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Current State of the Peace Process in Myanmar

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Current State of the Peace Process in Myanmar Time to renew outdated strategies Current State of the Peace Process in Myanmar By Christina Grein February 2018 After almost seventy years of civil war and armed conflict the peace process is considered to be the centerpiece of a future peaceful coexistence of the various ethnic groups in Myanmar. Peace negotiations under the former Thein Sein government led to the so called Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed by 8 ethnic armed organisations out of approximately 21. The initia- tion of the Panglong Peace Conferences by the succeeding National League for Democracy government aroused high hopes among ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, frustration over the faltering negotiations is growing. In Decem- ber 2017 Christina Grein met with Dr. Sai Oo, Director of the Pyidaungsu Institute, to talk about the current situation of the negotiations and the challenges ahead. How did the Pyidaungsu Institute come to nic minorities nor an understanding of their po- be founded? sitions. Back in 2013, the Pyidaungsu Institute was set What was the role of the institute in the up in Chiang Mai, Thailand, because we couldn’t beginning? set up an office inside Myanmar. The director has been involved in the democratic movement, During the last 5 years it has been a stony path the ethnic and federal movement for many in the peace process. Initially, we only provided years. The idea of setting up this institute came technical support for the armed ethnic organi- up during the establishment of the Myanmar sations (EAOs). In the early phase of the peace Peace Center for the Union-wide peace negotia- process, we had a nationwide ceasefire agree- tions. The ethnic groups realised that the nego- ment (NCA). Here, we assisted the leaders of tiations were solely under the government’s the EAOs with negotiating and the formulation control. There was neither a forum for the eth- of common principles and goals. We played Blickwechsel | February 2018 page 1 quite an important role in the drafting process gle. It is all gone now, but this territory was then of the NCA. We were also involved in drafting controlled by the Burmese Communist Party. the political dialogue framework, which is to be After two years, the situation changed when followed after the signing of the NCA. An infor- General Khin Nyunt initiated ceasefires with the mal working group has been designing the EAOs. I ended up as a refugee in Thailand for a framework. There have been a lot of consulta- while and later on got a scholarship to study in tions and the whole process took about 7 or 8 Australia. I went there to study for some time months. In 2015, we moved with our head office but regularly visited Thailand. After completing to Yangon in order to work more closely with my studies, I worked at the University of West- political parties and civil society organisations, ern Sydney and in the Government of New but we still keep a small office in Chiang Mai. South Wales. But there was something missing in my life. In 2013, I decided to come back to What changed after the Pyidaungsu Insti- Myanmar. So I took the opportunity to work tute moved its head office to Yangon? To with the Pyidaungsu Institute. That was a very what extend did this benefit your work? personal choice and a matter close to my heart. As time passed, we developed a close relation- To date, two Panglong Conferences have ship with political parties and EAOs. As a mem- been held, and the third round is due to ber of the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Commit- follow very soon. What is your assessment tee, we work closely with various key stakehold- of the current state of the peace process? ers in the peace process. This body governs and manages the peace negotiations and the politi- The situation is getting increasingly complicated cal dialogue. Our staff is also working in the because of the many different interests of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee. Instead EAOs. The military is still very powerful in the of providing assistance, we have been asked to negotiations. The election victory of the National represent the EAOs and to negotiate for them. League for Democracy (NLD) created a lot of That makes us very busy. One the one hand, we expectations. After a while we all realised that are not that independent anymore. But on the the NLD still has many things to learn in order other hand, we have the advantage to better un- to fulfill its role as the government. It is still in a derstand the debate and ongoing discussions quite weak position. Under the previous govern- and to get first-hand information. We aim to un- ment, the peace process had a slightly better derstand the gaps and needs in the negotia- position because there was a kind of informal tions, for example the knowledge gaps. We are dialogue. Under the NLD government, the mili- not necessarily taking the EAOs positions. There tary treats the peace process as a security issue. are many groups involved and their positions That is a significant change. According to the can be very diverse and sometimes also dis- NCA, the stakeholders have to sign the ceasefire puted. agreement first. After that, there will be a polit- ical dialogue with discussions about constitu- Negotiating with and for the diverse ethnic tional change et cetera. Currently, we are mak- groups must be an interesting but also ing no progress because the situation got more tough job. I presume that your personal complicated. There is a number of organisations background is somehow associated with that didn’t sign the NCA yet: the heavily armed the democracy movement in the country. and powerful Northern Alliance1, which is in Can you tell us more about that? control of a large territory, and the United Na- tionalities Federal Council2 (UNFC), which orig- Back in 1988, during the democratic movement inally has been at the forefront of the NCA nego- in the country, I was a young man to begin my tiations but then somehow withdrew. university studies. I also had been involved in the anti-government movement and protest. What were the reasons for the withdrawal That was a very rough time and many of us were of the UNFC? imprisoned. I managed to escape and joined one of the EAOs in the northern Shan State. In I guess there are a lot of reasons. One main issue 1989 and 1990, I lived in Namkhan in the jun- is that the UNFC didn’t want to give legitimacy page 2 Blickwechsel | February 2018 Kachin Independence Army cadets in Laiza, Kachin state ©Paul Vrieze, VOA, Public Domain to the semi-civilian government under Thein forces of Myanmar) distinguishes between offi- Sein. Each organisation has some radical forces cially recognized groups and the so called “un- in their circle. These forces say: “We have been lawful associations”. It is ready to negotiate oppressed for so many years. Why are we nego- with groups like the Kachin Independence Army, tiating now? None of the things that we want is but will refrain from discussions with the Myan- guaranteed”. Some people also want to have the mar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta- answers before they go into negotiations. That is ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan understandable. They have been deceived many Army. It is complicated by historical devep- times. Despite many ceasefires with the govern- ments. The Myanmar National Democratic Al- ment/ military, nothing has changed. But there liance Army, a Kokang group, has been the very are also some groups that are more pragmatic first to break away from the Communist Party of and see the peace process as an opportunity. Burma and to agree to a ceasefire with the gov- These groups gave up their arms and agreed to ernment in the 1990s. At that time it had a very participate in the political dialogue. They don’t good relationship with the government. The re- want to keep fighting forever. gion underwent an economic boom with both Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army What role does the Northern Alliance play and Tatmadaw troops making profits especially in the peace negotiations and what is their with opium and heroin. But in 2009, the army stance towards the NCA? split in two factions, when government troops forced it to transform in Border Guard Forces.3 The Northern Alliance controls a large territory One faction was willing to transform and got the but it is situated in a remote area and has very exclusive control over the Kokang self-adminis- little access to the international community. But tered zone. The other faction went underground it has a close relationship with China. Let’s take and disappeared for a long time. In 2015, this a closer look at the political argument: so far, group emerged and tried to retake this area. the Northern Alliance doesn’t accept the NCA There were lots of casualties on the side of the approach of the government. It wants a new ap- Tatmadaw. It got very upset. The Arakan Army proach, but so far it hasn’t demonstrated yet and Ta-ang National Liberation Army were sup- how this new approach looks like. A better op- porting the Myanmar National Democratic Al- tion would be to try to push for additions in the liance Army in its attack. The Kachin Independ- current NCA. Since the NCA is nationally recog- ence Army was also accused of lending a help- nized, it is impossible to replace the whole ing hand but they denied any involvement.
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