Qr. 4. 2018 No. 7 ISSN 2543-9839 Warsaw, Poland, November 8, 2018

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qr. 4. 2018 no. 7 ISSN 2543-9839 Warsaw, Poland, November 8, 2018. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (R) and US Secretary of Energy Rick Perry (L) during a meeting in Warsaw.

On the same day, a long-term contract for the purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG) was signed between the state-owned Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNIG SA) and the American Cheniere Marketing International LLP. This contract spans a length of 24 years and covers around 40 billion cubic meters of gas. This is yet another step for Poland to diversify gas supplies and deepen cooperation with the United States in the field of energy security.

Dear Readers,

he collapse of communism and the restoration of the states previously locked behind the Iron Curtain formed a new geopolitical constellation in Central Europe. One successful attempt to take advantage of the Tsituation in the region was the launch of a new political initiative, which was expressed through an act of will to cooperate by the leaders of three countries: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the framework of the Visegrad Group, these states, which are naturally related by a parallel historical background, cultural commonality, and geographic location, have further been consolidated by shared objectives for the future, the most noteworthy of which is the convergence of interests in foreign policy, and the emerging cooperation in terms of economy, transport, ecology, and science.

Although the most vital tasks, including the entry of the V4 countries into the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, and then into the European Union, have been accomplished, effective teamwork has made it possible to inaugurate a sense of local community alongside each state’s own coherent cultural and social identities. The past and future of this partnership are the topics raised in our Visegrad Report, in which you will find papers by the Head of Energy and State Treasury Commission of the Polish Parliament, Maciej Małecki, Piotr Bajda, Joanna Antczak, and Aleksandra Romanowska.

Another topic proposed to our readers is how Central European countries function in the European Union. In this regard, I especially recommend the article by our own Warsaw Institute

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expert, Professor Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, in which he analyzes the functioning of EU institutions, and, more generally, European The integration in aspects of integration “through law” and the Warsaw problem of European constitutionalism (majority voting). Institute As the author remarks, “these instruments are considered Review problematic in light of democratic standards”.

© Copyright 2018 I also recommend two historical articles. The first is by Karol Warsaw Institute, Wołek, entitled “The War after the War”, which describes the Warsaw, Poland particular circumstances in which Poland found itself as a result of Soviet aggression, despite winning the war with Germany. Editor-in-Chief Another subject described in this issue is the work Anna Karolina Piekarska of the outstanding Polish artist Józef Brandt presented [email protected] by Mariusz Klarecki in his paper, which is illustrated Associate editor with rich iconography. Rafał Zgorzelski Translations Aleksandra Tomaszewska I wish you all an enjoyable read, Proofreading Alba Editing Anna Karolina Piekarska Cover and Layout Editor-in-Chief Katarzyna Dinwebel The Warsaw Institute Review Jacek Kotela

DTP and Printing www.sindruk.pl

Publisher Warsaw Institute Wilcza 9, 00-538 Warsaw, Poland Public purpose co-financed by the Co-financed by the Minister of www.WarsawInstitute.org Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic Culture and National Heritage [email protected] of Poland in the competition “Cooperation from the Promotion of Culture Editorial office The Warsaw in the Field of Public Diplomacy 2018”. Fund. Institute Review Wilcza 9 00-538 Warsaw, Poland www.WarsawInstitute.Review

The opinions given and the positions held in the materials published in the Ministry Warsaw Institute Review solely reflect of Foreign Aﬀ airs the views of the authors and cannot Republic of Poland be equated with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and Ministry of Culture and National Partner: Partner of Visegrad Report: Heritage of the Republic of Poland. ISSN 2543-9839

4 The Warsaw Institute Review Contents

V6ISEGRAD REPORT geopolitics49 H110ISTORY Maciej Małecki: Witold Repetowicz: Mariusz Klarecki, PhD: V4: “It’s good to be among Is Iraq set to become The Kresy: Józef Brandt friends” the future regional in search of painterly superpower? inspiration

Visegrad report Eastern report Maciej Małecki Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Albert Komar 6 V4: “It’s good to be among friends” Hostile propaganda: how it affects Visegrad report 66 Lithuanian society Piotr Bajda, PhD Eastern report The Visegrad Group in the Paweł Ozdoba 10 security architecture of Europe Warsaw-Vilnius Relations Visegrad report as a Common Matter: the Polish Joanna Antczak, PhD 75 Ethnic Minority in Lithuania Expenditure on cybersecurity Opinions 18 of the Visegrad Group countries Krzysztof Rak Visegrad report 82 Why Destroy the Nation State? Aleksandra Romanowska V4 countries towards Russian ECONOMY 34 aggression against Ukraine Adam Stolarz Key Instruments for Financing GEOPOLITICS Innovations in Poland as Part of the Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, PhD 88 “Entrepreneurial State” Policy 40 On Democracy in Europe HISTORY GEOPOLITICS Karol Wołek Witold Repetowicz A post-war war. The years Is Iraq set to become the future 103 of 1944–1963 in Poland 49 regional superpower? HISTORY GEOPOLITICS Mariusz Klarecki, PhD Robert Rajczyk, PhD The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search 57 The Balkan Melting Pot 110 of painterly inspiration

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V4: “It’s good to be among friends” Maciej Małecki The Visegrad Group is proof that it is possible to create friendly ties in international politics. These ties connect Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary – the Visegrád Four (V4). The strong relationships are built on newer and older common history, a shared geographical neighborhood, vivid contacts – both social and sometimes even familial, economic cooperation – but above all, an awareness of our common interests.

ommunity in interests” their disparities. It is distinguished does not mean that we by a far-reaching identity resulting from are the same. Getting rid many aspects and confirmed again of differences is not what and again in the context of new challenges. “it is allC about. The point is that the things This has been proven against the backdrop in common between these countries with of (not necessarily) benevolent pressure regional roots are more significant than of various international players.

6 The Warsaw Institute Review V4: “It’s good to be among friends”

Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Energy and the State Treasury and Member of the Polish Parliament Maciej Małecki. © Warsaw Institute© Warsaw

For Poland, the V4 is an invariably important framework for conducting regional policy and realizing the interests The point is that the things of the Central European region on the more general, global arena. The creation in common between these of the group and the development of cooperation within its framework is countries with regional regarded in Poland as one of the greatest political successes after 1989, in addition roots are more significant to the accession to NATO and the EU. The fact that the group has maintained than their disparities. and intensified its cooperation by passing

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and administrative authorities. However, The Visegrad cooperation the group has weaker social, cultural and security dimensions, the construction of which is both is mainly focused on a real challenge for V4 countries political aspects – based and simultaneously a pressing need. The Visegrad Group should find on the cooperation of common areas of cooperation primarily in the field of strategic security. The state, government, and current geopolitical order is changing and the countries of the region, when administrative authorities. grouped into one organization and speaking with one voice, would have a more significant influence on the through different vicissitudes confirms international arena. that it also has significant political and practical value for Poland’s partners. The migration crisis is one aspect The current revitalization of this of security that requires the close cooperation is particularly welcome. cooperation of V4 countries. The members of the group were able to build The Visegrad cooperation is developed common ground to talk about it and through several areas and formulas. The dealing with it. The V4 countries should most visible results can be found in the continuously demand the tightening of V4 cooperation at the EU level. Common the EU’s external borders and speak with positions of the Visegrad countries on one voice in the EU against the forced crucial elements of the EU political relocation and admission mechanism. agenda – namely the future of the EU, However, they must consistently work the Multiannual Financial Framework, together to raise awareness and talk and the cohesion policy to the issue of openly about the general European artificial intelligence – are carefully noted, opinion and the reasons thereof. strengthen the position of V4 countries and facilitate the defense of common One aspect of security where they should interests. Nonetheless, the countries in the cooperate more closely is in the sphere Group still face various further challenges. of energy security, which is crucial for all V4 countries. V4 should become a permanent, essential element of the European architecture and Gaseous fuel is the most substantial a cornerstone for the broader construction imported energy raw material of a common representation of all interests in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. of the Central European region as a result Each country has different energy of its historical past, has generally been an consumption needs in the energy mix, object and not an actor in international but the problems they face are similar. politics. Dependence on supplies from the east, the lack of an integrated energy market, The Visegrad cooperation is mainly infrastructural deficiencies between focused on political aspects – based on countries and, finally, the threat of the cooperation of state, government, an interruption in the supply of energy

8 The Warsaw Institute Review V4: “It’s good to be among friends” resources have a negative impact on the security of the entire region. Recently, new dynamics This is the reason why energy policy cooperation and infrastructure have been observed development projects should be a priority for V4 countries and developed at a in V4 cooperation. regional level. They should jointly respond to the initiative to build the Nord Stream (ReSAP 2022), which aims to promote the II gas pipeline, which will not only affect creation of technological sovereignty of the the energy security of the countries of region through closer cooperation between central and Eastern Europe, the budgets defense industries. of individual states, by monopolizing and thus increasing gas prices in Europe. The European Defence Fund (EDF) also opens up new opportunities for The answer to this threat may be the cooperation between defense industries in promotion of such projects as gas the V4 group. The countries of the Group interconnectors at the borders of Visegrad should be ready to discuss joint V4 projects countries (e.g., the Poland-Czech Republic that could apply for EU funding. Recently, interconnector), the north-south corridor, new dynamics have been observed in V4 i.e., the extensive development of LNG, or cooperation. Visegrad countries have great the Baltic Pipeline project. Diversification potential for cooperation, which can have of raw material supplies can make a real an impact on improving security in the contribution to enhancing the energy region – and in the EU as a whole. Today security of all the V4. However, the critical it is evident that the V4 countries are in dimension of security here is to increase solidarity with each other in all domains. military capabilities and cooperation The main example of this is the common in the armed forces of all four Visegrad opposition to the construction of Nord countries. They should discuss joint Stream II, or the attempt to shape a single military exercises, support for combat attitude towards the migration crisis. capabilities and the exchange It is, therefore, necessary to overcome of defense experience. the obstacles together, open the door to closer cooperation and eliminate the risks It is also necessary to develop this associated with different perceptions of arrangement for other countries, as in threats which constitute an impediment to the case of the V4 political format, e.g., real cooperation. The Visegrad Group can an extension of military exercises and and should become an example of building technical cooperation to the Baltic States. good relations in international politics1. Closer historical experience, a similar perception of threats and comparable Maciej Małecki operational requirements of the armed September 10, 2018 forces of the V4 countries provide a reasonable basis for cooperation on arms and possibly the joint purchases of equipment. 1 The text was written on the basis of the speech by Maciej Małecki, delivered on September 10, 2018 in Poland encourages its V4 partners Warsaw during the conference “The Visegrad Group Contribution to European Security – Common to take a closer look at the initiative of the Challenges and Goals” organized by the Warsaw Regional Security Assistance Programme Institute.

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The Visegrad Group in the security architecture of Europe Piotr bajda, PhD While attempting to understand the role of the Visegrad Four (V4) in the security policy of Central Europe or, more broadly – the North Atlantic Treaty, it should not be forgotten that the Visegrad Group is strictly a political project, rather than a defensive project.

his was the case when the in Europe, though perhaps not project originated, and this in the hard, defensive dimension, but is how it is now. However, undoubtedly in what we call soft power. this does not mean that Tcooperation within the Visegrad format This dimension of soft security was at has no impact on the security policy the origin of the Visegrad Declaration in the region. In fact, it is quite the signed in February 1991. Today it is hard opposite: the Visegrad Group is a kind to imagine Central Europe without the of political core of Central Europe, and Visegrad Group, but this was not so when the agenda of meetings in the framework the process of political transformation of the annual V4 presidency of particular began in our region. The main initiator states has a visible impact on the and author of the project’s founding discussions about the security policy documents was Václav Havel, the president

10 The Warsaw Institute Review The Visegrad Group in the security architecture of Europe

© Leszek Szymański (PAP) Strbske Pleso, Slovakia, October 11, 2018. Polish President Andrzej Duda (L), Hungarian President of Czechoslovakia during that time, who János Áder (2L), Slovak President Andrej Kiska (2R), and Czech President Miloš Zeman (R) during – as befits an author of theatre plays – the official welcome ceremony in front of Grand knew how to assign new political roles to Hotel Kempinski, where a two-day summit of V4 particular states in the region. But his first Presidents was held. concept, announced in Bratislava in April 1990 at a meeting with representatives of new Hungarian and Polish political Dimension of soft security elites, was the division of the region into the North and the South. According to was at the origin of the Havel’s concept, the real Central Europe Visegrad Declaration was supposed to include the states of the Danube region, in the Adriatic Basin, and signed in February 1991. the task of Warsaw in this project was to organise an alliance around the Baltic up by the Czechoslovakian president was Sea, together with Lithuania, Latvia and not a sign of dislike towards Poland; after Estonia who were at that time fighting for all, Havel had plenty of friends there, their independence1. The scenario drawn which he mentioned in February 1990, during a speech in the Polish parliament 1 President Havel wanted Czechoslovakia to be a kind of keystone between the two subregions – but rather a result of the assessment of – that is how he wanted to make Prague the the international situation. In the mid- indispensable element of cooperation for each of the two projects. Text of the speech: Projev Bratislava 9 dubna 1990, http://vaclavhavel.cz/ prezidenta ČSFR Václava Havla na setkání showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=318_projevy. představitelů Polska, Československa a Maďarska, html&typ=HTML (accessed on: September 8, 2018).

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in neighbouring countries, including those in south Slovakia. This is why in The most significant the following stage Havel proposed the result of the rising of the cooperation of three Central European states, which resulted in signing the Visegrad Group, however, Visegrad Declaration in February 1991. The above-mentioned document should was the creation of an be closely examined because of two reasons. Firstly, due to the title, which area of relative security emphasizes the goal of this initiative: and the setting up of a a common goal towards achieving European integration2. The second regional structure which significant detail was a specific character of the new structure of this form of was a credible partner for regional cooperation. From the very beginning, Havel assumed it would not be Western capitals. a new international organization of any kind, but rather a loose form of political 1990s it was not certain how the process cooperation between the three states. of dismantling the Eastern Bloc would go, This is how he wanted to avoid the danger what would be the result of the process of the new structure being dominated by of the reunification of Germany (including the biggest state, Poland, and of Warsaw the issue regarding the country’s exact forcing its agenda on it. The rule boundaries), and whether the Red Army of consensus that was accepted resulted would peacefully leave East Germany in smaller countries feeling safe and equal. and Poland. In this situation, it was safer for Havel to propose an alliance of small The most significant result of the rising Central European states, leaning on of the Visegrad Group, however, was Austria and based on the alliance with the creation of an area of relative security Italy. It was supposed to protect Prague and the establishment of a regional from a geopolitical storm. The president structure which was a credible partner for of Czechoslovakia was therefore concerned Western capitals. Rather than follow the about the security of his own state when Yugoslavian scenario of ethnic conflicts he was presenting his ideas in Bratislava. and generate further tensions, the three Central European states declared their A year later, at a meeting in the Castle intention to cooperate. Looking at of Visegrad, things were no different. historical animosities, one may have been Havel was aware of the progressing surprised by this. Common experiences decomposition of the USRR, growing and a unity of principal objectives, ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, and, what is emphasized during the Visegrad summit, more – of the lack of interest of Vienna to were a smart use of a communication code play a more significant role in stabilizing which was clear to Western politicians. the area of the old Habsburg monarchy. This is how the Visegrad Group filled the In this situation Poland, which had just 2 Exact title: Declaration on Cooperation between signed a border treaty with Germany, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic became a more attractive partner. of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving Otherwise the only alliance left for Prague for European Integration, http://www.visegradgroup. eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad- would be Hungary, dreaming about declaration-110412 (accessed on: September 8, building autonomy for Hungarians living 2018).

12 The Warsaw Institute Review The Visegrad Group in the security architecture of Europe geopolitical void after the fall of the Berlin Wall, proving to European institutions and the most powerful European capitals that In 1998 The Visegrad there is a regional political center behind Group turned out to be the eastern border of Germany which is ready to accept the Western model of an exceptionally useful action. Therefore, the motto of returning to Europe was not included in the title and effective tool. of the Visegrad Declaration on purpose. And as for the European institutions divided (January 1993). For many Western and western capitals, the establishment observers, who looked up to Havel, this of V4 was a relief; instead of a new problem came as a big surprise. Only few had there was a chance for dialogue between actually taken into consideration Slovak partners and stabilization in a strategic aspirations and fears, which were best region. illustrated by Ján Čarnogurský – former dissident and prime minister of the Slovak There was another unexpected result from republican government at that time – in an establishing the Visegrad Group in 1991. interview for PAP (Polish Press Agency) in Thanks to the initiative of Havel, the term 1991 about the Slovak people’s desires to “Central Europe” made its way back into have their own star on the European flag4. the political science vernacular. A new, Nevertheless, it was not the dissolution local and original initiative was placed of Czechoslovakia which represented the on the old Cold War division between most important test in the early years of the East and the West. The creation of an the V4. A more severe crisis happened independent political center was another between 1993 and 1998, when the result of the formation of the V4. This was leaders of the newly created independent rightly predicted by Karl Schlögel, professor Slovakia and Czech Republic, in order to at the Viadrina European University who emphasize their underlying differences, noted that Germany will be “ousted” from rejected the Central European identity Central Europe and that decisions will be they had previously declared. Vaclav taken independently in Warsaw, Prague or Klaus, the prime minister of the Czech Budapest. The day before the V4 entered Republic, declared that the Czech people the EU he wrote: “Central Europe is not are a bastion of Western civilization in the a utopia, not an idea or fiction, but a fact Central European desert5, while one of the which can be discovered by any interested closest advisers of Vladímir Mečiar, the person – it is a historical and very cohesive head of the Slovak government, declared land”3. I dare say that the Visegrad Group that the Slovak people are the only bridge strongly contributed to this statement between the East and the West6. and to a certain political independence of Central Europe. However, already in 1998 The Visegrad Group turned out to be an exceptionally This sense of independence of the V4 had 4 to be dealt with during quite turbulent Czechoslovakia: interview with the PM of Slovakia, „Przegląd Międzynarodowy – Dodatek Tygodniowy times. Apart from the final act of the PAP” [International Review – PAP Weekly dissolution of the Soviet Union in Belarus Supplement] No. 1189, from July 13, 1991. (December 1991), Czechoslovakia was also 5 After: B. Doležal, Niebezpieczne zaszłości [Dangerous animosities], „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 3 K. Schlögel, Środek leży na wschodzie. Europa July 27, 2000, p. 12. w studium przejściowym [The centre is in the East. 6 R. Chmel, Poslední rusofili strednej Európy, Europe in a temporary stadium]. Warsaw 2005, p. 73. „OS – Občianska spoločnosť”, No. 2/2007, p. 22.

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© Jan Morek (PAP) Hungary, Visegrad, February 15, 1991. A summit in Visegrad, trilateral talks: Czechoslovakia’s delegation (L), Poland’s delegation (C), to halt the process of NATO enlargement Hungary’s delegation (R). or to marginalize the Central European coalition – the Visegrad Group. useful and effective tool. As a result of Slovakia becoming internationally However, the V4 turned out to be an isolated during the rule of Mečiar, instrument worth maintaining, a form Bratislava was rejected from the group of cooperation which had the power of of the first candidates invited to join mobilization in breakthrough situations. the European Union and NATO. There The first depiction of this phenomenon was, therefore, a threat that a black hole was perhaps the diplomatic support given would appear in Central Europe – a state to Slovakia on the international scene. which would be a grey area of security, When the government of Mačiar was and, in addition, separating Hungary, ousted from power, it was under the aegis about to join the North Atlantic Treaty, of the Visegrad Group that Bratislava from other members. Therefore, it should was given the perspective of membership not come as a surprise that the cabinet negotiations with the EU and NATO. of Mečiar was given a particularly warm Thanks to the diplomatic support of welcome in Moscow, where ideas of some the Central European states and to the politicians from the government coalition resumption of the Visegrad cooperation, that Bratislava should declare neutrality Slovakia, until recently an isolated state, were much anticipated7. There is no space entered the European Union together with for a more profound analysis on this other Visegrad states, as well as NATO – particular matter, but it is clear that for with a slight delay, in the second wave of the Russians, Slovakia was the last chance enlargement in 2004.

7 More about the Russian support for the Mečiar This lesson of Visegrad solidarity government in: P. Bajda, Elity polityczne in the face of Slovakia’s struggles, na Słowacji. [Political elites in Slovakia] Kręta droga do nowoczesnego państwa [Winding road as well as the adopted mechanisms to a modern state], Warsaw 2010, pp. 108–115. of institutionalization of the Visegrad

14 The Warsaw Institute Review The Visegrad Group in the security architecture of Europe cooperation (annually rotating presidency, creating the V4+ format and establishing the International Visegrad Fund8) raised With Lithuania, Slovenia the overall level of attractiveness of the Visegrad Group. Therefore, it should and Romania applying not have come as a surprise when new for membership, candidates started applying for V4 membership. This was the moment when the Visegrad Group the Visegrad states’ leaders took a decision which may have been difficult decided not to expand to understand at first. The goal of each organization is to strengthen its position, and proposed the V4+ and its attractiveness is defined by the format to all of the number of applicants for membership. However, with Lithuania, Slovenia and parties interested Romania applying for membership, the Visegrad Group decided not to expand in cooperation. and proposed the V4+ format to all of the parties interested in cooperation. would become blurred, and their position There were two principal reasons for this – weakened. Among the V4 states, Slovakia decision. First and foremost, this self- – the smallest state – cared most about limitation was due to security reasons. this exclusive membership status. This was The V4 feared that accepting new largely due to the benefits this provided to members could create an impression that the country’s image and the opportunity the intention of Warsaw or Prague is to for it to represent the Visegrad Group in build an alternative political centre or an the European Monetary Union, as it was alternative defensive alliance, which could the only V4 state to have adopted be used by others. The ultimate aim of the the euro when it did in 20099. V4 states was always to be stronger within the European Union and NATO, and The contemporary role of the V4 in the not outside these structures. The second security architecture of Europe can still reason for the decision was tactical; it was be discussed, as the Visegrad Group was in the best interests of the small Visegrad not dissolved the moment the Central states to maintain the exclusive status of European states entered the European being a founding member. In other words, Union. In theory, the task of the V4 if the V4 accepted Romania or Lithuania, included in the Visegrad Declaration was the presence of the founding members in greater cooperation towards European integration. This aim was accomplished 8 In 2000, the V4 defined the mechanism of in 2004. There could be no objections presidency from July to June of the following year, in the following order: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, when the leaders of the Visegrad states Czech Republic. Also, the V4+ format gives a lot announced the success of the project on of freedom to invite third states to meetings in the Visegrad format; there are annual V4+Western May 1, 2004. Nevertheless, a couple Balkans meetings, and V4+Japan, V4+Germany of days after the greatest enlargement and France summits were also organized in this format. The International Visegrad Fund is the only 9 More about the V4 role in the strategy of Bratislava institution which joins all the four states under a in: P. Bajda, Małe państwo europejskie na arenie formal agreement, in the framework of which a sort międzynarodowej. Polityka zagraniczna Republiki of foundation was established, to sponsor projects Słowackiej w latach 1993–2016 [Small European allowing for connecting and cooperation in various country on the international scene. Foreign policy areas and formulas (NGOs, local government, of the Slovak Republic in 1993–2016], schools and universities). Cracow-Warsaw 2018, pp. 251–260.

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of the Western Balkans or the Eastern Partnership became almost obligatory in The Kroměříž the program of each Visegrad presidency. For a long time before it became popular Declaration includes in Brussels, the idea of a Western Balkan a statement that the EU enlargement was largely promoted by the Visegrad politicians. It should, unique experience of however, be emphasized that this engagement for the stabilization and the V4 should be used Europeanization of the Western Balkans was often met with the approval of EU or to continue the process Western states leaders. It relieved them from actually taking care of this subject, of EU enlargement which for many capitals was not a priority. with other Eastern As a result, many Czech and Slovak diplomats were given community tasks in and Southern this region. For instance, the current Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák who, European states. on behalf of the EU, was responsible for organizing an indenpendence referendum of the EU, the leaders of the V4 met in Montengro (2006) and served as the in the lovely Czech town of Kroměříž EU High Representative in Bosnia and and decided to continue regional Herzogovinia between 2007 and 2009. cooperation in the Visegrad format. In the announcement published after The Visegrad cooperation can also be the meeting, they emphasized their perceived as the inspiration of a new satisfaction with achieving the main regional project – Three Seas Initiative. aim, but that they had also decided that The frequently used V4+ format contributed the Visegrad cooperation ought to be to meetings of representatives of Northern continued for the sake of strengthening and Southern Europe, at various levels Central European identity. The Kroměříž and under the Visegrad aegis. Declaration includes a statement that the unique experience of the V4 should And yet, despite so many initiatives be used to continue the process of EU stabilizing the immediate surroundings of enlargement with other Eastern and the European Union, the Visegrad Group Southern European states10. It was the was recently perceived by many as the eastern and the southern neighbourhood main obstacle for the new migration policy. that made up one of the principal areas The objection of the V4 states to accept in which the V4 states wanted to work migrants on a mass scale became almost and contribute their added value to the a trademark which strongly polarized EU entire European community. And indeed, members. Over time, the policy of Visegrad from that moment on, meetings of the states to seal the external borders of the leaders of the V4 states with the leaders community and to preserve the attainment of the Schengen zone was in the most part 10 Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic considered the right approach. However, of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation the fact that the ‘European outskirts’ broke of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession ranks with the most powerful capitals and to the EU, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2004/ declaration-of-prime (accessed on: September 10, disagreed with their decision was almost 2018). regarded by Brussels to be a rebellion,

16 The Warsaw Institute Review The Visegrad Group in the security architecture of Europe prompting them to threaten withdrawing Slavism, while in Hungary it is a decision European funds or imposing financial of the political leaders, who perceive a close penalties for not accepting refugees. relationship with Russia mostly as a chance to carry out lucrative business projects and For the new and small members of the who do not consider Russian policy as a European community, the Visegrad Group threat to international order. There is an offers a change to express fears regarding analogical difference of opinion between policies in the protection of a recognizable Warsaw and other Visegrad capitals when regional structure. However, because the it comes to relations with Ukraine. For actions of the Visegrad Group often irritate Slovakia, it is mostly a partner in the transit Brussels and leaders in powerful western of Russian energy fuels; for Budapest – a capitals, the potential of the format of this state discriminating against the Hungarian cooperation is not fully used. Nevertheless, minority living in Zakarpattia, and for the V4 has naturally become the region’s Prague – a secondary partner. Despite main political center; if not governing, different opinions on such sensitive issues, then certainly organizing the outskirts of it is most often thanks to Polish initiatives the European Union, which stabilizes the that Ukrainian leaders are invited to European neighborhood and advocates for Visegrad meetings, while the International the soft Europeanization of these states (the Visegrad Fund has a program of support Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership). for the Eastern Partnership states. It is hard to specify to what extent coexistence From the perspective of Warsaw, the within the V4 contributed to the fact that Visegrad Group is one of the most our partners did not strongly object to the important instruments in Polish foreign program of the pronounced presence policy making in two ways. The principal of NATO troops on the Eastern flank dimension concerns European politics. or declaring that they were not interested The V4 considerably strengthens the in hosting alliance troops on their territory position of particular Central European was their only response. states in key areas. It is mostly thanks to efficient Visegrad cooperation that the The Visegrad Group is therefore club “Friends of Cohesion” was established not a perfect structure of regional during negotiations regarding the last cooperation, but it is a proven instrument, multi-annual EU budget. The second so there is no urge to replace it with aspect relates to regional dimension something else. For all four capitals it of Polish foreign policy. The occasion constitutes an important when the opinion of Budapest, Prague or tool in their respective national foreign Bratislava on a given issue varies from that policies. The V4 – despite being mostly of Warsaw is not unprecedented. Probably a strictly political project – contributes the most visible difference is the policy importantly to building regional towards the Russian Federation. Moscow and European security. In addition, has succeeded in building strong and it creates an environment in which influential pro-Russian communities in the partners trust each other, which smaller Visegrad states. The framework positively influences relations with direct of this article does not allow for a more neighbours of the EU in the Western profound analysis of the roots of these Balkans or with the states participating pro-Russian attitudes, which vary greatly in the Eastern Partnership. among the states. In the Czech Republic or in Slovakia they are deeply rooted in Piotr Bajda history and are built on the idea of Pan- September 24, 2018

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Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries Joanna Antczak, PhD Nowadays, cyber threats have become increasingly strategic in nature, covering all activities of the state, including its security and defense system.

ybercrime is causing greater a given state, as well as the digital losses to national economies, security of its institutions and citizens, businesses as well as private a number of entities have to engage in individuals than ever before, dialogue and partnership. First of all, a Cwith cyber methods now being used common strategy should be developed in to influence democratic elections in cooperation between representatives of individual countries. On the one hand, the administration responsible for action armed forces are there to protect citizens plans and entrepreneurs experienced from such attacks, while on the other in eliminating online threats. Second, hand, the very same forces develop their it concerns operational activities proper offensive capabilities. Therefore, undertaken by network administrators cyber methods are seen as an effective of public administration offices and deterrent when making political or their counterparts in private companies. military decisions; also, they can be used However, this must not be simply superficial as a means of a retaliation or response dialogue. The EU and its member states to political or military actions of other need to devise a coherent system of countries (such as the recent changes protection, based on standards applicable to made by the US President Donald entities affected by cybersecurity de( facto, Trump, that give even more freedom each and every one of us). Protection in when it comes to offensive actions). cyberspace cannot be provided in isolation from the outside world1. Cybersecurity is a matter which cannot 1 Cyberbezpieczeństwo – problem nas wszystkich? be considered in isolation. In order Strategie państw UE wobec wyzwań związanych to ensure the digital security within z dostępem do danych w sieci, „Europejskie Forum

18 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

Characteristics of the these countries and to coordinate their Visegrad Group countries positions on major international issues, The Visegrad Group (V4) is an association including those within the EU. The of four Central European countries. group was set up on February 15, 1991 The original reason for its establishment by three countries: Poland, Hungary and was to provide a platform on which to Czechoslovakia, creating the so-called cooperate regarding the withdrawal Visegrad Triangle. Following the split of Soviet troops stationed in Central of Czechoslovakia into two countries on and Eastern Europe. Subsequently, Janaury 1, 1993, the Czech Republic and the V4 played an important role in the Slovakia became members of the Group. coordination of efforts to join NATO The International Visegrad Fund and the EU. Today, the group’s objective is is an institution established to finance to further develop a partnership between joint projects.

e Visegrad Group

C R S

B H

Nowych Idei” [Cyber security – a problem affecting us all? Strategies undertaken by the EU Member All four countries joined the European States with regard to challenges posed by accessing online data, from: European Forum for New Ideas], Union on May 1, 2014 and have belonged Sopot, October 1, 2015, p. 1. to the Schengen zone since December 21,

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2007. Slovakia adopted the euro on a system of interconnected facilities, January 1, 2009, while the others chose including construction facilities, to keep their national currencies. equipment, installations, and services Characteristics of the analyzed countries

* Price measurements for goods and services in relation to average income, with the use of the purchasing power standards, understood in terms of a common currency

Source: private materials based on data from: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_pl (accessed on: July 19, 2018).

Taking into account the living standards essential to the safety of the state and in the analyzed countries, defined as GDP its citizens and ensuring efficient per capita expressed in PPS, the Czech functioning of public administration Republic (85) and Slovakia (77) perform bodies, as well as institutions and best, while Poland and Hungary are at the businesses. Critical infrastructure same level (68). In terms of area, Poland is includes the following systems: the largest country while Slovakia is the energy supply, energy and fuel raw smallest. This is also true as of population materials, communications, ICT size. All of the countries are parliamentary networks, financial, food supply, water republics. supply, health protection, transport, and rescue, all of which ensure the Cybersecurity System of the continuity of public administration, Visegrad Group countries production, storage, and the use of In Poland, the issues of its cybersecurity chemical and radioactive substances, system have been addressed in the including pipelines of hazardous following documents: substances.

• Act of April 26, 2007 on crisis • Act of August 5, 2010 on the protection management (the Official Journal of classified information (the Official of Laws of 2007 No. 89 item 590, as Journal of Laws 2010, No. 182, item amended), in which Article 3 item 2 1228, as amended) and Act of July 18, defines critical infrastructure to be 2002 on the provision of electronic

20 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

services (the Official Journal of Laws of networks and information systems 2002, No. 144, item 1204, as amended), within the territory of the Union in which an ICT system was defined, (EU OJ 2016 L194), which remain which should be understood as a set of closely related. These were developed interconnected IT devices and software by a group consisting of representatives that ensures the processing and storage, of the following ministries: digitization, and the sending and receiving of data national defense, internal affairs via telecommunications networks and administration, as well as with a terminal device appropriate for representatives of the Internal Security a given type of telecommunications Agency, the Government Centre for network, as defined in the Act Security and the National Security of July 16, 2004. Bureau. In accordance with the vision contained in point 4, in 2022, Poland • Telecommunications Law (Journal of will be a country more resilient to Laws of 2016, item 1489, as amended). cyber-attacks and threats. Thanks to the synergy of internal and • National Framework for the Cyber international activities, the cyberspace Security Policy of the Republic of of the Republic of Poland will constitute Poland for the years 2017–2022 a safe environment enabling the (Resolution No. 52/2017 of the Council implementation of all state functions of Ministers of 27 April 2017) and and allowing for the full exploitation the Cyber Security Strategy of the of the potential of the digital economy, Republic of Poland for the years while respecting the rights and 2017–2022, in accordance with the freedoms of citizens. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) on measures The main as well as specific objectives for a common level of high security of the Strategy are presented in Figure 2.

Main goals and speci c objectives of cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022

MAIN GOAL To provide public and private sector as well as citizens with a high security level in terms of performing and using key and digital services

DETAILED GOAL 1 DETAILED GOAL 2 DETAILED GOAL 3 DETAILED GOAL 4 To attain the ability to coordinate To enhance all kinds of capabilities To increase national potential and Building Poland’s strong position state-level actions aiming to prevent, dedicated to ght cyber dangers all competences within the frame- in the domain of cybersecurity detect, ght, and minimize all work of security in cyberspace consequences of incidents that might possibly breach the security of the ICT systems indispensable for the state’s functioning

Source: private materials (based on: Cybersecurity strategy for the Republic of Poland for the years 2017–2022, p. 8).

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On April 26, 2018, the Council of 1. Analysis and assessment of the Ministers adopted a draft act on the state of cybersecurity on the basis national cybersecurity system which aims of aggregated data and indicators to implement the NIS directive effective developed with the participation of as of May 25, 2018. The Act provides for, government administration bodies inter alia: and teams responding to computer security incidents operating in the • the creation of three CSIRTs2: Gov3, Ministry of National Defense, the MON4 and NASK5; Internal Security Agency and the • rules for identifying the operators of Scientific and Academic Computer key services and their obligations, Network – National Research • implementation of a safety management Institute; system and conducting audits), 2. Developing new solutions and • rules regarding public entities (these initiating activities in the field of will be obliged to handle incidents), cybersecurity at the national level; • requirements for digital service 3. Issuing opinions on drafts of legal providers (online trading platforms, acts and other government documents cloud computing services and search affecting the implementation of tasks engines), in the field of cybersecurity; • a description of the incident response 4. Conducting and coordinating system and the involvement of all activities conducted by government stakeholders, as well as the categories administration bodies aimed at of incidents. raising public awareness of the threats of cybersecurity and safe use of the In March 2018, the Office of the Internet; Government Plenipotentiary for 5. Initiating national cybersecurity Cyber Security6 was established. exercises; and Pursuant to § 2 of the Regulation, the 6. Cooperating with other countries, plenipotentiary is the Secretary of State organizations and international or the Undersecretary of State in the institutions on cybersecurity issues; Ministry of National Defense. The tasks 7. Undertaking activities aimed at of the Plenipotentiary include ensuring supporting scientific research and the coordination of activities and the development of technologies implementation of the government’s policy in the field of cybersecurity; – in in the area of ensuring cybersecurity, consultation with relevant ministers. and in particular: On February 16, 2015, the Government 2 CSIRT – Computer Security Incident Response of the Czech Republic approved the new Team operating at the national level. National Cybernetic Security Strategy 3 CSIRT GOV – Computer Security Incident Response Team led by the Head of the Internal for the years 2015–2020, which is a Security Agency. comprehensive set of measures aimed 4 CSIRT MON – Computer Security Incidents at achieving the highest possible level Response Team led by the Minister of National of cybersecurity in the Czech Republic. Defence. 5 CSIRT NASK – Computer Security Incident Response Team run by the Scientific and Academic The main objectives to be achieved in Computer Network – National Research Institute. five years are a key part of the strategy. 6 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of March They are divided into the following 16, 2018 on the appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for Cyber Security, Journal of Laws priority areas: of March 20, 2018. Item 587.

22 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

1. Ensuring efficiency and strengthening 1. Citizens’ awareness. of all structures, processes and 2. Critical Information Infrastructure cooperation in the field of cybersecurity. Protection. 2. Active international cooperation. 3. Engage in international cooperation. 3. Protection of the national Critical 4. Establish a public-private partnership. Information Infrastructure and 5. Establish an incident response Important Information Systems. capability. 4. Cooperation with the private sector. 6. Establish an institutionalized form of 5. R&D/Consumers’ trust. cooperation between public agencies. 6. Support to the education, awareness 7. Establish baseline security and development of the information requirements. society 8. Establish incident reporting 7. Support of the development of the mechanisms police’s capabilities to investigate 9. Foster R&D. and prosecute information crime. 10. Organize cybersecurity exercises. 8. Cybersecurity legislation (development 11. Strengthen training and educational of legislative framework). Participation programs9. in the creation and implementation of European and international In June 2015, the government set up a regulations7. National Security Office for cybersecurity. The National Agency for Electronic The National Agency for Cyber Security Networks and Systems is also in place. and Information has been operating since August 2017. The concept of cybersecurity On March 21, 2013, the Hungarian of the Slovak Republic for the years government decided on a national 2015–2020 was implemented on cybersecurity strategy (No. 1139/2013). June 1, 2015. The purpose of the strategy is to determine The concept is based on a statement national objectives and strategic and a description of the basic terms directions, tasks and comprehensive and principles, characteristics of the government tools which will enable current situation of the strategic, legal Hungary to enforce its national interests and institutional frameworks in the area in the Hungarian cyberspace, within the of cybersecurity in the Slovak Republic context of the global cyberspace10. and on a strategic and methodological framework formed by NATO and They are divided into the following European Union documents; subsequently, objectives: the concept formulates principles, 1. Critical Information Infrastructure goals and proposed solutions8. Protection. 2. Develop national cyber contingency They are divided into the following plans. objectives: 3. Engage in international cooperation. 4. Establish an incident response

7 Vide: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/ capability. structure-organization/national-liaison-office/news- from-the-member-states/czech-republic-national- 9 Vide: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national- cyber-security-strategy-2015-2020 cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/strategies/cyber- (accessed on: August 19, 2018 r.). security-concept-of-the-slovak-republic 8 Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for (accessed on: August 19, 2018). 2015–2020, p. 6. 10 National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary, p. 2.

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5. Establish an institutionalized form of science, security and defense, thus making cooperation between public agencies. it difficult to determine exact values. There 6. Establish baseline security are no comprehensive statistics that cover requirements. cybersecurity expenditure at different levels. 7. Establish incident reporting mechanisms. The analysis of expenditures on 8. Organize cybersecurity exercises. cybersecurity of the Visegrad countries was 9. Strengthen training and educational made on the basis of selected indicators: programs11. • defense spending; It is worth noting that in 2018 two legal • defense spending as % of GDP; acts entered into force in all countries • R&D expenditure as % of defense belonging to the European Union: expenditure; • ICT sector as % of GDP; • On 10 May – Directive 2016/1148 of • employment in the ICT sector; the European Parliament and of the • employment in fields related to science Council of 6 July 2016 on measures for and technology; a high common level of network and • number of ISO/IEC 27001 certificates information system security within the issued; Union, which requires member states to • ICT Development Index (ITU); develop national strategies for network • IMD World Digital Competitiveness and information system security or to (WDC); set up appropriate monitoring and risk • National Cyber Security Index (NCI); response units. • the difference shows the relationship • On 25 May – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 between the NCSI score and DDL. of the European Parliament and of Selected indicators indirectly demonstrate the Council of 27 April 2016 on the a state’s preparedness to finance protection of individuals with regard cybersecurity. to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and Table 2 presents defense spending. repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Table 3 shows the level of defense spending Data Protection Regulation, GDPR). as a percentage of GDP in 2010–2017. The regulation covers all entities, both public and private, that process An analysis of the data presented in the personal data and, at the same time, table shows that in 2017, defense spending most of the data processing operations. in each country increased compared to 2016. The highest increase was recorded Expenditure on cybersecurity by the Czech Republic (14%) and the of the Visegrad Group lowest by Poland (9%) (Note that absolute countries numbers should be taken into account – A state’s expenditure on cybersecurity and here, it is Poland that takes the lead is difficult to estimate. Costs calculated in this type of expenditure). at the state level are scattered across different areas such as digital technologies, Only Poland allocates at least 2% of its digitization, development, economy, GDP to this purpose, in accordance with NATO guidelines. In other 11 Vide: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national- countries, the level of defense spending cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/strategies/ national-cyber-security-strategy is approximately 1%. (accessed on: August 19, 2018).

24 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

Military expenditure by country, in millions of US$ at current prices and exchange rates, 2010–2017

* e gures for Poland exclude some defence spending in other ministries, and additional domestic defence spending such as the Armed Forces Modernization Fund (AFMF) and some additional Defence R&D. Between 2004 and 2016 these additional sums varied between about 240 million and 640 million Zlotys. No AFMF for 2017.

** Figures for these countries do not include military pensions.

Source: SIPRI NATO milex data 1949–2017.xlsx; http://www.sipri.org/ (accessed on: August 10, 2018). Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 2010–2017

Source: SIPRI NATO milex data 1949–2017.xlsx; http://www.sipri.org/ (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

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Research and Development Spending in Military Expenditures (in millions of euro and as % of GDP)

Source: private materials based on www.eda.europa.eu (accessed on: 10 July 2018).

Analyzing overall defense spending in 2014, the Czech Republic (6,5%) recorded a decrease compared to the previous year, while the other countries recorded an increase (the largest made by Poland – 12,6%). Poland allocates a significant part of its defense budget on research and development. Table 5 presents the share of the ICT sector in GDP in selected countries for the years 2009–2015. ICT sector as percentage of country’s GDP, 2010–2015

Source: private materials based on Eurostat.

26 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

Analyzing the data in Table 5, it can be which may indicate a high potential observed that Hungary recorded a high for development. In Poland, this sector share of ICT above 5% between 2010 and translated into 3.14% of GDP in 2015, 2015. The share of the ICT sector in the while in countries such as Malta, Great GDP of the Czech Republic and Slovakia Britain, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia the is above 4%. The share of the ICT sector level is at 7.26%, 5.9%, 5.87%, 5.08%, in Poland’s GDP is still relatively low, and 4.81%, respectively.

Table 6 illustrates employment in the ICT sector in 2010–2015 and Figure 1 shows employment in science and technology related areas in 2016 (as a % of the active population aged 25–64). Employment in ICT sector, 2010–2015 (in %)

Source: private materials based on Eurostat http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/digital-economy- and-society/data/database (accessed on: July 10, 2018). Employment in science and technology sectors

38,7% 36,7% 42,8% 34,2%

C H P S R

Source: private materials based on Eurostat.

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The analysis of Table 6 shows that Hungary for the certification of the information has the highest level of employment in security management system. the ICT sector, exceeding 3%; whereas for Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic The ISO/IEC 27001 standard has this accounts for less than 3%. international scope, and defines Analysis of Figure 1 shows that the the requirements and principles highest level of employment in science of initiating, implementing, maintaining and technology (42,8%) was recorded and improving information security by Poland and the lowest by Slovakia management in an organization. It also (34,2%). includes best practices for the application On January 10, 2018, the standard PN-EN of security objectives in the areas ISO/IEC 27001:2017-06 “Information of information security management. security management systems. In 2016, the ISO 27001 certification market Requirements” was issued. This standard grew globally by 25% y/y. According to does not introduce new requirements Przemysław Szczurek, Product Manager for PN-ISO/IEC 27001:2014-12, and this for Information Security TUV NORD update results from the introduction of Polska, the main reasons encouraging previously issued corrections to ISO/ a certification of information security IEC 27001:2013: Cor 1:2014 to Annex A management system are as follows: Clause 8.1.1 and Cor 2:2015 to Clause • improving the security of our own 6.1.3. information, as well as information entrusted to us by our business ISO/ IEC 27001 (PN-ISO/ IEC 27001) partners, “Information Security Management • increasing a company’s value, Systems. Requirements” is the basis • establishing a competitive advantage12.

Number of ISO/IEC 27001 certi cates issued in the years 2010–2016

Source: private materials based on: https://www.iso.org (accessed on: July 10, 2018).

12 Market Analysis Report_ISO_27001.pdf, p. 3. 12 Market Analysis Report_ISO_27001.pdf, p. 3.

28 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

By analyzing the data covering a period of countries, which in turn translates into the seven years, it can be seen that the largest level of awareness of threats in the cyber number of certificates has been issued field, i.e. the readiness to bear the costs of in Poland: in 2016 alone, as many as 657 strengthening cybersecurity. certificates were issued in Poland. Compared In 2017, the ITU issued a second edition to 2015, this represents an increase of 47%. of the index (the first one was published Globally, Poland ranks 11th. The largest in 2014). The indices in both reports are number of certificates are issued in Japan, based on the same pillars: where in 2016 the number of certificates issued was 8,945, followed by the United 1. Legal basis – with an emphasis on Kingdom with 3367. Within the Visegrad forensic science and the fight against countries, Poland takes the lead. In the cybercrime; Czech Republic, the highest number of 2. Operational capacities – comparable certificates were issued in 2010 (529), in to the EU index; Slovakia in 2015 (232, a drop of 9% y/y in 3. Organizational measures – so-called 2016), and in Hungary in 2016 (421, a 33% y/y road maps, policies, procedures, increase). In terms of industry, information evaluation systems; technologies take first place, with the 4. Reinforcement of the capacity of the number of certificates in 2016 amounting to state – standardization of development, 6,578 (the public administration sector ranks development of professional staff, 7th, with 235 certificates issued). certification; The ICT Development Index of the 5. Cooperation between countries, International Telecommunication Union agencies, sectors and within the is one of the most trusted indicators in framework of interstate organizations. ITU ICT Development Index 2017

Source: private materials based on: www.itu.int (May 2, 2017). the world reflecting a given society’s and Analyzing the data shown in Table 8, economy’s reliance on ICT technologies. in 2017, the index (+7) was reached Indirectly, it also indicates the by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, technological advancement of individual and (-7) by Hungary and Poland.

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In 2018, a separate report assessing the • Poland ranked 36th (in 2017: 37th) “digital” competitiveness of countries was scoring 68,557; published by the International Institute for • Hungary ranked 46th (in 2017: 44th) the Development of Lausanne Management scoring 57,099; (IMD World Competitiveness Center) for • Slovakia ranked 50th (in 2017: 43rd) the second time. scoring 56,536.

The IMD World Digital Competitiveness The National Cyber Security Index (WDC) ranking analyzes and ranks (NCSI) is a global index, which countries’ abilities to adopt and measures the preparedness of countries explore digital technologies leading to to prevent cyber threats and manage transformation in government practices, cyber incidents. The NCSI is also business models and society in general. a database with publicly available Based on research, the methodology evidence materials and a tool for of the WDC ranking defines digital national cybersecurity capacity building. competitiveness into three main factors: The indicators of the NCSI have been knowledge, technology, future readiness13. developed according to the national Out of the 63 countries surveyed, the cybersecurity framework. The NCSI Czech Republic ranked 33rd with 71,488 Score shows the percentage the country points (out of 100,000 possible achieved by received from the maximum value of the the United States, which was ranked first). indicators. The maximum NCSI Score is The rest of the Visegrad Group was always 100 (100%) regardless of whether ranked as follows: indicators are added or removed14.

IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking

Source: private materials based on: IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2018.

13 IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 14 Vide: https://ncsi.ega.ee/methodology/ 2018, p. 28. (accessed on: August 17, 2018).

30 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

In addition to the NCSI Score, the index Slovakia is ranked 4th in the NCSI, table also shows the Digital Development which measures a state’s preparedness Level (DDL). The DDL is calculated to prevent cyber threats and to manage according to the ICT Development cyber incidents, with a relatively high Index (IDI) and Networked Readiness score of 80,52% (France is ranked first, Index (NRI). The DDL is the average with 83,12%). The other Visegrad Group percentage the country received from countries were in the top 20 places: the maximum value of both indexes. • Czech Republic ranked 9th, scoring The difference shows the relationship 74.03%; between the NCSI score and the DDL. • Poland ranked 13th, scoring 70.13%; A positive result shows that the country’s • Hungary ranked 16th, scoring 66.23%. cybersecurity development is in accordance with, or ahead of, its digital The Visegrad countries have exhibited development. A negative result shows positive results, which means that the that the country’s digital society is more development of cybersecurity is in line advanced than the national cybersecurity with the digital development in each area15. country. To recapitulate the results of the Chart 2 illustrates the current NCI Index, comparison of indicators for selected and Table 10 the difference between NCSI countries, the following conclusions and DDL results. can be drawn:

National Cyber Security Index

100% 24 74% 66% 70% 81% 80% 18

60% 12 13 40% 9 16 8

20% 4 4

0% 0

W I

Source: private materials based on: https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/, (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

15 Vide: https://ncsi.ega.ee/methodology/ (accessed15 Vide: https://ncsi.ega.ee/methodology/ on: August 10, 2018). (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

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e Dierence shows the relationship between the NCSI score and DDL

Source: private materials based on: https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/, (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

• There is a continuous need for an There is a need for a systemic coordination ongoing analysis of expenditure versus on a national scale in order to effectively costs/threats on a national scale (public analyze the need for expenditures and to and private sector, support for science, minimize costs on a national scale. It is for ICT security and for the development necessary for authorities to be informed of the society/digital economy); of the costs incurred by the private sector. • A cost/threat analysis should be linked Conclusions from this analysis should to a single cybersecurity think-tank that influence an efficient building of our would coordinate actions (and hence own national potential at the scientific, expenditure) across the country; technical and industrial level in order • The Visegrad Group countries have to ensure overall cybersecurity. evinced relatively good cybersecurity potential. A well-designed decision-making structure is key to a rational and more effective SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS government policy of expenditure on The above analysis has proved that the cybersecurity, both at the national and identification of cybersecurity spending private levels. At the national level, it is ceilings is not a simple operation. It appears necessary to specify competencies in three that governments, public institutions and areas: detecting, protecting and responding private entities all lack an appropriate to threats at all levels of government, tool, which would help to assess risks and simultaneously initiating and coordinating threats (in the short-, medium- and long- actions at all levels. term perspective), develop strategies and programs to counter these risks and, in so In 2012, the Kosciuszko Institute published doing, allocate appropriate resources. V4 Cooperation in Ensuring Cyber Security

32 The Warsaw Institute Review Expenditure on cybersecurity of the Visegrad Group countries

– Analysis and Recommendations, in which • Developing a CSDP doctrine on the following recommendations were put cyberwar that would encompass the forward, which are still valid: issue of information operations and would be compatible to relevant NATO • Common understanding of the procedures is recommended. fundamental cybersecurity framework • The V4 Group should postulate the needs to be ensured. The process inclusion of funding tasks related to includes, among others, consideration cybersecurity into various EU’s funding of key players, definition of basic mechanisms (e.g. cohesion policy)16. notions and fundamental security goals as well as limitations which In conclusion, it may be stated that in terms need to be respected (e.g. privacy of both tangible expenditure on research, as preservation). well as in the organization and effectiveness • There is a strong need for public-private of the cybersecurity system, the Visegrad cooperation within each of Group countries are more the V4 countries as well as on the level or less in the vicinity of the EU average. of cross-national sectoral working A successful coordination both within groups. Additionally, private entities and among the V4 countries may lead should be strongly involved in the to the development of a specialization of process of cyber space protection. these countries in the field of cybersecurity • The V4 countries should support (although competition is high – from large the involvement of the private sector countries such as Germany, France or in Cyber Europe exercises and the Netherlands, to smaller but advanced exercises organized by NATO. countries in this field such as Estonia • The V4 countries should jointly or Lithuania). This can promote good explore the utility for the benefits of use of the International Visegrad Fund regional cooperation on cybersecurity, programs and the Group’s efforts to create the mechanism offered by European even broader cooperation forums – such treaties such as permanent structured as the Three Seas Initiative17. All of the cooperation, and the EU’s provision above activities are related to a readiness to a task undertaken by several to incur expenditures on building efficient Member States. structures, both in respective countries • The V4 countries should support and internationally, increasing expenditure the inclusion of the provisions related in the field of ICT and on R&D (and its to cyber threats in the new edition implementation), as well as on initiating of the European Security Strategy. international programs under V4, the • There is a need for establishing Three Seas Initiative, the EU or NATO. a new comprehensive EU cybersecurity strategy that would encompass Joanna Antczak all the dimensions of the EU’s September 1, 2018 action in this field. • The V4 Group should support establishing a body (e.g. EU Cyber 16 T. Rezek, T. Szatkowski, J. Świątkowska, J. Vyskoč, Security Coordinator) for the purposes M. Ziarek, V4 Cooperation in Ensuring Cyber Security of coordinating various aspects of the – Analysis and Recommendations, The Kosciuszko EU’s cybersecurity policy. Alternatively, Institute, Cracow 2012, s. 83–87. the responsibilities of the above- 17 More on this topic in: BRIEF OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE Kosciuszko INSTITUTE, The -mentioned entity can be attributed Digital 3 Seas Initiative – The Digital Tri-City Initiative to an already existing structure. is a step into the future of the region, June 2018.

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V4 countries toWAR Ds Russian aggression against Ukraine Aleksandra Romanowska The establishment of the Visegrad Group was a response to the new challenges that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary faced after another European spring of nations.

n their founding declaration of The economies of the V4 countries February 15, 1991 (the Soviet depended on the Kremlin for raw Union dissolved on December materials and their economies were 26th of the same year), the V4 associated with the collapsing economy I“founding fathers” pointed to “the of the Soviet Union. full restoration of the independence of states, democracy, and freedom” For the first time since the Yalta and “commitment to the creation of Conference, this new situation required a European political and economic the V4 countries’ leaders, elected in system”. They drafted their program democratic elections, a permanent when Soviet troops were stationed in the redefinition of relations with the Soviet territories aspiring for independence. Union, and then with Russia, its legal

34 The Warsaw Institute Review V4 countries towards Russian aggression against Ukraine

© Leszek Szymański (PAP) Hungary, Budapest, March 2, 2018. The Conference of Presidents of Parliaments of the V4 Countries. successor. The Soviet, and then the Russian factor, were present in the politics of V4 countries. For the first time since

Today, European historians remind the Yalta Conference, us that their first common political and this new situation military success was moving the Soviet army units away to the Soviet Union. required the V4 It was a very important moment in this history. However, the Soviet Union (and countries’ leaders, subsequently Russia) have remained a permanent reference point for elected in democratic many policies of the V4. elections, a permanent Russia has not intended to give up its political and economic influence in redefinition of relations Central Europe and in the so-called with the Soviet Union, post-Soviet area. From the perspective of 27 years (from the dissolution of the and then with Russia, Soviet Union to the present day), we can form a hypothesis regarding the political its legal successor.

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Russia is permanently seeking to revise the constructive order in Europe after V4 countries rarely the victory of Solidarity, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Velvet Revolution. The adopted a common authorities are trying to believe they can position on Russian turn back time and find alliances. policy, especially V4 countries against in crisis situations. the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression conflict between the V4 countries and the The annexation of the Crimea and the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia). organization of a separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine is another example of the Russia’s policy towards Prague, Warsaw, continuation of Russia’s revisionist policy. Budapest and later towards Bratislava, was This sequence of events should also include first focused on having economic, political the history of the conflict over Transnistria and on establishing secret service base in and the war with Georgia in 2008. In the former satellite countries, as illustrated this context, we can see a combination by some links to Russia’s policies towards of two strategic lines of Russian policy: the new states taking advantage of the maintaining control (political, military, historical occurrences and susceptibility and economic) of the post-Soviet area as well as pro-Soviet leanings of certain as well as attempting to block European circles. Both the new V4 authorities and Union and NATO expansion in this region. the general public rejected these policies. Sociologically, these conflicts are also one of the sequences of the disintegration of Another contentious point between Russia the Soviet empire: not only is this historical and V4 countries was a strategic issue of process still ongoing, but also without a key importance to security and the future: foreseeable resolution in the near future. the accession of Central and Eastern It is the background, or more precisely, European countries to NATO and to the the counterpoint and inspiration for the EU. This was and remains a fundamental Kremlin’s revisionist policy. dispute concerning the nature and meaning of politics, the understanding of V4 countries rarely adopted a common European values and, in particular, the position on Russian policy, especially in analysis of the message of Europe’s tragic crisis situations. The divisions within the history in the 20th century. Russia was and group became obvious during the war remains opposed to this choice. between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, when the presidents of Slovakia and Russia considered the NATO enlargement a the Czech Republic, Ivan Gašparovič and historical mistake; a decision directed Václav Klaus, and Slovak Prime Minister against their interests. They also negatively Robert Fico accused Georgia of being assessed the European political and responsible for the armed conflict. Poland, economic model. Russians subordinated however, supported Georgia. Polish their revisionist policy towards Europe President Lech Kaczyński organized a pro- and the North Atlantic Community to -Georgian alliance with the participation this very thesis. One of the strategic aims of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. of Russia is to stop the evolution of NATO He did not get the support of the President and to weaken the European Union. of Hungary for his inititative, though.

36 The Warsaw Institute Review V4 countries towards Russian aggression against Ukraine

László Sólyom, the Hungarian president When Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine during this time, remained neutral in 2009, the Slovak Prime Minister accused towards the Russian-Georgian conflict. Ukraine of being responsible for disrupting gas supplies to the Slovak Republic, In the Georgian capital, President whereas Poland condemned Russia for Kaczyński took part in a rally and using “gas weapons” against Ukraine. The delivered a sharp, anti-Russian speech: different positions of the Czech Republic “We are here to take up the fight. For the and Hungary on the 2009 gas crisis, which first time in years, our eastern neighbors were described as “pragmatic” by their show the true face we have known for governments, did not hinder the start hundreds of years. They think other of cooperation on European integration nations should be subordinated to them. of gas markets and its diversification. We say no! That country is Russia”, Kaczyński said. The Visegrad Group In the political discourse within the countries did not support the Polish Visegrad Group (V4) some argue repeatedly President. His initiative was also criticized that the different nature of perception of by the “old Europe”. security threats and national interests, including fundamental differences in The German newspaper Frankfurter the assessment of Russian politics, may Allgemeine Zeitung recalled that France, undermine trust between V4 countries having held the EU presidency at the time, and consequently weaken their cooperation. considered the five leaders’ trip to Tbilisi to be “an unhelpful expression of bias”. The newspaper claimed the expedition Ukrainian crisis was arranged so quickly that there was no When Euromaidan in Kiev was radically time to fully agree on common positions, exacerbated, V4 ministers convened on and that Lech Kaczyński took little effort January 29, 2014, to advocate a peaceful to agree on a trip with the EU, whose solution to the Ukrainian crisis. They also then-president, French President Nicolas expressed disappointment over Ukraine’s Sarkozy, was at the same time mediating refusal to sign the Association Agreement in Moscow. with the European Union. In this phase

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In December 2014, all V4 countries supported the Polish suggestion to In the political discourse establish the second V4 EU Battlegroup in 2019. However, they were not within the Visegrad that unanimous supporting another proposition–regarding the increase in Group (V4) some military spending to 2% of GDP. Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks believed this was argue repeatedly that a premature and unrealistic postulate. the different nature of The attitude of V4 partners to the perception of security Ukrainian crisis has gradually evolved. At the EU level, V4 countries supported threats and national the sanctions imposed on Russia linked with the annexation of Crimea and the interests, including separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine and supported internal reforms in Ukraine fundamental differences in various ways. In national political discourses, new trends have emerged, in the assessment revealing fundamental differences in the assessment of the situation and proposed of Russian politics, solutions. The dividing lines are formed on the assessment of Russia’s threat, the may undermine trust effectiveness of sanctions and their further application, and ways of pursuing national between V4 countries economic interests, especially in energy. and consequently In 2018, Hungary continues to advocate for the lifting of economic weaken their and political sanctions against Russia and implemented major energy cooperation. projects with Ukraine. The Hungarian government believes that sanctions of the crisis, the ministers supported the have been, and still are, costly for the activities of the European Union mission Hungarian economy and it will be in Kiev with the participation of Polish difficult to rebuild the trade balance Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. with Russia even after lifting them. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor After the annexation of Crimea, V4 Orbán is blocking Ukraine’s dialogue called on Russia to respect the Budapest with NATO, demanding Kiev provides Memorandum guaranteeing Ukraine’s for greater freedom for the Hungarian territorial integrity and reached a consensus ethnic minority in Zakarpattia. Ukraine on the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine, perceives Orbán’s policy as another the direct supply of which was blocked threat to its territorial integrity. by Russia. Ukraine received gas through Slovak, Polish and Hungarian gas pipelines. Today, the Czech Republic and Slovakia The Visegrad countries also shared the believe that there is no longer a direct responsibilities related to economic and security threat caused by Russia and humanitarian aid for Ukraine. are also considering the advisability

38 The Warsaw Institute Review V4 countries towards Russian aggression against Ukraine

Kiev, Ukraine, January 29, 2014. Protesters gather in Independence Square during the continuing protest.

© Maxim Shipenkov (PAP/EPA) of maintaining sanctions against this Conclusions country. Governments in Prague The Visegrad Group has reached and Bratislava distance themselves no consensus on shaping a common from American decisions to rearm policy towards Russia in one of the and strengthen the Ukrainian army, most complicated conflicts after the describing their attitude to the conflict collapse of the Soviet empire. The initial as pragmatic, related to implementing agreement reached at the beginning economic interests of their countries and of the Ukrainian crisis at the turn of voters. President Milos Zeman, the most 2013–2014 and immediately after the prominent representative of this pro- annexation of Crimea turned out to be -Russian political trend, proposed very fragile. Some countries had their in his election campaign that Russia own separate economic policies with should pay Ukraine for Crimea. Russia. This confirmed that V4 could not aspire to take part in a geopolitical game: Poland seems to be the most consistent as one of its critics said, it “stood outside in implementing the assumptions European politics”. Strategic objectives, and objectives of its policy towards such as diversification of energy transport Russia adopted four years ago – after routes, security, environmental and Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the climate cooperation, and the delivery aggression in eastern Ukraine. The of transformation help to Ukraine, Polish government is strongly in favor of remained common priorities for the extending the time and its anti-Russian V4 countries. However, divergences sanctions and expresses its solidarity with regarding Russia, which is questioning the policy of the United States supporting the foundations of the European order Ukraine also in the military sphere. and striving for their radical revision, An important element of this policy is may damage trust among the V4 Warsaw’s opposition to the construction countries, causing political erosion of the second line of the Northern Gas of the Visegrad Group. Pipeline (Nord Stream 2) and the creation of alternative gas supply networks Aleksandra Romanowska to Central and Eastern Europe. September 24, 2018

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On Democracy in Europe Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, PhD Democracy constitutes the core of Europe’s political culture1. At the same time, it is endangered by the ongoing processes of European integration. As for the European Union, it has no proper legitimacy while such phenomenon is referred to as a democratic deficit2.

U institutions are increasingly so-called integration as well as through restricting democratic practices the observation of the rule of law in its member states. This is principle. The goal of the following due to two main reasons: first, article is to analyze certain European Ethe EU aims to improve the efficiency problems with democracy using the of the management of public policies, example of two basic mechanisms and second, it seeks to develop the of European integration: the first

1 Comp. Grosse T.G., Changes in Western democracy: the European Union and How to Fix It, Polity, London a systemic crisis, or a chance to overcome it? Politeja, 2008; Habermas J., The Crisis of the European Union, No. (3) 21, 2012, pp. 133–154. Polity, London 2012; Habermas J., Democracy 2 Follesdal A., Hix S., Why There is a Democratic in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary and How Moravcsik, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, It Is Possible, European Law Journal, 2015, Vol. 21, Vol. 44, pp. 533–562; Hix S., What’s Wrong with pp. 546–557.

40 The Warsaw Institute Review On Democracy in Europe mechanism concerns the ingratiation hereby referred to as “output legitimacy”, “through law” while the second concerns regards essentially the direct results of all European constitutionalism. Here, I will policy-making processes. That is why it is focus in particular on the example of the justly specified as “utilitarian legitimacy”. Court of Justice of the European Union In times of economic prosperity, when (CJEU) as well as its policy of extending the European Union was not tormented the scope of EU law, seeking to enhance by any serious crises, the issue of the competences of EU supranational insufficient “input legitimacy” was usually institutions and the protection of downplayed; instead, the community the rule of law principle within the was rather praised for its usefulness in community. The second mechanism is relation to the member states, being related to the majority voting procedure alleged to provide better solutions to in the EU, which appears to be more and social and political problems. Therefore, more frequently used within its structures. utilitarian legitimacy was expected to Both instruments are considered constitute the very core of both the EU’s problematic under the light of democratic political authorization and its subsequent standards. According to some scholars, progress. Yet this sometimes occurred such mechanisms3 may therefore result in at the expense of reducing the influence the rebellion of member states along with of electoral politicization while progress their societies against EU institutions and in integration acted to the detriment of thus might deepen further disintegration “input legitimacy” of the political process. processes in Europe. Nonetheless, electoral mechanisms constitute the very core of democracy Democracy still important while utilitarian legitimacy has only for voters a complementary character. Modern Europe’s problems with democracy seem to be a major challenge During subsequent crises it turned for future integration processes. Some out that all claims concerning the EU’s research has referred to the “democratic higher utility had been severely dented deficit” in the EU or insufficient political whereas utilitarian legitimacy ceased legitimacy for the European project4. to justify the EU’s power over European The most well-known typology specifies societies. According to polls conducted two types of legitimacy: the first is the by Eurobarometer, such was the feeling so-called “input legitimacy”, which of at least a large part of EU citizens7. is typically based on a mandate granted Therefore, it can be assumed that the EU’s via general scrutiny5. According to the structure is properly legitimated during aforementioned research, such legitimacy “good times”, but not during periods of appears to be weak in the European trouble. Before such problematic situations context6. The second type of legitimacy, started to emerge, progress in integration

processes enjoyed some social consent, 3 Scharpf F.W., De-constitutionalisation and majority even though the project did not fully meet rule: A democratic Vision for Europe, European Law Journal, 2017, No. 23, pp. 315–334. V.A. Schmidt, Democracy in Europe. The EU and 4 Comp: Grosse T.G., Kryzys demokracji w Europie National Polities, Oxford – New York: Oxford [Crisis of Democracy in Europe], Przegląd University Press 2006; Risse T., Kleine M., Assessing Europejski, No. 3/2014, pp. 24–52. the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods, 5 Scharpf F.W., Governing in Europe: Effective and “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 2007, Democratic? Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999. Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 69–80. 6 Schmidt V.A., The European Union: Democratic 7 Eurobarometer Survey 89.2 of the European Legitimacy in a Regional State?, “Journal of Common Parliament. A Public Opinion Monitoring Study, Market Studies”, 2004, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 975–997, European Parliament, June 2018, pp. 51–52.

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claim that the growing importance of electoral politics in the EU, and thus the During subsequent ever-increasing role of voters in political processes at the European level, may crises it turned out that exacerbate hitherto crises and prevent integration from fully developing10. all claims concerning the Moreover, the European Union lacks the adequate democratic legitimacy to conduct EU’s higher utility had such radical reforms that would make it been severely dented possible to deal with the aforementioned impasses as well as to ensure more whereas utilitarian effective governance, understood in terms of greater utilitarianism of the European legitimacy ceased to project. justify the EU’s power Integration mechanisms: not really democratic over European societies. It is vital to indicate two basic integration mechanisms. The first is referred to as all democratic criteria. In the literature integration “through law” or “European on this subject matter, such phenomenon constitutionalism”. This consists of is generally referred to as the period of granting European law supremacy “permissive consensus”8. Citizens allowed over national law, as well as envisaging political elites to make decisions on the the systematic strengthening of the EU’s essential affairs as long as there competences of the European Commission were no major problems; it was only later (EC) and the Court of Justice of the that they began to monitor the issue of European Union in ensuring proper integration – either by criticising it or implementation of EU law in all member questioning its further development. states. In light of the discussed concept, Such was the manifestation of electoral European treaties aspire to become EU politics, which had until recently been constitutional law whereas the CJEU is either dormant or simply ignored by the eager to be perceived as the constitutional elites during some integration processes. court for the entire community. Under This new political period has been referred the notion of integration “through law”, to as “constraining dissensus”, which as mentioned above, both treaties and was equivalent to reducing integration European law tend to encompass more processes by dissatisfied Europeans. and more public affairs. In addition, these Interestingly, some scholars have been two institutions actively seek to extend their wondering why certain societies eventually current scope of competences as well the decided to accept integration processes, impact of EU law, even beyond the literal bearing in mind that they kept evolving understanding of treaty provisions, which without any proper democratic mandates in fact influences some spheres controlled for quite a long time9. Additionally, experts exclusively by the member states11.

8 Hooghe L., Marks G., A Postfunctionalist Theory 10 Hutter S., Grande E., Kresi H. (eds), Politicising of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus Europe: Integration and Mass Politics, Cambridge to Constraining Dissensus, British Journal of Political University Press 2016. Science, Vol. 39 (2009), pp. 1–23. 11 Read more: Cappelletti M., Secombe M., Weiler 9 Scharpf F.W., De-constitutionalisation and majority J.H.H. (eds), Integration through Law: Europe and rule: op.cit., p. 319. the American Federal Experiment, De Gruyter, 1985.

42 The Warsaw Institute Review On Democracy in Europe

As for the second mechanism responsible world’s democratic countries. Such claim for deepening integration, this may be evidenced by the fact that in many concerns the ever-growing number democratic systems voters, parliaments or of cases submitted to intergovernmental representatives of the executive branch have institutions (mainly in the EU Council) the right to appoint judges, or to influence that are subsequently handled through the choice of the state’s highest judicial the majority voting procedure. This bodies, with particular regard to members institution plays a leading role in legislative of constitutional courts. Moreover, the EC procedure (“community method”), even tends to extend the scope of impact exerted despite the fact that it is the European by European law also on the domains being Commission that has a near monopoly on within exclusive competences of member legislative initiatives while the European states and those that have been nominally Parliament is also involved excluded from the jurisdiction of the in the legislative procedure. In addition CJEU. The Commission interferes in these to improving governance, majority voting areas on the pretext of protecting liberties speeds up the law-giving process as well on the common market as well as taking as facilitating the adoption of more advantage of referring member states to the effective solutions and not only those CJEU. Such was the case of the limited use solutions that could satisfy all interested of military offsets by EU countries, even parties. Nonetheless, such procedure regardless of the fact that both security shifts power in the EU to the community’s and defence matters were excluded from largest states, which only intensifies during the rules related to the common market times of crises, and what I personally refer (pursuant to Article 346 of the TFEU)14. to as the systemic tendency towards As for the Court, it tends to agree with the “asymmetric confederation”12. the Commission in such cases15. Needless to say that, under the CJEU rulings, also Therefore, scholars claim that these in some matters in which the European two main integration development Union has no competencies, member states mechanisms should not be perceived as shall exercise their respective powers in purely democratic tools. According to Fritz accordance with European law16. Such W. Scharpf, integration “through law”, attitude violates the democratic principle, along with expanding the competences according to which only sovereign of both the EC and the CJEU, seem highly political communities, backed by their problematic from the perspective of democratically-elected representatives, democratic principles13. The former lacks are entitled to pass competences appropriate electoral input legitimacy to international institutions. while the latter does not have at its disposal adequate political supervision from In addition, more and more cases the elected “majoritarian” institutions. of majority voting have emerged, Being part of the trias politica model, 14 Comp. Weiss M., Blauberger M., Judicial Law- the judicial system shall indeed enjoy -Making and Opportunistic Enforcement: Explaining some autonomy; nonetheless, it cannot the EU’s Challenge of National Defence Offsets, be completely free of influence exerted Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 451. by the electoral politics in any of the 15 Malecki M., Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice? Evidence of divergent preferences from the 12 Grosse T.G., Introduction, [in:] Grosse T.G. (ed.), judgments of chambers, Journal of European Public European Union Policies at a Time of Crisis, Scholar Policy, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 59–75. Publishing House, Warsaw 2017, pp. 9–32. 16 Case C-341/05 Laval, No. 87. See also: Weiss 13 Scharpf, F.W., De-constitutionalisation M., Blauberger M., Judicial Law-Making and and majority rule: op.cit., p. 319. Opportunistic Enforcement, op.cit., p. 448.

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of them with a greater number of votes and – more importantly – outvoting some Essential problem of other communities in the Council of the European Union – does not comply with the EU results basically democratic legitimacy. If the European Union had the intention to apply majority from the choice voting in its institutions, such occurrences would have to take place only in cases between the greater where a losing minority could be entitled effectiveness of its to take advantage of the opt-out right, which would allow them to exclude governance and fidelity themselves from a given regulation without a need to implement it on their territory18. to the aforementioned For instance, such was the case of the Central European countries that voted democratic principles. against legislation on the compulsory relocation of asylum seekers in the EU in 2015 when having been outvoted by other the procedure of which raises some member states, they refused to enter the concern about its compliance with directive into force in their respective democratic principles. The EU is closer to national systems. Although such behaviour a confederal rather than federal solution, constituted an example of violating EU thus constituting first and foremost a law as well as the principles of “European union of equal states while its democratic constitutionalism”, they acted according mandate derives primarily from scrutiny to democratic rules. carried out in subsequent member states. Many scholars urge that the EU should This brings me to the main conclusion be referred to as a “demoi-cracy”, and of this part of the paper. The essential not as a “democracy”; it forms a union of problem of the EU results basically democratic national communities (demoi) from the choice between the greater that has failed to develop into a uniform effectiveness of its governance and European community (demos). So, voting fidelity to the aforementioned democratic processes in such systems shall be primarily principles. Nonetheless, today’s political based on consensus, understood in terms reality makes it impossible to meet both of unanimous decisions made by their of these criteria while any undertakings members. Therefore, it is not democratic aiming to enhance action effectiveness to let one national community – or a group are immediately associated with of them – to outvote any other ones. Under disregarding democratic legitimacy. EU principles, all democratic communities Obeying such strict democratic norms shall be equal with no apparent dominant translates usually into a detention in structure17. Therefore, providing only one action efficiency as well as difficulties occurring at the decision-making level 17 Cheneval F., Lavenex S., Schimmelfennig F., in the EU institutions. This is dramatic Demoicracy in the European Union: principles, for the European project, constituting institutions, policies, Journal of European Public Policy, 2015, Vol. 22, No.1, pp.1–18; Habermas J., Citizen and State Equality in a Supranational and Its Crisis, Journal of Common Market Studies, Political Community: Degressive Proportionality 2013, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 351–369, Scharpf, F.W., De- and the Pouvoir Constituant Mixte, Journal constitutionalisation and majority rule, pp. 326–327. of Common Market Studies 2017 Vol. 55. No. 2, 18 Scharpf, F.W., De-constitutionalisation pp. 171–182; Nicolaïdis K., European Demoicracy and majority rule, op.cit., p. 331.

44 The Warsaw Institute Review On Democracy in Europe a situation with no simple solution, Europe’s rule of law is safeguarded by which has additionally worsened during the CJEU, referred to as the most subsequent crises. independent judicial institution in the world20. Nonetheless, possessing Rule of law as a mechanism for independence does not translate directing the integration progress into having an apolitical nature. According One of the most important instruments to scholars, the court does not operate of the integration “through law” is the in a political vacuum, being in fact a practical implementation of the rule of political actor21, involved in implementing law principle. Its main task is to defend a particular vision of a progress in the authority of European law and its integration22. Moreover, it fosters the supremacy over national law. In addition, expansion of both European law as well as it constitutes a source of power for the the power of the community’s institutions EU institutions, with particular regard to while its judges seem to closely follow the European Commission and the Court public debate; they “read morning papers”, of Justice of the European Union, as both with special regard to Western European of them account for the interpretation titles, according to some experts23. Some of rule of law and its observance in EU exampled emerged of judicial decisions member states. Therefore, such principles aimed at establishing long-term public mainly seek to promote support both for the union as well as the a specific vision of integration, based on work of the court. Such type of policy, the expansion of European law as well as which is currently being created by the the competences of the EU institutions. members of the CJEU, has been even Therefore, the above-mentioned rules described in the subject-matter literature reconcile the supranational interests as so-called “diffuse legitimacy”24. The of both the European Commission and aforementioned strategy consists of the Court of Justice of the European defending rights of EU citizens, ranging Union. However, in Europe, the rule from consumer protection to some of law tends to be exercised in a rather regulations regarding mobility flexible, discretionary and often arbitrary and employment in the internal market25. manner. Such approach gives the 20 impression that some national interests, Kelemen R.D., The political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union, Journal of especially those of the largest and European Public Policy, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 43–58. most influential member states, are far 21 O’Brien C.R., The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship more privileged than those of others, in vain: Commission v. United Kingdom, Common Market Law Review, 2017, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. as evidenced by the expansion of the 209–244. existing Nord Stream pipeline; 22 Scharpf F.W., Perpetual momentum: directed and the undertaking of which actually unconstrained?, Journal of European Public Policy, breaches EU law – or at least is far from 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 127–139. 23 the rule of law principle19. Blauberger M., Heindlmaier A., Kramer D., Martinsen D.S., Sampson Thierry J., Schenk A., Werner B., ECJ Judges read the morning papers.

19 Explaining the turnaround of European citizenship Comp.: Riley A., Nord Stream 2: A Legal and Policy jurisprudence, Journal of European Public Policy, Analysis, CEPS Special Report, No. 151, November 2018, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1488880. 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR151AR%20 24 Nordstream2.pdf (accessed on: June 29, 2018); Clark T.S., The separation of powers, court curbing, Fischer S., Nord Stream 2: Trust in Europe, Policy and judicial legitimacy, American Journal of Political Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 4, March 2016, Center for Science, 2009, Vol. 53, No. 4: 971–989; Larsson O., Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, http://www. Naurin D., Judicial independence and political uncertainty: css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/ how to take risks of override affects, International cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP4-4.pdf Organization, 2016, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 377–408. (accessed on: June 29, 2018). 25 Read more: Kelemen R.D., Eurolegalism. The

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In the 1990s, the court safeguarded the While observing such changes within right to move freely within the territory the jurisprudence of the court, numerous of the EU, while another incentive was pundits question the actual reason for open access to the welfare systems of the such state of affairs. According to some most affluent European countries. The opinions27, the court essentially took into same applied to the possibility to work in account the change in attitude of voters the internal market; freedom of movement in western and southern countries who, of employees was widely encouraged, facing the global economic recession mostly by eliminating barriers imposed became much more critical of both by countries that could offer higher wages liberal principles in the internal markets but which were also characterised as well as of the ongoing globalisation by more extensive regulations and processes. Yet other experts claim28 a strong level of unionisation. So, that the court bore in mind the fact in both cases, namely access to social that the EU’s most influential member welfare and freedom of employment states, including France, Germany and in the common market, the court’s judicial Italy, opposed such liberal rules. In light decisions backed liberal solutions that were of both interpretations, it is recognized beneficial to the inhabitants of less affluent that political factors have altered the Central European states, not to mention jurisprudence of the court while its greater financial solidarity granted by the protectionist interpretations of EU law countries of Western seemed beneficial for the societies of the and Southern Europe. so-called “old Europe”, at the expense of the newly-admitted member states of the Nonetheless, at the time of the global European community. financial crisis, such case law was subject to gradual changes. The court ceased The issue of the jurisprudence of the to invoke the rights of EU citizens to Court of Justice in the context of the free movement, all to work – no longer Eurozone crisis, especially in terms perceived in terms of superior values of some unconventional interventions – simultaneously stipulating that job of the European Central Bank (ECB), has opportunities offered by other EU member come under scrutiny in relevant literature. states, or the possibility to profit from Interestingly, some scholars perceived such their social security systems, shall have a interventions as evidence of breaching or solely conditional character. The judicial bypassing EU law29. institution referred to the need to protect public finances of the EU’s most affluent european-union-on-the-way-towards-protectionism/ (accessed on: December 27, 2017). countries as well as to reduce the free flow 27 Blauberger M., et. al. ECJ Judges read the morning of workers on EU territory, a solution that papers, op.cit.; Grosse T.G., The prospect of euro could have been implemented through egoism, op.cit. the necessity to comply with protective 28 Carrubba C.J., Gabel M.J, International Courts regulations on local markets26. and the Performance of International Agreements. A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union, New York: Cambridge University Press 2015; Transformation of Law and Regulation in the Larsson O., Naurin D., Judicial independence European Union, Cambridge: Harvard University and political uncertainty, op.cit. Press 2011. 29 Kreuder-Sonnen Ch., An authoritarian turn 26 Comp. Blauberger M., et. al. ECJ Judges read the in Europe and European Studies? Journal of European morning papers, op.cit.; Grosse T.G., The prospect Public Policy, 2018, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 452–464; of euro egoism, op.cit. European Union on the way Joerges C., Three transformations of Europe and towards protectionism, Jagiellonian Club, 2017, the search for a way out of its crisis, [in:] Joerges Report for the Center for the Analysis http://cakj. C. and Glinski C. (eds), The European Crisis and pl/2017/09/21/the-prospect-of-euro-egoism- the Transformation of Transnational Governance.

46 The Warsaw Institute Review On Democracy in Europe

For example, the ECB broke the principle taken in the name of a higher historical of independence of the national fiscal necessity. There is little doubt that the policy and the sole responsibility of court acted accordingly with European the member states for their own debt integration, preventing the EU’s monetary (pursuant to Article 125.1 of the TFEU). union from undertaking any dissolution The institution is also believed to have processes. Nevertheless, many lawyers violated both the ban on the mutualization refer to these actions as arbitrary and as of debt as well as that on making the ECB characterized by their loose approach the lender of last resort (under Article towards the treaties in force; some of 123.1 of the TFEU). In many cases, whom resorted even to accusing the the ECB has ceased to be a politically- EU institutions of changing hitherto independent institution, which can be constitutional order32. Of course, it is observed in situations where it forced considered by some that the Court had borrowing states to accept all conditions sought to authorize such unconventional imposed by the creditor states. Both the policy conducted by the ECB, though it ECB and the EC disrespected the treaty was deprived of its legitimacy based on rule related to some public policies, which the rule of law observance33. During the should be left to the exclusive competence recession, integration “through law” was of the member states (pursuant to Article used to centralize power at the European 5 of the TEU). This was a consequence of level, which appeared particularly visible imposing fiscal austerity on some member in the case of technocratic institutions, states that affected these public policies. including the EC, the ECB as well as the CJEU. They all became subject to the As for the court, it authorized the activities politicization, i.e. they served the interests carried out by both the EC and the ECB of the EU’s wealthiest states that granted that were referred to by many lawyers assistance loans to some members of the as disregarding Europe’s constitutional monetary union. In such a way, formally law, including treaties30. Similarly, the independent institutions became a tool for judicial institution limited the citizens’ the most influential and well-off European abilities to assert their basic rights if countries, thus sanctioning the hierarchy they were disregarded by international of power in the EU (and more specifically assistance programs31. Therefore, it altered – the monetary union) between creditor its previous policy of “diffuse legitimacy” countries and debtor countries34. that opted for safeguarding the rights of In addition all actions performed EU citizens while such a step has been by the CJEU, including the rather arbitrary implementation of the principle of the rule Authoritarian Managerialism versus Democratic Governance, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. of law, have been completely subordinated 25–46; White J., Emergency Europe, Political Studies, to such hierarchy, which I have previously 2015, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 300–318. defined as asymmetrical power relations 30 Menéndez A.J., The Crisis of Law and the European between stronger and weaker member Crises: From the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat 35 to the Consolidating State of (Pseudo-)technocratic states . Governance, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 44, No. 1, March 2017, pp. 56–78; Scicluna N.,

Integration through the disintegration of law? The ECB 32 and EU constitutionalism in the crisis, Journal Menéndez A.J., The Crisis of Law and the European of European Public Policy, 2017, DOI:10.1080/135017 Crises, op.cit. 63.2017.1362026. 33 Scicluna N., Integration through the disintegration 31 Comp. Costamagna F., The Court of Justice and of law?, op.cit, p. 10. the Demise of the Rule of Law In the EU Economic 34 Menéndez A.J., The Crisis of Law and the European Governance: The Case of Social Rights, Carlo Alberto Crises, op.cit. Notebooks, 2016, No. 487, pp. 1–29. 35 Comp. Grosse T.G., Introduction, op.cit.

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Growing rebellion of national also to become independent of the judicial communities decisions issued by the CJEU. Such steps as promoting the principle of the rule of law within the EU structures, It is worth noting that all tendencies escalating the power of both the EC and the mentioned above, which ultimately lead CJEU in relation to subsequent countries, as to the rejection of two basic integration well as outvoting all countries representing instruments, stem directly from the interests other than those of the EU’s largest increase in electoral politics within member member states, may eventually lead to some states, thus undermining liberal norms instances, in which the EU’s political order and defending democracy. Therefore, they could be openly questioned. This might be result from the deficit of “input” democratic executed on the basis of, or even to defend, legitimacy of Europe’s political processes, democratic principles36. Individual national and are fuelled by some instances of communities or their governments may European inconsistency or even hypocrisy challenge the authority of the Commission within the scope of the rule of law. as well as the judgments of the CJEU, or even fail to implement any regulations Conclusion that have been adopted contrary to their Recent crises have seemingly woken up positions. Scharpf urges that undermining the EU’s dormant election politics. Voters the EU’s legal order may concern the have decided to defend their own national rejection of liberal principles applied in the democracy against the authoritarian internal market by voters being increasingly and liberal tendencies that accompanied critical of liberalization and globalization the progress of European integration. processes37. The same may also apply to The literature refers to such direction of liberal values being questioned in other integration development as “authoritarian domains. Such a trend seems more and liberalism”38, which is being increasingly more visible in the case of migration contested by some societies. We cannot policy, as evidenced by the example of be sure whether such sentiment(s) will tensions amid the alleged violation of the continue to grow or how they might possibly rule of law principle by both Poland and influence further processes of European Hungary, within the framework of which integration. Nonetheless, everything seems the right of the European institutions to to indicate that the European Union should interfere in states’ internal reforms has been alter its hitherto approach and adapt to the reportedly undermined in both countries. principles of democratic legitimacy, which Nonetheless, the European legal system was could be achieved even at the price of less perhaps most seriously questioned during operational efficiency and weaker decision- the United Kingdom’s European Union -making processes. Undertaking all steps membership referendum in 2016, as a result aiming to improve the management, yet of which the country voted to leave the at the expense of democratic standards, community. Most Britons sought to regain constitutes a shortcut that seems profitable their sovereignty in enacting law giving for integration processes only in a short- processes, among other reasons, and thus, -time perspective.

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse 36 Grosse T.G., A Potential for Revolution in Europe? September 1, 2018 [in:] Góralczyk B.J. (ed.): European Union on The Global Scene: United or Irrelevant? Center for Europe, 38 Read more on the concept of authoritarian University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2015, pp. 203–223. liberalism in the EU: Somek A., Delegation and 37 Scharpf F.W., De-constitutionalisation and majority Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today, European rule, p. 321. Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. May 3, 2015, pp. 340–360.

48 The Warsaw Institute Review Is Iraq set to become the future regional superpower? Witold Repetowicz Today, many regard Iraq to be a failed state. Therefore, this title would seem to be absolutely absurd.

he future of Iraq depends 20th century, Germany lost its power twice heavily on two major factors. only to rebuild itself each time On the one hand, its strategic owing to its potential. Similarly, Russia geography, vast natural or the USSR collapsed spectacularly in the Tresources and demography early 1990s. While it may be argued that seem to argue future dominance in the region. Yet, on the other hand, the same factors fuel third countries’ concerns over Iraq’s growing stability, making Under unfavorable them counteract the state’s efforts to strengthen its position. economic or military This is particularly true of Iraq’s circumstances, neighboring countries. a superpower may A country’s power is subject to change. Under unfavorable economic or military quickly sink into decline. circumstances, a superpower may quickly sink into decline. Potential, though, is not Potential, though, lost so easily. History offers innumerable examples of this. Over the course of the is not lost so easily.

4/2018 49 Geopolitics © PAP/EPA Baghdad, Iraq, September 3, 2018. Iraqi lawmakers attend the first session of the parliament after elections.

Russia’s comeback as a superpower has encouraging its regional rival, Iraq, not been achieved yet (with many factors to invade. Additionally, the particular that could potentially stall or even reverse demography of Iran, that is, its ethnic its progress); a comeback, nonetheless, and religious diversity further is achievable due to the country’s contributed to its weakening position. considerable potential. To a varying degree, the population of Iraq is also marked by a similar The Middle East is no different. Iran particularity. Such diversity weakens rose to prominence after it briefly lost its the country’s unity and facilitates position, following Iraq’s 1982 counter- debilitating or even disintegrating -offensive in the Iran-Iraq War. The activities (such as separatism) on the part 1979 Revolution brought disarray in of rival countries. Therefore, instead of the Iranian military, thus depriving struggling for power with rival countries, the country of its military power and what is needed is investment to protect and deepen the country’s unity. Such diversity, however, may prove to be This can only be a great asset and even a mighty weapon if used skillfully. This can only be achieved through achieved through bolstering a sense of national identity among different bolstering a sense of ethnic and religious groups. Such groups can consequently exert influence over national identity among their counterparts in third countries, thus extending their country’s spheres different ethnic and of influence rather than contributing to the continuous disintegration religious groups. of their own state.

50 The Warsaw Institute Review Is Iraq set to become the future regional superpower?

In the Middle East, the influence of the aforementioned demographic ethnic and religious diversity on a phenomena, it is still present and vital to country’s significance and power is of the potential of both Iraq and Iran. What fundamental importance. If one was to does, however, change with time is the oversimplify, it can be said that this is country’s ability to capitalize on it as well attributable to the fact that every country as the need to do so. in the region, except for Iran, was largely constructed after World War I, mostly A country’s potential relies on three due to the dissolution of the Ottoman major elements – its economy, Empire. While Iran’s case is different, for demographics and territory. various historical reasons, it also boasts a very ethnically diverse society (and to a Undoubtedly, monitoring GDP rates is lesser extent, religiously diverse as well). a classical qualitative index of a country’s This plays a role in the state’s spheres performance. Another indicator is the of influence/continuous disintegration country’s quantity of natural resources. dynamic, which is particularly visible Since the majority of Middle Eastern in Iran-Iraq relations. Both regional economies are rather poorly diversified, powers then tried to exploit that diversity natural resources play a key role in during their eight-year-long conflict. For establishing a country’s potential. a number of reasons, the success of that strategy was equally limited on both sides. According to the 2017 World Bank GDP Saddam Hussein tried to unite the Iraqis Index, the GDP of Iraq is ranked 52nd, by playing out the Arabic identity vs. and behind four countries of the region: Persian identity card all the while making Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE efforts to appeal to the Arabic minority (as well as Israel, which shall be excluded inhabiting the Khuzestan Province in here, given its particularity). Out of the Iran. This strategy proved to have little to four, three share a border with Iraq, and no success as the Khuzestani (2% of Iran’s all, except for Turkey, base their economy population) are predominantly Shia. Until on oil and gas exports (although the UAE 2003, Shia Muslims were a marginalized is perhaps less dependent on such exports). group in Iraq even though they are a While the GDP of Saudi Arabia practically majority in the country. Moreover, under stalled between 1980 and 2000, the Hussein’s regime they were persecuted. country later benefited greatly from Iran’s Iran tried to capitalize on this fact, perhaps isolation as well as Iraq’s precipitous slide with greater success. This, however, did into chaos. It must be noted, however, that not lead to mass desertion within in 1980 the GDP of Saudi Arabia was 8.5 the Iraqi army as it had been intended. times higher than that of Iraq. Meanwhile, It shall be underscored that Iraqi Shia were by 2016, it was barely 3.2 times higher. the majority among the army’s privates, thus being a pillar of Iraq’s military force. Undoubtedly, Turkey is the region’s richest The strategy proved unsuccessful largely economy with its total GDP being 4.3 due to the underlying conflict between times higher than that of Iraq. The country the Shia and Arabic identity. Within 30 is faced with serious problems, though, in years following the Iran-Iraq War, both addition to being strongly dependent on countries have been subject to profound the imports of natural energy resources, changes. For instance, in Iraq after 2003, and on its convenient transit position, the Shia majority took power, which to which an alternative may soon be translated into radical change in Iraq’s provided. Interestingly, comparison relations with Iran. Notwithstanding between the Turkish and Iraqi economies

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has been surprisingly stable for the last 38 It wasn’t until shortly before 2012 that both years despite the numerous problems that countries produced a near equal amount Iraq has dealt with: a costly war against of oil again. Currently, Iranian exports are Iran, imposed sanctions, turmoil following significantly less than that of Iraq. the ousting of Saddam Hussein, and the This is due to both the imposed sanctions war it waged against ISIS. Meanwhile, the and domestic consumption. In 2011, even gap between the GDP of the UAE and that the UAE’s output was higher than that of of Iraq shrunk only a little – from the GDP Iraq. Saudi Arabia’s sales figures currently of the Emirates being 2.2 times higher stand at 7.2 million barrels daily, which to 1.9 now. Although Iran boasted a GDP is double Iraq’s current output. During five times the size of Iraq’s GDP in 1980, his recent visit to Warsaw, Mr. al-Luaibi today this number falls to just 2.2 times announced that Iraq was going to increase higher. It must not be forgotten that Iran its daily output from 5 million barrels is faced with economic sanctions, which today to 7 million by 2022, thus becoming heavily influences its yearly performance. the second largest exporting country The analyzed data clearly demonstrate that in the region, already ahead of Russia Iraq’s economic potential has grown in and getting closer to the world’s leader, the last few decades, despite the country’s Saudi Arabia. troubled times. Additionally, Iraq holds considerable Iraq is currently the world’s third largest reserves of natural gas, although its petroleum exporting country with 3.8 extraction output is currently minimal, million barrels sold daily. And that is smaller even than Poland’s extraction excluding the fields of Kirkuk and those quantities, which ranks 65th largest in of Kurdistan. Exclusion of oil sales from the world. Iraq ranks in 11th place on the these regions stems from a conflict between list of countries by natural gas proven the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and federal reserves. According to al-Luaibi, however, authorities. According to Iraqi oil minister, new extraction works will mean the Jabbar al-Luaibi, if oil exports from Kirkuk country moving into 4th place by 2022. are resumed, the sales would shortly reach Furthermore, Iraq is set to build 1 million barrels a day. Kurdistan Region a new LNG terminal in the city of Basra. currently sells around 600,000 barrels a day. Interestingly enough, prior to the sanctions Territorially speaking, Iraq has something imposed on Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait to offer as well, having ttwo major trade in the mid-1990s, the country produced routes crossing: one running north and nearly 2.9 million barrels a day. By 1991, south while the other one running east to this number plummeted to a humble west. Presently, the former route is used 300,000 barrels a day. Meanwhile, Saudi more frequently. It runs from the Persian output rose from round 5 million barrels Gulf, though Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil in 1989 to 8.3 million within a period and Mosul up to the border with of three years. It was not before 2012 Turkey and further into Europe. that Iraq managed to reach its pre-1991 Its significance, however, depends heavily production levels. Neither the war raged on Iran’s geopolitical position because against ISIS nor the current conflicts with Iran can offer alternative routes to the Kirkut and Kurdistan regions had an effect Caucasus, the Caspian Sea area, China, on Iraq’s oil output. the Persian Gulf, and through Turkey’s Anatolia to Europe, all of which bypass In 1990, Iranian oil output was Iraq. Therefore, Iraq’s position as the comparable to the Iraqi oil output. second-best choice to Iran’s trade routes

52 The Warsaw Institute Review Is Iraq set to become the future regional superpower?

© Murtaja Lateef (PAP/EPA) Basra, Iraq, September 8, 2018. Iraqi Shiite gunmen stand guard outside the office of Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces. connecting the Gulf to Turkey. Europe is also dependent on Iran’s continued conflict with Turkey and Europe and The Shia Crescent is the country’s resultant isolation. Quite ironically, this is favorable to Iraq’s east- intrinsically linked with -west route, which results from the fact that this is how Iraq provides an Iran’s domination in the alternative to Iran’s trans-Anatolian route. The said alternative connects Iran, Iraq, Middle East, much to Syria, Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea, and is referred to as the Shia Crescent. the detriment of Turkey Some see it as a part of China’s larger project: the Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia. (BRI), also known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), which has triggered strong own significance in the region providing opposition, most notably from Israel, that it has the ability to make decisions the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia. The that are advantageous to its own interests. reasons behind this vary but include That is why neighboring countries make the military threat stemming from Iran efforts to prevent it from happening. So far gaining ground in the regional struggle for Iraq’s ability to self-govern in this respect dominance and trading losses linked with is limited, especially when it comes to routes and supply diversification. The Shia benefiting from benefiting from the rivalry Crescent is intrinsically linked with Iran’s between Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. domination in the Middle East, much to This, however, may change. the detriment of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Globally, it weakens the position of the US Iraq’s total area is significantly smaller and Russia, while favoring China. Iraq’s when compared to the area of Saudi moves, even though they eventually benefit Arabia, Iran and Turkey, three of its other actors on the whole, influence the six neighboring countries. Much of its region’s balance of power. This alone gives Western provinces, bordering Saudi proof of the country’s potential. Iraq can Arabia, Jordan and Syria, are deserts, capitalize on such decisions to increase its which could be used as strategic depth

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in the event of war. In a sense, they have Iran supported the Peshmerga against already been used in this fashion after Iraq. In 2005, after ousting Saddam 2003, except it was solely for the use of Hussein and adopting a new constitution partisan warfare targeted at the newly- the situation changed dramatically. Iraq -elected government. Furthermore, they was to become an Arabic-Kurdish state, are tribal lands that transborder Sunni at least in theory, with both ethnic groups tribal federations, which span territories enjoying equal rights, despite a major in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. disproportion in terms of population size While the mountainous borders with considering the fact that the Kurds only Turkey and Iran may appear to be different make up 20% of Iraq’s population. Neither at first glance, they are similar because the Iraqis nor the Kurds have found they are inhabited by Kurds, which means a way to benefit from the situation. Only that the natural borders (mountains and strong cooperation between both groups deserts) are indeed not borders at all. would translate into a strong situation Therefore, the defensive tactics pertaining for the Kurds within a strong Iraq. The to these lands focuses not on natural result would strengthen Iraq’s position in obstacles but rather on winning the loyalty the region while allowing Kurds to wield of both the Kurds and the Sunni trial influence over the Kurdish diaspora in federations. If Iraq’s demographic diversity other countries (or take disintegrating has so far weakened the country’s position, action there). Presently, the situation it may soon become one of Iraq’s main appears to be different. Turkey and assets. The situation of the Kurds is of Iran (Syria has deprived itself of such fundamental importance in Iraq’s relations possibility) capitalize on Kurdish inner with Iran, Turkey and to some extent rivalries as well as on conflicts between Syria as they inhabit all four countries. For Baghdad and Erbil. The vast majority of decades on end, they were instrumentally Iraqi Kurds do not want a stronger Iraq used in proxy wars between authoritarian as they feel Kurdish rather than Iraqi, if not totalitarian regimes. Syria, for and gravitate toward independence. This, instance, backs the PKK in Turkey while however, would weaken the position of the

54 The Warsaw Institute Review Is Iraq set to become the future regional superpower?

Kurds rather than strengthen it. A small, strong state of a few million inhabitants, surrounded by enemies, geopolitically Iraq’s unity and would be a weak move. Any index, whether it is GDP, resources, population, identity are stronger or territory, indicates its poor potential and power. This cannot be said of the than they might seem. notion of Great Kurdistan, but its potential existence is merely abstract at the moment. Sunniland happened to be among the most affected by the war, thus The alternative would be to have real needing considerable financial support. influence over regional policies of a Furthermore, Arabic Sunni countries superpower that in a few years can yield benefiting from fueling Sunni-Shia its full demographic potential. The Iraqis animosity would regard such a purely should feel compelled to convince the Sunni state as cumbersome, since Kurds that Iraq is their home, too, and it would eliminate the possibility that they are advancing the Kurdish of steering Baghdad. agenda more effectively when part of a strong country. Without them, Iraq One should bear in mind that the concept simply cannot be seen as a strong and of Iraq as a nation was artificially created stable state. This is perfectly understood 100 years ago as was the case with by Iraq’s neighbors (including Iran, despite Turkey. The latter consolidated over the the two parties officially having good experiences of a war of independence, relations, based on a shared ‘Shia identity’), which the Turks had fought led by Atatürk concerned with stoking the Kurdish-Iraqi until 1923, when a peace treaty was signed conflict without taking things as far as in Lausanne. It seems that Iraq followed allowing for Kurdish independence. in its neighbor’s footsteps with its own war waged against ISIS, which has only The Kurdish question aside, Iraq’s unity recently finished. Little is certain, as Iraq’s and identity are stronger than they might neighboring countries are fully aware of seem. Already in 2014, Iraq was heralded the damage Iraq could bring to the current as a failed state. What was to follow was balance of power, if consolidated. This its allegedly inevitable fragmentation seems all the more threatening to today’s into three substates: Kurdish, Shia and regional leaders – especially those of Iran, Sunni. The idea of ‘Sunniland’ remained Turkey and Saudi Arabia – given Iraq’s a distant myth, popularized only among astounding demographic growth. With Western theoreticians, but very far from 39 million inhabitants, Iraq has the 35th local reality. Admittedly, a number of Iraqi largest population in the world, which Sunnis did initially back ISIS, but this was is twice as small as that of Turkey and a far different proposal than traditionally Iran but slightly larger than that of Saudi understood. A more common demand Arabia and significantly larger compared among the Iraqi Sunnis (which make up to other countries in the region. 20% of the country’s population) was a return to the status quo from before 2003, Yet Iraq’s growth in this sense has been far as opposed to further division of the greater in the last few decades compared country into three parts, each of which to the growth exhibited by other countries even weaker than Kurdistan. The four- in the region. Demographic forecasts leave -year-long experience of war changed no doubt that Iraq is quickly bridging the much as well. The lands of a future gap between both Iran and Turkey. Before

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and self-defeating. This is especially true of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Already in 2017, It may come as the Saudis revisited their foreign policy as they understood that the further weakening a surprise, but this may of Iraq actually favors Iran, since it makes Iraq more and more dependent on its be further facilitated by mighty neighbor. But one of Iraq’s major geopolitical weaknesses, access to water, is Iraq’s democracy, as one often overlooked. This is yet another Iraqi paradox, given the fact that the world’s of the strongest in the oldest civilization flourished there precisely thanks to the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. region (while still being In the 21st century, though, Iraq, as a downstream country, is subject to ‘water very weak), which is also theft’ by Turkey, and Iran (to a lesser extent), which occurs as a result of dam regarded as a threat. construction. Interestingly enough, in this regard, Iraq’s interests are identical to 2060, Iraq is expected to be the world’s Kurdish ones. Moreover, both rivers flow 20th largest country by population, having from Turkish Kurdistan in the direction of twice as many people as Saudi Arabia, some Iraq. This makes it all the more possible to pundits say. Such fast population growth incite possible military conflict over water may be conducive to internal tensions, but between Turkey and Iraq that would be set it undoubtedly increases the possibility of against a Kurdish background. Admittedly, wielding influence over other countries, the Iraqi military force was laughable in especially if Iraq manages to consolidate 2014 but much has already changed since itself as a nation. It may come as a surprise, then and it should not be forgotten that the but this may be further facilitated by Iraq’s Islamic Republic of Iran needed only three democracy, as one of the strongest in the years following its creation to fully restore region (while still being very weak), which its military power. is also regarded as a threat. Moreover, the RNI for Turkish Kurds is higher than for The list of internal obstacles that Iraq has the Turks themselves, which means that to overcome is far from being exhausted Turkey must preoccupy itself with settling here. Problems like rampant corruption or the Kurdish question. Otherwise, it may be its feudal approach to holding offices stand subject to growing influence from Iraq, if in the way of rebuilding its position in the Kurds happen to identify with Iraq more region. After the war, the Sunni provinces strongly. On the other hand, the growing need more than $80 billion to cover the number of atheists among Iranians will damages sustained. And the southern shift the Shia-Sunni dynamics both in Iraq provinces are in dire need of desalination and Iran. The center of the Shia world will installations. Such expenditure makes move from Qom in Iran to Najaf, thus it more difficult, if not impossible, to changing the geopolitical deal. harness economic potential to becoming an economic and military superpower. Unquestionably, Iraq’s neighboring Therefore, the way Iraq is going to be countries are well aware of these threats, governed in the following years is crucial. which they will not leave unanswered. Iraq is by no means on the losing end here, as its Witold Repetowicz opponents’ interests are often contradictory September 1, 2018

56 The Warsaw Institute Review The Balkan Melting Pot Robert Rajczyk, PhD Talk about the current border between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo risk escalating the simmering ethnic conflict between the two. Following its unilateral declaration of independence 10 years ago, Kosovo has been indefatigable in its effort to become a full-fledged member of the international community.

hile the Poles have their be the first of many confrontations Jasna Góra Monastery between the Poles and the Turks. While and Gniezno, the Serbs the battle decimated both armies and and the Albanians claimed the lives of both rulers, it was Wrevere the Kosovo field. It is a mythical won by the Turks. Nonetheless, some cradle of the Serbian state. Except for accounts claim that it has never been the fact that it is located within the settled. What is certain, however, is that territory of the Republic of Kosovo. In the battle is important for this Serbian mid-June 1389, it became the theater national myth. Prince Lazar (Serbian of battle between the Ottoman Empire and the Serbs, supported by their Slavic allies. According to some historical It is a mythical cradle sources, Polish knights might have even joined the Serbs. That would then of the Serbian state.

4/2018 57 Geopolitics © Author’s own archives In Mitrovica, the cult of the leader of Serb Chetniks lives on.

for Lazarus), who commanded the legend according to which Miloš Obilić Serbian army, is worshipped as a martyr was indeed an Albanian. The lost battle and the knight Miloš Obilić holds the established permanent dominance of the status of a national hero. While there Ottomans over the region for the next 500 are no historical accounts confirming years. This important moment in Serbian his existence, legend has it that, when history is commemorated by a memorial in battle, he pretended to be a converted in the shape of a medieval tower known Muslim. He was then led before Sultan as Gazimestan, which was erected in Murad I to perform the traditional ritual the 1950s. A nearby mausoleum is said of kissing his feet. He stabbed the Sultan to accommodate the remains of Sultan with a tainted dagger, thus assassinating Murad I, who perished in the battle. him, and was killed afterwards. In 1987, Slobodan Milošević, so far only His legend turned into a cult reaching locally known as the leader of Serbian as far as Greek Mount Athos, which communists, gave a speech that came to enjoys autonomy within Greece and be one of the most important speeches is an important center of the Orthodox of his career. He appeared as a defender Church. of the Serbs, who complained about the discrimination they experienced from The legend of Miloš Obilić lived on Albanians. As hundreds were trying to thanks to two men: a Montenegrin ruler get through to hear the speech, they were who established the highest military attacked by the police. Milošević was decoration named after him and a local quick to comment on the situation: Niko bishop who extolled the courageous ne sme da vas bije (roughly translating knight in his sermons. Interestingly, into: ‘no one will beat you again’). Quite there is an Albanian version of that symbolically, Milošević arrived in a

58 The Warsaw Institute Review The Balkan Melting Pot helicopter, which was supposed to parallel the myth of Prince Lazar’s assumption. Gazimestan and the Kosovo field One must bear in mind in general is what brings the Serbs and the Albanians together all the that Kosovo is while bitterly dividing them. of particular importance Albanians or Kosovars? The Kosovars much like the Albanians to the Serbs also for derive their roots from the Dardani, an ancient Illyrian tribe. This hypothesis, as religious reasons. Three well as the resultant linguistic community, historic monasteries are is the very foundation of Albanian identity. It is worth mentioning that modern located in Peć, Prizren Kosovar identity is built upon recent political events. From calls for granting and Gračanica, all Kosovo equal republican status within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to within the territory demanding its actual independence. One of the mightiest mythmoteurs of Kosovo of Kosovo. was the armed struggle for independence as performed by the Kosovo Liberation dominant religion. While they share an Army (UÇK) and its resultant ethos. Part ethnicity, the Albanians from Kosovo of this myth is holding fallen soldiers of differ from the Albanians of Albania. the UÇK in reverence, which translates This is especially true in the case of into much attention and care for military religion. The Kosovars are Sunni while cemeteries. Numerous public facilities the Albanians are Bektashi, with are named after Adem Jeshari, one of a considerable number of atheists as well. the commanders of the UÇK. The list includes a sports stadium in Mitrovica Together and apart (or Kosovska Mitrovica for the Serbs) The history of Kosovo has been influenced and the main airport in Pristina, by the Serbian-Albanian conflict ever since the country’s capital. the Albanian mass migration began in the 15th century and continued for over The Serbs are the largest minority of the 200 years. It is connected with the Serbian Republic of Kosovo. They are Orthodox Great Migration Period, as it is called. As and inhabit several enclaves (communes of 1690, 200,000 people emigrated. As the located in the northern part of Kosovo Orthodox Serbs fled Turkish expansion, – author’s note). Other ethnic minorities they were replaced by Albanians who include the Bosniaks, the Turks, the were converting to Islam. This gave them Ashkali (Albanized Romani), the a better social and economic standing Balkan Egyptians (of Romani descent (mostly thanks to tax exemptions). and deriving their origin from ancient Kosovo, except for Metohija, became part Egyptians) and the Romani. of the Kingdom of Serbia as late as 1912, when the First Balkan War came to a Kosovo is marked by significant religious halt. One must bear in mind that Kosovo and ethnic diversity. 92% of its inhabitants is of particular importance to the Serbs identify themselves as ethnic Albanians also for religious reasons. Three historic (Kosovars – author’s note). Islam is the monasteries are located in Peć, Prizren

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stage was marked by the events of 1968, when Kosovo-based Albanians pushed In 1989, the autonomy for recognizing Kosovo as an equal of Kosovo was constituent of the Republic. Politically controlled by the socialist significantly limited state and dominated by the Serbs both culturally and economically, in only to be abolished 1968 the Albanians started voicing their dissatisfaction ever louder. Josip one year later, after Broz Tito, the leader during that time, a new Serbian constitution conceded under pressure and granted the Autonomous Region of Kosovo- was adopted. -Metohija more freedoms. The name Metohija was dropped as many Albanians opposed it due to the name sounding very and Gračanica, all within the territory controversial (Metohija in Greek means of Kosovo. The latter is a great Balkan as much as monastic estates). Albanian phenomenon as both Muslim Romani and national symbols were allowed in public. Orthodox Serbs make pilgrimages there. The year 1969 saw the foundation of the Moreover, one of Islam’s denominations, University of Pristina, which turned out to Bektashi Order, recognizes several be key in strengthening the position of the Catholic celebrations and the cult Albanian language and culture. One of the of saints, which are popular mostly direct consequences of its existence was in Albania and Turkey. the push for equalizing Kosovo’s status with Yugoslavia’s constituent republics. The dominance of Serbian landowners was Such call had existed ever since the end of greatly felt under the Kingdom of Serbs, WWII, which marked the incorporation Croats and Slovenes (SHS) created on of Kosovo into the Socialist Federal December 1, 1918 and as of 1929 under the Republic of Yugoslavia. Yet it was only in Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1943, shortly 1974 that the newly adopted constitution after the Italian occupation, Kosovo established local government and and Metohija came under German rule. parliament for Kosovo. In reality, it meant That period was marked by ever stronger as much as reporting to Serb authorities. Albanian extermination of Romani and Jews as well as the banishing of Serbs from The third stage of the Albanian rebellion their homes. The League of Prizren was began in 1981. Further disintegration of founded at the time whose political agenda Yugoslavia had encouraged the Serbs to included the notion of the Great Albania, strive for political dominance aimed at the creation of which would result from keeping the country’s federal character. joining all Albanian lands. In 1989, the autonomy of Kosovo was significantly limited only to be abolished Conflicted forever? one year later, after a new Serbian Historically, the Serbian-Albanian constitution was adopted. conflict in Kosovo is divided into three stages. The first stage, occurring in the Independent Kosovo years 1944–1945, is connected with the In the historical process of Kosovo’s policies imposed first by the Italian and struggle for independence, the late 1980s then the German occupier. The second are of paramount importance. The

60 The Warsaw Institute Review The Balkan Melting Pot © Author’s own archives The cult surrounding UÇK is part and parcel of the Kosovar national myth. beginning of Yugoslavia’s final decline its leader Ibrahim Rugova appointed incited a wave of nationalism, which was president. From then on, a period of successfully suppressed until this point double-government ensued. Next to the by the personal authority of Marshal official Serbian government bodies, there Tito who passed away in early May of existed an underground government 1980, among other things. Seven years of independent Kosovo. This was due later Serbia saw the onset of nationalistic to the fact that the Republic of Serbia did rhetoric while Slobodan Milošević, not recognize the results of the elections president of the League of Communists as valid. President Rugova’s policy of non- of Serbia, rose to political leadership, even -aggression with regard to the political though he did not hold the office of the and ethnic conflict was rather fruitless. Republic’s president. In 1994, in wake of growing disenchantment with his policies, the In September 1990, in Kaçanik, members Kosovo Liberation Army was created, of the Kosovar parliament adopted which pledged an armed battle for a new constitution of Kosovo. A year later, independence. a referendum was held between 26th and 30th September. As a result, 87% Two years later, in response to Serbian of voters said yes to independence. repression and persecution from the The plebiscite was boycotted by local Serbs police, the Kosovo Liberation Army and Montenegrins while Belgrade declared undertook partisan activity. Following it as illegal. By virtue of the referendum’s the conclusion of the Dayton Accords result the parliament of Kosovo declared in 1995, support for Rugova’s non- independence from Yugoslavia. In the violent policy had plummeted. The elections held on May 24, 1992, Kosovo’s Dayton Accords put an end to the war in Democratic League came first, with Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Dayton

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In 2001, a constitutional framework was promulgated thus laying the groundwork In the Dayton Accords, for the establishment of state institutions known as the Provisional Institutions the international of Self-Government (PISG). It divided competencies between UNMIK and community ruled PISG. It also established a ‘self-governing geopolitical entity under temporary the problem of Kosovo international control’. To guarantee their participation, the minorities were granted to be an internal affair 20 parliamentary seats as well as three ministries. The PISG enjoyed a three-year of Serbia. mandate. This included the Assembly of Kosovo, which was a parliamentary body. Accords, the international community Its legislative acts, however, had to be ruled the problem of Kosovo to be an approved by the Special Representative internal affair of Serbia. In 1997, Serbia of the Secretary-General for Kosovo. offered Kosovo limited autonomy. The Assembly actively participated While the proposal was backed by Rugova, in the procedure of government election the Kosovo Liberation army refused through a vote of confidence. Meanwhile, to accept it. the president held representative functions only. As the international community engaged in the resolution of the Serbian-Kosovar Due to a lack of progress in Serbian- conflict, the UN adopted Security Council -Kosovar talks on the status of the Resolution 1244 in 1999. Consequently, province, the Kosovars unilaterally Kosovo’s unofficial government bodies commenced the execution of were forced to comply with the UN’s constitutional solutions as formulated mission in Kosovo (UNMIK – United by the UN Special Envoy for the Kosovo Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo) Status Process. According to Martti which took over the country. It took Ahtisaari’s plan, UNMIK was to cease control of the legislative, judiciary and its activity and gradually pass on its executive. This double-government competencies to Kosovo’s administrative situation (UNMIK on the one side and bodies under the supervision of the the underground Kosovar authorities on International Civil Representative, who the other) led to the establishment of the also held the function of EU Special Envoy. Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The Joint Interim Administrative On April 8, 2008, Kosovo’s new Structure (JIAS) comprised four constitution was carried by acclamation. administrative bodies: Special It entered into force on June 15 and Representative of the Secretary-General comprised 142 articles. One of its key who exercised general supervision, Interim features is its republican nature. When it Administrative Council composed of four comes to the organization of power, the UNMIK officials and four representatives constitution established a parliamentary of the Kosovars, a 36-member Kosovo system of government with a rather Transnational Council representing strong position of prime minister, who Kosovo’s ethnic structure as well is independent in his personal decisions as administrative departments regarding the cabinet without having to of de facto ministries. ask for presidential consent.

62 The Warsaw Institute Review The Balkan Melting Pot

The government is appointed by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. The cabinet members take an oath of office On April 8, 2008, before the Assembly and are politically responsible before the Assembly. The Kosovo’s new president holds representative functions and is elected indirectly by the Assembly. The constitution was carried judiciary is executed by common courts while the execution of the constitution is by acclamation. supervised by the Constitutional Court. It entered into force on The constitution’s elementary provisions include state secularism, equality before the June 15 and comprised law (including gender equality and positive discrimination of national minorities), 142 articles. and sovereignty (the people as sovereign, without reference to a given national unilateral declaration of independence, community, but to a multiethnic society). which means that Kosovo’s parliament The constitution rules out the possibility validly proclaimed the declaration of of accession to another state or any border independence. What remains questioned changes without the consent of the Serbian is the independence itself. Kosovo based community. its independence on the principle of the self-determination of nations as mentioned Questioned sovereignty in international law. It refers, however, to In its advisory opinion, the International postcolonial regions rather than secession Court of Justice in The Hague did not through violation of territorial integrity. question the legitimacy of Kosovo’s Undoubtedly, the active engagement on © Author’s own archives Serbian national symbols dominate the divided town of Mitrovica.

4/2018 63 Geopolitics © Author’s own archives A few years back, the Ibar River Bridge was blocked and thus a symbol of the town’s division.

the part of international organizations in four majority Serb municipalities, including the process of Kosovo’s creation may prove local chief officers. Regarding the judiciary, to be a significant obstacle in Kosovo’s the Appeal Court in Pristina is to include struggle for international recognition a special chamber dedicated to the cases under international law. For what happened concerning Serb enclaves and ruled by was that a state, that is, a primary legal Serbian judges. Given Serbia’s efforts to join entity, was created by an international the community of the European Union, organization, a secondary legal entity. the agreement on mutual relations was concluded under the auspices of the EU. Kosovo is recognized as an integral This general agreement was complimented part of the Republic of Serbia. It is in 2015 by five additional agreements, included in the Republic’s administrative which laid out the cooperation provisions division comprising five regions and in further details. They concerned such the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and topics as the functioning of the Community Metohija. It is further divided into five of Serb Municipalities, energy provisions, districts: Kosovo, Peć, Prizren, Kosovska car circulation on the Ibar River Bridge Mitrovica and Kosovo-Pomoravlje. as well as Kosovo’s own telephone prefix.

Under the agreement between Serbia and Toward the future Kosovo on the regulation of government Following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration and on the normalization of their of independence, it has since been mainly relations, concluded on April 19, 2013, the preoccupied with its recognition by the Community of Serb Municipalities was international community. So far, Kosovo established. In these municipalities, along has been recognized by over 100 states local Kosovar authorities, consisting of all over the world, which comprises all Kosovo’s 34 municipalities, there exist over a half of all UN members. Kosovo’s parallel local government authorities, which potential UN membership seems have competence over local budget, health to belong to the distant future, as it will care, education, and landscape planning. surely meet strong opposition on the part Under the agreement, parallel structures of two permanent members of the UN’s exist in the police force. It is organized in Security Council, namely the Russian accordance with the ethnic structure of Federation and the People’s Republic

64 The Warsaw Institute Review The Balkan Melting Pot of China, which openly question the country’s sovereignty. The Republic of Kosovo is neither a member of the Following Kosovo’s Council of Europe, nor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe unilateral declaration (OSCE). It does, however, feature among the of independence, members of the IMF and the World Bank. In December 2015, the Republic of Kosovo it has since been officially joined the International Olympic Committee, which means that its national mainly preoccupied team can now compete in the Olympic Games. with its recognition

When it comes to the economy, the by the international Kosovars need to tackle numerous challenges: dramatic economic situations, community. unfavorable economic structures, a high Kosovo’s international recognition. Until unemployment rate, as well as significant June 2018, the most serious criminal cases dependency on foreign aid. Furthermore, were handled by EULEX, the EU’s police the country deals with rampant corruption mission, co-responsible for the security and organized crime. With a total area and protection of the northern borders of 11,000 square meters, it is one of the in cooperation with Serbian border guards. poorest regions in Europe. Its population is estimated at 1.8 million, one third of The ongoing border talks between whom lives below the poverty threshold presidents Aleksandar Vucić (Serbia) and while over 30% of the active population Hashim Thaçi (Kosovo) were the subject is unemployed. Among those aged 15–24 of heated debates among members of the years, as many as two-thirds are deprived international community with such well- of stable employment. Kosovo’s GDP per -known figures like Federica Mogherini capita stands at $3,500 USD. The economy taking a stance. Trading northern parts is dominated by mining, agriculture, of Kosovo with its center in Kosovska forestry and cattle husbandry. The main Mitrovica for the now Serbian Preševo natural resources are brown coal, zinc, Valley is hoped to remedy current border lead, and nickel. tensions. Interestingly, the proposal seems to have caused more controversy In politics, one of the challenges Kosovo’s among the third parties than the two current leaders face is that of their pasts, countries involved. At present, Mitrovica, especially those in the ranks of the Kosovo or Kosovska Mitrovica for the Serbs, Liberation Army. This has generated is a symbol of a divided country. This much controversy as the army has been half-Kosovar and half-Serbian town accused of organized crime, drug and is the centerpiece of this long-lasting arms dealing, as well as selling transplant conflict, which was touchingly organs in the years 1998–2000. epitomized by the case of the Ibar River Bridge, until-recently blocked, thus Reconciliation and laying a foundation dividing not only two river banks, but for a common state call for reliable also ethnic communities. investigations and due justice for the crimes committed on both sides. Obtaining such Robert Rajczyk consensus will likely pave the way for September 24, 2018

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Hostile propaganda: how it affects Lithuanian society Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Albert Komar State-sponsored propaganda, which in recent years has become a more visible phenomenon, is never spread just for its own reasons. It is either part of a broader foreign policy toolbox or part of the new hybrid warfare, thus pursuing deeper goals.

merican scholars Garth S. be classified as “deliberate”. Moreover, Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell propaganda is an attempt to create a certain defined propaganda as state for a specific audience towards which a “deliberate, systematic the propagandist has clear pre-set aims. Aattempt to shape perceptions, manipulate Succeeding in this attempt is the goal of cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve propaganda. Specifically, propaganda can a response that furthers the desired intent be dedicated to forming an understanding of the propagandist.” or perspective (by using and manipulating speech, slogans and symbols), manipulating Propaganda is not a spontaneous activity, awareness (by forming cognitive skills but rather a well-thought-out and planned useful for the propagandist) or impacting strategy, thus its definition only contains behaviour (by focusing not only on forming those propaganda activities that can a specific mode of thinking and habits, but

66 The Warsaw Institute Review Hostile propaganda: how it affects Lithuanian society also on the capacity to “activate” the target group and exploit its actions). Propaganda is not a Propaganda can be compared to radiation. Propaganda, just as radiation, can slowly spontaneous activity, affect society, which, for a long time, does not even recognise that it is being affected. but rather a well- Therefore, the state only turns to its defence -thought-out and system the moment it becomes visible and when perhaps damage has already been planned strategy, thus its inflicted. For example, for more than 20 years, the narrative that Crimea belongs to definition only contains Russia was pursued by means of soft power. Therefore, when the “little green men” those propaganda showed up, society in the peninsula did not resist the brutal violations of the most basic activities that can be international norms in the 21st century. classified as “deliberate”. According to Vytautas Kersanskas, an of propaganda in the long term. Secondly, expert on hybrid threats, propaganda an apathetic and apolitical society is perfect as a phenomenon encompasses a wide for employing other hybrid means to variety of manipulation techniques such influence the development of the country. as overemphasising the facts and making them “breaking news” when they are Kersanskas notes that although the last not, presenting one-sided information, couple of years were marked by an increased disinformation, etc. All these techniques, level of state-sponsored propaganda, it is still including in particular the increased use not popular to talk about the manipulation of fake news, basically serve one goal, of information as an act of war or part i.e. they make people lose hope in the of warfare. A peace-time mentality is still possibility of fully understanding everything leading the narrative; therefore states are and finding out the real truth about the quite reluctant to act against this threat. political developments taking place both This is also visible in Western democracies domestically and internationally. This where state-sponsored propaganda manages correlates with the growing distrust in the to manipulate the core element of liberal media and the belief that everyone lies. democracy, i.e. the right to personal views It is no coincidence that Russia Today (RT), and the possibility to express them freely. the main globally oriented propaganda Therefore, propaganda news outlets become channel of the Kremlin, uses a “Question an “alternative opinion” in a pluralist society. more” slogan, by which they mean to infer However, they are strongly coordinated at that “yes, maybe we are lying, but everyone the political level of the state, which supports – including your own government, your them, or they might even be state-owned own media – lies”. People get confused and news networks, as in the case of Russia become dull and apolitical, because they Today. Any attempt to control, limit or are no longer aware of which side to choose. ban the spread of propaganda becomes an For propagandists, the expansion of this grey opportunity to talk about an undemocratic zone that exists in-between the supporters and illiberal act against the freedom and the adversaries is useful. Firstly, of the media, which is why many it is much easier to make indifferent governments are still afraid and confused people supportive to take such action.

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Russia has implemented the most integrated a so-called neutral space between Europe system of state-sponsored propaganda in and Russia and maintaining the status the world. The exact understanding of the of a so-called buffer zone comprising the Kremlin as to what the media is and what Baltic States, despite their membership journalists are for has been well represented in Euro-Atlantic organizations. There are by Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s Minister of also attempts to exploit Lithuania’s socio- Defence, who said the following: “The day -economic disadvantages by strengthening has come when we all have to admit that the cultural divide within the country as a word, a camera, a photo, the Internet, well as in Lithuania’s relations with Europe and information in general have become and emphasising the problems of the a yet another type of weapon, yet another country’s policy on historical memory. component of the armed forces. This weapon can be used both in a good The propaganda image of Lithuania and in a bad way. This is a weapon is created by: that was involved in various events in our country in different years, a) Emphasising and hyperbolising the both in our defeats and in our victories.” problems of social exclusion and emigration in Lithuania, thus forming Russia has already developed a unique an image of a “failed state”; approach to international politics, which can be regarded as “Russian” geopolitical b) Contrasting historical narratives discipline, marked by a certain perception (especially with regard to the assessment of the world and Russia’s place in it. Russian of the consequences of World War II), propaganda inevitably relates to the thereby creating a myth of Lithuania desire to export this perception to foreign as a neo-fascist state; countries, incorporating the Russian worldview into the consciousness of the c) Highlighting the myth of alleged distrust largest audience of foreign citizens possible, in Western allies and the importance legitimising this perception globally, of the so-called consensus with Russia; and facilitating the realisation of Russia’s foreign policy objectives. After all, a state’s d) Supporting the tendencies of closure of influence increases when it becomes the national communities, thus encouraging centre of power that formulates concepts cultural and political fragmentation and proposes a wording that others adopt of Lithuanian society. or adapt to. Hence, the worldview of that country becomes a socially constructed Myth of Lithuania as a failed truth1. The power centre, which is able state to impose its definition of reality, also In an interview with a US television imposes the political rules of the game. channel in September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that The goal of the Kremlin’s propaganda is “only 1.5 million people currently live to create an image of the Baltic States as in Lithuania”. The Russian leader wanted “temporary” and “derivative” structures. to make the suggestion that Lithuania is a The constant sticking of such labels as failed state, which, in just over two decades “fake West” and “false Europe” is related of independence, has lost more than half to Russia’s geopolitical interest in creating of its population2. Yes, the emigration

1 Polegkyi, O., Changes in Russia foreign policy 2 BNS, „V. Putinas interviu JAV žiniasklaidai dukart discourse and concept of “Russian World”, PECOB’s sumažino Lietuvos gyventojų skaičių“, September Papers Series, Wrocław University, 2011, p. 10. 29, 2015, http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/v-

68 The Warsaw Institute Review Hostile propaganda: how it affects Lithuanian society problem is real in Lithuania and, compared to 1990, there are about 900,000 less people living in Lithuania today. However, the Today the Lithuanian manipulation of data forms a negative image of the country both in the eyes of view of history of World the US, a strategic partner of Lithuania, and in certain segments of Lithuanian War II recounts the role society. In addition, according to the Russian state news agency Interfax, Putin of the Soviets as being invites Lithuanians to immigrate to the Kaliningrad Region3. It should be noted equal to that of the Nazis. that the alleged narrative of only 1.5 million people living in Lithuania Lithuania as a neo-fascist state has been repeated several times After the restoration of Lithuania’s by Putin in various media outlets. independence, there was no space in the narrative of Lithuanian history for the cult Russian propaganda also focuses on social of the heroic Red Army and its “glorious” problems. Moreover, the vulnerability victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War5. of post-Soviet states also increases due Today the Lithuanian view of history of to the phenomenon of Soviet nostalgia World War II recounts the role of the Soviets among the population. This is particularly as being equal to that of the Nazis. In other manipulated by Russian propagandists, words, the USSR is perceived as an aggressor who maintain that the life in Russia today which illegally occupied Lithuania, could be associated with the life that while the people who opposed the Soviet existed in the Soviet Union (hence, for occupation and were participants of the example, the narrative “life was better anti-Soviet resistance or underground non- when we lived together with Russians”). violent resistance (dissident movement) are In the Baltic States, the aim is to set people treated as the new heroes of Lithuania. This against each other and divide the public narrative of Lithuanian history contradicts by consistently repeating the message the cult of the so-called Russian heroic that the development of the country victory in World War II. has been disturbed, that it is unable to overcome the problems faced by the It is precisely for this reason that the most vulnerable social groups, and that Kremlin’s historical policy towards injustice is thriving. The magnitude of Lithuania has relied heavily on the attempt actual problems is stressed by emphasising to persuade that the Soviet occupation was negative tendencies, which creates a voluntary step made by the Lithuanian a negative atmosphere, undermines government and its people. There is also confidence in the authorities of the widespread questioning of the memory country, and diminishes a sense of pride in of the restoration of independence and the state and its history. In such a medium, other important dates of the Lithuanian society becomes vulnerable4. state. Various media outlets are employed putinas-interviu-jav-ziniasklaidai-dukart-sumazino- tyrimai, 2012, nr. 5, p. 183–205, http://www.zurnalai. lietuvos-gyventoju-skaiciu.d?id=69130444. vu.lt/zurnalistikos-tyrimai/article/view/1800/1071. 3 15min.lt, „Vladimiras Putinas lietuvius kviečia 5 Oficiali dabartinės Rusijos (kaip ir SSRS) emigruoti į Rusiją“, July 26, 2015, http://www.15min. istoriografija nuo Antrojo pasaulinio karo, pradėto lt/naujiena/aktualu/pasaulis/vladimiras-putinas- SSRS ir Vokietijos sutartu Europos padalijimu, lietuvius-kviecia-emigruoti-i-rusija-57-518010. atskiria Vokietijos ir SSRS karo veiksmus, pradėtus 4 Martišius, M., „Komunikacinės progresijos 1941-06-22, neprisiimant atsakomybės už Lenkijos konstravimas informaciniame kare“, Žurnalistikos padalijimą, Žiemos karą, Baltijos valstybių okupaciją.

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and that there were allegedly evidence that the killing was planned in advance by When Lithuania joined the Lithuanian leadership. In particular, the program tried to emphasise that all the European Union currently accused persons are Russians and NATO, Russian only, thereby demonstrating the allegedly existent tension between Lithuanians and propaganda started Russians. The program tried to make an impression that the circumstances of the creating an image that events of January 13, 1991 and the ongoing pre-trial investigation were motivated by Lithuania was not national hatred. As in the case of assessing the history of World War II, Russia accused an independent state Lithuania of radical nationalism. The aim was to delegitimize the Lithuanian and did not carry out government with the introduction of a conspiracy theory, maintaining that sovereign policies. it was the Lithuanian government that was to downplay partisan activities, promote responsible for the victims whose deaths nostalgia for the Soviet past, criticize the were supposed to incite hatred for the then aspirations to investigate Soviet crimes, legitimate Soviet government. and improve the image of those who worked in the Soviet structures and those Similarly, other historical topics are responsible for mass deportations. also manipulated. For example, there is particular emphasis on the history of the One of the most frequently attacked Vilnius Region to create confrontation episodes of Lithuanian history is the tragedy between Lithuania and Poland. In this of January 13, 1991 caused by the bloody case, the merits of the Soviet Union in attack of the Soviet Army against the “returning” the Vilnius Region to Lithuania peaceful people of Lithuania, who defended are emphasised7. the recently restored independence of the country. Even in 2007, the Russian Increasing the distrust in broadcaster First Baltic Channel showed Western security guarantees a TV program telling a distorted story When Lithuania joined the European of the events of January 13. After repeated Union and NATO, Russian propaganda reports of such slandering information started creating an image that Lithuania in 2013, when the commemoration was not an independent state and did not of a freedom fighter of Lithuania was carry out sovereign policies. According defamed, the channel was banned. to propagandists, even before Lithuania’s accession to the EU and NATO, the country This decision was taken after the TV went through a Brussels-Washington program The Man and the Law (Rus. controlled path of policy making. This Человек и закон) aired on the First Baltic narrative is reinforced by depicting Lithuania Channel in October 20136. The program as a pseudo-member of the European Union suggested that on January 13, 1991 not a and NATO in order to convey the impression single man was killed by Soviet soldiers that other members of the organizations

6 „Человек и закон“, Youtube, October 7 Regnum, «Красная армия и Армия Крайова: 4, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/ Как 71 год назад освобождали Вильнюс», July 15, watch?v=2Pb6bwNNODM. 2015, https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1942284.html.

70 The Warsaw Institute Review Hostile propaganda: how it affects Lithuanian society would turn their backs on the Baltic States and plans to create new bases, headquarters in the event of an emergency8. and airports, which were discussed at the summit, and “left no doubt that NATO was Lithuania is portrayed as an instigator preparing for a war”. The Russian message of tension in the region which artificially was very clear, i.e. NATO’s deterrence increases the threat posed by Russia. measures were causing tension in the The outrage stemming from Russian region, promoting a so-called arms race and propaganda that emphasised social problems reducing the security of Lithuania and other was caused, in particular, by a statement Baltic States. In this context, however, it is made by the President of Lithuania concealed that the arms race in the region maintaining that Russia is a terrorist state had already begun starting from the very and that the Baltic States are, therefore, moment Russia turned Kaliningrad into its asking for permanent deployment of NATO military forefront in the space of just a few forces. There were widespread Russian years, thus threatening to separate the Baltic disinformation campaigns reacting to other States from the Alliance’s defence system. events. For example, the establishment of a joint Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian On the one hand, such statements are brigade was interpreted by the Russian aimed to support the hostility of Russian media as a means of sending conscripts society towards the West. On the other, of the Lithuanian Army to fight in Ukraine. they seek to provoke anxiety and fear in Russia’s neighbours and NATO member Russian propaganda related to the activities countries, including the people of Lithuania, of the Baltic States in NATO has become thus forcing them to feel that they are in especially active. In July 2016, after the danger of war which they do not want at all. NATO Summit in Warsaw took a decision Propagandists are deceiving the people of to deploy an international battalion in each Lithuania and trying to portray, in particular, of the Baltic States, Russian authorities the US as a state merely interested in reacted immediately and stated that the act maintaining its global hegemony. Under the was considered to be NATO’s way of further circumstances of such rhetoric, some political expanding its borders towards Russia. It movements are now claiming that Lithuania was announced that Russia, in response has once again been “occupied” by alien to such actions, would increase its forces military forces. along the borders with the Baltic States and in the Kaliningrad Region. Although Russian media also attempts to portray official statements by the Kremlin, as always, the contradiction that arises between the are distinguished by laconic rhetoric, the political elite of Lithuania with regards to Russian state media outlined the NATO NATO and its relations with Russia. A lot Summit in Warsaw more visually. In one of attention was paid to the statements made of the most popular Russian news program by Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis Vesti (Rus. Вести, which is also broadcast highlighting that there should be more in Lithuania), Dmitry Kiselyov said that negotiations with Russia. In June 2016, NATO’s approach to its relations with Russia Andriukaitis criticised Linas Linkevičius, has changed substantially after the Warsaw Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Summit. He maintained that “Russia was for his “unfriendly” rhetoric concerning no longer a partner, but rather a target”, Russia9. The news agency Baltnews.ru stated

8 Воробьев, В., « Пентагон: НАТО не в состоянии 9 Baltnews.lt, «Еврокомиссар ответил главе МИД защитить Прибалтику», June 22, 2016, https:// Литвы: с Россией нужно вести переговоры», rg.ru/2016/06/22/pentagon-natone-v-sostoianii- June 16, 2016, http://baltnews.lt/vilnius_ zashchitit-pribaltiku.html. news/20160616/1015694844.html.

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that Andriukaitis’s moderate position in The Russian community in Lithuania is relation to Russia did not coincide with comparatively small and cannot be mobilised the strict official position of Vilnius. It was to cause cultural and political fragmentation also mentioned that Jean-Claude Juncker, in Lithuania. That is why the Kremlin’s goal President of the European Commission, is to unite, both politically and culturally, was criticised by Linkevičius when the the Russian and Polish communities based latter expressed his concern for the lack on the worldview of the so-called Russian of Europe’s efforts to renew and improve World and by promoting the Soviet nostalgia relations with Russia at an economic still felt by those communities11. The results forum in Saint Petersburg. The purpose of a sociological survey titled Who is guilty of highlighting such disagreements in the for the conflict in Ukraine, conducted by the Russian media is to convey the impression BNS in 2014, show that Russian propaganda that the EU is fragmented and that the messages about the events in Ukraine central EU government would be willing resonate in the national communities of to negotiate if it were not for certain states, Lithuania. Apparently, the share of Poles and such as Lithuania, who have an interest in Russians who believed that either Ukraine increasing the military contingent of NATO itself or the West were to be blamed in their territories in order to deter Russia. for the conflict in Ukraine was significantly The Russian media portray Lithuania as larger than that of Lithuanians12. an allegedly uncompromising state which is unwilling to sit at the negotiating table In Lithuania, the creation of a civic and is actively increasing its military platform favourable to the Kremlin is also potential at the same time. aimed at uniting national minorities by putting emphasis on domestic policy issues. Promotion of exclusion One way to achieve this is by highlighting of ethnic minorities from the importance of education of national Lithuanian society minorities. Russian mass information Unlike in Latvia or Estonia, all sources maintain that the two national inhabitants in Lithuania were minorities of Lithuania have been merging immediately granted Lithuanian for years now and that, since the Soviet citizenship after the restoration of the times, not only Russians, but also many country’s independence. Therefore, for Poles have acquired education in Russian a long time Russia had no reason to language13. The problem is quantitatively speak about discrimination against local raised by placing the Polish and Russian Russians in Lithuania. In Estonia and minorities into a historically and politically (in particular) in Latvia, the problem common national group, which allegedly of non-citizens (stateless persons) is still suffers from a national government, so widely publicised by Russian propaganda. that the issue of the Lithuanian Poles can The Baltic States in the Russian press are 11 constantly portrayed as countries where Ramonaitė, A., Maliukevičius, N., Degutis, M., Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės the rights of Russian-speaking people are geokultūrinės nuostatos (Studija), Vilnius, Versus violated and their interests ignored. Aureus, 2007, p. 3, http://www.civitas.lt/wp-content/ An example of such a narrative is the uploads/2015/07/geokulturines_nuostatos_ isplestine_santrauka.pdf. report of Russian media sources on the 12 BNS, „Apklausa: Lietuvos tautinės mažumos apie 10 alleged Russian language ban in Latvia . įvykius Ukrainoje sužino iš Rusijos.“, January 7, 2015, http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/88819. 10 Delfi, „Rusijos žiniasklaida dėl Latvijos sukėlė 13 RuBaltic.ru, «Нацменьшинства в Литве — isterijos Bangą“, January 19, 2015, http://www.delfi. заложники геополитики», December 17, 2015, lt/news/daily/world/rusijos-ziniasklaida-del-latvijos- http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i- sukele-isterijos-banga.d?id=66942210. obshchestvo/171215-natsmenshinstva-litva/.

72 The Warsaw Institute Review Hostile propaganda: how it affects Lithuanian society thus become a matter to be addressed This brings us to another question by not only Lithuania and Poland but concerning practical policy: how much also by Russia. For the Russian-speaking do the measures proposed in Lithuania, Lithuanian Poles, who feel nostalgic for the such as the ban on Russian TV channels Soviet past but do not know much about or the restriction of Russian production Poland, Russia claims to be their shelter on Lithuanian television channels, abroad with its concept of the so-called make sense? The answer to this question Russian World. depends on the theory we choose to apply. In this case, two different theories compete It should be noted that pro-Kremlin with each other, i.e. the theory about the Russian online press (for example, effect of communication and the theory Rubalt.ru) emphasises that the national about the model of resonance. minorities in Lithuania are allegedly hostages of geopolitics and that the The theory about the effects of multi--polar international system should communication says that the repeated be more favourable to the situation of hearing of a certain message affects such minorities. In this context, Russia’s the recipient. For example, a 2007 support for the narratives of a neo-fascist investigation of the impact of the FOX Lithuanian state and depiction of both news channel on US voters revealed that NATO and the US as aggressive policy watching the channel convinced from 3% makers serve as a means of deepening the up to 28% of non-Republican supporters divide between the national communities to vote for the Republican Party. In this living in Lithuania and the Lithuanian case, it was concluded that even if state and weakening the integration of a person rationally perceives the channel Lithuanian society. they are watching as biased, hearing a certain message repeatedly still How to deal with propaganda? affects that person. In seeking a recipe that would limit the impact of propaganda, it is, first The theory about the resonance model and foremost, important to answer the claims otherwise, i.e. the effect of a question of whether we can equate the message depends on its compatibility impact of propaganda with the spread with the person’s beliefs. If the message of Russian media or Russian cultural corresponds to the person’s beliefs, the production in Lithuania. According message is accepted and reinforces the to sociologist Ainė Ramonaitė, seeing opinion that already exists, and if not, propaganda messages does not necessarily the message is rejected as biased, mean an acceptance of or reliance on unreliable, etc. In other words, propaganda them. Well-thought-out propaganda is effective when it is based on existing tries to exploit the prevailing attitudes beliefs. The image of the world created by of society, reinforcing them or linking the Kremlin seems persuasive when it fits them with other propaganda messages. and “resonates” with the person’s internal This means that the prevalence of every attitudes, familiar symbols, and usual Russian-friendly message cannot be cultural and social norms. Therefore, the regarded as a consequence of Russian most important task in the fight against propaganda14. hostile propaganda is to find a way to change that framework which employs 14 Ainė Ramonaite, „(Ne)atsparumas Rusijos all interpretations of empirical propagandai: priežastys ir padariniai“ iš A. Ramonaitė et all „Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos?“, (real or false) facts, familiar symbols, Vilnius, 2018, p. 139. and normal cultural and social norms.

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A poll conducted in Lithuania asked the of a certain message may have people surveyed who was to be blamed for a certain impact. Lithuania has made some the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Of policy decisions that take into account these non-Russian channel viewers, 67% blamed arguments. For example, the ban of two Russia for the war in eastern Ukraine. Russian TV channels resulted in the Of those who sometimes watch Russian viewing duration of Russian TV by one channels, 60% indicated Russia as the main third in the space of just a few years16. culprit behind the war in eastern Ukraine. And 46% of viewers who watch Russian However, the limitation of Russian TV channels every day mentioned Russia program brought another problem, the as the main reason for the war in Ukraine. spread of Russian production on Lithuanian There is a difference found between the TV channels. In the period of one week groups of television viewers, but it is not in January 2007, Lithuanian channels had as significant as one could expect if the broadcast 79 hours of Russian production, theory of communication effects was while the figure soared to 151 hours in absolutely correct15. 2016 and 198 hours in 2017. Most of this production consisted of Russian TV shows According to Ramonaitė, an assessment and movies. On some Lithuanian TV of the Soviet era helps to explain the channels, almost half of the production resistance to propaganda much better than was made in Russia. Taking into account an analysis of the effect of watching Russian the fact that almost all Russian productions TV channels. In other words, the essential are broadcast with Lithuanian subtitles, it difference lies in whether or not a person was expedient to change the existing legal values the life in the Soviet Union (be it a regulation and establish that television better or a worse one) more than the life program broadcast in non-EU languages in a free and independent Lithuania. The are to be translated into the Lithuanian Soviet-era assessment involves a change in language with either Lithuanian voice- the standard of living by taking into account -over or dubbing. Currently, broadcasters the person’s status in the Soviet era and can choose between a translation and a how their social status changed after the display with Lithuanian subtitles. Given that restoration of independence. The more one translation is expensive, subtitling is usually appreciates the Soviet era, the more often chosen as the cheaper option. In the absence one watches Russian TV and not the reverse. of such choice, the cost of broadcasting Sociological surveys show that during the Russian production would increase and 2012 economic crisis, 42% of Lithuanians also the emotional connection with this said the Soviet past was better than the production will decrease. It is, therefore, present reality. Now the figure stands at believed that some broadcasters could around 25 %. This shows that the reduction reduce the expenses of such production of social exclusion, strengthening of the by instead offering more European middle class, and creation of a welfare state products to their television viewers. are essential policies to strengthening the public’s resilience to propaganda. Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Albert Komar October 15, 2018 On the other hand, there is no need to reject the arguments of the theory of the effects of communication in that the repeated hearing 16 Verslo žinios, Apklausa rodo rusiškų televizijų populiarumo mažėjimą Lietuvoje, February 1, 15 Ainė Ramonaite, „(Ne)atsparumas Rusijos 2017, https://www.vz.lt/verslo-aplinka/2017/02/01/ propagandai: priežastys ir padariniai“ iš A. Ramonaitė apklausa-rodo-rusisku-televiziju-populiarumo- et all „Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos?“, Vilnius, 2018, p. 153. mazejima-lietuvoje.

74 The Warsaw Institute Review Warsaw-Vilnius Relations as a Common Matter: the Polish Ethnic Minority in Lithuania Paweł Ozdoba “Lithuania, my country!” – these words were written by Adam Mickiewicz, a Polish poet and independence activist, in the first half of the 19th century to refer to his homeland. While today, despite much political turmoil and after many years, similar exclamations can still be heard from the 200,000 or so Poles living in Lithuania.

nfortunately, members of the For instance, such phenomenon can Polish minority in Lithuania be observed in Lithuania, in particular often face procedural in the Vilnius Region. As confirmed difficulties and discrimination by official statistics, the Polish community Uon the part when dealing with local in Lithuania is perceived as an inseparable authorities, which have been noticed in element of the country’s demography. Warsaw. Meanwhile, few are aware that It is estimated that one quarter of the outside Poland’s current borders there are inhabitants of the Vilnius Region claim still some cities inhabited by Poles who to be of Polish nationality while the vast constitute 60–70% of their population. majority of them consider themselves

4/2018 75 Eastern Report © Leszek Szymański (PAP) Rasos Cemetery, Vilnius, Lithuania, February 17, 2018. President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda and his wife Agata Kornhauser Duda during a wreath-laying ceremony at the Mausoleum of the Mother and the Son’s Heart, where the heart of Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s is enshrined.

to be patriots who express a vivid interest However, such rich and beautiful past in Poland’s current situation and engage traditions or common interests could be in both social and cultural activities translated into equal rights for the Polish aiming to maintain national traditions. minority in Lithuania. And despite the fact that Lithuania signed the Treaty of Friendly As a result of some political decisions made and Neighbourly Cooperation with Poland right after the Second World War, Poland in 1994, as well as both countries belonging was deprived of the Vilnius Region. Even to the EU, Poles living in the Vilnius Region several years later, this issue keeps inflaming often report abusive practices and unequal the hearts of many Poles. The region’s treatment by the Lithuanian authorities. charm, traditions and history have been repeatedly immortalized both in Polish Feeling at home: 700 years of literature as well as in film. Poland’s relations Polish presence in Lithuania with the Vilnius Region are evidenced by First, it should be noted that Lithuania such symbols as the Gate of Dawn – along is home to many Poles. These people are with the icon of Our Lady – that constantly neither immigrants nor displaced people attract many Poles living in various parts of as many of them have been living in the the world and numerous groups of Polish Vilnius Region for several generations. pilgrims. In addition, both countries seem Moreover, the first migrations of Poles united by the fate of many distinguished to the territory of today’s Lithuania took Poles who considered Lithuania to be their place as far back as 700 years ago with home. This includes Marshal Józef Piłsudski, some important political declarations who played a key role in regaining Poland’s dating back to 1385; their subsequent independence, Jesuit Andrzej Bobola, decisions resulted in the creation declared Saint of the Catholic Church, as of a common state organism. Under the well as poets Czesław Miłosz – awarded Act of Kreva, the Grand Duke of Lithuania the Nobel Prize in Literature – and Adam Jogaila (later Władysław II Jagiełło) Mickiewicz who is regarded as one of committed himself to marry the Queen Poland’s most talented poets. of Poland Jadwiga and to convert to

76 The Warsaw Institute Review Warsaw-Vilnius Relations as a Common Matter: the Polish...

Roman Catholicism. In addition, Jagiełło was obliged to attach both Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands to the Crown of Poland. Lithuania’s capital While the Lithuanian sovereigns were preparing themselves to adopt the Roman became one of the most Catholic religion in 1387, an increased number of Poles migrated to Lithuania. important cultural centres At that time, not only did Polish priests of the Polish-Lithuanian and monks come to the lands northeast of the then-Polish Kingdom; Commonwealth and the the territories also became the destination for numerous country’s fifth largest city. townspeople, officials and soldiers. meanwhile, the magnates and Lithuanian The agreement concluded in Kreva fell nobility were undergoing gradual shortly after the death of Queen Jadwiga; polonization. Thanks to the increasing nonetheless, close relations between the popularity of the Polish language, it was two countries were constantly maintained possible to conduct cultural integration and refreshed by subsequent acts such as within the structures of the Polish- the Pact of Vilnius and Radom, the Pact of -Lithuanian Commonwealth. In addition, Horodło, and the Union of Grodno (1432); the development of the common state the latter of which specifically aimed fostered further migration processes. to rebuild good relations between The disintegration of this powerful state the two countries. organism did not occur until the Third Partition of Poland in 1795; yet, in spite of One state – two nations this Polishness in Lithuania still managed Nevertheless, the glory times of both to survive until modern times. Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland were yet to come. On July 1, 1569, the Crown of Following Poland’s return to the map of the Kingdom of Poland and the Great Duchy Europe, the state authorities made some of Lithuania reached an agreement in the political decision related to the creation city of Lublin, also referred to as the Union of Central Lithuania, which eventually of Lublin. Under the treaty, a powerful state incorporated the Vilnius Region into – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – Poland’s territory. At the time, the Vilnius could be formed and united with a common Voivodship consisted of about 1.3 million ruler, coat of arms and currency. In addition, inhabitants; 60% of whom were Poles, both countries shaped their foreign and while Lithuania’s capital became one military policy with the aim of protecting of the most important cultural centres of their common interests. The decisions made the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by the rulers of both countries exerted a very and the country’s fifth largest city. Poland large impact on the ever-increasing number lost the Vilnius Region again as a result of of Poles in Lithuania. At that time, both political changes that occurred after World peoples could be connected by common War II. However, despite several dramatic interests and the state, whose development events as well as some difficulties in became a priority for Poles and Lithuanians. integrating these areas within the USSR, the Polish community, whose It is noteworthy that national awareness representatives largely remained in their in the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland homeland, kept expressing a strong sense kept developing in the mid-16th century; of national consciousness.

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In the remaining parts of this article, Discrimination against Poles in there is no more room to further discuss Lithuania the history and development of the Today, despite their common history, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Poles in Lithuania often stress that they nonetheless, such a brief historical outline feel discriminated against. Although the may help readers to understand – at least Lithuanian authorities keep insisting on the to some extent – the reasons behind importance of the Polish minority in some the Polish presence in Lithuania’s official statements, many Polish nationals present territory. are constantly facing various difficulties, as evidenced by some issues related to language The Russian invader to and terminology. For instance, Lithuania’s reinforce anti-Polish State Language Act of 1995 provides that sentiments all inscriptions in the Republic of Lithuania The problems of the Polish community shall be conducted in the national language. in Lithuania did not emerge overnight. As a consequence, it is not possible to have The fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Polish names of cities and towns – even for Commonwealth at the end of the 18th those inhabited mostly by representatives century opened the way for growing of the Polish minority – on road signs. In anti-Polish sentiments in Lithuania. addition, under present law, it is prohibited The situation got more complicated in to use Polish spelling in the names of Polish the second half of the 19th century after schools, as evidenced by the 2008 case where the failure of the January Uprising; at that in the Lithuanian town of Lavaryshki, time, it was forbidden to use the Polish located in the Vilnius Region, the Polish language on the territory of the former community intended to name Emilia Plater Grand Duchy of Lithuania while Poles – a participant of the November Uprising were treated with hostility. The conflict – the patron of the school. However, local between Poles and Lithuanians was authorities decided that this would be additionally exacerbated by the Russian possible only if the school’s name was invader. A similar state of affairs was written in the Lithuanian version “Emilija maintained even after Poland regained Plateryte”. The Polish community living its independence; even if a large part of in the Vilnius district referred the case the Vilnius Region could be then found to the European Court of Human Rights within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian in Strasbourg, which was eventually Commonwealth, Poles living on the dismissed due to procedural errors. Soviet-controlled territories encountered much more serious obstacles. In addition, Poles forced to use Lithuanian the interwar period was marked by an names and surnames ever-increasing level of de-Polonization, Under present law, Poles living in Lithuania which eventually resulted in closing Polish cannot use the Polish versions of their first schools and cultural institutions. To make and last names. Instead, they are forced matters worse, Poles could no longer use to use the Lithuanian versions of their their surnames, and were obliged to use names, which usually consists of adding Lithuanian versions. Under Lithuania’s the masculine suffices “us” or “ius” and citizenship law, members of the Polish feminine endings “aite” or “ienie” to all minority were deprived of many rights Polish surnames. In 2009, the Constitutional and could not practice in many Court examined an application of professional fields including medicine Lithuania’s Seimas (the legislative branch and law. Some of the above-mentioned of government) concerning the possibility problems are faced by Poles even today. of writing both the name and surname

78 The Warsaw Institute Review Warsaw-Vilnius Relations as a Common Matter: the Polish... © Rafał Guz (PAP)

Antakalnis Cemetery, Vilnius, Lithuania, March 9, 2018. Poland’s Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki during a wreath-laying ceremony at the monument commemorating Polish soldiers who died in the Polish-Bolshevik war.

in the national language; regardless, the Community Threatened with final ruling did not turn out satisfactory for Ongoing Russification the Polish minority. According to the court, Poles in the Vilnius Region appear afraid the Polish form might be included in official not only of being discriminated against documents, such as in passports, but it could by the Lithuanian authorities but also be treated only in terms of its auxiliary role of the ongoing process of Russification, whereas the Lithuanian version would still understood in terms of imposing Russian be recognized as the only official form. culture onto the public. According to Members of the Polish minority claim that the Lithuanian census of 2011, the Polish the difficulties in using their own first minority numbered slightly over 200,000 and last names constitute a deliberate while the second largest community, the act on part of the Lithuanian authorities. Russian minority, is estimated at 177,000. In addition, Moscow, which seeks to pursue Not all Poles are able to a “divide and rule” strategy, is oftentimes restitute their property responsible for the worsening relations Poles living in Lithuania point out that between Poles and Lithuanians. After all, the local authorities do not fulfil the basic weakening both Poland and Lithuania provisions of the Treaty of Friendly and appears beneficial to Russia. Neighbourly Cooperation. Another example A similar policy has already been of gross negligence, aiming to discriminate implemented over many years, both after against the Polish minority, is the lack of the Second World War and in the early solutions to some matters regarding the 1990s when the countries of the region restitution of property lost by Poles as a were regaining their independence. result of Soviet decisions. The inhabitants It is noteworthy that Polish residents of the Vilnius Region argue that a very speak overtly about the omnipresent large number of applications for the return “Russian propaganda” being offered of nationalized property are still to be to the Lithuanians via easily accessible considered. Moreover, representatives of Russian media, which seem so popular the Polish minority have noticed a trend, and numerous that people in Lithuania according to which Lithuanian citizens increasingly tend to prefer them while are provided with preferential treatment abandoning Lithuanian-speaking TV as their applications are examined stations and newspapers. Unfortunately, much more quickly. it is difficult to counterbalance the

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claim that the liquidation of Polish schools is essentially aimed at weakening the Polish Moreover, members of the minority.

Polish minority complain In 2017, five Polish junior high schools (“gymnasiums”) were listed among about the difficulties in Lithuania’s top schools, according to the Reitingai magazine. The top positions were accessing Polish classical occupied by John Paul II Gymnasium in literature, and new Vilnius, ranked 21st, and Adam Mickiewicz Gymnasium, ranked 42nd. editions of contemporary Polish schools forced to novels in Polish. conduct classes in Lithuanian strength of the Russian media. Apart from language having small budgets, Polish media are There are other difficulties related often underinvested and fought off by their to education as well. According to competitors. Such was the case of the Polish- information that appeared in July of this -language daily Kurier Wileński (Vilnian year, Lithuanian politicians are seeking Courier); the newspaper, which has been to reduce the importance of the Polish printed in Lithuania since 1990, has recently language in Polish educational institutions. required subsidies by the Lithuanian state The bill provides that as much as 60% of budget. With no support being granted, such classes would be conducted in the the only Polish newspaper published in Lithuanian language. If these proposals Lithuania struggles and finds it difficult come into force, they will constitute yet to compete with powerful competition. another blow to the Polish education system in Lithuania. In 2011, the authorities Number of Polish schools is introduced similar regulations that limited despite their successes obligated Polish schools to run part of their Poles living in the Republic of Lithuania classes in Lithuanian language. This new also face problems in the domain of development may be perceived in terms education. It is certain that the country has of another step aimed at undermining numerous Polish primary and junior high the importance of Polish education. schools but in most cases, they are not In addition, since 2000, Polish students subsidized to a satisfactory level. Moreover, in Lithuania are no longer required Lithuania’s government keeps deliberating to pass Polish language in their secondary about the closing of Polish educational school final examinations. institutions. According to the Ministry of Education, there are too few students in Moreover, members of the Polish minority Polish schools so their further financing complain about the difficulties in accessing does not appear profitable for the state Polish classical literature, and new editions budget. It needs to be mentioned that these of contemporary novels in Polish. This institutions are sometimes financed by the problem often occurs in smaller towns, Polish government as well as the Senate of where libraries are full of books only in the Republic of Poland. Even if the funds Lithuanian and Russian. As for Polish make it possible to purchase the necessary editions, they are usually old and worn-out, equipment perform minor repairs, the which discourages young readers. However, schools remain rather underinvested. The thanks to the efforts of non-governmental Polish inhabitants in the Vilnius Region organizations, some institutions have

80 The Warsaw Institute Review Warsaw-Vilnius Relations as a Common Matter: the Polish... managed to provide libraries with new representatives of the Polish minority copies in Polish, which translates into an living in the Vilnius Region have noticed increased readership, according to local an improvement in the relations between residents. Warsaw and Vilnius. The same can be said about the increased level of trust between Common interests as a hope for the two partners. Thanks to a mutual better relations understanding and fight for common Despite the fact that Poland and Lithuania interests, both countries can be economically have been united by long-lasting traditions stronger and more secure. The first serious and a common history of the Polish- cues about the potential will to strengthen Lithuanian Commonwealth, their current mutual cooperation appeared at the turn relations appear extremely complex. Both of 2017 and 2018, which were accompanied countries are neighbours and common by a debate on the implementation of the members of international institutions, Three Seas Initiative policy inaugurated including the European Union and NATO. by Poland’s President Andrzej Duda. They are also united by shared economic Moreover, the Lithuanian army participated interests as well as some other issues related in the celebrations of the National Day to both energy and military security. of Remembrance of the Cursed Soldiers. However, relations between Warsaw This was the second time that the Lithuanian and Vilnius have somehow cooled over army participated in Wolf’s Trail Run, the last few years; this did not change which was met by great enthusiasm despite the close friendship between by Lithuania’s Polish community. the then-Presidents of Poland and Lithuania: Lech Kaczyński and Valdas A better future is possible Adamkus, respectively. Unfortunately, the together governments of both countries have not A possible thaw in Polish-Lithuanian managed to work out any common strategy relations – as well as a will to undertake regarding the Polish minority in Lithuania. some multidimensional cooperation Following many years of neglect as well as – raises hope for building a new and some external interference in the relations better future. However, it is necessary between the two countries, the Polish- to take decisive steps that will seek to -Lithuanian alliance has so far failed to strengthen the role of the Polish minority bring about satisfactory results. Therefore, in Lithuania and its empowerment. The the position of Poles living in Lithuania Polish authorities in Warsaw cannot take has gradually weakened while their such decisions unilaterally. It is also vital potential is no longer capitalised upon. to engage the Lithuanian government to further cooperate. The final outcome Polish national minority to will appear beneficial not only for Poland bring both countries together and Lithuanian but also for the Polish Many argue that the period of coolness in community whose links to the Vilnius Polish-Lithuanian relations is slowly fading Region as well as their attitude can be away, which may ultimately translate into described by the lyrics of the song by Polish- a stronger partnership on many levels. -Lithuanian politician and musicologist Friendship between the two countries could Gabriel Jan Mincewicz: Vilnius, my beloved be additionally tightened by the patriotic land! I will not exchange anything for you, and extremely active Polish community in let me live with you and let me die! Lithuania whose members have repeatedly signalled their willingness to participate Paweł Ozdoba in any possible talks. In addition, some September 1, 2018

4/2018 81 Opinions

Why Destroy the Nation State? Krzysztof Rak Neoliberals, who seem fully committed to fighting against any manifestations of nationalism, do not know what they are doing. Their victory would be considered tantamount to destroying all foundations of our social life. Deprived of a nation state organism, Western societies are destined to plunge into unimaginable chaos.

Ad Hitlerum This assessment is no exaggeration. For An enlightened neoliberal establishment, example, to find out more one should until recently predominant in the West, read the interview with the famous eventually put nationalism forward as Polish intellectual and journalist, the main enemy of the system, which Adam Michnik, in the German weekly is why it aimed to fight against its two Der Spiegel in 2013, where he boasted most important creations: the nation and about his acuity. “Back in 1990, I wrote the nation state. However, its arguments that nationalism is the last stage of do not seem particularly sophisticated communism: a system of thought and take the form of syllogisms, whose that gives simple but wrong answers construction appears to be very simple, as to complex questions. Nationalism they tend to associate nationalist attitudes is practically the natural ideology with anti-Semitic behaviours. of authoritarian regimes”, he claimed.

82 The Warsaw Institute Review Why Destroy the Nation State?

And while the German journalist suggested that anti-Semitism tended to run concurrently with nationalism, It developed the Michnik did not deny this, while making a small exception for the Poles, noting that concepts of a “nation” “Poland is the only country in Eastern as well as of a “nation Europe that was able to control itself in this respect”. The Polish intellectual added state”, both constituting that “anti-Semitism is no longer socially or politically acceptable in Poland”. institutions that keep Therefore, as evidenced above, the most important phenomenon shaping determining our the socio-political life of the West for the last two centuries has been social existence reduced by neoliberal intellectuals to an in a decisive way. extremely simple formula: nationalism is bad as it often consists of showing hatred the same social being – just as two sides towards Jews, which ultimately led to of the same coin. the Holocaust. Such an understanding of nationalism is not only an expression Awareness of such a quasi-tautological of the intellectual immaturity of many relationship between these two notions members of the western elite; it also emerged some time ago as their early constitutes a form of “false awareness” traces can be found in the philosophical of the European establishment whose works of Georg Hegel. This seemed natural representatives are afraid of losing the for legal positivists living in the second dominant position they managed to half of the 19th century who had come up assume after the end of the Cold War. with the idea of the current state and law Nevertheless, it has little in common with doctrine. Needless to say it was integrated the hitherto achievements of modern into the classical definition of the state social sciences. It is, therefore, first worth formulated by the Austrian law professor starting with current knowledge about Georg Jellinek. According to this tradition, nationalism as well as its functions. the nation is referred to as a national state (staatsvolk), mainly due to the fact Fruits of Nationalism that the state itself is expected to form Nationalist ideology was founded at any nation-creating bonds. The nature the beginning of the 19th century. It of this relationship is best understood developed the concepts of a “nation” as by the phenomenon of citizenship. well as a “nation state”, both constituting Generally speaking, there are two types institutions that keep determining our of relations: vertical – between the state social existence in a decisive way. Leaving (state authority) and individual – defined aside all considerations about their by the recognition of mutual rights and historical origin, it can be concluded obligations as well as horizontal ones that that they have managed to reach their ultimately create social ties, making each present mature form as a result of mutual society much more than just and continuous interactions. Therefore, a mere collection of individuals. it is clear that the nation has created the Any national bond is thus assumed modern state while the state has come up in terms of its civic – and political – with the idea of the modern nation. Both affiliations, which seems to explain why state nation and nation state incorporate a state nation may be identified with a

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political nation. Naturally, back in the mostly due to the existence of a state 1930s, the German state imposed educational system, which creates a a racist interpretation of national ties homogeneous national culture that on their citizens, hence associating eventually leads to the unification of nationalism with anti-Semitic attitudes. society members. As its tools, the state Interestingly enough, the phenomenon uses a monopolistic educational and of anti-Semitism is considerably older information policy, which leads to the than nationalism. emergence of a nation whose victorious expansion aims to eliminate all regional Industrial homogenization differences by means of a gradual, yet The core of any relationship between inexorable process. The nation disposes nation and state can be understood of a unified conceptual apparatus, which thanks to industrialization processes. allows its members to perceive the world The concept had previously attracted in the same way, thus bringing about a the attention of Karl Marx who was able national intersubjectivity that eventually to distinguish a factor that would first stems from such unification. foster the development of the nation state but also able to destroy it. Nonetheless, Cultural homogenization disposes of Marx’s historiosophical predictions did an overwhelming force, which seems not come true since the working class particularly visible even in today’s times, did not manage to annihilate the existing thus aspiring to abolish all biological order based on national institutions. differences between men and women. It was not until the 20th century that The traditional division of a man who nationalism emerged victorious from its maintains a family, and a woman who historical clash with internationalism raises children at home, constitutes a while the reasons for this unprecedented huge waste from the point of view of triumph were convincingly explained in modern industrialisation processes. the early 1980s by the philosopher Ernest Accompanied by such a rigid distinction Gellner in his time-honoured book of social roles, any work that generates Nations and Nationalism. profit – and therefore also progress – can only be carried out by half of the Gellner argued that the nation state population. Such is the reason behind was necessary to make any industrial the revolutionary transformation of society exist as it “lives from constant, traditional types of family that has taken uninterrupted development and from place over the last two centuries and continuous improvement”. As a result, whose main outcome was providing man became homo oeconomicus whose women with an equal position on the aim is to work more and more efficiently labour market. This was not the last stage, in order to improve both the quality and though. According to industrial logic, quantity of production. Such progress can the family is not the only institution be understood as a continuous change perceived as irrational; basically any in production methods. It is possible to social bond appears to be dysfunctional attain such ideal situations provided that as it binds people together, thus limiting a new type of society is created while its their mobility and posing a threat to members need to be characterized by a homogeneity. Not incidentally, the high level of mobility and flexibility so current stage of industrialisation strongly as to meet various challenges resulting endorses the “ideal”, in its opinion, from work organization and constantly institution of the so-called ‘single’. Such changing technology. Such shifts occur an individual is genderless; not being

84 The Warsaw Institute Review Why Destroy the Nation State? related to other society members in any significant way; he or she does not get involved in any deep social relations. Some Western elites Such a person constitutes an incarnation of an alienated human whose emergence believed that the had already been anticipated by 19th fall of communism century philosophers. Apart from having some personal obligations, a single person was possible due to has no commitments to anyone, which makes him or her a perfect candidate the triumph of such on the labour market. With no bonding commitments, including even biological neoliberal ideology. ones, such a person can fully devoted himself or herself to work much more were allowed to run undisturbed. Their instead of being distracted by ever-- task will be to ensure constant economic going consumption. Omnipresent in the progress, making humanity wealthier neoliberal media, singlism constitutes over time. Individuals will be busy one of the greatest victories of culture consuming their ever-increasing income; over nature, understood as biological focused solely on fulfilling their own processes. It reflects the possibility to needs, before eventually plunging into take advantage of culture to overcome the universe of heavenly happiness. In the biological division of both sexes, as this new brave world, there will no longer evidenced by gender ideology. be war or social conflicts. It is expected that the history of mankind will reach As for Gellner, he believed that its end in this respect. Such view was unification, which shall be perceived as a expressed by the philosopher Francis prerequisite for further industrialisation Fukuyama in his book The End of History, processes, could only take place under the published in 1992, which dominates the conditions of a nation state. Therefore, he thinking of neoliberal elites to this day. was convinced that this institution would be able to fulfil its functions According to the researcher, nationalism for a long time. constitutes a relic of history; a phenomenon that needs to be eliminated Universalist utopia since it does not allow for the further Gellner’s diagnosis dates back to the early development of economic forces. As a 1980s. Less than a decade later, global result, a new society will emerge while sociology was dominated by its perfect homogeneity will be based a contradictory view that managed on universal principle rather than on a to flourish as a result of the popularity national one. This “new brave world” will of neoliberalism after the end of the be shaped by a new social formation – a Cold War. Some Western elites believed homogeneous universal state that will that the fall of communism was possible replace the unified nation state. According due to the triumph of such neoliberal to Fukuyama, “it must be universal, that ideology. Yet all simple explanations is, grant recognition to all citizens because are characterized by their great they are human beings, and not because persuasive power. As for representatives they are members of some particular of neoliberalism, they were convinced national, ethnic, or racial group. that they could solve all social problems And it must be homogeneous insofar provided that free market mechanisms as it creates a classless society based

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Interestingly, as evidenced by the example of Fukyuama, Western utopians have Eliminating the dialectic been pursuing the same goal now for many centuries. One may notice that of a slave and a master neoliberal thought is tightly connected with Marxist philosophy. The German would be the same as sociologist also believed that mankind was only a step away from a society ousting both power and where all differences between particular members would be abolished due to an violence from our social internationalist culture taking control over the world. Such a society would life. And such a society provide individualists with freedom would comprehend resulting from the lack of social hierarchy. False awareness absolute equality Neoliberals are not aware that the fight against nationalism – which currently as it would be deprived takes the form of a clash with nation states – keeps destroying the foundations of any hierarchy. of Western societies. The liquidation of nation state institutions on the abolition of the distinction is not equivalent to the destruction between masters and slaves”. of the present welfare state. Implementing the desired universal homogenous society However, such neoliberal Arcadia would result in its members no longer constitutes a classic example of being bound to having to maintain any utopia since it is impossible to build social ties. In particular, this would a community based on the idea of result in annihilating any instances humanity. No culture – at least not of generational solidarity. Working one that would be able to homogenize generations would have absolutely no – could be created in that respect. intention to pay for pensioners’ social Such thesis seems clear provided that services. But can anyone imagine our we understand that there is neither lives without universal health care, a language that would constitute one social insurance system or pensions? common culture of the aforementioned Today, Europe’s nation state is bound to humanity nor would it be elaborated provide its citizens with social security. upon in any imaginable future. If Without such institutions, we are all Fukuyama’s predictions were to be taken doomed to chaos and unimaginable seriously, such a universal state would social catastrophe. have to encompass the entire territory of our globe while humanity would become Events of recent years seem to corroborate one monoculture. The fact of eliminating the validity of Gellner’s reflections – we the dialectic of a slave and a master will still have to wait for a new type of would be the same as ousting both social organization that could replace the power and violence from our social life. homogeneous nation state. This is best And such a society would comprehend evidenced by the failure of a homogenous absolute equality as it would be deprived European state, which is how Gellner of any hierarchy. would probably describe all instances

86 The Warsaw Institute Review Why Destroy the Nation State? of power centralisation and federalization oligarchy consists of the same people that of the European Union, which failed had called for a new society to be created after having been confronted with some 30 years ago. Yet Adam Michnik, reality – there is no homogenous culture the aforementioned intellectual, passes that connects all those who inhabit the for an emblematic figure of the Western territories between the Atlantic Coast European oligarchy as he seeks to defend and the Bug River. its status quo at all costs.

What are neoliberals fighting for today? Nonetheless, any action triggers an First and foremost, they seek to keep appropriate reaction. The neoliberal all hitherto influences while their absolutization of freedom gave the birth clichés of freedom and equality are only to political movements whose aim was to empty ideological slogans used in their fight for greater social equality. Democracy constant struggle for political survival. can only work effectively if both its basic In the course of the last generation, principles of freedom and equality are representatives of neoliberalism have mutually exclusive while equality may become an oligarchy capable of governing only be implemented in the nation state. Western societies. Neoliberals have Neoliberals oppose this concept while focused on implementing the idea of their opponents – hereinafter referred to as freedom, understood by them as a lack neostatists – appear attracted by such idea. of restrictions. Rather, this was more about lifting limitations of all kinds; not Who will come in first in this political only economic, but also those imposed clash? As evidenced by Donald Trump’s by family, the state and culture (nation). triumph in the U.S. presidential election, Therefore, most neoliberals consider it seems that the neostatists are most the nation state as their main opponent; likely to win with a pyrrhic victory. an institution that shapes any social Western society is currently tormented existence, and by also introducing some by a problem of childlessness caused restrictions. Such an approach is fiercely mainly by the long-term impact that combatted by all those who oppose any industrial homogenization keeps exerting utopian attitudes. In order to defend all on families. A woman, whose position their possessions, they do not hesitate on the labour market corresponds to the to attack the democratic decisions role of a man, is now less likely to give of societies that seek to deprive the birth to children than in previous times. neoliberal oligarchs of their influence. Such a demographic catastrophe refers And if democracy manages to overcome to the situation in which the labour force oligarchy in one of the states, such will be no longer able to provide financial a situation is immediately referred support to pensioners. And this will bring to as “the triumph of populism”. about disturbances to Western Europe’s prosperous society, leading to the collapse Since the time of Plato, we have been aware of nation state institutions. The socio- that all absolutization of freedom in social -economic system, based on continuous life ultimately leads to the oligarchization progress and increasing prosperity, will of democracy and the emergence of social eventually cease to exist. Thus, it is very inequalities. Today’s Western societies likely that industrialization will eventually have a strong sense of the ever-growing devour its own child – a nation state. wealth gap that exists as well as the power of the few privileged individuals over Krzysztof Rak the rest. Interestingly enough, today’s September 24, 2018

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Key Instruments for Financing I n novations in Poland as Part of the “Entrepreneurial State” Policy Adam Stolarz Over many centuries1, both innovations and inventions have constituted an inherent part of the human creative process. Since the beginning of the 20th century, they have become an essential carrier of economic value, almost as important as traditional resources, such as land, labour and capital, all of them having been mentioned in Adam Smith’s classical economics theory.

1 Vide: cf. http://www.mariangorynia.pl/prasa/ekonomista/Ekonomista_2013_nr_4.pdf (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

88 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland... © Jacek Bednarczyk (PAP) Cracow, June 14, 2018. Deputy Head of the National Center for Research and Development, Izabela Żmudka (C), President of the Management Board of Poczta Polska SA, Przemysław Sypniewski (L), and member of the PP SA Management Board Paweł Skoworko (R) sign a letter of intent on cooperation between NCBR and Poczta Polska for developing electromobility in Poland within the framework of the Impact ’18 Congress in Cracow.

nnovation economics focus mostly societies, subsidizing conferences, on such concepts as knowledge, financing research and development innovation, technology, and studies;

1 entrepreneurship. These factors • backing business environment Ihave stimulated values responsible for the institutions, including clusters, successful growth of many of the world’s incubators, and technology parks; countries while boosting innovations2 • initiating research consortia constitutes one of the core determinants and science parks; of a state’s prosperous development • adapting a higher education policy, which basically consists system by promoting all research of the following components: domains being of particular importance to the state’s main • purchasing innovative products, industries; both by the state and by its subordinate • stimulating cooperation between entities, financing their further public research institutions and development or applying new solutions companies; in public sector companies; • supporting technical and business • research grants and scholarships, consulting for technology providing support for scientific companies; • disseminating the results of R&D works and information on innovative 2 Knosala R., (ed.), Inżynieria produkcji. Kompendium wiedzy [Production engineering. Knowledge solutions via mass media and publicly compendium] PWE 2017, p. 324. accessible databases.

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Innovation policy in Poland due to the following correlation: a At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the country’s level of innovation will be Organisation for Economic Co-operation higher provided that its value is closer and Development (OECD) published to 1. According to the Innovation Union guidelines concerning innovative Scoreboard 2015 report4, Poland, which activity, which currently constitutes an has achieved a synthetic innovation rate internationally-accepted methodological of 0.313, could be ranked among countries standard. These assumptions have also with moderate innovativeness, referred to been included in the OSLO MANUAL, as moderate innovators, being at the same a publication containing both definitions time ahead of Romania (0.204), Bulgaria and methodological recommendations (0.229), Latvia (0.272) and Lithuania concerning the following issues: (0.283). Still, Poland has managed to remain in the • expenditure on innovative activity group of moderate innovators, taking fifth and the types thereof, to last place, while the leading position was • effects of innovation and ways maintained by Sweden. The list of Europe’s of measuring their impact, fastest-growing innovators includes such • sources of information for innovation countries as Malta, Latvia, Bulgaria, ideas, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Poland. • objectives of innovative activity, Globally speaking, EU results still seem • obstacles that hinder or prevent to give way to the achievements of the innovation. United States, Japan and South Korea. The total innovation indicator for Poland The percentage of entities that implement amounts to 56.4% of the average indicator process or product innovations is for EU countries; such state of affairs has commonly used when assessing the level of allowed the state to maintain its position modernization in enterprises. According among other moderate innovators. Total to Eurostat data in 2006–2008, Poland indicators for EU countries in 2006–2014 dropped in out one of the bottom positions confirm a clear upward trend while Poland among other European Union countries. underlined its quite stable position with Germany was ranked 1st while Lithuania a slight increasing tendency. was placed as the last country on the3 Unfortunately, according to the European list. In Europe, the innovation potential Innovation Scoreboard 2017 report5, of economies is traditionally measured Poland was ranked 25th out of 28 EU by the Summary Innovation Index (SII), member states, followed only by Croatia, which is published within the framework Bulgaria, and Romania. Even this decline of the Innovation Union Scoreboard. The did not prevent the country from being total index is calculated as the weighted part of the group of so-called moderate arithmetic mean of 29 partial indicators innovators. According to data from the for EU countries, Turkey, Iceland, Norway, Global Innovation Index 2017 ranking6 Switzerland, USA, and Japan. The single (GII 2017), which analyzes 127 world indicator consists of several partial ones economies, Poland was ranked 38th; that cover both innovation expenditures 4 Vide: cf. https://badania.parp.gov.pl/polska-w- as well as results obtained in this respect. innovation-union-scoreboard-2015 This index assumes a value from 0 to 1, (accessed on: July 30, 2018). 5 Vide: cf.: https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/ 3 Janowska A.A., Malik R., Wosiek R., Domańska A., files/2017/06/European_Innovation_ Innowacyjność i konkurencyjność międzynarodowa Scoreboard_2017.pdf (accessed: July 30, 2018). [Innovation and international competitiveness], 6 Vide: cf.: https://www.kpk.gov.pl/?p=37250 SGH 2017, p. 58. (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

90 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland... simultaneously, it was a global leader in terms of growth in dynamics of R&D expenditures by enterprises in 2008–2015, Since the beginning of which resulted in an overall increase of 212 %. As for growth in the state’s 2016, the concept of domestic spending, Poland was put in third position, behind Slovakia and China economic patriotism (with an increase of 107%). Moreover, the report states that during the economic has become the core recession in 2008–2009, both research and development expenditures seemed to vary exponent of Poland’s significantly in individual countries. For example, China, India, Mexico, Russia, economic policy, defined and Poland did not reduce their spending during the crisis; interestingly, they even by Professor Eryk Łon intensified it once the recession was over. A similar tendency could be observed in as the concern for the enterprises’ R&D expenditures; during the recession, there was a decrease in both common good and the domestic and business spending on R&D. Nonetheless, systematic growth was noted further development of compared to the situation before the crisis. According to the authors of the report, such was the case of the economies that the property of Polish traditionally spend much of their funds on research and development, including the citizens and a systematic United States, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands as well Chile and Slovakia. increase in their

In both rankings, Poland stayed ahead of incomes. the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and as special emphasis on the venture capital Slovakia while Croatia and Romania are formula – which seeks to use public funds ranked even lower. In addition, Poland and resources – it is possible to take does not submit many international advantage of foreign capital as a significant patent applications that can indicate shareholder of the emerging funds. the efficiency of using funds allocated for innovation. Fortunately, Poland Responsible Development is perceived as one of world’s leaders Strategy in terms of growth dynamics, which Since the beginning of 2016, the concept looks favourably on the country’s of economic patriotism has become the future prospects. Nonetheless, the state core exponent of Poland’s economic authorities should make their best efforts policy, defined by Professor Eryk Łon as to ensure that all of the above-mentioned the concern for the common good7 and will be used genuinely to support the idea the further development of the property of setting up the innovative economy, the of Polish citizens and a systematic effective spending on which is one increase in their incomes. Such steps of the pillars of the country’s Responsible Development Strategy. Thanks to the wide 7 Łon E., Patriotyzm gospodarczy [Economic scope of the activities planned, as well patriotism], Zysk i S-ka 2018, p. 127.

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can be implemented by the Responsible the final version of the RDS was approved Development Strategy (RDS), also only a year later with main task that were referred to as the “Morawiecki Plan”; this written out up to 2020 (with prospects roadmapfor Poland’s development was set until 2030)8. up in 2016 under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, The RDS aims to boost Poland’s own who served as Minister of Economic potential for responsible development Development and Chairman of the of the country and to improve the quality Economic Committee of the Council of of life of its inhabitants. All corrective Ministers in the Cabinet of Beata Szydło. measures shall focus on three specific The draft was adopted by the Council of objectives as well as being based Ministers on February 16, 2016 whereas on the9 following pillars: FiveFive traps traps for for Poland’s Poland’s FiveeconomicFiveeconomicFFivei vtraps etraps t trapsra p for developmentfors development forf oPoland’s rPoland’s Poland’s Poland’s economiceconomicececonomiconom developmenti cdevelopment developmentdevelopme n t

M M LL (half(half of Poland’s of Poland’s working working populationM population earn earn less than less than net PLN net PLN 2.500 2.500 (the (themajority majority ofL Poland’s of Poland’s domestic domestic capital capital is transferred is transferred abroad) abroad) net whilenet while their their salaries salaries are third are third times times lower lower compared compared to those to those in in (halfM of Poland’s working population earn less than net PLN 2.500 (the majorityL of Poland’s domestic capital is transferred abroad) highlyhighly developed developed countries) countries) (half of Poland’s(half neto fworking PwhileolaM n theird’s population w salariesorkin g are pop earnthirdula tlesstimesio n thane lowerarn net le comparedss PLN than 2.500 P toLN those 2.500 in (the majority(the ofm aPoland’sjoLrity o fdomestic P olan d’s dcapitalomest isic transferredcapital i s tr anabroad)sferred abroad) net (halfwhile of ntheiret Poland’s w hsalariesile t hworkingeir are sa thirdlar populationieshighly timesare tdevelopedhi lowerrd earn tim compared es lesscountries) lo wthaner c nettoom those pPLNared in2.500 to th ose in (the majority of Poland’s domestic capital is transferred abroad) net while their salarieshighly developed arehi thirdghly d times countries)evelo plowered co compareduntries) to those in highly developed countries)

A A (poor(poor(poor innovation, innovation,innovation, no no global no global global brands) brands) brands) A (poorA innovation,(poor in n noov globalation, nbrands)o g lobal brands) (poor innovation, no global brands)

D T (low birth rate, increase in the number of people (low tax collection, no coordination of activities of the public D D at the post-working age) TT administration) (low(low birth birth rate, rate,increase increase in the in number the number of people of people (low(low tax collection, tax collection, no coordination no coordination of activities of activities of the of public the public D at theat post-working the post-working age) age) T administration)administration) (low birth(l rate,owD b increaseirth rate ,in in thecre anumberse in the of n upeople mber of people (low tax collection,(lowT tax c onoll e coordinationctio n, no co or ofdi nactivitiesation of ofac ttheivit publicies of t he public (low birthat rate,the post-working increaseat the pino sthet- age)w numberorking a ofge) people (low tax collection,administration) no coordinationadminis oftra activitiestion) of the public at the post-working age) administration)

8 Council of Minister Resolution of 14 February 2017 on adopting the Strategy for Responsible 9 Vide: http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/ Development by the year 2020 (with the prospects download.xsp/WMP20170000260/O/ to 2030) (“Polish Monitor” 2017, Item p. 260). M20170260.pdf (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

92 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland...

Specific Objective (1) – Sustainable savings culture in Poland, mainly due economic growth based on knowledge, to the fact that the level of domestic information and organizational savings largely determines investment excellence possibilities of the state economy.

1. Reindustrialization processes 5. Foreign expansion of Polish companies carried out on the basis of Polish encompasses the efficiency of employed resources and aiming to strengthen capital, both thanks to economies of the foundations of the Polish economy. scale as well as due to their stronger Industry constitutes the very core of presence in already existing markets all commercial spending in research and entering emerging and fast- and development, and for companies -growing ones of Asia and Africa. Such belonging to the tertiary sector. a step will help to reduce the current account deficit in the country’s overall 2. The development of innovative balance of payments. Apart from companies, understood mostly in exports – with special regard to high- terms of boosting the level of products’ tech goods – foreign expansion should technological advancement, stimulating primarily consist of direct investments new organizational and technological of Polish enterprises. solutions on the basis of enterprises’ own resources as well as promoting pro-innovation attitudes thanks to the Specific Objective (2) – Socially- optimal use of human capital. sensitive and geographically-balanced development 3. Small and medium-sized enterprises – increasing Polish companies’ 1. Geographically-balanced development potential in order to make them is defined as an evolution of all more competitive, due to all actions territories by reinforcing their performed in their legal environment endogenous potential, boosting as well as implemented innovations, development factors, as well as creating new jobs and facilitating removing all existing barriers. In greater access to financing instruments addition, such advancement processes for enterprise development. shall encompass regions that are currently struggling with restructuring 4. Capital for development translates and adaptation challenges (including into mobilizing financial resources, Silesia and the macroregion of Eastern including these of the private sector, Poland), rural areas (along with their which should eventually result in local urban centres), and medium-sized higher levels of investment. In order to cities being gradually deprived of their strengthen Polish companies, it is vital essential economic functions. to expand the financial instruments offered by state development 2. Social cohesion needs to become a institutions. Moreover, it is desirable determinant of the economy’s dynamic to boost the efficiency of using public progress, therefore such development funds, with particular regard to shall be first and foremost conducive European subventions as well as capital to social inclusion, which will gathered by the Polish diaspora. Capital subsequently translate into an economy for development may also provide characterised by a high level of quality favourable conditions for establishing a employment and entrepreneurship.

4/2018 93 Economy Corrective measures (according to the Action Plan for Responsible Development of Poland)

R D (state partnership for the strategic branches of Poland’s economy, (establishing new „Business Constitution“, reviewing Poland’s clusters and industrial valleys, seeking attractive research institutions, „Start in Poland“ program, creating friendly foreign investments) legal environment for enterpreneurs)

C (mostly by growing savings, acquiring European funds, Polish Development Fund, funds from Juncker’s plan, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investnment Bank as well as from Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)

F S (setting up Export Support Division at the Polish Development (e ective regional policy, pact for rural areas, Fund, reviewing Poland’s business diplomacy, building a strong promoting educational programs) Polish brand)

On the one hand, such attitude may mostly by reducing regulatory burdens mean the need to adapt the economy in order to provide more favourable to current demographic trends, in conditions for carrying out business particular by ensuring the availability activities in Poland as well as satisfying of services provided in response to the basic needs of particular groups these challenges while, on the other, of citizens. Therefore, any changes in it may necessitate further development this respect shall be primarily marked to be supported as well as appropriate by such factors as deregulation, use of the potential offered by particular improvement of the legal system – social strata on the labour market. including a stable and predictable legal environment as well as rationalised Specific Objective (3) – Effective state legislative processes, understood and institutions for growth and in terms of partnerships between social and economic inclusion the main institutional, corporate and social entities. 1. Law in the service of citizens and state economy is essentially understood in 2. Pro-development institutions and terms of improving the quality of law, strategic expansion management

94 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland...

are equivalent to the functioning conditioned by the need to guarantee of institutions that enable the setting sustainable macroeconomic stability, up of a country’s competitive also in the context of the state’s budget advantages as well its proper policy. The aforementioned steps shall be social entities. This area includes supplemented by further infrastructural comprehensive actions to increase projects and other regulatory and the efficiency of public institutions institutional actions, also in such key (consolidation, integration areas for economic advancement and of activities), changes in the improving quality of life, including social administrative structure and its and human capital (education, culture, functioning (de-bureaucracy), boosting health), transportation, energy acquisition efficiency of the judicial system, changes and distribution as well as providing viable in the public procurement system, environmental protections in accordance and emphasizing the importance with the idea of sustainable development. of dialogue. Entities financing innovations 3. E-state portal makes it possible to take in Poland advantage of the opportunities offered The process of creating an innovative by all digital technologies available. product is preceded by research and Electronic programs used both for development, during which a lone inventor servicing citizens and entrepreneurs – or a team of innovators – processes an are within some state administration immaterialized concept of a product into agendas and will enable the its real form, thus resulting in a prototype. improvement of the functioning At this stage, financial outlays attain of the latter in the long-term, reduce a considerable level that keeps growing until service costs and make companies the product is finally launched onto the function in a more efficient way. market. In order to perform the so-called market test, the very first merchandises are 4. Public finances – in order to implement usually placed on the market in a relatively state policy as providing favourable small quantity. In the case of successful conditions for potential growth in feedback, a company begins preparations the incomes of Polish citizens – while to start serial production. Putting the increasing cohesion in social, economic product onto the market will allow the and territorial aspects – it is crucial enterprise to slow down the pace of to undertake appropriate stabilizing preparations for mass production after actions as well as to boost the efficiency the risk, understood as negative feedback of public finance management. on the product and its unsuccessful acceptance on the market, is eventually 5. Effective use of EU funds is first and eliminated at an appropriate stage. foremost perceived in terms of reorienting the current way of spending European Nonetheless, private business entities were subventions while taking into account the oftentimes unable to bear all unpredictable scope, coordination and forms of support risks, which would make it challenging useful to co-financing projects regarded for them to incur any related expenses as as of key importance for achieving the a similar situation necessitated the state’s defined development goals. active involvement. Such engagement in the economy is usually tantamount to refuting All activities regarded as priority the liberal conception of the country as a objectives shall be at the same time “night watchman”.

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Warsaw, December 28, 2016. Head of the NCBR, Maciej Chorowski (L), © Paweł Supernak (PAP) and Vice-President of PFR Ventures Tomasz Gigol (R) sign a contract on launching the Investment Fund within the framework of the BRIdge VC program. In the background: Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development Mateusz Morawiecki (L) and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Science Jarosław Gowin (R).

The conviction, according to which no one while the state is bound to play a passive should interfere in the economic sphere role during the entire process. Mazzucato in order to make it flourish, does not opposes such a false image of the state’s correspond to current reality; in addition, vision as an active participant, or even such attitude may even constitute a real a director of pro-development policy, threat to the interests of national economies without which the innovativeness of the that face such challenges as regionalization economy would be significantly reduced. and globalization. Therefore, the state shall In light of this approach, the state shall first and foremost guarantee its active and perform the duties of a dynamic – and appropriate presence in the economy, sometimes even a leading – partner and to provide for the possibility of the in the private sphere. inflow of foreign investment capital instead of just speculative capital. Such Therefore, the only state that can is the main theme noted by the economist successfully face modern challenges is Mariana Mazzucato in her book entitled the entrepreneurial one as it is essentially The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public focused on setting multiple directions for vs. private sector myths, which has been both development and regulating relations recently translated into Polish10. According between the public and the private sectors. to its author, the title myth consists of Nonetheless, a country’s participation in a conviction that innovative development all benefits achieved by the private sector is primarily powered by the private sector is a serious problem that needs to be tackled. If the state engages in some high- 10 Mazzucato M., The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector myths, -risk projects, its share of profits would Heterodox 2016. be perceived as appropriate, enabling

96 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland... to at least partly neutralize the costs of a possible failure. At the same time, it would be easier to convince taxpayers to The Center’s activities are carry out projects that might potentially be related to high uncertainty. In her aimed at strengthening publication, Mazzucato argues that the state’s role as an active inspirer, and therefore the the cooperation between main strategist of innovative development, will foster the proper conditions for the various actors of the entrepreneurial state model being widely accepted by members of society. The future Polish business sector, of economic development will, therefore, depend on whether such a vision of the state which will result in is accepted and further implemented in its greater involvement of practical dimension. Such perspective was outlined in the Responsible Development entrepreneurs (including Strategy. foreign ones operating The main legal act determining the rules for financing innovative activities in in the territory of the Poland is the Act of April 30, 2010 on the Principles of Financing Science. According Republic of Poland) to Article 3 of the Act, science financing is defined as providing support for the in financing research implementation of the scientific, technical and innovative policy of the state, with and more effective particular regard to scientific research, development works and other tasks being commercialization of special importance for civilization’s progress as well as the country’s of their results. economic and cultural advancement. increasing innovations, and thus Poland’s The aforementioned objectives are more economy competitiveness. The Center’s precisely implemented by two executive activities are aimed at strengthening the agencies: the National Science Center cooperation between various actors of the and the National Center for Research Polish business sector, which will result and Development, the latter being essential in greater involvement of entrepreneurs to put innovative policy into effect. (including foreign ones operating in the territory of the Republic of Poland) in Key entities to finance financing research and more effective innovations in Poland commercialization of their results. While The main task of the National Center pursuing these goals, NCBR makes sure for Research and Development11 (pol. that any public funds spent on research Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, and development works shall result in the NCBR) is to foster modern solutions and greatest benefits to the Polish economy. technologies that may be conducive to Thanks to several dozen programs 11 Vide: cf. http://www.miir.gov.pl/ (accessed on: July currently being implemented by 30, 2018). the institution, the Center is able to

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The program’s objective is to increase the innovation and competitiveness of the A particular focus shall Polish gas sector. The program’s budget totals 400 million PLN. Financial grants remain on supporting for research and development works may be applied by consortia made up young academicians. of enterprises or scientific units or by the latter only. Financial support may provide financial support for a project be guaranteed to the best proposals (the NCBR’s annual budget amounts that encompass innovative projects to to about 5 billion PLN12) at all levels be implemented in such domains as of technological readiness, starting exploration, hydrocarbons extraction and from initial industrial research to the production of gaseous fuels, exploration of development of an innovative product, coal-bed methane, providing materials for service or technology. Such an offer is gas network construction and operation, additionally complemented by other gas network as well as use, trade and new programs aiming to support the financing applications of both LNG and CNG. of international protection of industrial The Agency’s activity embraces only property or foreign expansion of young the below-mentioned NCBR VC program. innovative entrepreneurs. In addition, the center pays great attention to ensuring The National Science Center14 (pol. favourable conditions for the further Narodowe Centrum Nauki, NCN) provides development of scientific staff. A particular for subsidising basic research carried out focus shall remain on supporting young in the form of research projects, doctoral academicians. Moreover, governmental scholarships and internships (offered agencies such as the Ministry of National after obtaining a PhD degree), research Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and projects for experienced scientists that Administration as well as the Internal are essential for implementing innovative Security Agency conduct joint activities solutions for scientific development, related to research on the state’s defence as well as other studies that do not fit and security. Both programs and projects into the scope of interest of the National aim to increase the potential of Poland’s Center for Research and Development. scientific and industrial entities as well The NCN budget reaches approximately as to strive for the state’s technological 1 billion PLN15. independence, mostly by setting up Polish know-how in such domains as Polish Agency for Enterprise technology, security and defence. Business Development16 (pol. Polska Agencja partner projects are best evidenced by Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości, PARP) is the INGA (Innovative Gas Industry) involved in the implementation of both venture, constituting the13 result of domestic and international projects cooperation initiated by GAZ-SYSTEM, financed by structural funds, the state PGNiG and NCBR in December 2016. budget and multi-annual programs of

14 12 Vide: cf. https://www.pb.pl/gowin-55-mld-zlotych- Vide: cf. https://ncn.gov.pl/o-ncn/zadania-ncn z-ncbr-na-innowacje-w-2017-r-852618 (accessed on: (accessed on: July 30, 2018). July 30, 2018). 15 Vide: cf. https://ncn.gov.pl/aktualnosci/2015-10- 13 Vide: cf. http://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/ 13-plan-budzetu-ncn-2016 (accessed on: July 30, id/400-mln-zl-na-innowacje-w-gazownictwie/newsGr 2018). oupId/10184?changeYear=2017¤tPage=2 16 Vide: cf. http://poig.parp.gov.pl/ (accessed on: July 30, 2018). (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

98 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland... the European Commission. PARP is actively involved in both creating and implementing state policy in the field of entrepreneurship, innovation and staff adaptability in order to transform the agenda into a key institution accountable for establishing an entrepreneur-friendly environment. Pursuant to the “Think Small First” principle, the Agency’s activities are carried out with particular regard to the needs of the SME sector. In 2007–2013, the Agency disposed of a total budget in the amount of over 7 billion EUR, which could be spent on implementing operational programs17. Moreover, PARP carries out 13 activities within the Innovative Economy Operational Program under the following priority axes:

• Priority axis 1: Research and development of modern technologies; • Priority axis 3: Capital for innovation; • Priority axis 4: Investment in innovative ventures; • Priority axis 5: Diffusion of innovations; • Priority axis 6: Polish economy on the global market; • Priority axis 8: Information Supernak© Paweł (PAP) society – increasing the economy’s Warsaw, December 28, 2016. Head of the National Center for Research and Development Maciej innovativeness. Chorowski. The National Center for Research and Development and PFR Ventures have signed The state’s support system is provided a contract on launching the Investment Fund within the framework of the BRIdge VC program. within the framework of the ScaleUP pilot18 program implemented as part of the StartInPoland governmental The Foundation for Polish Science (pol. venture. As part of this activity, PARP Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej, FNP) seeks to combine the potential of creative is an independent, self-financing start-ups with infrastructure, resources, Polish non-profit organization with its and knowledge and experience offered headquarters in Warsaw. Established in and gathered by large corporations. February 1991, its mission is to support The undertaking targets mostly young Polish science. Its founding capital in the companies that may receive up amount of 95 million PLN was provided to 60 million PLN to develop mainly from subsidies of the Central their ideas and further activities. Fund for the Development of Science and Technology, due to the fact that the 17 Vide: cf.: http://www.parp.gov.pl/perspektywa- finansowa-2007-2013 (accessed on: July 30, 2018). institution was being liquidated at that 18 Vide: cf.: https://www.parp.gov.pl/parp-uruchamia- time. FNP constitutes Poland’s largest non- konkurs-scale-up (accessed on: July 30, 2018). -governmental source of science financing.

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in innovative entities are widely discussed The Foundation by representatives of the SME sector, both new and traditional industries, politicians for Polish Science and EU institutions. The idea of venture capital is widely recognizable in the (pol. Fundacja na rzecz financial world whereas corporate venture capital constitutes nothing more than an Nauki Polskiej, FNP) integral corporate structure within capital is an independent, groups that operates in various industries, being also part of the open innovation self-financing Polish system that aims to invest in small innovative enterprises for non-profit organization two main purposes: with its headquarters • supporting the parent company strategy, with the investment objective in Warsaw. to integrate a solution within the corporation, entering a new market The EU Framework Programs19 for and introducing a new product), or Research and Technological Development is the EU’s maint instrument for funding • purely financial reasons (maximizing research studies and work in Europe. the company’s return on investment). They constitute the third largest budget line of EU expenditure, preceded only Poland’s current CVC structures by the Common Agricultural Policy and accompany the implementation processes Structural Funds. The seven-year Horizon of the Responsible Development Strategy 2020 Framework Program, scheduled conducted within the framework of for 2014–2020, is currently being development capital. Perceived in terms implemented, which makes it the EU’s of a catalyst for creating joint state and largest project in the domain of research private capital units, the NCBR CVC and innovation. Its budget has a total support program will exert a positive of 80 billion EUR, 2.8 billion of which influence on the development of the will be ultimately spent on the market. Nonetheless, it is difficult to above-mentioned spheres20. provide any exact structural framework of the CVC within the open innovation Building venture capital for system; over the past few years, it was innovative projects possible to develop and successfully Poland’s new innovation policy should implement some of their functioning be further supported by venture capital models. First and foremost, in spite of its funds and corporate venture capital funds name, corporate venture capital does not (their company equivalents) while news resemble a typical venture capital fund; on investments in start-ups or accelerators CVCs are created not by investors but may eventually prevail over press releases by corporations for a simple reason – as about changes in Poland’s tax. Investments corporate venture capital aims not only to subsidise small “targets” at their early 19 Szatkowski K., Zarządzanie innowacjami stage of development but also enterprises i transferem technologii [Innovation and Technology Transfer Management], PWN 2016, p. 174. in much more advanced phases of growth. 20 Vide: cf: https://www.nauka.gov.pl/horyzont-2020/ Poland has become an area of intense (accessed on: July 30, 2018). development of venture capital entities

100 The Warsaw Institute Review Key Instruments for Financing Innovations in Poland... specializing in financing innovation. 6 and 9 CVC funds, whose capitalization Established in 2016 by the Polish would vary between 60 and 100 government as part of the RDS, the Polish million PLN, in different sectors of the Development Fund (PFR) offered, via R&D commercialization market. The its subsidiary (PFR Ventures), repayable investment goals of CVC funds are to be funding to innovative companies achieved within 13 years, which could belonging to the SME sector, regardless of be possible thanks to their cooperation their advancement stage (pre-seed, growth with commercial investors, such as large or expansion). As part of the instruments, enterprises (corporations), managed five programs were launched (PFR by independent management entities. Starter FIZ, PFR Biznest FIZ, PFR Open Innovations FIZ, PFR KOFFI FIZ and 2. The EFC Magenta fund (pol. Fundusz PFR NCBR FIZ), which were to transfer EEC Magenta). The corporate venture over 2 billion PLN for the development of capital (CVC), set up jointly by Poland’s small and medium-sized enterprises in energy holding company TAURON, the form of repayable financing provided the Polish Development Fund and by appropriate intermediary institutions21. the National Center for Research and The following projects of funds Development, constitutes the first such and vehicles for financing innovation entity on the Polish market. TAURON may be distinguished: will invest in two funds created under the PFR Starter: FIZ and BRIdge VC 1. NCBR CVC. By pursuing the policy of / PFR NCBR CVC programs. Such combining public funds with resources support will enable multi-stage support and experience provided by private for innovative companies. investors, the NCBR made a decision It could be possible due to involvement to launch the world’s first NCBR CVC in acceleration programs, investing Fund-of-Funds. The total allocation in enterprises at their initial stage or of the NCBR funds for the NCBR ensuring subsequent funding CVC Fund under the Smart Growth under the NCBR CVC. Operational Programme amounts to 100 million EUR (440 million PLN) 3. PGE Ventures. Launched in 2016, and constitutes 50% of the funds for the the strategy of Poland’s largest energy project capitalization (880 million PLN). group envisages some innovative The remaining funds will be secured activities to be carried out. The plan by private corporate investors. NCBR will have a significant impact on the CVC is managed by a professional funds development of start-ups. PGE Ventures fund manager, namely PFR Ventures has announced the launch of external consortium supported by PFR TFI. The venture capital funds as part of the fund is supervised by a team that can Polish Development Fund programs boast having unique experience on both (PFR) and the National Center for Polish and international markets in the Research and Development (NCBR). As field of creating VC funds. The NCBR Tauron seeks to set up Poland’s start-up CVC project intends to create between ecosystem, PGE Ventures also aims to invest in the following programs: PFR

21 So far, PFR Ventures have signed the first seven Starter FIZ, BRIdge Alfa, BRIdge VC. investment agreements. PFR Starter FIZ: Xevin PGE Ventures submitted applications VC; KnowledgeHub; Tar Heel Capital Pathfinder; for these programs in order to create Ventures For Earth; PFR Biznest FIZ: SILBA. Within the framework of PFR Open Innovations FIZ: external funds, in which PGE Ventures Montis Capital, APER Ventures. will be supposed to act as the main

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investor, thus having a fundamental best effort to launch a venture capital impact on the funds investment strategy. fund this year and to invest in “new Innovation constitutes one of the pillars and promising companies”. It is said of the PGE Group’s business strategy. that Poczta Polska aims to take over a By 2020, the company will have allocated Zapakuj.to box editor and Pakomatic a total of 400 million PLN to develop intelligent pack stations. In the research and innovation, half of which foreseeable future, the state agencies comes from private funds while the may also be interested in Hyperloop remaining resources are provided within technology, which is currently being the framework of external financing. developed by the HyperPoland company In addition, Grupa Lotos intends to and which would potentially be invest 50 million PLN per year using deployed to transport parcels. All these its own funds in order to develop new projects participated in the first edition technologies, products and business of the Gamma Rebels acceleration lines. While supporting the innovative program powered by Poczta Polska, project, PGE sought to undertake any which was co-organized by the postal comprehensive steps, which seems operator while the second edition has to explain why capital investments only recently come to an end. in start-ups are carried out by PGE Ventures, separated as a specialised Conclusion CVC fund, while incubation and project Such steps towards innovation acceleration processes at their initial development as well as establishing stage shall be first and foremost treated and adopting effective marketing by the PGE Nowa Energia company. strategies are crucial to implement the Such distribution will allow for quick “Morawiecki Plan”. They have an impact and efficient operation as well as on eliminating the middle income trap optimization of the entire process. by promoting projects of high intellectual capital at the expense of low-processed 4. The Lotos Group (pol. Grupa Lotos): production and low-margin business Poland’s oil company Grupa Lotos is services for international corporations. bound to create a CVC fund22, with They directly reduce the average product an estimated value between 40 and 50 trap, mainly by focusing on developing million EUR. The work on establishing Polish technical solutions and supporting the CVC funds is still at a relatively early their expansion on foreign markets (one stage as the corporation is currently of the pillars defined in the strategy). The assembling its management team. Thus, emerging venture capital and corporate one can assume that Grupa Lotos will venture capital market, supported by invest in start-ups that may be classified state institutions and large corporations, as part of the fuel industry. constitute an opportunity to set up development capital. It is vital that – apart 5. Poczta Polska23 (Polish Post) This from local, including public, sources – institution is currently making its foreign entities also express their interest in projects of high growth potential.

22 Vide: cf.: https://mamstartup.pl/inwestycje/12854/ Such is the practical implementation grupa-lotos-uruchomi-w-tym-roku-fundusz-cvc- of the idea of the Entrepreneurial State zainwestuje-w-startupy-40-50-mln-euro (accessed as depicted by Mariana Mazzucato. on: July 30, 2018). 23 Vide: cf.: https://mamstartup.pl/spolka/12753/poczta- polska-bedzie-inwestowac-w-startupy-ma-utworzyc- Adam Stolarz fundusz-venture-capital (accessed on: July 30, 2018). July 31, 2018

102 The Warsaw Institute Review A post-war war. The years of 1944–1963 in Poland Karol Wołek Poland was the first country in Europe to experience World War Two, which began on September 1, 1939. Poland was also the first country to engage in armed combat with the joined forces of Nazi Germany and the USSR in their attempt the change the world order.

n their struggle to regain known partisan was killed by the occupying independence, Poles established a Soviet forces as late as 1963. The last hiding clandestine movement known as the partisan, however, is reported to have Polish Underground State. Polish stayed active until 1982. He stayed in battle Isoldiers were ceaseless in their efforts throughout the Nazi occupation and well to liberate the country not only during into the Soviet occupation. the course of WW II, but also well after the war ended. The year 1945 did not mean An outline of Poland’s geopolitical the end of the war in Poland. The struggle situation feels compellingly necessary for independence continued on Polish if one wants to understand the situation territory until the 1950s while the last of the Polish nation after 1945.

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Soviet and German Invasion of Poland in September 1939

P 3. A

K R L

B S K

1.09-2.10 V K H S 3. A 1-7.09 21.09 K G O K E P M S L 20-22.09 11. A O 20.09 1-7.09 G N D S T A G N 2. DGKZ 3. A . A G 4 8-10.09 8-10 IX 4. A A G N 1-3.09 W W B M T U S S R

8.09 10-29.09 W P P 9-18.09 9-12.09 M 25.09 Ł T WARSZAWA D P 1-7.09 1-7.09 Z B B G 7-11.09 17.09 K Ł 2-5.10 6.09 K 8 . A T S M R 19-25.09 L W K D 1.09 10 B . A M 12-13.09 W K 7.09 7.09 W Z Ł O S A G S R M 5. A T 14.09 K L

P 7.09 C T 12-20.09 20-22.09 7.09 Z P 18-19.09 6. A T T P 14. A S R B M B Ż S T C 12. A S S A O T S A T K P G A O T G A 17.09 K K P A F H C 12-13.09 T G -S K H C M B K B T P F T 7.09 S G K T G R 7.09 T P P H C R S P A

1939 – the beginning of World their targets in Poland from a radio station War Two located in Minsk, then in the Soviet Union. World War II began with a coordinated attack on Poland conducted by the Third In accordance with the secret protocol Reich and the USSR, led by Adolf Hitler known as the Hitler-Stalin Pact (also and Joseph Stalin respectively. As referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop of September 1, 1939, the very first day Pact), the new allies – Germany and the of World War Two, both totalitarian Soviet Union – were to jointly invade regimes held joint military action against Poland. Red Army troops were to march Poland. Starting from September 1, into Poland three days following the German bombers were guided onto Reich’s attack. Joseph Stalin, however,

104 The Warsaw Institute Review A post-war war. The years of 1944–1963 in Poland did not adhere to the protocol, with his troops advancing into Poland only 17 days after the Germans hit. The delay The secret protocol was caused by concerns over western propaganda which Stalin wanted appended to the alliance to only focus on Germany’s activity. agreement concluded For 17 days the German troops were between the Soviet facing Polish soldiers without expected support. This resulted in one third of Union and Germany its tank fleet being destroyed. A quick victory, as intended by Adolf Hitler, divided Poland into required a mighty ally. Without it, the invasion of Poland might have proven two occupation zones to be risky. The secret protocol appended to the alliance agreement concluded and, more broadly, it between the Soviet Union and Germany divided Poland into two occupation zones divided Eastern Europe and, more broadly, it divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres into German and Soviet of influence. Under the agreement, the spheres of influence. German troops, which had attacked Poland much earlier and, therefore, had seized more land, had to recede. Polish inevitable class struggle. Both are key territory was thus split in two halves. elements of Karl Marx’s ideology as well The Polish government was forced into as the ideology of the Soviet Union. exile, first in France, and following its surrender, further in the UK. World revolution means taking over the world by the communist state. According The Soviet Union – an outline to communist ideologues capitalist The Soviet Union was the world’s first states could not peacefully coexist with communist state. Its political elites were communist states. The Soviets’ goal was driven by communist ideology when it inducing a world war. After the capitalist came to both foreign and internal affairs as states would annihilate one another, the well as the establishment of economic and Soviets would take over the entire world. social policies. Understanding the Soviet This was why the Soviet Union had always Union, its nature and policies, would not had strategic attack war planning, but had be possible without comprehending what never prepared a plan for a defensive war. goals communist ideology had set for the world’s first communist state. The class struggle is a cornerstone The state emblem of the Soviet Union of Karl Marx’s philosophy. It requires embodies those goals. a restructuring of society in accordance with communism. When put in practice, It depicts a hammer and a sickle over this brought about genocide: the killing a globe. The hammer and the sickle are of 10 to 15% of a given society as well as symbols of communism, of communist annihilating its elites and those strata revolution, and of the USSR itself. The of society that were unwelcome in a reasons behind the state’s creation were communist state. Predominantly, this hit as follows: world revolution and the entire families and the most educated,

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halted by Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, thus saving millions of For the communist Poles from eastern parts of the former Polish state from being sent off. Suddenly, partisans the German the entire Polish territory was under troops and the Polish Nazi occupation. Following the Nazi attack on the Soviet Underground State Union, the communists, who suddenly found themselves behind the front, were were equal enemies. ordered to organize a partisan movement. Until 1941, it would have been impossible who, when alive, acted as guarantors of due to the close Hitler-Stalin alliance. culture, national and state traditions, The Soviet partisans and communist knowledge and of faith. For communists organizations manifested an openly hostile they stood in the way of communist rule attitude towards the Polish Underground and of harnessing entire societies State. Polish resistance organizations, under a totalitarian regime. which were in a continuous anti-Nazi struggle since 1939, had lured most of The Soviet Union and the Poland’s youth into their ranks. This independence of Poland meant that the communists recruited Poles were the first nation to have been chiefly from hoodlums and mobster subject to extermination in the Soviet gangs. They offered political protection, Union solely on grounds of nationality. but demanded full loyalty to communist Over the course of the Polish Operation, authorities. The communists allowed for conducted between 1937 and 1938, the continued criminal activity of these nearly 140,000 were persecuted, with groups, henceforth known as partisan 111,000 suffering immediate death. The units of the People’s Army and of the sole criterion of repression was Polish People’s Guard. nationality. It was the first nationally- -motivated act of genocide in a The Home Army, the Polish Underground communist state, as opposed to mass State’s biggest military organization, killings carried out on political, social regarded it as rather unfortunate to fight or classist grounds. against units answering to Joseph Stalin, since the Soviet Union was allied with the After the joint invasion of Poland, the UK, home to the Polish Government-in- two allies cooperated closely for nearly exile. It was the second biggest military two years. Both Germany and the organization within the Underground Soviet Union manifested equally hostile State, known as the National Armed attitudes towards the Poles. It included Forces that fiercely tackled communist mass killings, the annihilation of Polish banditry. Communist partisans were not elites and the extermination of Poles in very successful, but for the countless acts concentration camps, often after having of plundering, rape, and killings that they exploited them through forced labour. subjected civilians to. They were usually The Soviets methodically deported the poorly skilled and depraved individuals. Polish populace into forced exile in Predominantly, they were tasked with distant parts of the USSR, characterized collecting intelligence, especially with by a hostile climate – semideserts, taigas regard to those involved in the structures or tundras. The deportation process was of the Polish Underground State. The

106 The Warsaw Institute Review A post-war war. The years of 1944–1963 in Poland information gathered was subsequently passed to the central headquarters in the USSR by way of radio transmission, Polish partisan units and was used to identify and disband the Polish resistance movement. engaged in armed

Given their poor skills and munitions, combat with the the communist units rarely fought against the Germans. They chiefly Germans under focused on blowing up rail tracks in order to slow down German provisions Operation Tempest. sent to the eastern front. The Germans slaughtered civilians in retaliation. For It was aimed at liberating the communist partisans the German troops and the Polish Underground State cities and territories in were equal enemies. They were both seen as an obstacle in the way of bringing Poland before the onset worldwide revolution. For this reason, under the Nazi occupation, communist of the Red Army. partisan units often murdered Poles involved in the resistance movement or attacked Polish partisan groups. regular military forces, which makes it impossible to engage in partisan In 1944, the front-line was pushed back warfare. As the Soviet troops advanced into pre-war Poland. As the German into Poland, they arrested and disarmed troops retreated, the Red Army soldiers units of the Home Army, which revealed were advancing into Poland. They were themselves during Operation Tempest. joined by the NKVD units. As seen by Polish officers were murdered or deported Poles, it was the same Red Army that had eastwards to Soviet concentration camps. attacked Poland back in 1939 as Hitler’s Privates, however, were incorporated into ally. The Soviets by no means changed special units created especially for them their approach to Poles and their struggle within the Red Army. for independence. The NKVD units, following the advancement of the Soviet The NKVD used the intelligence that the soldiers, were tasked with methodical communist partisans had gathered to searches, arrests, investigations, murders target members of the Polish resistance and deportations of Poles involved movement. It was aimed at a total in the resistance movement. liquidation of those who had confronted the Germans in the struggle for Poland’s Anti-communist Insurrection independence. For the USSR, they were The following events ensued across the a major threat to the advancement of entire Polish territory. Polish partisan communist ideology and to the final units engaged in armed combat with conquest of Poland, because of their the Germans under Operation Tempest. great attachment to the Polish state and It was aimed at liberating cities and national values as well as to the idea of territories in Poland before the onset of freedom in general. Consequently, mass the Red Army. Some units disbanded terror ensued in the territory occupied by before the front-line advanced, thus the Soviets. Following the end of WWII, avoiding saturation of a given area with over two hundred concentration camps

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Map of Soviet concentration camps a er World War II

G G

Z B

S C L

P WARSAW T M N L G O B P A P G K K Ł Ł P Ż R Z W K Ś S G L L P

N S W L M

O J W

O S V

P B K-P V

K W

D W . L S Ś B K Ł G O B T G T B N S C B B P W B K -K G K Ś Ł P S S T K K Ś J B C K B S L J G I M K G N K R K W

C L C B -B

L C Ż

108 The Warsaw Institute Review A post-war war. The years of 1944–1963 in Poland for Polish civilians were put up in Poland. the war did not end in 1945. The Soviets also used existing camps, He continued his partisan struggle which had been in use under for 18 years on end. In the last years, the Nazi occupation. he was mostly in hiding, as he knew that if he was to be captured by the Soldiers of disbanded partisan units Soviets, he would be murdered. were chased down and murdered. In no time, the forests had filled yet Warrant officer Antoni Dołęga was the again with fugitives, evading capture last soldier of the Polish Underground and terror by the occupier. Partisans, who State who did not surrender. He stayed had previously fought with the Germans, in hiding while being continuously were forced to return to combat and chased down by the communists until fight against the Soviets in self-defence. 1982. A Polish soldier before the war, Many new partisan groups were formed. he fought in Poland’s defensive war Their total number was higher than that in 1939. Then he was involved in the under the Nazi occupation. This was the Polish conspiracy movement under response to the mass terror and killings the Nazi occupation. During the Soviet to which the Soviets resorted. occupation, he was a partisan unit leader. After he was left with a handful It is estimated that following the end of of soldiers, he made them go home while WWII over 200,000 people were involved he stayed in activity until his natural in partisan warfare. They fought for death in 1982. independence and against mass terror. It is commonly referred to as the Polish Partisan units and soldiers of the Polish anti-communist insurrection. The years Underground State would not have 1944–1947 saw the fiercest combat survived in combat against the Soviets, between pro-independence partisans if it had not been for the overwhelming and the Soviet occupier. On the Soviet support of the Polish populace. While side, the NKVD mechanized brigades Western societies went on to rebuild their were predominantly engaged in the homelands after the war, the UK saw the combat. They were special units, specially onset of Beatlemania, and Elvis Presley’s designated to fight partisan groups, career was in its infancy, gunshots were armed with fast-firing heavy machine still being heard in Poland. The struggle guns and AFVs. This gave them an for its independence was far from being overwhelming advantage over over. The Soviets had established their lightly-armed partisans. military bases. And through imposed terror they exerted total control over Organized combat continued on Polish Poland, its economy, politics and society. territory until the 1950s. The last Polish organized military units revealed Poland did not regain its independence themselves and ceased their activity in after World War Two. After the great 1954. The National Military Union was conflict, the Soviet Union, which had first among the largest military forces that had attacked Poland as Hitler’s ally in 1939, fought the occupier for the longest time. seized the entire Polish territory, The last Polish partisan died in combat with the open connivance of the against Soviet-led forces as late as 1963: triumphant Allies. Sergeant Józef Franczak, a soldier of the Polish Army and a partisan fighting both Karol Wołek German and Soviet troops. In his eyes, October 1, 2018

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The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search of painterly inspiration Mariusz Klarecki, PhD The Kresy, its events and genre scenes are perhaps the most defining topics of Józef Brandt’s oeuvre.

he paintings by Józef Brandt place where time truly slows down. ingeniously capture the It was there that he conceived particularities of old Polish his characters or such particularities of life and the cultural mosaic his oeuvre as decaying wooden khutors, Tunderpinning the identity of the Kresy or hamlets, and herds of horses that (literally borderlands, though the grazed on local meadows. In the outskirts term yields much broader cultural of the former Kingdom of Poland he and historical meaning) at the time. grasped the might of endless steppe for The painter depicted it without forceful the first time; there he discovered old grandiloquence or theatrical pomposity. Polish garments and militaria, hidden His brushstrokes are frank, yet poetic. in estates and palaces of the gentry and While literary works had undoubtedly doomed to oblivion. He encountered it stimulated his imagination, it was not all while exploring the distant lands of enough for the young artist. He knew Volhynia, Polesia or Bessarabia, but also perfectly well that the Kresy are the only on much shorter excursions to Kazimierz

110 The Warsaw Institute Review The Warsaw Uprising: A Fight for Remembrance

Dolny or Cracow. Not all letters by Józef Brandt have lasted to the present day. In 1871, Brandt and Some vanished fairly recently; regretfully, as they could have provided Juliusz Kossak, also a tremendous insight into the artist’s life and travels. Notwithstanding a painter, set out on the loss of these works, it is possible to recreate Brandt’s errs by putting a journey eastward, together a fragmented mosaic of his correspondence, sketchbooks, that is, to Eastern photographs, watercolor and oil paintings. To this end, one must focus on Galicia and the western the accurate dating of his works, which would allow the most likely sequence lands of Podolia. of events to be recreated. Although lands of Podolia. The over one-month-long paintings are rarely dated by their expedition was documented in four authors, it seems easier to follow the letters penned by Brandt, as well chronology of woodcut reproductions as depicted in illustrations signé Juliusz usually done shortly after the painting Kossak, who was Brandt’s dear friend was made. This was especially the case and travelling companion, and Aleksander in the 1870s. Very often accurate dating Gryglewski, whom the two happened to is made possible by the minutest details. meet in Podhorce. Brandt wrote the first letter on October 19, 1871 in Lwow. We are In 1871, Brandt and Juliusz Kossak, also informed that the travellers commenced a painter, set out on a journey eastward, their journey on October 17, in Cracow that is, to Eastern Galicia and the western and made their first stopover at the palace

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of Prince Sanguszko in Gumniska, not The second letter was written on October far from Tarnów. It is with absolute awe 24, 1871, already in Podhorce. that the artist remembers the visit paid to Brandt opens with his impressions Sanguszko’s horse stud. On his first day on Lviv, which he explored with Juliusz there, he marvelled at 12 stud mares and Kossak and Kossak’s brother Władysław. numerous foals grazing in the pasture In the Ossolineum, the three met Prince located right where the Biała River flows Jerzy Lubomirski, who showed them the into the Dunajec. All were of tremendously museum and its collection, prior to the thick bones, broad chests, stout croups, and, official opening. Brandt notes: They have above all of excellent legs. That place where a pretty array of dated paintings, armours, they graze, of tradition proudly reaching drawings, books and other sentimental the times of Hetman Tarnowski, [...] items. The collection is expanding. Surely marvellous grove bursting with snowball it will soon be a great selection with the trees, willows, beeches, lush herbage, two eagerness of this great man that Lubomirski rivers, such beauty, oh, how envious I am is 4. Another highlight of the stay in Lviv of these horses and their place of stay1. was the collection of Count Włodzimierz On the second day, Brandt, joined by Dzieduszycki, including a collection of Julek, as he called Kossak, admired the taxidermy that the travellers had a chance finest stallions of the stud. Prince Eustachy to see. It had all specimens of animals demonstrated 12 stallions and 18 carriage inhabiting Poland: birds, fish, plants, rocks, horses. One stood out the most: an Arab reptiles, trees, fossils, excavated bones of horse, originally from Turkestan, that antediluvian animals, in a word, all that Prince Eustachy had bought in Vienna. lives in Poland, but for people. The cabinet Brandt’s imagination is especially captured was so big, so splendidly arranged that I by leopard-spotted horses, a recurrent don’t remember seeing a rival to it not even topic of his early works: They have pretty once5. The following day was marked by leopard horses over there, so tiny, as if one a meeting with a great aficionado of fine gently sprinkled their white background arts, the priest Józef Nowakowski, residing with ink. Incredibly hairy, with marvellous in Żółkiew (now Zhovkva in Ukraine). heads, you’d find more skin than meat In the parochial church, they marvelled under their scalp [...] So I sketched some, at the tombstones of the Zółkiewskis, the harnessed, as they stood there. But Prince founding family of the town, portraits Paweł liked them all too much and greedily of King Stephen Báthory or a painting took all of my sketches2. In the evening depicting George Rákóczi begging for of that very day, the two travellers took pardon after plundering Poland. There a train to Lviv, where they arrived were four monumental paintings, though, shortly before midnight3. that sparked the most attention: Battle of Kłuszyn, commissioned by Żółkiewski himself and three works commissioned by King John III Sobieski, namely Battle 1 Listy Józefa Brandta Ilustrowane Przez Juliusza of Chocim, Battle of Vienna and Battle Kossaka Z Podróży Po Galicji w 1871 by M. of Párkány. Victories of Vienna and Radojewski in Ze Skarbca Kultury, Biuletyn Parkany were immortalized in painting Biblioteki Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, ed. J. Szczepaniec, vol. 26 (1875), p.p. 13–14. by Martin Altomonte, shortly after the 2 Ibidem. Viennese triumph of 1683. Their size is 3 The letter included the following drawings: 1) Our perhaps what impresses the most, with arrival in Gumnice, 2) a drawing depicting greeting a carter and artists in Tarnów, signed JK (Juliusz 4 Kossak), 3) depicting the painters accompanied by M. Radojewski, op.cit., p. 16. prince Eustachy Sanguszko watching horses graze. 5 Ibidem, p. 16.

112 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search of painterly inspiration

Warsaw, June 29, 2012. On the Look Out by Józef Brandt reclaimed by the Polish state; currently in the collection of the National Museum in Warsaw. © Radek Pietruszka (PAP) each canvas covering 60 square meters. artist’s preparation to conceive his own As Brandt puts it I so ardently studied composition two years later. It depicted the paintings that I would infallibly redraw the onslaught of Polish hussars on a the most minute of their details; we must Turkish camp put up by Vienna in 16837. have spent there several good hours6. The very evening, the aspiring artists Such in-depth studies were part of the 7 Battle of Vienna, 1873, oil on canvas, 136×318 cm, 6 Ibidem, p. 17. property of the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw.

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were back in Lviv, where two days later was hosted by Count Włodzimierz they caught a train for Złoczów (currently Baworowski, owner of Strusów and Zolochiv in Ukraine). There they hopped member of Imperial Council in Vienna. on a bałaguła, a carriage typical of the Tarnopol would be the following Kresy, and went to Podhorce (currently destination. This was where a gathering Pidhirtsi in Ukraine). As Brandt confesses of gentry and a horse race were to be in his letter, his heart skipped a beat held. The two travellers arrived on upon seeing the Palace of Podhorce. September 25, aboard a train packed They were housed in rooms fitted with with noblemen arriving at the town a canopy, lusciously decorated rooms to attend the gathering. As the painter that boasted an imposing wall of thirty-six boasts in his letter, he was presented to hussar armours, originally from hetman numerous household names, including Jabłonoswski’s Viennese mission, with Andrzej Zamoyski, Artur Potocki, Count their wings and guidons; it had banners, Jan Tarnowski of Dzików, Jabłonowski, bunchuks, all kinds armours and what and General Władysław Rozwadowski. not. Other rooms, abounding in paintings, The estate and stud farm governed by portraits featuring the most magnificent Włodzimierz Baworowski were set to be of outfits, were fitted with richly gilded the next stopover. Unquestionably, the plafonds, furniture, vases, pure delight since planned dressage competition promised it was kept as it was in the olden days. Two to be interesting. The following day days we spent on sketching, from dawn to the travelling duo were already off to dusk; here’s me sketching a hussar armour, Trembowla (currently Terebovlia in and here’s Julek, standing on a wobbly Ukraine), where they visited a castle, table sketching some fascinating garments while joined by a photographer they had depicted on the plafond8. met in Strusów. He was supposed to take some photographs10 which are currently The author, writing to his mother, included in the collection of the National eagerly describes the material that he Museum in Warsaw. They were donated gathered over the course of these two by the painter’s family five years following days, with which he planned on using his death. Three photographs depict when preparing his next painting Battle Trembowla, and another three focus of Vienna. Brandt is exceptionally keen on a market organised in the town square on the idea of coming back for longer in of Strusów. They were the inspiration the following year. Interestingly, Kossak behind Brandt’s painting Ruthenian and Brandt’s stay happened to coincide Market Held in the Town of Strusów, with that of Aleksander Gryglewski whose completed already in 187211. painting Crimson Room was reproduced as a woodcut and published in Kłosy The fourth letter was written on October Review in 18729. 16, 1871 in Cracow, after the artists had come back from Eastern Galicia. From The third letter was written on September the opening paragraph we learn, quite 28, 1871 on a steppe in Strusów (currently unexpectedly, that the next destination Strusov in Ukraine), where Brandt was to be Podhajce, and more precisely

8 The letter included the following drawings: 10 The letter included the following drawings: 4) drawing depicting the castle of Podhorce, drawn 7), Strusów’s Steppe, 8) Dressage Arena in Strusów, in the heading, signed AG, made by Aleksander signed JK. Gryglewski, 5) Our Arrival in Podhorce, 11 The National Museum in Warsaw (MNW): nr inw. signed JK, 6) Here’s Us While Drawing. DI 34363 MNW, DI 115433 MNW, DI 115432 MNW, 9 Kłosy, vol. 15, 1872, p. 237. DI 29346 MNW, DI 29348 MNW, DI 29347 MNW.

114 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search of painterly inspiration the estate of the Czartoryskis, governed by portraits with horses. Brandt also Ludwik Kastory. The two painters arrived mentions plans of another stay in Słowita there on October 29. Unfortunately, the the following year, as the invitation weather suddenly worsened. Figuring out was extended. There were talks of a the French barometer turned out to be the joint horseback excursion to Radowice predominant pastime of this short stay. and then to the Carpathian Mountains It also included a visit paid to Kossak’s with the count and his wife. It remains sister in Kozowa, who treated the unknown whether Brandt actually stuck wanderers with exquisite confiture. to his plan of going to the Carpathians. Following that, the artists came back to The two painters came back to Lviv amid Podhajce for one day only, and, aboard heavy snowfall. Lviv and Cracow were a carriage, departed for Stanisławów the last stops of their joint journey. (currently Ivano-Frankivsk in Ukraine), From there, Brandt went on his own in the direction of Monasterzyska to Vienna, where he stayed overnight, (currently Monastyryska in Ukraine). and then to Munich12. Brandt pointed out that Stanisławów, with its cultural mosaic and Ruthenians Andrzej Daszewski13, Józef Brandt’s and Hutsuls as prevailing ethnic groups, grandchild, mentions another journey that differed substantially from northern the painter set out on with Juliusz Kossak. parts of Galicia. The next destination It would be in 1874 with the two going to on the list was Radowice. Again, due to the Ukraine, as far as to Bałta in Podolia the worsening weather and much lower (currently Balta in Ukraine). Sadly, we do temperatures, the artists decided to not know the details of the journey, which change their plans. As the cold season makes it uncertain whether it actually was advancing, they renounced the took place14. Such details could perhaps idea of going hiking in the mountains, be provided by the photographs from the where it had already snowed. Instead, artist’s collection taken between 1870 and the painters took a train to Lviv, where 1875, currently owned by the National they stayed overnight. The following Museum in Warsaw. They depict Podolia morning, they were already on their way including its villages, ruins of a former to the befriended family of the Count defence Basilian monastery in Podgórzany, Starzeńskis. They owned an estate in not far from Trembowla, ruins of a castle Słowita (currently in Ukraine), in the and of Carmelite Church in Trembowla, Przemyśl District. The way from the a castle in Olesko. Several photographs station to the estate was quite memorable were taken in Buczacz (currently Buchach as the painters were escorted by the count in Ukraine), which depict a Basilian and his service, riding on glorious Arab monastery, the town hall, the town, horses from the Dzieduszycki stud farm. and ruins of a castle15. The painter had the chance to mount one 12 The letter included the following drawings: of these fine horses the following day, 9) Novel French Barometer, 10) On the Way to while hunting. The count appreciated Stanisławów, 11) Daniel and Confiture, signed JK, Brandt’s unusual equestrian aptness by 12) Plenary Meeting in Stanisławów, signed JK, 13) drawing depicting carters seen from behind offering one of his personal horses – a bay with an inscription reading Inhabitant of Szyk, Jew, Arab named Mazepa. The three-day-long Cracovian, Ruthenian. stay was a moment of joy and inspiration. 13 A. Daszewski, op.cit., p. 56, 58. The evenings were celebrated with music 14 Letter by Józef Brandt sent to Roman Padlewski from Munich on 23rd May 1874. Jacek Malczewski Museum and singing, and the joyful moments in Radom (MOR), manuscript, sygn. 7851 IV. were depicted in cartoons. Juliusz Kossak 15 National Museum in Warsaw (MNW): DI 29182 was tasked with painting watercolour MNW, DI 29301 MNW, DI 29302 MNW, DI 29212

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Brandt sought inspiration also during One such watercolor, presently privately much shorter excursions. Like the one owned, depicts Feuerstein’s Granary he made to Kazimierz Dolny, located by located at 60 Puławska Street18. Another the Vistula River. The artist’s collection one, owned by the National Museum contains several photographs (also in Cracow, depicts the Twin Granary, as available in the National Museum in it was called, located at 46 Puławska Street. Warsaw), taken anonymously between Initially, there were two separate granaries 1870 and 1875, which depict the sharing one of the side walls. Only half of parish church, tenements houses of St. the construction has lasted to the present Christopher and St. Nicholas as well as day, that is, one granary19. Many other wooden constructions of the town’s main pencil sketches made by the artist at the square. There are also shots of the Celej time were not dated. Therefore, we cannot House as well as Kazimierz landscape, state with absolute certitude that they seen from the southern part depict Kazimierz, even though they focus of the city, with the Three Crosses mainly on wooden architecture. Mountain exposed16. The painter often used them as background for oil paintings representing One’s imagination is captured by an the life in the towns of Podolia20. Vast imposing granary known as the Passion landscapes of sandy beaches stretching of Christ Granary, located near the river along a mighty river, which are especially crossing into Janowiec. The photograph picturesque in Kazimierz Dolny nad must have been taken before 1881, they year Wisłą, are often present in Brandt’s series its ruins were demolished17. It was arguably of paintings entitled At the Crossing. The one of the finest Renaissance granaries in romantic scenes, focusing on borderland Poland. Similarly, granaries clearly captured banks of the Dnieper were made as early Brandt’s imagination as he had decided as 1875. They usually depict Cossacks with to paint at least two watercolor featuring horses by the river bank, or a group granaries precisely from 1875. These were of horse riders with distant gazes as they dated by the artist himself, who included wait for the crossing. Brandt developed the date and place of painting under his the topic later by depicting the army signature. Therefore, it was possible to date at the crossing making its way with Brandt’s trip to Kazimierz and perhaps even military supplies. the following stages of his 1885 travels. 18 Granary in Kazimierz by Józef Brandt, 1875; pencil, watercolor, gouache, paper, signed Kazimierz/75./J Br., on the reverse of the letter Brandt sought there is a sticker from TZSP in Warsaw (?) no. 15564, entitled Old Construction, with a date of issuing 1926; stamp ‘private property of inspiration also Z. SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ. The watercolor was auctioned by REMPEX Auction House on 29th during much shorter March 2006 and reproduced in the auction’s official catalogue. Granary in Kazimierz by Józef Brandt, excursions. 1875; pencil, watercolor, gouache, paper, 30,3×47,4 cm, signed Kazimierz/75./J Br., MNW, DI 29180 MNW, DI 34360 MNW, DI 115370 The National Museum in Cracow. MNW, DI 29181 MNW, DI 34364 MNW, DI 27812 19 Granary in Kazimierz by Józef Brandt, 1875; MNW, DI 27811 MNW, DI 29303 MNW, DI 29156 pencil, watercolor, gouache, paper, 30,3×47,4 cm, MNW. signed Kazimierz/75./J Br., The National Museum 16 MNW: DI 28898 MNW, DI 28912 MNW, DI in Cracow. 29267 MNW, DI 94281 MNW, DI 29268 MNW, 20 Town in Podolia, woodcut reproduction, Kłosy DI 29320 MNW, DI 94281 MNW, DI 29266 MNW, review, 1876, vol. XXII, p. 389; Street in Chocim, DI 29319 MNW. woodcut reproduction published in Album 17 MNW, inw. number DI 29260 MNW. Malarzy Polskich, Warsaw, 1876.

116 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search of painterly inspiration © Artissima Auction House The Lisowski’s Soldiers on Reconnaissance by Józef Brandt, 1882, oil on canvas, 100 x 88 cm. Private collection.

Thanks to the drawings published by The painter informs: we’re publishing Tygodnik Ilustrowany in early October an album of works by Munich painters 1875, we can establish that Brandt was with Tygodnik Ilustrowany as the publisher. in Warsaw. Two sketches were published When I was in Warsaw, I struck a deal under the title Drawings by Józef Brandt. with them, they put me in artistic charge. They were two small-sized woodcuts It would seem that such a publication taking on Bessarabia, entitled Gypsies of will be of interest to all. It shall have Bessarabia and Cossack Camp. The artist portraits of the painters involved as well21. first sketched them and then slightly Brandt’s excursions to the Kresy assuredly collared them with watercolor. Around translated into numerous pencil sketches, September, Brandt must have sent his 21 Source: Collection of letters sent to mother and works to a publisher in order to have them uncle Stanisław Lessel quoted, A. Daszewski, op.cit., graphically reproduced. Brandt’s arrival p. 59; H. Stępień, Artyści Polscy W Środowisku in Warsaw in October 1875 is further Monachijskim W Latach 1828–1914, Warsaw, 1994, p. 113. The labum mentioned by Brandt: Album confirmed by the letter he sent to his Malarzy Polskich. Seria Pierwsza. Munich. Warsaw mother and uncle Stanisław Lessel. 1876, published by J. Unger, table 10, p. 10.

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118 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search of painterly inspiration © A.J. Ostrowski, Łódź 1915. Gypsies of Bessarabia by Józef Brandt, a photograph of a missing painting.

watercolor and ideas for oil paintings, drawing sessions in the Oriental Museum which the artist put in practice after he in Vienna or during distant travels to came back to Munich. Quite possibly Cracow and further into Podolia. And it was in the fall and winter of 1875 that it is precisely his 1884 journey to Podolia the artist conceived several oil painting that seems the most intriguing, as the compositions, for instance Crossing the majority of sketches include dates and Dnieper, Bar Confederates or Cossack names of the places where they were and a Girl by the Well22. sketched. The journey began on August 18, in Cracow. There, the artist drew elements In 1877 Brandt married Helena of horse tack, with an inscription reading Pruszakowa, a widow to Brandt’s old ‘3 horse tacks’ and elements of horses friend Aleksander Pruszak. This was when themselves. For the next 10 days, that is, he deepened his ties with Orońsko. From from August 31 until September 9, Brandt that moment on, the married couple would is hosted by Roman Konopka in his estate spend every summer there. Looking after in Tomaszowice near Cracow. There, the the estate required regular presence, artist closely studies a dovecot, drying pots which meant that Brandt could travel (August 31), nineteenth-century cavalry elsewhere only between late summer spurs and a horse’s head (September 9) and and wet fall season. a sign hanging in front of an inn reading ‘selling vodka and beer’. Later Brandt A pocket sketchbook, currently privately went to Lviv, where he stayed in Hotel owned, sheds light on yet another series Krakowski and on September 18, of Brandt’s travels in the years 1879–1887. he closely studied thick ropes. Brandt would use it during open-air sketching sessions around Munich, In the morning of September 20, the artist was already in Mariampol. Sitting 22 Crossing the Dniester, oil on canvas, 31,5×63,5, on the left bank of the Dniester, he signed Józef Brandt/from Warsaw/1875, the National Museum in Cracow; Bar Confederates, oil on canvas, hastily expressed his impressions by 61×110 cm, signed JBr., the Polish Army Museum in giving his drawings such titles: From the Warsaw; Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie; Dniester, depicting a boat on a river bank, Cossack and a Girl by the Well oil on canvas, 51×99 cm, signed Józef Brandt/from Warsaw/1875, Overturned Ship, Cabin Next to Galar the National Museum in Kielce. Construction, and Construction of a Galar

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Julisz Kossak, Here’s Us While Drawing, drawing depicting Józef Brandt and Juliusz Kossak while drawing exhibits in the Armoury of the Castle of Podhorce. It was included in the letter written in Podhorce on 24th October 1871. Source: Listy Józefa Brandta Ilustrowane Przez Juliusza Kossaka Z Podróży Po Galicji w 1871 by M. Radojewski in Ze Skarbca Kultury, Biuletyn Biblioteki Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, ed. J. Szczepaniec, vol. 26 (1875), p. 16.

(galar is a type of boat especially popular for a different way though, straying from in the 18th century). Brandt drew his the riverside road and passing by the attention to an embankment located on village of Kunisowice. There, a church the opposite river bank – In the Shallows. belfry of unique architecture sparked his Other drawings depict a shepherd’s cabin interest. Brandt stayed in the area or little boys standing by the riverside. for several days. The sketches are done in a rather hurried fashion, documenting what the artist The next drawings are marked with a date saw during his journey. This reportage of September 29. They were made in the made of drawings gives an impression village of Uniż, located on the left bank as if the painter moved along the of the Dniester. They depict household river on a boat and observed the world containers, plants, peasant huts and from that perspective. a countryside gate. This journey alongside the Dniester came to a halt Brandt moved further along the riverside in in the town of Zaleszczyki. It is located the following days. In the village of Dołhe in a picturesque deep ravine, squeezed into he sketched some boys standing by the a meander of the Dniester. Zaleszczyki was riverside. In Niżnów, he studied the church founded by Poland’s last king Stanisław and a carriage with horses and people. August Poniatowski and belonged to the The drawing made on September 22 in the Poniatowskis. Brandt was inspired by village of Dolina presented church towers villagers making tar in a yard, which he seen from afar. On the next day, that is, on depicted in two drawings entitled Tar. Back September 23 the painter is forced to go on the shore, Brandt went from Zaleszczyki ashore to reach the cemetery of Czernelica to Horodenka. It is unlikely that he stayed village, two kilometres away from the river. there for long, as the sketchbook features There he sketched three tombstones. only one drawing. That of a woman of the On his way there, Brandt drew a signpost, village, entitled Horodenka. It remains a roadside cross, a fence, grazing horses unknown where he was when he sketched as well as fellow wanderers. That very day, a horse and a pair of stirrups included on Brandt was back at the riverside, opting a separate sheet of paper dated October 7.

120 The Warsaw Institute Review The Kresy: Józef Brandt in search of painterly inspiration

While on the way from Horodenka to and depicts peasants standing in front Kołomyja near Czermiatyn, the painter of a mud hut and a shack. Interestingly, sketched a carriage loaded with timber. it is very similar to Brandt’s missing The long way to Cracow got perhaps a painting Gypsies of Bessarabia from touch more interesting on October 11 in 188924. The position of the hut in the Szeparówka, when Brandt spotted and photograph is akin to the one in the sketched a well-sweep on October 19 in painting. Similarly, at closer look, one Biłka Królewska (16 kilometres away from will see that the peasants are wearing the Lviv), where steam chimneys piqued his same garments both in the photograph interest. The artist finally arrived in Cracow and in the painting. The oil painting, on October 27, where he did a drawing however, has a different composition. of a typical house with an avant-corps Brandt solely selected some elements from and a gambrel roof, incorporated into the photograph, and by adding horsemen the city’s modern architecture. he completely changed the narrative of the painting. In the foreground, he The journey lasted just over two months. placed hunters asking for directions and The most interesting sketches were made gypsy women. The mud hut stands in the in Podolia, which focus on rural life and background, without its adjacent shack. landscapes, on the region’s towns and All in all, the painting seems to depict the Dniester bank area. It seems most a genre scene somewhere on likely that the artist spent the summer in the outskirts of the Kresy. Orońsko and on August 18, 1884 departed for Cracow and from there headed to the Undoubtedly, travels to the Kresy became Kresy. After October 27, the painter went intrinsic to Brandt’s artistic practice. The straight to Munich, where he typically painter had a unique way of translating stayed to for the wintertime. The sketches his experiences and observations into made during his trip to the Kresy were a painting. He enriched elements from enough to occupy him with composition photographs or sketches with a historical making in the painter’s atelier in Munich. background or landscapes of wild The small size of the sketchbook as well steppe. The inhabitants of the eastern as the nature of the drawings are proof and southern parts of the Kresy were of Brandt’s very personal approach. immortalized first in his sketches, then He did not sketch to prepare a specific in his paintings. Such compositions were composition. It was rather a brief overview complemented with accessories of the surroundings that he felt like of Brandt’s own collection of garments “photographing by drawing”. and military equipment. That, combined with Brandt’s excellent painterly skills The last group of photographs documented made for a tremendous oeuvre, depicting Brandt’s journey to Bessarabia, which he not only historical events, but also the made together with photographer Michał reality of the Kresy. Greim. It was most likely in 1888. The photographs depict Moldovan Mariusz Klarecki carriage with a four-ox team, Landscape September 1, 2018 with a herd of buffalo in the river, and Peasants [Gypsies] in front of mud huts23. One photograph is particularly interesting, 24 The painting was reproduced as a woodcut in Tygodnik Ilustrowany 1875 (2) s. 248; Świat (that of Cracow) 1888, p. 248. The painting reproduced 23 MNW: DI 29292 MNW, DI 27810 MNW, DI as a photograph in Józef Brandt, published by 29293 MNW. A. J. Ostrowski Łódź, b.d.w. [after 1915].

4/2018 121 Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in the USA Piotr Wilczek © Radek Pietruszka (PAP) US Ambassador to Poland Georgette Mosbacher © Radek Pietruszka (PAP) enhancements to U the Source: November 10, 2018 November The Hill/Rzeczpospolita Source: to put resources significant forth effort . towardthis willing are The U nited S tates Pentagon the Congress and considering are further . S . military presence Poland in our and Polish. military friends Joint text by HE Georgette Mossbacher and HE Piotr Wilczek Piotr HE and Mossbacher Georgette by HE text Joint Poland’s First Geopolitical Think Tank in Washington According to Marcin Gawęda, president of the think tank – being at the same time its associated U.S.-based foundation – “the strategic goal of The Warsaw Institute Foundation, as the first Polish geopolitical think tank in Washington, is to reinforce Polish interests in the United States”.

Established in June 2018, The Warsaw InstituteF oundation is an organization inspired by the Poland-based Warsaw Institute. Its experts hold regular meetings with American institutions, which constitutes an excellent occasion to depict a Polish perspective on such important issues as geopolitics, international order, historical policy, energy and military security as well as the Polish attitude towards Putin’s Russia. “All activities of our association are essentially aimed at setting up a consensus around politics, cultural and economic relations between Poland and the United States”, Mr. Marcin Gawęda said. Bernard Bartnicki, one of the initiators of The Warsaw Institute Foundation, stresses out that – as a young Pole and an American – he can notice the need to create and develop a strong organization whose aim will be to enrich U.S.- -Polish ties. “I am deeply convinced that our Warsaw branch will play a predominant role in disseminating knowledge about geopolitical conditions of Central and Eastern European countries”, he emphasized. Bart Bagniewski (The Warsaw Institute Foundation) focuses on the need for further deepening of Polish-American relations: “We consider partner communication with the American state administration as a key factor since the government pursues a policy being consistent with the U.S. interests, regardless of current regime or political conditions in Poland”, he added. The Warsaw Institute Foundation remains in close cooperation with the Warsaw Institute based in the Polish capital. Their partnership seems best evidenced by the U.S. promotion of the “The Warsaw Institute Review” – an English- -language quarterly that is regularly delivered to the world’s top 1,300 research, analytical and expert centers. In March this year, all experts, who later contributed to works of The Warsaw Institute Foundation, took an active part in an international conference on the Polish Three Seas Initiative, organized jointly by Poland’s Warsaw Institute and The Heritage Foundation in Washington. The event was attended by renowned guests, including Chief of Cabinet of the President of Poland, Professor Krzysztof Szczerski. In addition, representatives of The Warsaw Institute Foundation accompanied President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda during his September visit to the United States as well as they participated in a conference held by The Jamestown Foundation; the meeting, attended by Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, Piotr Naimski, was devoted to such issues as the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. More information on the activities of The Warsaw Institute Foundation think tank is available online and on social media. www.warsaw.institute

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