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27 February 2002 Ever perfidious Albion by T C A Srinivasaraghavan possible to project power by means of Pakistan’s importance grew out of this. It is never easy to write a riveting book long range aircraft. This reduced the role What happened thereafter is now on a subject that has been written about of sea-based power. The oil reserves of common knowledge. Basically, when as extensively as Kashmir has. And if you the Middle East then ensured that it is Pakistan decided to capture Kashmir by are a former civil servant or a diplomat that region that needed to be defended. force, the British, in spite of being fully not accustomed to the rigours of writing, India’s importance diminished. aufait with the realities of the situation, one must assume that it would be even Mr Dasgupta writes that as India’s played a pro-Pakistani game. Albion, even harder to do so. independence approached, the British in the dying days, proved as perfidious Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, a as ever. former diplomat, has managed However, there are two very the feat with admirable interesting aspects of the book that dexterity. He tells the story of deserve special mention. The first what happened in those crucial concerns the crisis in Junagarh, and months immediately after the second the role played by Lord Independence in a degree of Mountbatten. detail and simplicity of style that By a strange quirk of history, Indians ought to give any good historian have forgotten what really happened a run for his money. in Junagarh, thus allowing Pakistan The core of Mr Dasgupta’s to throw it on our faces whenever thesis is fairly well known Kashmir is discussed. The fact is and it has also been recently that Junagarh had a predominantly publicised in newspapers. It is Hindu population with a Muslim that almost immediately after ruler who opted for Pakistan. This is they granted India and Pakistan remembered. their independence, the British, What is not remembered, however, in pursuit of their oil interests in is that Jawaharlal Nehru offered to the Middle East, decided to side Pakistan that a plebiscite should be with Pakistan. held in Junagarh and if the people Not just this. As the former voted in favour for Pakistan, India colonial power that knew would not object to it becoming a everything that was worth part of Pakistan. It was Pakistan that knowing about the region, they refused a plebiscite. also deeply influenced American As for the role of Lord Mountbatten, policy towards India and Mr Dasgupta reminds us that while Pakistan. The effects of that are he may have been a friend of India, still being felt and perhaps only he was by no means an enemy or now being gradually reversed. a foe of Pakistan. His fondness of Mr Dasgupta makes an War & Diplomacy in Kashmir India was always subordinated to his interesting observation. He says By C Dasgupta pursuit of British strategic interests. that until the development of air SAGE Publications It was in the pursuit of these interests power and the discovery of large Price Rs 250 that he restrained India from taking amounts of oil in the Middle military action until India finally 240 Pages East, it was India that needed decided that such restraint would to be defended, therefore, prove far too costly. It was also he British strategic policy aimed at having started a process of redrawing their who ensured that India did not extend its military bases on land and at sea around strategic doctrine. Over time, India came operations into the Poonch and Mirpur it. India also straddled the sea routes to to be seen mainly as an important military districts. India lost more than half of the Far East. base. The British strategic planners also Kashmir as a result. But all this changed when it became considered it imperative to prevent India from coming under Russian influence. 2 June 2002

Kashmir: The real picture Covering a crucial period in history, the book delves into the root of the Kashmir problem by O S Dawson other powers, in particular the United Kashmir became and remains an issue/ To be asked to review Mr C Dasgupta’s States, also contributed to influencing dispute because of Pakistani aggression. book War and Diplomacy in Kashmir developments. The British archives throw Kashmir is not the real problem nor is it 1947-48 is to experience a swift personal a fascinating light on the ways in which the central issue in Indo-Pak relations. It transition to events which took place while I the British generals and diplomats in India is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, not an was serving as a young officer in the Royal and Pakistan co-ordinated their moves envisaged by Jinnah who saw Pakistan as Indian Navy. Through a sense of belonging to contain the war and ensure that an a democratic Muslim Majority State, that is to that period, it provides an opportunity to Indian advance stopped well short of the the cause of Indo-Pak problems. Kashmir reflect upon some of the issues that have Pakistan border. General Bucher, India’s is not the cause but its pretext. become so closely woven into the fabric Commander-in-chief, kept his colleagues in The book covers a crucial period 1947- of our lives. Pakistan informed about his military plans, 48 and brings out a factual account of giving them an assurance that he would not events which have become so inextricably The author has carried out extensive advance beyond specified positions. research, shifted the focus on facts and entrenched in Indo-Pak relations. World carefully outlined the history of the region In his concluding chapter the author very opinion in favour of India can never be from the documents he has had access to. clearly brings out the role played by General expected because they have never grasped He has examined a range of issues that Cariappa, Air Vice Marshal Mukerjee and the reality of the Kashmir issue but have took place in the run up to independence, the events leading to the end of the first wrongly kept projecting the problem, as if the deceit of the British in the major politico- Indo-Pakistan war. there is some struggle against oppression military issues, with special emphasis on What is its relevance to the future? When going on. the trauma of the post strategic-divide of persons like General Musharraf harps on This book would dispel any doubts in the India that epicentered on 15 August 1947, the centrality of the Kashmir issue and minds of those unfavourably disposed the creation of Pakistan, the invasion when recently, Pakistani’s Interior Minister and hostile towards India. It indeed is a and illegal occupation of territory in the Lt General Moinuddin Haider equates valuable book of reference to policy makers, Sovereign State of Kashmir, resulting in Palestine with Kashmir it is obvious the researchers and the armed forces, besides war, which continues to emit shockwaves two have not grasped the reality of the also to those concerned in the USA, UK, to this day and beyond. Kashmir issue. other G7 countries, Pakistan and the UN. The war was unique only to the extent to What is the “reality” of Kashmir? which the two new states were vulnerable to May 1947: Lord Ismay in dialogue with British influence on account of the presence Mountbatten suggesting an attempt of British officers at the senior most levels to batkanise and break up India into of their armed forces. While India and several sovereign states. Pakistan should have been rejoicing their 23 Oct 1974: 5000 armed Pathan new found freedom from colonial rule, they tribesmen cross the Kashmir borders. became pawns in the quest of imperial The British Military and Civil officers machination. Britain was keen that both remained mute spectators. India and Pakistan should remain with a commonwealth link, with British officers 26 October 1947: But for the timely in the armed forces. By August 1947, the intervention by India at the behest British authorities had determined that of sovereign ruler Maharaja Sir Hari their strategic interests in the subcontinent Singh, the entire state would have lay primarily in Pakistan. The command been overrun and Srinagar annexed over Arabian Gulf and the Northern Indian through an act of aggression and Ocean routes for uninterrupted flow of vitally illegal occupation by Pak-sponsored important oil supplies was uppermost in tribesmen. their mind. 13 August 1948 – UN Resolution In the run up to Independence, it is evident calling for a cease-fire in Kashmir that British intrigue and Imperialism which became effective on 1 Jan conditioned many of the decisions taken 1949. by India, which were not bold or conclusive. The presence of Pakistani troops This is particularly evident during the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir constituted over Kashmir. The Defence Committee a material change in the situation. chaired by Governor General Mountbatten, The security Council decided that whose affection for India never interfered Pakistan should withdrawn all its War & Diplomacy in Kashmir with his pursuit of British interest, ensured troops and nationals from the state. By C Dasgupta that the full Indian cabinet was kept in the However, India was permitted to retain dark. Upto the end of 1947, Britain was some forces, which gave credence SAGE Publications the only overseas power with a significant conceding the legality of the state’s Price Rs 250 involvement in the Kashmir conflict. But accession to India. 240 Pages 9 April 2005

Perfidious Albion and the first Kashmir war by Sreeram Chaulia Commonwealth Relations, Noel Baker. In the legality or morality of the Indian or (A Review of Chandrashekhar Dasgupta’s the words of Mountbatten’s aide, Ismay, Pakistani case. In July 1947, Whitehall War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947- anything that brought the two dominions, issued a “Stand Down” instruction to 48 SAGE Publications, New Delhi. 2002, India and Pakistan, into a crisis “was a British authorities if hostilities broke out 240 Pages Having won accolades for more matter in which the instructions of His between the two dominions “since under than 30 years as one of the brightest and Majesty the King should be sought [by the no circumstances could British officers be best Indian Foreign Service officers, the Governor-General]” (p 21). ranged on opposite sides” (p 19). Averting legendary Chandrashekhar Dasgupta has Second, Field Marshall Auchinleck open war thus became a sine qua non of once again proved his mettle by writing remained supreme commander of the British purpose, regardless of the relative a highly original, revelatory and myth- British Indian army even after August rectitude of the two sides. shattering book on the genesis of the 15 1947, and closely conferred with “Stand Down” was not, however, meant Kashmir imbroglio. No competent historian Commanders-in-Chief Rob Lockhart and to be neutrality, leave alone benevolent until now has been able to portray the Roy Bucher, Air Chief Marshall Thomas neutrality, for the larger geopolitical undeclared 1947-8 India-Pakistan war Elmherst and a host of other generals in reassessment conducted by British over Kashmir from the standpoint of British both India and Pakistan. Their importance planners in 1946-7 was clear that “our strategic and diplomatic calculations. as trump cards for guaranteeing British strategic interests in the subcontinent lay It comes as no surprise that the strategic objectives was underlined by primarily in Pakistan” (p 17). Hopes of a Promethean “CD” (as Dasgupta is the Commonwealth Affairs Committee defense treaty with India were present admiringly called by the “old boys” of in London, which proclaimed that in but not deemed as vital as the retention his St Stephen’s College, Delhi, and in an emergency involving India and of Pakistan, “particularly the North West”, the diplomatic corps) decided to fill the Pakistan, “the Minister of Defense, in within the commonwealth. The bases, gap with a lucid and well-referenced consultation with the Secretary of State airfield and ports of the North West were treatise on the perfidies of Whitehall for Commonwealth Relations, should send invaluable for commonwealth defense. and its representatives who remained in instructions to the Supreme Commander” Besides, the UK chiefs of staff reasoned authoritative positions on the subcontinent (p 33). Throughout the Kashmir war, Nehru that Pakistan had to be kept on board to even after formal transfer of power to the and Patel had occasions to be furious with preserve British “strategic positions in the domains of India and Pakistan. the solicitation of external instructions by Middle East and North Africa”. Employing British commanders who owed primary typical communal logic, the former colonial While the origins of the Kashmir conflict loyalties to London. masters also felt that estranging Pakistan are highly contested by both the claimant would harm Britain’s relations with the parties and this debated history has With nationals of a third country leading the opposing armies and top executive “whole Mussulman bloc”, a premise that produced several partisan as well as would be fatal when the Kashmir war came impartial accounts, Dasgupta’s work is the structures of India and Pakistan, the Kashmir war of 1947-8 was unique in the up before the UN Security Council. Briefed first to unearth the complex military and that the “area of Pakistan is strategically diplomatic decision-making in the crowded annals of modern warfare, yet fell into the predictable pattern of third world conflicts the most important in the continent of 15-month war that was influenced and India and the majority of our strategic distorted by Britain. that were “moderated” or “finessed” by great power pressures. Without full requirements could be met … by an British aces on the eve of the Kashmir national control over respective armies, agreement with Pakistan alone” (p 17), crisis India and (to a lesser extent) Pakistan Mountbatten and the British personnel on Immediately after Indian and Pakistani were unable to determine the course and the ground knew whom not to displease independence, by a peculiar quirk of outcome of the war as their political elites if it really came to a choice between India circumstances, Britain had a number wished. and Pakistan. of “men on the spot” at its disposal to Twin British ‘instructions’ and the Prelude in Junagadh protect and buttress its interests. First, fatal tilte A curtain-raiser to this tilt came over the governor-general and head of state Two broad British interests, conveyed and the disputed accession of Junagadh in in India was Lord Louis Mountbatten of September 1947, when British service the British Royal Navy. True to his blue- acted out through Mountbatten and other operatives, were at stake in an India- chiefs tried to falsely convince Nehru and blooded lineage and decorated career Patel that the Indian army was “in no rendering yeoman service to “His Majesty, Pakistan war. One was integrity of the commonwealth and avoidance of inter- position to conduct large-scale operations” the King of England”, Mountbatten took to flush out the Nawab’s private army regular “appreciations” and advice on his dominion warfare. Reduced to a “half great power” by 1945, London foresaw immense from neighboring Mangrol. Patel rebutted role in India from Clement Attlee, Defense bitterly to Mountbatten, “senior British Minister Alexander Albert, the UK chiefs of prestige and economic and political merit in retaining both India and Pakistan in its officers owed loyalty to and took orders staff, British high commissioners in Delhi from Auchinleck rather than the Indian and Karachi, and the Secretary of State for sphere of influence and knew the dangers inherent in taking sides, irrespective of government” (p 26). The governor-general, who constituted a defense committee of more forceful policies - air interdiction of and thus convey to the USSR divisions in the cabinet during the stand-off appointing Afridi invasion routes and even a counter- the “Anglo-Saxon camp”, Washington himself, not Nehru, as the chairman, attack into West Pakistan to “strike at reluctantly followed the British agenda. backed off and allowed Junagadh’s bases and nerve centres of the raiders”. American ambassador to India, Grady, incorporation into the Indian union, not A desperate Moutbatten then mooted went on record saying the US “would before cheekily suggesting “lodging a complaint against the tribal invasion to have adopted a more sympathetic attitude complaint to the United Nations against the United Nations as the proper course to India, had it not been for the pressure Junagadh’s act of aggression”. Kashmir of action and simultaneously promised full exerted by the British delegates”. Even would be a different kettle of tea because military preparations for a counter-attack. as loyal a Briton as Mountbatten had to Pakistan had a much greater interest in it Nehru accepted this in good faith, hoping record, “power politics and not impartiality and the British were wary of the dangers of the British service chiefs would keep their are governing the attitude of the Security “losing” Pakistan from their grand strategic part of the agreement. “This proved to be Council” (p 123). Attlee himself was chessboard. a fatal error. The Governor-General was disturbed at the undue discretion Noel Constraining India at war determined to thwart the cabinet” (p 101). Baker was exercising in New York and General Bucher saw to it that no measures wrote: “all the concessions are being Before the Pakistani “tribal” invasion were made for a lightning strike across the asked from India, while Pakistan concedes of Kashmir in October 1947, General border and Britain also imposed a sudden little or nothing. The attitude still seems to Lockhart was secretly informed by his cut in oil supplies in early 1948, with be that it is India which is at fault whereas British counterpart in Rawalpindi of the serious implications for India’s capacity to the complaint was rightly lodged against preparations underway for the raids. carry out military operations in Kashmir. Pakistan” (p 129). Following a rethink by The commander-in-chief shared the the major players, the April resolutions crucial information with his two other Ismay, Mountbatten’s chief of staff and of the UNSC, despite Noel Baker’s best British service chiefs but not with the British high commissioner to India, Shone, efforts, called for withdrawal of the Indian government (Nehru discovered this reported to London that Pakistan was “the invaders from “Azad Kashmir” for which delinquency only in December, leading to guilty state conniving in actual use of force “Pakistan should use its best endeavours”, Lockhart’s dismissal). After the invasion in Kashmir” (p 58). Attlee was, of course, to be followed by a plebiscite as Nehru and the accession of Jammu and Kashmir unprepared to alienate Pakistan and “the had agreed. The August 1948 UNCIP to India, Lockhart and Mountbatten whole of Islam” and accepted the latter’s (United Nations Commission for India and worked feverishly behind the scenes to contention that Karachi could appeal to the Pakistan) resolution restated the sequential prevent inter-dominion war, which in fact tribal invaders only after a “fair” solution de-escalation with greater clarity. meant restraining Indian armed retaliation was reached in Kashmir. Noel Baker against the invading Pakistani irregulars. marshalled this thinly veiled pro-Pakistan The Bucher-Gracey deal Patel’s directive that arms be supplied approach at the Commonwealth Relations Baker’s pitch that “stabilization” of the urgently to reinforce the Maharaja’s Office and then transferred his communal situation required the induction of regular defences “was simply derailed by the bias to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in Pakistani army soldiers into Jammu and commander-in-chief acting in collusion the early months of 1948. Kashmir, though not succeeding in the with Field Marshal Auchinleck”. (p 42). British skullduggery at the UN UNSC, found another votary in General Mountbatten, privately chastising Jinnah Around the same time, the partition of Roy Bucher, Lockhart’s replacement as for actively abetting the tribal invasion, Palestine earned bitter Arab recriminations commander-in-chief of the Indian army. publicly advised the Indian government against Britain and America, and the Behind the back of his government, that it would be a folly to send munitions Foreign Office in London decided, “Arab Bucher had top-secret confabulations to a “neutral” state since Pakistan could do opinion might be further aggravated if with his British counterpart in Pakistan, the same and it would end up a full-scale British policy on Kashmir were seen as Douglas Gracey, in March 1948. An war. Nehru and Patel were certain than an being unfriendly to a Muslim state” (p 111). informal truce was agreed upon (with the informal state of war already existed and Aneurin Bevin’s pro-Pakistan line, shared assent of Pakistan premier Liaqat Ali Khan) urged an airlift of Indian armed forces by Noel Baker, meant that British proposals where Bucher promised not to launch any to relieve Srinagar from the rampaging in the Security Council were supportive of offensive into territory controlled by the Pathans. The service chiefs warned that an Pakistan on every major point. Kashmir’s “Azad Kashmir” forces and to withdraw airlift involved “great risks and dangers”, accession to India was ignored and the Indian troops from Poonch town and the but Nehru refused to be deterred. In problem of irregular invasion pushed under environs of Rajouri. “Each side would November, as the situation worsened in the carpet. “The only yardstick used by remain in undisputed military occupation of the Jammu-Poonch-Mirpur sector and Bevin and Noel-Baker was acceptability to what are roughly their present positions … Nehru asked for immediate military relief, Pakistan. Indian reactions, not to mention and it will be essential for some Pakistan Mountbatten and Lockhart painted somber legal or constitutional factors, were hardly Army troops to be employed in the Uri pictures of the incapacity of the Indian taken into account” (p 114). sector” (p 139). Upon learning of this armed forces. When Nehru still insisted on scheme, Nehru and Patel flatly rejected it Close British allies America, Canada, and action to “rid Jammu of raiders”, the British as unauthorized contradiction of their aim France were brought around to supporting slyly changed the order to mean merely of expelling occupants from the entire the Pakistani stand, but not before US “evacuating garrisons”. territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Secretary of State George Marshall In the absence of Pakistani “appeals” to plainly stated that his government “found The Bucher-Gracey deal never the raiders to withdraw and with more it difficult to deny the legal validity of materialized, but it presaged Pakistan’s evidence of invader brutalities in Kashmir, Kashmir’s accession to India” (p 121). But unilateral push of its regular battalions the Indian cabinet exhorted more and in the desire not to present a rival proposal into raider-held areas in May, a crucial movement known to Bucher in advance Venus” in Naoshera. commissioner in India could upbraid the but conveniently hidden from Nehru until Besides military aid, Pakistan’s offer of a British chief of the Indian Air Force for it was too late. Noel Baker hush-hushed defense pact elicited Noel Baker’s promise “foolish, unnecessary and provocative the violation of “Stand Down” when to return the Kashmir question to the action” (p 209)? The counter-factual Gracey personally ordered the influx of UNSC before India evacuated invaders conclusion one gleans from War and the Pakistani army with British officers into from the whole of Jammu and Kashmir. Diplomacy in Kashmir is that the history Kashmir, citing threats to British interests: In November, Britain tried mobilizing of Kashmir and of the subcontinent would “Pakistan might leave the Commonwealth; support in the UNSC for an “unconditional have been a lot different had Britain not the hostility of the Muslim population of ceasefire”, freezing the trench lines but toyed with facts and legality to serve its the world to the UK might be increased” permitting Pakistan to retain troops in ulterior ends through eminences grises in (p 160). Jammu and Kashmir. America turned it India and Pakistan or had America taken a A ‘very secret’ alliance down as “inappropriate” and inconsistent keener interest in the region and not left the nitty-gritty in the hands of its “Anglo- In September 1948, as an Indian advance with UNCIP and UNSC resolutions. John Saxon ally”. into Mirpur looked imminent, Pakistan sent Foster Dulles complained, “the present UK its deputy army chief to London on a “very approach to Kashmir appears extremely Incidentally, “CD”’s research has also secret mission” to negotiate a defense pro-Pakistan as against the middle ground” demythified Nehru’s alleged pacifism, treaty with Britain. Attlee welcomed (p 195). The final UNCIP proposals, feebleness and “softness” towards Liaqat’s demarche and the preliminary reaffirming the earlier resolutions, fell Pakistan. The Indian prime minister discussions “served to enhance the pro- short of Indian expectations, but Nehru had emerges from the narrative as, to use Pakistan tilt in British policy” (p 170). As a no other option than accepting them since a term he disapproved, a courageous reward for Pakistan’s eagerness to join the Bucher and his cohorts had convinced the “realist” who thoroughly understood West, London offered the Pakistan army cabinet with their “superior expertise” that the geopolitical and military context “hints”, “tips” and “assurances” about India was “militarily impotent”. of Kashmir. It has, of late, become Indian army plans in the last three months Conclusions fashionable in Indian politics to demean Nehru as a dreamy utopian who practiced of the Kashmir war. Most appallingly, while Drawing upon recently declassified British appeasement and squandered Indian maintaining the fa?ade of neutrality, the Foreign Office archives, “CD” has dug out advantages in foreign policy. “CD” has UK High Commission in Karachi noted, some of the most telltale and hermetically shown that whatever mistakes India made “from London, assurance had now been sealed secrets of Whitehall malfeasance in 1947-8 had to do with the sabotage of given by H M G that an attack by India on during the first Kashmir war. The much- external agents who kept Nehru in the dark west Punjab would not be tolerated” (p trumpeted British “sense of fairness” on several outstanding counts. 171, emphasis original). Bucher restricted comes unstuck in this damning book, Indian offensive action to the utmost and inducing the reader to wonder what kind In terms of policy relevance, this book relayed all vital intelligence to his opposing of neutrality it was that caused General should be read by those who currently number in Pakistan, allowing the latter to Cariappa to remark he was “fighting two advocate “third party arbitration” to solve relocate forces in most vulnerable sectors. enemies - army headquarters headed South Asian disharmony. It is useful to Attlee also bent the rules of “Stand Down” by Roy Bucher and the Pakistani army know from history that facilitators and in favor of Pakistan, what with British headed by Messervy” (p 137). What kind mediators had and have their own gooses officers planning and executing “Operation of impartiality was it that the British high to cook in Kashmir.

18 March 2002

WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN KASHMIR 1947-48 War & Diplomacy in Kashmir state for commonwealth affairs, in misleading By C Dasgupta his own prime minister and the US on the SAGE Publications dispute. It provides a history that’s little Price Rs 250; 240 Pages known to today’s and yesterday’s generation DASGUPTA is a career diplomat with a of Indians. Few of us know that in 1947 both difference. He writes well, and commendably the Pakistani and Indian armies were led by well given the fact that he’s writing on British commanders, much less that these two Kashmir, an issue that has resulted in C-in-Cs fighting under different flags came to dozens of books. He throws a startling new a clandestine understanding on negotiating light on the beginnings of the most complex a truce. Mountbatten played no small part in of problems that India has been facing the infamous sequence of the events. Does for over half a century. Based on recently the genesis of the problem matter now? It declassified documents, Dasgupta exposes does, and should have a bearing on the efforts the duplicity of the British that led to the made by India and Pakistan to clean up this Kashmir dispute and the devious role played festering wound. The book also explains the by Philip Noel-Baker, the British secretary of role of the big powers in Third World conflicts. 9 June 2002 Who Queered The Pitch For Kashmir? by Padma Ramachandran He was arrested at a most inappropriate time Mountbatten went alone. At this point, he made and the National Conference was put down Pandit Nehru promise that the will of the people Here, fresh from the printing press is a book that firmly by the maharaja, much to the chagrin would be ascertained through a plebiscite that lifts the curtain on the events that overtook us in of the Congress, with which the National would be conducted under the auspices of the Kashmir immediately on winning Independence, Conference had ties. Pandit Nehru tried to United Nations. All Jinnah had to do was to when we were still guided by our erstwhile intervene personally, but was not allowed to get give the violators of the territorial boundary an rulers, especially in military and defence into Kashmir. The fear of having to hand over order to come out and to warn them that if they matters, and depended a great deal on Britain power to Sheikh Abdulla made the maharaja did not comply, he would cut off their lines of for military equipment, stores and supplies. apprehensive about acceding to India. communication. But Lord Mountbatten refrained This was so in Pakistan, too. The difference “Patel,” says the author, “wrote to the maharaja from pressing for the withdrawal of the raiders was that we had Lord Mountbatten at the on July 3, urging him to accede to India as a first step to the settlement of the Kashmir helm and he made sure that he chaired the without any delay and reassuring him about dispute. Instead, there were wily proposals Defence Committee of Cabinet and not Pandit the Congress intentions.” By wanting Jinnah and Lord Nehru. It was at the Defence Committee that all the time the maharaja was at Mountbatten to be in joint decisions relating to pushing back the raiders last prepared to shed his earlier control of Kashmir. in Kashmir were being taken. The overriding reluctance to appointing Sheikh On November 27, when consideration at his level was to pre-empt any Abdulla to office (he signed the two prime ministers direct confrontation between India and Pakistan. the Instrument of Accession in met, Lord Ismay prepared Jawaharlal Nehru kept pressing for rapid October,) Pakistan had taken a note, which sought nationalisation of the Armed Forces, but this advantage of the delay and to reconcile the legal was not allowed to happen. The reasoning put decided to wrest Jammu and implications of Kashmir’s forward was that since Britishers headed the Kashmir by force. It launched a accession to India with the Army in both the countries, they could not fight clandestine invasion by Pakistan requirements of Pakistan’s against each other. In case of conflict, British tribesmen, ex-servicemen and expressed concern officers were required to “Stand Down” and soldiers “on leave”. Its govern- for a fair and impartial not take part. ment, then as now, disclaimed plebiscite. But again there So much importance was given to the Stand all responsibility. was an impasse, because Down order that it was made the main point The genesis of the trouble War & Diplomacy in Kashmir the raiders came to the for inaction by the British commanders at every was an agrarian uprising in By C Dasgupta Jammu side and created stage when action was sought of the Indian Poonch. Pakistan followed this SAGE Publications havoc. Despite the urgency, Army to push back the interlopers when they up by sending armed infiltrators Price Rs 250; 240 Pages the Service chiefs again raided Kashmir. against the maharaja’s forces. successfully thwarted all This book must be read if only to remove the Soon, they were poised to attack Srinagar. efforts to destroy the bridges there to stall the cobwebs about why we could not establish, on The Indian government had anticipated that incoming raiders. In addition to the problems the ground, the legal position of the accession “Pakistan would try to seize Kashmir by force of of winter and Pakistan sending in its regular of Kashmir to India. (One wishes that the arms”, and so, Sardar Patel asked the defence army into the state, India had to contend with Instrument of Accession had been signed minister to dispatch arms and ammunition to Noel Baker and his anti-Indian, pro-Pakistan earlier without any parrying.) Many “thank” Kashmir, if need be, by air. It was the Defence stand. The latter half of the book clearly explains Pandit Nehru for this legacy of uncertainty and Committee, headed by Lord Mountbatten, and the role Baker played in the United Nations to dithering in Kashmir and the resulting “Kashmir not the Cabinet, headed by Pandit Nehru, which promote his stand. Problem”, a solution for which remains elusive. was taking the decisions, unfortunately. On In Chapter XVII, the author sums up the They have repeatedly laid blame at his door for one excuse or another, the sending of arms developments: “Mountbatten made sure taking the issue to the United Nations. to Kashmir was effectively stalled by Lord that India did not extend operations upto the This book goes intensively and extensively into Mountbatten and the British commanders, Pakistan border in the Poonch and Mirpur archival material and shows that Pandit Nehru leading to loss of precious time. districts ... he foiled contingency plans for a had been badly cornered. It shows where the Then, as now, the world was counselling counter strike across the Pakistani border while onus might rightly be placed. It gives an idea of India to have a dialogue with Pakistan, as prevailing upon Nehru to take the Kashmir issue the policy followed by Britain, involving duplicity if India was the one at fault, when it was so to the UN. By securing the position of chairman and partiality and guided by a pro-Pakistan tilt. clear who the aggressor really was. Then too, of the Defence Committee, he could directly The tilt stemmed from Britain’s perceived need “restraint” and “bilateral relations” were being influence government policy where possible and “to improve its position in the Moslem world”. dinned into Indian ears. A proposal came from undermine it where necessary. Together with Her strategic interests were related to West Auchinleck in October that there should be a his army officers, he insisted on the Stand Down Asian oil and the growing role of air power, round-table conference with Jinnah, Liaqat, instructions and obstructed all moves for military and the use of airfields, primarily in Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten, Pandit Nehru, the maharaja action. The British side always asserted that Suddenly, India did not seem to matter any and the Kashmir premier. Sardar Patel opposed Kashmir was a “territory in dispute”, and the more—she had ceased to be the jewel in the the proposal vehemently, but Pandit Nehru was Americans, who were not involved, disagreed, crown. willing to go with Lord Mountbatten. stating that they found it difficult to deny the legal validity of Kashmir’s accession to India. The book details the background of the National Just then, the Pakistan government issued Such was the British bias.” Conference and the emergence of Sheikh a statement rejecting Kashmir’s accession Abdulla and the misgivings of the maharaja to India, saying it was based on fraud and (Ms Ramachandran is a former vice-chancellor about him and his “secular ideal”. violence. Pandit Nehru dropped out and Lord of MS University in Vadodara and a former chief secretary to the government of Kerala.) 11 May 2002 Kashmir in Retrospect by A.G. Noorani region. Both were convinced of Blair’s “tilt” 1947-48 was but one factor. The other and War & Diplomacy in Kashmir towards India; both are known advocates of more fundamental was the fact that the Third By C Dasgupta reconciliation with India. World needs external support for its military ventures, as the author acknowledges at the SAGE Publications In reacting thus, Dasgupta lapsed from a reflective approach besides, ironically, from end of the book: “In wars in the Third World, Price Rs 250; 240 Pages secrecy, surprise and speed are essential CHANDRASHEKHAR DASGUPTA is one of his nationalist stance. Why do we ask the Blairs and the Bushes to do our job for us? political requirements for a decisive campaign. “the brightest and the best” of India’s Foreign In the absence of these factors, an offensive Dasgupta’s reflections in his introduction bear Service. He was India’s Ambassador to China runs the risk of being aborted by external quotation in extenso: “The conflict which broke (1993-96) and to the European Union (1996- intervention in the shape of a Security Council out between India and Pakistan in 1947 was 2000). Since he does not permit himself resolution or simply by a warning from one or unique in the annals of modern warfare: it the luxury of a Preface, with its customary more of the great powers. Unless a benign was a war in which both the opposing armies acknowledgements, one can only admire superpower is prepared to hold the ring - by were led by nationals of a third country. British the industry he expended, while in Brussels, exercising its veto against a Security Council generals commanded the armies of the newly in trips to London, to delve into the archives resolution or deterring intervention by other independent states of India and Pakistan... there. powers - secrecy, surprise and speed are of The scholarship, however, is not celibate. fundamental importance from a diplomatic It is married to the distinct nationalistic as well as military point of view.” fervour with which South Block infects Why, then, pursue a policy of confrontation most. He views events of 1947-48 from rather than one of conciliation? the perspectives of today and angrily rails at the incongruities of the times, when In 1965, India had no option but to attack we were weak, though independent. The West Pakistan because Pakistan had gone memories irk. for the jugular vein (Akhnur in Jammu), the lifeline to Srinagar. But, India entered Most of the book is about the Albion East Pakistan in November 1971, as a perfide, a later corruption of Bossnet’s prelude to war, only after Indira Gandhi “L’Angleterre, ah! La perfide Angleterre” had secured assurances of support from (England, Oh, perfidious England). Around “a benign superpower”, a reluctant Soviet the time of British Prime Minister Tony Union. It had signed the Treaty with India Blair’s visit to the subcontinent last January, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Lord Mountbatten (August 9, 1971) to restrain India and he went to town, with articles in dailies and Jawaharlal Nehru at the conference in continued to maintain a balance of sorts more than one, recalling British infidelities which Mountbatten disclosed the British in Indo-Pak relations, a fact which is little over half a century ago citing “newly- plan for the partition of India. understood. What Andre Fontaine of Le researched material” in his book. In one, Monde called “the great switch” came he concluded: “In 1947-48 Britain chose to While it was unique in this one respect, the about in September as a result of Indira ignore the implications of the clandestine war first Indo-Pakistan war was also a typical Third Gandhi’s tough talk in the Kremlin. Even so, launched by Pakistan. This led to an increasing World conflict from a broader perspective. Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin told Indian Pakistani appetite for such actions, resulting External factors tend to play a major part in correspondents. “This basic problem must be ultimately in the massive terrorist campaign wars between medium or small states. Their solved by peaceful political means and not by unleashed by the ISI. If Blair seriously wants dependence on major powers for military military conflict.” Had Z.A. Bhutto accepted the to play a calming role in the sub-continent, he supplies, economic assistance and diplomatic Soviet-inspired Polish resolution in the Security must do everything in his power to ensure that support makes these states vulnerable to Council in December 1971, there would have the terrorists are rooted out from Pakistan and external pressures. Thus the positions taken been a direct transfer of power from Pakistan Pakistan-occupied territory. If the terrorists are by the great powers can influence the duration, to Bangladesh. Not a single prisoner of war not brought to justice, India will be left with no intensity and even the outcome of such (POW) nor a sliver of territory would have come other choice than to ‘bring justice’ to them, to conflicts. The Kashmir war of 1947-48 is one into India’s hands. borrow President Bush’s felicitous phrase.” such example. For both India and Pakistan, There would have been no Shimla Pact. In a It is a palpably unhistorical approach and Britain was the leading overseas partner in sense, Soviet presence loomed large even at a self-righteous one, too: History stopped trade, industry and finance. Both countries Shimla and thereafter. P.N. Dhar was “puzzled between 1948 and 1988 when Zia-ul-Haq turned to Britain for military equipment, spares by her loss of temper” when he advised Indira launched the covert operation in Kashmir; and oil supplies. The war was unique only Gandhi against “the immediate return of the India committed no wrongs; the wishes of in the extent to which the two states were territories we had won”. Why? “My hunch the people matter not; and it is a pure case vulnerable to British influence on account is that she was under pressure - This could of terrorism. Blair was treated with suspicion of the presence of British officers at the only have been from the Soviets - to return because of British policies in 1947-48. seniormost levels of their armed forces. These the occupied territories” (Indira Gandhi, the Pakistani perceptions of Blair’s stand were officers were in a position to directly influence “Emergency and Indian Democracy; Oxford altogether different. The reviewer met, around the course of the war through the advice they University Press; p. 209). tendered to their respective governments and the time of Blair’s visit, two of Pakistan’s Both little Israel and a power like China most distinguished diplomats at the Sind the manner in which they implemented - or ignored - government directives.” were careful to secure winks of approval Club in Karachi, which maintains standards from the United States before embarking on of excellence unsurpassed by any in the The presence of British officers in India in their military ventures. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari’s book, Israel’s Lebanon War (1984) Mountbatten “proposed that an Emergency role which everyone knew he would play. Yet, disclosed Ariel Sharon’s talks in Washington Committee be set up to deal with every whenever Nehru firmly decided on a course D.C. with Secretary of State Alexander Haig: aspect of the troubles, the Indian leaders of action, the Service Chiefs complied. The “From the substance of this meeting one can agreed with alacrity on the understanding fact that he did not veto their disagreement glean an understanding of how Sharon - and that he would be the Chairman”. Set up on or sack them, as he could well have done, through him Begin and the rest of the Israeli September 5, less than three weeks after testifies to his realism. India depended on Cabinet - concluded that Washington would India became independent, it received from British supplies. On one occasion they were not interfere with an Israeli action in Lebanon” the Cabinet “overriding authority and priority withheld to deliver a message. (p. 72). Claudia Wright reported in New in dealing with the emergency”, powers Dasgupta is in gross error when he asserts: Statesman (June 18, 1982) the details of the which Mountbatten exercised “with will... The “Contrary to popular belief, he achieved his talks from May 22-27. Emergency Committee interfered in almost ends mainly by exercising his official powers, Deng Xiaoping met President Jimmy Carter every field of national life” (Mountbatten: pp. not by influencing Nehru’s thinking behind the in the White House on January 29, 1979. 432-3). scenes. The fact that India’s first Governor- Towards the end of the talks he proposed that In the same month, Nehru contemplated General was not a mere constitutional the aides depart “so that he could discuss moving into Junagadh, after it acceded to figurehead has gone almost unnoticed. a more confidential matter with me... the Pakistan. The three British service Chiefs Mountbatten’s appointment as Chairman of Chinese leader outlined his tentative plans wrote a joint letter to the Cabinet counselling the Cabinet’s Defence Committee invested for China to make a punitive strike across the against the move, the armed forces were in him with very real executive authority in border into Vietnam.” Carter puts it exquisitely: no position to undertake the campaign and an area of vital importance to the state. By “I tried to discourage him” (Keeping the Faith: British soldiers could not take part in any securing this appointment, Mountbatten Memoirs of a President; p. 206). operation which involved clashes with another manoeuvred himself into a position from Dasgupta’s analysis is realistic; his member of the Commonwealth. They were where he could directly influence government nationalistic lament contradicts it. In 1947, clumsily making a grey zone darker. Nehru policy, where possible, or undermine it, where as in 2002, the Big Powers would not have protested at this defiance. Mountbatten and necessary.” allowed Pakistan militarily to wrest Kashmir Claude Auchinleck, Supreme Commander A Committee of the Cabinet is its creature. It out of the Indian Union; nor India to resolve in India and Pakistan, explained it away to can be overridden or even dissolved whenever the dispute unilaterally by military means, Nehru, while privately sympathising with the the Cabinet (that is, the Prime Minister) regardless of the wishes of the people of the Service Chiefs. so willed. To assert that Mountbatten had State and a settlement with Pakistan. Ziegler adds: “To make sure that such “real executive authority” as Chairman of In 1947, within a day of his assuming office incidents did not recur, a Defence Committee the Committee is to assert a constitutional as Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten sought to of the Cabinet was set up. Mountbatten was monstrosity. He acted with Indian leaders’ impress on Jawaharlal Nehru “the need to asked to act as its first Chairman and agreed consent - and acquiescence. retain British officers in order to prevent a to do so” (p. 443). This is the core of Dasgupta’s laboured thesis; breakdown of law and order. Nehru was NEHRU’S biographer S. Gopal records how and a rewriting of history from the perspectives of unimpressed; he said that India wished to why he “recruited the services of Mountbatten today and with the fervour of nationalism. He retain friendly ties with Britain but she could (in the administration) even though he was is consistently tendentious on Indo-Pakistan not stay on in the Commonwealth.” This a constitutional head of state”. Mountbatten relations and is weak on the diplomatic represented the position the Congress had was present at the press conference on aspect. “Mountbatten took the position that taken for nearly two decades on Nehru’s September 13 when Nehru announced that Junagadh had become Pakistani territory insistence. The talk took place on March the Governor-General would preside over the by virtue of the Nawab’s accession, even 24, 1947. In but a few months, he changed Emergency Committee (Jawaharlal Nehru; though the accession was clearly indefensible his stand and agreed not only to India’s Vol. 2, p.17). On Junagadh Mountbatten on moral grounds” (p. 201). In regard to membership in the Commonwealth but also “threw his weight against military action”. Junagadh, then, morality should prevail over to retention of Mountbatten as Governor- Gopal mentions the Service Chiefs’ letter and legality. But, not so on Kashmir. References General, a conversion as radical as St. Paul’s when the government objected, “Mountbatten to Sheikh Abdullah’s popularity miss one on the road to Damascus. took on the chairmanship of the Indian Cabinet important aspect: On the issue of accession, Nehru acted in India’s interests, as he and thus ensured that no military decision was the people had a right to exercise their option. perceived them. But the compromise entailed taken without his knowledge” (ibid. p. 19). It might have been different from the Sheikh’s. a price of which Nehru was well aware - The sequence showed the purpose behind Are we sure that if a referendum on India’s Mountbatten, the three Service Chiefs and the Chairmanship. It had the consent of both membership of the Commonwealth was held other British officers would pursue British Nehru and Patel. That was the price they paid in 1947 or 1949, the people would have interests; harmonise them with India’s, if for the retention of the British officials and blindly followed Nehru and Patel, much as possible, but pursue Britain’s exclusively, if for Mountbatten’s services on India’s side; a they loved them? not. A war between India and Pakistan was factor Dasgupta tends to overlook. Nor, surely, On May 14, 1948, even as the war was contrary to British as well as Indian interests. could they have been oblivious of his loyalty to being fought in Kashmir, Indira Gandhi wrote Time and again Nehru contemplated direct the British government. to Nehru from Srinagar: “They say that only hits against Pakistan during the Kashmir war But to Dasgupta, Mountbatten “contrived to Sheikh Saheb is confident of winning the as Dasgupta documents. He accuses them of obtain the chairmanship... on the basis of plebiscite” (Sonia Gandhi; Two Alone, Two thwarting Nehru a word utterly inappropriate his military experience. The full political and Together; p. 551). Nehru’s note of August for the Prime Minister of India. He acquiesced constitutional implications of this arrangement 25, 1952, which Dasgupta cites, makes most of the time because India could not have seemed to have eluded the Indian contemptuous references to the people “gone it alone”. government... Mountbatten was to stretch of the State (“soft and addicted to easy The Governor-General, a constitutional head his new powers to their fullest extent during living”). He cites it to show that Nehru had of state, presided over two vital Committees the Kashmir operations, working tirelessly decided against a plebiscite in late 1948, of the Cabinet - the Emergency Committee behind the scenes to restrain Indian defence but misses an important fact. To Pakistan and the Defence Committee. His biographer initiatives” (p. 26). He is wrong in ascribing and to the Kashmiris Nehru kept repeating Philip Ziegler records how it happened. When naivety to Nehru and Patel; right in describing his commitment to a plebiscite right till 1954, at a meeting with Nehru and Vallabhai Patel, the effect of the arrangement; and wrong, which, he knew was at variance with his again, in berating Mountbatten for playing a own private resolve. He wrote as much to Sheikh Abdullah on January 12, 1949; but military force.” War would have become Library in London? I reproduce a letter which counselled him not to reveal it. inevitable if, say, Uri fell to Pakistani forces V.P. Menon wrote in 1965 for publication. I On three crucial points - the force of the or Indian forces went close to Kashmir’s had written an article for Opinion, a weekly Instrument of Accession, the communal factor border with Pakistan. On November 24, edited by A.D. Gorwala, ICS, who stood up and the use of force, the positions which India 1947, Mountbatten wrote to Nehru: “I have bravely during the Emergency. (Its annual and Pakistan took on Junagadh in September on several occasions repeated my views on subscription was Rs.2.) I criticised the 1947 conflicted with their respective stands the question of sending Indian troops into Government of India for partiality in giving on Kashmir in the next month (Vide the writer’s these Western areas... During my absence in their Records to Leonard Mosley, a British “Jinnah and Junagadh”; Frontline; October London this object changed. It then evidently journalist. I was misled by the fact that 12 and 26, 2001). Junagadh acceded to became the purpose of the Government throughout his book, The Last Days of the Pakistan on September 15, 1947. A mere of India to impose their military will on the British Raj, Mosley cited “the Government two days later, as Mountbatten reported to Poonch and Mirpur areas.” He thus bared of India Records”. V.P. Menon wrote a letter London, “members of the Indian Cabinet his basic approach in full candour to Nehru correcting me and authorised me to publish had... decided among themselves that as early as then. it. The Government of India “never gave military action was the only answer” - to the In December 1948, the U.K. High Commission any papers to Mr. Leonard Mosley to write accession itself; not in defence of Junagadh’s in Pakistan reported to London: “For the first his book because the Government of India feudatory. Dasgupta’s chapter “Junagadh - A time Pakistan forces... are so placed that they have no papers themselves regarding the Curtain Raiser” ignores India’s disdain for the can deliver a blow... against Indian lines of transfer of power. I was the Constitutional Instrument of Accession (on which it relies in communication in Kashmir, splitting Indian Adviser to Lord Linlithgow, Lord Wavell and the case of Kashmir); omits to mention India’s Army and endangering the safety of a large Lord Mountbatten. Generally after the term insistence that the plebiscite in Junagadh was part of it. Any such counter offensive would, of office, every Governor-General took away to be arranged by India and Junagadh to the of course, entail major clash between two his papers to England with him. Some they exclusion of Pakistan and depicts its military Dominion armies which could hardly fail to destroyed but as a special case, they allowed moves as intended “to protect Babariawad”. extend beyond Kashmir.” me to keep my papers. Mr. Mosley came to Bangalore with an introduction letter from a Worse, he omits mention of Somaldas Two issues deserve mention. Dasgupta very dear friend of mine and I helped him to Gandhi’s expedition which Patel supported. proves to the hilt the disloyalty of General put the facts together. In the course of our Of a British document (on “Stand Down” of Rob Lockhart, the first Commander-in-Chief discussion I did show him some of my papers its officers here in the event of a war), he of independent India: “At the end of 1947, on the strict understanding that he would not writes: “The minute... reflects the political Nehru discovered that his Commander-in- quote from them. He also promised me that calculations underlying British policy on Chief, General Lockhart, had received an he would show me the manuscript. He did not Kashmir.” This is not naivety in this veteran early indication about the tribal invasion keep his promise and whenever he quoted diplomat. It is fervour. Surely, all states, of the Kashmir valley but had withheld the from my documents he put it as Government Indian included, are actuated by “political information from the Indian government. of India documents in order to give it more calculations”. Lockhart handed in his resignation and authenticity. He certainly betrayed my was succeeded by the fellow British officer His research renders much service to confidence and I could not do anything about (General Roy Bucher) who, he believed, bad historical truth. No student can ignore it. A lot it. When I wrote my book on the Transfer of ‘betrayed’ him to the Prime Minister.” It was is newly unearthed - Philip Noel-Baker’s pro- Power, I did not show it to the Government on the testimony of Lockhart, narrated by his Pakistan stance for which Attlee reprimanded of India because I did not use any papers stooge Major General Rudra and one Major him; the liaison between the British Chiefs of belonging to them, but I took the permission of General D.K. Palit, whose role in 1962 was Army Staff of India and Pakistan - so much so HM’s Government to use some of the papers dubious, that Jaswant Singh retailed in his that on March 19, 1948 they confabulated on belonging to the past Governors General” book Defending India the libel that Nehru told deployment of three battalions of Pakistan’s (Opinion; August 24, 1965). Army in Kashmir - and their regular reporting Lockhart “Scrap the Army; the police is good The time is also come for serious reflection on to the British High Commissioners in their enough to meet our security needs”. Nehru’s whether it is wise and dignified to seek great respective countries. Nehru and Patel could memo of February 3, 1947 on Defence Policy power status on the coat-tails of the not have been ignorant of that or of U.S. in order to impose a Kashmir Mountbatten’s regular reporting to The time is come for academia to demand a settlement on Pakistan rather than London and his use of U.K.’s High follow the regional route to greatness, Commissioner in Delhi to report to more liberal policy on disclosure of archival through a policy of conciliation with all London. Mountbatten would tip off material and for the retrieval of documents our neighbours - Pakistan and China, Prime Minister Attlee about Nehru’s included. Why complain about the intentions and, thus, secure Attlee’s concerning the country’s history. British today? They had grandiose demarche to Nehru. plans for a treaty of alliance. Nehru U.K.’s High Commissioner Terence Shone alone belied it. Jaswant Singh not only ignored foiled them. None other than Sir B.N. Rau informed London on December 28, 1947: it, despite a handsome research grant from prepared a draft treaty on Mutual Defence “I... understand that for some days past the Dorab Tata trust, but falsified the record of 12 articles. Under it, India pledged to its Nehru and the Inner Cabinet have not been by attributing to Nehru the views of Gandhi as erstwhile rulers to respect the fundamental discussing their military plans frankly with summarised by Nehru in his Discovery of India rights of its own citizens. His covering letter Mountbatten or Lockhart but have been taking (p. 443). In the very next paragraph, Nehru of April 30, 1946, demonstrated that he could advice from Indian military experts.” made plain his disagreement and that of the not even read the United Nations Charter Britain’s main concern was to prevent war. Congress. Both were for “the development correctly on a crucial question - attack on “If Auchinleck prevented Jinnah from sending of the Army”. Jaswant Singh’s falsification India by a permanent member of the U.N. the Pakistani army into Kashmir, Mountbatten of the record is deplorable (vide Defending Security Council. Sir B.N. rose high in thwarted Nehru from ordering the Indian Army India, p. 45). independent India. into Pakistan.” Secondly, is it not humiliating that the Minutes Attlee wrote to Nehru in November 1948: “I of the Defence Committee of the Indian am sure neither of you (India and Pakistan) Cabinet are available in the Mountbatten would wish to settle the fate of Kashmir by Papers in India office records in the British The Kashmir Telegraph May 2002

REINVESTIGATING THE KASHMIR ISSUE by Salman Haider end they were prepared to ignore, or to subvert, the absorbing features of those times. He was Former Foreign Secretary, Government orders they received from the authorities they no titular Head of State in India, being at the of India served. On at least two occasions, such refusal same time the head of the Cabinet Defence to obey had the effect of averting full-scale Committee during a crucial period. He played war. On a number of other occasions, the a full part in that Committee where he was two sides were pushed away from a course in close touch with the senior Ministers of that threatened outright strife. Thus the third the Indian Cabinet. The author shows that national element in the sub continent, the his influence derived not from a shadowy British, was able to manipulate the other two relationship with Nehru but from his formal and effectively. As the author demonstrates, beyond open authority within the Government. Though a point it became impossible to give effect to Pakistan remains very suspicious about his an independent policy without attaining national role, the author demonstrates that Mountbatten control of the armed forces. was no enemy to that country and played an Actions to avert expanded war may be honourable part in trying to keep the balance defensible, but the deliberate tilt towards between the two contending Dominions. Pakistan that British policy came to acquire is The leading figure from the Indian side was, an entirely different matter. In the initial stages, of course, Jawaharlal Nehru. The portrait of legal considerations were regarded as all- Nehru that emerges from Dasgupta’s narrative important, hence Lord Mountbatten’s insistence gives the lie to accusations of indecisiveness War & Diplomacy in Kashmir on formal accession before troops went in to or softness that some recent critics have By C Dasgupta protect Kashmir. This fact also weighed heavily directed against him. He was a realistic and SAGE Publications in Whitehall, to India?s undoubted advantage, determined leader. He was not duped by the Price Rs 250; 240 Pages but other factors soon drove British policy motivated advice proffered by his own military away from principle towards expediency. chiefs, who were British at that point, and he This is a revealing account of the first and Pakistan?s strategic value in the Cold War and repeatedly pushed them into a more active most important steps in the dispute that its supposed importance in the Islamic world war effort. Nehru was impatient to replace continues to haunt us today. Questions that caused British policy-makers to fear that if they British officers with Indian successors, from still nag and perplex us are looked at in a new came down against that country, irrespective of whom he obtained useful advice even before light: why did India go to the UN, why was a the rights and wrongs of the dispute, Britain?s they were formally in command. Nehru and ceasefire accepted, what was Nehru’s role, and larger interests would suffer. At this juncture Sardar Patel worked effectively as a team. If Mountbatten’s, how did foreign intervention Philip Noel-Baker, Commonwealth Secretary Nehru stopped short of expanding the war it affect the issue, and many more. Dasgupta has in the British Cabinet, gave his country’s policy was not for want of confidence in the outcome written with authority on these matters, drawing a deliberate pro-Pakistani bias from which it or belief in the rightness of India’s cause. He on recently released material from the British could not recover, even when Prime Minister was aware, however, that war was a costly and archives, and bringing to the task his own wide Attlee was disquieted by it. Under Noel-Baker’s uncertain option and that it was best avoided experience of how governments function. He direction, the UN process was slanted away in the prevalent international situation. Even looks at dry official documents with unusual from its original course of adjudicating on so, he refused a premature ceasefire, despite discernment, to show what they contain, and, aggression, and Pakistan?s covert invasion of pressures, and accepted it only when the just as important, what they conceal. The Kashmir was deliberately downplayed. India’s terms were satisfactory. Thereafter the matter personalities of the time are described and concerns were largely disregarded in the cause got bogged down as power politics came to their impact on events. Every comment is not of justice but of British interest. What could dominate the issue, to the point that Nehru was corroborated from the extensive records on the have been a relatively straightforward matter forced to lose confidence in the UN process that subject, yet this is no academic treatise: deftly before the UN acquired the impenetrable he had himself initiated. written, it delves into hitherto hidden aspects of complexity from which it has never emerged. past history and vividly re-creates the drama of This is a diplomatic and military history that the time. The events of the time, as reconstructed here, adds much to what has already been revealed are something of a preview of issues that about the crucial early days of the Kashmir An important part of the book is what it shows absorb New Delhi even today. Pakistani support dispute. It remains closely focused on its about the British role in the conflict. While the for the ?raiders?, unacknowledged but all too theme and it forces the reader to think afresh two prime antagonists have been under the real, prefigured the cross border terrorism of about some familiar matters. The author is microscope from the start, the part played by today. It confronted Indian policy makers with throughout judicious and balanced in his tone the former imperial power has largely remained the same dilemmas and challenges. Thus and leads us through highly contentious and buried in the files, from where Dasgupta an attack on the raiders? bases in POK was disputed issues with objective good sense and resurrects it. It is no secret, of course, that seriously contemplated, not dissimilar to what judgment. He has no polemical intent but the the armies of the two new Dominions were led was under consideration some months ago conclusion to which he is driven reminds us by British generals and contained significant in response to terrorist attacks on India; then, of the strength of India’s case before the UN. numbers of British officers. How these foreign as now, the Government of India eventually This well researched and highly readable book servants of the new countries contrived to desisted. India?s frustrations on this score are deserves the great success it has enjoyed. It is serve both their King and their employer is ancient. already in its seventh printing in its first year an intriguing tale. Their overriding concern, of publication, and has established a place dictated by Whitehall and not by New Delhi or The uniqueness of Lord Mountbatten?s position and the part he played is another of for itself on every bookshelf of modern South Karachi, was to avert all out war, and to this Asian affairs. 17 August 2002 Colonel Blink’s Conspiracy It’s declassified: how the Raj’s leftovers played foul in Kashmir, circa ‘47 by Aravinda R. Deo for India and Pakistan, Field Marshal stopped well short of the Pakistani border”. It couldn’t have been timed better. Auchinlek, ‘Indian’ commander-in-chief An interesting case was the attack by an Dasgupta’s work, extracts from which Gen Lockhart refrained from sending iaf craft on a Pakistani Dakota air-dropping appeared on the eve of Tony Blair’s visit, supplies requested by Maharaja Hari Singh. supplies to Gilgit. The officiating air chief describes what happened during the early He also withheld from the government justified this action saying he had ordered days of the Kashmir troubles and examines intelligence received from his “Pakistani” any unidentified aircraft flying over J&K the British role in manipulating the tribal counterparts about impending infiltration to be shot down. Under “advice” from invasion of Kashmir to a stalemate and by “tribesmen”. the British High Commissioner, Air Chief internationalising the issue. He draws The process of decision-making was soon Elmhirst was persuaded to ignore the heavily on documents that have now been taken over by Whitehall, which had come Pakistani air-drops. declassified and reveals the role played to the conclusion that on greater strategic It was only after the departure of senior by Mountbatten and the service chiefs in considerations “a tilt towards Pakistan” British military officers that any meaningful India and Pakistan (all British nationals) was necessary. Mountbatten was required contingency planning could take place. But who owed their loyalty not so much to the to act as mediator between India and by then Kashmir had become an intractable governments of the dominions they served Pakistan and when these attempts failed problem. In ‘48 the Americans had seen but to the British government. he, acting in collusion with Lockhart, the legitimacy of Kashmir’s accession to The work seeks to answer questions that sought to thwart India’s plans to take the India. It was only with the Cold War that the have haunted Indians: why did India not war to Pakistan’s border with J&K. US began to woo Pakistan. carry the war into Pakistan, as in ‘65? Why The book examines the dubious role Could India have fared better had it not did we take the issue to accepted Mountbatten as the United Nations? Why governor-general and, like was no serious effort made Pakistan, picked a senior to clear Pakistani forces Congress leader to that post? from the western areas of Could India have done away Poonch and Mirpur? Why with the services of British did India accept a ceasefire officers? The answer to the when she clearly had first question is yes. To the military superiority? When second, perhaps. Bucher Pandit Nehru, in his ‘tryst et al brought little benefit with destiny’ speech said to us and many handicaps. “we have almost attained The goi writ didn’t run fully independence”, he didn’t in some sensitive matters. elaborate how incomplete Perhaps India was much that independence was and too dependent on the UK how costly it would prove in for military hardware but the long run. even that could have been The armed forces were still obtained at a price. Whatever led by British officers and be the case, Kashmir became the vital defence committee of the Indian played by two persons—Mountbatten and a festering sore thanks to these men. One cabinet was presided over by Mountbatten, Philip Noel-Baker, secretary of state in the can only hope we learn from our mistakes a British naval officer. Understandably Commonwealth Relations Office. At this and trust no strangers in matters of enough, their loyalty was to their British point, Britain needed Pakistan more than national security. sovereign and affected the manner in India for what were perceived to be British which they discharged their duties and oil and strategic interests in the Gulf region. carried out—or in some cases failed to Thus UK policy—somewhat even-handed carry out—orders of the government in the first month of the Kashmir troubles— in whose pay they happened to be. By began to take a strong pro-Pakistan turn manoeuvring himself at the head of the with Noel-Baker exceeding his brief and defence committee, Mountbatten was managing to get a UN Security Council able to influence India’s policy and, where resolution and obtain a ceasefire on the necessary, undermine it. basis of inducting Pak troops into J&K. Gen During the Junagadh crisis, the service Bucher, who had succeeded Lockhart as chiefs addressed a joint letter to the Indian C-in-C, was similarly engaged in a collusive defence minister declaring their inability exercise with his Pakistani counterpart. to participate in the operations should an After Mountbatten’s departure, the task of Indo-Pak conflict ensue. India reacted conveying British advice to Bucher fell on sharply to this invasion of political domain the British High Commissioner in Delhi. by the armed forces and the letter was The book has drawn heavily on British War & Diplomacy in Kashmir withdrawn. archives to conclude that the British By C Dasgupta In the initial stages of the conflict, general and diplomats coordinated their SAGE Publications counselled by the supreme commander moves “to ensure that any India advance Price Rs 250; 240 Pages 28 January 2002 Crowning deceit Jawaharlal Nehru. Many have suggested it pro-Pak tilt. Therefore, it was the British who, was Nehruvian idealism that prompted Delhi through persuasion, manipulation and often to move the issue from the Valley, where India deceit stopped India from expanding the war had a comfortable advantage, to the hostile and made it approach the UN. terrain of the UN. Nehru, it has been vigorously But Mountbatten’s treachery was of a lesser argued, believed Delhi would get real justice order compared to the skulduggery of Lord from the multilateral body. Noel-Baker, then secretary of state for Similarly, it is often argued that Nehru did Commonwealth relations, who won a Nobel not want to permanently scar relations with Peace Prize later. He advanced proposals Pakistan by taking the war into its territory, in the Council that “involved the unqualified believing as he did that India and Pakistan acceptance of Pakistan’s demands and the needed to begin their history on a relatively outright rejection of Indian views”. harmonious note. And that it was Sheikh Indeed, if he had succeeded, Kashmir would Abdullah who forced him to stop the army have been placed under effective UN control. from moving the aggressors even further from The book is essential reading for not just War & Diplomacy in Kashmir what is now the Line of Control as Abdullah’s By C Dasgupta influence did not extend beyond the Valley. SAGE Publications C. Dasgupta rejects this conventional wisdom. Price Rs 250; 240 Pages Through the sheer force of new evidence, in Almost everyone who has followed the history the form of the Mountbatten papers and other of Indian policy on Kashmir is intrigued by at recently declassified papers at the India Office least three questions. Why did India, which Library in London, he shows convincingly it today has made a mantra of bilateralism, take was British intrigue rather than Nehruvian the issue to the UN in 1948? Why did India not idealism that was responsible for many of the vacate Pakistan-sponsored aggression from Indian follies in the first years of the conflict all of Kashmir before accepting the UN Secu- over Kashmir. rity Council’s cease-fire call in 1949? And why Dasgupta’s argument is simple. Most of the LORDING OVER INDIA: Mountbatten did India not respond to Pakistan’s invasion by early decisions were not made by the full taking the war into enemy territory, as it did Indian cabinet, but by the cabinet’s Defence concerned Indians, but Tony Blair and other later in 1965? Committee chaired by governor general Lord Brits who portray themselves as peacemakers Mountbatten, whose “affection for India never in Kashmir. Without British Machiavellian Much of the blame for these decisions has policies there would have been no Kashmir often been put on India’s first prime minister, interfered with his pursuit of British interest”. And British strategic interests had a distinct dispute.

8 August 2009 Great Game of Kashmir In the 62 years of the Kashmir conflict, there made a convincing case that it was British And not for just geo-political reasons, but have been only two outstanding diplomatic intrigue rather than Nehruvian idealism even cultural ones. Take two examples. Atlee histories — broadly sympathetic to Indian that was responsible for many of the so- categorically stated that Kashmir was an issue interests — dissecting the international called Indian follies in the first years of the so germane to the Muslim world that the game that was played out in the early years conflict over Kashmir. D.N. Panigrahi joins British must support Pakistan keeping in view of the dispute. The first, Kashmir: A Study Gupta and Dasgupta in the shrinking Indian the British interest in the Middle East. Lester in India-Pakistan Relations, was produced galaxy of diplomatic historians. Jammu and Pearson, the foreign minister of Canada, by Sisir Gupta in 1966. A scholar-turned- Kashmir, the Cold War and the West is an while trying to disinter the reasons for the diplomat, he trained generations of future invaluable contribution to the literature on British preference revealed that the “British South Asia scholars — including the doyen the international politics of Kashmir. Strongly with a few exceptions, will tell you that the of South Asian studies in the US, Stephen sensitive to India’s position, this, however, is ‘Paks are better people, more our type, you Cohen — even as he analysed the minutiae neither propaganda nor a polemical diatribe. It know’” while Indians can be “unreasonable”, of the Kashmir “problem” from the research is a first-rate scholarly account that will have “self-righteous” and “morbidly sensitive about confines of Delhi’s Sapru House. In 2002, shelf life even beyond the conflict. their independent position”. The third section Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, an outstanding He has accessed the papers of Clement Atlee, of the book, Indo-Pak dialogue on Kashmir, is diplomat turned scholar and produced War Winston Churchill and almost all the British essential reading for all those in the “corridors and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48. dramatis personae who played a role in the of powers” seeking to find a settlement on Gupta demonstrated the legal and moral Kashmir conflict. Like Dasgupta, Panigrahi Kashmir even though it relies excessively on strength of India’s position on Kashmir. provides compelling evidence to reveal the the diplomat Y.D. Gundevia’s equally brilliant Dasgupta, benefitting from the declassified nature of British interests and intrigue, which Outside the Archives (1984). papers at the India Office Library in London, translated into a strong bias for Pakistan. The Kashmir Telegraph May 2002 by Romeet Kaul Watt to India’’. Under pressure from Noel-Baker, at the time of conflict in 1947-48 were still the US finally agreed to float a draft resolution led by British officers and the critical defence War & Diplomacy in Kashmir which would have permitted entry of Pakistani committee of the Indian cabinet was presided By C Dasgupta troops but only if India concurred. When his over by none other than Mountbatten. British SAGE Publications cabinet colleagues objected that India would generals in India and Pakistan maintained Price Rs 250; 240 Pages never accept this, Noel-Baker chose to conceal informal channels of communication on C Dasgupta, one of India’s most distinguished his own hand in prompting the US move.” Noel- Kashmir developments, according to the diplomats, was Ambassador to China and the Baker tried to have Kashmir placed under author. General Douglas Gracey’s telegram of European Union before retiring recently. He has effective UN control, pending a plebiscite, with 24 October finds a place in every account of done the Nation an immense service with his Pakistani troops entering the state with a status the history of Kashmir; less well known is the latest book, War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, similar to that of the Indian Army. But the US fact that he had informed ‘Indian’ commander- 1947-48, largely based on documents that and other countries did not accept this. in-chief Gen Lockhart about preparations for have now been declassified. In the words of John Foster Dulles, the acting leader of the the invasion even before October 24. In the another diplomat: “what saves Dasgupta’s story US delegation in the Security Council, in early stages of the conflict, counselled by the from being a twice-told tale is that he tells it November 1948, complained to the State supreme commander for India and Pakistan, from a new angle: the British perspective.” Department that the ‘‘present UK approach (to Field Marshal Auchinlek, ‘Indian’ commander- Kashmir is beyond doubt one of the most the) Kashmir problem appears extremely pro- in-chief Gen Lockhart refrained from sending litigious and multifarious issues in South Asia GOP (Government of Pakistan) as against (the) supplies requested by Maharaja Hari Singh. He today. It has persisted for more than 50 years, middle ground we have sought to follow.’’ also withheld from the government intelligence which has resulted in three cruel wars in the received from his “Pakistani” counterparts sub-continent. This important book aims to In his summary of the debate in the UN about impending infiltration by “tribesmen”. see in new light, the origins of the problem Security Council in January 1948 on the Indian During the entire episode, the British and examines the costs of the fact that British complaint of Pakistani aggression, Dasgupta commanders discharged their duties in a way officers commanded the armed forces of both says: “the Western Group backed Pakistan on that suited the British interests. India and Pakistan in 1947-48. three crucial issues: that Pakistan could take no effective action to stop the invaders until a During the Junagadh predicament, the service The historical mistake made by India was to formula was found for a solution of the Kashmir chiefs in a joint letter to the Indian defence refer the case to the United Nations, to which problem acceptable to her; that the Abdullah minister declared their lack of ability to Nehru later regretted. Nehru, to begin was government would have to be replaced; and participate in the operations should an Indo- persuaded by Mountbatten to refer the Kashmir that the United Nations must not only observe Pak clash ensues. India reacted harshly to this problem to United Nations but only with limited the plebiscite but actually hold it under its incursion of political sphere by the armed forces references. India suffered in a major way when authority.’’ and the letter was withdrawn. the case was referred to the Security Council, On 27 February, the Commonwealth Affairs The process of management was soon taken as Pakistan not only successfully refuted all over by Whitehall, who over the period of time charges levied against them but effectively Committee of the British Cabinet discussed the Kashmir question for the first time where had come to the conclusion that on greater countered by asserting that India was hostile tactical considerations “a tilt towards Pakistan” to Pakistan. This couldn’t have been possible according to the author at least one minister expressed his views with great force in was necessary. Mountbatten, it is believed was without the help of ‘Old Labour’ minister in the required to act as go-between between India Atlee government, Philip Noel-Baker. the British Cabinet minutes, saying the US document made no mention of the undoubted and Pakistan and when these attempts botched C Dasgupta says: “In 1947, when Pakistani fact that the tribesmen had passed through he, acting in knowledge with Lockhart, sought tribesmen invaded Kashmir, Britain decided Pakistan territory before entering Kashmir, or to frustrate India’s plans to take the war to to adopt a pro-Pakistan tilt — not because of of the failure of the Pakistan Government to Pakistan’s border with J&K. any merit in the case but strictly in pursuit of prevent this; it mentioned the possibility that Thus the book examines the dubious role played British global interests in the belief that this Pakistan troops may be permitted to enter by the British, spearheaded by two persons— was essential for her Middle Eastern policy. Kashmir. Mountbatten and Philip Noel-Baker. Unfortunately for India, the British minister in charge of executing this policy, Philip J On 16th of February 1948, Nehru had written Observers and analysts believe that C Dasgupta Noel Baker, had few scruples in exceeding to Vijayalaxmi Pandit, “ I cannot imagine has sent a strong message to the Indian his instructions.” According the author, Noel that the security council could probably establishment through his book: don’t rely on Baker decided to take a totally anti-India stand behave in the trivial and partisan manner in the Western powers, Britain and America, in in the UN instead of leaning in its favour as which……………and it is not surprising our fight against terrorism in general and cross- instructed by his government and deliberately that the world is going to pieces…and the border terrorism in particular. misrepresented India’s position to his own US and the Britain have played a dirty game, India has to ensure that in its fight against global government. Britain being the chief actor behind the terror, it will do what ever it feels necessary to scenes………” The book also gives a vivid account of how Noel- safeguard its national and security interests, Baker misled his government on the US position Nehru originally thought the Western bias was irrespective of whether America or other too. C Dasgupta says: “In 1947-48, Washington because of America’s search for concessions in Western powers like it or not. accepted (Secretary of State George Marshall) Pakistan; but after a briefing, he realized that A senior diplomat observes: “the UK and the the fact that Kashmir legally belonged to India by Noel-Baker was the ‘villain of the piece’. Nehru West generally continue to refract the issue of virtue of the Maharaja’s accession. In February complained angrily to Attlee that Noel-Baker terrorism in Kashmir through the prism of their 1948, the Americans informed Noel-Baker that had, in a conversation with Sheikh Abdullah, extraneous interests in West Asia and Central they were disturbed by the implications of the dismissed as untrue the charge that Pakistan Asia. This is, of course, no longer focused on the resolution that he wanted to move in the UN, had assisted the raiders into Kashmir. Great Game of containing Russia but accessing which would have allowed Pakistan to deploy its Subsequently, in December 1950, India the greatest reserves of natural gas in the world troops in Kashmir.” rejected United Nation’s offer to mediate in — Central Asia generally and Turkmenistan in When the British side argued that Kashmir Kashmir. “the only way to sole it is for India and particular. Afghanistan is the first transit country was a ‘‘territory in dispute’’, the Americans Pakistan to know that the burden is upon them on the route. Pakistan is the second. India is disagreed, stating that they ‘‘found it difficult to and no one else”, Nehru wrote to the United not needed. Which is why the ‘global war on deny the legal validity of Kashmir’s accession Nation’s. terrorism’ has co-opted the principal source of The armed forces in both India and Pakistan terrorism as its principal ally.” October 2002

Colonel Blink’s Conspiracy It’s declassified: how the Raj’s leftovers played foul in Kashmir, circa ‘47

evidence while also being succinct planners in London was the need to keep and precise. This book is not a lengthy the Muslim world happy, especially with treatise on Indo-Pak relations. Nor the seething resentment in the Middle is it one more history of the Kashmir East over the creation of Israel. These conflict. Its purpose is limited, and two reasons contextualised the Kashmir that is where its strength lies, in crisis in a larger regional and even Cold highlighting the regional and global War setting. context that determined the interests For instance, Dasgupta draws more than of the countries involved and their the usual parallel between the Kashmir strategies to control the outcome of and Junagadh crises, both of which the crisis. engendered hostilities in October 1947. More recent theoretical work in Apart from the discrepancy between international relations questions the the religious affiliations of the majority positivist approach of the dominant community in either state with that schools of thought, namely realism, of their respective rulers, the manner liberalism, and institutionalism. Such in which Junagadh was handled was criticism contends that there is no ominous for future developments in objective reality outside of our own Kashmir. The reluctance of the three social constructions. Hence, it is service chiefs (who continued to hold asked: if truth has a history, then how office post-independence) to engage in can history have a truth? A simplistic a possible inter-dominion war and the War & Diplomacy in Kashmir yet plausible counter to such a view constitution of a Defence Committee of does not challenge the heterodoxy the Cabinet to be chaired by Mountbatten By C Dasgupta of this new approach. Rather it were two such crucial developments. SAGE Publications is contended that the reading of These raise new questions that are yet to Price Rs 250; 240 Pages history brings us closer to the truth. be answered. Why were the constitutional Dasgupta’s book must be treated in positions of the service chiefs not clarified by Arunabha Ghosh this light. With its preface conspicuously prior to independence? Were the Indian WE now know! When leading Cold War missing, the author’s objective is well leaders guaranteed something other than historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote a book summarised on the back cover. While what in retrospect can be clearly seen as with this striking title (OUP, New York, he succeeds in questioning many long- a situation that would generate dual and 1997), the Cold War was already over held perceptions about the alleged follies conflicting loyalties? but people were still seeking answers. of India’s leaders during the critical first More unfortunate were the conflicting As the archives in Russia and the East two years after independence, he does opinions and advice that British European countries were opened to the not attempt to provide any subjective officers in the subcontinent extended public, Gaddis moved in to fill the gaps. A judgments, leaving it to the reader to to London. Field Marshal Auchinleck more localised conflict began around the draw her/his own conclusions. had virtually accepted the legality of same time but continues to fester even Dasgupta argues that the British officers Kashmir’s accession to the Indian Union today. C. Dasgupta’s first book seeks serving in India and Pakistan owed by threatening to issue ‘Stand Down’ out new evidence that can help explain their loyalty ultimately to the Crown. orders to British officers when Jinnah the genesis of the crisis in Jammu and British interests in the region had also planned to send the army into Kashmir. Kashmir. What we now know about the altered from the days of India’s strategic On the other hand, Prime Minister Attlee role that third powers played can help to importance in the ‘British Lake’ of the sent secret telegrams to Liaquat Ali Khan answer some critical questions that have Indian Ocean. India’s logistical and indicating that withdrawal of the raiders plagued the analysis of the developments manpower resources that had fuelled should follow ‘if satisfactory results are of 1947-48. the British Empire were now considered achieved’. By citing archival sources only recently secondary to Pakistan’s strategic location Again, Dasgupta highlights the declassified in the United Kingdom, with the possibility of using its airfields in contradictions inherent in Mountbatten the author builds a narrative that is any major war in future. A second reason assuming a mediator’s role in late 1947 contextualised and cemented with why Pakistan found favour amongst many even as he remained the Head of State of one of the disputants! Nehru and he Baker, Britain’s Secretary of State for the capitals of the great powers. This is diverged on the possible role of the UN Commonwealth Relations who led the an area of research open to scholars who as well. While Nehru wanted the UN only British delegation, consistently adopted a want to take Dasgupta’s work forward. to play a supervisory role in a plebiscite, pro-Pakistan position despite orders from Ultimately, it was the combination of Mountbatten in his bid to mediate London for a neutral position. While Attlee conflicting loyalties, back-channel suggested that the UN should come into rebuked him for such indiscretions, it was communications between British military Kashmir in an administrative role as well, too late to change tack in the UNSC. officials, and the willingness to give thus adhering to Pakistan’s demands. Second, there were disagreements Pakistan more than its due share of a long Even military planning was hostage to between the US and the UK as well leash (as John Dulles himself commented the conflict of interests. In their zeal to with Secretary of State Marshall never upon) that forced India’s hand in prevent all-out war in which Pakistan doubting the legality of the accession accepting the UNCIP ceasefire proposal would surely have suffered total defeat, and even questioning British attempts to of December 1948. It is not ironical Mountbatten and the service chiefs in colour the conflict in communal terms. then that similar games continue to be India persisted in their efforts to convince While Noel-Baker was able to win the played out even in the current version the cabinet against any large scale day most of the time, it is not clear why of the conflict. Thus, just as in 1947-48, offensive, whether on the ground or in the US gave Britain so much leeway on Pakistan’s ability to control the militants the air. Even as Nehru reluctantly agreed the issue. It could be argued, as even the (read raiders) is at present questioned. to take the matter to the UN he insisted author has done, that the US might have Similarly, Pakistan’s propensity to on continuing preparations for a full scale considered the British specialists in the implode has been one unfulfilled attack. But the service chiefs did not region and therefore, were willing to give potential that has worked to its greatest comply in full earnest. Britain the lead. advantage. A reading of the documents There is also some circumstantial Two points, however, temper this from 55 years ago cannot but raise a evidence to show that some British line of reasoning. First, as the author doubt in the manner in which Pakistan officials and even military officers serving himself points out, Britain’s absence has been branded – a country that India had prior knowledge of Pakistan’s from the UN Commission on India and would collapse at the slightest instance deployment of regular troops in Kashmir Pakistan enabled the US to develop its of things not working to its heart’s which thwarted India’s offensive in the independent perspective on the issue. content! Nevertheless, Pakistanis could summer of 1948. And the Stand Down This was probably reflected in the not find everything favourable to them in instructions were interpreted vastly August resolution of the Security Council, the evidence that has been uncovered. differently in autumn 1948 when British which contrary to Noel-Baker’s position Auchinleck’s refusal to Jinnah might be a officers helped to plan and participated demanded the withdrawal of all Pakistani sore point to many Pakistanis who might in Operation Venus in the Naoshera forces prior to a referendum. Second, hypothesise favourable eventualities. area. And finally, strategic redeployment the Americans had earlier in the 1940s It is imperative that the book’s implicit of Pakistani forces from West Punjab to shown greater resolution to reshape message does not go unnoticed. It the Kashmir theatre in October 1948 the world rather than continue with the seeks to remind us not of follies of the followed tip-offs from the Commander- colonial interests of the European powers. past, but rather the nature of relations in-Chief of the Indian Army, General Roy This had been clearly enunciated in the between states situated differently in the Bucher, that India would not launch an Atlantic Charter of 1941, which hinted at international system. The oft-repeated all-out offensive. American demands for the British to leave cliché suggests that states have no In a book on war and diplomacy, it is India once the war was over. Why then permanent friends or enemies, only the evidence presented on the latter were the British negotiators permitted to permanent interests. Not much purpose that leaves the reader more startled. determine the course of events in the UN is served by petitioning other countries to Conflicting interests is one thing; working to such an extent? solve our problems and then complaining against one’s own government’s orders Another missing link which can that they are biased against us. Much of quite another. The narrative of diplomacy shed more light on the reasons the what happened in 1947-48 is recurring in the United Nations during 1948 reveals different players had for adopting their in the present and those who argue that discrepancies at several levels, which respective positions is the role of India’s the issue is irresolvable without third- were glossed over in public. First, Noel- Ambassadors and High Commissioners in party support might need to rethink their strategies. 12 May 2002

Why did independent India and Pakistan retain British generals? over control of the security and defence of any war between the two dominions, Pakistan the country to the British against whom would be completely defeated militarily in a they had been struggling for independence fairly short time.” for so many years. Surprisingly, neither the So the British interests in looking after Pakistan Indian leaders, nor the intellectuals or the required preventing an all-out inter-dominion general public objected to this handing war and ensuring that Mountbatten projected over of the control of the country’s defence to Indian leaders a deliberately exaggerated forces as well as its defence policy to the picture of India’s military limitations, vis-a-vis British. No wonder these British officers Pakistan. The British C-in-C and other British were able to harm India’s national interests senior officers followed the same pattern while in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48. This discussing the matter with Indian leaders. It is the most revealing and interesting part was a well-planned strategy that worked. The of the book which deals with war and British generals and Pakistan wanted that the diplomacy in Kashmir in 1947-48. Indian Army should not be allowed to advance War & Diplomacy in Kashmir The author asks searching questions as to beyond the line of Uri-Poonch-Naushera in By C Dasgupta why India did not carry war into Pakistan J&K. The British C-in-C of the Indian Army did SAGE Publications in 1947-48 as she was to do in 1965? not send more troops to J&K on one pretext or Price Rs 250; 240 Pages Why was no serious effort made to clear another, so that Indian forces could not launch by Rajendra Nath the Pakistani forces from J&K? Why did a proper offensive to throw out Pakistani forces India accept a cease-fire when she clearly from J&K. IN 1942, the Indian National Congress passed had military superiority? This well-written the famous Quit India Resolution, asking In order to ensure the success of their book tackles these questions in a rational the British to leave India. As India was the gameplan, General Busher, C-in-C Indian and analytical manner by referring to British brightest jewel in the British Empire, the British Army, issued a directive on July 6, 1948, records. were against the Independence Movement. to General Cariappa in J&K that no major However, in 1947, they had to leave India. In the introduction, the author states that the operation should be undertaken without The attitude of the British should have been conflict which broke out between India and approval of Army HQ. The author states that clear to Indian leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Pakistan was unique in that the opposing “Busher also seems to have explored secret Pandit Nehru, Maulana Azad and Sardar Patel. armies of both the independent states of India understanding with Gracey (C-in-C Pak Army).” They should logically have ensured that no and Pakistan were commanded by British I invited Field Marshal Cariappa to give a British held any important post in India after generals who were in a unique position to talk to the cadets when I was Commandant Independence. But the British government and influence the course of the military action. Yet, IMA in 1980. Cariappa told me that General its Defence Staff were keen on ensuring that curiously, their role has received little attention Busher used to pass information to General British officers continued to hold senior posts in India, states the author with good reason. Gracey regarding the operations he intended in the Indian armed forces after Independence. The book brings out how the Atlee Government to launch in J&K and so he used to keep According to the book under the review, the in the UK, Mountbatten and the British generals secret his plans from Army HQ at New Delhi! British government’s analysis concluded: “It is in India and General Gracey, British C-in-C of Prime Minister Nehru suggested more than in our view that the Indian Government should Pakistani army, cleverly stopped India from once that the Indian Army should be used to be persuaded to accept the assistance of the making full use of its military strength to throw attack Pakistani bases from where the raiders necessary number of British personnel”. out Pakistani forces from J&K or to attack were planning to attack certain targets in J&K Pakistan in 1947-48. So the British must surely have been delighted and Pakistan but his suggestions were always when the independent Indian government That Pakistani forces were in no position to overlooked due to opposition by Mountbatten decided to retain the British Commander-in- fight against the Indian armed forces in 1947- and General Busher. Chief of the Army, and the British Chiefs of Air 48 is brought out by the author who quotes The book states that it was on the advice of and Naval Staff. To add to it, Lord Mountbatten records of the meeting between Mountbatten Mountbatten that India took the case to the was appointed the Governor General of India. and General Gracey. “I asked him how the United Nations. The superior Indian army He was also given the power to preside over the Pakistan armed forces stood in relation to war. could not attack Pak bases or launch a bigger proceedings of the Defence Committee of the How ready were they if war came between the offensive in J&K because the British C-in-C Cabinet, which is normally the prerogative of two dominions? General Gracey shrugged his and Mountbatten were deadly against such the Prime Minister. In this case, Prime Minister shoulders and said “Pakistan has not got a actions and somehow managed to persuade Nehru was not allowed to preside over the hope. The air force can hardly take to the air. Indian leaders to give up such plans. Yet Indian proceedings of the Defence Committee. Nehru, The army, such as it is, quite efficient, but it leaders did not take any action against them or Patel and others attended the meetings of is half the size of the army of India and has replace them with Indian generals. the committee under the chairmanship of no proper backing. The Pakistan army would This is a well-documented and thoughtfully Mountbatten. run out of ammunition very quickly indeed in written book that throws new light on the event of any large scale engagement and It may seem incredible, but it is true that Indian operations in J&K in 1947-48. It should make there were no ammunition factories of any leaders lead by Pandit Nehru willingly handed a useful addition to any library. type in Pakistan to replenish the stocks. In fact,