INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMl films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMl a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, If unauthorzed copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. OversKze materials (e.g.. maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMl directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 UMT NEITHER DECADENT, NOR TRAITOROUS, NOR STUPID: THE FRENCH AIR FORCE AND AIR DOCTRINE IN THE 1930s DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Anthony Christopher Cain, M.S., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2000 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Allan R. Millett, Adviser Professor John F. Guilmartin, Jr. Professor John A. M. Rothney Adviser Department of History Graduate Program UMl Number. 9971521 Copyright 2000 by Cain, Anthony Christopher All rights reserved. UMl* UMl Microform9971521 Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Copyright by A nthony C Coin 2000 ABSTRACT The airmen and politicians who led theArmée de I ’Air as it served the Third Republic worked diligently to create a military institution that they believed met French defense needs. Their efforts revealed the difiBculties that arose when air power theory clashed with established notions of how to employ air forces. Airmen changed their ideas and methods about the proper role for the Air Force to accommodate competing Army and Navy opinions. Reactive doctrine crept into every aspect of the air service because the airmen failed to argue effectively for a distinct vision of warfare predicated on the dominance of the air weapon. Air force leaders transmitted doctrine and institutional values to operational and tactical commands by several institutional channels. At the lowest levels, airmen learned basic technical skills. Pilot training, aircraft and engine maintenance, radio operator training, and gunnery schools provided specialized training that met the basic Job requirements for manning combat units. These schools also gave members their first exposure to air doctrine concealed in the fijrm of technical training. After individuals completed basic technical training and reported to their assigned tactical units, exercises, and maneuvers became the primary means of transmittmg and refining air doctrine. Performance and behavior m day-to-day training, and, more importantly, in armual exercises indicated the degree that air force members accepted or rejected official ii doctrine. The degree and frequency of change in the structures and methods of the French training and education system also provided insight into institutional values and tactical efrëctîveness. The defeat of 1940 rocked the nation’s military institutions. The Air Force, in particular, shouldered a large portion of the blame for the military’s poor performance. The leaders of the institution sought to derive lessons from the battles of the war so that the disaster of 1940 would not reoccur. Air Force leaders launched an investigation into the conduct of the air war. Officers from combat and combat support specialties responded to requests for reports on their wartime experiences. In the harsh, painful process of self-examination and critique. Air Force persormel identified important areas for doctrinal and institutional change. in Dedicated to my wife, Mechieal Cain IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS A writing project such as this may seem to some to be the product of a single mind. Yet, no one who attempts such a task emerges with this impression intact. The list of those to whom I owe emotional and intellectual debts is long. At the Air Command and Staff College, Colonel (ret.) John Warden and Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Larry Weaver, established an atmosphere that encouraged and rewarded intellectual development. Colonel Weaver’s tireless efforts to set up the advanced degree program allowed me to begin this project; his timely and insightful feedback on each chapter helped me to complete it. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Forsyth and Dr. Rich Muller allowed me to focus on completing the manuscript. Colonel (retired) Tommy Dickson encouraged my research efforts and provided essential technical resources that made my time in Paris more productive. Dr. Bill Dean and Major Vicki Rast (Ph. D.) provided intellectual and emotional support well beyond the call of duty. A grant from the Institute ofNational Security Studies made my trip to the Service Historique de l'Armée de l ’Air at the Château de Vincennes just outside of Paris possible. Général (C. R) Hugues Silvestre de Sacy offered his kind assistance and that of his staff while I gathered the primary material that formed the core of this study. His permission to scan thousands of documents made my research efforts much more practical. Patrick Façon, François Peraot, and Marie Catherine Villatoux listened patiently to my ideas and did not condenm me for butchering their native tongue. Professor Façon graciously commented on organization and provided critical advice on sources. Laurent Henninger of theCentre d'Études d 'Histoire de la Défense also offered encouragement. Without the expert help of these professional historians, my dissertation would remain ill formed. At The Ohio State University, Professors John Guilmartin, Mark Grimsley, John Rothney, John Burnham, and Geoffrey Parker served as excellent professional role models. My primary dissertation adviser, Allan Millett, struck the ideal balance between enthusiasm for the project and direction. With so many top-notch scholars guiding my efforts, one might anticipate a flawless product, however, I cannot lay any blame for the shortcomings of this work at their feet. They offered their best advice; any flaws resulting from my failure to capitalize on that advice are mine. As much as the aforementioned individuals contributed to the completion of this dissertation, my family suffered its birth pangs. My children, Jessica, Micah, and Ryan, have, more often than not, seen their father with his nose in a book or glued to a computer screen. Yet, like most children, when I remembereu that they were infinitely more important than any piece of historical literature, they welcomed me with unconditional love and affection. My wife Mechieal remains the rock upon which our family depends. She shouldered the responsibilities of both mother and father while I traveled to Paris, she listened patiently to my endless musings about the writing process, and she reminded me that there is life after graduate school. Mechieal has honored me with her love and companionship for nineteen years; any success I attain stems from her unfailing loyalty and support—it is to her that I gratefully and lovingly dedicate this effort. VI VTTA August 16, 1958 ........................................ Bom—Marietta, South Carolina 1988...........................................................M. S., Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 1996...........................................................Course Director, Theater Air Campaign Studies Course, USAF Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 199 8...........................................................M.A., History, The Ohio State University 199 9...........................................................Academic Instructor and Advisor, Department of International Security and Military Studies, USAF Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama Present....................................................... Course Director, Air Power Studies Course, USAF Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama PUBLICATIONS 1. “The Military-Technical Revolution in the Interwar Years: Strategic Bombardment,” War Theory Curriculum Coursebook, USAF Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (1995). 2. “The Mechanics of War Termination: Planning for Engagement and Enlargement,” War Termination Curriculum Coursebook, USAF Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama (1995). FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History Vtt TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Dedication.................................................................................................................. iv Acknowledgments....................................................................................................