DOCSLIB.ORG

Geography of Poverty in Mali

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Geography of Poverty in Mali Report No. 88880-ML Public Disclosure Authorized Mali Geography of Poverty in Mali April 23, 2015 Public Disclosure Authorized PREM 4 Africa Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of the World Bank CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate as of March, 2015) Currency unit = CFA franc (CFAF) US$1.00 = CFAF 610 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset AFD African Development Bank AFISMA Afican-led International Support Mission to Mali AICD Africa Infrastruture Country Diagnostic AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb CID Center for International Development CPI Consumer Price Inflation CSLP Cadre Stratégique de Lutte Contre la Pauvreté (Poverty Reduction Strategy) DNSI Discrimination and National Security Initiative ELIM Enquête Intégrée auprès des Ménages EMEP Enquête Malienne sur l’Evaluation de la Pauvreté EMOP Enquête Modulaire et Permanente auprès des Ménages F CFA Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine FEWSNET Famine Early Warning Systems Network GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographic Information System IDP Internal Development Program IED Improvised Explosive Devises IMF International Monetary Fund INSTAT Institut National de la Statistique MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey MICS Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali NOREF Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre PAPC Post-conflict Assistance Project PIB Gross Domestic Product RGPH Recensement Général de la Population et de l’Habitat UEMOA West African States Monetary Union UN United Nations USD US dollar WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union WDI World Development Indicators Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Sector Director: Ana Revenga Country Director: Paul Noumba Um Sector Manager: Pablo Fajnzylber Task Team Leader: Johannes Hoogeveen i Table of Contents Aknowledgements .................................................................................................................... v Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ vi Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 Mali by Agglomeration Type ............................................................................ 5 A. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 5 B. Classifying Mali by population density and size of the locality ......................................................... 6 C. Population Characteristics .................................................................................................................. 9 D. Spatial distribution of economic activities ........................................................................................ 14 E. Urban expansion and income growth................................................................................................ 19 F. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 21 Mali by Livelihood Zone ................................................................................. 23 A. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 23 B. Livelihood zones in Mali .................................................................................................................. 23 C. Income and wealth ............................................................................................................................ 26 D. Patterns of consumption .................................................................................................................... 32 E. Access to services ............................................................................................................................. 34 F. Characteristics of poor households across livelihood zones ............................................................. 37 G. Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 39 Explaining Well-being Using a Spatial Perspective ...................................... 42 A. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 42 B. Consumption ..................................................................................................................................... 42 C. New poverty lines for this report ...................................................................................................... 46 D. Poverty and poverty trends ............................................................................................................... 48 E. Caution When Interpreting poverty .................................................................................................. 59 F. Consumption and poverty and since 2010 ........................................................................................ 62 G. Ownership of assets .......................................................................................................................... 64 H. Other correlates of welfare ................................................................................................................ 65 I. Consumption regression.................................................................................................................... 69 J. Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 73 Spatial Challenges to Service Delivery: Trading off Equity, Efficiency and Quality 76 A. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 76 B. Unit costs and the delivery of services.............................................................................................. 76 C. Education: access versus quality ....................................................................................................... 78 D. Electricity .......................................................................................................................................... 89 E. Access to markets and roads ............................................................................................................. 91 F. Discussion ......................................................................................................................................... 97 Poverty Reduction and Growth in the Face of Spatial Challenges ........... 100 A. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 100 B. Poverty reduction requires accelerated growth ............................................................................... 100 C. Growth between 2000 and 2013 ..................................................................................................... 103 D. Spatially conscious strategies for accelerating growth ................................................................... 107 ii Annex Annex 1: Services trade policies for Member States of WAEMU ........................................................... 112 List of Tables Table 2.1: City size and city rank (1987, 1998 and 2009) ............................................................................ 9 Table 2.2: Household characteristics by agglomeration type ..................................................................... 10 Table 2.3: Sorting of internal migrants (ages 15-64) by education level (2009) ........................................ 12 Table 2.4: Access to basic utilities (2009) .................................................................................................. 13 Table 2.5: Decomposition of the change in poverty between 2001 and 2010 ............................................ 20 Table 3.1: Wealth Characteristics According to Livelihood Zone ............................................................. 30 Table 3.2: Market access by livelihood zone .............................................................................................. 34 Table 3.3: Population density and access to basic utilities by livelihood zone (2009) ............................... 36 Table 4.1: Poverty incidence by livelihood zone ........................................................................................ 51 Table 4.2: Determinants of per capita consumption ................................................................................... 72 Table 5.1: Net enrollment in primary and secondary schools ..................................................................... 78 Table 5.2: Summary Data for Primary and Secondary Schools .................................................................. 86 Table 5.3: Percent of population living within a certain distance from a school ........................................ 88 Table 5.4: Road type and state of maintenance........................................................................................... 96 Table 7.1: Population estimates for
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Conflict's Complexity in Northern Mali Calls for Tailored Solutions
    Policy Note 1, 2015 By Ole Martin Gaasholt Who needs to reconcile with whom? The Conflict’s Complexity in Northern Mali Calls for Tailored Solutions PHOTO: MARC DEVILLE/GETTY IMAGES While negotiations are taking place in Algiers, some observers insist on the need for reconciliation between Northern Mali and the rest of the country and particularly between Tuareg and other Malians. But the Tuareg are a minority in Northern Mali and most of them did not support the rebels. So who needs to be reconciled with whom? And what economic solutions will counteract conflict? This Policy Note argues that not only exclusion underlies the conflict, but also a lack of economic opportunities. The important Tuareg component in most rebellions in Mali does not mean that all Tuareg participate or even support the rebellions. ll the rebellions in Northern Mali the peoples of Northern Mali, which they The Songhay opposed Tuareg and Arab have been initiated by Tuareg, typi- called Azawad, and not just of the Tuareg. rebels in the 1990s, whereas many of them cally from the Kidal region, whe- There has thus been a sequence of joined Islamists controlling Northern Mali in reA the first geographically circumscribed rebellions in Mali in which the Tuareg 2012. Very few Songhay, or even Arabs, joined rebellion broke out a few years after inde- component has been important. In the Mouvement National pour la Libération pendence in 1960. Tuareg from elsewhere addition, there have been complex de l’Azawad (MNLA), despite the claim that in Northern Mali have participated in later connections between the various conflicts, Azawad was a multiethnic territory.
    [Show full text]
  • Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali
    United Nations S/2016/1137 Security Council Distr.: General 30 December 2016 Original: English Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali I. Introduction 1. By its resolution 2295 (2016), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2017 and requested me to report on a quarterly basis on its implementation, focusing on progress in the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. II. Major political developments A. Implementation of the peace agreement 2. On 23 September, on the margins of the general debate of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, I chaired, together with the President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a ministerial meeting aimed at mitigating the tensions that had arisen among the parties to the peace agreement between July and September, giving fresh impetus to the peace process and soliciting enhanced international support. Following the opening session, the event was co-chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and African Integration of Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, and the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Algeria, Ramtane Lamamra, together with the Under - Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. In the Co-Chairs’ summary of the meeting, the parties were urged to fully and sincerely maintain their commitments under the agreement and encouraged to take specific steps to swiftly implement the agreement. Those efforts notwithstanding, progress in the implementation of the agreement remained slow. Amid renewed fighting between the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and the Platform coalition of armed groups, key provisions of the agreement, including the establishment of interim authorities and the launch of mixed patrols, were not put in place.
    [Show full text]
  • Algeria–Mali Trade: the Normality of Informality
    101137 DEMOCRACY Public Disclosure Authorized AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ERF 21st ANNUAL CONFERENCE March 20-22, 2015 | Gammarth, Tunisia 2015 Public Disclosure Authorized Algeria–Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality Sami Bensassi, Anne Brockmeyer, Public Disclosure Authorized Matthieu Pellerin and Gael Raballand Public Disclosure Authorized Algeria–Mali Trade: The Normality of Informality Sami Bensassi Anne Brockmeyer Mathieu Pellerin Gaël Raballand1 Abstract This paper estimates the volume of informal trade between Algeria and Mali and analyzes its determinants and mechanisms, using a multi-pronged methodology. First, we discuss how subsidy policies and the legal framework create incentives for informal trade across the Sahara. Second, we provide evidence of the importance of informal trade, drawing on satellite images and surveys with informal traders in Mali and Algeria. We estimate that the weekly turnover of informal trade fell from approximately US$ 2 million in 2011 to US$ 0.74 million in 2014, but continues to play a crucial role in the economies of northern Mali and southern Algeria. Profit margins of 20-30% on informal trade contribute to explaining the relative prosperity of northern Mali. We also show that official trade statistics are meaningless in this context, as they capture less than 3% of total trade. Finally, we provide qualitative evidence on informal trade actors and mechanisms for the most frequently traded products. JEL classification codes: F14, H26, J46. Keywords: informal trade, Algeria, Mali, fuel, customs. 1 The authors would like to thank Mehdi Benyagoub for his help on this study, Laurent Layrol for his work on satellite images, Nancy Benjamin and Olivier Walther for their comments and Sabra Ledent for editing.
    [Show full text]
  • Mali Enhanced Market Analysis 2019
    FEWS NET Mali Enhanced Market Analysis 2019 MALI ENHANCED MARKET ANALYSIS JUNE 2019 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Chemonics International Inc. for the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), contract number AID-OAA-I-12-00006. The authors’Famine views Early expressed Warning inSystem this publications Network do not necessarily reflect the views of the 1 United States Agency for International Development or the United States government. FEWS NET Mali Enhanced Market Analysis 2019 About FEWS NET Created in response to the 1984 famines in East and West Africa, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) provides early warning and integrated, forward-looking analysis of the many factors that contribute to food insecurity. FEWS NET aims to inform decision makers and contribute to their emergency response planning; support partners in conducting early warning analysis and forecasting; and provide technical assistance to partner-led initiatives. To learn more about the FEWS NET project, please visit www.fews.net. Disclaimer This publication was prepared under the United States Agency for International Development Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) Indefinite Quantity Contract, AID-OAA-I-12-00006. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States government. Acknowledgments FEWS NET gratefully acknowledges the network of partners in Mali who contributed their time, analysis, and data to make this report possible. Recommended Citation FEWS NET. 2019. Mali Enhanced Market Analysis. Washington, DC: FEWS NET.
    [Show full text]
  • Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet: Mali
    May 2021 Climate, Peace and Security Fact Sheet Mali Dormino UN Photo/Marco Photo: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS: Mali is characterised by short-term climate variability, and is vulnerable to long-term climate change due to high exposure to the adverse effects The UN Security Council (UNSC) should task the United Nations of climate change, but also high population growth, diminished resilience Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and multiple violent conflicts. Mali is forecast to become hotter with (MINUSMA) with incorporating climate, peace and security more erratic rainfall, impacting seasonal regularity and increasing the risks as a higher-order priority in its mandate. MINUSMA should risk of droughts and floods. Moreover, conflict, political instability and report to the UNSC on climate security, its effects on the mission weak government institutions undermine effective adaptation to climate mandate, and actions taken to address these problems. change. The UNSC should encourage MINUSMA to work with UN • Climate change may impact seasonal regularity and jeopardise Environment Programme (UNEP) to appoint an Environmental natural resource-based livelihoods. Livelihood insecurity can Security Advisor for prioritising climate, peace and security risks interact with political and economic factors to increase the risk within MINUSMA and for coordinating effective responses with of conflicts over natural resource access and use. the rest of the UN system, the Malian government, civil society, international and regional partners. The Advisor should support • Conflict, agricultural development and changing environmental capacity-building for analysis, reporting and coordinating conditions have affected migratory livestock routes, pushing responses to climate, peace and security risks – particularly in herders into areas where natural resources are under pressure the Malian government and MINUSMA divisions that regularly or shared use is not well defined.
    [Show full text]
  • Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions
    Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions: How the past and present explain each other Oumar Ba Working Paper No. 007 Sahel Research Group Working Paper No. 007 Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions: How the past and present explain each other Oumar Ba March 2014 The Sahel Research Group, of the University of Florida’s Center for African Studies, is a collaborative effort to understand the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the countries which comprise the West African Sahel. It focuses primarily on the six Francophone countries of the region—Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—but also on in developments in neighboring countries, to the north and south, whose dy- namics frequently intersect with those of the Sahel. The Sahel Research Group brings together faculty and gradu- ate students from various disciplines at the University of Florida, in collaboration with colleagues from the region. Abstract: This article stresses the importance of history in understanding the cyclical pattern of Tuareg rebellions in Mali. I argue that history and narratives of bravery, resistance, and struggle are important in the discursive practice of Tuareg nationalism. This discourse materializes in the episodic rebellions against the Malian state. The cyclical pattern of the Tuareg rebellions is caused by institutional shortcomings such as the failure of the Malian state to follow through with the clauses that ended the previous rebellions. But, more importantly, the previous rebellions serve as historical and cultural markers for subsequent rebellions, which creates a cycle of mutually retrospective reinforcement mechanisms. About the Author: Oumar Ba is a Ph.
    [Show full text]
  • The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (CSA)
    PA-X, Peace Agreement Access Tool (Translation © University of Edinburgh) www.peaceagreements.org AGREEMENT FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN MALI RESULTING FROM THE ALGIERS PROCESS 1 PA-X, Peace Agreement Access Tool (Translation © University of Edinburgh) www.peaceagreements.org Preamble We, the Government of the Republic of Mali and the signatory movements of the road map at Algiers on July 24, 2014, hereinafter known as the Parties; Meeting at Algiers within the framework of the negotiations defined by the roadmap to reach an Agreement for a global and durable peace, in order to guarantee a definitive solution to the crisis in Northern Mali, known by some as Azawad; Expressing our deep gratitude to Algeria, as leader of the Mediation Team, as well as the Economic Community of West African States (la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de Ouest, CEDEAO), the African Union (l’Union Africaine, UA), the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (l’Organisation pour la Coopération Islamique, OCI), Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, members of the Mediation Team; Having carried out an in-depth analysis of the situation in Mali, in general, and in particular of the nature of the crises which periodically affect the regions of Northern Mali; Determined to deal definitively with the basic causes of the present situation, and to bring about genuine national reconciliation by reappropriating history through national unity, while respecting the human diversity which characterises
    [Show full text]
  • France's War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army
    CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and EDUCATION AND THE ARTS decisionmaking through research and analysis. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service INFRASTRUCTURE AND of the RAND Corporation. TRANSPORTATION INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY Support RAND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Browse Reports & Bookstore TERRORISM AND Make a charitable contribution HOMELAND SECURITY For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Corporation View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. C O R P O R A T I O N France’s War in Mali Lessons for an Expeditionary Army Michael Shurkin Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr770 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.
    [Show full text]
  • Mali Refugee and IDP Settlements
    Mali Gross Cell Product in 1990 Chronic Complex Emergency: Mali The Northern Region of Mali has been in high rates of conflict since 2011-2013, but has previously suffered chronic armed and fatal political violence. The continued uprisings of the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA) have lead to persistent conflict in the states. The MNLA’s overall goal is secession of the Northern region of Mali. This region has also hosted Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) for several years. Along with this chronic nature of political violence, the northern part of Mali is subject to high rates of natural disasters occurrence. This region has been economically and politically marginalized by southern governments, leading to chronic under-development in a country where 50% of the population lives on less than $1.25 a day. Conflict GDP Timbuktu Gao Kayes Mopti Segou Bamako Sikasso Mali Natural Disasters from 2000 to 2011 Gross Cell Product (1990, 1995 US $) PPP Mali Refugee and IDP settlements Western Sahara Ethnic Geography (number of ethnic communities in each district) Environmental Disasters Main_Towns 0 - 35 000 000 Western Sahara # Refugees & IDPs Settlements 35 000 000 - 79 000 000 79 000 000 - 142 000A 0l0g0eria 0 75 150 300 Miles 142 000 000 - 231 000 000 Algeria 231 000 000- 480 000 000 Mauritania Mauritania # Kidal Timbuktu Mali Mali Gao # Nagara Gao # # # Niger ##Techibe Niger Kayes Mopti Aite#Aouru ## # SameKayesTambakara Segou Senegal Senegal Bamako Burkina Faso Burkina Faso # # Sikasso Faragouaran Sikasso# Loulouni Guinea Nigeria Guinea Benin Nigeria Benin Ghana Sierra Leone Ghana Togo Côte d'Ivoire Togo Côte d'Ivoire Sierra Leone 0 100 200 400 Miles Liberia Liberia 0 75 150 300 Miles Number of Natural Disasters Drought, Flood and Flash Flood 3 4 - 5 6 7 8 - 9.
    [Show full text]
  • MINUSMA's 2021 in Uncertain Times
    MINUSMA’s 2021 Mandate Renewal in uncertain times Arthur Boutellis Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2021 ISBN: 978-82-7002-350-9 Any views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be re-published in part or in full without the permission of NUPI and the authors. Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d Address: P.O. Box 8159 Dep. NO-0033 Oslo, Norway Internet: effectivepeaceops.net | www.nupi.no E-mail: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 99 40 50 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 Cover photo: UNPhoto / MINUSMA Investigates Human Rights Violations in Bankass Area MINUSMA’s 2021 mandate renewal in uncertain times Author Arthur Boutellis Data Visuals Jose Luengo-Cabrera EPON series editor Cedric DeConing Contents Acknowledgements 5 List of figures 7 Executive summary 9 Introduction 11 1. Brief history of MINUSMA 13 2. Assessing the effectiveness of MINUSMA since 2019 17 2.1. Supporting the Peace Process 17 2.2. Supporting PoC and the re-establishment of state authority in Central Mali 20 2.3. Supporting the 18-month Malian political transition 25 2.4. The relationship between MINUSMA and other forces 27 3. Implications for MINUSMA’s mandate renewal 33 3.1. The first strategic priority: The Peace Process 34 3.2. The second strategic priority: Central Mali 35 3.3. Supporting the Malian Transition within the framework of existing two strategic priorities 36 3.4.
    [Show full text]
  • MALI Northern Takeover Internally Displaces at Least 118,000 People
    1 October 2012 MALI Northern takeover internally displaces at least 118,000 people Few could have predicted that Mali, long considered a beacon of democ- racy in West Africa, would in less than a year see half its territory overrun by Islamic militants and a tenth of its northern population internally dis- placed. Instability and insecurity result- ing from clashes between government forces and Tuareg separatists and pro- liferation of armed groups in northern Mali in the wake of a coup d’état have combined with a Sahel-wide food crisis to force some 393,000 Malians from their homes since January 2012, some 118,800 of whom are estimated to be Malians who fled the unrest in the northeastern city of Gao wait at a bus internally displaced. station in Bamako to return to Gao, September 2012. REUTERS/Adama Diarra Some 35,300 people are displaced across Mali’s vast three northern regions, living in town with host fami- lies or out in the open in makeshift shelters. Most of the 83,400 IDPs who have taken refuge in the south are staying with host families. Both IDPs and host families face severe shortages of food, access to health care and basic necessities. Many IDPs have lost their sources of livelihoods and children’s education has been severely jeopardised. The nascent government of national unity, which took power in August 2012 after prolonged instability, has taken some steps to respond to health, nutrition and education needs but serious concerns remain for the vast majority of the displaced who still lack access to basic services.
    [Show full text]
  • The Roots of Mali's Conflict
    The roots of Mali’s conflict The roots Mali’s of The roots of Mali’s conflict Moving beyond the 2012 crisis CRU Report Grégory Chauzal Thibault van Damme The roots of Mali’s conflict Moving beyond the 2012 crisis Grégory Chauzal Thibault van Damme CRU report March 2015 The Sahel Programme is supported by March 2015 © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. About the authors Grégory Chauzal is a senior research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. He specialises in Mali/Sahel issues and develops the Maghreb-Sahel Programme for the Institute. Thibault Van Damme works for Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit as a project assistant for the Maghreb-Sahel Programme. About CRU The Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ is a think tank and diplomatic academy on international affairs. The Conflict Research Unit (CRU) is a specialized team within the Institute, conducting applied, policy-oriented research and developing practical tools that assist national and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations in their engagement in fragile and conflict-affected situations. Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/ Table of Contents Acknowledgements 6 Executive summary 8 Introduction 10 1. The 2012 crisis: the fissures of a united insurrection 10 2. A coup in the south 12 3.
    [Show full text]