Lord Runciman and the Sudeten Germans: a study of appeasement Item Type text; Thesis-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Cornfield, Stanley Alan, 1939- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 06/10/2021 05:29:25 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/318970 LORD R0NCIMAN AND Til SUDETEN GERMANSs A STUDY IN APPEASEMENT ! • by Stanley A. Cornfield A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1 9 6 4 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This thesis has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in The University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or re­ production of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in their judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, howdver, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED APPROVAL BY THESIS DIRECTOR This thesis has been approved oh the date shown below: JAMES BONOHuE Associate Professor of History ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Russell C. Ewing, Head of the Department of History of the University of Arizona; Dr. Donald N» Lammers, Assistant Professor of History; Dr. John R. Vignery, Assistant Professor of History; and to the faculty of the department for their advice and encouragement during his pursuit of graduate study in history. Special gratitude is extended to Dr. James Donohoe, Associate Professor of History, who first interested the author in the study of Western Civilization, and whose guidance and interest were important factors in the successful completion of this thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE STATEMENT BY THE AUTHOR^ . ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS............................ ill I. INTRODUCTION: THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING OF THE PROBLEM..>........... 1 II. THE GERMANS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.......... 25 III. BRITAIN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA: 1938............... 73 IV. THE MISSION TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.......... 101 V. THE RUNGTHAN REPORT.................... 142 B1BLI 0 GRAPH Y ooo»oooeo*-eooo. <re*»ooeoo»*o» 154 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING OF THE PROBLEM Until recently, historical writing on the diplomatic history preceding the Second World War has been almost devoid of major controversy. It seemed that the evidence presented at Nuremberg, and the German and English diplomatic documents published after 1945, had provided a complete and final under­ standing of the origins of the war. Historians accepted this interpretation in an almost monotonous parade of conformity: the war was the result of a general plan for world conquest, or at least European 1 conquest, by Hitler and his close followers. The publication of English historian A. J. P. Taylor's The Origins of the Second World War in 1961 ignited one of the liveliest historical controversies of recent decades--a controversy which raged both in Among the most prominent historians adhering to this interpretation are Alan Bullock, Winston Churchill, Sir Lewis Namier, Hugh Trevor-Roper, John Wheeler-Bennett, and Elizabeth Wiskemann. 1 learned journals and in frequent television debate, and which recently culminated in the announcement that Professor Taylor's lectureship at Oxford would not be renewed. There should be no argument about Taylor's contention that there is a need to re-evaluate the crises which led to World War II. The Nuremberg documents were prepared as a lawyer's brief--to make a case rather than to provide an objective historical description. The case which emerged from the trials described the crises of 19 3 8-19 3 9-- the Anschlus s with Austria, the Czechoslovak crisis, and the Polish question--as reflections of Germany's conscious plans for aggression in Eastern Europe. By late 1937 Ger­ many had passed through several phases of foreign policy in which she rearmed to gain a military and political position from which to launch aggression. It is this interpretation of the events that Taylor challenges. His thesis is that the events of 1938-1939 were not the culmination of a general plan of conquest by Hitler; the war was rather "unwanted" by all sides, the result of diplomatic miscalculations by all the Great Powers. Taylor has provided an invaluable service to historians by leading them to re-examine their positions, to return to the documents, and to re-evaluate their original interpretations of them. And he has shown that our knowledge of the past is not simply a picture that springs full-grown from the documents, but is at least partially a construct of the historian's imagination. An analysis of the evidence presented by historians who subscribe to the thesis of Hitler's dominant role in the Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, and an examination of Taylor's crit­ icisms, is necessary before proceeding to the more particular subj ect--the mission of Lord Walter Rune iman to Prague in the summer of 1938, considered under the aspect of appeasement as the governing motive of British foreign policy. The key document presented by the prosecution at Nuremberg was the memoir of Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, Hitler's adjutant, who recorded the pro­ ceedings of a secret conference held on November 5, 2 1937. Five of the major political and military 2Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946), III, 295-305. Quotations in the following paragraphs are taken from the Hossbach Memoir, introduced in evidence at Nurem­ berg as Document 386-PS. l e a d e r of the Third Reich assembled in the Reichs- kanzlei in Berlin for a conference with Hitler„ The Fuehrer announced that the meeting was too important to take place in the larger Reich Cabinet; he planned to describe his "fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy," and his remarks were meant to be taken as his last will and testament, Hitler began by describing German policy. "The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation, and its propagation. That is, consequently, a problem of space." Since expansion was necessary to compensate for population growth, the type of expansion was the next point considered. Hitler rejected as solutions increased productivity within Germany, or a widespread colonial empire; the former was impossible because of soil deterioration, and the latter was undesirable because it would make Germany's 3 Those present at the conference, in addition to Hitler and Hossbach, were Field-marshal Werner von Blomberg, Reichsminister for War; Colonel-General Baron Werner von Fritsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Srmy; General-Admiral Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Wavy; Colonel-General Hermann Goering, Commander- in-Chief of the Air Force; and Baron Konstantin von Neurath, Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs. 5 food supply dependent upon British good will. "It is not a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas," The question for Germany was "where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost." In very clear terms, the. Fuehrer expressed his determination to use aggression if necessary as an instrument of national policy. , The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk.,. ..If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following exposition, then we are left to reply to the questions 'when1 and 'how'/ Three contingencies were then discussed. The first stipulated that the problem of German living space would have to be solved by 1943-1945, since Germany's armament position in relation to the other powers would begin to decline by then. But Hitler mentioned two possibilities for action before that date, depending upon the international situation-- action against Czechoslovakia could be taken either if the French army were incapacitated by internal conditions, or if France became involved in a war with another state„ Hitler followed with an evaluation of the probable attitudes of the other Great Powers. The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability England and perhaps also France have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleared up by Germany. No opposition was anticipated from Mussolini, and German operational speed was expected to discourage Russian or Polish intervention. This document has become now the subject of historical debate. The interpretation accepted by most historians is that given by the Nuremberg prose­ cution. Hitler had determined to embark on a renewal of the Drang nach Osten in order to secure living space. To accomplish this, he had to dispose of two primary obstacles-'-Austria, whose independent existence challenged Hitler's contention that "Common A blood belongs in a common Reich", and Czechoslovakia a democratic republic which stood in ideological opposition to National Socialism, and which was the ^Adolf: Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York: Reyna 1 & Hitchcock, 1941), p. 3. pivotal point in France's anti-German security system in Eastern Europe. These historians accept Hitler's words at the-November 5 conference as a description of his ambitions, and see the events of 1938 as results of Hitler's efforts to absorb these two states,,a goal specifically mentioned by Hitler during the meeting.