PREFATORY NOTE iV September 30th, l~fr. Chamberlain came back from lWlmich Q with the proud boast that he had seatred "peace for our time." l'Vithin a very few days the reaction of sudden relief had passed and the nation turned to examine the" peace" more close!;'. Doubts and criticisms came not on!;' from Socialists and malcontents, not ontJfrom peace organisations and Liberal bodies, bu: from mall)' infinentia] Conservatives. And soon the Premier himself was admilling that " peacefor our time" was something of an orersratement made in the momentary flllsh of acbieuement. I t is certain!;' a strange peare; a peacewhich, as all Mr. Chamber­ lain's sllpporters agree, means rearmament at a more desperate rate than ever before; a peace which requires the conscription of our people and the restriction ofour democratic rights. In our belief this peace doesnot even deserve the modest claim which has been made for it-that it affords a short respite from war, dllring which we m'!)' set our costtJ bllt illefficient defences ill order. This " peace" m'!)' well enable Hitler to wage u/ar where previollstJ he dared ontJ threaten. It means dead!;' danger, not meretJ to the far-awtD' colonies and "British interests" for which llfr. Chamberlain is pledged to fight, bu: to the livillg standards of the British people and their right to maintain them. LABOUR RESEARCH DEPARTMENT. 2 CHAMBERLAIN'S SEVEN MONTHS HE t at Munich on September 29, 1938 Herr Hitler, W Signor Mussolini, Mr. 1 [eville Chamberlain and 1\1. Daladier set their signatures to the Four-Power Agreement dismembering Czechoslovakia, a new and more perilous chapter began in the story of post-war Europe. The Pact of Munich consummated the first stage in a programme deliber­ ately and clearly set down when the Rome-Berlin axis between the Fascist States was forged. It marked, too, the realisation of a policy steadfastly pursued by Mr. [eville Chamberlain during his sixteen months as Prime Minister and his seven months in virtual control of the Foreign Office-a policy, to which he adhered in face of opposition representing all sections of the nation, aiming to end the era of collective security, and to substitute a new system based on co-operation between Britain, France and the Dictator States. For those seven vital months while Mr. Chamberlain con­ troIled foreign affairs, democracy had been on the defensive on two fronts-Spain and Czechoslovakia. Both were vital for peace. Each brought to the forefront the issue of collective security against aggression by dictators, who made no secret of their intention to secure world domination by force of arms. In both instances, the weight of British influence, the prestige of her vast armaments were thrown on the side of the aggressors. They were used to force the Popular Front Government of France into line with British policy. CoIlective security, which the " 1 ational" Government in its 1935 election manifesto declared to be the only method of avoiding war, was jettisoned and cynically ignored. Four threads run through the story of these seven months: (1) There was the attempt at the cost of incredible humilia­ tion to secure co-operation with Fascist Italy, which had left the League in December, 1937. While this plan was being carried through, Britain watched the breach of every pledge which Mussolini had made, saw British ships bombed and British seamen killed by Italian aeroplanes, acquiesced in Fascist intervention in Spain amounting to a virtual invasion, (2) There was a steady march of Hitler's policy towards domination in Central Europe, leading to the annexation of Austria and to the final tragedy of Czechoslovakia. 3 (3) Through these months in which events rushed to the finale at Munich, there was a complete refusal by the British Government to announce clearly its policy in regard to Czecho­ slovakia. Week after week in the House of Commons prominent Conservatives, as well as Opposition members, pleaded that war could be averted only if Britain made clear that she would stand by France and Russia in the event of a German attack, or that she was unable to give her support and Czechoslovakia must act accordingly. (4) Evidence was made public to show that while he refused to make his pos!tion clear to the British people and to the world, Mr. Chamberlain had long decided on the line of action which was ultimately to find expression at Munich. * * * Mr. Chamberlain was a comparative newcomer to foreign policy when he succeeded Mr. Baldwin in the premiership in May, 1937. Mr. Anthony Eden, a League supporter, had become Foreign Secretary after the enforced resignation of Sir Samuel Hoare. But events had moved swiftly. Sir Samuel Hoare was soon back in the inner Cabinet circle. Lord Halifax, with a roving commission as Lord President of the Council, was interesting himself largely in foreign affairs. Sir John Simon, another ex-Foreign Secretary, who had aimed the first death blow at the League when he gave moral support to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, was very near the Prime Minister. In January, 1937, there had been a "gentleman's agree­ ment " with Italy, in which Mussolini had declared that he had no territorial ambition in Spain; by the end of the year Mr. Eden's patience was wearing thin. The open despatch of Italian troops to Spain, and the flagrant anti-British propaganda from Rome, had reduced the agreement to a farce. It was an open secret that Mr. Chamberlain was at logger­ heads with his Foreign Secretary, and it was no less apparent that steady pressure was being brought to bear upon Downing Street by circles friendly to Fascism. The Banker, a solid City of London publication, had drawn attention to the latter fact in February, 1937: .. We regret to have to admit that from a small but rather influential circle in the City of London there flows a constant stream of propa­ ganda in favour of credits for Germany. These propagandists say 4 that a loan to Gennany would be a two-fold investment. We could buy off German aggression, and, by propping up an admittedly desperate and faithless tyranny, we could prevent Germany from falling into Communism." The position of the Fascist powers had been made perfectly clear. Marshal Goering's Nazional Z eilung wrote in November, 1937: " The time will soon come when we shall put into execu­ tion rhe agreement made in Berlin between Signor Mussolini and Herr Hitler. To the former, Spain, to the latter, Central Europe." It was in these circumstances that in November, 1937, Mr. Chamberlain made his first move to secure" appeasement." Over the head of Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax paid a " private and unofficial " visit to Herr Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The pretext was an invitation to the International Hunting Exhibition at Berlin. Lord Halifax was with Hitler for five hours, and after­ wards saw Mar shal Goering and Dr. Goebbels. The only official statement was to the effect that Anglo-German relations were discussed, and in the House of Commons Mr. Chamberlain said that he was satisfied the visit had been valuable in " furthering the desire felt in both countries for closer mutual understanding." It was unofficially stated that Hitler had demanded a free hand in Austria and Czechoslovakia in return for a six-years' truce regarding colonies. Mr. Geoffrey Mander, Liberal M.P., asked bluntly in the House of Commons whether this was a fact. He was shouted down with cries of" Order." Mr. Chamberlain declared that no pledge had been given by Lord Halifax. This dialogue followed: MR. ATTLEE : " May we take it that no commitments of any kind will be made without the House having full opportunity of dis­ cussion." .:\ IR. CHAMBERLAIN: U Of course." MR. GALLACHER : "Will it not be too late? " In September, 1938, when the fate of Czecho slovakia was ealed in the cabinet room at Downing Street, Mr. Chamberlain refused the appeal of the Labour Opposition that the House shoul d be recalled before vital decisions were taken. Uneasiness at the implications of the Halifax -Hitler move continued to grow. Then, on November 25th, Mr. Chamberlain said that the visit of Lord Halifax would be discussed during a visit of the French Premier and Foreign Minister on November 29th. There was no agreement or understanding and none was 5 contemplated which " might affect the security of France or of airy other COll1ltlY to lI'hich France IIJas allied fry Treaty or Pact." But was it without significance that, immediately after these talks, Foreign Minister Delbos made a hurried tour of Poland, Rou­ mania, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Hungary? Was it to counteract the fears among France's allies, resulting from the Halifax-Hitler conversations? On December I st, Mr. Neill\!cLean returned to the attack in the House of Commons. He asked whether the Halifax conversations had dealt with the return of German colonies, the abandonment or restriction of the League's policy of collective security, the reform of the Covenant of the League, the aims of Germany in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and what views Lord Halifax was authorised to express on behalf of the British Government. The Prime Minister refused, in spite of appeals, to give any further information. Still later, after Mr. Eden had resigned, J\Ir.