An In-Depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network
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The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2004, Article 2 An In‐depth Look at the Jemaah Islamiyah Network Yanina Golburt Seeking to destabilize regional governments Background and cultivate cooperation and sharing of Abdullah Sungkar, co‐founder of the Pondok resources with homegrown terrorist and Ngruki schooling network in Central Java in 1971, separatist groups, the radical Islamist Indonesian established JI in Malaysia in group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), poses a significant 1995 as an “ideological JI envisions the threat to the United States and its interests. The hybrid” of Darul Islam and 2 founding of an Islamic umbrella terrorist network exploits Southeast Saudi Wahhabism. Asia’s lax security controls to set up front Sungkar found inspiration state, Daulah Islamiyah companies, fundraise, forge documents, and in radical thinkers that Nusantara, which purchase weapons. The predominantly weak promoted literal would include states of the region suffer from limited reach of interpretations of Islam, Malaysia, Indonesia, law enforcement, poor border controls, and such as Hassan al‐Banna, southern Thailand, the underdeveloped financial institutions that founder of the Egyptian southern Philippines combine to provide fertile ground for JI’s growth. Muslim Brotherhood, and Political and logistical difficulties in monitoring Sayyid Qutb, who and Singapore. Islamic charity networks, Islamic banks, and espoused doctrines money‐laundering operations encourage the legitimizing militant Jihad against non‐Islamic growth of the organization through the creation of regimes. JI envisions the founding of an Islamic Al Qaeda syndicates and cooperation with state, Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara, which would organized crime networks. Poverty and include Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand, 3 underdevelopment further encourage terrorist the southern Philippines and Singapore. Based sympathizers and recruits in the Muslim region of on its desire to replicate the pristine Islam of the Thailand, where a large part of the youth have founding ancestors (salaf), JI “justifie[s] violence attended Saudi funded schools (pendoks), and against Muslim rulers who suppressed Islamic 1 follow a stringent brand of Wahhabism. This law… as well as violence against Americans and article examines the JI organization in depth and ‘Crusaders’ promoting secular societies presents the internal debate among terrorism responsible for the subjugation of Islam since the 4 scholars concerning the nature of the JI – Al abolition of the caliphate in 1924.” In October of Qaeda link. In this context, it will assess the JI’s 2002, the organization’s current spiritual leader, threat potential to harm U.S. interests in Southeast Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, delivered a sermon that Asia and conclude with policy recommendations marked a public shift away from JI’s strategy of a to contain the organization. purely internal struggle against corrupt Muslim rulers; he preached that Americans are directing © Al Nakhlah – The Fletcher School –Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah Indonesian affairs and assault Islam by are usually a recycled group of experienced field orchestrating bombings and libels aimed at commanders that are given two months extra 5 weakening the defenders of the faith. Attacking training and then deployed to engage in bombing 9 Western and U.S. interests may have replaced, if campaigns. In addition to ideology and the not overtaken, the primary focus on Indonesian common Afghani experience that draws and Christian targets, as the attacks on a nightclub in inspires the organization’s core membership, an Bali in 2002 and on the Australian embassy in intricate network of arranged marriages between Jakarta in 2004 have demonstrated. Moreover, JI subordinates and leaders creates a “giant bombers now seem much more willing to create extended family” that helps keep the organization 10 mass casualties among fellow Muslims by secure. choosing so‐called “soft targets” such as malls, hotels, and restaurants. Training Training is essential to the military character Structure of the JI network. It provides a sense of purpose, JI is characterized by a depth of leadership expands its capabilities, increases religious fervor 6 that gives it a regenerative capacity. The Amir, and commitment, and produces a new generation who stands at the apex of JI’s hierarchy, appoints of fighters and instructors. Sungkar began and presides over governing, religious, fatwa, and sending groups of recruits to Afghanistan years disciplinary councils. The governing council is before JI formally came into being—an experience headed by a central that shaped their worldview, provided them with Marriages are a way to command that sets policy combat skills, and formed a bond among the bring siblings and and determines operations, Indonesian trainees and members of Al Qaeda. relatives into JI and controls the leaders of All of Sungkar’s early followers trained in a camp activities, and the the four mantiqis and the led by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a mujahideen with heads of wakalahs. close ties to the Saudi religious establishment and reliability of a wife is Mantiqis resemble to Osama bin Laden, who at the time assisted often a criterion for territorially based with the international recruitment of mujahideen. formal JI membership. administrative structures The Afghan war and the Sayyaf camp became the and are equivalent to training and bonding ground for most of JI’s elite. 7 regions, while wakalahs correspond to districts. There, they took extensive three‐year military and Each of the four regional divisions assumes religious courses, became experienced instructors, different functions through independently and encountered non‐Indonesian fighters from 11 operating cells. Mantiqi I cells cover Singapore Pakistan, the Philippines, and Egypt. and Malaysia and provide JI with economic A Saudi funding shortage in 1995 forced resources to support its operations; Mantiqi II Sungkar to relocate the Afghan training camps to cells operate in most of Indonesia, and consider the geographically closer southern Philippines. the area to be the target area for jihadi operations; The new location also featured an Indonesian Mantiqi III covers Mindanao, Sabah, and Sulawesi community able to provide a strong support 12 and its cells are responsible for training; Mantiqi structure to recruits. In 1996, Mukhlis, an IV includes Papua and Australia and cells deal “Afghan alumnus” and now a commander of the with fundraising. Radwan Issamudin, known as Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Hambali, was the overall head of the Mantiqis established a JI cell within the MILF main base at 8 before his arrest in 2003. Camp Abu Bakr. The location offered JI ready The senior Afghan veterans that constitute access to weaponry, explosives and cheaper the core of JI’s leadership try to recruit candidates training facilities and provided JI members with from conflict areas, since these individuals will real combat experience through participation in 13 require little additional training. Participants can the local Mindanao conflict. MILF and JI be recruited outside of the official structure, but operated on the principle of reciprocity, including © Al Nakhlah – The Fletcher School –Tufts University Fall 2004, Article 2 3 the agreement that MILF would accommodate JI the reliability of a wife is often a criterion for 21 fighters in its camps. In return, JI was to assist the formal JI membership. The impeccable lineage of MILF in conducting bombings in the Mindanao one’s wife enhances a member’s standing within 14 conflict. The goal in establishing the camp was the organization and increases his network 22 to replicate Afghanistan training as closely as potential. possible, featuring the same instructors. The pre‐ Religious and financial incentives and the selected recruits received an all‐expenses‐paid appeal of solidarity entice both well‐educated and training that included military, engineering, self‐ poor JI recruits from a variety of countries. defense and leadership instruction. An obligatory Spiritual emptiness is the original incentive that 15 period of service to JI was thus created. After the attracts most young men to seek out charismatic 23 Philippine armed forces destroyed Camp Abu preachers. Many of the Singaporean JI members Bakr in 2000, JI moved its training facilities to first looked for religious training to become better Poso, Central Sulawesi, where the Muslims Muslims and became awed by Ibrahim Maidin, practiced a more fundamental form of Islam, thus the leader of the Singaporean wakalah, and his increasing the organization’s ability to wage Jihad participation in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda 16 through increased recruiting and support. training. The members of this Singapore cell were The conflicts in Maluku and Poso were not marginalized elements, but had found critical to JI’s recruitment strategy and, according purpose through belonging to a radical cause, to ICG, “those conflicts may have taken the place even one which was to be of Afghanistan and the southern Philippines as realized through terrorist Solidarity, i.e. empathy 24 training centers, not just for Indonesian Islamic violence. Similarly, many with the suffering of radicals but for non‐Indonesians linked to JI as of the Malaysian JI cell 17 fellow Muslims, well.” While the training in Afghanistan enjoyed members were well international