DOCSLIB.ORG

Miroslav Nožina

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Miroslav Nožina V březnu 2011 ofi ciálně skončila vláda vojenské junty v Barmě. Již dnes je zřejmé, že cesta ke skutečné demokracii zde bude ještě dlouhá a plná obtíží. Jednou z klíčových otázek, které Barma musí ře- šit, je etnický problém. Úze- mí Barmy obývá 135 značně rozdílných etnických skupin. Významná část z nich zahá- jila po získání nezávislosti země v roce 1948 ozbrojený boj proti vládě. Tento boj do- posud neskončil. Etnický konfl ikt v Barmě je nejdéle trvající občanskou válkou v novodobých dějinách světa. Za současné situace by se hnutí etnických menšin mohlo stát pověstným „jazýčkem na vahách“ v boji o demokracii v Barmě. Ten dnes mezi sebou vedou stoupenci bývalé vojenské junty, rozhodnutí i nadále si udržet výsadní mocenské postavení, a demokratická opozice. Pochopení etnic- kého problému v Barmě tak získalo novou naléhavou dimenzi. Studie zpracovává etnický problém v Barmě zejména v rovině vztahů mezi mi- noritními etnickými uskupeními a centrální vládou. V první části se zaměřuje na předkoloniální a koloniální období; v druhé části rozebírá období po získání nezávislosti Barmy a vojenských diktatur, třetí část je věnována analýze etnic- ZA DEMOKRACII BOJ A VÁLKA PROBLÉM, ETNICKÝ kého problému v kontextu aktuálního politického vývoje země. Miroslav Nožina PhDr. Miroslav Nožina, Ph.D. (*1962), etnolog; působí jako vědecký pracov- BARMA: ník v Ústavu mezinárodních vztahů Praha. Věnuje se problematice pevninské jihovýchodní Asie a nevojenské bezpečnosti. K jihovýchodní Asii mimo jiné publikoval Siam Undiscovered (2004), Royal Ties (2006), Dějiny Kambodže (2007), Dějiny Laosu (2010). BARMA Miroslav Nožina Miroslav ETNICKÝ PROBLÉM, VÁLKA A BOJ ZA DEMOKRACII BARMA: ETNICKÝ PROBLÉM, VÁLKA A BOJ ZA DEMOKRACII Miroslav Nožina BARMA ETNICKÝ PROBLÉM, VÁLKA A BOJ ZA DEMOKRACII Praha 2013 Ediční rada nakladatelství Ústavu mezinárodních vztahů Obsah Prof. PhDr. Pavel Barša, M.A., Ph.D. (Filozofi cká fakulta UK, Praha), Mgr. Ing. Radka Druláko- vá, Ph.D. (Fakulta mezinárodních vztahů VŠE, Praha), Doc. PhDr. Jan Eichler, CSc. (ÚMV, Pra- ha), JUDr. PhDr. Tomáš Karásek, Ph.D. (Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha), Prof. PhDr. Michal Klíma, M.A., CSc. (Metropolitní univerzita Praha), PhDr. Michal Kořan, Ph.D. (ÚMV, Praha), Doc. Ing. Mgr. Petr Kratochvíl, Ph.D. (ÚMV, Praha), PhDr. Pavel Pšeja, Ph.D. (Fakulta sociál- ních studií MU, Brno), Mgr. Dan Marek, PhD., M.A. (Filozofi cká fakulta UP, Olomouc), Prof. PhDr. Lenka Rovná, CSc. (Fakulta sociálních věd UK, Praha). Publikace je výstupem zpracovaným podle časového harmonogramu výzkumné činnosti ÚMV, který vychází z materiálu Dlouhodobý koncepční rozvoj ÚMV, v. v. i., na léta 2012–2018. Úvod 9 Ediční poznámka 14 Použitá literatura a prameny 15 Vývoj etnického problému v Barmě v předkoloniálním a koloniálním období 17 Etnická situace 17 Předkoloniální období 20 Hlavní aktéři 20 Rané státy 23 Indické vlivy a mandalové struktury 27 Struktura barmského státu 30 Recenzovali: Mgr. Dagmar Bečková Šanské müangy 33 Petr Komers, Ph.D. Mgr. Mária Strašáková, Ph.D. Etnika na okraji mocenských center 35 Mezietnické vztahy 37 Koloniální období 41 Britská koloniální správa 43 Zrod moderního barmského nacionalismu 47 Miroslav Nožina Etnická hnutí a nacionalismus v prostředí menšin 50 Barma: Etnický problém, válka a boj za demokracii Druhá světová válka a japonská okupace 54 Vydal Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, v. v. i., v Praze roku 2013. Cesta k nezávislosti 58 © Ústav mezinárodních vztahů, v. v. i., Praha 2013 Vědecký redaktor: PhDr. Vladimír Trojánek Nezávislá Barma 65 Obálka: Jan Šavrda (fotografi e autor, archiv ADRA Myanmar) Období parlamentního režimu (1948–1962) 65 Tisk: Petr Dvořák – tiskárna, Dobříš Období vlády Revoluční rady (1962–1974) 72 ISBN 978-80-87558-08-9 Období Socialistické republiky Barmský svaz (1974–1988) 78 Barma pod vojenskou vládou (1988–2009) 82 Závěr 157 Dohody o příměří 90 Vztahy mezi centrální vládou a etnickými autoritami v období Résumé 165 mezi uzavřením příměří a přijetím nové ústavy v roce 2008 93 Devoluce 94 Poznámky 169 Oblast Waů 95 Oblast Koukanu 97 Seznam zkratek 185 Koexistence: rezignace, kompromis a přijetí 99 Rezignace: Čjinský stát 99 Hlavní povstalecká uskupení 192 Kompromis: Kačjinský stát 102 Pragmatické přijetí: Paoská národní organizace 105 Literatura 214 Okupace 108 Okupace etnických území mimo zóny ozbrojeného konfl iktu: Rejstřík 226 Arakanský stát 108 Okupace etnických území v zónách ozbrojeného konfl iktu: Mapy 249 Karenský a Kajaský stát 111 Etnická situace 250 Karenské oblasti 112 Oblasti a státy 251 Kajaský stát 114 Samosprávní zóny a území 252 Nagské oblasti 115 Ústava z roku 2008 116 Reakce na novou ústavu a volby ze strany menšinových organizací 119 Volby 2010 122 Nová vláda 126 Současnost etnického problému v Barmě 129 Hlavní aktéři na barmské politické scéně 129 Transformované vojenskopolitické uskupení 129 Demokratická opozice 137 Hnutí etnických menšin 144 Vlády etnických států a etnické politické strany 144 Ozbrojená opozice 146 Konfl ikt v Arakanu 149 Aktuální problémy menšinových oblastí 151 Ekonomické vytěžování 151 Uprchlický problém 154 Nelegální produkce a obchod s drogami 155 Úvod Úvod Roku 1988 se v Barmě/Myanmaru po násilném převratu chopil moci vojen- ský režim. Následující více než dvě dekády barmské historie byly pozname- nány ekonomickou exploatací země ze strany příslušníků vojenské junty, zatýkáním a represemi vůči opozičním aktivistům, potlačováním základ- ních lidských práv a svobod. Toto počínání vojenské junty proti ní v minu- lých letech vyvolávalo odpor jak na domácí, tak i na mezinárodní politické scéně. Deklarovaným cílem zemí Evropské unie se stalo nastolení legitimní a demokratické civilní vlády.1 Rovněž Česká republika zařadila Barmu mezi země, v nichž prioritně podporuje demokratizační snahy.2 Až rok 2011 přinesl řadu významných změn. Dne 30. března ústřední or- gán vlády vojenské junty, Státní rada míru a rozvoje (SPDC), předal moc nové barmské vládě a státním orgánům, vzniklým na základě všeobecných voleb v listopadu 2010. Vojenská diktatura tak ofi ciálně skončila. To vyvolalo řadu očekávání jak v Barmě, tak i v zahraničí. K současnému vývoji v zemi by ovšem bylo chybou přistupovat s přehnaným optimismem. Cesta ke sku- tečné demokracii v Barmě bude ještě dlouhá a plná obtíží. Demokratizační proces je v počátcích a je výrazně poznamenán snahou současných vojensko- -politických špiček i nadále si udržet výsadní mocenské postavení. K tomuto účelu si bývalý režim SPDC přizpůsobil novou ústavu z roku 2008, provedl celou řadu politických a ekonomických reforem, včetně rozsáhlé privatiza- ce státních podniků, a rovněž realizoval pod svojí taktovkou všeobecné vol- by v roce 2010 a ustavení nové barmské vlády. Po provedení politické transformace je dnes na barmské politické scé- ně možné identifi kovat tři hlavní aktéry – transformované vojenskopolitické uskupení, reprezentované na politické platformě zejména vládní Stranou so- lidarity a rozvoje Svazu (USDP) a armádou, demokratickou opozici a různé organizace etnických menšin. Je zřejmé, že budoucí politický vývoj v Bar- mě se bude odvíjet od jejich vzájemného dialogu. 9 Barma: Etnický problém, válka a boj za demokracii Úvod V případě barmské opozice se v minulých letech zájem zahraničních vlád Rovněž se do dnešního dne v Barmě neprofi lovala výrazná osobnost, která a médií soustřeďoval zejména na Národní ligu za demokracii (NLD) a její by tyto celonárodní menšinové zájmy reprezentovala, jak je tomu v případě vůdkyni Aun Schan Su Ťij. Ta za své hrdinné postoje obdržela v roce 1991 demokratického hnutí a Aun Schan Su Ťij. Slovy jednoho diplomata EU Nobelovu cenu za mír. Zahraničí pod tímto prizmatem často zjednodušeně v Rangúnu se v případě etnické otázky v Barmě jedná „o příliš komplikova- chápalo boj za demokracii v Barmě jako soupeření vládnoucí vojenské jun- nou hru, v níž se těžko hledají spoluhráči“.3 ty a NLD. Ve skutečnosti však v Barmě nalézáme desítky opozičních usku- Tato studie zpracovává etnický problém v Barmě zejména v rovině vztahů pení vyznačujících se rozdílnými cíli i strategiemi. Mnohá z nich fungují na mezi minoritními etnickými uskupeními a centrální vládou. Přitom argumen- neformální bázi a mají minimální, nebo žádné kontakty se zahraničím. Stra- tuje, že dnešní Barma ani zdaleka není politicky konzervovaným komple- tegie jak zemí EU, tak ČR vůči Barmě zatím nejsou schopné tyto odlišnosti xem či vnitřně pevnou totalitní politickou strukturou. Jen částečně naplňuje ve vztahu k různým opozičním uskupením refl ektovat. Z velké části se ome- koncept státu jako „organizované, politicky jednotné společnosti na určitém zují na humanitární agendu a komunikaci s úzkým okruhem barmské vzdě- území, tzn. v určitých hranicích, s jednotným zákoníkem, vládou a správou“.4 lané opozice, schopné navázat zahraniční kontakty. Zdaleka tedy nedosahu- Spíše nežli o kompaktní státní celek jde o útvar, který M. Duffi eld označuje jí do širšího spektra barmské společnosti. jako „rodící se politický komplex“ (emerging political complex). Tento ter- Nezřídka pomíjen je i třetí faktor – hnutí etnických menšin. Menšinová mín zahrnuje souhrn fl exibilních a adaptibilních vazeb, které propojují státní etnika tvoří přibližně třetinu obyvatel Barmy. Významná část z nich zahájila a další politické autority s místními a zahraničními podnikatelskými zájmy po získání nezávislosti země v roce 1948 ozbrojený boj proti centrální vlá- a zájmovými skupinami (jak legálními, tak ilegálními), tradičními domo- dě. Tento boj doposud neskončil. Etnický konfl ikt v Barmě je nejdéle trvající rodými předáky, náboženskými
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Important Facts About the 2015 General Election Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation - Emref
    Important Facts about the 2015 Myanmar General Election Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation (EMReF) 2015 October Important Facts about the 2015 General Election Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation - EMReF 1 Important Facts about the 2015 General Election Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation - EMReF ENLIGHTENED MYANMAR RESEARCH ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABSTRACT FOUNDATION (EMReF) This report is a product of the Information Enlightened Myanmar Research Foundation EMReF is an accredited non-profit research Strategies for Societies in Transition program. (EMReF has been carrying out political-oriented organization dedicated to socioeconomic and This program is supported by United States studies since 2012. In 2013, EMReF published the political studies in order to provide information Agency for International Development Fact Book of Political Parties in Myanmar (2010- and evidence-based recommendations for (USAID), Microsoft, the Bill & Melinda Gates 2012). Recently, EMReF studied The Record different stakeholders. EMReF has been Foundation, and the Tableau Foundation.The Keeping and Information Sharing System of extending its role in promoting evidence-based program is housed in the University of Pyithu Hluttaw (the People’s Parliament) and policy making, enhancing political awareness Washington's Henry M. Jackson School of shared the report to all stakeholders and the and participation for citizens and CSOs through International Studies and is run in collaboration public. Currently, EMReF has been regularly providing reliable and trustworthy information with the Technology & Social Change Group collecting some important data and information on political parties and elections, parliamentary (TASCHA) in the University of Washington’s on the elections and political parties. performances, and essential development Information School, and two partner policy issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Queries Raised and Replied, Proposal Submitted, Approval Sought
    Established 1914 Volume XVIII, Number 338 6th Waning of Tabaung 1372 ME Friday, 25 March, 2011 Root cause of splits The root causes that underlay the rise of fractious sectarianism and the proliferation of splits are found to be the incentives that the colonialists provided to expand their sphere of influence, the wedges of instigation and incitement that they drove in a wellplanned manner among colleagues, the arrogance born of overestimating oneself, personal rivalries and underestimating others, jealousies, suspicions and grudges. Some parties looked to foreign countries for guidance and inspiration, followed the imported ideologies and directives irrationally under foreign influence and carried out purges against fellow party members, which inevitably led to their demise. There were also many others that brought misery on themselves by aping the practices of countries with divergent development and dissimilar backgrounds. Senior General Than Shwe Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (From speech delivered at the parade of 64th Anniversary Armed Forces Day) Senior General Than Shwe sends Four political objectives * Stability of the State, community peace and tranquil- lity, prevalence of law and order * National reconsolidation felicitations to President of Hellenic Republic * Emergence of a new enduring State Constitution * Building of a new modern developed nation in accord NAY P YI T AW, 25 March—Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Peace and with the new State Constitution Development Council of the Union of Myanmar, has sent a message of felicitations to His Four economic objectives Excellency Mr. Karolos Papoulias, President of the Hellenic Republic, on the occasion of the * Development of agriculture as the base and all-round devel- opment of other sectors of the economy as well National Day of the Hellenic Republic, which falls on 25 March 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Q&A on Elections in BURMA
    Q&A ON ELECTIONS IN BURMA PHOTOGRapHS BY PLATON Q&A ON ELECTIONS IN BuRma INTRODUCTION PHOTOGRapHS BY PLATON Burma will hold multi-party elections on November 7, 2010, the first in 20 years. Some contend the elections could spark a gradual process of democratization and the opening of civil society space in Burma. Human Rights Watch believes that the elections must be seen in the context of the Burmese military government’s carefully manufactured electoral process over many years that is designed to ensure continued military rule, albeit with a civilian façade. The generals’ “Road Map to Disciplined Democracy” has been a path filled with human rights violations: the brutal crackdown on peaceful protesters in 2007, the doubling of the number of political prisoners in Burma since then to more than 2000, the marginalization of WIN MIN, CIVIL RIGHTS LEADER ethnic minority communities in border areas, a rewritten constitution that A medical student at the time, Win undermines rights and guarantees continued military rule, and carefully Min became a leader of the 1988 constructed electoral laws that subtly bar the main opposition candidates. pro-democracy demonstrations in Burma. After years fighting in the jungle, Win Min has become one of the This political repression takes place in an environment that already sharply restricts most articulate intellectuals in exile. freedom of association, assembly, and expression. Burma’s media is tightly controlled Educated at Harvard University, he is by the authorities, and many media outlets trying to report on the elections have been now one of the driving forces behind an innovative collective called the Vahu (in reduced to reporting on official announcements’ and interviews with party leaders: no Burmese: Plural) Development Institute, public opinion or opposition is permitted.
    [Show full text]
  • Ceasefires Sans Peace Process in Myanmar: the Shan State Army, 1989–2011
    Asia Security Initiative Policy Series Working Paper No. 26 September 2013 Ceasefires sans peace process in Myanmar: The Shan State Army, 1989–2011 Samara Yawnghwe Independent researcher Thailand Tin Maung Maung Than Senior Research Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Singapore Asia Security Initiative Policy Series: Working Papers i This Policy Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author’s own and not that of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). The paper is an outcome of a project on the topic ‘Dynamics for Resolving Internal Conflicts in Southeast Asia’. This topic is part of a broader programme on ‘Bridging Multilevel and Multilateral Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution’ under the Asia Security Initiative (ASI) Research Cluster ‘Responding to Internal Crises and Their Cross Border Effects’ led by the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies. The ASI is supported by the MacArthur Foundation. Visit http://www.asicluster3.com to learn more about the Initiative. More information on the work of the RSIS Centre for NTS Studies can be found at http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts. Terms of use You are free to publish this material in its entirety or only in part in your newspapers, wire services, internet-based information networks and newsletters and you may use the information in your radio-TV discussions or as a basis for discussion in different fora, provided full credit is given to the author(s) and the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies, S.
    [Show full text]
  • Silencing Dissent
    Silencing Dissent SILENCING DISSENT The ongoing imprisonment of Burma’s political activists In the lead up to the 2010 elections Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) P.O Box 93, Mae Sot, Tak Province 63110, Thailand, e.mail: [email protected], web: www.aappb.org Silencing Dissent Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) P.O Box 93, Mae Sot, Tak Province 63110, Thailand, e.mail: [email protected], web: www.aappb.org Silencing Dissent Repression to silence dissent The widespread and unlawful detention of political activists has a significant impact on Burma's political environment in two main ways. Firstly, most of the prominent activists are removed from public or political life. Almost all of the 88 Generation student movement leadership is in prison preventing them from organising against the elections or educating the people on political issues. Lead members of National League for Democracy party, including democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, are imprisoned, as are lead ethnic politicians who promote a peaceful tripartite dialogue and national reconciliation, such Gen Hso Ten and U Khun Tun Oo. Secondly, the harsh sentences handed down and the torture and punishments inflicted on political activists threatens the wider population, sending a clear message: refrain from opposition activities or risk the consequences. The consequences are well known. Unlawful arrest and detention and torture are practiced systematically in Burma and occurred throughout 2009 and 2010. These practices pose an ongoing threat to civilians; ensuring populations live in fear, thereby preventing any politically critical activities. This fear stifles dissent, prevents a vibrant civil society and halts any criticism of the regime; key components of a genuine democratic transition.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Political Parties and Religion in Myanmar Kristian
    Political parties and religion in Myanmar Kristian Stokke Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo Myanmar is characterized by a puzzling paradox when it comes to the relationship between religions and political parties: While religions, especially Theravada Buddhism, are omnipresent in society and frame politics in multiple and contentious ways, the reintroduction of electoral politics has not been followed by the formation of religious parties or major party- driven politicisation of religious identities and interests. Although religious beliefs and belongings are parts of politics in a broad sense, the links between religions and political parties seem relatively weak and are difficult to discern. Myanmar is a multi-ethnic country that officially recognises eight ‘national races’: Bamar, Chin, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Kayin (Karen), Mon, Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan. Bamar comprise approximately two thirds of the population. The Union of Myanmar is territorially organised in seven Bamar-dominated regions in the central parts of the country and seven ethnic states along Myanmar’s borders (Figure 1). Myanmar is also a multi-religious country where the large majority are identified as Buddhist, but there are also important Christian, Muslim and Hindu minorities, and some of these are prominent in particular areas (Carstens, 2018; Fink, 2018). Whereas Buddhism is the dominant religion and has fundamentally shaped Myanmar’s cultural and political history, Islam has also had a long history in the country and Christianity is a major religion among ethnic nationalities (especially Chin, Kayah, Kachin and Kayin) (Gravers & Ytzen, 2014). Animist traditions and worship of nat spirits and Hindu gods are also common, including as part of Buddhism.
    [Show full text]
  • Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State
    A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State ASIA PAPER May 2018 EUROPEAN UNION A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State © Institute for Security and Development Policy V. Finnbodavägen 2, Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden www.isdp.eu “A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State” is an Asia Paper published by the published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy. The Asia Paper Series is the Occasional Paper series of the Institute’s Asia Program, and addresses topical and timely subjects. The Institute is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and cooperates closely with research centers worldwide. The Institute serves a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. It is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion. This publication has been produced with funding by the European Union. The content of this publication does not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in the paper lies entirely with the authors. No third-party textual or artistic material is included in the publication without the copyright holder’s prior consent to further dissemination by other third parties. Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. © European Union and ISDP, 2018 Printed in Lithuania ISBN: 978-91-88551-11-5 Cover photo: Patrick Brown patrickbrownphoto.com Distributed in Europe by: Institute for Security and Development Policy Västra Finnbodavägen 2, 131 30 Stockholm-Nacka, Sweden Tel.
    [Show full text]
  • Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team
    Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team Seventeen Ethnic Armed Organizations held a conference in Laiza, the headquarters of KIO/KIA on 30 Oct – 2 Nov 2013. At the end of the conference, ethnic leaders established Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) on Nov 2, 2013. The NCCT will represent to member ethnic armed organizations when negotiating with government peace negotiation team, UPWC. NCCT Leader: • Vice-Chairman : Nai Hong Sar, New Mon State Party • Deputy Leader 1 : General Secretary – Padoh Kwe Htoo Win (Karen National Union) • Deputy Leader 2 : Deputy Commander-in-Chief – Maj. Gen. Gun Maw (KIA) Member • Lt. Col. Kyaw Han, Arakan Army • Central Committee Member Ms. Mra Raza Lin, Arakan Liberation Party • General Secretary Twan Zaw, Arakan National Council • Presidium Dr. Lian Sakhong, Chin National Front • Col. Saw Lont Lon, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army • Secretary-2 Shwe Myo Thant, Karenni National Progressive Party • Gen. Dr. Timothy, Foreign Affairs, KNU/KNLA Peace Council • Col. Hkun Okker, Patron, Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization • Central Committee member Sai Ba Tun, Shan State Progress Party • Secretary-General Ta Aik Nyunt, Wa National Organization NCCT member Organizations: 1. Arakan Liberation Party 2. Arakan National Council 3. Arakan Army 4. Chin National Front 5. Democratic Karen Benevolent Army 6. Karenni National Progressive Party 7. Chairman, Karen National Union 8. KNU/KNLA Peace Council 9. Lahu Democratic Union 10. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army 11. New Mon State Party 12. Pa-Oh National Liberation Organization 13. Palaung State Liberation Front 14. Shan State Progress Party 15. Wa National Organiztion 16. Kachin Independence Organization Note: Representatives of Restoration Council of Shan State attended the ethnic armed organizations conference held in Laiza, the headquarters of KIO.
    [Show full text]
  • Election Monitor No.13
    Euro -Burma Office 4 January 2010 to 8 January 2010 Election Monitor ELECTION MONITOR NO . 13 CENSUS OF RETIRED CIVIL SERVANTS IN RAKHINE AND RANGOON DIVISION The Burmese junta has begun taking a census and collecting personal details of retired government servants in the education sector in Sittwe and Taung-gok townships in Rakhine State. According to a retired female teacher from Taungok Township, "I retired three years ago. Officials from the education department came and asked me when I retired, my age and who my family members are. Even if they had come in connection with the forthcoming elections, I will vote for the candidate and the party I like." Another retired teacher in Sittwe said, "the authorities are collecting details of retired employees of the education department in the township and [it is] thought to be related to the elections. They already have lists of retired government servants but they are confirming who are retired and still alive. It is being done for the 2010 elections. During the 2008 referendum to approve the constitution, they used the votes of retired government servants as “YES” votes." Similar census activities are also being undertaken in several townships in Rangoon Division. Family member’s lists (Tha- gaung-sa-yin) are being checked for those currently living and working abroad, and those over the age of 18 years. While the regime had announced that it will hold nation-wide elections this year, it has not announced the dates nor declared the electoral law yet. USDA WOOS VOTERS WITH FREE EYE TREATMENT CAMP IN KACHIN STATE.
    [Show full text]
  • Myanmar's Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
    Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement BACKGROUNDER - October 20151 1 Photo: Allyson Neville-Morgan/CC SUMMARY examples over the last 25 years were the 1989 agree- The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement ment with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), (NCA) seeks to achieve a negotiated the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in settlement between the government of 1994 (albeit which broke down in 2011), and the Myanmar and non-state ethnic armed New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1995. Upon organizations (EAOs) that paves the way coming to office as president in August 2011, U for peace-building and national dia- Thein Sein initiated an effort to end fighting on logue. Consisting of seven chapters, the a nation-wide scale and invited a large number of “draft” text of the NCA agreed on March EAOs for peace talks, with negotiations initially 31, 2015, stipulates the terms of cease- seeking to secure a series of bilateral accords. Upon fires, their implementation and monitoring, and concluding many of these, the government agreed the roadmap for political dialogue and peace in February 2013 to multilateral negotiations over ahead. As such, the NCA, if signed by all parties, a single-document national ceasefire agreement would represent the first major step in a longer that encompasses the majority of EAOs. Signifi- nationwide peace process. While the government cantly, this was the first time that the government in particular hopes to conclude the NCA before had agreed to negotiate a multilateral ceasefire.2 national elections take place on November 8, de- mands for amendments in the final text, ongoing 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Sold to Be Soldiers the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma
    October 2007 Volume 19, No. 15(C) Sold to be Soldiers The Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers in Burma Map of Burma........................................................................................................... 1 Terminology and Abbreviations................................................................................2 I. Summary...............................................................................................................5 The Government of Burma’s Armed Forces: The Tatmadaw ..................................6 Government Failure to Address Child Recruitment ...............................................9 Non-state Armed Groups....................................................................................11 The Local and International Response ............................................................... 12 II. Recommendations ............................................................................................. 14 To the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) ........................................ 14 To All Non-state Armed Groups.......................................................................... 17 To the Governments of Thailand, Laos, Bangladesh, India, and China ............... 18 To the Government of Thailand.......................................................................... 18 To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)....................... 18 To UNICEF ........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • EBO Background Paper NO. 4 / 2015 AUGUST 2015 EBO MYANMAR
    EBO Background Paper NO. 4 / 2015 AUGUST 2015 EBO MYANMAR AUTHOR | Paul Keenan ALL-INCLUSIVENESS IN AN ETHNIC CONTEXT After what had been recognised as successful ostensibly an agreement not to militarily engage talks in July that brought the Nationwide Ceasefire the government’s armed forces. Agreement (NCA) closer to fruition only three While two of the three main points, signatories and points remained to be addressed before a binding witnesses to the agreement, were satisfactorily agreement could be signed. Perhaps crucially the settled at a meeting between the Union Peace- most important for all concerned parties were making Work Committee (UPWC) and Ethnic Armed which groups are to be included in the signing of Organizations-Senior Delegation (SD), from 6 to 7 the NCA. This has become a particularly difficult August 2015, at the Myanmar Peace Centre, the point to address as the Government and the main one, all-inclusiveness, or more correctly who armed ethnic group leaders have differing views gets to sign the ceasefire agreement, continues as to the validity of those groups that can be a part to be unresolved and without compromise could of the process at the initial ceasefire stage. see the peace process delayed until well after There are six groups that are a major concern May 2016, as the 8 November election and the during these talks, each groups has a different installation of a new government is finalised. background, a different goal, and different claims Consequently, there remains little time left for an as to why they deserve to participate in what is agreement to be made.
    [Show full text]