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Download the Briefing [Pdf, 177KB] Burma Policy Briefing Nr 4 December 2010 A Changing Ethnic Landscape: Analysis of Burma's 2010 Polls The elections held in Burma on 7 Novem- ber 2010 were not free and fair. The mani- Conclusions and Recommendations pulation of the vote count was even more Burma is at a critical juncture in its blatant than those parties and individuals history. The transition to a form of who decided to participate, despite the un- civilian government and constitutional level playing field, had expected. This has rule is underway, however imperfect it severely limited the opposition’s represen- may be. tation in the legislatures, and it has seriously damaged the credibility of the The 2010 elections in Burma have not new government to be formed in the been free and fair. The manipulation of coming weeks. the vote count was also more blatant than anticipated. This has severely limited Nevertheless, the significance of the elec- opposition representation in the tions should not be underestimated. This legislatures, and seriously damaged the was a point made in advance of the elec- credibility of the new government that tions by many opposition parties that took will be formed soon. part, that they were participating not out of any misguided sense that the polls would be The new government should open credible, but because of the important political space in the country, release structural shifts the elections should bring: political prisoners, protect basic freedoms, a generational transition within the military and seek lasting solutions to the ethnic leadership, an array of new constitutional conflicts. and political structures, and some space to openly debate political issues. A positive The international community should evolution is not inevitable, but those major support the range of actors in Burma in changes present new opportunities that their efforts to promote political change, should be recognized and utilized. The including political parties that release of Aung San Suu Kyi also presents participated in the elections and ceasefire important opportunities for the country, groups. It should also develop policies even if the motives behind it may have been that support efforts aimed at preventing a questionable. new phase in the 60-year insurgency, and that promote peace and equitable This paper provides an overview of the development. final election results, and discusses the implications for the functioning of the legislatures. While the regime-created more complex in the ethnic-state legisla- Union Solidarity and Development Party tures. The main focus of this paper is on the (USDP) together with the armed forces opportunities that may exist for improving have overwhelming control of the national the governance of ethnic areas. In this legislatures and the legislatures in the respect, the relative success of some ethnic Burman-majority regions, the picture is parties must be set against the fact Burma Policy Briefing | 1 The balance of power in the national legislatures SEATS Military1 USDP NUP NDF Ethnic Independent FILLED Upper elected — 76.8% 3.0% 2.4% 17.3% 0.6% 168 UPPER HOUSE 25.0% 57.6% 2.2% 1.8% 12.9% 0.4% 224 Lower elected — 79.4% 3.7% 2.5% 14.2% 0.3% 325 LOWER HOUSE 25.3% 59.3% 2.8% 1.8% 10.6% 0.2% 435 Congress elected — 78.5% 3.4% 2.4% 15.2% 0.4% 493 CONGRESS 25.2% 58.7% 2.6% 1.8% 11.4% 0.3% 659 that several others were excluded from the declared on 17 November (published the elections, and that a dangerous confronta- next day). No official tally of the seats won tion continues between the government by each party has been released, which, and several ceasefire groups. strictly speaking, is unnecessary. Unlike a parliamentary system in which the party THE ELECTION RESULTS with a plurality of seats forms the govern- ment, under Burma’s new constitutional The vote on election day was peaceful, with arrangements the President, chosen by the 2 a reasonably high turnout. Although there congress (the bicameral national legisla- were many alleged irregularities in polling ture), appoints the government. Since all stations, the general view of credible infor- the seats have been declared, the totals can mal observers was that these were not sys- easily be calculated, and are given in the tematic and were probably not serious textbox ‘Results by political party’. enough to affect overall results. However, allegations regarding the actual count were The USDP’s massive majority gives it more serious, particularly in relation to control of many of the constitutional levers ‘advance votes’. Collected in a non-trans- of power. The future President will be parent way, they were overwhelmingly for chosen from three nominees, one nomi- the USDP, and in many constituencies were nated by the elected representatives in the sufficient in number to give victory to upper house,3 one by the elected repre- USDP candidates lagging far behind in the sentatives of the lower house,4 and the third count of ballots cast on voting day. by the military representatives of both houses. The USDP’s majority ensures that The sheer number of advance votes it will choose two of the three presidential seriously undermined the credibility of the nominees. Since the choice of the President elections. Doubts were only increased by is made by the congress as a whole in its the massive majority subsequently obtained role as presidential electoral college, the by the USDP, particularly in the Burman USDP’s overall majority means that it will heartland, where it secured 90 per cent of select the President. On paper, the military seats at the different legislative levels. will only be able to choose one of the three nominees, but will have no say over which The results were announced in batches by is chosen to be the President. the Election Commission and published in the Myanmar state media in the days Given its control of the upper and lower following the poll, with the final seats houses, the USDP will also dominate 2 | Burma Policy Briefing Results by political party Party Upper Lower State/ TOTAL House House Region 1 Union Solidarity and Development Party 129 258 496 883 (USDP) (76.5%) 2 National Unity Party (NUP) 5 12 45 62 (5.4%) 3 Shan Nationalities Democratic Party 3 18 36 57 (SNDP) (4.9%) 4 Rakhine Nationalities Development Party 7 9 19 35 (RNDP) (3.0%) 5 All Mon Regions Democracy Party 4 3 9 16 (AMRDP) (1.4%) 6 National Democratic Force (NDF) 4 8 4 16 (1.4%) 7 Chin Progressive Party (CPP) 4 2 6 12 (1.0%) 8 Pao National Organization (PNO) 1 3 6 10 (0.9%) 9 Chin National Party (CNP) 2 2 5 9 (0.8%) 10 Phalon-Sawaw [Pwo-Sgaw] Democratic 3 2 4 9 Party (PSDP) (0.8%) 11 Kayin People's Party (KPP) 1 1 4 6 (0.5%) 12 Taaung (Palaung) National Party (TNP) 1 1 4 6 (0.5%) 13 Wa Democratic Party (WDP) 1 2 3 6 (0.5%) 14 Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State 1 2 2 5 (UDPKS) (0.4%) 15 Inn National Development Party (INDP) – 1 3 4 (0.3%) 16 Democratic Party (Myanmar) (DPM) – – 3 3 (0.3%) 17 Kayan National Party (KNP) – – 2 2 (0.2%) 18 Kayin State Democracy and Development 1 – 1 2 Party (KSDDP) (0.2%) 19 National Democratic Party for – – 2 2 Development (NDPD) (0.2%) 20 88 Generation Student Youths (Union of – – 1 1 Myanmar) (0.1%) 21 Ethnic National Development Party – – 1 1 (ENDP) (0.1%) 22 Lahu National Development Party (LNDP) – – 1 1 (0.1%) — Independent candidates 1 1 4 6 (0.5%) TOTAL 168 325 661 1154 A total of 1157 seats were contested in the elections.5 However, in 3 constituencies (all in Mongla township, Shan state) no balloting was held, so no representatives were elected. Burma Policy Briefing | 3 The following 15 parties failed to win any seats Democracy and Peace Party National Political Alliance Kaman National Progressive Party Peace and Diversity Party Rakhine State National Unity Party Khami National Development Party Union Democratic Party Kokang Democracy and Unity Party Union of Myanmar Federation of Modern People Party National Politics Mro or Khami National Solidarity United Democratic Party Organization Wa National Unity Party National Development and Peace Party Wunthanu NLD. lawmaking. It will only need the support of of ethnic areas is considered in more detail military representatives in matters requir- below.) ing a super-majority, such as amending the constitution (requiring a three-quarters GOVERNANCE AND ETHNIC majority) and impeaching public officials ASPIRATIONS (requiring a two-thirds majority). Special Despite its many serious deficiencies, a sessions of the legislatures can be called by crucial feature of the 2008 constitution is one-quarter of the representatives. Only the that it defines Burma as a multi-ethnic, USDP and the military have enough seats multi-party democratic state, something to do so.6 that cannot be said of many countries in The USDP also dominates the legislatures the region. This twenty-first century vision in the ethnic Burman areas (the seven of Burma has yet to be realized in practice, ‘regions’). In each of these regions, the but as an aspirational goal it is widely USDP has more than 80 per cent of the shared and important. elected seats, and over 60 per cent of the Reaching that goal is likely to take some total seats. It will therefore control lawmak- time. Constitutional niceties are unlikely to ing in those areas, and together with the bring about major changes in an authori- military can impeach regional officials and tarian state with a Burman-dominated decide when the legislatures meet.
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