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SOFWERX Presentation The Iranian Threat Network: Implications for the U.S.-Iran Crisis Diane M. Zorri, Ph.D. Department of Security Studies and International Affairs Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Daytona Beach, Florida Bona Fides • Diane Maye Zorri, Ph.D. • Assistant Professor, Security Studies at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, Florida • USAFA-2001, NPS-2006, George Mason-2015 • Defense Industry • Air Force • Research interests: Iraqi politics, Iranian proxies, Middle East Studies, U.S. Foreign Policy, National Security • Joint Special Operations University - Research Grant • Research Questions • Strategic Framework • Iraq Agenda • Syria • Yemen • Analysis • Implications • Discussion Research Questions • JSOU Monograph “Iranian Proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen: A Comparative Analysis” • Q1.) How does Iran develop, employ, and sustain proxy organiZations in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen? • Q2.) Why do Iran’s proxies thrive over host (Iraqi, Syrian, and Yemeni) domestic governmental structures and institutions? • Q3.) What vulnerabilities does Iran’s regional strategy face? Middle East Strategic Framework Hegemony Nobody likes the hegemon, but everyone wants to be the hegemon. IRAN TURKEY SYRIA Yemen SAUDI ARABIA ISRAEL Saddam Hussein Bandwagoning vs. Balancing • Joseph Sassoon – Iraqi Scholar • Rijal wa Madina (Men and a City) • Psyche of Iraqi people - Bandwagon MAJOR IRANIAN TRAINED PROXIES IN IRAQ PRE-ISLAMIC STATE IRANIAN TRAINED PROXIES POST-2014 IRANIAN TRAINED PROXIES MOVEMENT OF THE ASAIB AHL AL KATA’IB SARAYA IMAM ALI PARTY OF GOD’S NOBLES NAME HAQ HEZBOLLAH BADR KHORASANI BRIGADES (Harakat Hezbollah al- (AAH) (KH) Nujaba, HHN) ﺗﻛ ﺎ بﺋ مﺎﻣﻹا ﻲﻠﻋ رﺣ ﻛ ﺔ بزﺣ ﷲ ا ﻟ ﻧ ﺟ ﺑ ﺎ ء رﺳ ا ﯾ ﺎ ا ﻟ ﺳرﺧ ﺎ ﻧ ﻲ ردﺑ ا حﺎﻧﺟﻟ ا يرﻛﺳﻌﻟ ﺗﻛ ﺎ بﺋ بزﺣ ﷲ ﺻﻋ ﺎ ﺋ ب أ ھ ل ا ﻟ ﺣ ق ARABIC NAME Abu Mahdi al- LEADER Qais al-KhaZaili Hadi al Ameri Ali Al-Yassiri Akram Abbas Kaabi Abu Zaidi Muhandis END STRENGTH 10,000 - 20,000 400 – 30,000 10,000 – 50,000 500 - 1000 ~9,000 4000 - 7000 41, 42, 43 45, 46, 47 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 18 12 2 11, 21, 22, 23, HASHD LIWA(S) 24, 27, 30, 36, 50, 52, 53, 55, 110 2018 POLITICAL ALLIANCE FATAH FATAH FATAH FATAH FATAH FATAH Hegemony 101 Divide and Control “There is only one basic way of dealing with complexity: divide and conquer.” -Bjarne Stroustrup Hegemony 101 Divide and Control • How to control territory when people don’t like you • Political control v. Military control • Micro: La Cosa Nostra & New York’s Five Families • Macro: British Imperial India Hegemony 101 Divide and Control • Macro- Imperialist Strategy • Micro – Narcissistic/Megalomaniac Strategy 1. Create, foster, and promote divisions and cleavages in the host 2. Empower minority factions with military aid, benevolent charity (**Never empower the majority faction**) 3. Empower tractable and pliant leaders 4. Keep leaders dependent on your charitable giving 5. Encourage host to spend as much money as possible (on useless things) 6. When emergent leaders in the host become too powerful, repeat steps above Benefits of Divide and Control • Gives perception of ever-increasing power • Plausible Deniability / Buck-passing • Play both ends against the middle • Focuses population on external vs. internal threats • Prevents others from concentrating power Iranian Playbook War on the Cheap Weapons & Personnel • Ballistic missiles • Drones • Suicide speed boats • Proxy factions, Mercenaries Tactics • Sabotage • Assassination • Gaslighting Gaslighting • IRGC, after Britain’s seiZure of ship bound for Syria in Straights of Gibraltar • “Its Tehran’s “duty” to seiZe a British oil tanker • Javad Zarif, after Iran’s seiZure of the British oil tanker passing through Straits of Hormuz • “Iran wants normal relations based on mutual respect” • “ Iran does not seek confrontation.” IRAQ Distribution of Iraqi Ethnoreligious Groups • Northern Ê Western Iraq Iraq - Kurdish - Sunni Arab Ê Baghdad - Shi’ia/Sunni Mix Ê Southern Iraq – Shi’ia Arab Ayatollah Khameini Ayatollah Sistani QOM, IRAN NAJAF, IRAQ • The state makes people good • Good people make the state • State rule by Jurist- Vilayet e Faqih • Supports the civil state • Export Islamic Revolution • Spiritual leader of Shi’a Muslims • Defend the weak • Apolitical Prominent Shi’a Political Trends DAWA ISCI SADRIST MAJOR IRAQI MILITANT GROUPS PKK Peshmerga KURDISH Kurdish Islamic Movement 1920 Revolution Brigade Hamas Iraq SUNNI Mujahadeen Army Islamic Army Iraq SOI - Baghdad SOI - Anbar Sunni Awakening Al Qaeda Iraq Daesh (ISIS) SALAFIST Ansar Al Islam Ansar Al Sunna Badr Brigades ISCI Asa’ib ahl al- Haqq Peace Brigades Promised Day Brigades SHI’IA Mahdi Army Kata’ib Hezbollah Coalition Bombing of Al Askari Death of U.S. Forces Sistani Invasion Mosque Saddam Hussein Exit Iraq Fatwa 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 MAJOR IRAQI MILITANT GROUPS PKK Peshmerga KURDISH Kurdish Islamic Movement 1920 Revolution Brigade Hamas Iraq SUNNI Mujahadeen Army Islamic Army Iraq SOI - Baghdad SOI - Anbar Sunni Awakening Al Qaeda Iraq Daesh (ISIS) SALAFIST Ansar Al Islam Ansar Al Sunna Badr Brigades ISCI Asa’ib ahl al- Haqq Peace Brigades Promised Day Brigades SHI’IA Sadr’s Mahdi Army Kata’ib Hezbollah Coalition Bombing of Al Askari Death of U.S. Forces Sistani Invasion Mosque Saddam Hussein Exit Iraq Fatwa 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 MAJOR IRAQI SHI’A MILITANT GROUPS HASH’D AL SHAABI Badr OrganiZation Hash’d al Shaabi Liwas 1, 3-5, 9-11, 21 – 24, 27, 30, 36, 50, 52, 53, 55, 110 Imam Ali Brigades (Liwa 2) Saraya Khorasani (Liwa 18) Harakat HeZbollah al Nujaba (Liwa 12) Kata’ib HeZbollah QF/ HEZBOLLAH TRAINED HEZBOLLAH QF/ - Hash’d al Shaabi Liwas 45, 46, 47 IRGC QOM, IRAN Asa’ib ahl al- Haqq Hash’d al Shaabi Liwas 41, 42, 43 Mahdi Army Promised Day Brigades Saraya al Salaam Liwas 313, 314 Risaliyun (Liwa 31) LOYALISTS Quwat Wa’ad Allah (Liwa 33) SISTANI AND/OR SADR SISTANI IRAQ 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Coalition Invasion Bombing of Al Askari Mosque Sadr Ceasefire U.S. Forces Exit Iraq Sistanti Fatwa Against Islamic State Hash’d al Shaabi • Paramilitary Units (PMUs) • Sistani Fatwa – 2014 • Iranian Involvement • Badr OrganiZation • Hadi Al Ameri • Success against Islamic State 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections Uniters for Saairun Fatah Alliance Victory Alliance State of Law Al Wataniya National Wisdom Political Bloc ReForm Moqtada Hadi Haider Nouri Osama Ayad Ammar Leader al-Sadr al-Amiri al-Abadi al-Maliki al-Nujafi Allawi al-Hakim Seats 54 48 42 25 23 21 19 Notable Hash’d Brigades League of the Righteous Saraya al Salaam Badr Organization (AAH) Hashd Sunni Jihad Brigade (Saraya al Jihad) Risaliyun (Kata'ib al-Tayyar al- AAH al Qa'id Abu Mousa al Risali) Asaib ahl al Haqq Amiri Supporters of the Faith Quwat Wa'ad Allah (aka Liwa al- AAH Saba al Dujail (Seven Forces of the Expected Brigade (Liwa al- Shabab al-Risali) Kataib Hezbollah Dujail) Muntadhar) Saraya Khorasani Saraya Ashura Harakat Hezbollah al - Nujaba Imam Ali Brigades Meets initial Behavioral Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Revisionist Or Status Quo Status Quo Revisionist Status Quo Status Quo Revisionist Revisionist Revisionist Notable Iraqi Political Iraqi National Parties Sadrist Trend ISCI Dawa Dawa Mutahidoon Accord ISCI Iraqi National Iraqi Communist Party Al Fadhila Congress Al Hadba Al-Muwatin Islah Al Hal Sunni Iraqi Al Sadiqoun Islamist Party 2018 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections Uniters for Saairun Fatah Alliance Victory Alliance State of Law Al Wataniya National Wisdom Political Bloc ReForm Moqtada Hadi Haider Nouri Osama Ayad Ammar Leader al-Sadr al-Amiri al-Abadi al-Maliki al-Nujafi Allawi al-Hakim Seats 54 48 42 25 23 21 19 Notable Hash’d Brigades League of the Righteous Saraya al Salaam Badr Organization (AAH) Hashd Sunni Jihad Brigade (Saraya al Jihad) Risaliyun (Kata'ib al-Tayyar al- AAH al Qa'id Abu Mousa al Risali) Asaib ahl al Haqq Amiri Supporters of the Faith Quwat Wa'ad Allah (aka Liwa al- AAH Saba al Dujail (Seven Forces of the Expected Brigade (Liwa al- Shabab al-Risali) Kataib Hezbollah Dujail) Muntadhar) Saraya Khorasani Saraya Ashura Harakat Hezbollah al - Nujaba Imam Ali Brigades Meets initial Behavioral Conditions Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Revisionist Or Status Quo Status Quo Revisionist Status Quo Status Quo Revisionist Revisionist Revisionist Notable Iraqi Political Iraqi National Parties Sadrist Trend ISCI Dawa Dawa Mutahidoon Accord ISCI Iraqi National Iraqi Communist Party Al Fadhila Congress Al Hadba Al-Muwatin Islah Al Hal Sunni Iraqi Al Sadiqoun Islamist Party SYRIA Syrian Politics • Alawite – minority faction • Free Syrian Army • Kurdish & Sunni Resistance • Russian Support of Assad Regime • Iranian/ Hashd Support of Assad Regime Iranian Objectives in Syria MAJOR SYRIAN ARMED FACTIONS Al Qaeda Daesh (ISIS) MULTI-FACTION OPPOSITION Al Nusra Front FACTIONS SUNNI MAJORITY FREE SYRIAN ARMY (FSA) OPPOSITION U.S.-NATO Support PEOPLE’S PROTECTION UNITS (YPG) KURDISH WOMEN’S PROTECTION UNITS (YPJ) SYRIAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES (SDF) SYRIAN ARAB ARMY (SAA) NATIONAL DEFENSE FRONT (NDF) FORCES SYRIAN ARMED HeZbollah Russian/Iranian Support ASSAD REGIME ASSAD Liwa Abbas AAH AAH- Haidar al-Karar Brigades IRANIAN BACKED Liwa Fatemiyoun (LF) IRAQI ORIGIN – HA’ASHD AL SHAAB ARAB SISTANI SPRING FATWA 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 IRANIAN-BACKED ARMED FACTIONS IN SYRIA Russian/Iranian Support SYRIAN ARAB ARMY (SAA) NATIONAL
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