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2014 Imperial Glory or Appeasement?: The Cliveden Set's Influence on British Foreign Policy during the Inter-War Period David M. Valladares

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

IMPERIAL GLORY OR APPEASEMENT? THE CLIVEDEN SET’S INFLUENCE ON

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

By

DAVID M. VALLADARES

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2014

David M. Valladares defended this thesis on March 25, 2014. The members of the supervisory committee were:

Michael Creswell Professor Directing Thesis

Jonathan Grant Committee Member

James P. Jones Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements

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To my wife Letty-Ann and our four wonderful children

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Jim Jones for instigating this research, Dr. Jonathan Grant for supporting me throughout its development, and Dr. Michael Creswell for his hard work in helping me refine my prose. I would also like to thank my parents for their encouragement, my wife for her love, and my children for their joy.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... vi

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2. ALFRED MILNER AND HIS KINDERGARTEN ...... 16

3. THE KINDERGARTEN, THE SELBORNE MEMORANDUM, SOUTH AFRICAN UNIFICATION AND THE ROUNDTABLE MOVEMENT ...... 34

4. THE KINDERGARTEN IN CLIVEDEN ...... 54

5. CONCLUSION ...... 69

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 73

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 81

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ABSTRACT

The Cliveden Set was a 1930s right-wing, upper class group of prominent individuals who were

politically influential in Britain during the interwar period. The group’s members included notable politicians, journalist, and aristocrats such as Nancy Astor, Geoffrey Dawson, Philip

Kerr, Edward Wood, and Robert Brand. The term ‘Cliveden Set,’ meant as a pejorative term, was coined by journalist Claud Cockburn who wrote for the newspaper The Week. Though initially considered to be a scapegoat for pre-World War two anxieties, the Cliveden Set surreptitiously formulated and enforced a British foreign policy that supported Hitler’s rearmament and the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. Their goal in doing so was to preserve British Imperial rule and unification of their dominions. By applying the formula of imperial unification that was demonstrated by Alfred Milner during South African reconstruction, and by adopting the template of imperial preservation exercised by Milner’s

Kindergarten, The Cliveden Set’s role in the developments that led to World War II proves substantial.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Halifax to Germany

On November 10, 1937, a report appeared in Britain’s Evening Standard that the Lord

President of the Council of the United Kingdom, Viscount Halifax, had been invited to attend an international hunting exhibition in Berlin. The exhibition had been arranged in 1936 by Hermann

Goering in his capacity as Game Warden of the Third Reich. Since Lord Halifax was a proficient sportsman and Master of the Middleton Hounds, an invitation to him and his projected attendance appeared unexceptional. The Evening Standard added, however, that Lord Halifax would meet with Adolf Hitler and that Anglo-German relations would be discussed, “but no negotiations or specific issues are contemplated. If the present plan is carried out, Lord Halifax will leave for Germany on Monday week.”1

The following day, an Evening Standard diplomatic correspondent provided additional details about the possible negotiations:

I am able to give certain indications of the attitude of both the German and British Governments towards the coming talks. The British Government have information from Berlin that Herr Hitler is ready, if he receives the slightest encouragement, to offer to Great Britain a ten-year ‘truce’ on the Colonial issue. During the ‘truce; the question of Colonies for Germany would not be raised. In return for this agreement Herr Hitler would expect the British Government to leave him a free hand in Central Europe.2

British reaction to the allegation that Lord Halifax would be conducting negotiations with

Hitler that would give Berlin a free hand in Central Europe in order to relieve German pressure

on British property was rapid and violent. The British press engaged in a lively argument as to

the authenticity of the Evening Standard report. From The Times’ conclusion that the claim was

1 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 Series D, (1937-1945) Volume IV: The Aftermath of Munich, Oct. 1938-March 1939, 39. 2 Alan Campbell Johnson, Viscount Halifax: A Biography (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941), 430.

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merely “artless suggestion” to the Yorkshire Post’s political correspondent independently

obtaining similar information “from sources satisfactory to any reputable journal,” rumblings

within the British journalistic world that Halifax might indeed be heading to Berlin started to

appear in several newspapers.3 Two days later, British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon made a formal announcement in parliament that Halifax had accepted the invitation, thus showing that these “rumors had real substance.”4

Halifax’s visitation to Berlin on November 17, 1937 spurred more than just reportage speculation and the British public’s dissatisfaction with the country’s foreign policy. Questions and concerns began to arise as to why Halifax and not the current foreign minister, Anthony

Eden, would be conducting negotiations. Had the current Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, sent Halifax without support of the cabinet? And if the Foreign Office did not send Halifax, then who did? Had the British government decided to farm out foreign policy to outsiders or was

Halifax acting on his own accord? The answer to these questions could have serious political ramifications.

These questions spawned a series of journalistic articles that claimed to have uncovered a

“shadow cabinet” so well hidden within the British government that it had for years “exercised so powerful an influence on the course of ‘British’ policy.” These articles suggested that a sinister elitist conspiratorial group was set to appease Germany while undermining the true interest of the country. This piece of startling information quickly caught fire, and the nickname given to the conspiratorial group was “The Cliveden Set.”5

3 Johnson, Viscount Halifax, 433. 4 Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), 174. 5 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 4.

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The Cliveden Set was a 1930s right-wing, upper class group of prominent personalities who were politically influential in Britain during the interwar period. The group’s members included notable politicians, journalists, aristocrats and entertainers such as Nancy Astor,

Geoffrey Dawson, Philip Kerr, Edward Wood, Robert Brand, T.E. Lawrence, and Rudyard

Kipling. The name “Cliveden” itself comes from the stately home located in Buckinghamshire,

England, which was owned by Lord and Lady Astor. The term “Cliveden Set,” meant as a pejorative, was coined by the journalist Claud Cockburn, who wrote for the newspaper The

Week. According to Cockburn, the Cliveden Set was a social network that was comprised of aristocratic germanophiles who favored appeasing Germany and who attempted to influence

British foreign policy in Berlin’s favor.6

The Cliveden Set

The argument that an aristocratic group existing within the upper echelons of the British government was influencing foreign policy in order to promote German interests was a socially scandalous idea. Indeed, members of the Cliveden Set were comprised of the social elite of the highest pedigree. They were people who held substantial positions of power, whose world consisted of ostentatious estates and lavish social events. But more than an open display of wealth and power, they were frequently in contact with both British and German policy makers.

In other words, their potential influence reached into the political world.

Initial reaction to Cockburn’s accusations was at most non responsive. As Cockburn put it, “Absolutely nothing happened. It made about as loud a bang as a crumpet falling on a carpet.”7 Weeks later, however, journals began to publish and embellish the sensational report of

6 Alfred Leslie Rowse, All Souls and appeasement: a contribution to contemporary history (Macmillan, 1961), 97. 7 Claud Cockburn, Crossing the Line (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960), 19.

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the existence of a shadow cabinet in Britain. Newspapers in Singapore, New York, and Buenos

Aires and elsewhere began to investigate and scrutinize the members of the Set.8

Pronouncements about supposed influence of the Cliveden Set on British foreign policy began to extend to Britain’s political class. In 1938, former Member of Parliament (MP) for

Bradford North and Nobel Prize winner Norman Angell wrote in the periodical Time and Tide

that the Cliveden Set “occupied a strategic position in forming the policies of the country.”9 In his book Who Helped Hitler?, Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, Ivan Maisky wrote that, “(The

Cliveden Set) had very great influence on the appointment of Ministers, the formation of governments and the determination of the policy of those governments.”10 Sir Maurice Hankey,

secretary to the cabinet, placed them “among the most influential” of the “Political congeries”

operating in London.11 The Labour Party leader Hugh Dalton describes the members of the group as “These traitors of Printing House Square, this residue of the Cliveden Set, Hitler’s Fifth

Column in London.”12 A Labour MP stated at a meeting in Hyde Park that “the foreign policy of this country is no longer settled by the Cabinet in Downing Street but at the country home of

Lady Astor at Cliveden.”13 That such prominent political figures in Britain made similar remarks

about this issue suggests the extent to which this narrative about the Cliveden Set began to take

hold in Britain.

Historiography

8 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 4. 9 Norman Angell, “Foreign Affairs: Clivedenism,” Time and Tide, April 2, 1938. 10 Ivan Maisky, Who Helped Hitler? (London: Trans. Andrew Rothstein, Hutchinson, 1964), 69. 11 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 1. 12Hugh Dalton Dalton, Call back yesterday: memoirs 1887-1931 (London: Muller, 1953), 243. 13 Anthony Masters, Nancy Astor, a biography (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981), 193.

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A review of the historiography on the Cliveden Set reveals that little scholarly work has been undertaken or completed. The extent of the Cliveden Set’s appearance in the historiography is limited to a minor reference or a brief rebuttal to the level of the Set’s influence on British foreign policy. Conversely, there is an extensive selection of biographical work available on specific members of the group. These biographical contributions, however, are limited in focus and analysis. While they may provide useful information on individual experiences and personal accounts, little effort has been devoted to examining wider historical concerns surrounding the

Cliveden Set.

Biographical studies consistently deny that the Cliveden Set was sinister or subversive.

Nancy Astor biographer Christopher Sykes argues that the Claud Cockburn fabricated the claim that the Cliveden Set sought to influence Britain’s foreign policy in favor of Germany, and that all of Cockburn’s accusations were ideologically motivated and by no means substantial.14

Biographer James Fox states that “what started as a Marxist kite flying in a cyclostyled news sheet (referring to Cockburn and The Week) grew into a myth that helped to end Nancy’s (Lady

Astor) political career, damaged her reputation irreparably, and closed down Cliveden as a social and political powerhouse.”15

Additional contributions align in some variation with both Sykes and Fox’s conclusions.

Lady Astor biographer John Grigg writes that “…the main reason for the myth’s growing

(Cliveden Set) – and lasting – currency is that it offered a scapegoat for the general failure to

stop Hitler…”16

14 Christopher Sykes, Nancy: the life of Lady Astor (Charlottesville: Collins, 1972), 365. 15 James Fox, Five Sisters: the Langhornes of Virginia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 423. 16 John Grigg, Nancy Astor: portrait of a pioneer (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980), 149.

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Although these arguments eventually gained wide acceptance among historians, they are cursory. Nonetheless, these conclusions follow a biographical process of reasoning that results not from in-depth analysis, but from an academic approach that limits focus on individual characters of the Cliveden Set.

Whether it is Anthony Masters’ biography on Nancy Astor, David Billington’s biography on Philip Kerr, or Michael Astor’s presentation of his family history in Tribal Feeling, much of the research that has been produced on the individual members of the Cliveden Set altogether discredit Cockburn’s claims. Such refutations occur because biographical contributions are incapable of piecing together the foundational significance of the Set’s very purpose, which is much more convoluted and intricate than any single member.

An additional weakness of a biographical approach is the overreliance of the members themselves as a primary source base. Due to the nature of esoteric organizations and the complete failure of appeasement during the 1930s, a close reading of diary entries, personal correspondences, or completed memoirs leads to misguided conclusions. Additionally, how is the historian to give merit or credence to anecdotes or explanations that are purely hearsay and unsubstantiated by any other primary source? An even greater concern arises when the body of personal production of Set members regularly contradicts each other or appears incomplete.

Some of the first historians to reevaluate how the early historiography depicted the Set

were Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott’s. They state that “The talk at Cliveden was certainly of

appeasement, but it was a side show.”17 In 1965, the historian/novelist Margaret George committed some brief primary research to substantiating Cockburn’s accusations. Though minimalistic in analysis, she concluded that there was a group of influential people who did meet

17 Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (Boston: The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1963), 31.

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at the Astor’s estate and who did discuss critical foreign events, “but the Cliveden Set, with its

shifting personnel, had no monopoly on enthusiasm for Fascism; they were one circle among

many, all of them made up of people of similar social status and public prestige.”18

In short, any mention of the Cliveden Set by the traditional historiography is to either supplement research on interwar appeasement or to fulfill a biographical contribution of the high profile people who comprised the Set. In both instances, authors and historians dismiss the claim that the Set was as perfidious as Claud Cockburn suggested. Gilbert and Goth go so far as to say that “were the archives of Cliveden ever on view, they would be more useful to the novelist than to the historian.”19

Though Gilbert and Goth are misguided in their statement, they may in fact be correct.

One of the salient errors that have been duplicated in much of the research produced on the

Cliveden Set is that scholars (i.e., Gilbert/Goth and Norman Rose) have attempted to anthropomorphize the Cliveden Estate itself as a central antagonist.

Still, Gilbert and Goth’s contentions on this specific issue are erroneous. They, as do many other scholars, view the existence and function of the Cliveden Set through the general lens of germanophile appeasement. Because they do not qualify the Set as the sole or primary source of political appeasement during the interwar period, they disregard them as inconsequential within any historical dialogue. As a result, early work on the Cliveden Set is both general and mediocre.

It was not until 2000 that Norman Rose published a comprehensive monograph on the

Cliveden Set. Titled The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity, the monograph is

18 Margaret George, The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933-1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965), 137. 19 Gilbert and Gott, The Appeasers, 31.

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broken down into twelve chapters. The eighth chapter is the primary portion of the book where

Rose engages in sustained analysis about the existence and function of the Set and their effect on

British foreign policy. The purpose of illuminating the organization of the monograph is that

Rose’s analysis of Cliveden Set proves to be more of a comparative exercise between early 20th century British Aristocracy and an Elizabethan tragedy.

Although a thoroughly researched work and a substantial contribution to the literature,

the monograph is a biographical exercise which spends more time reliving the grandeur of the

Cliveden Estate and its habitués than as a work of historical analysis. The book itself is

constructed as a work of fiction. Not only is it replete with oedipal characters whose good

intentions are tragically ineffective due to cruel circumstance and inherent hubris, but it begins

with a colorful prologue and ends with an emotional epilogue.

Even the questions that frame the primary thesis engage more in a semantic joist than

presenting scholarly queries. The primary limitation to Rose’s work, however, is that it excludes

necessary elements that would provide for a more comprehensive understanding of events

surrounding the Cliveden Set and its activities. For instance, he appears to show greater concern

with personifying the grandeur of the estate than actually piecing together the Set’s agenda and

whether there was any real credibility to Cockburn’s claim. Alfred Milner, who played a crucial

role in the development of Kerr, Brand, and Curtis’ political ideology, is barely mentioned.

In the same manner, Milner’s Kindergarten (a group of young men from Oxford, many

who were central figures in the Cliveden Set) is given the same scant treatment. Rose’s oversight

limits any incisive interpretation of Halifax’s November 1937 visit because Rose is more

concerned with absolving the Astors of any conspiracy than questioning the aims behind

Halifax’s negotiations with Hitler.

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There are a number of questions that Rose could have usefully raised. For example, as part of its negotiations, why did the British government seek a ten-year truce with Germany when dealing with the colonial issue? Why is this point not under further scrutiny when it was clearly not the official stance of Chamberlain, his cabinet nor supported by public opinion? This is what Halifax was sent to negotiate, yet Rose fails to inquire any further into the matter except to insist that Halifax’s visit was not a plot concocted at Cliveden.20 By doing so, Rose confines his analysis and almost completely excludes, when questioning the Set’s goals of imperialistic preservation, additional concerns that push beyond Cockburn’s heavy handed accusations. The line of reasoning being that if Cockburn was shown to be overzealous and jejune in his style of tabloid journalism, then the members of the Set would be vindicated. It still does not answer, however, why Halifax and whoever sent him were so concerned about Germany in South Africa and the free hand that they were hoping to secure if Central Europe were abandoned to Hitler.

If research on the Cliveden Set has been limited to germanophile concerns and whether its members were pro-Nazi, then Rose’s analysis would be extensive enough to answer the

Cliveden involvement, and his contentions would be viable. Yet, the extensive role that the Set played on a global level is ignored altogether and, in reality, their dealings with Hitler were but a bump in an otherwise successful, unimpeded, and surreptitious road towards unifying British

Dominions. Still, Rose’s work is currently the most extensive research produced, and it is the first to consider the Cliveden Set to be an important historical issue in its own right.

The primary caveat when conducting research on the Cliveden Set is the extremely limited availability of primary sources. This is not a novel obstacle. Indeed, the perennial challenge facing all historians is the accuracy and availability of an adequate source base. These

20 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 176.

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challenges become increasingly difficult when dealing with cryptic groups which intentionally

conceal, distort or even destroy documentation about them. Carroll Quigley states that “it is not

possible for an outsider to write about a secret group without falling into errors.”21

Primary Sources and Esoteric Groups

Documentary concerns are compounded when taking into account the vilification of the

Set’s members prior to the Second World War and the substantial atrocities that resulted from that conflict. Due to the nature of concealment, what is left available for the scholar are personal papers that reveal very little about what may have occurred behind closed doors. In attempting to qualify the function and effect that Cliveden had on British foreign policies, the scholar is forced to review the chronology of events, analyze (through documentation) the psychologies of prevalent figures, and construct inferences based on outcomes.

In the case of the Cliveden Set, however, the historical questions that set the boundaries of research must be clear and to the point. To ask “What constitutes a Set?”22 or to attempt to measure levels of influence and participation, leads to soft contentions. When dealing with secret societies and it members, the questions themselves garner just as much significance as the findings that are produced. For instance, if the historical question remained “Was the Cliveden

Set a conspiratorial, fascist cadre responsible for promoting Nazi propaganda in Britain?” Then the answer is no. The evidence does not support such a finding, and the question is quickly refuted. The danger remains that such a query proves to be more of a distraction than historical contribution. In contrast, if the question is more pointed and less nefarious such as, “Was British

Government’s treatment of the Anschluss or the Nazi annexation of Czechoslovakia a result of

21 Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (New York: Books in Focus, 1981), x. 22 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 5.

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policy pushed on Chamberlain by the Cliveden Set?” then the significance of the Set reemerges

and the thesis contributes substantially to the historiography.

To avoid falling into error, this work will not pose questions that cannot be adequately

answered within the sources. If the sources on Cliveden do not lend themselves to evaluation, then a closer look of the Set’s progenitors (i.e., Alfred Milner, the Kindergarten, and the Round

Table Group) is necessary. Thus, the academic lens must be broadened beyond the borders of the

Cliveden Estate.

From Milner to Cliveden

Beginning in the late 1940s, many academics began to debate the purpose and cause behind Britain’s strategy of appeasement. This extensive debate has produced a rich historiography comprised of four general perceptions. The first school emphasizes Hitler’s personality; the second emphasizes domestic constraints; the third emphasizes international restraints, especially empire, and the fourth emphasizes the increase in British commitments and the corresponding decrease in British economic and military strength. Attempting to analyze the

Cliveden Set specifically within these constraints and placing them as the sole or primary force behind British appeasement is inadequate and inaccurate. Gilbert and Goth attempt to do this in their monograph The Appeasers.

Early research on British appeasement, however, consistently constructs the Set’s role as historically insignificant and assigns all indictments against them under Cockburn’s tabloid journalism. As a result, it is understandable that current scholarship, such as Christopher Sykes’

Nancy: The Life of Lady Astor and Anthony Masters’ Nancy Astor, lends itself to perceiving the

Cliveden Set as a scapegoat for Britain’s failed foreign policy. The deficiency with this approach is that it limits analysis of the Set to interwar appeasement. The relevance of the Cliveden Set

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within the discourse of German appeasement is peripheral compared to the actual influence and

goals that it clandestinely pursued within a broader promotion of a world empire.

With further analysis, the Cliveden Set holds a significant position within the historical

literature. Not only does research on the Cliveden Set produce greater understanding of the cause

behind the British policies that led German appeasement during the inter-war period, but it also

bring to light the ulterior motives of British imperial preservation that existed between persons of

power and influence.

Halifax’s visit to Berlin to negotiate a ten year truce that would allow Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe adds additional consideration to the cause behind both Germany’s annexations of Hungry and Czechoslovakia. This study fortifies the link between the Cliveden Set and why they supported Hitler’s call for lebensraum. Their support of German expansion far exceeds

Chamberlain’s mantra of “peace in our time” and, instead, directly supports their insatiable obsession for British imperial unity.

This research will follow an inductive process by which the historical significance of the

Cliveden Set can be pieced together from emergent facts. Ending with the Evening Standard’s

undisputed November 10th report on the proposed ten year truce that would grant Hitler a free

hand in Central Europe, the cause behind the Cockburn’s supposed “outrageous calumny”23 can

be traced back to a Milnerian ideology.

Discovering the objectives and aims of the Set within the promotion of a centralized

world power is difficult to say the least if the academic lens remains solely concentrated on its

public contributions or private socializations. The ingenuity and importance of the secret parties

at the Cliveden estate is that it allowed its members to politically maneuver and promote their

23 Johnson, Viscount Halifax, 433.

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agendas while avoiding the scrutiny of public accountability. Though readily dismissive, Gilbert

and Goth are likely correct in their accusation of how useless the Cliveden estate archives would

prove to a historian because the nature of esoteric cabals is to limit the dissemination of

information.

The Cliveden Set followed closely the very construct of a cabal that intended to surreptitiously circumvent proper political conventions by imposing its ideological without the possibility of public scrutiny. This is a difficult claim to support because it lacks the

aforementioned concrete evidence. Tracing the driving force behind Halifax’s concessions to

Hitler back to the Cliveden Set, however, raises the question of purpose. How would the Set

benefit from a ten-year ‘truce’ with Germany on the colonial issue? Were members such as the

Astors or playwright George Bernard Shaw deeply invested in colonial matters?

Following the ideology of Alfred Milner, his South African Kindergarten, and the Round

Table movement that imbedded itself within British political environment, the Set believed that

Britishization was the only means by which its colonies, dominions, and the rest of the world

would modernize to a Civitas Dei i.e., World Government.24 This mentality is very much

reflective of Shaw’s 1912 play Pygmalion in which the cultured, educated Henry Higgins trains the guttersnipe, Cockney flower girl, Eliza Doolittle, to pass as a duchess. If the backward, regressive identifiable other would fall under the tutelary of their progressive leadership, then

British imperial utility could be achieved.

Following the structure and method established by Alfred Milner in South Africa, controlling public opinion through political manipulation, public education, and outright propaganda, the Set did everything in its power to preserve British imperial growth, even if that

24 Derek Drinkwater, Sir Harold Nicolson and international relations: the practitioner as theorist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 179.

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meant promoting ill-advised concessions to Hitler.25 This closer union of societies and the State was an assertive attempt to duplicate on an imperial scale what had been perceived as successful in South Africa under the efforts of Milner’s Kindergarten.26 Thus, the experiences of the

Kindergarten in South Africa, whose leading members became part of the cadre within Cliveden,

convinced them that the methods of organization and propaganda techniques that worked in

South Africa could be duplicated and would be effective in bringing about their goal of a strong

centralized world government.27

Thesis

This study is intended to accomplish two objectives. The first is to establish a direct chronology that will tie Alfred Milner, his Kindergarten, and the Cliveden Set to a political ideology that directly promoted a British rule of imperial governance. Establishing the transference of a political ideology that viewed any democratic process as an obstruction to the promotion of civility within British imperialism reveals the subversive qualities of the Cliveden

Set. I delineate between members of the Set who directly experienced the tutelage of Milner’s

Kindergarten (Philip Kerr and Robert Brand), and members who inherited the legacy (Lord and

Lady Astor). Ultimately, I will show how Lord Halifax’s visit to Berlin in 1937 and the terms of negotiations that he was instructed to present to Hitler reflected the ideological motivations of the Set members.

The second goal of this work is to review and analyze the degree to which members of the Set infiltrated positions of power and influence within the British political system. Although

25 Walter Nimocks, Milner’s young men: the “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial affairs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), 120. 26 Ibid., 133 27 John E. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 45.

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this study takes into consideration outlets of corroboration by both All Souls College, Oxford

and Round Table Groups, it is primarily concerned with the Set’s access to power and the

exercise of such power to promote its interests. I also contend that the attempted application of

Milner’s world vision directly reproached the established electoral, political system in Britain and that interwar British foreign policy was obdurately aimed at German appeasement due to the

Set’s supplemental meddling.

Although an important area of research within the academic study of the Second World

War and the interwar period, this work is not merely intended to engage with or contribute to the literature on the British strategy of appeasement. It would be difficult to measure the level of direct influence that the Cliveden Set has on promoting Chamberlain’s agenda on German appeasement, and the Cliveden Set was not, by any means, the sole motivating force behind

Britain’s appeasement sentiments. Additionally, this study does not seek to prove or disprove the merits of Cockburn’s accusations. It is irrelevant to the thesis whether there existed a sinister or nefarious aspect to the Set’s decisions. This work is instead committed to presenting how the ideology of Alfred Milner pervaded British avenues of power and how the framework that had been established in South Africa after the Boer Wars was being exercised in function by the existence of Cliveden Set.

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CHAPTER TWO

ALFRED MILNER AND HIS KINDERGARTEN

British and South African Relations

In the 1830s, South Africa was settled by Dutch farmers known as either Boers or

Afrikaners. They remained under British rule until 1850, when the provinces of the Orange Free

State and Transvaal were granted independence. The two states increasingly began to conflict with their British overseers, however, because of continual British intrusion into South African domestic affairs. This conflict escalated in 1877 South Africans tried to unify Natal, Cape

Colony, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal.

In response to these efforts, Britain annexed the Transvaal. In 1881, after the victory of the Boers at the Battle of Majuba Hill, Britain withdrew from the Transvaal and accorded to its inhabitants “complete self-government subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors.”28 Despite the agreements reached at the Convention of Pretoria of August 1881 which allowed the South African Republic to regain self-government under nominal British suzerainty, hard feelings remained between the British government and the Afrikaner settlers.29

The Convention of Pretoria, which granted Britain control of Transvaal foreign policy and the right of the Crown to veto legislation, was eventually replaced with the 1884 Convention of London. Removing British veto power over Transvaal legislation, the Convention at London established one clear proviso: “The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or enjoyment with any State or nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any tribe to the eastward or

28Julian Ralph, Towards Pretoria a record of the war between Briton & Boer to the hoisting of the British flag at Bloemfontein (London: C.A. Pearson, 1900), 353. 29 Walter Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men: The “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), 4.

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westward of the Republic until the same has been approved by Her Majesty the Queen.”30 There

was no mention of suzerainty within the articles of the convention.

The population balance in South Africa altered drastically from Afrikaners to British

immigrants once gold and diamonds were discovered in 1868. In 1886, immigrants began to pour

into the Transvaal, and, as if almost overnight, Johannesburg exploded with colonial capitalists

looking to establish their fortunes. By the mid-1880s, 44,000 foreign miners and labors, mainly

from Britain, had relocated residency to South Africa. Termed “Uitlanders,” these British

immigrants were treated inequitably by Transvaal law and policy. While military obligations for

Afrikaners remained optional, Uitlanders were required to carry out military service and pay

higher taxes. An Uitlander would not be granted political rights until establishing a residency of

fourteen years. Paul Kruger, the president of the Transvaal, saddled the Uitlanders with these

requirements because he feared that, if immediately given the right to vote, Afrikaners would

have their authority challenged and would lose their chance of gaining independence.31

South African sovereignty presented a severe obstacle to British imperial aspirations.

Joseph Chamberlain, who had become colonial secretary in 1895, was determined to immediately assert British dominance throughout South Africa. Plans for an Uitlander rebellion, supported by South African mining magnate Cecil Rhodes, came to fruition at the end of 1895 with the botched raid on Paul Kruger's Transvaal Republic by Leander Starr Jameson. The raid, later termed the Jameson Raid, proved to be an absolute failure for the Uitlanders, who would eventually surrender to the Afrikaners.32

30 Convention of Pretoria, art. 4, 1881. 31 John E. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 4. 32 Assa Okoth, A History of Africa: African societies and the establishment of colonial rule, 1800-1915 (East African Publishers, 2006), 379.

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However minor the raid may have appeared, the outcome resulted in Kruger preparing for a full-scale military conflict with the British. Combining both the military growth of the Boers and that South Africa was becoming more independent of British influence, Chamberlain was convinced that Britain’s position as a world power was dependent on reasserting her supremacy in South Africa.33 It was in this tense situation, in February 1897, that Chamberlain appointed Sir

Alfred Milner governor of Cape Colony and high commissioner of South Africa.34

Alfred Milner’s Rise to Power

Milner did not appear to be an obvious choice because he had no experience with the current problems in South Africa, and he knew very little about colonial governorship. On meeting with Milner at the Colonial Office on January 18, 1897, Chamberlain described the appointment: “What is now at stake is the position of Great Britain and with it the estimate formed of our power and influence in our Colonies and throughout the world...”35

Still, Chamberlain perceived other desirable qualities in Milner. For instance, Milner was dedicated to the maintenance and the consolidation of the empire. Chamberlain thus chose

Milner because Milner was a true British imperialist jingo. Milner believed that the empire

should serve as a substitute for religion, and that it would promote the expansion of civilization,

and that the unification of South Africa posed a direct danger to the expansion of the British

Empire.36

33James W. Muller, Churchill as Peacemaker (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997), 132. 34 A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: a study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), 31. 35 Quoted in J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger’s Republic (Oxford, 1961), 318. See also J.L Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. III (London, 1934), 459. 36 Jessica Jarland-Jacobs, Builders of Empire: Freemasons and British Imperialism, 1717-1927 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 241.

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Born to English parents in 1854, Milner spent the first fifteen years of his life in the

Hessian town of Gießen. Upon the death of his mother in 1869, he returned to England and attended King’s College, London. In 1872, he continued his studies at Balliol College, Oxford, where he formed a close friendship with a young economic historian, Arnold Toynbee. After leaving Oxford, Milner tried law but soon deserted to journalism and the Pall Mall Gazette, edited by W.T. Stead. In February 1884, Milner became the private secretary and good friend of

George Joachim Goschen, who later became Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was his association with Goschen that put Milner on the path to high administrative influence and power.37 In 1889,

Goschen recommended Milner for the post of director-general of accounts in Egypt. But in less than a year, Milner was promoted to the under-secretary for finance.

Milner remained in Egypt for three years, and it was there that his imperial philosophy on

Britain’s civilizing mission was forged. In 1982 he published a book titled England and Egypt. A window into Milner’s ideology, he argues in the book that only the British race and British civilization could properly guide dependents, like Egypt, toward civilized independence. Only by continuing her guardianship and acting upon “the simplest ideas of honesty, humanity and justice” would England ensure the progress and welfare of the Egyptian people.38 To quote:

The qualities which we may have contributed to the Egyptian Administration are not novel or extraordinary qualities. They are the commonplaces of civilization. But it need only a little experience of the East to realize how vast an improvement may be effected in the condition of a country by the introduction of nothing more than the ordinary methods and principles of civilized government.39

In 1892, Milner was appointed to chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue at Somerset

House. Gaining recognition as an official of the very first rank, Milner served for five years at

37 Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, 23. 38 Sir Alfred Milner, England in Egypt (London: 37 Bedford Street, 1899), 290. 39 Ibid., 290.

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Somerset House before being called by Chamberlain to aid the empire in South Africa.40

Milner’s appointment as high commissioner of South Africa and governor of the Cape Colony was announced on February 1897, and in March he was the guest of honor at a farewell banquet in London. The unanimity and support exhibited at the banquet were symbolic of how Milner was recognized as a man above party lines and one who would serve the British imperial cause.41

Milner reached the Cape in May 1897. For his first year, he committed himself to improving the political standing of the Uitlanders of the Transvaal. Kruger, however, avoided and delayed any real concessions; and after winning the Transvaal elections 1898, Kruger reinforced his dominance as South Africa’s premier. As a result, Milner concluded that the established South African leadership remained the primary obstacle to South African modernity.

In a report to Chamberlain, Milner stated that “There is no way out of the political troubles of

South Africa except reform in the Transvaal or war. And at present the chances of reform are worse than ever.”42

At no time did Milner believe that British supremacy in South Africa would be directly challenged. He did, however, realize that maintaining British rule would be extremely difficult. It quickly became apparent to him that the Boers would reject British concessions on the status of

Uitlander, and that there would be no alternative to the use of force. British supremacy in South

Africa would have to be established by war, and (in Milner’s opinion) that war would be brief, bolster the economy, and attract immigrants. Milner did maintain one clear certainty a failure to act would inevitably shatter the empire.

40 Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, 26. 41 J. Lee Thompson, Forgotten Patriot: A Life of Alfred, Viscount Milner of St. James’s and Cape Town, 1854-1925 (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), 106. 42 Peter T. Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur (Great Britain: Biddle Ltd., 1994), 455.

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Milner’s drive to restore Britain’s military and economic prominence in South Africa was

directly related to his desire to preserve Britain’s imperial union. Unification within British

colonies must be maintained in order to accomplish its civilizing mission. Milner truly believed

that sovereignty over the Transvaal was the first step toward the consolidation of the British

Empire.43

In a March 1898 speech at Graaf-Reiner, Milner lashed out at Kruger and blamed him for

the current unrest between the Uitlanders and the Afrikaners. He also accused Kruger of being

unprogressive in his policies and leadership.44 His public accusations caught Kruger and

Chamberlain by surprise. This was the first time that a governor of the Cape had openly criticized the citizens of his colony and the head of a foreign state, something that was never done by Milner’s predecessor, Lord Rosemead.

Milner’s Graaf-Reiner speech prompted two distinct responses. Uitlanders in South

Africa hailed him as a leader and innovator, while Chamberlain feared that Milner was creating a crisis.45 Milner’s appointment in Cape Town resulted from the perception by Chamberlain and others that Milner was a safe man with a “cross-benched mind”46 who would act in such a way as

to satisfy English public opinion. Chamberlain warned Milner that avoiding diplomatic

complications with France, Russia, and Germany required a non-confrontational strategy in

South Africa, and that public opinion at home was not ready to support any excessive changes in

South Africa. It was on this occasion that Milner’s logical perception of the right course in South

43 The Milner Papers, vol. 2, 159-60. 44 E. Halevy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, 1895-1905 (London: Ernest Benn, 1951), 71. 45 James Louis Garvin, Julian Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. III (Macmillan, 1932), 364. 46 Ibid., 366.

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Africa collided with Chamberlain’s firmness that nothing must be done to sacrifice the goodwill

of the English electorate.

Milner was exceptionally affected by Chamberlain's attempts to limit policies that Milner believed necessary to promote the British Empire in South Africa. He perceived that

Chamberlain would not allow any damage to popular support because the British government depended on it.47

It was during these early limitations that Milner became extremely critical of the party system, democracy, and parliamentary government. Party politics were a “pure struggle of ins and outs,” and worst of all there was “no separating of the local and Imperial, of the great and the small… in the same unwieldy Cabinet, which… cannot give continuous thought and study to the vital, being eternally distracted by the local and temporary…”48 Milner would come to perceive party politics with distrust and distaste. With its inefficiency, confliction, and compromises,

Milner thought, as did many of the ruling elite, that democracy, the party system, and even the

British constitution were obstructions to British imperialism.

In a letter to Lady Edward Cecil, he stated in reference to Chamberlain that, “Joe…is very strong. But Joe may, under certain circumstances, give way to the pressure of parliamentary necessities, of Party, of a rotten public opinion…But the system is wrong… I set sail in a rotten ship.”49

It was this realization that his imperial policies were directly being hindered by what he saw as the ordinary, ignorant, short-sighted, unqualified voter that caused Milner to detest British democracy. Additionally, he perceived politicians with distaste and disregard. In a 1903 letter to

47 Garvin, Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 336. 48 Edward Crankshaw, The Forsaken Idea: A Study of Viscount Milner (London: Longmans, Green, 1952), 163. 49 The Milner Papers, vol. 2, 446.

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Violet, Lady Edward Cecil, he wrote, “Perhaps a great Charlatan – political scallywag, buffoon,

liar, stump orator, and in other respects popular favourite – may someday arise, who is nevertheless a statesman…”50 Milner considered his work as a statesman to be the result of

meritocratic accomplishment and intellectual ability, not some greedy, disingenuous politician

who had an “inadequate regard for trained knowledge and complete information running through

the whole people…”51

Despite Milner’s disdain for party politics and public opinion, he did appreciate the available outlets by which they both were influenced. Having been a journalist for nearly ten years at the Pall Mall Gazette, Milner knew the importance of newspapers as a “barometer and a guide of popular thinking.”52 Learning from Sir Lord Cromer (Evelyn Baring) during his time in

Egypt, Milner put high priority on the publicizing of imperial policies “in sufficiently attractive

forms to get readers.”53 Thus, from the onset of his arrival at Cape Town, Milner aggressively

pursued creating contacts and garnering influence with journalists, but none compared to the

close friendship that Milner enjoyed with editor of the Cape Times, Edmund Garrett.

Both Garrett and Milner worked under W.T. Stead at the Pall Mall Gazette; however,

they first met in 1892 in Egypt and soon after Milner’s appointment, Garrett was one of the first

people who Milner met with in order to discuss some of the current issues in South Africa. The

connection that Milner forged with Garrett reflected closely on some of Milner’s early

apprehensions about influencing Afrikaners. In a letter to the 2nd Earl of Selborne (William

Waldegrave Palmer), Milner voiced his concerns:

50 A.D. Harvey, Collision of Empire: Britain in Three World Wars, 1793-1945 (London: The Hambledon Press, 1992), 461. 51 The Milner Papers, vol. 2, 447. 52 Andrew N. Porter, “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899,” Historical Journal, No. 16 (1973): 323-339. 53 Cromer to Milner, 27 June 1891, cit. Wrench, Milner, 119-20.

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A great effort is however being made to work up the Afrikaner feeling in view of the elections next year. As the Dutch farmers are very ignorant, and only read the papers which systematically mislead them, it is difficult to remove false impressions.54

In an attempt to remove this “false impression,” Milner used his friendship with Garrett

in order to turn the Cape Times into an imperialist, propagandist mouthpiece. The Cape Times,

of which Garrett was the editor, was both the morning paper in Cape Town and enjoyed the

largest circulation in all of South Africa.55 As a result, due to no little influence by Milner, The

Cape Times became a staunch supporter in Cape Colony and around South Africa of the

Uitlander cause. The Cape Times promotion of the Uitlanders came about “as a result of Milner’s increasingly open collaboration with Garrett…”56 Milner gained such influence over Garrett that

Milner even took part in the selection of an editor for the Johannesburg Star.

Either through charisma or friendships, Milner succeeded in manipulating the journalistic

output in South Africa with such dexterity that there was very little printed in opposition to his

policies. Milner maintained a strong presence within the press so that it could promote the very

authoritarian vision that it was charged with circumventing. What allowed Milner to be so

effective in his manipulation was that he imposed his viewpoint surreptitiously. He even

attempted to keep his encounters with Garrett secretive, but their regular meetings became so

frequent that keeping them inconspicuous was difficult.57

Milner’s alliance with Garrett proved to be so beneficial in promoting sentiment in Cape

Town towards Uitlander causes that he explored divergent avenues by which he could encourage

similar sentiment at home. He wanted to obtain an avenue by which he could stream his highly

54 Milner to Selborne, 13 Oct. 1897, Headlam, 1, 100. 55 Andrew N. Porter, “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899,” Historical Journal 16(1973): 323-339. 56 Porter, “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899,” 323-339. 57 Garrett, Fydell Edmund, and Gerald Shaw, The Garrett Papers (Cape Town: Van Riebeeck Society, 1984), 36.

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biased information and opinions into London and avoid opposition to his official dispatches. On

the suggestion of Phillip Lyttelton Gell, a director of the British South Africa Company, Milner approved a plan that would extend his influence into Britain.58

He would hire a new editor of one of the imperialist controlled newspapers, the Star, and

have its editor serve as the South African correspondent for the London Times. Not only did he

continue to work closely with Garrett, but his influence over the Star enabled him to determine

the opinions expressed in many newspapers. It was from these editors as local correspondents, or

from their papers via the news agencies, that the English gained the bulk of their knowledge

about South Africa.59

In 1899, Chamberlain began to establish policy in South Africa that closely reflected

Milner’s original support of the Uitlanders. Chamberlain, however, embarked on a South African policy that would productively garner home support. Recognizing the substantial effect that

Milner had on the attitude of Englishmen at home, Chamberlain had Milner promulgate a detailed indictment of the Boers. On May 4, 1899, Milner produced his famous “Helot dispatch.”

The document laid out Uitlander grievance against the South African Republic. Chamberlain’s timing in requesting the Helot dispatch was opportune, for shortly after the dispatch reached the

Colonial Office, a petition from British Uitlanders arrived in London requesting assistance from the Queen in ameliorating their maltreatment. Both Milner’s dispatch and the Uitlander’s petition helped Chamberlain fortify home support.60

After receiving approval from the cabinet, Chamberlain drafted a document that accepted the Uitlander appeal to the Crown. At the end of this dispatch, Chamberlain proposed a meeting

58 Porter, “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899,” 323-339. 59 Andrew N. Porter, “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899,” Historical Journal 16(1973): 323-339. 60 Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Boer War 1899-1902 (Osprey Publishing, 2003), 31.

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between Milner and President Kruger intended to resolve foreign and domestic problems in

South Africa.

Milner was convinced, however, that any additional negotiations with Kruger would be pointless. In Milner’s opinion, war with the Transvaal was both inevitable and desirable.

Chamberlain, though, remained skeptical that war, at this point, had become Britain’s only viable option. Chamberlain believed war could be averted if Kruger realized that Britain would fight rather than abandon the Uitlanders. It was Chamberlain’s belief that the threat of war would be enough to frighten Kruger into accepting British concessions. Yet the administrative threat of force failed to frighten Kruger primarily because he knew that British public opinion would not support a war.

Under Secretary of State Lord Selborne wrote to Chamberlain on June 23 1899, telling him that, “Public opinion does not yet realize the supreme importance of the crisis; that it does not understand that Kruger’s word cannot be trusted and that he never has yielded and never will yield a point till a pistol is put at his head; and that consequently the Government do not feel strong enough to apply that pressure which alone can fulfill their policy without war.”61

Finally, Chamberlain insinuated that if negotiation failed, war would follow. Known as

the Bloemfontein Conference, the meeting between Milner and Kruger was a complete failure

due to ultimatums issued by Milner that Kruger in turn rejected. It is unclear whether the

publication of both the Helot dispatch and the Uitlander petition in June 1899 was Chamberlain’s

61 Godfrey Hugh Lancelot Le May, British Supremacy in South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 22.

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attempt to garner public support; regardless, he received it on October 12 when war began with

the invasion of British territory by Boer commandoes.62

As the war in South Africa continued, Milner’s status and public recognition skyrocketed.

His Graaf-Reinet speech and Bloemfontein negotiations implanted him in the public eye as a

firm, confident imperial statesman who foresaw the oncoming storm in South Africa. He was the

new champion of the Imperial cause.63

Milner’s confidence extended to the reconstructing of the civil administration in both the

Transvaal and the Orange Free State even before the war was over. In June 1902 at the Treaty of

Vereeniging, the Boer republics agreed to come under the sovereignty of the British Crown and the British government. Within a month of signing the treaty, the Letters Patent, which established a new system of Crown Colony Government in the conquered territories, was established.

Milner’s Kindergarten

By the end of 1901, Lord Milner had assembled a staff of young men completely devoted to the British imperial dream of reconstructing a united South Africa within an empire of autonomous nations. Reflecting his credo, Milner believed that the success of South African reconstruction would turn on his ability “to strike fresh roots in distant parts.”64 Those “fresh

roots” proved to be inexperienced English men from Oxford and the “distant parts” was to be

South Africa. Milner astutely perceived that reconstruction in South Africa would serve as the

model by which the Britishization of the rest of the dominions would follow, and that in order to

62 Eric Anderson Walker, The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume 8 (Cambridge University Press, 1963), 611. 63 Francis Hugh De Souza, A Question of Treason (Durban: Kiaat Creations, 2004), 53. 64 Bill Schwarz, Memories of Empire: The White Man’s World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 99.

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extend the likelihood of future infiltration and application efforts, he would have to seek young

men. By having young impressionable men in his service, Milner could easily implant his vision

of South African reconstruction into the heads of his naïve, inexperienced minions and they

would do what he asked without much contestation.

In a personal correspondence to Sir Percy Fitzpatrick in 1900, he stated that,

…I mean to have young men. There will be a regular rumpus and a lot of talk about boys and Oxford and jobs and all that… Well I value brains and character more than experience. First class men of experience are not to be got. Nothing one could offer would tempt them to give up what they have… No! I shall not be here for very long but when I go I mean to leave behind me young men with plenty of work in them…65

Milner took great care in the selection of the men he was to employ. The power and opportunity that he was going to afford these men exceed menial tasks or bureaucratic service;

Milner intended to offer, under his direction, a chance for a select few to remake an entire country. Milner recruited men who had the stamina to accept an undertaking and complete it regardless of the opposition. Additionally, youth was by no means a singular necessity. Although he trusted and believed in youth, he was primarily pursuing men of ability, education, energy, initiative, open mindedness, and willingness to work for a small salary.

Milner did not have to look very far to find men intent on assisting him with the challenge of South African reconstruction. The opportunity of working towards the preservation of the British imperial mission proved enticing, and Milner possessed the ability to inspire the youth around him. One of the young men to apprentice under Milner, Robert Brand, recalled how Milner “inspire all those who worked with him with admiration and affection.”66

The recruitment of young men (upon whom he had the greatest influence and ability to attract) from Oxford to South Africa was substantially informal. Milner relied on personal

65 Gollin, Proconsul in Politics, 41. 66 Robert Brand, The Listener, 15 Oct. 1953, 631.

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friendships, contacts in the Colonial Office, and Oxford associations in order to collect the names

of young men who would suit his purpose. But when his recruits were eventually drawn together

in South Africa, they became a cohesive group of administrators who formed close friendships

with each other.67 This group came to be known as the Kindergarten.

Initially meant as a pejorative term popularized by a former judge advocate general, Sir

William Marriott, the Kindergarten was a direct reference to those men who worked and lived in

close contact with Milner, with each other, and were all graduates of Oxford, mainly New

College. The group soon became proud of the title and regarded membership in the Kindergarten as a distinction of the first quality.

By the end of 1901, Milner had recruited five men: J.F. Perry, Lionel Curtis, Patrick

Duncan, Hugh Wyndham, and Geoffrey Robinson. They made up the nucleus of the

Kindergarten, which was later expanded to include John Dove, Robert H. Brand, Lionel

Hichens, Douglas O. Malcolm, and Philip Kerr.68 They were suitably named since the eldest of

them was Patrick Duncan at thirty one and the youngest being Philip Kerr at twenty three.

Though youthful and inexperienced, they were extremely talented, and were often perceived as

arrogant and overly opinionated due to their eagerness.

Correspondent for The Times, Leo Amery, contended in his autobiography that Milner’s belief in youth, energy and adaptability, combined with first-class brains, solidified his faith in the abilities of the Kindergarten despite the shortcomings inherent within their youth. As a result, the Kindergarten often made mistakes that were attributed to being too “cocksure.” Still, Amery

67 Donald Denoon, A Grand Illusion: The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony During the Periods of Reconstruction 1900-1905 (Longman, 1973), 52. 68 Lionel Curtis, With Milner in South Africa (Blackwell, 1951), 344-5.

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credits that their “…sheer enthusiasm, ability, devotion to duty and passionate loyalty to their

chief they achieved a gigantic task (South African reconstruction).”69

Other observers, however, were much more critical of the Kindergarten and what was

justified as youthful intransigence. They were often described as a “small band of fledglings;

most of them trained in public schools and universities of England.”70 Additionally, many

complained that their “youth was accompanied by a display of superiority and assertiveness

foreign to the customs of colonial life.”71

Despite their youth and inexperience, the Kindergarten was awarded considerable

responsibility designed to afford them administrative experience and to direct a planned society,

all aimed at achieving South African unification.72 They all played intricate parts in promoting

Milner’s cause in unifying South Africa, and, strangely enough, though they were a very small element within the newly-established South African government, they enjoyed great influence.

Under the direction of Milner, the members of the Kindergarten were given real administrative

responsibilities which allowed them to develop their talents early on. Many were directly

involved with South African reconstruction and regularly dealt with both Africaners and

Uitlanders in mitigating conflict so that they could promote South African unification.73

Due to their youth, shared living quarters, and close association with each other, the

members of the Kindergarten developed among themselves a strong camaraderie during their

years in South Africa. Yet, the most prominent influence within their youthful ideologies was

their connection with Milner. In their eyes, he epitomized strong leadership, but he empowered

69 Leopold Stennett Amery, My Political Life: The unforgiving years, 1929-1940 (Hutchinson, 1955), 177. 70 Richard Goldmann, A South African Remembers (Cape Times, 1947), 132. 71 Goldmann, A South African Remembers, 132. 72 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 13. 73 Ibid., 18.

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them with the discretion to move freely within their responsibilities. But because they were

under the authority of a single man (Milner), their handling of interdepartmental cooperation often caused them to come across as head strong and arrogant in their attempts to resolve

problems.

Their shared values and their similar ideologies reflected the prevailing attitudes of

Victorian Oxford. Race relations, native questions, conceptual organic unity between British dominions were at the forefront of their concerns. They shared the belief that English civilization was superior to other civilizations that were under the rule or suzerainty of the British Empire; they had been indoctrinated with this air of superiority during their time at Oxford. They were religious in their belief that the imperial mission was the only positive solution to imperial problems, and they were divinely tasked with its implementation.74

The Kindergarten’s displays of superiority can be attributed to both their elite upbringing

and Milner himself, for he made certain to surround himself with likeminded young men who he

could easily influence. There were two important matters that Milner passed on to his

Kindergarten. The first was his disdain of the party system, and the second was that of racial

treatment of the native question.

Throughout Milner’s stay in South Africa, he was extremely critical of the party system,

democratic procedures, and parliamentary government. He clearly voiced his aversion to party

politics and the “shifts and compromises to which politicians were driven, and he was convinced

that colonial and imperial policies should not be a party subject.”75 Milner staunchly distrusted

74 Walter Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men: The “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press), 17. 75 Milner to Lady Rdward Cecil, 25 March, 2 April, and 16 May 1903, Headlam, The Milner Papers, vol. 2, 446-8.

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democracy, and he was sure to voice and embed his criticisms into the Kindergarten members.

This strongly affected the way the Kindergarten was to carry out its duties in South Africa.

When it came to the native question (how to deal with Boers and Britons in relation to tribal natives), the Kindergarten followed Milner’s incorporation of social Darwinism into administrative prerogative. Milner believed that South Africa had to be ruled by white men, for they were “elevated by many, many steps above the black man.”76 According to Milner, it would be centuries before the black population in Africa could lift itself to the level of white established civility and modernity. He believed, however, that white men could legitimize subordinating the black populace only if white men were able to use “superior civilization” for the benefit of blacks, and if individual blacks could not make progress towards a British standard of civility, then they should be treated appropriately.

The Kindergarten followed Milner in subordination of blacks in South Africa in treatment and policy. They inherited the duty to raise black men to a more civilized position, and that the treatment of blacks within South African society would be based on the level of civilization that individual members were able to achieve.77

Some of these perceived benefits included educating natives in developing their own

aptitudes. He adopted Rhodes’s maxim in these matters: “equal rights for every civilized man.”78

This was a deceptive phrase. It appeared to be high-minded and progressive, but in reality it was

76 The Milner Papers, vol. 2, 467. 77 P. Eric Louw, The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004), 17. 78 Gordon Le Sueur, Cecil Rhodes: the man and his work (Harvard University: McBride, Nast & company, 1914), 76.

32 based on a deep-seated belief in white supremacy. Indeed, the white man would always decide who was or was not civilized.79

By mirroring Milner’s ideology exactingly, the Kindergarten put on the visage of impressionability in the way all of its members so quickly and easily parroted the Milnerian plans for South Africa. When Milner’s tenure as high commissioner of South Africa and governor-general of the Transvaal came to an end in April 1905, he was optimistic that the reforms that he had instituted would remain intact, and that he had achieved his goal of a united and prosperous South Africa firmly tied to the British Empire.80 His legacy would not easily dissipate for he had been sure to leave a cadre of young, able men motivated to continue his work.

79 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 10. 80 Nimocks, Milner’s young men, 55.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE KINDERGARTEN, THE SELBORNE MEMORANDUM, SOUTH AFRICAN UNIFICATION AND THE ROUNDTABLE MOVEMENT

With Milner’s departure in April 1905, the Kindergarten was left to occupy key positions in the Transvaal Administration under Lord Selborne. These positions included colonial secretary, colonial treasurer, town clerk, and secretary of the intercolonial council.81 Fulfilling

the drive to earn the approval of their former leader, the Kindergarten was anxious to put their

exceptional and diverse talents to work. Yet, they found themselves confronted by countrywide

economic depression, which would put their talents to the test.

Economic friction among the colonies was fueling isolationist sentiment in the Transvaal,

and the Kindergarten feared that South Africa was dissolving into groupings hostile to British

control. Additionally, rate wars were stifling railway production, rebellions were erupting with

Natal Natives, and British commercial communities were suffering from Boer agricultural

solidarity.82 Richard Feetham was one of the first Kindergarten members to voice this concern.

“…We have to think out at once a concrete plan - a definite goal to which it is our business to

find the best and shortest way, and to start at once.”83

The Kindergarten’s concerns in remedying the economic stagnation in South Africa was

exceeded only by the immediacy that they assigned to the implementation of any concrete plan

that they would eventually craft. If Britain’s imperial tie to South Africa was being weakened by

disunion, then it was upon their shoulders to create closer union within the colonies.

81 L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 61. 82 “South Africa. The Natal Trouble. Unrest Spreading,” The Advertiser, February 20, 1906, Article. 83 Richard Feetham, “Some Problems of South Africa Federation and Reasons for Facing them,” read to the Fortnightly Club, Johannesburg, on 4 Oct. 1906.

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Heavily concerned with British imperial preservation, the Kindergarten hesitated to take a strong stance towards consolidation of South Africa. Consolidation meant unification, and unification would readily place Boers in positions of authority throughout South Africa. But while a possible abandonment of Milnerian goals, the Kindergarten realized that unification would promote an environment of economic prosperity and political security which would, in turn, encourage British immigration. As Sir Percy Fitzpatrick put it, “The future, as I see it, lies this way: both races hope for prosperity, prosperity means expansion, expansion means immigration, and immigration means British!”84

In their discussions, the Kindergarten concluded that in order to strengthen British influence in South Africa, economic stability would be crucial to attracting a continuous stream of British immigrants. An increase of British immigrants would ensure a British political majority in South Africa, and they believed that the surest way to accomplish this goal was through closer union. The only issue remaining was whether their former leader would embrace such a solution.

On this point Milner expressed reservations about whether unification of the colonies would be a wise decision, for unification was sure to place Boers in positions of significant authority. He believed that unification would be safe only after a strong influx of British settlers had outnumbered the Afrikaners. To test the viability of this strategy, unification would have to be placed on hold so that adequate time could be afforded to potential British immigrants to emigrate to South Africa.

In an address delivered to the Bloemfontein Town Council, Milner stated that unification

84 John Peter Richard Wallis, Fitz: The Story of Sir Percy Fitzpatrick (London: Macmillan Press, 1955), 137.

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May take years; it may take far longer than is generally supposed. In any case, I am not sanguine enough to anticipate that it can possibly come in my time, and indeed, when you consider all the difficulties which have to be got over, while there is no reason to despair of the ultimate attainment of that end, I think more harm than good is done by expecting to see it come sooner than it possibly can come… I have learned to be very patient; and I don’t expect to see the accomplishment of my hopes during my residence in South Africa, or perhaps during my lifetime.85

Milner’s vision of achieving British control over South Africa by gradually promoting a

British-oriented population was fading. His large scale immigration scheme failed because it did not find the economic support that he believed increased mining would attract. As a result, the

Kindergarten abandoned Milner’s model which relied heavily on position politics--i.e., maintaining Britons in positions of authority, and adhered to a different tactical approach aimed at immediately consolidating the various areas of British South Africa into one nation.

Milner’s skepticism failed to weaken the Kindergarten’s resolve in pursuing closer union.

If anything, their push for immediate unification followed what they perceived as a necessity if

British rule and influence were going to dominate the colonial landscape. This influence would be fortified only through a strong centralized government under British direction. A central government was essential if economic stability were to be achieved and the native question dealt with uniformly.86

South African unification was by no means the conceptual child of the Kindergarten. On multiple occasions, South African colonies had attempted to unify but were hindered by either

British interference or internal friction. Even before what would later become the Kindergarten’s

1906 initiative to unify South Africa, interest in unification had been debated and discussed for some time but without success. In order to ensure that that closer union would be achieved, the

85 Remarks to the Bloemfontein Town Council, Jan. 25, 1904, Headlam, II, 501-502. 86 John E. Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 26.

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Kindergarten needed to clearly communicate to both Boers and Britons the dangers that existed

in disunion. To do so, it was suggested (not clear by whom) “that somebody ought to get busy

preparing a memorandum stating clearly, by means of facts and statistics, the dangers of disunion

in South Africa and indicating Union as the only remedy.”87 The memorandum would become known as the Selborne memorandum.

The Selborne Memorandum

The purpose of the Selborne memorandum was to accomplish three things. The first was to analyze the existing relationship between the colonies, the second was to organize a formal request for unification, and the third was to draft a constitution suggesting the specific form unification might take. Lionel Curtis, who was to be the “Organizing Secretary” of the project, was charged with collecting information and drafting a memorandum that would present arguments for closer union. As draftsman, Curtis would travel throughout South Africa and collect information that would aid in examining conditions in the various colonies. He would then submit reports on each stage of his work for the other members to evaluate. Afterwards, their findings would be submitted to Lord Selborne for his final approval.88

While Curtis’s work on the memorandum was still in its preliminary stages, he sent

Milner a letter outlining what he hoped would be accomplished. Though Milner’s role of high commissioner was occupied by Selborne, there remained within the Kindergarten an open and obvious desire for Milner’s approval. More importantly, Curtis knew that the road to closer union would be smoother with Milner’s assistance and that it would be a costly enterprise.

87 H. Milford, Selborne Memorandum: A review of the mutual relations of the British South African colonies in 1907 (Oxford University Press, 1925), xv. 88 David E. Torrance, The Strange Death of the Liberal Empire: Lord Selborne in South Africa (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 146.

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Being a trustee of the Rhodes Trust, Milner was able to garner financial support for the project; there were, nonetheless, a few stipulations made. Most notably, the members of the

Rhodes Trust required that Selborne’s hand in the preparation of the memorandum remain secret and that the source of the financial support, the Rhodes Foundation, remain secret as well.89

Milner worried that if news pointed to strong British involvement, it would “excite local

prejudice against them (the Kindergarten) on the score of ‘dictation’ (by the Crown).”90

After receiving the support he required, Curtis spent much of September and October

touring the four South Africa colonies and assessing the attitudes of the British Afrikaner

population toward union. Curtis found that the promotion of unification was timely. Having

obtained electoral victories in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, Boer leaders no

longer feared that a British majority would dictate law and policy.91

Absent strong resistance from South African British authority or Boer leadership, Curtis

began to meet weekly with other members of the Kindergarten, where they would discuss their

plans and critically assess Curtis’s findings. These meetings were termed “moots,” and at them

the Kindergarten covered a wide range of issues relevant to unification and to South Africa’s

position in the imperial framework. These discussions proved to be valuable, leading to the

formation of the Fortnightly Club. The role of these inner committees was to discuss and

examine new problems that would arise and it served as an excellent forum to air their ideas.92

89 The stipulations can be found from extensive letters written by Milner to Robinson, 21 Sept. 1906, Dawson Papers, précised by Nimocks. 90J. Lee Thompson, Forgotten Patriot: A Life of Alfred, Viscount Milner of St. James’s and Cape Town, 1854-1925 (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007), 249. 91Leonard Monteath Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 63. 92 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 26.

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The meetings extended beyond the Kindergarten members themselves; occasionally men not associated with the Kindergarten were brought in as guests. This “outside assistance and support” was needed both to facilitate both cooperation and backing from men in authoritative positions, and also to persuade them to support the Kindergarten’s goals. However genuine these invitations and moots may have appeared, only the members of the Kindergarten were kept within the inner circle of strategy and confidence, while the true motivations behind the

Kindergarten’s purposes remained veiled in intense secrecy. As Kerr put it, “There is great secrecy about the whole thing.”93

Secrecy was an essential if the Selborne Memorandum, later called A Review of the

Present Mutual Relations of the British South African Colonies, were to achieve its ends. The

Kindergarten feared, whether contrived or sincere, that the memorandum would be rejected altogether if the Afrikaner leadership discovered the source of the memorandum back to

Selborne.94 By keeping their plans for unification secretive, they were able to strategically maneuver around perceived opposition and deceptively obscure the source of the memorandum.

In their attempts to avoid any possible offense, the Kindergarten constructed a scenario in which Selborne could circulate the memorandum in such a way as to create the illusion that the study had been conducted at the request of one of the four colonial governments. The author of this elaborate fiction, Curtis, approached Leander Starr Jameson, the prime minister of Cape

Colony, and requested his assistance in circulating the memorandum. Willing to cooperate,

Jameson, on November 28, publicly requested that the high commissioner review the current conditions in South Africa and complete a feasibility study on South African unification. Upon

93 Quoted without citation in Butler, Lothian, 22. 94 Walter Nimocks, Milner’s young men: the “Kindergarten” in Edwardian Imperial affairs (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968) 86.

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receiving the go-ahead, Selborne distributed copies of Jameson’s request to the governments of

the other states. The response was resoundingly positive, and Selborne clarified that he had not

drafted the memorandum, but that the unnamed group who did deserved great praise for

undertaking and completing such a difficult task.95

Curtis remained concerned that the other South African governments would begin to

oppose the memorandum if they believed that it was an attempt by the imperial government to

force unification upon South Africa, or if it were going to subordinate Afrikaner status. Because,

if not distracted and deceived, Afrikaners could realize that the memorandum would lead to a

South African unification that would directly serve the interests of British South Africans and the

Empire, and Curtis wanted to ensure that any obstructions to the memorandum would remain

minimal. Curtis put additional measures in motion that would guarantee the acceptance of the

memorandum. Following strategies employed by Milner during the Boer War, Curtis was

convinced that he needed to influence and control avenues of information dissemination. As

Milner did with Edmund Garrett and The Cape Times, Curtis needed a mouthpiece aimed at the

South African readership. Curtis turned to the magazine that was started by the Kindergarten to

promote closer union: The State.

Conceived during a Kindergarten moot and edited by Kerr, The State was a monthly

publication written in both English and Dutch.96 It was the only publication of its time to bridge

the ethnic and language barriers in order to support unification. A.L. Burt would later go on to

describe The State as “the most important factor in creating the public opinion that carried Union

95 Cmd. 3564, (1919-56), p. 9. 96 James Ramsey Montagu Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1960), 30.

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through.”97 Curtis utilized The State as both a public education platform and an outright propaganda tool. This plan is illustrated in the January 19, 1909 edition that claimed the L.S.

Jameson’s feasibility study that led to the distribution of the Selborne Memorandum was prompted by a series of articles in the Afrikaner newspaper Ons Land.98

The six articles that The State referenced did in fact exist. They were published by a

young Afrikaner who was the editor of Ons Land, Francis S. Malan. Despite being an Afrikaner,

Malan was a strong supporter of immediate unification. Through the prompting of Curtis, Malan

continued to publish articles in Ons Land that favored unification, and, when the time came,

Malan helped distribute the memorandum to the public.99 Pointing to Malan’s articles as the

actual source of Jameson’s feasibility study is, however, fallacious. The Kindergarten deemed it

prudent to hide the true origins of the memorandum, so they intricately constructed an alternate

reality that would keep them hidden from the spotlight.100

The second measure that Curtis employed was a strong public appeal for economic

growth. In order for the Selborne Memorandum to remain viable, unification had to solve the

many economic, social, and political problems that confronted South Africa. To confront the

economic problems, Curtis decided to use the current railroad controversy as a supportive

example. There was significant concern among all four South African governments that

economic development in South Africa was being hindered due to railway inefficiency. Friction

between governments was then kept at a minimum because of ongoing consolidation efforts to

97 A.L. Burt, review of Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940, by J.R.M. Butler, The Journal of Modern History, XXXIII (Sept., 1961), 342. 98 Written by editor F.S. Malan, the articles urged immediate unification upon South Africa. State, I, No. 1 (Jan., 1909), 19. 99 Nimocks, Milner’s young men, 89. 100 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 29.

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create a functional, reciprocal railroad system. But, even these measures were sure to collapse the moment the interests of the colonial governments conflicted.101

Soon after the memorandum had been circulated to the colonial governments, Selborne distributed an appendix titled South African Railway Unification and its Effect on Railway Rates.

Selborne took no credit for the report; he did, however, claim that it was “a valuable contribution to the study of the railway problem in South Africa by a gentleman who has had opportunities of giving very special attention to the subject.”102

The author of the report was none other than Philip Kerr. Under the critical eye of Brand,

Hichens, and Duncan, Kerr’s report recommended the creation of a state-owned railway system

managed by an independent commission which, in turn, would receive its authority from a

unified South African government. Writing home to his mother, Kerr claimed that his report “is

designed to prove that we can’t get sound railway management in South Africa until they are

unified.”103 Kerr’s report recommended that a state-owned railway system needed to be created and managed by an independent commission which would be controlled by a unified South

African government.104 Kerr’s report would later be used in the Union Constitution to determine railroad provisions throughout South Africa.

Curtis’s preventive measures proved effective. After its release to the press and the general public in July, the newspapers and political response around South Africa was positive.

Even the reaction from the general public appeared favorable due to the belief that unification would create a strong independent South Africa.

The Times reported that:

101 C.M. Bruce, The New Transvaal (London, England: Alston Rivers Ltd., 1908), 97. 102 Cd. 3564, (1900-1918), p. 63. 103 From a letter from Kerr to his mother. Quoted without citation in ibid., p. 23. 104 Nimocks, Milner’s young men, 87.

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Lord Selborne’s memorandum is admitted throughout the country to be a State document of extreme importance…. (It) is a consensus of opinion that the memorandum sheds a new light on the whole subject, arrays the essential facts lucidly and temperately crystallizes ideas which hitherto have often been vaguely and indefinitely expressed and gives a strong stimulus to a wider and more careful consideration of South African federation as an immediate practical policy instead of a remote ideal. The trend of South African thought, Dutch as well as British, seems to be in this direction.105

Even with the initial positive reactions that the memorandum was generating, the

Kindergarten expected that overall support would be sluggish at best. But what they perceived to

be an indifferent general public proved to be a mass of white South Africans clamoring to

support immediate unification. Even previous hostility from the Boer political leadership waned

once their authority was secured. In response to how quickly the memorandum was gaining

support, Curtis enthusiastically wrote that “I scarcely dreamed (at the beginning) that the

movement could make so much progress in so little time. But the grass was very dry and the

flames ran the movement the match was dropped into it.”106

The Closer Union Movement

In order to preserve the momentum that the memorandum was gaining, the Kindergarten decided to create a popular movement called “The Closer Union Movement.” The purpose of the movement was to create local organization centers where the general public could go to better understand the benefits of immediate unification. In a few short months, the number of union societies had risen to sixty and had been established in cities and towns through South Africa.107

The membership of these closer union societies included both Boers and British leadership. It

was important to Curtis that the movement included local leaders who were capable of

105 Geoffrey Robinson, the Times, July 6, 1907. 106 Curtis to Jebb, Sept. 30, 1908, Jebb Papers. 107 The State, I (Jan., 1909), 19.

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influencing their constituency, so that when needed, the Kindergarten could assert their influence at the provincial level.

The closer union groups held regular meetings during which papers on constitutional issues were read and guest speakers were brought in to extoll the benefits that came with unification. Harmoniously, the Kindergarten integrated a periodical publication that would allow them to disperse propaganda to the general public, and to facilitate specific instruction to the leadership of the various branches. From the time of their establishment until the passing of a unified South African constitution, The Closer Union Movement served to increase local interest in unification.

The Kindergarten’s efforts proved beneficial when in August the Imperial Parliament approved a constitution in the form of the South African Act, and the Union of South Africa was formally established. It had been four years since the Kindergarten first met at Moot House and decided to promote immediate unification in South Africa. With the accomplishment of South

African unification, the Kindergarten members readily accepted credit for the achievement, and third party commentary that followed was even more generous in its praises.

Paul Knaplund in 1924 wrote that “it appears certain that without the aid of the young

Britons trained in the neoimperialistic school of Chamberlain and Lord Milner the union could not have come into existence at this early date.”108 Sir Evelyn Wrench would later add that “…it is impossible to over-estimate the importance of the part played by the members of the

Kindergarten, in paving the way for closer union of South Africa after Milner had left.”109 And according to Vladimir Halperin, “It was principally through their efforts (the Kindergarten) that

108 Paul Knaplund, “The Unification of South Africa: A Study in British Colonial Policy,” Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters, XXI (July, 1924), 20. 109 Sir Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and our Times, (Hutchinson, 1955), 53.

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the Union of South Africa came into being.” Current scholarship, however, is much less convinced of the Kindergarten’s impact on South African unification.

In his detailed history of the Kindergarten, Walter Nimcocks states that,

It is obvious from the account just presented that Milner’s young men did not unite South Africa. Their efforts were important in bringing closer union to the attention of the general population and keeping it there. And members of the group did exert some influence upon those, both British and Boer, who determined the final form of the constitution. But forces far more powerful than anything the kindergarten could muster were responsible for South African unification.110

To say that the Kindergarten was the sole reason for South African unification would be absurd. There were many forces and groups whose efforts contributed to the union. Still, the significance of the Kindergarten’s participation was the method of unification that they were now convinced was effective. This method focused on organized propaganda and behind-the- scenes discussion.111 Even Nimcocks concurred that “By political manipulation, public education, and outright propaganda they did everything in their power to unify South Africa.

And South Africa was unified.”112 The unification of South African had a profound and lasting

effect on the group, particularly on Curtis and Kerr, bolstering their confidence and affirming

them in their goals.113

However successful the Kindergarten’s efforts were in uniting South Africa, their central goal remained the promotion and preservation of the British Empire.114 To them, the achievement of unification was merely a trial by which they could then apply what they had learned to creating a more rational organization of the British model. Robert Brand would later describe their efforts in South Africa as merely a first step towards a more global scheme. In a

110 Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men, 121. 111 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 45. 112 Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men, 120. 113 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 24. 114 (Interview Lord Brand, London, May 3, 1960.)

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letter to Richard Jebb, Curtis affirmed that from the very inception of the Kindergarten’s push for

South African unification, the group intended to apply what it learned to strengthening the

British Empire. Curtis would write, “As you know it has always been our idea to unite South

Africa and then try to make some scheme for closer Imperial Union grow out of it.”115

To the Kindergarten, the viability of unity in South Africa demonstrated that imperial unity was inevitable, and that they were the mechanism by which this new unity would come to pass. And why should they not be? They were young, well educated, and now experienced.

Through this experience, they had developed methods for circumventing governmental inefficiencies, and they had formulated political and social structures that would aid in manipulating public opinion. Previous limitations inherent within conflicting regulations and provincial jealousies now gave way, and a more effective imperial administration could be formed as long as its foundations were embedded within a strong centralized power.

This centralized power would help create a commonwealth of British nations that could liberate and modernize the world. Progress could be brought to backward and impoverished lands and millions would benefit. Yet this altruism was not the Kindergarten’s primary motivation in promoting imperial unity. A unified British imperial power was a strong imperial power. And in the case of the Kindergarten, much of their idealism was given additional intellectual force by Milner himself. As mentioned earlier, Milner’s experiences in Egypt had fortified the belief that Britishization of the world was necessary if it were to progress beyond provincialism, and according to Lothian, “he worshipped it (the Empire), not because he liked to

115 Curtis to Jebb, Dec. 6 (1908), Jebb papers.

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see the map painted red, but because… he saw in …its… ideals the principal hope for the

progress of mankind.”116

While Milner had been away from South Africa and the Kindergarten, he had been independently promoting imperial unification on his own. British hegemony was waning as the

United Kingdom was falling behind both the United States and Germany in industry.

Additionally, Germany’s naval fleet was growing at such a rapid rate that it would soon be able to challenge the Royal Navy. Global competitors were arising, and Milner perceived Britain as growing increasingly fractious.117 In this menancing international environment, Britain needed to bolster itself lest it lose its preeminence to a hostile competitor.

In addition to the many public appearances that he made and speeches that he delivered,

Milner was also active in many British organizations formed for the discussion of imperial affairs and the advocacy of imperial union.118 Though much of Milner’s contributions during

this period appeared focused and open, the majority of his efforts and intentions remained out of

public view. He spent much of his time gathering information and creating proper connections in

order to confer his imperial federation vision.

There remained, however, inconsistency between his public work and private agenda. For instance, while touring Canada, he delivered a speech titled “The Nation and the Empire” in which he claimed that federative union between Britain and Canada was a distant possibility. He was, nonetheless, sure to form small groups of Canadians to work secretly towards the goal closer union: “I think every member of your body should feel it his principal business to

116 Philip Kerr, “Lord Milner,” Nation and Athenaeum, May 23, 1925. 117 Paul M. Kennedy, “The development of German naval operations plans 1896-1914,” in Paul M. Kennedy, The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 (London, 1979), pp. 171-98. 118 Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union, 46.

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influence as many people as possible who are not of it and who do not know they are being

influenced.”119

Despite Milner’s efforts, by 1908 he still had been unable to establish an empire wide organization capable of influencing Britain’s imperial structure. Despite the support he did enjoy on the home front, Milner longed for additional assistance from dedicated like-minded men on whom he could rely. Curtis contacted Milner in November and requested to be part of the upcoming imperial solution that was being developed by Milner and Leo Amery.120

Of course, Curtis was not simply speaking for himself but also for the Kindergarten, and

Milner was happy to merge efforts. Eager to demonstrate to Milner their new knowledge and

ability, the Kindergarten drew up a detailed proposal that reviewed the strengths and weaknesses

of the new movement. Within the proposal was the recommendation that institutions were to be

used for imperial ends, and it was decided that Curtis would travel throughout the empire

locating people who could be trusted to support the movement.

The Roundtable Movement

By March 1909, the Kindergarten had developed a step-by-step plan to unify the Empire.

This plan mirrored the process that had proved successful in South Africa. Just as the Selborne

Memorandum, The Closer Union of Societies, and The State were all necessary and effective pieces that contributed to South African unification, the Kindergarten desired to duplicate on an imperial scale all these devices. This plan came to be called “The Round Table Movement.”

119 Carroll Quigley, “The Round Table Groups in Canada, 1908-38,” Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 43, no.3 (September 1962), pp. 204-24. 120 Curtis to Milner, 31 Oct. 1908, box 77, Milner Papers

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One of their first meetings took place at Lord Anglesey’s house, Plas Newydd, in the first week of September 1909.121 It was at this meeting that the goal and form of empirical unity would take shape. It was concluded that co-operation between the Dominions and Britain would not be enough to hold the Empire together. Instead, it was necessary to create a form of organic unity: As Lothian would put it, “That is to say the creation of a central sovereign authority directly elected by the people of the Empire which shall control policy and services such as army and navy, and raise taxation through its own officers.”122 However, the appearance of co-

operation should be made until “people realized that the principle of co-operation had broken

down.”123

First garnering support from people in positions of influence, Curtis then began to gather information from around the world in order to draft his new memorandum. Even as he traveled about gathering information for it, Curtis intended to discuss the matter informally and to locate in each nation of the Empire people who could be trusted to support their cause.

While Curtis traveled throughout the Dominions promoting what would be later called

“the Green Memorandum,” Kerr was editing the first issue of The Round Table journal. Both

Milner and the Kindergarten had decided that a single journal was more representative of what they were trying to achieve within imperial unification then to just establish magazines for each

Dominion. Thus, The Round Table journal would be made up of contributions from each

Dominion. The aim of the journal was to strengthen in Britain and the Dominions a sense of common imperial identity to prepare the ground for a federal movement. The Round Table

121 James Ramsey Montagu Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1960), 36. 122 To Brand, 1 Nov. 1909, Lothian in BUTLER 39. 123 Minutes of meeting 4-6 Sept. 1909.

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recruited a number of young professionals in the Dominions into study groups and challenged

these groups to think about the imperial future.124

In support of the Green Memorandum, the first series of articles for The Round Table journal was written by Kerr on the topic of the Anglo-German Rivalry. With the relative decline of Britain as an industrial power and the massive increase of the German naval fleet, Kerr feared that “Germanism… if it is allowed to become powerful… will destroy (England’s) freedom, and with it the foundation on which the Empire rests.”125

These early articles revealed a great deal about The Round Table’s agenda and what they perceived to be a serious hindrance to British imperial vitality. The one common interest that

Round Table members from the dominions recognized was the problem of defense and foreign policy. Beginning in 1908, Germany decided to expand its naval fleet. This was a strong cause for alarm among the Round Table members since the very viability of the British Empire was premised on naval superiority.126 This naval scare resulted in an expansion of the British navy, leading to one of the first modern arms races. Still, the naval scare of 1909 strengthened the

Kindergarten’s resolve that imperial union was essential.

In fact, it was the German question in South Africa that helped initiate the Boer War. In

1895, Cecil Rhodes’s conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Transvaal resulted from what he called “German intrigues.” Rhodes would later justify the coup before a Select

Committee of the House of Commons by stating that he had become convinced that the

Transvaal was trying to “introduce the influence of another foreign power into the already

124 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the quest for world order (Praeger, 2006), 2. 125 Philip Kerr, “the New Problem of Imperial Defense,” The Round Table, 1, no. 3 (May 1911), pp. 231-62. 126 Matthew S. Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 103.

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complicated system of South Africa, and thereby render more difficult the closer union of the

different states.”127 One of Rhodes contemporaries and colleagues, Sir Herbert Baker, would

later explain that “…The (Jameson) Raid and the Anglo-Boer War… (were) the first act of the

drama of the German wars.”128

It is of the upmost importance to note that Milner, Curtis, Kerr and the rest of the

Kindergarten members who would be placed in positions of political authority throughout the

Dominions sincerely feared that if not maintained, a German menace would arise in South Africa

that was capable of challenging British colonial hegemony. It is for this reason that they

promoted immediate South African unification, pushed for imperial cooperation, and why

Halifax would be later sent to bargain Germany out of South Africa in exchange for giving Hitler

a free hand in Eastern Europe. They would see it as their responsibility to ensure that the Nazi

call for lebensraum was not to be found in South Africa or any other British Dominion.

The Green Memorandum

By spring 1910, Curtis drafted what came to be called the Green Memorandum, which was a preliminary statement of imperial problems. The memorandum was an appeal to the four

British Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. It claimed that London could not continue to bear the financial brunt of defending the empire by itself. Curtis added additional impetus by brining attention to the strength that the German Empire was garnering and how its overbearing and controlling political system would violate the democracy and freedom established within British Dominions. Solitary independence would simply make the Dominions susceptible to being conquered by stronger nations. Curtis proposed that the five countries would

127 “Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa,” Question 19, February 16, 1897. House of Commons Sessional Paper No. 311, Accounts and Papers, 9 (1897). 128 Baker to Howell Wright, May 2, 1942, Howell Wright papers (Yale University Library), Case 1.

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be members of an elected parliament in which questions of foreign relations and defense would

be considered, that taxes would be levied in order to support the given parliament, but that the

nation members would retain all other sovereign powers.

Despite the successful establishment of The Round Table journal, the Green

Memorandum started to experience resistance from Dominion Round Table groups who

disagreed with Curtis’s assessment and proposed solutions. Unlike South Africa, where strong

mutual interests were the underlying impetus behind unifying, British Dominions had different

needs and concerns that did not necessarily align and occasionally conflicted with each other.

For instance, almost all the Round Table groups agreed that their countries needed to take more

responsibility for their defense and foreign policy and that federation was an adequate

mechanism in strengthening the Imperial structure, but they disagreed that their choices should

be limited to either union or complete independence.

Prosperity proved to be part of the problem as well. While traveling throughout Canada

and the United States, Kerr was struck by Canadian prosperity and how America was

“extraordinarily like England.”129 He noted that England could not provide Canada with

“anything that the United States can’t offer just as well, and there are certain obvious disadvantages in the surrender of autonomy which is entailed in the creation of any Empire organization.” Complete independence of the British Dominions would most readily lead to the

Empire fracturing, which in turn would decentralize power and thus allow the rise of faction and conflict. In the case of Canada, Kerr warned that “If you forced Canada to choose now between

Imperial Federation and independence, I think she would take independence.”130 His

recommendation was to “postpone forcing the issue” and to “manipulate the Press” so that

129 Quoted without reference in Butler, Lothian, 40. 130 Ibid., 37.

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Federation and the scheme of Imperialism could appeal “to men’s imagination as worth

having.”131

Press manipulation would come in the form of recruiting owners and editors whose primary responsibility would be to support the movement. Editors could promote the relevance and importance of the Imperial mission to the leaders of opinion in all the self-governing countries of the Empire. “The local editors are most important,” Curtis would go on to say.

“Already I am getting hold of a series of local papers… whose editors will undertake to give common currency to the Imperial ideas.” It was important that supervision remain centralized so that editors could also pass on any local material which might be of use to other parts of the

Empire. It was Curtis who suggested “Philip Kerr, who thoroughly understands the whole business would be the man to run the central office, find the editors and keep the whole thing going.” In January 1913, in the spirit of “keeping the whole thing going,” Kerr found the Astors.

131 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the quest for world order (Praeger, 2006), 176.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE KINDERGARTEN IN CLIVEDEN

Waldorf Astor

Waldorf Astor was no by means a newspaper editor. He was instead a native New Yorker

who had ingratiated himself in British high society and politics; and it was through his close

association with Philip Kerr and the Kindergarten that the Astors and the Cliveden Estate would

later become the central antagonists of Cockburn’s accusations. To what extent the Astor

manipulation extended is unknown; but what is known is that Round Table meetings were often

held in the great library at Cliveden or during decadent dinning parties held at their London

house at 4 St. James Square. Legend has it that the discussions at these social events entailed

“interesting and somewhat controversial conversation respecting Empire affairs.”132

No matter the speculation on whether political discussion at Cliveden actually affected or advanced German appeasement is not an issue of central importance. What must be established is that Waldorf Astor’s close association with the Kindergarten resulted from the unity of ideas that they shared both philosophically and politically. Astor agreed with their cause, and just as significantly, he was a proponent of their methods. He saw value in federating the Empire, which would be accomplished only through a shroud of secrecy and controlling public opinion.

Initial unity between the Kindergarten and Waldorf Astor was a fundamental extension of

Curtis’s desire to recruit editors and to gain further access to avenues of influence. Thus, the recruitment of Waldorf was essential if the Kindergarten were to hold sway with the British media. The courtship of Waldorf was not difficult, for he perceived himself someone who

132 Borden, Memoirs, 367, See also Curtis to Mrs. Borden, and Borden to Curtis, 13 July 1912, copy, reel c246, Borden Papers.

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wielded influence rather than power.133 Though Waldorf Astor held ministerial office most of his life, his ability to garner and exert influence resulted from his approach to what he considered to be effective reform within the British Empire. The primary method by which this influence gained strength was through acquiring control over news outlets.

Waldorf’s father, William Waldorf Astor, moved his family to England in 1890. This move stemmed from the vulgarities that he perceived within American society.134 But once in

England, William was quick to purchase for himself a peerage, which was the outward symbol of the natural superiority that he inherently felt toward others.135

Whether due to his bad experiences with the American press, or due to an investment

opportunity, William Astor was quick to acquire many newspaper outlets. In 1892, he bought the

Pall Mall Gazette, the same newspaper for which Alfred Milner wrote. And later, in 1911, he purchased the Observer, Britain’s oldest Sunday newspaper.136 Four years later, Waldorf would

assume control of the paper and join forces with James Louis Garvin, a then prominent

journalist. In 1912, Waldorf would confide in Garvin that “he was more interested in getting

things done than in jockeying for political favors.” He saw himself as a reformer rather than a

careerist.137 Still, despite all of the newspaper outlets that Waldorf would inherit and control, the

one sparkling jewel that showcased the extent of the Astor importance was their acquisition of

The Times in 1922.

133 David Sinclair, Dynasty: The Astors and Their Times (New York: Beaufort Books, Inc., 1984), 291. 134 Ibid., 255. 135 Ibid., 255. 136 Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity (London: Jonathan Cape, 2000), 19. 137 Sinclair, Dynasty, 291.

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The importance of the Astor role within British interwar politics lies in their connection

with the Kindergarten, not just as an acquaintance but as a participatory member. Both Waldorf

and the Kindergarten shared the commonly held view of empire preservation and the cryptic

agenda of global Britishization. Astor had been friends with Robert Brand at Oxford and his

wife, Nancy Astor, was very close to Kerr. These friendships were beneficial to the Kindergarten

by providing entré for Lionel Curtis and later Geoffrey Dawson. Formerly the editor of the

Johannesburg Star, Dawson would eventually become the chief editor of The Times. The

personal connections between the Astors and the Kindergarten would eventually turn into a

familial bond with Brand’s marriage to Phyllis Langhorne, Nancy’s sister.138 This close

association confirms the adoption of the Kindergarten’s agenda into the Astors political

motivations. The closer the link between the Kindergarten and the Astors become, the stronger

the contention that the Cliveden Set sent Halifax to negotiate with Hitler becomes.

Despite Waldorf’s strong connections with the members of the Kindergarten, and his own

individual perpetuation of Milner’s political philosophy, there remains, among scholars,

considerable resistance to placing any accountability on the Astors for the role they played in swaying interwar British foreign policy in favor of Hitler and his followers. This academic resistance results from three main reasons. The first is that all accusations of wrongdoing, specifically those by Claude Cockburn, remain in the purview of German appeasement or

Crypto-fascism. By doing so, one is limited to either evaluating Cockburn’s criticisms or portraying the Set as something more than conspirators-- i.e., traitors. The second reason for discrediting Waldorf’s role in the Kindergarten’s affairs is because of the historical significance of his wife Nancy. And the third reason manifests itself concretely by keeping the Cliveden

138 William Fong, J.W. McConnell: Financier, Philanthropist, Patriot (McGill-Queen’s Press, 2008), 612.

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Estate itself as the cornerstone setting of the Kindergarten’s political manipulations. It is due to these three primary distractions that historians have missed the connections between the

Cliveden Set and Milnerian Britishization.

Cockburn’s “Communist Rag”

It is a pertinent question, especially from a historical standpoint: did the Cliveden Set

exist or not? This is a significant issue that Michael Astor discusses in Tribal Feeling139 and

Norman Rose considers in The Cliveden Set: Portrait of an Exclusive Fraternity.140 Both men began their interpretation of what exactly constitutes a Set by setting the boundaries of their definitions on the shoulders of Cockburn’s “Marxist kite flying.”141 Thus if Cockburn’s

accusations of the existence of a conspiratorial group which conducted its intrigues and

machinations under the roof of the Astors at Cliveden, could not be substantiated as crypto-Nazi,

gallophobic, or treacherous, then any and all allegations of the sort were mere delusions of a

British society in World War anxiety seeking to cast blame on someone or something, no matter

what the evidence indicated.

Beginning with Cockburn’s accusations as the starting point of for questioning the

existence of the Cliveden Set is understandable. For it was Cockburn who coined the term

“Cliveden Set.” Indeed, he was the journalist who initiated and promoted the recognition of the

Set’s existence to the world. Additionally, Cockburn was a reputable and brilliant journalist. He

had been a correspondent to Washington and New York for The Times from 1929 to 1932, and

he served under the chief correspondent for The Times in Berlin, Norman Ebbutt.

139 Michael Astor, Tribal Feeling (J. Murray, 1963), 138. 140 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 5. 141 James Fox, Five Sisters: The Langhornes of Virginia (Simon and Schuster, 2001), 423.

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It was not until 1933 that Cockburn decided to strike out on his own and publish The

Week, which was an extraordinary success. Nancy Astor biographer Christopher Sykes goes so

far as to contend that the “The Week became extremely important. It was read by all the

embassies in London, by members of the British and foreign governments, and by as many of the

home and foreign intellectual public as could procure copies.”142 Sykes’ claim about The Week’s

level of influence is difficult to substantiate; but establishing the small publication’s currency

throughout the modern world would indeed limit a global hostile reaction to the Cliveden

“conspiracy” to Cockburn’s machinations.

Before Cockburn’s article “The Cliveden Set” appeared in the November 22, 1937 issue of The Week, there remained a series of reported events that led to that publication. The first of these events was reported on October 27, 1937 when Sir Nevile Henderson, who served as the

British ambassador to Germany, was identified as a Hitler supporter and frequent attendee of

Nazi Party rallies. The Week credited Henderson with initiating and inviting Germany, Italy,

Austria and Hungary to a conference aimed at luring Yugoslavia into central European control,

thus weakening France and the Little Entente.143

The significance of the proposed conference would become evident as a result of The

Week’s November 17 report. The report was taken from an earlier publication by the Evening

Star titled “Hitler ready for Truce.” In it, the Evening Star’s diplomatic correspondent reported that Halifax was being dispatched to Berlin to offer Hitler a “free hand” in central Europe in return for a ten-year truce on the Colonial issue. In this instance, a “free hand” meant that Britain would not interfere with Germany or its presence in Czechoslovakia. And Britain would provide

142 Christopher Sykes, Nancy: The Life of Nancy Astor (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1972), 365. 143 J.E. Kaufmann, H.W. Kaufmann, Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defences in World War II (Stackpole Books, 2007), 115.

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“immediate recognition of the right of the German minority in that country to administrative

autonomy within the State and to cultural unity with the people of the German Reich.”144 If accurate, the article obviously implied that Halifax and the British government were ready to trade other nations’ liberties in order to relieve German pressure on a British colonial possession.145 This British colonial possession was likely South Africa, which remained the

necessary cornerstone for the dwindling British empire and, of course, the iconic centerpiece of

Milner and his Kindergarten’s accomplishment.

The Round Table imperialists had been concerned with Germany’s interference in South

Africa for some time. Beginning in 1908, with the expansion of the German naval fleet, the

Round Table remained concerned with what Cecil Rhodes termed “German intrigues.” There

existed a real concern that Germany could undermine British influence and control in South

Africa, and the Round Table movement had been formed to ensure continual unity and

consolidation of the British power within its remaining Dominions. Thus, with this new German

leader and powerful Nazi party, now was the time to grant Germany additional living space,

while protecting British interests abroad.

This key issue is completely omitted by current scholarship. Christopher Sykes, Norman

Rose, Margaret George, Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, ignore the connection between

Halifax’s visit to Germany, that Waldorf Astor was an active Kindergarten member, that the

Round Table movement remained concerned with the German presence in South Africa, and that

Germany did, in fact, invade Czechoslovakia under the approval of the Munich Agreement of

144 Alan Campbell Johnson, Anthony Eden: A Biography (New York, Ives Washburn, Inc., 1939), 336. 145 Alan Campbell Johnson, Viscount Halifax: A Biography (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941), 434.

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September 30, 1938. The Anschluss, Germany’s annexation of Austria,146 coupled with the

Munich agreement substantiates that Hitler was indeed permitted a “free hand” in central Europe

as reported by Cockburn. Additionally, the Evening Standard’s report on Halifax’s meeting with

Hitler and the terms of their discussions have never been denied; the controversy that does exist

questions who sent Halifax.147

On October 23rd and 24th, the Astors hosted a weekend party at Cliveden, where their guests included Nevile Henderson, Philip Lothian, Geoffrey Dawson and Anthony Eden. As reported in The Week, Cockburn asserted that it was at this meeting that the plans of this “other

Foreign Office” were presented to the tehn current foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. “He was

asked in order to ‘associate’ him with the intrigue. He (Eden) expressed his immediate and

profound opposition to the whole perilous business.”148

The nature and content of this meeting is where the majority of academic controversy exists. Many argue that the validity of Cockburn’s claims can be logically discredited if events surrounding this specific evening at Cliveden can be explained pragmatically. Norman Rose contends that there could not have been any scheme hatched during the gathering. “No plot was concocted at Cliveden that weekend.”149 Instead, Rose points to an unfortunate emergence of

“the usual coincidence of opinions.” By making the attendance of these gatherings coincidental,

Rose is attempting to excuse away Cockburn’s accusations as if they were merely a misinterpretation of powerful friends at lunch.

146 Klaus Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, (University of California Press, 1973), 65. 147 Johnson, Viscount Halifax, 434. 148 Sykes, Nancy, 367. 149 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 176.

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In his biography of Nancy Astor, Christopher Sykes calls into question the presence of

Anthony Eden at the event. According to Sykes, “Eden and the Foreign Office were supposed to be the intended victims of this great Germanophile conspiracy, and there they were fully represented at the plotting session. Worst of all the Halifaxes were not there.”150 Once again,

both Rose and Sykes limit the boundaries of the existence of the Cliveden Set to Cockburn’s

accusation and his description of how he defines the Cliveden Set.

If the question remains, “Were the members the Cliveden Set a group of Germanophile,

Gallophibic, treacherous, conspirators?,” then the response to the first two items is that an

appeasement sentiment was not, by any means, limited to the Cliveden Set. Margaret George, in

The Warp Vision, accurately states that, “The Cliveden Set, with its shifting personnel, had no

monopoly on enthusiasm for Fascism, they were one circle among many, all of them made up of

people of similar social status and public prestige.”151 Thus the second fallacy becomes evident.

As pointed out by Gilbert and Gott, “Were the archives of Cliveden ever on view, they would be more useful to the novelist than to the historian.”152

Examining the ledger of guests that had attended the Cliveden Estate parties during the

Astor reign would prove quite useless with its “shifting personnel.” The panoply of attendees

prevents us from focusing on any guest or group of guests that would implicate the Astors as

being treacherous or conspiratorial. As noted by David Sinclair, “All Shades of political opinion

were represented at Cliveden house parties – even Wiston Churchill, whom both the Astors but

150 Sykes, Nancy, 367. 151 Margaret George, The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933-1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965), 137. 152 Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers (Boston: The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1963), 31.

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especially Nancy disliked and mistrusted, was to be seen amongst the guests.”153 As a result, one cannot merely pick and choose guests who were pro-Nazi in order to argue that the Astors were guilty by association for meeting with Joachim von Ribbentrop, Tom Jones, or Unity Mitford.

It remains rather myopic to limit analysis of the Cliveden Set to a mere pro-German connection. In his monograph, The Anglo-American Establishment, Carroll Quigley argues quite

convincingly that, “This must be emphasized because of the mistaken idea which circulated after

1920 that the Cliveden group… was pro German. They were neither anti-German in 1910 nor

Pro-German in 1938, but pro-Empire all the time, changing there their attitudes on other

problems as these problems affected the Empire.”154

To insinuate that the Astors were in league with German advocates such as Charles

Stewart (Lord Londonderry) or infamous British fascists like Oswald Mosley is unsubstantiated and fallacious. The extent to which Cockburn attempted to do so should be limited to him alone.

Perhaps in his attempts to sell newspapers, Cockburn felt the need to place substantial effort into solidifying the connection between Cliveden and Hitler no matter how weak the connection demonstrated. The evidence does not lend itself to supporting such a contention, however, which is what current scholarship emphasizes. For instance, German Foreign Minister Joachim von

Ribbentrop, who was charged with promoting German sympathies among the British elite, held very little influence within Cliveden. On Nancy Astor’s first meeting with him during lunch at 4

St. James’s Square, she was sure to voice what she perceived to be the absurdity of Hitler’s appearance. Most notably, she believed that no one could take Hitler seriously as long as he wore

153 Sinclair, Dynasty, 294. 154 Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (New York: Books in Focus, 1981), 102.

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a Charlie Chaplin mustache.155 This comment to Ribbentrop about Hitler’s mustache would

eventually land Nancy on a Nazi hit-list that would be discovered only after the war.156 How can

one really assert that Cliveden was Hitler’s “Fifth column in London”157 when they appeared to

be so easily disregarded by the Nazis? Or maybe was it just Nancy Astor who was so readably

disposable?

Other than some attenuated accusations and clear anti-Semitic sentiments that Nancy openly held, there is no viable link between her and Hitler’s regime.158 The Astors at Cliveden do not, however, remain completely innocent of their participation in German appeasement or their clandestine meddling within British foreign policy. The attempt to vindicate the Cliveden Set of any political interference or depicting them as a helpless scapegoat results primarily from the historical significance that Nancy garners.

Nancy the Feminist

Within her own historical legacy, Nancy Astor is celebrated as being the first woman to take a seat in the British parliament.159 Her appointment in 1919 aligns very closely with the suffragette movement in the United Kingdom, where voting equality began to make headway with the passage of the Representation of the People Act of 1918, which allowed women over the age of 30 to vote. James Laver writes in his monograph, Between the War, that Nancy’s appointment to the House of Commons “was hailed all over the country, and indeed all over the

155 Miranda Seymour, Noble Endeavours: The life of two countries, England and Germany, in many stories (Simon and Schuster, 2013), 55. 156 Christine Keeler, Secrets and Lies: Now Profumo is Dead, I Can Finally Reveal the Truth About the Most Shocking Scandal in British Politic, (John Blake Publishing, 2013), 1976. 157 Hugh Dalton and Baron Dalton, Call back yesterday: memoirs, Volume 2 (The University of California, 1957), 243. 158 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 39. 159 Adrian Fort, Nancy: The Story of Lady Astor (St. Martin's Press, 2013), xiv.

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world, as a great achievement.”160 Keith Layborn, in Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century

British Politics, goes so far as to argue that because Nancy Astor was the first woman to breach the “male preserve” in the House of Commons, that she has “emerged as a figurehead in the political development of the feminist movement.”161

Nancy’s status as a promoter of feminist ideals has become iconic within the history of

female leadership. She was a trailblazer, and her appointment invariably enfranchised women in

Britain. It has even been claimed that her feminist ideals were pervasive in her youth.162 As a result, it is unsurprising that during her service in parliament, Nancy proved to be an advocate of woman’s issues, and she worked hard to promote equality among the sexes. Although Nancy was a Conservative politician, she held a wide range of views beyond those normally associated with the Conservative Party. She supported legislation that equalized the grounds for divorce between men and women, she helped reduce the voting age for women from 30 to 21, and she was a constant defender of the rights of married women to work and receive equal pay with men.163

But whether she was a feminist is a different question.

Norman Rose contends that she was not a feminist “in the contemporary meaning of the

term.”164 True, she may have served as an “ice-breaker” on such issues of inequality between men and women, but does that suggest that Nancy identified herself as a feminist or advocate of the feminist cause? One area of support that has not been covered within the literature is Nancy’s close association to Christian Science. Initially introduced to it by her sister Phyllis, who thought

160 James Laver, Between the Wars (Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 17. 161 Keith Layborn, Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics (Psychology Press, 2002), 9. 162 Sykes, Nancy, 183. 163 Layborn, Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics, 9. 164 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 102.

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that Nancy would find the topic interesting, the writings of Mary Baker Eddy was quite

influential on Nancy.165

For the purposes of this study, it is unnecessary to cover the tenets of Christian Science; it

is important, however, to emphasize that Nancy was a full convert to that system, and that its

doctrine strongly emphasizes female independence. Female scholars have posited that Eddy and

other women of their time gravitated toward Christian Science because it provided them with

ideological independence and possible avenues of achievement that did not exist for them within

a male dominated society.166 For example, Margery Fox sees Christian Science as “a nineteenth

century women’s protest movement,” its founder as “a classic female hysteric who resolved her

personal conflicts by developing Christian Science and assuming an extraordinary power role,”

and its followers as primarily women who “wanted to enact dominance roles that society denied

them access to.”167

Perhaps by compounding both her legislative support for woman’s issues and her entrenchment in Christian Science it can be contended that Nancy Astor did, in fact, fulfill an iconographic liberative role for women within Britain at the beginning of the 20th century. Such contentions would be needed in order to oppose her own insistence that she was not a feminist.168

Despite her own admission, the strongest evidence that counters any possible feminist

ideal that Nancy may have had lies within her subservience to her husband, Waldorf Astor.

Seemingly, Nancy’s decision to both enter British politics and exit the House of Commons was

165 Adrian Fort, Nancy: The Story of Lady Astor (St. Martin's Press, 2013), 134. 166 Jean A. McDoanld, “Mary Baker Eddy and the Nineteenth-Century ‘Public’ Woman: A Feminist Reappraisal,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1986), pp. 89-111. 167 Margery Fox, “Protest in Piety: Christian Science Revisited,” International Journal of Women’s Studies, 1 (July/August 1978): 401, 403. 168 Patricia Hollis, Jennie Lee: A Life (Oxford University Press, 1998), 37.

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premised on her husband’s instructions. It was Waldorf’s suggestion that she run to begin with,

and in a letter to Thomas Jones on December 28, 1944, she revealed that “I am not at all certain

that I should leave Parliament at this moment. It was Waldorf’s decision not mine. He was tired but as Bill (Astor) remarked why should Mother retire and not you? … I am 65 and very spry

and very strong with a good knowledge of politics.”169 Still, she did retire prematurely, despite

her protestations.

Claims that the Cliveden Set was a scapegoat for interwar British appeasement are

premised on either Cockburn’s sensationalism or the fear that dispersions cast on Nancy would

in some way diminish her accomplishments--i.e., feminist advancements of the early 20th

century. In reality, Nancy Astor remained excluded from the politics of her husband and Milner’s

Kindergarten. Even though he was a late addition to the society, Waldorf had indeed been

welcome to the Kindergarten as an honorary member; but his inclusion into the society should

rather be pictured as the Kindergarten utilizing the Astor money to further their own ideals rather

than as being used for any purpose by the master of Cliveden.170 If Waldorf’s participation was limited to providing financial assistance, then Nancy’s role can be characterized as naïve hostess.171

It is impossible to determine exactly what occurred within the walls of Cliveden during its grand parties, but what can be extrapolated is that Nancy was left with generalities of what the

Kindergarten and the Roundtablers were trying to accomplish. This suited her, for “Nancy found in the central simple idea which animated the Kindergarten, namely the unity of the English-

169 J.P. Wearing, Bernard Shaw and Nancy Astor (University of Toronto Press, 2005), 178. 170 Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (New York: Books in Focus, 1981), 5. 171 Sinclair, Dynasty, 298.

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speaking world”172 to be enough to garner her support and affection for what the Roundtable

movement was trying to accomplish.

The extent of Nancy’s influence on the Kindergarten or its members remained limited to

social friendships. She did, indeed, have close relationships with both Lionel Curtis and Philip

Kerr who she perceived to be “interested in serious affairs.”173 For Curtis, she helped him

overcome a morbid sense of propriety which severely hindered his dealings with women. Nancy

was particularly helpful in facilitating a relationship with the woman who would later become

Curtis’s wife, Miss Scott.174 And for Philip Kerr, she assisted him with overcoming his regular

anxiety by converting him to Christian Science.

There exists no evidence that would indicate Nancy’s participation in esoteric roundtable

meetings or the global plans that had been put into motion by Milner in South Africa. Thus,

whatever politics were discussed around the grand table at Cliveden, it was not reflective of the

true political maneuverings aimed at removing German influence from Africa.

The Cliveden Estate

Within his prologue, Norman Rose states very clearly that, “Cliveden itself, this imposing stately home, plays a leading role in their (The Cliveden Set) story.”175 Thus, it is within Rose’s

prologue that the fundamental fallacy is established as if analysis of the Cliveden Set remains

limited to the grounds of the estate, and its guest registry. What Rose has inadvertently done is

give absolute credence to the moniker that Cockburn ascribed to the group. Carroll Quigley is

not so spatially limiting, however, in his characterization of this elite secret society. “This society

172 Christopher Sykes, Nancy: The Life of Nancy Astor (London: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1972), 124. 173 Masters, Nancy Astor, a biography, 64. 174 Sykes, Nancy, 184. 175 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 7.

67 has been known at various times as Milner’s Kindergarten, as the Round Table Group, as the

Rhodes crowd, as The Times crowd, as the All Souls Group, and as the Cliveden Set.”176

As the for the Cliveden members themselves, Rose pushes for a sympathetic exoneration when within his Epilogue he calls them “children of their time.”177 In reviewing the ostentatious, elitist, and privileged life that they had the good fortune to enjoy, it remains difficult to see the group as victims of their times. Instead, the global reaction to Cockburn’s claims illuminated to the Set the greater necessity for secrecy and a stronger promotion of the appearance of victimization.

But in the light of his exoneration, Rose also condemns the Cliveden Set, and rightfully so. To perceive the Set’s machinations in the light of a desired peace at least portrays them as naïve humanitarians. To associate the Cliveden Set only with appeasement and the desire to establish peace at any price is, nonetheless, a mistake. It remained the Milner Group that proved to be “the reality behind the phantom-like Cliveden Set.”178

176 Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment, ix. 177 Rose, The Cliveden Set, 214. 178 Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment, 193.

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CONCLUSION

The Cliveden Set was an elitist group of powerful people intent on strengthening and centralizing their influence on British foreign policy. The nature of their machinations remains a subject of debate within the academic historiography. Analysis of the Cliveden Estate itself or the guest ledger does not definitively point to the Cliveden Set as a group of conspirators. The

Astors entertained so many guests at the Cliveden Estate who came from such varied nationalities and various party affiliations that a pattern of a distinct group cannot be established.

Nor would it be accurate to impose guilt on the Cliveden Set merely through association. It does exemplify the limited and shortsighted research that has been conducted on the group. The connections between Milner, the Kindergarten, The Roundtable Movement, and the Cliveden set have been attenuated at best. This attenuation exists not because the connections are inherently weak, but because they have substantially been overlooked.

The primary historian to first connect the dots from Milner to Cliveden and the reality of the existence of a secret society that governed global events was Carroll Quigley. In his monograph Tragedy and Hope, he claimed to have been granted access to a variety of secret papers and sources from this clandestine group through which he did his research. There is no sound reason to doubt Quigley’s claims since he was considered a trusted and well respected professor of history at Georgetown University. The sources Quigley utilized in order to substantiate his claims, however, are unavailable for review. As a result, this research has not relied heavily on Quigley’s book as a foundation source but merely as a referential point.

Instead, the substantial contribution that this research achieves is creating the causal link between methods of South African reconstruction, the British foreign policy of German appeasement

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during the inter-war period, and the players who catalyzed events that led to the Second World

War.

The British strategy of German appeasement that Neville Chamberlain championed during his service as prime minister has been viewed by historians as rather short sighted or naïve. Some even paint Chamberlain as a well intending victim who fell prey to Hitler’s deceptions. Inclusion of the Kindergarten, the Round-Table Movement, and the Cliveden Set

Members, however, reveals the ugly underbelly of the concealed monster that truly dictated what foreign policy would be espoused during the interwar period. Just as his father Joseph

Chamberlain, while serving as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was supportive of the

Milnerian ideology of conquering, controlling, and Britishizing South Africa, Neville carried on the legacy of strengthening British imperialism, promoting British colonization, and solidifying

British political control of their Dominions. These considerations were given priority, and they directly align with the agenda that the Cliveden Set was advocating. The evidence does not support claims that Chamberlain was coerced into fulfilling the agenda of the Cliveden Set, or sending Halifax to bargain with Hitler. Why would Chamberlain need prompting when the bolstering a strong, centralized British government converged directly with what the Cliveden

Set was attempting to achieve?

The surreptitious methods of political manipulations carried out by the Cliveden Set is

best illustrated by the process of South African unification that was conducted and accomplished

by Milner’s Kindergarten. In its own right, the unification of the four South African states

following the second Boer War is considered an incredible economic and political achievement.

Within such consequential results, the Kindergarten clearly understood and adopted Milner’s

70

hatred for party politics and the democratic process of ineffective policy and mercurial public

opinion.

The Kindergarten’s treatment of composing and publicizing the adoption of the Selborne

Memorandum reveals the level of interference and coercion that they were willing to enforce in order accomplish their goal of a unified South Africa. Analysis of the Selborne Memorandum is essential to establishing a working formula for what both the Round Table Movement and the

Cliveden Set would later apply. Additionally, information of the purpose and the process of developing the memorandum exist in a period before the Kindergarten lowered an iron veil of secrecy on their political aims and the structure of their developing organization.

Just as Milner recruited young, capable, eager and impressionable young men to assist him in in South Africa, the Kindergarten utilized the Round Table Movement to ally themselves with people in power, recruit like-minded imperialists, and theorize on how to best implement their agenda. Both Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr played a central role in both the recruitment and the indoctrination of influential persons both in Britain and in the dominions. It was through this effort that the Kindergarten came to befriend the Astors.

The dismissive nature that many historians have had towards the Cliveden Set relates more to the possible misnomer assigned by Cockburn. Placing the Cliveden Set as the central protagonist within the overall subversive world order that was attempting to hew the established system reduces the level of political infiltration from conspiratorial to accidental. It was the very function of the Round Table Movement to expand and recruit from every corner of the empire.

It is expected that Norman Rose’s conclusions would, on the whole, vindicate the

Cliveden Set. The sources that he was used led him in that direction. Limiting the breadth of analysis to a specific period and a specific location (such as the Cliveden Estate) hinders the need

71 to move beyond the sources produced by the Cliveden Set members. It also circumvents the need to push beyond the façade of the Cliveden Set itself and discover the true cadre that was functioning behind the scenes.

One of the primary fallacies that underlie the interpretation of events that led to the

Second World War exists within an academic approach that attempts to hone in on a specific meeting or moment where these elitist machinations occurred. The road from South Africa to the

Cliveden Estate is a long, winding and intricate one. The diaries, correspondences, moots, or even governmental documentation left behind by the Cliveden Set only provides a very minimal representation of the actual level of influence and interference that Milner, the Kindergarten, the

Roundtable Movement, and the Cliveden Set exerted.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

OFFICIAL PAPERS

Convention of Pretoria, art. 4, 1881.

Borden Papers

The Round Table

The Curtis Papers

The Dawson Papers

The Howell Wright Papers

The Garrett Papers

The Jebb Papers

The Milner Papers Volume I & Volume II

Selborne Memorandum

U.K. Parliament. Comd 8758. Sessional Papers 1917-1918 (Commons)

U.K. Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 5th ser., vol. 121 (1919)

NEWSPAPERS

Evening Standard (London) Nov., 10, 1937

Manchester Guardian (Manchester) Nov. 1919-Feb. 1920.

The State, I (Jan., 1909), 19.

The Times (London) Oct. 1919-Feb. 1920.

The Week Oct., 27, 1937

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MONOGRAPHS

Amery, Leopold Stennett. My Political Life: The unforgiving years, 1929-1940. Hutchinson, 1955.

Angell, Norman. After All; the autobiography of Norman Angell. London, England: H. Hamilton, 1951.

Astor, Lady. My Two Countries. Garden City, New Jersey: Doubleday, 1923.

Astor, Michael. Tribal Feeling. London, England: John Murray, 1963.

Baker, Arthur. The House is Sitting. London, England: Blandford Press, 1958.

Balsan, Consuelo Vanderbilt. The Glitter and the Gold. New York, New York: Harpers, 1952.

Billington, David P. Lothian: Philip Kerr and the quest for world order. Praeger, 2006.

Bruce, C.M. The New Transvaal. London, England: Alston Rivers Ltd., 1908.

Butler J.M. Lord Lothian, Philip Kerr, 1882-1940. London, England: MacMillan, 1960.

Chamrley, John. Chamberlain and the Lost Peace. London, England: Hodder & Stoughton, 1989.

Cockburn, Claud. A discord of trumpets: an autobiography. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1956

------In time of trouble: an autobiography. London, England: R. Hart-Davis, 1956.

------Crossing the Line. New York, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1960.

Cockett, Richard. Twilight of truth: Chamberlain, appeasement, and the manipulation of the press. London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989.

Collis, Maurice. Nancy Astor, an informal biography. Dutton. 1960

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Cowles, Virginia. The Astors. New York, New York: Knopf, 1979.

Cowling, Maurice. The Impact of Hitler: British politics and British policy, 1933-1940. London, England: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

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Crankshaw, Edward. The Forsaken Idea: A Study of Viscount Milner. London: Longmans, Green, 1952.

Curtis, Lionel. With Milner in South Africa. Blackwell, 1951.

Dalton, Hugh Dalton. Call back yesterday: memoirs 1887-1931. London: Muller, 1953.

Denoon, Donald. A Grand Illusion: The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony During the Periods of Reconstruction 1900-1905. Longman, 1973.

De Souza, Francis Hugh. A question of treason. Durban: Kiaat Creations, 2004.

Drinkwater, Derek. Sir Harold Nicolson and international relations: the practitioner as theorist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Eddy, Mary Baker. Science and Health with Key to Scriptures. Boston, Massachusetts: By the trustees under the will of Mary Baker Eddy, 1922.

Eden, Anthony. Facing the Dictator; the memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon. Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

Fong, William. J.W. McConnell: Financier, Philanthropist, Patriot. McGill-Queen’s Press, 2008.

Fort, Adrian. Nancy: The Story of Lady Astor. St. Martin's Press, 2013.

Fox, James. Five Sisters: the Langhornes of Virginia. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster. 2001.

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Fuchser, Larry William. Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: a study in the politics of history. New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982.

Gannon, Franklin Reid. The British Press and Germany, 1936-1939. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1971.

Garvin, J.L. and Amery, Julian. Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. III. London: 1934.

Gates, John D. The Astor Family. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1981.

George, Margaret. The Warped Vision: British Foreign Policy, 1933-1939. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1965.

Gilbert, Martin. The Roots of Appeasement. London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.

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Gilbert, Martin and Richard Gott. The Appeasers. London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967.

Goldmann, Richard. A South African Remembers. Cape Times, 1947.

Gollin, A.M. Proconsul in Politics: a study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964.

Granzow, Brigitte. A Mirror of Nazism. London, England: Victor Gollancz, 1964.

Grigg, John. Nancy Astor: portrait of a pioneer. London, England: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980.

Halevy, E. Imperialism and the Rise of Labour. London, 1951.

Halperin, John. Eminent Georgians : the lives of King George V, Elizabeth Bowen, St. John Philby, and Nancy Astor. New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

Harrison, Brian. Prudent Revolutionaries: Portraits of British Feminists between the Wars. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1987.

Harrison, Rosina. Rose: My Life in Service. London, England: Viking Press, 1975.

Harvey, A.D. Collision of Empire: Britain in Three World Wars, 1793-1945. London: The Hambledon Press, 1992.

Henderson, M. Brooke. “The Cliveden Set: Myth and Reality.” master’s thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1993.

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Johnson, Alan Campbell. Anthony Eden: A Biography. New York, Ives Washburn, Inc., 1939.

------Viscount Halifax: A Biography. New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1941.

Jones, Thomas. A Diary with Letters, 1931-1950. London, England: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Kaufmann, J.E., H.W. Kaufmann. Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defences in World War II. Stackpole Books, 2007.

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Keeler, Christine. Secrets and Lies: Now Profumo is Dead, I Can Finally Reveal the Truth About the Most Shocking Scandal in British Politic. John Blake Publishing, 2013.

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Keynes, John Maynard. Economic Consequences of the Peace. New York, New York: Harcourt Brace and Howe, 1920.

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Lammers, Donald. Explaining Munich: the search for motive in British policy. Stanford, California: The Hoover Institute, 1966.

Langhorne, Elizabeth. Nancy Astor and her friends. Praeger Publishers, 1974.

Laver, James. Between the Wars. Houghton Mifflin, 1961.

Layborn, Keith. Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics. Psychology Press, 2002.

Le May, Godfrey Hugh Lancelot. British Supremacy in South Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

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Londonderry, Lord Charles. Wings of Destiny. London, England: MacMillan, 1943.

Louw, P. Eric, The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2004.

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Marais, J.S. The Fall of Kruger’s Republic. Oxford, 1961.

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McDonough, Frank. Neville Chamberlain, appeasement, and the road to war. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1998.

Medlicott, William. British Foreign Policy since Versailles, 1919-1963. London, England: Methuen & Company, 1968.

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Milner, Alfred. England in Egypt. London: 37 Bedford Street, 1899.

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Muller, James W. Churchill as Peacemaker. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997.

Muslof, Karen J. From Plymouth to Parliament: a rhetorical history of Nancy Astor's 1919 campaign. New York, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.

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Quigley, Carroll. Tragedy and Hope. New York, New York: Books in Focus, 1981.

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Reynolds, Philip Alan. British Foreign Policy in the Inter-War Years. London, England: Longmans, 1954.

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Schmidt, Gustav. The Politics and Economics of Appeasement: British foreign policy in the 1930s. trans. Jackie Bennett-Ruete, Berg, Hamburg. 1986.

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Seligmann, Matthew S. The Royal Navy and the German Threat 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War Against Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Seymour, Miranda. Noble Endeavours: The life of two countries, England and Germany, in many stories. Simon and Schuster, 2013.

Sinclair, David. Dynasty: The Astors and Their Times. London, England: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1983.

Sykes, Christopher. Nancy; the life of Lady Astor. London, England: Harper & Row, 1972.

Taylor, A.J.P The Origins of the Second World War. New York, New York: Fawcett Premier, 1961.

Thompson, J. Lee. Forgotten Patriot: A Life of Alfred, Viscount Milner of St. James’s and Cape Town, 1854-1925. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2007.

Thompson, Leonard Monteath. The Unification of South Africa, 1902-1910. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.

Torrance, David E. The Strange Death of the Liberal Empire: Lord Selborne in South Africa. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.

Walker, Eric Anderson. The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Volume 8. Cambridge University Press, 1963.

Wallis, John Peter Richard. Fitz: The Story of Sir Percy Fitzpatrick. London: Macmillan Press, 1955.

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Wearing, J.P. Bernard Shaw and Nancy Astor. University of Toronto Press, 2005).

Wrench, Evelyn. Alfred, lord Milner, the man of no illusions, 1854-1925. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1958.

------Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times. London, England: Hutchinson, 1955.

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PERIODICALS and ARTICLES

Astor, Lady. “My First Year in Parliament.” Pearson’s Magazine, June 1921, 464.

Astor, Viscountess, M.P. “What Women Can Do in Politics That Men Cannot Do.” Woman’s Home Companion, Sept. 1920, 7-8.

Astor, Viscountess. “I Hate Fascism.” The Forum, April 1939, 237-238. Brand, Robert. The Listener, 15 Oct. 1953, 631.

“Essence of Parliament.” Punch, 10 Dec. 1919, 493.

Fox, Margery. “Protest in Piety: Christian Science Revisited,” International Journal of Women’s Studies 1 (July/August 1978): 401, 403.

Feetham, Richard. “Some Problems of South Africa Federation and Reasons for Facing them,” read to the Fortnightly Club, Johannesburg, on 4 Oct. 1906.

Grasty, Charles H. “British and American Newspapers.” Atlantic Monthly, November 191, 577- 591.

Kennedy, Paul M. “The development of German naval operations plans 1896-1914,” in Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 (London, 1979), pp. 171-98.

Kerr, Philip. “Lord Milner,” Nation and Athenaeum, May 23, 1925.

Knaplund, Paul. “The Unification of South Africa: A Study in British Colonial Policy,” Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters, XXI (July, 1924), 20.

“Lady Astor’s Triumph.” Outlook, 17 Dec. 1919, 491.

McDoanld, Jean A. “Mary Baker Eddy and the Nineteenth-Century ‘Public’ Woman: A Feminist Reappraisal,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1986), pp. 89-111.

Porter, Andrew N. “Sir Alfred Milner and the Press, 1897-1899,” Historical Journal 16(1973): 323-339.

Quigley, Carroll. “The Round Table Groups in Canada, 1908-38,” Canadian Historical Review, 43, no.3 (September 1962), pp. 204-24.

Robinson, Geoffrey. The Times on July 6, 1907.

“South Africa. The Natal Trouble. Unrest Spreading,” The Advertiser, February 20, 1906, Article.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

David M. Valladares received his double bachelor’s in English and History from the University of Florida in spring 2004. In the summer of 2002, he had the opportunity to study Victorian

Literature at St. Catherine’s College at Cambridge University. Mr. Valladares became an

Assistant Professor at Tallahassee Community College in 2010 and is currently Lead Associate

Faculty of the Writing Department of Developmental Communications. He is married to Letty-

Ann Valladares, and they have four beautiful children: Nathaniel, David, Aida-Maria, and

Letticia-Anna.

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