Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix
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INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: WHY SALAFISM AND TERRORISM MOSTLY DON'T MIX 13 September 2004 Asia Report N°83 Southeast Asia/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. WHAT IS SALAFISM? ................................................................................................. 2 III. THE SALAFI MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA............................................................ 5 A. ORIGINS................................................................................................................................5 B. DEWAN DAKWAH ISLAM INDONESIA AND THE CAMPUS MOVEMENT ......................................6 C. LIPIA...................................................................................................................................7 D. THE RISE OF SALAFISM IN YOGYAKARTA...............................................................................9 IV. THE DYNAMICS OF DISSEMINATING SALAFI TEACHINGS ...................... 10 A. PESANTRENS.......................................................................................................................10 B. MOSQUE CONSTRUCTION....................................................................................................11 C. PUBLICATIONS PROGRAMS ...................................................................................................12 V. DISPUTES WITHIN THE SALAFI COMMUNITY ............................................... 12 A. JA'FAR UMAR THALIB VS. YUSUF BAISA.............................................................................12 B. THE RISE OF THE FORUM KOMUNIKASI AHLUSSUNNAH WAL JAMAAH ...............................15 C. LASKAR JIHAD ....................................................................................................................16 D. CURRENT DIVISIONS WITHIN THE SALAFI MOVEMENT..........................................................18 VI. FUNDING...................................................................................................................... 21 A. DEWAN DAKWAH ISLAMIYAH INDONESIA............................................................................22 B. THE INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RELIEF ORGANISATION (IIRO)............................................23 1. Yayasan al-Sofwah ..................................................................................................23 2. Wahdah Islamiyah ...................................................................................................24 VII. SALAFIS AND SALAFI JIHADIS............................................................................. 25 A. SALAFI VS. SALAFI JIHADI IN INDONESIA ............................................................................26 B. THE CIMANGGIS BOMBS .....................................................................................................27 C. CROSSING OVER AND CROSSING BACK...............................................................................28 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 29 APPENDICES A. MAP OF INDONESIA.......................................................................................................................30 B. GLOSSARY OF TERMS ...................................................................................................................31 C. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ..........................................................................................................33 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................54 E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS ON ASIA SINCE 2001 ..........................................................55 F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS .................................................................................................................58 ICG Asia Report N°83 13 September 2004 INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: WHY SALAFISM AND TERRORISM MOSTLY DON'T MIX EXECUTIVE SUMMARY One result of the "war on terror" in Indonesia has believe it is not permissible to revolt against a been increased attention to the country's links with Muslim government, no matter how oppressive religious institutions in the Middle East and the or unjust, and are opposed to JI and the Darul puritanical form of Islam known as salafism. Islam movement because in their view they Particularly outside observers but some Indonesians actively promote rebellion against the Indonesian as well tend to assume that salafism is alien to state; and Indonesian Islam, is growing by leaps and bounds, and is dangerous, because it promotes violence. All tend to see the concept of jihad in defensive three notions are misleading. This report, the first terms -- aiding Muslims under attack, rather comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon in than waging war against symbolic targets that Indonesia, concludes that most Indonesian salafis find may include innocent civilians. organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the group While some involved in terrorism in Indonesia, responsible for the Bali bombings of October 2002 such as Aly Gufron alias Mukhlas, a Bali bomber, and almost certainly the Australian embassy bombing claim to be salafis, the radical fringe that Mukhlas of September 2004, anathema. Salafism may be represents (sometimes called "salafi jihadism") is more of a barrier to the expansion of jihadist not representative of the movement more broadly. activities than a facilitator. The report examines the rise of salafism in Indonesia, The term salafism describes a movement that seeks to noting that far from being alien to Indonesian Islam, return to what its adherents see as the purest form of it is only the most recent in a long history of Islam, that practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and puritanical movements, and looks at the role of Saudi the two generations that followed him. In practice, funding in its expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. As this means the rejection of unwarranted innovations important as funding is the close communication (bid'ah) brought to the religion in later years. between Indonesian salafis and their Middle Eastern mentors, most but not all of them Saudis. The strictest salafis in Indonesia: Indonesian salafi leaders rarely decide issues of are religious, not political activists; doctrine or practice without consulting their teachers. eschew political or organisational allegiances Laskar Jihad, the militia established to wage jihad because they divide the Muslim community in Ambon was forced to disband after one important and divert attention from study of the faith and Saudi scholar concluded it had strayed from its propagation of salafi principles; original purpose. The fact that the Saudi sheikhs most frequently consulted by Indonesian salafis are reject oath-taking to a leader -- central to the themselves close to the Saudi government is another organisational structure of groups like JI; brake on any attraction within the movement to Osama bin Laden. Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix ICG Asia Report N°83, 13 September 2004 Page ii A major split within Indonesian salafism is between That said, ICG's information suggests that most salafi "purists", who reject any association with groups or jihadis are not recruited from salafi schools but rather individuals willing to compromise religious purity from schools linked to Darul Islam or JI itself; urban for political goals, and more tolerant and inclusive mosques; and areas with a history of communal groups willing to acknowledge some good even in conflict. The report examines the few concrete cases deviant teachings. The "purists" categorically reject known of salafis who have crossed into or out of JI. the Muslim Brotherhood and its Indonesian offshoot, Drawing on their own writings, it looks in depth at the the political party PKS, as well as organisations like difference between salafis and salafi jihadis. Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jemaah Tabligh, and Darul Islam. Not only will they not interact with them, but they More than ever, there is need for an empirical study also reject funding from any source that has deviant of the educational backgrounds of known JI- organisations among its grantees. members, but ICG concludes that salafism in Indonesia is not the security threat sometimes Ironically, this means that the most "radical" of the portrayed. It may come across to outsiders as salafis are the most immune to jihadist teachings, intolerant or reactionary, but for the most part it is and the more "moderate", those more open to other not prone to terrorism, in part because it is so streams of thought, may provide slightly more inwardly focused on faith. fertile recruiting grounds for the jihadis. Southeast Asia/Brussels, 13 September 2004 ICG Asia Report N°83 13 September 2004 INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: WHY SALAFISM AND TERRORISM MOSTLY DON'T MIX I. INTRODUCTION dictate, control and correct individual behaviour, and takes the form of occasional punitive actions against individuals or groups regarded as 'bad Muslims'".2 Increased attention to Indonesian links with religious Most Indonesian salafis would not even go that far. institutions in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, and to the salafi movement, the propagation That said, things become complicated when some -- of a puritanical form