The Electoral System of Myanmar

國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-sen University Master Thesis

緬甸選舉制度之研究 The Electoral System of Myanmar

研究生：柯蓉卡 Kristína Kironská 指導教授：林文程博士 Dr. Wen-cheng Lin

中華民國 100 年 7 月 July 2011 I

Acknowledgements

From the formative stages of this thesis, to the final draft, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my thesis advisor, Dr. Wen-cheng Lin. His sound advice and careful guidance were invaluable as I attempted to examine the electoral system of Myanmar and the legitimacy of the current government established after the 2010 elections.

I would also like to thank Miss Wu, the China and Asia-Pacific department’s secretary, for her never failing and patient assistance. A sincere thank to all professors of the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies and the Institute of Political Science who have taught me for their generous academic support and teaching. Special thanks to Professor Allison Haga, for her insightful comments, and to my classmate Kevin for his patience while proofreading my work.

In addition, I would also like to show my gratitude to the Taiwan Ministry of Education which has provided me financial support throughout my studies at NSYSU.

Lastly, I offer my regards to all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of this thesis.

Kaohsiung, July 2011 -Kristína Kironská-

Abstract

Myanmar, an isolated country in Southeast Asia, held general elections for the People’s Assembly in 2010, the first in twenty years and the second in fifty years. The military junta that has ruled the country for decades has been facing strong criticism from the international community. This research has systematically examined the historical development of the electoral laws and the overall electoral system of the Union of Myanmar (since October 2010 officially known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar) during the period of 18 June 1989 up until the latest elections on 7 November 2011. Why did the military bother organizing elections? The latest elections were meant to give the impression that they would create a legitimate government. In reality, they were designed to preserve military rule under a façade of democracy. The junta learned a valuable lesson from the last free elections in 1990, which ended in a fiasco for the pro-junta parties, and did not leave it to the people's will in 2010. In order to effectively extend military rule, in 2008 the junta used a flawed referendum to approve a supremacy constitution, according to which the military automatically receives 25% of the seats in parliament. This constitution helped the junta impose several severe limitations on parties willing to participate in the 2010 elections, thus ensuring that the military-backed political parties would win most of the seats at stake. This thesis attempts to show the powerlessness of the masses against a system based on the creation of self-serving laws used by the ruling junta to control the society.

KEY WORDS: electoral system, electoral law, Union of Myanmar, Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi, military junta, SLORC, SPDC. III

摘要

緬甸，一個孤立在東南亞的國家，近日舉行了一個為了人民集會的大選，此舉為過去五十年來的第二次，也是二十年來第一次的活動。統治此國家數十載之軍政府一直面臨著國際社會的強烈批評。此研究有系統地檢視了選舉法之歷史發展以及緬甸聯邦（自 2010 年 10 月正式被稱為緬甸聯邦共和國）於 1989 年 6 月 18 日起至最近一次舉行於 2011 年 11 月 7 日的選舉之整體選舉制度。為何軍政府要干涉選舉活動的舉行最近一次的選舉是為了帶給世人他們將建立一個合法政府的印象。但在現實中，他們的目的其實是要維護在民主外觀底下的軍事統治。軍政府從先前於 1990 年舉行的自由選舉學到了寶貴的經驗教訓，此選舉前軍政府的政黨以慘敗做收場，但在 2010 年卻無法如人們所願。為了有效地延長軍事統治，2008 年軍政府使用了有缺陷的公民投票批准一項至高無上的法規，根據此法，軍政府將自動地接收

25％的國會議席。此法規助長緬甸軍政府對有意願參加 2010 選舉之政黨施加一些嚴厲的限制，因此確保了在危急關頭時，軍政府支持的政黨能贏得大多數的席次。本論文所試圖想表達出的是，與只為謀私利並藉此控制整個社會的軍政府體系相互抗衡的弱勢群眾的無能為力。

摘要：選舉制度，選舉法，緬甸聯邦，緬甸昂山素姬

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements...... II

Abstract (English)...... III

Abstract (Chinese)...... IV

Table of contents...... V

List of Figures, Maps and Tables ...... VIII

List of Acronyms and basic information...... IX

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION...... 1

1.1. MOTIVATION...... 1

1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES...... 3

1.3. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE...... 8

1.4. METHODOLOGY ...... 12

1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...... 14

1.6. CHAPTER ARRANGEMENT ...... 18

1.7. EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION...... 19

CHAPTER TWO: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS...... 20

2.1. ELECTIONS HELD IN AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES...... 21

2.2. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS...... 26

2.3. THE BURMESE LEGAL SYSTEM...... 29

2.4. HISTORY OF ELECTIONS IN BURMA/MYANMAR...... 31

CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICAL-HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BURMA/MYANMAR...... 35

3.1. EARLY HISTORY ...... 36

3.2. COLONIAL ERA...... 38

3.3. CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT ...... 45

3.4. MILITARY RULE UNDER SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT...... 49

3.5. UNDER THE SLORC AND THE SPDC REGIME...... 53

CHAPTER FOUR: 1990 ELECTIONS...... 59

4.1. PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNING...... 60

4.2. NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY ...... 62

4.3. THE GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS RESULTS ...... 64

4.4. AUNG SAN SUU KYI ...... 67

4.5. THE 1990 ELECTION AFTERMATH ...... 70

CHAPTER FIVE: 2010 ELECTIONS ...... 73

5.1. POLITICAL PARTY REGISTRATION ...... 74

5.2. AUNG SAN SUU KYI BOYCOTTING THE ELECTION ...... 81

5.3. THE 2010 ELECTION CAMPAIGN ...... 82

5.4. NOVEMBER 2010 GENEAL ELECTIONS...... 84

5.5. 2010 ELECTION RESULTS ...... 87

5.6. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 2010 ELECTION ...... 92

5.7. THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR...... 93

5.8. COMPARISON OF THE 1990 AND 2010 ELECTIONS...... 95

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ...... 97

APPENDICES...... 101

APPENDIX 1: Basic information about Burma/Myanmar ...... 101

APPENDIX 2: Historic Flags of Burma/Myanmar...... 108

APPENDIX 3: Key Dates in Burmese History after Gaining Independence ...... 110

APPENDIX 4: 2010 Election Timeline ...... 112

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 113

VII

List of Figures, Maps and Tables

Figure 1: The Old and the New Flag of Myanmar 4

Figure 2: The Political Make-up of the Parliament after 2010 90

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Map 1: Union of Myanmar and its Neighboring Countries 1

Map 2: Areas Where Voting Was Cancelled 86

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Table 1: Characteristics of Authoritarian and Totalitarian Dictators 22

Table 2: The Current Most Common Electoral Systems in the World 28

Table 3: Various Official Names of Burma/Myanmar since Independence 35

Table 4: Official Names of Burma/Myanmar and its Leaders before Independence 44

Table 5: Official Names of Burma/Myanmar and its Leaders after Independence 46

Table 6: Overview of the 1990 Elections 65

Table 7: Political Parties Approved for the 2010 Elections 78

Table 8: Political Parties Dissolved Prior to the 2010 Elections 79

Table 9: Standing Candidates for the 2010 Election 80

Table 10: Number of Constituencies for Elections in Each House 84

Table 11: 2010 Election Results 89

Table 12: Voter Turnout in the 2010 Elections 89

Table 13: Overview of the 2010 Elections in Comparison with the 1990 Elections 96

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Picture 1: Poster “Aung San Suu Kyi FREE AT LAST” 69 VIII

List of Acronyms and basic information

AFO – Anti-Fascist Organization; descendant of AFPFL; established in 1944 by Aung San and Than Tun.

AFPFL – Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League; a civilian ruling coalition party; a confederation of political parties with left to left-center political opinion and socialist to some degree; established in 1944 by Aung San and Than Tun as the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO).

ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations; a geo-political and economic organization of ten countries located in Southeast Asia; established in 1967 by Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Burma joined in 1997.

BCP (or CPB) – Burma Communist Party; oldest existing political party in Burma, established in 1939 at a secret meeting in Rangoon; unrecognized by the Burmese authorities

BGF – Border Guard Forces; army-controlled; part of the Burma Army plan how to control all armed ethnic ceasefire groups to provide security along the border

BIA – Burma National Army; established by the Japanese during the WWII., fought alongside the Japanese, later changed sides and fought alongside the Allies; later renamed BDA - Burma Defense Army (1942), BNA - Burma National Army (1943), PBF - Patriotic Burmese Forces (1945).

BSPP – Burma Socialist Programme Party; established in July 1962 after the declaration of the “Burmese Way to Socialism;” sole political party during 1964-1988

KMT – Kuomingtan (Chinese Nationalist Party); founded by Song Jiaoren and Sun Yat- sen after the Xinhai Revolution. Later led by Chiang Kai-shek, it ruled China from 1928 until its retreat to Taiwan in 1949.

KNU – Karen National Union; a political organization with an armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) that represents the Karen people of Burma

NLD (or NLD) – National League for Democracy; created on 24 September 1988 by Aung Gyi (Chairman), Tin U (Vice Chairman), and Aung San Suu Kyi (General Secretary). NLD was the winner of the elections in May 1990, but the military refused to transfer power.

NUP – National Unity Party; an indirect offspring of BSPP (which was dissolved 28 September 1988) created to participate in the elections in May 1990. NUP won only 2% of the seats.

SLORC – State Law and Order Restoration Council; predecessor of SPDC; official name of the military regime of Myanmar (1988-1997) which replaced the role of the BSPP

SNLD – Shan National League for Democracy; in 2010 renamed Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP)

SPDC – State Peace and Development Council; descendant of SLORC; official name of the military regime of Myanmar (1997-2011); it replaced the role of the SLORC

UN – United Nations; established in 1945 to replace the League of Nations; currently 192 members

USDP – Union Solidarity and Development Party; a party registered in June 2010; successor to the Burmese government’s mass organization, the Union Solidarity and development Association (USDA)

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. 1. MOTIVATION

Myanmar is an isolated country in South-East Asia with a strategic position between China and India (see Map 1), two rising powers in Asia, and thus a hot issue in the region. It is also a major concern to Thailand and other ASEAN countries. “As one eminent Southeast Asian said of Myanmar relations, those states around Myanmar have ‘the burden of proximity,’ whereas those farther afield have the ‘luxury of distance.’ “1

Map 1: Union of Myanmar and its Neighboring Countries

Source: http://www.sea-tours.com/html/myanmar.html

1 Quoted in David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4.

Myanmar, with the gross domestic product per capita $462, is one of the poorest nations in Southeast Asia suffering from political instability.2 For decades, this country has been suffering from stagnation and mismanagement. Because it has instituted autarky: contacts with the outer world were minimized. There is no rule of law. At one point, people were not allowed to leave the country without authorization, and visas for foreigners were limited to 24 hours. Today, some of these restrictions have been removed, but there has been no easing of state control and censorship still remains in place. Energy shortages are common throughout the whole country. The killings of 1988 were not hot news on the world`s television screens and the world became aware of the situation in Burma/Myanmar thanks to a brave Burmese, Aung San Suu Kyi, who has earned international recognition as an activist for the return of democratic rule, winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. The ruling regime has repeatedly placed her under house arrest. The military authorities released the pro-democracy leader from house arrest just very recently, on 13 November 2010.

There is no culture of consent between the governed and the government and this fact is a constant of Burmese political life. Justice Rajsoomer Lallah, the previous UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Violations in Burma, best described the situation that prevails in Myanmar as “At the very worst, we are faced with a country which is at war with its own people; at the very best, it is a country which is holding its people hostage.”3

The 2010 elections in Burma/Myanmar were widely discussed and studied. With my academic background in international relations, it is a particularly interesting issue for me. Previously, I studied international relations and currently I am a student of China and Asia-Pacific studies. This research is not driven only by academic curiosity but also by personal motivation. I visited Myanmar in July 2010 and found my personal experience very different from what I had read before visiting the country. One thing was identical with what all the books and articles say: I could feel and see the fear among the population of speaking freely about political matters. One must be cautious in talking to the Burmese about the current situation in Myanmar. Burmese people live under constant watch of the

2 GDP per Capita – Myanmar Compared to Continent, Global Property Guide. Retrieved July 1, 2011 from http://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Asia/Myanmar/gdp-per-capita

3 Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07-Saffin_Snapshot.htm

state and will only whisper about politics. This is an obvious consequence of the repression by the military authorities. The kindness of the people and their historical background full of bloody wars seem contradictory and perplexing to me. My knowledge about the political history of Burma/Myanmar and the first-hand observation while visiting the country encouraged me to study this topic more.

1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This research will deal with the electoral system of Burma/Myanmar, and the source of legitimacy of the current government. Since 2010, Burma is officially known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Pyidaunzu Thanmăda Myăma Nainngandaw).

Since the end of the 19th century up to 1937, Burma was administered as a province of British India, when it became a self-governing colony. The country became independent from the United Kingdom on 4 January 1948 at 4:20 A.M., as the "Union of Burma." The new official name of the country together with a new flag was established as part of the 2008 Constitution (see Figure 1), and formally adopted on 21 October 2010.4 Prior to this, the country had been known formally as the Union of Myanmar since 18 June 1989, when the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, later in 1997 renamed SPDC) changed the name of the country from Burma to Myanmar to lessen ethnic problems and to get rid of the colonial baggage, and has insisted on its use in all grammatical forms.

4 The design of the flag has three horizontal stripes of yellow, green and red with a five-pointed white star in the middle. The new flag is basically a fusion of the flag of the State of Burma (1943-1945) without the royal peacock, taking instead the white star that symbolizes the Union of Burma in the canton of its flag (see Appendix 1). The new flag avoids symbolizing ethnic groups like the two previous ones did. The flag adopted upon independence from the United Kingdom in 1948 consisted of a red field with a blue canton charged with one large white star, representing the union, surrounded by five smaller stars representing the main ethnic groups in Burma. In 1974, General Ne Win adopted a new flag, which depicted fourteen stars, encircling a gear and a rice plant in a blue-colored canton against a red field. The rice stands for agriculture, the gear represents industry, and the fourteen stars represent each of the fourteen member states of the Union.

Figure 1: The Old and the New Flag of Myanmar

Source: http://www.miricommunity.net/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=32628&start=0 (Retrieved November 30, 2010)

This controversial name change has become a domestic and international political issue, and also indicates political persuasion. The new name was accepted by the United Nations and by many countries, but is not recognized by the Burmese democratic movement nor by some countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, which did not accept the new name in solidarity with the opposition claiming that this name change was made by an illegitimate military government. In this research, the terms are used without political intent: “Myanmar” for the period under SLORC, “Burma” for the previous periods, “Burma/Myanmar” for indicating continuity, and “Burmese” as an adjective.

This thesis attempts to show the powerlessness of the masses against the system based on the creation of self-serving laws by the ruling junta. It will examine the scope and dynamics of the historical development of the electoral laws and the overall electoral system of the Union of Myanmar during the period since 18 June 1989 up until the latest elections, and the application of these laws during the twenty-one years of existence of the Union of Myanmar (in 2010, two weeks before the elections, changed to Republic of the 4

Union of Myanmar), paying particular attention to the general election held on 7 November 2010 and the factors that had affected it. What are the motives of the junta to organize elections? Is the current regime legitimate? What is the source of legitimacy of the current regime in Myanmar?

The final results of the 2010 multi-party elections, which were obviously just a charade, were announced by the Myanmar Union Election Commission on 17 November 2010. In the House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw) there were 168 of the 224 seats up for election, and the military-supported party–the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)5–won 129. In the House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) there were 330 of the 440 seats up for election and the USDP won 259.6

According to the new constitution, the military receives an automatic 25% of seats in parliament. This army-drafted constitution was approved in a referendum on 10 May 2008 with a 99% voter turnout.7 As the Human Rights Watch stated, the SPDC pushed ahead with a constitutional referendum with manipulated results in the immediate weeks after Nargis cyclone ahead at the expense of efforts by ordinary Burmese people to assist survivors. Said one young woman from Dedave township when describing the constitutional referendum three weeks after the Cyclone Nargis: "I have no idea what the constitution is. But we did vote after Nargis. We were told just to cast ‘Yes' vote. I don't know how the result came out. At the time, people were struggling hard to survive. We just did what we were told."8 It was the first national vote since the 1990 election. NLD spokesman Nyan Win, inter alia, criticized the referendum: "This referendum was full of

5 A few months before the 2010 elections, the prime minister, Thein Sein, and some other general resigned from their military posts and registered the USDP, which is the successor to the Burmese government's mass organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), originally formed in 1993 by SLORC.

6 The 2008 constitution reserves ¼ of the House of Representatives (lower-house) seats and 1/3 of the House of Nationalities (upper-house) seats for the military officers.

7 “Cyclone Nargis (3 May 2008),” Burma (Myanmar) Disaster Diplomacy. Retrieved May 2011 from http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org/burma.html

8 Burma: After cyclone, repression impedes civil society and aid / Human Rights Watch (2010). Retrieved December 10, 2010 from http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/04/29/burma-after-cyclone-repression-impedes- civil-society-and-aid-0 5

cheating and fraud across the country; in some villages, authorities and polling station officials ticked the ballots themselves and did not let the voters do anything.”9

Burma has one of the highest levels of corruption; it ranks 178th out of 180 countries worldwide on the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index.10

The May 1990 People’s Assembly elections, the first held in 30 years, are important when considering the issue of democracy in Burma/Myanmar. The National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won over 60% of the vote (and over 80% of parliamentary seats: 392 of the 485 constituencies contested). The military-backed National Unity Party won less than 2% of the seats, 10 out of 485 constituencies. The election results were subsequently annulled by Senior General Saw Maung's government. The SLORC claimed retrospectively that the elections were not multi-party general elections, but they were just to elect a group that would work out a constitution.11

A healthy society consists of the state, the market and the civil society. Civil society is a critical element of democracy, not only free and fair elections.12 In Burma/Myanmar a civil society does not exist. Civil society is often viewed as a threat by autocratic governments. In Myanmar, political power is concentrated in the military junta with the head of state being Senior General Than Shwe, who holds the posts of "Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council" and "Commander in Chief of the Defense Services" as well as the Minister of Defense. The majority of ministry and cabinet posts are held by military officers.

According to Theodore M. Vestal, authoritarianism is characterized by highly concentrated and centralized power structures in which political power is generated and maintained by a repressive system that excludes potential challengers and uses political

9 Dilemma of dealing with Burma - BBC News (2004). Retrieved December 13, 2010 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3761022.stm

10 CPI 2008 table – Transparency International (2008). Retrieved December 13, 2010 from http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table

11 Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07-Saffin_Snapshot.htm

12 Civil society is a structure of civic and social organizations and institutions functioning on a base of volunteering; it is different from state organized structures and commercial market structures.

parties and mass organizations to mobilize people around the goals of the government. He stated the following principles in order to define authoritarianism:

• rule of men, not rule of law; • rigged elections; • all important political decisions made by unelected officials behind closed doors; • a bureaucracy operated quite independently of rules, the supervision of elected officials, or concerns of the constituencies they purportedly serve; and • the informal and unregulated exercise of political power.13

According to the 2007 Economist Intelligence Unit democracy index, Myanmar is ranked the 163th out of 167 in total (North Korea being the 167th) with a score of 0.00 out of 10.00 in the evaluation for the electoral process and pluralism.14

This research will also completely analyze the effectiveness of the electoral laws used by the authoritarian government to control the society and the overall outcome of the electoral system. Furthermore, it will study the current regime and the ruling elite. The thesis aims to explore the ways and methods of the cultivation of long-term legitimacy and stability of the current regime through alterations of the electoral laws and other tactics to ensure the positive outcome of the 2010 elections for the junta.

The objective of this research is to examine and to evaluate the electoral system and its development throughout the years of the existence of the Union of Myanmar (established in 1989), and assessing the effectiveness of the laws and the changes of laws that directly affect the electoral system.

13 T. M. Vestal, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State, (Greenwood. 1999), 17. Retrieved December 13, 2010 from http://books.google.com/books?id=XWXtXOl56KkC&pg=PA13&source=gbsc_r=4#v=onepage&q&f=false

14 Economist intelligence unit democracy index 2007. Retrieved December 13, 2010 from http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/democracy_index_2007_v3.pdf

1.3. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

For issues concerning Burma/Myanmar, there has been a lack of scholarship on many aspects of political life in Burma/Myanmar. This is because of the insurgencies that had physically limited access to information since gaining independence, and also due to government policies that prevented field research by both local and foreign scholars. The bureaucrats do not assist scholars and researchers because it could have severe consequences for them.

There are barriers to conducting research not only because there is insufficient data, but also because the existing statistics are often manipulated due to the internal political situation. “Those who control its flow shape it [data] to impress Myanmar’s rulers. The result is akin to a Potemkin village designed to impress those at the top of the political ladder. Positive figures are often inflated, negative facts diminished and unpleasant realities ignored.”15 The ruling junta is very sensitive and does not allow public analysis of their regime. Because of the lack of access to materials, many scholars claim that in Myanmar, facts are negotiated more than they are observed and thus, our knowledge is fractional at best.

The media is not allowed to enter Myanmar and reporters sneak in under the pretext of visiting the country as a tourist. The country has one of the worst freedom of press records in the world. According to the latest worldwide index on press freedom provided by Reporters without Borders, Burma ranks 171 out of 175 countries.16 This plight is demonstrated in the 2010 documentary Burma VJ directed by the Danish filmmaker Anders Ostergaard.

For the theoretical part of the thesis dealing with the electoral theory, a classic review of the history of elections can be found in Charles Seymour and Donald Paige Frary:

15 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 9.

16 “Reporters In Burma Call For Easing Of Censorship,” Censorship in America, 5May 2011. Retrieved May 5, 2011 from http://censorshipinamerica.com/2011/05/05/reporters-in-burma-call-for-easing-of-censorship/

How the World Votes: The Story of Democratic Development in Elections.17An overview of electoral institutions can be found in Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction by David M. Farrell.18 Moreover, definitions from dictionaries, such as the Britannica online dictionary, have been used to define elections and electoral systems in general, and the authoritarian regime prevailing in Myanmar.

R. H. Taylor’s The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia, a collection of essays about elections in Southeast Asia published in 1996, offers an overview of the development of the Southeast Asian electoral system as a regional phenomenon: “In practice, elections have been a regular feature of Southeast Asian politics since the 1940s and, in some cases, earlier.”19 He also states the reasons why Southeast Asian governments bother to hold elections despite their authoritarian essence: “The electoral process does carry within it the promise of popular control of the state.”20 His essay on Burma within this volume, Elections in Burma/Myanmar: For Whom and Why?, explains the Burmese system as a development from British historical experience and poses an interesting question as to whether elections are intended for the entities in power or out of power.21 This essay also serves as a starting point for understanding the history of elections from the beginning of the century, through the decades of military domination, and up to the last elections before publishing his work. He also describes the turnouts of each election and describes the electoral behavior of the Burmese population, of the ruling elites, as well as the voters.

Makhdoom Ali Khan, one of the top five litigators in Pakistan, provided in his report, Burmese Way: to Where?, on behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, a brief but very clear historical line of Burma from the legal point of view.22 He then

17 Charles Seymour, and D. P. Frary, How the World Votes: The Story of Democratic Development in Elections, (Charleston, South Carolina: Biblio Bazaar, 2009).

18 D. M. Farrell, Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

19 R. H. Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 3.

20 Taylor, The Politics, 6.

21 Taylor, The Politics, 164.

22 Makhdoom Ali Khan, Burmese Way: to Where? Report of a Mission to Myanmar (Burma) on Behalf of the International Commission of Jurists, (France, 1996).

examined the rule of law and the legal system, and demonstrated how the SLORC has used old laws together with promulgated laws to curb democratic norms and freedoms. His work focuses on the 1990 elections and provides an extensive analysis of its legal background.

One of the most important scholars and specialists on Burma-Myanmar is Professor David I. Steinberg. He is currently the Director of Asian Studies at Georgetown University. He has written extensively on Burma, and other nations in Asia, and his articles and books are a crucial source of English written literature on the politics of Burma for this thesis. Earlier in his career, as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State, he served as the Director for Technical Assistance in Asia and the Middle East, and Director for Philippines, Thailand, and Burma Affairs. He is the author of several books about Burma/Myanmar, including: Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar (2006), and Burma: The State of Myanmar (2001), which were crucial for understanding the historical background of current happenings in Myanmar. Steinberg’s latest publication, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, is a list of reasonable answers to questions of interest concerning the Burma/Myanmar crises. The author himself wittily noted that the amount of fiction in the absence of reliable data and lacking happy endings resemble a novel.23

Than Myin-U, is another scholar who has contributed to the academic research on the Burma/Myanmar issue. I agree with his claim that if we understand the history, we might be more understanding of the present. He is a historian and a former UN official. He was born in New York City to Burmese parents and is the grandson of former UN Secretary-General U Thant24, who served as a Secretary-General of the UN in the 1960s. He is the author of The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma.25 In addition to this, he is also the author of The Making of Modern Burma, and he has written several

23 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, Preliminary notes.

24 U Thant (1909 - 1974) was a Burmese diplomat and the third Secretary-General of the UN from 1961 to 1971.

25 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (New York: Farra, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

articles for The New York Times, The Washington Post, the LA Times, the International Herald Tribune, the Far Eastern Economic Review, and other magazines.26

The Nobel peace prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi is also known as the Burmese opposition leader and a former General Secretary of the National League for Democracy (NDL). While under house arrest, she published a biography of her father, the national hero who was given credit for negotiating Burma’s independence: Aung San of Burma: A Biographical Portrait by His Daughter 27 ; as well as several other books on Burma: Freedom for fear 28and Letters from Burma.29

Crucial to understanding the early history and development of the tatmandaw (Burmese for “armed forces”) was Mary P. Callahan’s Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma.30 In 1991, she was able to get a research visa to study the history of the army “history of the tatmandaw”, with 1962 as the cut-off date of the period that she was permitted to research. Her work is devoted to the period between 1826 and 1962 where she explains the forces that turned the Burmese citizens into enemies of the state.

The above mentioned literature is pivotal for understanding the electoral systems in general, and the various issues concerning Burma’s political life and its various aspects. This literature has been carefully chosen because of its clear statement and relevance to the topic of this thesis.

26 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

27 Aung San Suu Kyi, Aung San of Burma: A Biographical Portrait by His Daughter (Kiscadale: 1991).

28 Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom for Fear (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995).

29 Aung San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997).

30 Mary P. Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004).

1.4. METHODOLOGY

By the elaboration of this diploma thesis, the analytical-synthetic methodology has been applied. This methodology is composed of two components: analysis and synthesis. Analysis is a method to unfolding of the problem, to loosen or separate things that are together. Synthesis is the opposite of the analysis – it proceeds from known to unknown, and thus is the complement of analysis. To synthesis is to place together things that are apart; it starts with the data available and connects the same with the conclusion. Moreover, the following two methods have been applied:

• The logical-historical document-analysis method. This methodology combines external analysis (the author, the timeframe, the place where the document was produced, the category in which the document falls, what is the intended audience of this document) and internal analysis of the document (content, credibility of the content); and

• The methodology of comparison. This methodology compares to or more similar facts of a certain point of view. This methodology was used in the case of the last two general elections in 1990 and in 2010.

The research will apply various sources of information involving both, secondary sources (books and articles), as well as primary sources’ interpretation (documents, laws, constitution). Most useful sources for data collection will include the unofficial English translation (translated by the Irrawaddy) of the Union Election Commission Law (The State Peace and Development Council Law No. 1/2010) under the Section 450 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, and the Political Parties Registration Law (The State Peace and Development Council Law No. 2/2010), which both were published by the junta in Burmese in several state-run newspapers.

Furthermore, the study will be based on a comprehensive review of media reports and other secondary sources and statements. Due to censorship, it is sometimes difficult to get up-to-date and correct information. The media became the monopoly of the military

junta already under Ne Win. During the civilian government, Burma had about 30 newspapers in Burmese, English, Chinese, Hindi, Urdu and Tamil, Telugu and Gujarati.31

Newspapers, such as the “New Light of Myanmar” 32 in the English language, which are run by the government, are not a reliable source of objective opinion and facts. According to this newspaper, the four political objectives of the SPDC are:

1. Stability of the State, community peace and tranquility, prevalence of law and order;

2. National reconsolidation;

3. Emergence of a new enduring State Constitution; and

4. Building of a new modern developed nation in accord with the new State Constitution.33

Furthermore, statements, such as “Anarchy begets anarchy, not democracy; Riots beget riots, not democracy; Democracy can be introduced only through constitution” can be found on the backside of each print-out of this newspaper.

News agencies abroad constitute the most important and valuable source of information on this research. The Burmese government is wary of international media, and as a consequence, many news organizations are banned from reporting in the country. Foreign media are generally accused by the government of "spreading lies" to undermine national unity. Foreign based exile media outlets, such as the Democratic Voice of Burma based in Norway, attempt to offer an uncensored perspective on Burmese affairs to the rest of the world. Also, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring service, which gets publicly broadcast messages and then translates and summarizes them with the special focus of the United States’ and United Kingdom’s governments, is another important source of valuable information.

31 Bertil Lintner, “10 Myanmar/Burma”, in Colin Mackerras, Ethnicity in Asia (New York: Routledge Courson, 2003), 174.

32 NEW LIGHT ON MYANMAR is the official newspaper of the SPDC, published by the Ministry of Information. Before 1993, it was known as the “Working People’s Daily (established in 1963). Various government slogans are run across the front page and visits of officials overseas are highlighted.

33 The New Light of Myanmar newspaper, Vol. XVIII, No. 85, 15 July, 2010, 1.

The internet inside of Myanmar is strictly controlled, with access blocked to critical websites like Burmese exile groups and foreign media. Outside of Myanmar, however, there is a number of Burmese exile sites that publish information about Myanmar (in English), including Mizzima (which is based in New Delhi), and The Irrawaddy (which is based in Thailand), which were both very helpful at the time of research.

1.5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis attempts to understand the motives for which the junta holds elections, and to define the source of legitimacy (if there is one) of the current regime.

An electoral system is a method by which voters make a choice between several options, often in an election, on a policy referendum or on a plebiscite. The electoral system and its rules for valid voting determine the control of the state over the society. The most common electoral systems are majority rule, proportional representation, or plurality voting with a number of variations. The Union of Myanmar has created its own electoral system after the ruling regime announced its decision in February 2008 to push ahead with its “road map to disciplined democracy” by holding a referendum on a military-sponsored draft constitution in May 2008. The new constitution legitimized the leading role of the military junta in any future government. The electoral system enacted in this constitution was meant to be the legal framework of the multiparty elections in 2010. Electoral laws are the ground-rules for the elections. The regime designed these electoral laws in order to ensure its control over the society. On one hand, the regime needs to use elections to increase its legitimacy; on the other hand, it needs to make sure that it can win the elections.

An election, the basic compound of the electoral system, is a formal decision- making process by which a population chooses the right persons to hold public office. Elections have been the usual mechanism by which modern representative democracies operate since the 17th century. A representative democracy is defined by Anthony Giddens as “a political system in which decisions affecting a community are taken, not by its 14

members as a whole, but by people they have elected for this purpose.” 34 By 1920, adult male suffrage was ensured almost in every country in the world, though female suffrage was not established until somewhat later.

In Southeast Asia, competitive elections were held following the end of World War II, in many cases as a result of decolonization, though once again the restoration of authoritarianism was commonplace. Beginning in the 1970s, competitive elections were reintroduced in a number of countries. In Burma, the idea of elections as the usual means of choosing the leading figures has been a feature present for the first three quarters of the century. More recently, the question comes up as to whether elections serve the ones in power or the ones out of power.

Elections can fill offices in the legislature, sometimes in the executive and judiciary, and for regional and local governments. The universal use of elections as a tool for selecting representatives is a practice mostly in modern democracies. “An election is the formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting.”35 In some cases, electoral forms are present but the substance of an election is missing, as when voters do not have a free and genuine choice between at least two alternatives. Most countries hold elections in at least the formal sense. Formal elections do not mean that they are really competitive, like in the case of the 2010 elections in the Union of Myanmar, where the electoral situation was highly compromised and did not provide voters genuine alternatives among which to choose. Elections reinforce the stability and legitimacy of the political community, and that is what the regime during the last few years was preparing for. This upgrade was achieved through marginalizing the opposition, rewriting the constitution and changing the electoral laws, so nothing is left to chance.

Myanmar is an authoritarian state controlled by a military clique that has ruled for almost half a century. In this way, it is helpful to utilize political scientist Michael Mann’s typology: the state deploys high despotic power (the ability to crush what it can see) but

34 A.Giddens, Sociology, 5th ed., s. v. “representative democracy.” [glossary online] Retrieved November 30, 2010 from http://www.polity.co.uk/giddens5/students/glossary/m-r.asp#r

35 Encyclopædia Britannica. 2010, s. v. “election.” [encyclopedia online] Retrieved November 30, 2010 from: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/182308/election

low infrastructural power (an absence of institutions that would allow it to see everything).36

Authoritarian regimes have often used elections as a way to achieve a degree of popular legitimacy. Dictatorships may hold elections in cases where no substantive opposition is remotely feasible or when economic factors favor the regime. Even when opposition parties are allowed to participate, they may face intimidation by the government and its allies, which thereby precludes the effective mobilization of potential supporters. In addition, it has been a common practice of authoritarian regimes to intervene once balloting has begun by intimidating voters (e.g., through physical attacks), and by manipulating the count of votes that have been freely cast.37

The first elections were held in Burma in 1922, and then later in 1926, 1929, 1932 and 1935. They were free and fair as far as the limitations imposed by their colonial rule allowed. After Burma’s separation from India in 1937, there were no elections until 1947. During this period the Japanese Imperial Army occupied Burma for three years.38 The 2010 multiparty elections were the first since 1989, when the military regime ignored the results of a landslide victory of the democratic opposition, the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi. This thesis attempts to analyze the impact of the latest elections as well as compare it with the previous ones in 1990. The 2010 elections were aimed to upgrade to a more sophisticated authoritarian model – the so-called SPDC Version 2.0. The junta learnt a valuable lesson in 1990 and did not leave it to the people’s free choice, for they might not have gotten the result they wanted.

Elections do not directly establish public policy but instead commission a small group of officials with the authority to create these public policies through laws. Central to the election of such officeholders are political parties. The selection of candidates lies in the hands of political parties. The election is only the final process.

36 E. Prasse-Freeman, Burmanet - Democratic Voice of Burma: Retaking power in Burma (2010). Retrieved December 10, 2010 from http://www.burmanet.org/news/2010/07/26/democratic-voice-of-burma-retaking- power-in-burma-pt-1-%E2%80%93-elliott-prasse-freeman/

37 Encyclopædia Britannica. 2010, s. v. “authoritarian regime.” [encyclopedia online] Retrieved November 30, 2010 from: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/182308/election

38 Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7. December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07-Saffin_Snapshot.htm

The junta faces strong criticism from the international community. The junta uses elections to create a façade of democracy. Authoritarian regimes like the one in Myanmar allow a certain kind of pluralism, but they make sure that it is them who will win the elections if they are held. It is a kind of manipulated democracy at the best.

In addition to general elections, attention in this thesis will be turned also to referenda as another form of elections. A referendum is a form of direct democracy. It is a kind of election in which the preferences of the society are assessed on a particular issue. This kind of election reflects a certain reluctance to entrust full decision-making power to elected representatives. Referenda may be legislatively binding or merely consultative, but even consultative referenda are likely to be considered legislative mandates.

A third type of elections is a plebiscite, held to decide two highly sensitive types of political issues: the legitimacy of the government and the nationality of territories being argued about between governments.

1.6. CHAPTER ARRANGEMENT

The thesis will be divided into six main chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the topic, literature review, and the methodology of the research.

An outline of the theoretical framework guiding this research analysis will be resumed by conceptualization of electoral systems and electoral laws in the second chapter. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, the electoral system in general is defined as the “Method and rules of counting votes to determine the outcome of elections. Winners may be determined by a plurality, a majority (more than 50% of the vote), an extraordinary majority (a percentage of the vote greater than 50%), or unanimity. Candidates for public office may be elected directly or indirectly. Proportional representation is used in some areas to ensure a fairer distribution of legislative seats to constituencies that may be denied representation under the plurality or majority formulas.”39

The third chapter will give a brief description of historical and political development of the country as a starting point for understanding and the assessing of the development of the electoral system of the Union of Myanmar.

There has been written much about the 1990 elections, so I will give only a brief description of the electoral laws that had applied back then, and focus more on the 2010 elections. A brief assessment of the 1990 elections will be given in the fourth chapter. This topic may be of particular interest because of the fact that there was no guiding constitution at the time of the 1990 election, because the 1974 constitution has been suspended inter alia since 18 September 1988 by issuing Order 1/88 (and calling a constitutional convention in 1993, which was suspended in 1996), and so there was no constitution until

39 Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010, s. v. “electoral system.” [encyclopedia online] Retrieved November 30, 2010 from. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1516464/electoral-system

2008.40 Moreover, in 1996, the SLORC passed Order 5/96 that prohibited anyone from involving in constitutional matters with a penalty of 20 years sentence.41

The first four chapters will build an overarching perspective and a deeper understanding for the whole study. Chapter five will be analyzing and objecting the current electoral laws as part of the electoral system that was applied to the 2010 general elections in the Union of Myanmar as a tool for an extension of SPDC’s rule in civilian guise, sometimes also called “SPDC 2.0”. This chapter will also provide a comparison of the two last elections.

The last chapter will be the concluding one. Chapter six will finalize the thesis by briefly describing, analyzing and evaluating the application of the new electoral laws into practice in the 2010 general elections and the outcome and legitimacy of the government created after the 201o general elections.

1.7. EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION

The present research represents one of the first analyses of the 2010 general elections in the Union of Myanmar with an evaluation of the electoral laws that had applied to this election. The thesis attempts to highlight the rule of law, particularly the misusage of the constitution for political purposes. Accordingly, the study will greatly contribute to scholarship in South-east Asia and political studies. It is hoped that this research will generate further academic interest toward the Union of Myanmar, and the spread of word about the Burmese problem in order to educate the external world.

40 Timeline - Myanmar’s slow road to a new constitution, Reuters, 9 February 2008. Retrieved December 17, 2010 from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKBKK26169420080209

41 Speech by Janelle Saffin MLC (18th – 19th August 2000), Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07- Saffin_Snapshot.htm

CHAPTER TWO: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

“…elections, along with wars, revolutions, and coups, provide the divisions in history that allow us to distinguish one epoch from another.”42

The closing decades of the 20th century and the opening years of the 21st century were years of political reform in the Southeast- and East-Asian region. Major transitions from authoritarianism to democracy began in the Philippines (in 1986) with the popular uprising against Marcos and in South Korea and Taiwan (in 1987) with the negotiation of a transition from military-backed, single-party governments, followed by the resumption of civilian government in Thailand (in 1992), the UN convention in Cambodia (in 1993), the fall of Suharto’s regime in Indonesia (in 1998), and the international rehabilitation of East Timor (in 2001).

Today, more governments in Asia are chosen through free elections than ever before. Despite some disruptive elements such as unrests in Thailand and instability in East Timor, there is a clear trend toward democracy. Is this also the case of Myanmar, is Myanmar following the trends of Asian democratization?

42 Robert H. Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179.

2.1. ELECTIONS HELD IN AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES

Many governments in Southeast Asia, like the one of Myanmar, are authoritarian, but elections have been a constant feature of political life in the region for many decades since 1940s, in some cases even earlier.

The Britannica online dictionary defines authoritarianism as the “principle of blind submission to authority, as opposed to individual freedom of thought and action. In government, authoritarianism denotes any political system that concentrates power in the hands of a leader, or a small elite that is not constitutionally responsible to the body of the people. Authoritarian leaders often exercise power arbitrarily and without regard to existing bodies of law, and they usually cannot be replaced by citizens choosing freely among various competitors in elections. The freedom to create opposition political parties or other alternative political groupings with which to compete for power with the ruling group is either limited or nonexistent in authoritarian regimes.”43

According to the definition above, authoritarianism stands in contrast to individualism and democracy. Authoritarianism is not to be confused with totalitarianism. Authoritarian governments usually tolerate some degree of pluralism in social organization, and exercise that power within relatively predictable limits.

Totalitarianism can be defined as an extreme version of authoritarianism. The major difference between the two is that in an authoritarian state, social and economic institutions are not controlled by the government.

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism are both forms of autocracy. However, they differ in some key characteristics. Yale political scientist Paul C. Sondrol argues that while authoritarian leaders are unpopular, totalitarian leaders develop a manipulative

43 Encyclopædia Britannica. 2010, s. v. “authoritarianism.” [encyclopedia online] Retrieved May 30, 2011 from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/44640/authoritarianism

“charismatic mystique.” Authoritarian leaders are also more likely to apply power for personal “aggrandizement” than totalitarian leaders.44

According to Sondrol, authoritarians lack ideology and compensate it by applying a mixture of fear and rewards to loyal followers.45 This feature of authoritarianism is very evident in Myanmar.

Table 1: Characteristics of Authoritarian and Totalitarian Dictators

Totalitarianism Authoritarianism

Charisma of the leader High Low

Ends of power Public Private

Corruption Low High

Official ideology Yes No

Limited pluralism No Yes

Legitimacy Yes No

Source: P. C. Sondrol, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner". Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 23, No. 3, 599, 2009, modified by author

Authoritarian systems may also tolerate some pluralism. In Myanmar, the junta has officially allowed several groups to create political parties in order to participate in the 2010 general elections. However, these groups were strictly controlled and limited. Parties had to register with the authorities and transform before they could contest in the actual

44 P. C. Sondrol, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner". Journal of Latin American Studies Vol. 23, No. 3, 599, 2009. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=3192644

45 Ibid.

elections. If parties were not willing to transform according to the new (discriminatory) laws of the Election Commission, they faced deregistration. Existing parties faced these choices:

• to participate – under the motto “a constitution is better than no constitution,”46

• to boycott – because of the low credibility of the SPDC roadmap, and “unjust” electoral laws,

• to confront the polls.

Lack of the power to mobilize the whole population in pursuit of national goals is characteristic for authoritarian regimes, as is evident in Myanmar, where ethnic crises and insurgencies have been a long-standing problem.

Sondrol also argues that authoritarian regimes have no legitimacy. In Myanmar, legitimacy is limited. The government which was formed after the latest 2010 elections, in which a limited amount of parties participated because many of them boycotted the election, is not based on any constitution. The electoral system has been excluded from the 2008 Constitution for reasons of convenience - changes would have to be done through amendments to the constitution. Having it separate is more flexible; elections are managed by the Union Election Commission, which is in charge of election laws. However, some of the features of the electoral system are still tied to the constitution as this determines the terms of balance of power.

Because the generals in Myanmar govern by decree, there is no legal space for challenging the military regime. In democratic countries, the government is expected to operate transparently and according to the law. If necessary, the government can be challenged in court, or often the media is used to expose certain unregularities and/or violations of the law.47

46 “Burma in 2010: A Critical Year in Ethnic Politics”, TNI-BCN Burma Policy Briefing Nr 1, June 2010, Transnational Institute. Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.tni.org/briefing/burma-2010-critical-year- ethnic-politics

47 “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society,” ICG Asia report no. 27, 6 December 2001. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Civil_Society.pdf

Why do countries like Myanmar bother to hold elections? According to Professor Taylor, the reasons, why no governing elite in Southeast Asia has ever abandoned the idea of elections, are:

1. Elections are essential for third-world countries that want to receive aid from the Western capitalist democracies;

2. Elections are widely accepted in the West as one of the crucial elements of democracy, and in the past, elections were one of the required conditions when transferring power from the colonial power to the new independent state;

3. The widespread belief that independence means democracy prompts governments of third-world countries to hold elections; and

4. In democratic theory, elections are seen as “a way of expression of diverse interests…in pluralistic societies, preserving the rights of minorities while championing the power of the majority despite authoritarianism.”48

In Burma, there has been a history of elections since 1922, although elections during the colonial times were limited. Following independence, free and fair elections were introduced in Burma. Under Ne Win’s era, there were only one-party elections.

The 2010 multiparty elections were the first since 1990, when the military regime ignored the results and refused to hand over power to the democratic opposition, led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The junta learnt a valuable lesson in 1990 and in 2010 did not leave it to the people’s free choice. The 2010 elections were carefully designed to upgrade to a more sophisticated authoritarian model – the so-called SPDC Version 2.0.

Myanmar has illustrated the point where elections, in the case of aging regimes which have lost touch with most of the population, can provide a “lever for prying open and widening the sphere of legitimate political activity by demonstrating the illegitimacy of the old regime.”49 Is it merely a means of how factions that have previously lost control regain influence in a legitimate manner? The question, whether elections in Myanmar

48 Robert H. Taylor, The Politics of Election, 3.

49 Ibid, 8.

provide also an opportunity for new groups that would like to enter the political life, remains doubted.

The specially designed electoral process guarantees the popular control of the state. According to Professor Robert Taylor, a specialist on Myanmar and Southeast Asian politics, “those who seek to direct its public affairs must defend their records and convince the voters that the policies they propose for the future are feasible, desirable, and best carried out by those who propose them.”50

Authoritarian regimes have often used elections as a way to achieve a degree of popular legitimacy. Dictatorships may hold elections in cases where no substantive opposition is remotely feasible. Even when opposition parties are allowed to participate, they may face intimidation by the government and its allies, which thereby precludes the effective mobilization of potential supporters. In addition, it has been a common practice of authoritarian regimes to intervene once balloting has begun by intimidating voters, and by manipulating the count of votes that have been freely cast.51

50 Ibid, 1.

51 Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010, s. v. “authoritarian regime.” [encyclopedia online] Retrieved November 30, 2010 from: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/182308/election

2.2. ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

The Georgetown University defines the electoral system as “[a country’s] method used to calculate the number of elected positions in government that individuals and parties are awarded after elections.”52

Put differently, it is the way how to determine the amount of seats in governmental institutions which reflect the will of the people. There are several types of electoral systems used in various countries. According to scholars of the Georgetown University, there are three main types and all other forms are derived from or composed of these:

1. Plurality electoral systems

This system requires the voter to check only one vote on the ballot. The constituencies are usually composed of only one member (single-member constituencies). A candidate does not necessarily have to get over 50% of the vote in order to win the election; he simply needs to have more votes than the other candidates. Even though this system “does not represent the interest of all (or even most) voters,” it encourages the formation of “relatively stable political systems dominated by two major parties.”53 This system is used for example in the elections in the United Kingdom and the United States.54

2. Majority electoral systems

Similarly to the plurality systems, the constituencies are usually composed of only one member (single-member constituencies) and voters cast only one vote on the ballot. Contrary to the plurality system, the majority system requires the candidate to get over 50% of the vote in order to win. If none of the candidates achieve this result, a selected

52 Electoral systems, Georgetown University, 2000. Retrieved May 18, 2010 from http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm

53 Ibid.

54 The presidential election in the United States is also considered a plurality system, but in reality, the existence of the Electoral College makes it a hybrid of the plurality and majority systems.

number of candidates participate in the second round of voting.55 This system is used in for example in Austria, Finland, France, Portugal and Russia.

3. Proportional representation

A certain variant of this electoral system (at some level of government) can be found in most countries. The simplest way of attributing seats within this system is to “award a party the same percentage of seats in parliament as it gets votes at the polls.”56 There are other more sophisticated ways of proportional representation.

Under the Party list system voters don’t vote for individuals but for parties as a whole. The closed party list system is used in Germany and Israel. This system requires the voter to vote for a party as a whole; candidates are chosen by the party. The open party list system is used in for example in Denmark, Italy, Finland and Switzerland and voters vote for the party and also the candidates. Under all party list systems, seats allocation has to be determined.57 For this purpose several methods can be used (d’Hondt method, Saint-Lague method, Droop quota, Hare quota).58

55 For example: In Russia the top two candidates participate in the second round, in France all candidates with a minimum of 12.5% of the vote proceed to the second round.

56 Electoral systems, Georgetown University, 2000. Retrieved May 18, 2010 from http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm

57 Ibid.

58 The d’Hondt method is a highest averages method for allocating seats for a certain constituency. This system slightly favors large parties and coalitions over scattered small parties. In this system, the total votes cast for each party in the electoral district is divided, first by 1, then by 2, then 3, right up to the total number x of seats to be allocated for the district/constituency. The x highest distribution figures are awarded a seat.

The Saint-Lague method is a way of allocating seats approximately proportional to the number of votes of a party to a party list. It is similar to the D'Hondt method (and in most cases delivers identical or almost identical results), but uses different divisors. A quotient is calculated for each party according to this formula: quot= V/(2s+1) V= total number of votes that a party has received, s=number of seats that a party has been allocated so far, initially 0 for all parties: Whichever party has the highest quotient gets the next seat allocated, and their quotient is recalculated given their new seat total. The process is repeated until all seats have been allocated.

The Droop quota is the minimum number of votes a candidate must receive in order to be elected. Any votes a candidate receives above the quota are transferred to another candidate. The usual Droop quota is calculated according to the formula: [total valid poll/(seats+1)]+1 The Droop quota is the smallest number that guarantees that no more candidates can reach the quota than the number of seats available to be filled.

The Hare quota is the minimum number of votes required for a party or candidate to capture a seat. The Hare quota favors the smaller parties at the expense of the larger ones. It is calculated: the total valid poll/ the total number of seats to be filled.

Another important form of proportional representation is the Single transferable vote (STV). It is used for major elections for example in Australia. Some other countries use it in local elections. Under STV, voters vote for individuals, not for parties. Moreover, the voter ranks candidates in an order according to their choice. To determine the minimal number of votes that an individual candidate must get in order to be awarded a seat is used the Droop quota, the Hare quota, or the Imperial quota. Each candidate who is able to get a certain amount of votes calculated according to one of these quotas will be assured of winning a seat. For allocating seats, there is a variety of methods in use.

Table 2: The Current Most Common Electoral Systems in the World

Electoral system type Electoral system Plurality and majority electoral systems First Pass The Post (FPTP) Two-Round System Alternative Vote Block Vote Party Block Vote Proportional electoral systems Party List System Single Transferable Vote Mixed systems Mixed Member Proportional Parallel systems (use two electoral systems independently at the same time)

Nations who have previously been colonized usually inherited the electoral system from their colonizer without significant alterations, as such Burma inherited from the British the plurality electoral system, the First Pass The Post system. Within this system voters vote for only one candidate and the candidate who wins the most votes is elected. This form of voting favors a single-party-dominance because of its winner-take-all nature.

2.3. THE BURMESE LEGAL SYSTEM

When the British conquered Burma, they imposed a new foreign legal system claiming that they were bringing rule of law to the country. However, Burma already had a legal system with institutions going back to the Pagan Dynasty. As Thant Myint-U put it, “the Irrawaddy basin possesses one of the oldest legal traditions in the world.”59

The Burmese law was a model based on the legal code of Manu, the original law in the Hindu tradition, in combination with legal writings adjusted to the conditions in Burmese society. The Burmese law even distinguished between civil law (lawka wut) and criminal law (raza-wut).

A class of professional lawyers (shay nay), who argued cases before royal judges, was recognized. The lawyers wore special dresses, collected standardized fees (plus a percentage of the issue they argued) and lived in a special area of the town.60

After the British forceful imposition of their law, the Burmese law was reserved for three cases only: religion, marriage and heritage. 61 These became later known as the “Burmese Buddhist law”.

Even after independence, the British Parliamentary model was followed. The titular head of the State was the President elected indirectly for no more than two successive terms of five years. The bicameral Parliament, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, was elected directly for a period of four years, but could be dissolved by the President earlier. It consisted of:

• the upper house: House of Nationalities (Chamber of Nationalities), Amyotha Hluttaw: 120 members

• the lower house: House of Representatives (Chamber of Deputies), Pyithu Hluttaw: 250 members

59 Thant Myint-U, The Making of Modern Burma (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2001), 87.

60 Donald M. Seekins, Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 266.

61 M. A. Khan, Burmese Way: to Where? Report of a Mission to Myanmar (Burma) on Behalf of The International Commission of Jurists, (France, 1996), 30.

Elections to both houses (chambers) were regulated by law. “The Chamber of Deputies was elected by territorial constituencies delimited on the basis of population. The allocation of seats in the Chamber of Nationalities was made according to the Second Schedule of the Constitution. It gave 25 seats to Shans, 12 to Kachins, 8 to Chins, 3 to Karennis, 24 to Kayins (reduced to 15 in 1951) and 52 to the remaining territories of the Union.”62 The real power of the government was in the hands of the Premier, nominated by the House of Representatives, and his Cabinet.

The British legal system was generally admired under the civilian government and many colonial laws continued to be used. During these years, the British style legal system with its tradition of independence of the judiciary stayed almost intact. During the Ne Win era, vast reforms have been undertaken. These reforms undermined the British legal system and were shaped as to adapt the needs of Ne Win’s regime. The reforms were advocated by Dr. Maung Maung, the most influential legal expert of that time. A system of socialist legality with courts subordinate to the revolutionary BSPP party was created.

In 1988, the Constitution of 1974, defining the structure of the judicial system, was revoked by the new military regime. The junta ruled by decrees with exclusive judicial powers. According to John Austin’s “Command theory,” law in Burma/Myanmar became the command of the sovereign backed by the threat of punishment.63

62 Khan, Burmese Way, 29.

63 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010, s. v. “John Austin” [encyclopedia online]. Retrieved May 5, 2011 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-john/

2.4. HISTORY ELECTIONS IN BURMA/MYAMNAR

The electoral system in Burma developed from the British historical experiment. There had been elections for urban councils in the nineteenth century. In 1922 first major elections took place (partial elections for the Legislative Council in Burma) and since then, formal elections have been a regular feature of Burmese politics for three-quarters of a century. Originally, elections were perceived as the most appropriate means of choosing the governing elite. Recently, this belief shifted to the assumption that elections were the only way of establishing a legitimate government.64

The first countrywide elections in Burma were held in April 1947, shortly before independence, as part of Britain’s preparation to shift power to a new democratic government after independence. The constituent assembly consisted of 255 members, out of which 210 were elected from Burma Proper and the remaining 45 from the former Frontier Areas. Parties, such as Burma Communist Party (BCP) and the Karen National Union (KNU), boycotted the elections, and so U Nu, the successor of Aung San after his assassination, won with his AFPFL the majority of the seats (seven were left to independent communists).65

The first national elections (national election = general election) were held in 1951 and had to be conducted in three stages because of the insurgencies within the country. Less than 20% of voters took part in the elections. AFPFL was again the most successful party with 60% of the votes and 147 out of 250 seats in the legislature.66 Again, the BCP and the KNU did not participate in the elections (as well as in the subsequent ones in 1956). Robert Taylor evaluated these elections as follows: “If elections provide legitimacy for governments, the 1951 election in Burma provided a mere fig leaf.”67 The second elections after independence enjoyed much better political conditions than the first one. The AFPFL

64 Taylor, The Politics of Elections, 164-165.

65 Ibid, 171.

66 Robert H. Taylor, The State in Burma. (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1987), 247.

67 Taylor, The Politics of Elections, 173. 31

was again the most successful party with the majority of the vote, but this time, the support for AFPFL slipped to 48% of the vote.68

The last multi-party elections were held in 1960 (then only thirty years later, in 1990). The two main competitors both belonged to the AFPFL. The fight between the two factions was won by the former Premier U Nu and his Clean faction of AFPFL even though the military supported the other, Stable faction of the AFPFL. U Nu and his party took over 57% of the vote.69

The coup in March 1962 brought an end to multi-party elections in Burma. After the military took over, the only elections that took place, was the national referendum (the first and only in the history of Burma before the constitutional referendum in 2008) in January 1974. The voter turnout was 95% with the result of over 90% in favor of the new constitution written by a government commission.70 The main purpose of this constitution was to legalize the army-dominated one-party socialist system that was established after the army took power.

The highest participation rate in elections was achieved in the 1990 elections with over 72% of voter turnout. In total, ninety-three parties registered and twenty-seven successfully won seats. The winner was Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD winning 392 out of 485 seats with almost 60% of the vote.71 The army-backed NUP, the descendant organization of the old BSPP, won mere ten seats. Despite this over-whelming victory of the NDL, the military never transferred power to the legitimate winner, claiming that the elections were aimed to elect a group of people who would draft the constitution according to which later elections for the assembly would be held. Taylor concluded that the military was able to maintain rule due to two factors:

1. The military raised intentionally doubts about Aung San Suu Kyi and her loyalty to Burma (They highlighted the fact that she was married to a British citizen and

68 Taylor, The State, 247.

69 Ibid.

70 “Myanmar: Towards the Elections,” Asia Report No. 174, 20 August 2009. Retrieved May 7, 2011 from http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/burma-myanmar.ashx

71 “1990 Election Results Annulled; NLD Offices Reopen,” The Irrawady, 11 March 2010. Retrieved June 1, 2011 from http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=18007

thus had a double citizenship, and accused her of cooperating with underground insurgent groups).

2. The military did not hesitate in arresting opponents.72

Elections have not always, or rarely, achieved any significant power shift. Decision-making after the vote for Burma’s remaining part of the Indian province in 1932 did not follow the results of the elections (people voted against separating from India) and Burma became a separate self-governed colony in 1937. Sixty years later, after the general elections in 1990, the same happened when the NDL was not able to take over power despite the results of the elections. These facts enforce a rhetorical question whether elections serve the interest of the people who vote or the people who rule?

The 2010 elections were designed to prolong military supremacy rule in civilian guise. This “electoral authoritarianism”73 is characterized by an illusion of multi-party democracy with least effective elections. The Burmese junta has been very careful at planning the future of Myanmar by:

• approving its self-drawn military supremacy constitution in a manipulated referendum;

• excluding the electoral system from the constitution;

• creating an election commission for the 2010 elections which was held responsible for passing the discriminatory Union Election Commission Law;

• ensuring twenty-five percent seats both in House of Nationalities and House of Representatives for the military; and

• prohibiting the opposition politicians to participate in the 2010 elections.

72 Taylor, The Politics of Elections, 178.

73 Sai Wansai ed., Burma’s Election: From Autocracy to Competitive Authoritarian Regime or Civil Revolution?, 27 October 2010, Asian Tribune. Retrieved June 18, 2011 from http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/10/27/burma%E2%80%99s-election-autocracy-competitive- authoritarian-regime-or-civil-revolution

It is likely that the whole circus is designed to prolong the military regime’s political decision-making power, rather than a genuine democratization process. In other words, the built-in structure will insure military dominance for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the army is not answerable to the government in matters concerning the military justice and military expenditure. “In short, the military is a state within a state.”74

74 Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICAL-HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BURMA/MYANMAR

Myanmar is today involved in two major struggles: the restoration of democracy and the resolution of ethnic minority rights. The problems are closely interlinked, and therefore, it is important to consider history and culture and their complexity in order to understand how the Burmese society developed, how the current issues aroused, and how the current regime came to power. It is a very complex question which is associated with a number of other issues that originated in the past, and have not been overcome yet. These problems include: extreme poverty, the minority issue, the lack of educated people, and corruption. This chapter will analyze the historical context of these issues. In this thesis, the history of Burma/Myanmar is divided into these eras:

1. Early history (pre-1885)

2. Colonial era (1986–1948)

3. Civilian government (1948–1962)

4. Military rule under Socialist government (1962–1988)

5. Under the SLORC and SPDC regime (1988–2011)

Since independence, Burma/Myanmar has been several times renamed by the ruling elite. Since independence there have occurred four changes of the official name of the country (see Table 3).

Table 3: Various Official Names of Burma/Myanmar since Independence

4 January 1948 Union of Burma 4 January 1974 Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma 23 September 1988 Union of Burma 18 June 1989 Union of Myanmar 19 October 2010 Republic of the Union of Myanmar

3.1. EARLY HISTORY

Myanmar is neither the first nor the last country, in which leaders rewrite their histories in order to explain their contemporary roles. The Burmese, in general, are very proud of their pre-colonial history. The current regime has used Burmese history to glorify their role as a protector and unifier of the state, just as the three Burman warrior kings, Anawratha (1044-1077), Bayinnaung (1551-1581) and Alaungpaya (1752-1760) did in their time. The junta claims to be in a direct ancestral line with these three kings; and to honor them, the junta has built 3 huge statues in the newly-built capital, Naypyidaw. The fact that these kings were of Burman ethnical origin serves the junta’s purpose to claim legitimacy; as Professor Steinberg noted: “Perhaps authoritarian regimes seek legitimacy in this pre-historical manner.” 75 Moreover, highlighting the pre-colonial history helps to overcome the shame of having been colonized.

The Mon Kingdom (1287-1757) in the area today known as Pegu, as well as the Arakan kingdoms (9th century-1785) were conquered by the aggressive and expansive Burman kings.76 Their strength was demonstrated in the 18th century when they defeated the Chinese in their attempt to invade Burma and they themselves attacked the kingdoms of Siam and destroyed the Thai capital Ayutthaya in 1767.

Historically, Thailand has been the major rival of Burma and disputes over the ethnically ill-defined border continued up to the year 2002. Despite these disagreements, Thailand remains Myanmar’s official largest trading partner.

After the Burman kings have conquered what is today known as Thailand, they did not stop, and in the early 19th century they extended their territory westward across Assam to the very borders of British East Bengal and Manipur. The fear of Burmese conquest of the region around Dhaka led to the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826), which was won by the British and resulted in the British getting hold of two Burmese areas, Arakan and Tenasserim.

75 Steinberg, What Everyone, 17.

76 Ibid, 17-18.

Disputes over the peace treaty of Yandabo, which had ended the First Anglo- Burmese War, triggered the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-1853), with the outcome of the gradual hamstring of Burmese sovereignty; the start of which was the British annexation of the province of Pegu renamed Lower Burma.77

In June 1884, the Treaty of Hué sealed French rule over all of what is today known as Vietnam. From there, the French were pushing westward into Cambodia and Laos. Upper Burma, a territory that the British hoped for, would follow. A line had to be drawn somewhere.78 An alleged letter from the French to the Burmese foreign minister, promising French arms in exchange for the prerogative right over the king Thibaw’s jade mines, gave the pretext for an invasion.

The London Times reported in September 1885 that the argument for an invasion of Burma was now not doubted. One thing the British government had to do was to be careful not to transfer the war with Burma into a war with France.79 But the French neither denied nor suggested that they would help the Burmese king. The reign of king Thibaw, the last king of the Konbaung Dynasty of Burma, ended when Burma was defeated by the forces of the British Empire in the Third Anglo-Burmese War, in the end of the year 1885, prior to its official annexation on 1 January 1886.

77 Keat Gin Ooi, ed., Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia, From Angkor Wat to East Timor (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 736.

78 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (New York: Farra, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 9-10.

79 Ibid, 11.

3.2. COLONIAL ERA

The southern part of Burma was incorporated into the British Indian Empire in 1853. Subsequently, the rest of Burma came under the British rule 33 years later. British India was subdivided and Burma was ruled as a separate colony from 1 April 1937, until it gained independence in 1948.

Even though Burma was under foreign rule for a relatively short period of time, it had a profound impact on the country’s future. The British never built a colonial state in Burma; they simply applied the “Indian model of British governance,” which later came to cause unrest among the Burmans and other ethnic nationalities. It is also regarded by historians as the cause of today’s minority issue: the British divided their new colony into two parts. The central area was inhabited mainly by Burmans, named Ministerial Burma (or Burma Proper), and was ruled directly by the British; the frontier areas, which was also called as Frontier Areas (or Scheduled Areas), were inhabited by minorities and were ruled indirectly by the British. “[Yet] all of the major decisions regarding Burma from the 1820’s to 1920 were made in Calcutta or New Delhi, not London.”80 ,

After the end of the era of monarchy in Burma in 1885, king Thibaw had been abolished, and together with his family had to flee to India. Unrest broke out in Burma; and it took the British about ten years to suppress these rebellions. Troops from India were used for this purpose. Later, they came to dominate the trade. By the 1930s, the capital city, Rangoon, resembled an Indian city. This preferential position of Indians may be one of the early causes of resentment against the Indians (which prevails even today), which later culminated in 1982 with the expulsion of over 200 000 Indians after the Citizenship Act was passed.

Because the British did not trust the Burmans, in 1937, when Burma became a self- governed colony, minority people were hired into administrative or low governmental

80 Callahan, Making Enemies, 32.

positions, and were recruited into the army. “Only about 12.4 percent of the Burma Army was composed of Burmans at the start of World War II.”81

During the colonial rule, the British encouraged control and trade; they built roads, railroads, and developed ports and riverine transport. On the other hand, they took control over the economy and therefore large corporations were owned exclusively by Europeans. The British also undercut the position of Buddhism and introduced secular education. In order to allow greater state control of the rural areas, the indigenous social mechanism was destroyed and the traditional village authority became the lowest representative of the British Crown. This resulted in landlessness and high crime rates in Burma..

3.2.1. JAPANESE OCCUPATION

The students’ strike in 1936 was a major event in shaping Burmese nationalism against the British colonial presence (before World War II). Also, the Buddhist monks became an important part of the independence movement. Bogyoke Aung San was elected general secretary of the Thakin party (in Burmese: “Our own masters”), and became the leading nationalist and one of the key figures in Burmese politics.

During World War II., Japanese military interests in South-East Asia increased in 1940, because the British were providing military assistance to China which was at war against Japan since 1937. The British were sending war materials through the newly- opened Burma Road. Originally, Japan’s motives for invading Burma were to protect the flank of its forces operating in Malaya and Singapore, and later to close off the Burma Road.

The Japanese knew little about Burma at the time of their arrival to Burma. They made contact with Aung San, a Burmese student activist in China who had left Burma in 1940.82 In 1941, he and 29 other men created the “Thirty Comrades,” who cooperated with

81 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 29.

82 Wikipedia: “Burma National Army”. Retrieved January 2, 2011 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma_National_Army

the Japanese in attacking the British. Many of these “Thirty Comrades” came to play a significant role in independent Burma after the colonial era83.

The Japanese first invaded Burma in December 1941 from Thailand and they soon forced the British forces to withdraw to India. The British government in-exile settled down in Simla, from where it continued to claim authority over the Burmese territory. This period was very confusing because there were three British sources of decision making at the same time. “The foci of British decision-making in Burma were, first, the Burma office in London; second, the British-Burmese government in-exile in Simla under the leadership of the Governor, Reginald Dorman-Smith; and third, the Southeast Asia Command (SEAR) under Lord Luis Mountbatten, which has responsibility for the Burma theatre of war.”84

When the British government withdrew to India, many Burmans joined Aung San in an anti-British Burma Independence Army (BIA; December 1941 - June 1942), which was formally placed under the Japanese Fifteenth Army. The BIA was a disorganized decentralized local guerilla army of indigenous Burman men, which was as Mary Callahan described: “An entity that far outpaced Japanese plans”.85

Disputes between the BIA and the Japanese military police, Kempeitai (in Japanese: “Corps of Law Soldiers”), over the BIA’s attempt to form local governments in various towns in Burma (whereas the Japanese intended to form an administration on their own terms) led to the dissolution of the BIA by the Japanese.86 Subsequently, in April 1942, “… under [Japanese] auspices a smaller Burma Defense Army [BDA] was formed under the command of Aung San; Ne Win commanded one of its three battalions.”87

The BDA was a small group of soldiers organized into two battalions which gradually grew. According to Mary Callahan, “this small size was the key to the

83 For example, General Ne Win, who led a coup d‘état against the premier U Nu, became Burma’s head of government in 1962.

84 Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 65.

85 Callahan, Making Enemies, 53.

86 Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Armies (London: Penguin, 2005), 172.

87 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 37.

development of the tightly knit, corporate identity of the Tatmandaw.”88 The BDA (the successor of BIA; in 1943 it was renamed the Burma National Army, BNA) absorbed Japanese military tactics for their own nationalist purpose (and later in 1945, the BDA turned against the Japanese and helped to liberate Burma with the British).

3.2.2. INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE JAPANESE

In August 1943, Burma was granted nominal independence by the Japanese. Dr. Ba Maw, a politician imprisoned by the British before the war, assumed charge of the Burmese cabinet and named himself anashim (Burmese for “dictator”); he officially became Premier. Aung San became the Minister of Defense in the new regime, and also Commander-in-Chief of the renamed Burma National Army, with the rank of Major General. The capital was called Rangoon Naypyidaw (Burmese for “seat of the king”). Although Burma was nominally self-governing, it remained under Japanese military occupation.89

This independence granted by Japanese did not provide full international recognition, as the British were ruling by government in-exile. To gain full independence once and for all, Burma needed to get rid of the Japanese, the major enemy of the British. If the Burmese switched sides and helped the British to defeat the Japanese, independence could be negotiated. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP) joined forces in the anti-Japanese resistance, and created the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO). They were “fighting against the same enemy but fighting for very different visions of the future.”90 The CPB was against any cooperation with the Japanese, whereas the PRP favored collaboration with the Japanese in their fight for independence. They were not able to come to any agreement until August 1944, when AFO finally concurred that Japan was the primary enemy, and cooperation with the Allies was given green light.

88 Callahan, Making Enemies, 59.

89 “Burma National Army,” Wikipedia. [encyclopedia online] Retrieved January 2, 2011 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma_National_Army

90 Callahan, Making Enemies, 85.

3.2.3. THE END OF THE WAR

The British reoccupation campaign started in 1945. By the beginning of the year, while the Japanese were retreating, Rangoon was retaken by the Allies on 3 May 1945. The last few Japanese forces in Burma were cut off from each other and only some small fights occurred until Japan formally surrendered in August. After the atomic bombs were dropped by the Allies on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese government finally surrendered on 14 August 1945. The longest Commonwealth Campaign of World War II was over.

World War II had serious impact on Burma and its society. The infrastructure and the industry were destroyed; Indians fled back to India; tensions between Burmans and minorities were exacerbated (Karens and Kachins sided with the Allies, whereas the Burmans sided with the Japanese until 1945), and post-Japanese Burma was “armed to the hilt.”91

In October 1945, Reginald Dorman-Smith resumed his position as the governor of post-Japanese Burma (replaced by Hubert Rance in 1946). The question of Burmese independence was not clear. Britain’s policy toward this issue was ambiguous. The Military government, which had run Burma from May to October 1945, came to an agreement with Aung San to integrate his army into the regular Burma Army. The British government, nevertheless, was willing to grant only self-government within the British Commonwealth after three years of direct rule by the British Governor of Burma, followed by a system of limited self-government. The Frontier areas were to have a “separate status” under direct British rule. This two-Burma principle was embodied in the White Paper of 1945.92

3.2.4. DECIDING THE FUTURE OF BURMA

In the author’s opinion, there were four important factors that led to Britain’s decision to grant Burma independence:

1. Britain was exhausted after the war;

2. The Japanese occupation undermined British credibility;

91 Callahan, Making Enemies, 88.

92 Christie, A Modern History, 66.

3. The Burmese nationalist movement demonstrated their willingness to become independent; and

4. India was bound to become independent, and Burma would follow.

Aung San (1911-1947) has resigned from the army and moved to the political sphere. He became the main political actor who negotiated independence. This period is also called the “era of Aung San.” Negotiations with Britain resulted in the Aung San- Atlee Agreement (27 Jan 1947) calling for independence within one year. The White Paper would be bypassed and the Constituent Assembly would be elected (creating the basis for a fully self-governing Burma).93 The colonial government approved the formation of a new government consisting mainly of AFPFL representatives.

The Karens, who have had a loyalist relationship with the British during the colonial times, felt betrayed because Aung San was able to convince the British not to separate the Frontier areas from Burma proper. From 1947 on, the minority policies would be in the hands of Aung San and the AFPFL (successor of AFO). He advocated national unity in a kind of a federal system with the minorities. “He was not democrat, but rather wanted socialism, national unity, and a single, dominant political party.” 94 With his assassination on 19 July 1947, the minority leaders lost a trusted leader.95

The British had left Burma with the Karen problem unresolved. The Burmese and the Karens did not reach any agreement before independence. The 1947 constitution attempted to make a compromise between the Burmans and the minorities, and allowed three states to opt out of the Union of Burma after a ten year hiatus and a plebiscite.96 The constitution was more federal in theory than in practice, states did not enjoy as many freedoms as the constitution

93 Christie, A Modern History, 73.

94 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 42.

95 On 19 July 1947, a gang of armed paramilitaries of former Prime Minister U Saw broke into the Secretariat Building during a meeting of the Executive Council and assassinated Aung San and six of his cabinet ministers. U Saw was subsequently tried and hanged. A number of British army officers were implicated in the plot; they also were tried and imprisoned.

96 Christie, A Modern History, 76.

stated. The Karen-Burma hostility had not been resolved, but postponed; and after independence a full-scale rebellion broke out (which continues until this day).97

Table 4: Official Names of Burma/Myanmar and its Leaders before Independence

YEAR OFFICIAL Adminstration LEADER NAME 1886 British Indian Administered by Secretary of State for India Empire/ Britain British Raj 1937 Separately Administered by Secretary of State for India and administered Britain Burma: territory After WWII: 1937-1940 The Marquess of Zetland (independent of the *May-Oct 1945: 1940-1945 Leo Amery Indian administration) British military 1945-1947 The Lord Pethick-Lawrence government 1947 The Earl of Listowel *Oct 1945-Jan 1948: British civil government 1947 Separately Administered by Secretary of State for Burma: administered Britain and the Aug 1947-Jan 1948 The Earl of territory with a Transtional Listowel transitional government government – (Panglong Head of the Burmese transitional preparation for Agreement) government (Deputy Chairman of independence Executive Council of Burma): Feb1947-Jul1947 Aung San Jul 1947-Jan 1948 Nu (after independence the first Prime Minister) Source: Secretary State for India - eNotes.com Reference (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from http://www.enotes.com/topic/Secretary_of_State_for_India#Secretaries_of_State_for_India_and_Burma.2C_ 1937-1947, modified by author

97 Christie, A Modern History, 77-78.

3.3. CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT

The civilian government lasted from 1948, when Burma gained independence, to 1962 with a military interregnum during the years 1958-1960 when various groups demanded autonomy or independence and the Caretaker Government was invited in a coup by consent to restore order in the country.98

Although the civilian government used a legislation inherited from the British, it gave more freedoms than ever after this time: the market was open, the press was free, and the judiciary maintained neutrality. The country was rich in economic resources and the literacy rate was high.99 On the other hand, it was corrupt and power was personalized.

3.3.1. BURMESE INDEPENDENCE

The British basically determined Burmese independence. On 4 January 1948, at 4:20am, an auspicious date and time chosen by the Burmese according to their tradition, an independent democratic republic was established with Sao Shwe Thaik as the first President and U Nu as the first Prime Minister of the Union of Burma.100 “[The] founding fathers opted for a system … federal in name and appearance, sought to impose central control on diverse people … in the name of unity.”101 Under the 1947 constitution, a bicameral parliament was formed, consisting of the House of Nationalities, Amyotha Hluttaw, and the House of Representatives, Pythu Hluttaw. During this “democratic experiment”, as Michael W. Charney refers to these years of civilian government, 3 elections were held in 1951–1952, 1956 and 1960.102

98 Each state, besides the Kachin and Karen states, had the right of secession. The Shan and Karenni states had to wait till January 1958 before they could claim their secession right. [Khan, Burmese Way, 41.]

99 Khan, Burmese Way, 18.

100 Two months before official independence U Nu announced his plan to serve as Prime Minister for the first half year and in July 1948 step down and focus on strengthening his party, the AFPFL. This plan never came to realization.

101 Khan, Burmese Way, 38.

102 Charney, A history of, 72.

Table 5: Official Names of Burma/Myanmar and its Leaders after Independence

DATE OFFICIAL NOTES LEADER (President or COUNTRY Chairmen of the NAME Revolutionary Council, SLORC/ SPDC) 04. Jan 1948 Union of Burma parliamentary system 1948-1952 Sao Shwe Thaik 1952-1957 Ba U 1957-1962 Win Maung 1962 coup d'état, 1962-1974 Ne Win military regime/ military (Chairmen of the socialist era: Revolutionary Council) "Burmese way to Socialism" 04. Jan 1974 Socialist Republic of one-party system (Burma 1974-1981 Ne Win (he the Union of Burma Socialist Program Party); resigned, but maintained his generals took civilian posts function as chair of BSPP) 1981-1988 San Yu 1988 Sein Lwin 1988 Aye Ko 1988 Maung Maung SLORC created in a coup 1988-1992 Saw Maung d'état (23. Sep 1988), military regime 18. Jun 1989 Union of Myanmar SLORC declared martial law 1992-1997 Than Shwe SLORC renamed SPDC 1997-... Than Shwe (15. Nov 1997) 29. Oct 2010 Republic of the military regime Union of Myanmar Source: Zárate`s Political Collections (2007). Political Leaders: Myanmar. Retrieved December 7, 2010 from http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith/myanmar.htm, modified by author

The new independent Burma was anticommunist, neutral in the Cold War (taking economic help from every side), with a moderate socialist government with AFPFL103, a loose confederation of political parties and local influential leaders … with “left to left- center political opinions,” on the forefront of the government.104 Democratic socialism was fashionable in the world at that time, and in Burma it was perceived as necessary to get the economy back under Burmese control.105

The capital, Yangon (Rangoon), was a reflection of wealth with large colonial buildings, but the rural areas were a world closer to Buddhist traditions and work in the rice fields. During the first years of post-colonial Burma, old political struggles reemerged – political and military alliances were created. Two months after independence, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) resorted to armed struggle after an attack on its headquarters. Ethnic groups - the Karens, Karrenis and the Mons - followed. Previously, during the fight for independence, “1945-1947, the Burmese had unity, but not independence; under Nu, Burma had independence, but not unity.”106

3.3.2. THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT

Tensions between leaders of the AFPFL culminated in April 1958 and resulted in a split into two camps of the AFPFL:

• Clean AFPFL led by Prime Minister U Nu and Agriculture Minister Thakin Tin (later renamed the Pyidangsu Party)

• Stable AFPFL led by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein

The AFPFL fell apart politically and the two factions could not come to an agreement. Burma seemed ungovernable and the situation in the parliament became very unstable, with U Nu surviving a no-confidence vote only with the support of the opposition

103 AFPFL = a united front organization consisting of diverse groups. The most important ones: the Socialist Party, the Burma Trade Union Congress, and the All Burma Peasants‘ Organization. Other members of AFPFL: the Burma Muslim Congress, the All-Burma Women’s Freedom League, the Karen National Congress, the United Hill Peoples’ Congress, and the Youth League. The Communist Party of Burma was expelled from AFPFL in 1946.

104 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 53.

105 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: hat Everyone, 51.

106 Charney, A history of, 72.

National United Front (NUF), and a civil war was feared.107 The caretaker government under Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win was invited by U Nu for six months to solve the problem, and took over the country in a constitutional coup in 1958.

The military caretaker government stayed eighteen months (instead of six, as U Nu had planned), unilaterally running the state, and seemed better than the civilian government. The military was not corrupt and very successful during that short period of time: it calmed the situation, cleaned cities, outlawed opium production, and prepared the country for the new general elections in 1960. Although the military had favored U Nu’s opposition, the free election of February 1960 returned the government to U Nu's Union Party (the Clean AFPFL’s new name) with a large majority; and Ne Win voluntarily withdrew.108 This period, however, gave the tatmandaw, The Burmese military, the confidence that it could run the country.

3.3.3. U NU’S RETURN

U Nu’s administration was weak and not very effective. In 1961, Buddhism became the state religion, as U Nu had promised. Union-State conflicts (constitutional regulations concerning the rights of the states were not followed by the Union) as well as ethnic rebellions did not cease, and the economy was declining. The military became concerned.

107 Martin Smith, Burma — Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1991), 49.

108 U Nu won mainly because of majority of the Buddhist vote. The Buddhists supported him because he promised to legitimize Buddhism as the state religion (which was yet not incorporated in the Constitution), which on the other hand would offend the Kachins and Karens.

3.4. MILITARY RULE UNDER SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT

Constant Union-State struggles, minority insurgencies, and the failure of the government to solve these problems led to the end of the democratic rule in Burma in 1962 by General Ne Win’s military coup d'état. In April 1962, “The Burmese Way to Socialism” was introduced; and in July, the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) was established.

The parliament was dissolved, and between the years 1962 and 1974, Burma was ruled by a revolutionary council headed by the general. The government operated without a Constitution. In 1974, Ne Win and other generals resigned from the military and took civilian posts. The 1974 constitution codified the military control that had existed since 1962.

The rule of the BSPP was neither effective, nor politically or economically. Concretely, it ruined the economy, and thus led to another coup in September 1988 in order to keep the military in power.

3.4.1. MILITARY COUP OF MARCH 1962

The ostensible reason for the coup was the preservation of the Union of Burma. Minorities concerned by the secession clause of the 1947 Constitution came to Rangoon to claim their right to opt out of the Union. The military feared that the government of U Nu would embrace their claim and the Union would fall apart. The coup was a defense for preserving the Union. It was also the defeat of the Chinese KMT troops on Burmese territory, after which the Burmese military developed a strong belief in its ability to govern the whole country that had contributed to the coup of 1962.109

109 During the Chinese revolution 1948-1949, the Koumingtang (KMT) fled to Taiwan, but some forces crossed from Yunnan Province into the Shan State of Burma. These small troops attempted seven times to advance back to China, but failed. After Mao Ze Dong established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), his troops twice crossed the borders to control the KMT treat, and finally effectively eliminated the KMT troops on the Burmese side. Many of these troops were evacuated to Taiwan, others crossed into Thailand. After the KMT “invasion” into Burma, the Burmese government announced martial law in the Shan state (it lasted two years). The civilian government failed to mobilize support from the United Nations to fend the KMT and local Burmese authorities could not handle the KMT problem in Burma and so the Burma army was invited to take over direct administration of the local government in these areas. The ill-equipped tatmandaw launched a counteroffensive, but the KMT defeated the operation and the military failed to regain much of 49

According to Professor Steinberg, the preservation of the Union was not the only objective. He claims, that the military coup of 1962 aimed to accomplish four main goals:110

1. to ensure the preservation of the Union of Burma;

2. to free Burma from an ineffective government;

3. to get the Burmese economy away from foreign dominance and under local control; and

4. to provide the foundation for a military hegemony over the state.

None of these objectives have been accomplished. On the contrary, tensions increased, socialism was not successful in Burma and the “civilianized BSPP” was not effective.111

During Ne Win’s years of power, a coup plot to overthrow President Ne Win in 1976 was discovered and the responsible conspirator, Captain Ohn Kyaw Myint, was arrested and sentenced to death. After this failed coup attempt, promotions in the tatmandaw were increasingly based on loyalty to Ne Win. (Three decades later when Ne Win’s years in power were over, in 2002, a coup attempt against the SPDC involving Ne Win’s family112 was discovered. Ne Win’s grandsons were put on trial and sentenced to death.)

Burmese territory from the KMT. These failures made possible the transformation of the military from its post-resistance, decentralized, guerrilla character into one capable military institution. The tatmandaw was reshaped into a modern, European-style standing army. By 1953, the military alone was the decisive organ in matters of how enemies and threats would be handled in Burma.

110 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 62.

111 Ibid, 62.

112 Ne Win’s son-in-law Aye Zaw Win, and his three sons, Aye Ne Win, Kyaw Ne Win, and Zwe Ne Win were sentenced to death. Ne Win’s daughted, Sanda Win, was not charged, she was put under house arrest. Many believe that the whole incident was just a pretext how to get rid of the generally disliked Ne Win family.

3.4.2. THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM

After the 1962 coup, the parliament was dissolved and the 1947 Constitution set aside, and military rule was performed for the next fourteen years without any constitution. Burma was ruled by a junta of seventeen military officers of the Revolutionary Council, which ruled the country by decrees, “which had the force of law and abolished many laws which it considered to be in conflict with the Burmese Way to Socialism.”113 The head of the Revolutionary Council was the commander of the armed forces, General Ne Win.114 There was neither a legislature nor a judiciary.

In March 1962, the junta arrested all the key leaders which could have protested against the coup (protests were brutally crushed and people were killed); in April 1962, it introduced “The Burmese Way to Socialism”; and in July, it established the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). The BSPP was originally a cadre party, butr 1971 it became a mass party. The BSPP had twenty-four members – military officers, thirteen of whom were members of the Revolutionary Council. Meanwhile, all other political parties were banned.

The Burmese Way to Socialism was not a communist document, although it called for complete ownership by the state; it was a “mixture of socialism, Buddhist doctrine, and humanism.”115 The regime opted for isolation from the rest of the world and maintained neutrality in the Cold War. Tourist visas were limited to 24 hours. Foreign investment was forbidden and commerce and all industries (foreign and domestic companies) were nationalized.116 Within a few years the press was controlled and private newspapers were banned.117 Private schools and universities, which were considered the hotbeds for unrest,

113 Khan, Burmese Way, 18.

114 Ne Win (1911-2002) was a politician and military commander. He was Prime Minister of Burma from 1958-1960 and 1962-1974. In 1974 he became president and lasted until 1981 when he resigned. He was the founder and chairman (1963-1988) of the BSPP. He survived an attempted coup against him.

115 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 64.

116 Foreign investment was forbidden until 1988 with the exception of one West German firm, Fritz-Werner, producing weapons. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, 68.

117 Khan, Burmese Way, 19. 51

were closed or placed under state control. In an attempt for national unity, all schools were nationalized and minority languages were rarely taught.118

Seven years after the coup, former Premier U Nu established the Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP) in exile. It did not bring about any change; Ne Win and the tatmandaw were too strong.

3.4.3. BSPP LEGALIZED BY A NEW CONSTITUTION

In December 1973, the constitution had been approved in a referendum, and came into force after the following elections in 1974. “In March 1974, the Revolutionary Council was dissolved and a new government was established.” 119 Burma became a socialist centralized authoritarian state, but not a communist state. The new constitution regularized the single-party state with all activities being controlled by the BSPP. No other parties were legal and there was no opposition. The constitution established a unicameral legislature and the People's Assembly, Pyithu Hluttaw, was created, which held supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority. Ne Win became president of the new government of the newly renamed state: the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma.

In May 1974, a wave of strikes hit the country. People demonstrated against the government because of bad economic conditions: corruption, inflation, and food shortages. Later, in December 1974, further anti-government demonstrations broke out over the burial site of U Thant,120 a former UN Secretary-General.

118 Ibid, 20.

119 Ibid, 44.

120 U Thant (1909 - 1974) was a Burmese diplomat and the third Secretary-General of the UN from 1961 to 1971. He was former prime minister U Nu's closest advisor in the 1950s and was seen as a symbol of opposition to the military regime. The Burmese people felt that U Thant was denied a state funeral that he deserved as a statesman of international stature.

3.5. UNDER THE SLORC AND SPDC REGIME

In 1988, demonstrations against the military regime throughout the country known as the “8888 Uprising” were brutally crushed by the military and subsequently, in a coup, power was transferred to the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). This was the end of the totalitarian Burmese Way to Socialism (military control through the civilianized BSPP); and the beginning of the SLORC/SPDC era - an open continuation of military control through different means.

3.5.1. 8888 UPRISING

The riots in 1988 originally started as an apolitical matter and gradually grew into a popular uprising that spread nationwide. 121 The government was breaking down; something had to be changed. Ne Win suggested a new constitution and a multi-party system. In a radio speech, he even admitted that serious mistakes were made during his ruling.122 After a disagreement with the other members of the government, he resigned. In July 1988, he was replaced by General Sein Lwin, who ordered a brutal suppression of the demonstrating students. Universities were shut down and reopened three years later. The demonstrations reached the apex on 8 August 1988 (an auspicious date: 8-8-8), when it was brutally crushed. Security forces killed thousands of demonstrators. The government attempted to tame the dissatisfaction of masses by replacing Sein Lwin by a civilian president, Dr. Maung Maung. He only lasted in power until the coup a month later. He proposed to have new elections, but the government was not trusted and the people preferred a temporary government. The military junta, however, did not want to lose power, and thus created ‘chaos’ so that people would not protest against the return of the military government.123 In the middle of these events, the military launched a third coup on 18 September 1988 to prop up the military control of the state in a new form: The State Law

121 The student demonstration, which later spread into throughout the whole country, originally started with an argument in a tea shop in Rangoon.

122 Donald M. Seekins, Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar), (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), xxviii.

123 1988 ‘chaos’: people were allowed to run riots; criminals were released from prison, violence grew, shops were plundered; and people considered government spies were killed by the ordinary population. David I. Steinberg, What Everyone, 79.

and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with General Saw Maung as its chairman (in 1992 succeeded by Than Shwe). The governmental bodies established in 1974 were all abolished and the SLORC assumed executive, legislative, and judicial powers.124 The SLORC changed the country's official English name from the "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma" to the "Union of Myanmar" in 1989.

After widespread demonstrations against the ‘new’ regime, the SLORC declared martial law. In July 1990, after the unsuccessful elections (from the army’s point of view) in May 1990, the SLORC made clear that it did not intend to accept the 1974 Constitution and ruled the country over the next eighteen years without one.

After the crisis in 1988, the reaction of the international community was that many Western governments refused to continue their aid to Burma until the human rights situation improved.

3.5.2. 1990 ELECTIONS

In September 1988, the military government promulgated the “Political Parties Registration Law”, with the aim to hold free multi-party elections in May 1990, the first in almost thirty years. Within a short time over a hundred parties registered. Many of these parties registered mostly because of the telephone connections and petrol quotas that parties were entitled to.125

The BSPP was dissolved in September 1988 and later resurrected as the National Unity Party (NUP) to take part in the 1990 elections. The military wanted to secure its success in the elections by creating other NUP offshoots that were registered as new political parties. What the SLORC did not count on, was the success of the National League for Democracy (NLD) with Aung San Suu Kyi as its General Secretary. The NLD won over 80% of the seats, all together 392 out of the 485 constituencies contested.126 The NUP won less than 2% of the seats, 10 out of 485 constituencies. The election results were subsequently annulled by Senior General Saw Maung. Retrospectively, the military

124 However, a week later, SLORC delegated some judicial powers to civilian courts. Khan, Burmese Way, 46-47.

125 Khan, Burmese Way, 29.

126 Ibid, 30.

government declared that the elections were not multi-party general elections, but they were just to elect a group of people that would work out a constitution for the future democratic state.127

Because the generals have since then ruled by decree and judges are under the influence of the authorities, legal challenges were virtually impossible. Mayn educated people have left the country rather than live under such conditions.

3.5.3. THE STATE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

Since Ne Win’s coup, successive regimes have sought to diminish the influence of a civil society and permit only state-controlled organizations that further the regime’s interests. The only other large group in Burma that could eventually compete in size with the junta was the Buddhist monk association. Already in 1980, Ne Win tried to regulate the clergy, but in 1990, the army had the perfect pretext for placing the Buddhist monks under strict supervision. The military’s response to the monks’ protest against the government in August 1990 was the dissolution of all Sangha organizations of the monks and sects and the establishment of only one Sangha Organization in the Union of Myanmar to regulate the clergy.128

In 2005 the junta decided to move the national capital together with the civil servants from Yangon to a site near Pyinmana, and in 2006 it was officially named Naypyidaw (Burmese for "city of the kings", which literally means “the royal national site”).129 In 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council was renamed the State

127 Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07-Saffin_Snapshot.htm

128 The following nine Sects of Sangha approved by the Basic Regulation within the Sangha Organization have the right to abide by the code of discipline of their respective Sects: (a) Sudhamma Sect; (b) Shwekyin Sect; (c) Dhammanudhamma Mahadvara Nikaya Sect; (d) Dhammavinayanuloma Muladvara Nikaya Sect; (e) Ah-nauk-Chaung Dvara Sect; (f) Veluvana Nikaya Sect; (g) Catubhummika Mahasatipatthana Nget-twin Sect; (h) Ganavimut Kudo Sect; (i) Dhammayutti Nikaya Ma-har-yin Sect.

[Chapter II/ 5 of State LORC Law No. 20/90 of Oct. 31, 1990]

129 "Burma's new capital stages parade", BBC News, 27 March 2006. Retrieved May 5, 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4848408.stm 55

Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but the same policies were maintained. Most but not all members of the abolished SLORC continued in the SPDC military regime. Corrupt generals were purged, but Than Shwe, Khin Nyunt, and Maung Aye remained top leaders of the junta. Accusations and mistrust are very common features of the Burmese regime. In 2004, one of the originally trusted members of SPDC, Khin Nyunt (at that time Premier of Myanmar), was accused of corruption and sentenced to fourty-four years in jail. In 2002, a coup plot that involved Ne Win’s grandsons was discovered. Ne Win’s son-in-law and his three sons were arrested.

The SPDC regime is widely accused by the West of human rights abuses (forced labor, imprisonment, forced relocations, recruitment of child soldiers, killings during demonstrations, and arbitrary executions).

3.5.4. THE SAFFRON REVOLUTION

In August 2007, people began to protest over the junta’s decision to remove fuel subsidies which caused a sudden doubling of the price of diesel and petrol.130 This unrest grew into a major anti-government uprising. In September, even Buddhist monks joined in and marched to Aung San Suu Kyi’s house to pay respects to her at the gate of her home. She appeared in front of her house to greet the marching monks, but was subsequently moved to the Insein prison.131

Protesters were arrested, detained and even killed. The monks were not spared either. An audio message said that crying workers of a crematorium claimed that they were forced by soldiers to burn injured protesters to death.132 The protests did not bring about any significant conclusion. The junta agreed to talk to the opposition, but no democratic changes were obtained.

130 “Burma leaders double fuel prices”, BBC News, 15 August 2007. Retrieved May 5, 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6947251.stm

131 “Myanmar junta sets curfew”, Reuters, 25 September 2007. Retrieved May 5, 2011 from http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/25/us-myanmar-idUSB58859920070925

132 Audio file describing atrocities committed by the military regime (in Burmese with English translation), U.S. Campaign for Burma website, 29 September 2007. Retrieved January 12, 2011 from http://uscampaignforburma.org/

3.5.5. THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF MYANMAR

In 1992, the SLORC announced its intention to create a new constitution through the National Convention, which began 9 January 1993. The constitutional referendum was held on 10 May 2008 and promised a "discipline-flourishing democracy" for the country in the future.133 The SPDC pushed ahead with the referendum with manipulated results in the immediate weeks after the Nargis cyclone devastated the country.134 A general multi-party election would follow after legitimizing the constitution.

3.5.6. LAST ELECTIONS AND CURRENT EVENTS

In August 2010, the junta announced the election date: 7 November 2010, the first general election in two decades. A month before the election, the junta adopted a new flag and changed the official name of the country to Republic of the Union of Myanmar (replacing the old Union of Myanmar from 1989).

On 17 November 2010, Myanmar's ruling junta announced that the military-backed USDP won over 70% of the votes. This claim is widely disputed by the pro-democracy opposition groups, accusing the military regime of engaging in rampant fraud in order to achieve its result. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon claimed that voting conditions had been "insufficiently inclusive, participatory, and transparent."135 The 2010 elections and its results will be further discussed and analyzed in this thesis.

“’The recent elections in Burma have done nothing to change Burmese army tactics of terrorizing civilians with indiscriminate shelling, abusive sweeps, and forced labor in the

133 Myanmar capital readies for discipline-flourishing democracy, M&C News, 26 March 2010. Retrieved May 7, 2011 from http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/asiapacific/features/article_1543926.php/Myanmar-capital-readies- for-discipline-flourishing-democracy-Feature

134 Cyclone Nargis hit the country on 3 May 2008. It was the worst natural disaster in Burmese history. Reports estimated that more than 200,000 people were dead or missing and about one million people were left homeless. Myanmar's isolationist regime hindered recovery efforts by delaying the entry of United Nations planes delivering medicine, food, and other supplies.

135 "Myanmar parties concede poll defeat", Al Jazeera (English), 9 November 2010. Retrieved May 8,2011 from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/11/201011953329831880.html

country’s long-running civil war,’ said Elaine Person, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.”136

Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia. Civil war has prevailed in Burma/Myanmar for decades. From 1989 to 1995, more than seventeen ethnic groups agreed to ceasefires with the government. In 2007, relationships between these groups and the junta deteriorated over political reforms concerning the ethnic concessions. In 2008, the SPDC ordered all groups under ceasefires to transform into Border Guard Forces (BGF) (as stipulated by the 2008 Constitution). One brigade of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), as many other militias, refused to do so, and occupied the town of Myawady as well as caused confusion on the day of the general elections. As of the time of this research, the tensions with ceasefire groups still continue.

136 “Burma: Eyewitness Accounts of Abuses in Eastern Figting”, Hunam Rights Watch, 4 December, 2010. Retrieved May 8, 2011 from http://www.hrw.org/es/news/2010/12/04/burma-eyewitness-accounts-abuses- eastern-fighting

CHAPTER FOUR: 1990 ELECTIONS

In September 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) set four goals for the country (in its Declaration No. 1):

• to maintain law and order;

• to improve transportation;

• to improve the humanitarian situation; and

• to hold multi-party elections.137

General elections in Burma were held on 27 May 1990, the first multi-party elections in three decades. The date for the election was set for May 1990 with political parties registering for the election immediately. The date, 27 May 1990, was chosen for its auspicious nature (27 May 1990: the numbers 2+7=9, and the fourth Sunday of the fifth month 4+5=9).138

Surprisingly, the 1990 elections were not rigged. The voter turnout was 72.59% and the elections were won by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), which took 392 of the 492 seats. However, the military junta refused to recognize the results, and have since ruled the country.

137 James F. Guyot, "Myanmar in 1990: The unconsummated election", in Asian Survey, Vol. 3, No. 2, February 1991, 205–211.

138 Peter John Perry, Myanmar (Burma) Since 1962: The Failure of Development, (Chippenham, Wiltshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 123.

4.1. PARTIES AND CAMPAIGNING

In September 1988, after the SLORC was established, it abolished the Law Safeguarding National Unity from 1964 which made the BSPP the only legal political party in the country. The military junta included the holding of general elections as one of its tasks – thus indicating, that it would transfer power once social stability had been reestablished.

The same month, the SLORC decreed a new law, the Political Party Registration Law, after which over two hundred parties registered. Most of them were, however, deregistered by the Election Commission for Holding Multi-Party Elections, which was responsible for the election management. In the end, there were only ninety-three political parties left, which presented a total of 2,297 candidates to contest the 492 constituencies, with at least two candidates per constituency.139

Together, nineteen different ethnic parties took part in the elections. Among the most important were:

• Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) with its twenty-three out of fifty-seven contested Pyithu Hluttaw seats;

• Arakan League for Democracy with its eleven out of twenty-six contested seats;

• Mon National Democratic Front with its five out of twenty contested seats.

Sixteen other ethnic parties won between one and three seats each. Many of these ethnic parties have subsequently been harassed and even deregistered by the authorities. The SNLD, a close ally of the NLD, is one of the few ethnic parties that were able to survive and participate in the 2010 general election (under a new name: Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, with the same chairman: Sai Ai Pai). However, on its course of political activity, this party also endured a lot of repression from the government. In 2005, Khun Htun Oo and other SNLD leaders were arrested on charges of “disaffection toward the

139 Regional Surveys of the World: Far East and Australasia 2003, 34th Edition (London: Routledge, 2002), 863.

government" after a conversation about national politics during lunch. Khun Htun Oo was sentenced to ninety-three years of imprisonment.140

The National Unity Party (NUP) was the favored party - the junta expected the NUP to win the elections. In order to secure success in the elections, the junta also created NUP offshoots that were registered as new parties. The SLORC was confident about winning the elections, and therefore, the election result was as a negative surprised for the military regime.

Throughout campaigning, the government maintained its restrictions on public gatherings and political meetings. All political literature had to be approved by the SLORC before its publication. Moreover, there were restrictions placed on opposition politicians:

• Aung San Suu Kyi was banned from campaigning in January 1990 on the allegation that she has been unlawfully associated with insurgent groups. She was placed under house arrest on 20 July 1989 without any trial.

• Also former Premier U Nu remained under house arrest during the whole election process.

• Small pro-democracy parties that did not field candidates in at least three districts were deregistered.141

• Other parties, like the People’s Progressive Party, were banned by the Election commission on the grounds of allegations that these parties have pro-communist sympathies.142

All political campaigning had to be done within the parameters of Martial Law Order 3/90 (promulgated on 23 February 1990). The parties were permitted one ten minute statement on television and fifteen minutes on radio. These had to be approved before

140 "Myanmar Democracy Advocate Put Behind Bars for 93 Years," Amnesty International. Retrieved May 5, 2011 from http://www.amnestyusa.org/iar/pdf/UKhunHtunOoCaseSheet.pdf

141 Zunnetta Liddell, „No Room to Move: Legal constraints on Civil Society in Burma“, in Kramer, T., and P. Vervest Strengthening Civil Society in Burma: Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1990), 51.

142 Khan, Burmese Way, 29.

broadcasting. 143 Two days before the election, sixty-one foreign journalists were unexpectedly issued visas to cover the elections.

4.2. NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY

The NLD was Burma’s largest opposition party contesting in the 1990 elections. The party that campaigned under the farmer’s bamboo hat had over two million members and offices scattered across the whole country.

The leadership of the NLD is composed of leftist intellectuals and retired officers who believe that “the military belongs in the barracks”. The NLD also has several members who come from ethnic minority backgrounds.144 It was created on 12 September 1988 (as were 234 other parties over the period prior to the elections of May 1990) by Aung Gyi (Chairman), Tin U (Vice Chairman), and Aung San Suu Kyi (General Secretary).145 The party was under the banner of democracy and under the leadership of former military officers under the BSPP driven by antipathy to continuing military control. The Party leadership included a twelve-member Central Executive Committee.

The party has endured systematic problems and repressions from the Burmese authorities. Three months after the formation of the NLD, one of the leaders, Aung Gyi, together with his supporters, left the party claiming that Aung San Suu Kyi and other party members were under the influence of the Communist Party of Burma. Aung Gyi and his colleagues founded a new party, the Union National Democracy Party. On 20 July 1989, the other two leaders, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U, were placed under house arrest. By late 1990 all but for members of the Central executive committee were arrested. Other members are under permanent surveillance by military intelligence in every township.

143 Ibid, 30.

144 “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society”, ICG Asia report no. 27, 6 December 2001. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Civil_Society.pdf

145 Seekins, Historical Dictionary, 322.

After the elections only a few branch offices remained open outside Yangon. Most NLD members in rural areas do not dare to be active. Moreover, authorities have been intimidating landlords into not leasing offices to the NLD. The only reason the Rangoon headquarters were not shut down, was because the junta wanted to show the international community that the NLD is allowed to function.146 NLD members in Yangon were able to hold political meetings and seminars, but they were not allowed to distribute any party documents. Thus, communication with the public is very limited.

Observers have criticized Aung San Suu Kyi for a lack of balance between Burmans and ethnic minorities in her party. “The lady”, as she is often referred to, said in an interview with Dutch Ramsey Nasr: “People often say that everything will fall apart if the military presence is shut down, just as in Yugoslavia after the death of Marshal Tito. But it happened because the unit was imposed from above. It was not sprung from the hearts and desires of people. We have very good relations with the ethnic nationalities. I say not all; there are ethnic groups who support the junta. But we are allies with many of the ethnic national parties which won elections in 1990. I think we have managed to build a lot of goodwill. In short, I do not think the country will fall apart if the junta fails.”147

The NLD has worked actively, but so far was not able to drive the military junta from power by non-violent means. It has used several strategies:

• civil resistance;

• political dialogue;

• international activism (including a government in exile); and

• support for international sanctions on the regime.

However, lack of success has so far not driven away the sympathy and support of the “silent majority” of Burmese.148

146 “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society”, ICG Asia report no. 27, 6 December 2001. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Civil_Society.pdf

147 Ramsey Nasr, “Undercover Interview in Birma”, Ramsey Nasr Web, 2011, [Translated from the Dutch original to English]. Retrieved June 10, 2011 from http://www.ramseynasr.nl/web/Artikelpagina/Undercover- interview-in-Birma.htm

148 Donald M. Seekins, Historical Dictionary, 323. 63

4.3. THE GENERAL ELECTION AND ITS RESULTS

On 31 May 1989, the SLORC decreed the Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law to prepare for the general elections scheduled for 27 May 1990. The law specified that the elections would be held for the constituencies of the Pyithu Hluttaw: the lower house of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the bicameral legislature of Myanmar. It also specified in detail the “qualifications of voters and candidates, the criteria necessary to recognize votes as valid, and other matters.”149 Single-member election constituencies were described as being the same as those of the BSPP-era People’s Assembly.

However, during the election campaign, when it became clear that the NLD would win, the SLORC started changing its position. And so, on the day of the election, the people of Myanmar faced an extraordinary situation: “Even on the day when the people went to the polls it was not clear for what office they were voting.”150

Observers doubted that the election would be fair, but surprisingly, the election went smoothly and the results indicated that the SLORC had made little or no effort to interfere with the process, because it had most probably simply underestimated the seriousness of the dissatisfaction of the populace.

On the day of elections, 72.59% of eligible voters went to the polls (see Table 1).151 The participation rate was the highest in the country’s short history of elections. The NLD won 392 seats (81%) out of the 485 contested seats, and thus won 59.9% of the popular vote.152

149 Seekins, Historical Dictionary, 366.

150 Khan, Burmese Way, 31.

151 Kudo Toshihiro, “Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis,” IDE-JETRO Institute of developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, January 2011. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/20110104.html

152 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar: Military in charge”, in Fuston, N. John, et al. Government and Politics in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 226.

Table 6: Overview of the 1990 Elections

Total number of constituencies 492

Number of constituencies with elections 485

(including single-candidate constituencies)

Number of political parties with applying for registration 235

Number of political parties participated 93

Number of eligible voters (estimated) 21 million

Number of all candidates 2296

Number of independent candidates (out of all) 87

Voter turnout 72.59%

Source: Kudo Toshihiro, “Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis,” IDE-JETRO Institute of developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, January 2011, modified by the author.

The SLORC had apparently believed that either the NUP would win a majority, or that a number of small parties would form a coalition that could be easily manipulated by the military junta. After the election and the substantial victory of the NLD, the SLORC did not transfer power. Instead, it argued that the election was meant to convene a National Convention to write a new constitution. This claim contradicts the fact that the Pyithu Hluttaw is described in the Article 41 of the 1974 Constitution as the “highest organ of State power,” and not as a constitution-drafting organ. Two months after the elections, the junta found a solution for this confusion – the SLORC made clear that it did not intend to accept the 1974 Constitution, and ruled the country over the next eighteen years without one. Elected members who sought to form a parallel government were arrested or fled the country. During the upcoming years, people who were identified as active in the democratic movement were consequently dismissed.

On 27 July 1990, two months after the election, the military regime issued SLORC Announcement 1/90, signed by the SLORC First-Secretary Khin Nyunt, declaring that a civilian government could not be established until a new constitution was drafted, and that elected representatives were responsible for doing so. However, before the Assembly would be able to meet, the SLORC identified several difficult and time consuming steps (for example: The SLORC chairman must receive a list of elected members from the Election Commission and issue certificates of recognition to those members.). 153 The Announcement 1/90 also declared that the SLORC was “not bound by any constitution, [and] had exclusive legislative and judicial power and exercised administrative authority with the assistance of low-level governmental bodies.”154 The SLORC claimed that it had legitimacy to rule as it was recognized by the United Nations and individual countries, until a new constitution is adopted.155 The SLORC required all parties to recognize and accept the Order, and many opposition figures, who refused, were arrested.

The response to this announcement came one day later in the form of the Gandhi Hall Declaration. The Central Executive Committee of the NLD called for a transfer of power in the presence of representatives elected in the General Election present in the Gandhi Hall in Yangon. It also called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, Tin U, and other political prisoners from detention and/or house arrest, without any success.

153 M. A. Khan, Burmese Way, 33.

154 Donald M. Seekins, Historical Dictionary, 415.

155 The SLORC Order No. 1/90 of 17 July 1990. Retrieved July 1, 2011 from http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Declaration_1-90.htm

4.4. AUNG SAN SUU KYI

Aung San Suu Kyi, is one of the founding members of the NLD. She is also the most prominent leader of the opposition movement in Burma/Myanmar. She has earned international recognition as an activist for the return of democratic rule, and in 1991 won the Nobel Peace Prize.

She was born in Yangon on 19 June 1945 as the second of three children of Aung San. She was only two when her father was assassinated in 1961, when her mother, Khin Kyi was appointed as ambassador to India, she moved out of Burma and lived most of her life abroad, until 1988, when the illness of her mother brought her back to Yangon. She obtained a degree in social sciences from Oxford University and later worked for the UN in New York. She married a British scholar with whom she lived in Bhutan, the UK, and India.

On 26 August 1988, she gave her first official speech at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon. Frank in her speech and courageous in her actions, she instantly became popular. She is the one who is responsible for the landslide victory in the 1990 General Election, despite the fact that she was under house arrest at that time, and barred from running for a seat in the Yangon constituency.

The ruling regime has repeatedly placed her under house arrest. The first time, she remained confined in her residence on University Avenue for almost six years, from 20 July 1989, when she was placed under house arrest under martial law that allows detention without charge or trial for three years, which was extended up to 10 July 1995.

Her release in 1995 was the result of the growing confidence of the junta regarding the domestic opposition. By the time of Suu Kyi’s release, the NLD was barely a party at all. After her release, she recommenced her political activities and openly supported the imposition of economic sanctions by the West, and urged an international boycott of the regime’s “Visit Myanmar Year” campaign in 1996. The regime called her a “traitor to her

race for marrying an Englishman, and a power-hungry witch” (published in the New Light of Myanmar, a government-run newspaper).156

In 2000, she was again placed under house arrest. Her second release in 2002, together with the release of 300 political prisoners since January 2001 and the regime’s invitation to an open dialogue with the U.S. eventually created a better international for the junta.157 After her second release, she freely visited party branches in various parts of the country until the “Black Friday” incident (or Depavin massacre) on 30 May 2003, when she and other NLD party members got attacked by USDA members in Sagaing. The incident left about seventy people dead (the official figure was four), and Aung San Suu Kyi was taken into “protective custody” for more than three months before being returned to house arrest.158

In 2007, her house arrest was extended by one year despite a direct appeal from U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to General Than Shwe. In 2008, it was extended once again for another year, which is illegal under both international law and Burma's own law.159 The same happened in 2009 after the Trespass incident160. Moreover, this time Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to imprisonment for three years with hard labor. This sentence was later commuted by the military to further house arrest of eighteen months. The verdict effectively meant that she would be unable to participate in the elections

156 Seekins, Historical Dictionary, 98.

157 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung: “Preconditions and prospects for democratic transition in Burma/Myanmar”, Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 3 , University of California press, May/June 2003

158 Ellen Nakashima, “Burma’s Iron ‘Aunty’, The Washington Post, 13 October 2003. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A18107- 2003Oct12&=true

159 “UN: Suu Kyi detention 'illegal'”, Al Jazeera, 16 May 2009. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2009/05/2009515144939393754.html

160 On 3 May 2009, an American, John Yettaw, swam across Inya Lake to Aung San Suu Kyi’s house uninvited and was arrested when he made his return trip three days later. He claimed at trial that he was motivated by a divine vision requiring him to notify her of a terrorist assassination attempt. Ten days after the incident, Aung San Suu Kyi was arrested for violating the terms of her house arrest because of the swimmer, whom she allowed to stay in her house for two days before he attempted the swim back. The prosecution also accused John Yettaw of embarrassing the country. Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrest and subsequent trial received worldwide condemnation by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Western governments, Japan and the ASEAN, of which Burma is a member. 68

scheduled for 2010. The military authorities released the pro-democracy leader just very recently, on 13 November 2010.161

Picture 1: Poster “Aung San Suu Kyi FREE AT LAST” on the Building of the European Council

Source: Picture taken by the author on 10 May 2011 in Brussels, Belgium.

161 "Burma releases pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi", BBC News, 13 November 2010. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11749661

4.5. THE 1990 ELECTION AFTERMATH

The junta learnt a valuable lesson in the 1990 elections; in the years following the general election in 1990, several laws and decrees to weaken the parties that won the elections were promulgated. Many parties were declared illegal on the grounds of these new laws:

• After the general election, eighty-three out of ninety-three political parties were de-registered by the Election Committee - often without even specifying what they had done wrong. According to the Political Parties Registration Law, the Election Commission can de-register parties declared illegal under any domestic law.

• The Election Committee has refused to allow legal parties to fill party vacancies in top positions, because that is another reason for de-registration - if the party’s central executive committee falls below a minimum membership.162

• The July 1991 amendment to the People’s Assembly Election Law stated that any member of the newly-elected People’s Assembly, who commits an offence related to law and order, immediately ceases to be a member and will not be able to contest future elections. On this ground, 94 members of the parliament were disqualified in the upcoming years after the elections.163

• In June 1996, the junta issued a decree stating that political parties or other organizations that draft their own state constitution or hinder the National Convention will be dissolved or declared illegal.164 This decree was clearly aimed at the NLD members who had walked out of the National Convention in 1995 and started to consider writing a state constitution on their own.

162 K. S. Venkateswaran, Burma, Beyond the Law, (London: Article 19, 1996), 62.

163 “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society”, ICG Asia report no. 27, 6 December 2001. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Civil_Society.pdf

164 Venkateswaran, Burma, Beyond, 61.

Since the 1990 election campaigning period, groups of five or more people have not been allowed to meet in public. According to SLORC Order 1/91 (promulgated on 30 April 1991), neither civil servants nor their families were permitted to join any political parties, labor associations, or any other organizations which were not approved by the government.165 In addition, any guests spending the night at one’s house had to register in advance.166

The regime adopted a policy of zero tolerance towards dissidents, with the main goal of demoralizing and punishing activists and those who associate with them. Political cases in Burma are tried in closed court rooms, and the accused are not allowed to be represented by a lawyer.

The junta is most concerned about the emergence of action-groups. It has expanded its physical presence to new bases throughout the country so that the eventual civil unrest could be quickly crushed. Another tactic has been the establishment of mass organizations under military leadership to control the populace. These organizations work on a patron- client relationship where people feel compelled to demonstrate loyalty in return for protection. The largest such organization was the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), created in 1993, replacing the BSPP (which collapsed in 1988). General Maung Aye described the USDA as a “well-qualified auxiliary national defense force.”167 By 1999, the USDA reached the amount of eleven million members.168 Civil servants, soldiers, and university students are encouraged to join. Many of them just find their names added to the database.

The international community strongly condemned the SLORC for refusing to allow elected representatives to meet as a People’s Assembly, and for failing to honour the results of the elections and hand over power. However, China remained closely tied with Myanmar, and supports the Burmese government to this day. Myanmar has been one of the

165 Liddell, No Room to Move, 63-64.

166 “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society”, ICG Asia report no. 27, 6 December 2001. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Civil_Society.pdf

167 “Council Meets Trainees of USDA Management Course”, New Light of Myanmar, 24 June 1997. Retrieved June 12, 2011 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/NLM1997-06-24-text.pdf

168 “Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society”, ICG Asia report no. 27, 6 December 2001. Retrieved May 10, 2011 from www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/Civil_Society.pdf

earliest countries to establish diplomatic relations with new China, the People’s Republic of China, and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence advocated by both countries, have become the widely-accepted norms of developing nation-to-nation relations between these two countries. China has the power to support Myanmar in the United Nations and will veto any proposal for UN Security Council sanctions.

CHAPTER FIVE: 2010 ELECTIONS

International criticism of Myanmar’s regime along with economical sanctions, as well as growing dissatisfaction within the country, encouraged the military junta to organize elections. The 2010 general elections were the first elections in Myanmar since 1990. It was a significant moment in Myanmar’s political history, even if the elections were not organized in order to make a break with the past and bring a substantial change, but rather to ensure the continuity of the military regime.

The 2010 elections were part of a rigged plan how to create a façade of democracy in Myanmar. This plan was announced by General Khin Nyunt in August 2003 after having been endorsed by the SPDC, and was officially called the Roadmap to Discipline- flourishing Democracy. The roadmap that is supposed to represent progress and hope for the eventual democratization of the country, consists of seven steps:

1. Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996;

2. After the successful holding of the National Convention, step by step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system;

3. Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with basic principles by the National Convention;

4. Adoption of the constitution through national referendum;

5. Holding of free and fair elections for Pyithu Hluttaws (Legislative bodies) according to the new constitution;

6. Convening of Hluttaws attended by Hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution; and

7. Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw.169

The roadmap, however, lacks deadlines and time frames. The 2010 election were the fifth step in the process of creating a democratic Myanmar. How can democracy be achieved if the elections were neither free nor open, and were in reality designed to preserve military rule that had been present in the country for decades?

5.1. POLITICAL PARTY REGISTRATION

In March 2010, the SPDC released new laws concerning the upcoming general elections. One of the laws established a Union Election Commission (comprised of seventeen members appointed by the SPDC; two of them, Thein Soe and Tin Aung Aye, on the black list of the European Union) to supervise the parliamentary elections and political parties, and the Political Parties Registration Law set conditions for the registration and operation of political parties in Burma.

The law on political parties placed unreasonable restrictions on the participation in the elections. New political parties that wished to participate in the 2010 elections had to register within ninety days. Applicants had to submit a design proposal for their party flag and seal, as well as a list of at least three proposed candidates for the election. Parties that had been approved for registration were subsequently obliged to select their leadership within the next thirty days. The approval for political parties was a process with several steps, and with no right to appeal the Electoral Commission's decisions.170

169 This road map has been variously translated into English. This thesis states the translation found in the newspaper New Light of Myanmar, retrieved June 10, 2011 from http://www.myatmyanmar.net/EN/men20040811.pdf

170 The Political Parties Registration Law, The State Peace and Development Council Law No. 2/2010 of March 8, 2010, Chapter V, Section 20.

According to the new rules, a party that was organized throughout the entire Union had to have at least one thousand party members (or five hundred if the party was organized only in a region or state) and pay a registration fee of K 300,000 (about US$300) and an additional K500,000 (about US$500) per candidate.171

Under section 26 of the Political Parties Registration Law, existing political parties which are desirous to continue as political parties under the State Law and Order Restoration Council Law 4/88 had sixty days from the 8 March 2010 (the date of promulgation of the law) to submit an application to contest the general election of 2010. Existing parties that failed to submit an application within the prescribed days were deregistered.172

In order to effectively extend military rule, the junta imposed with the help of the military supremacy constitution several limitations to parties willing to participate in the 2010 elections, and thus ensuring that the pro-junta political parties would win most of the 1,163 seats at stake:173

• The main opposition parties were effectively sidelined from the electoral process by the new electoral law which required existing parties to transform and register before the elections. The junta knew the parties would not have gone along with a constitution that lends legitimacy to the military domination over the civilian population and would rather face de-registration.

• The new election laws precluded government employees from joining political parties or running as candidates in the upcoming parliamentary election. However, ministers and officials were according to the Election Commission political appointees and not government employees, and therefore could join the USDP.

171 Sai Wansai ed., Burma’s Election: From Autocracy to Competitive Authoritarian Regime or Civil Revolution?, 27 October 2010, Asian Tribune. Retrieved June 18, 2011 from http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/10/27/burma%E2%80%99s-election-autocracy-competitive- authoritarian-regime-or-civil-revolution

172 The Political Parties Registration Law, the State Peace and Development Council Law No. 2/2010 of March 8, 2010.

173 Michael F. Martin, “Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service,” Congressional research Service, Federation of American Scientists, 6 October 2010. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41447.pdf

• The new election laws barred more than two thousand political prisoners from being members of political parties. The NLD and other parties would have had to expel their imprisoned leaders, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, to be eligible to participate.174

• High registration fees hindered many contesting political parties from filing candidates and is seen as another means of blocking opposition candidates. Each party was required to register at least one thousand members for a non- refundable fee of K500,000 for each member, which represents for some people a full one year salary.

• Limited time (three months) to register was another factor for low fielding of candidacies for contending parties. Before the 1990 elections, parties had more than a year to choose and prepare for their candidates ahead of time and could immediately come up with the list, as soon as the registration was open. The deadline for all political parties to submit the names of their candidates for the 2010 elections was set for 30 August 2010. Four political parties contesting the elections, which were running out of time to fulfill the membership restriction and submit the candidate lists, have requested in August and in September that the vote be delayed to mid-December to allow more time to campaign and raise funds.175

Another manipulation of the electoral process from the part of the SPDC occurred in March 2010, when the SPDC transformed the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a mass social organization, into the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), transferring the assets of the USDA over to the new political party. A month later, in April, the SPDC Premier Thein Sein and twenty-six ministers and senior officials joined the newly formed USDP.176 In August that year, the Senior General

174 “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean

175 Phanida, “Parties Call for Electoral Watchdog to Delay Polls,” Mizzima, 26 August 2010. Retrieved June 28, 2011 from http://www.mizzima.com/news/election-2010-/4291-parties-call-for-electoral-watchdog-to- delay-polls.html

176 Nayee Lin Latt, “Regime Separates Assets of USDA and USDP,” Irrawaddy, July 8, 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18907

Than Shwe, his deputy General Maung Aye, and six other top military officers resigned from their military posts so they could run as candidates in the 2010 elections.177

Several opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), decided not to register and boycott the 2010 elections. Some of the opposition activists and former political prisoners decided to register parties and field candidates hoping that even small independent voices might slowly step by step achieve some genuine political change in future.

The Election Commission unfairly denied party registration to three ethnic parties (the Kachin State Progressive Party, the Northern Shan State Progressive Party, and the United Democracy Party Kachin State).178

By the end of summer 2010, forty-seven new or already existing political parties submitted registration applications to the Electoral Commission. In September, the Commission announced that several political parties were officially dissolved. 179 The Union Election Commission Notification 97/2010 in September 2010 issued by the Election Commission authorized thirty-seven political parties to run candidates in the 2010 elections (see Table 7). 180 This notification also cancelled the registrations of five previously registered and five new political parties (see Table 8).181

177 “Junta Chiefs Resign in Military Reshuffle,” Irrawaddy, August 27, 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=19323

178 “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean

179 Michael F. Martin, “Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service,” Congressional research Service, Federation of American Scientists, 6 October 2010. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41447.pdf

180 Union Election Commission Notification 97/2010, September 14, 2010, as published in The New Light of Myanmar, September 15, 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://burmamonitor.blogspot.com/2010/09/union-election-commission.html

181 Ibid.

Table 7: Political Parties Approved for the 2010 Elections

Name of the political party New/existing Ethnicity party “Wa" Democratic Party New Wa “Wa" National Unity Party New Wa 88 Generation Student Youths (Union of New Burmese Myanmar) All Mon Region Democracy Party New Mon Chin National Party New Chin Chin Progressive Party New Chin Democracy and Peace Party New Burmese Democratic Party (Myanmar) New Burmese Ethnic National Development Party New Chin Inn National Development Party New Inn Kaman National Progressive Party New Kaman Kayan National Party New Kayan Kayin People's Party New Kayin Kayin State Democracy and Development Party New Kayin Khami National Development Party New Khami Kokang Democracy and Unity Party Existing Kokang Lahu National Development Party Existing Lahu Mro or Khami National Solidarity Organization Existing Mro Khami National Democratic Force New Burmese National Development and Peace Party New Rohingya National Political Alliances League New Burmese National Unity Party Existing Burmese New Era People's Party New Burmese Pa-O National Organization New Pa-O Peace and Diversity Party New Burmese Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party New Kayin Rakhine Nationalities Development Party New Rakhine 78

Rakhine State National Force of Myanmar New Rakhine Shan Nationalities Democratic Party New Shan Taaung (Palaung) National Party New Palaung Union Democracy Party New Burmese Union of Myanmar Federation of National New Burmese Politics Union Solidarity and Development Party New Burmese United Democratic Party New Burmese Unity and Democracy Party (Kachin State) New Kachin Wunthanu NLD (the Union of Myanmar) New Burmese Source: The New Light of Myanmar, and Kudo Toshihiro, “Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis,” IDE-JETRO Institute of developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, January 2011, modified by the author.

Table 8: Political Parties Dissolved Prior to the 2010 Elections

Dissolved political parties (10) Existing political parties Newly established political parties Shan Nationalities League for Democracy Myanmar Democratic Congress National League for Democracy Myanmar New Society Democratic Party Shan State Kokang Democratic Party Mro National Party Union Pa-O National Organization Regional Development Party (Pyay) “Wa” National Development Party Union Kayin League Source: The New Light of Myanmar, modified by the author

In addition to the party candidates, a number of people registered as independent candidates by the deadline of 30 August 2010 (see Table 9).

Table 9: Standing Candidates for the 2010 Election

Number of candidates Number of Total number of representing political independent all candidates parties candidates Pyithu Hluttaw 949 40 989 Amyotha Hluttaw: 472 7 479 Regions and States Parliament 1,566 35 1,601 Source: Union Election Commission Notification No.143/2010, 7 December 2010, modified by the author.

5.2. AUNG SAN SUU KYI BOYCOTTING THE ELECTION

The leading opposition group, the National League for Democracy (NLD), just like other opposition parties, decided not to register before the prescribed deadline, and as a result was ordered to dissolve. On May 27, 2010, a splinter group of the NLD submitted an application to the Election Commission to register a new political party, the National Democratic Force (NDF).182 The party was approved and took part in the actual elections.

The true-blue NLD did not take part in the general elections because the new electoral laws required to dismiss many of its members, including the leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who remained under house arrest and was released a week after the November 2010 elections.

There has been a lot of criticism of her detention by the Western nations, India, Japan, South Korea, as well as Myanmar's neighbors in the ASEAN (particularly from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore). Malaysia even warned Myanmar that it could face expulsion from the ASEAN as a result of the detention of Suu Kyi.183 However, not all ASEAN countries hold the same stance on this matter. In August 2009, when the junta extended Suu Kyi’s house arrest for another eighteen months, Vietnam did not criticize this decision and called her conviction an internal affair.184 Also the former Primer of Thailand, Samak, Sundaravei, criticized the amount of support for Suu Kyi, saying that “Europe uses Aung San Suu Kyi as a tool. If it's not related to Aung San Suu Kyi, you can have deeper discussions with Myanmar.” 185 In 2008, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the human rights situation in Myanmar and calling for Suu Kyi's release with the result of eighty countries voting for the resolution,

182 Michael F. Martin, “Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service,” Congressional research Service, Federation of American Scientists, 6 October 2010. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41447.pdf

183 “Burma ‘faces ASEAN expulsion’,” BBC News, 20 July 2004. Retrieved June 10, 2011 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3081557.stm

184 “Vietnam: Suu Kyi’s verdict ‘internal’ matter for Myanmar,” ABITSU, 13 August 2009. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://www.abitsu.org/?p=5390

185 “Thai PM says West uses Myanmar’s Suu Kyi as political tool,” BurmaNet News, 25 August 2008. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://www.burmanet.org/news/2008/08/25/agence-france-presse-thai-pm- says-west-uses-myanmars-suu-kyi-as-political-tool/

twenty-five against, and forty-five absented the vote. Myanmar accused the UN of a shameless interference in its internal political process and said it would not be bound by the UN resolution.186 Other nations, such as China and Russia are less critical of the regime and prefer to cooperate only on economic matters.

After releasing of the elections laws in March 2010, student groups and Buddhist monks began boycotting the election campaign. They urged people not to vote in the November elections.187 The NLD (after its decision not to participate in the elections) also launched a campaign to educate voters of their rights under the elections laws, including their right not to vote. The official announcement that it was boycotting the election was made in August 2010.188 The SPDC responded by publishing stories encouraging people to vote in the upcoming elections, and threatening people who chose to boycott with prison sentences and fines.

5.3. THE 2010 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The formal campaign period for the November 2010 parliamentary elections began on 24 September 2010. The SPDC used several means to ensure its victory in the upcoming elections, and implemented a number of unreasonable restrictions in the campaigning process.

Each of the contesting parties was provided one fifteen-minute airtime on national television and radio. Only two parties have been given a special permission to broadcast

186 “UN General Assembly condemns Myanmar,“ Taipei Times, 26 December 2008. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2008/12/26/2003432089

187 Kyaw Kha, “Monks and Students Urge Poll Boycott,” Mizzima, May 26, 2010. Retrieved June 28, 2011 from http://www.mizzima.com/news/election-2010/3981-monks-and-students-urge-poll-boycott-.html

188 “NLD Election Boycott Official,” Irrawaddy, August 19, 2010. Retrieved June 28, 2011 from http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19257

their statements each day and have them published in The New Light of Myanmar.189 Party statements had to be approved by the Election Commission prior to the broadcast. In addition, the Election Commission had the right to refuse party statements to be broadcasted if the content was inconsistent with the regulations.

The National Unity Party (NUP) was the first party to broadcast its statement. The last broadcast took place on 31 October 2010, marking the official end of the campaign period. During the whole campaign, candidates were restricted to not exceed the campaign costs by K10 million (about US$ 10,000).190

In August 2010, the Election Commission released the Notification No. 91/2010, setting a number of conditions on political rallies, speeches, and campaigning. Hluttaw candidates and election representatives who wanted to assemble and/or give a public speech had to apply to the sub-commission for a special permit at least seven days prior to the event. They have to include the following details to the application:191 • planned venue; • planned date; • estimated starting time and finishing time; • estimated number of attendees; • the name, the ID number, and the address of a speaker or speakers; and • the name, the ID number, and the address of the applicant. If approved, the permit was issued forty-eight hours prior to the time of the commencement of the assembly.

Surprisingly, a few opposition rallies took place, but they were closely observed and some attendees were subsequently harassed by the police. The Election Commission has been more forthcoming with permits for junta-backed political parties.

189 Michael F. Martin, “Burma's 2010 Election Campaign: Issues for Congress Congressional Research Service,” Congressional research Service, Federation of American Scientists, 6 October 2010. Retrieved June 15, 2011 from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41447.pdf

190 Sai Wansai ed., Burma’s Election: From Autocracy to Competitive Authoritarian Regime or Civil Revolution?, 27 October 2010, Asian Tribune. Retrieved June 18, 2011 from http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/10/27/burma%E2%80%99s-election-autocracy-competitive- authoritarian-regime-or-civil-revolution

191 Union Election Commission Notification 91/2010 (published in The New Light of Myanmar, 19 August 2010). Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open7/190810iss.html

5.4. NOVEMBER 2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS

On August 13, 2010, the Election Commission announced that the parliamentary elections would be held on 7 November 2010.

The Union Election Commission simultaneously held the multiparty general elections in 325 constituencies out of 330 constituencies of the Pyithu Hluttaw, 168 constituencies of Amyotha Hluttaw, and 661 constituencies out of 673 constituencies of the Regions or States Parliament (see Table 10).192

Table 10: Number of Constituencies for Elections in Each House

House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw) Designated constituencies for election 330 Constituencies where elections were held 325 Percentage of holding elections 98.48% House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw ) Designated constituencies for election 168 Constituencies where elections were held 168 Percentage of holding elections 100% Regions and States Parliament (including national races) Designated constituencies for election 673 Constituencies where elections were held 661 Percentage of holding elections 98.22% Source: Union Election Commission Notification No.143/2010 (December 7, 2010), modified by the author

192 Union Election Commission Notification No.143/2010, 7 December 2010. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://euro-burma.eu/doc/EM_No_52_-_15-12-10.pdf

Under the provisions of the constitution, 25% of the seats in the House of Representatives and the House of Nationalities and each of the fourteen Regions and States Parliament are to be appointed by the commander-in-chief of Burma's Defense Services. The full lower house, the House of Representatives, has 440 members and the full upper house, House of Nationalities, has 224 members. The number of members in the Regions and states Parliament varies.

In the 2010 elections, voters cast three votes: one to elect representatives for the House of Representatives, one to elect representatives for the House of Nationalities, and one to elect representatives for the fourteen Regions and States Parliament. In certain areas, voters belonging to ethnic minority groups could cast another additional vote to elect ethnic representatives for the Regions and States Parliament only for ethnic minorities.

Burma's military government cancelled voting and did not open polling stations in several eastern border townships (in the Kachin, Kayin, Mon and Shan states) for security reasons and thus the number of contested seats for the House of Representatives was reduced by five, and those of the fourteen Regions and States Parliament by twelve, bringing the total contested seats to 1154.193 These regions are located under control of armed opposition groups with populations generally opposed to the SPDC. Debbie Stothardt, the spokeswoman for the Alternative ASEAN Network, said that the government disenfranchised on purpose ethnic groups that did not want the military to remain in charge.194 The problem for the military in the ethnic areas is that they cannot be fully controlled because most of the ethnic groups refuse to join the border force as the government had originally planned. In August 2010, ethnic Mon forces in Kayin State transformed into border guards, but other militias have resisted doing so and threatened to fight if the central government pressures them.

193 Union Election Commission Notification 91/2010 (published in The New Light of Myanmar, 19 August 2010). Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.mrtv3.net.mm/open7/190810iss.html

194 Ron Corben,” Burma Excludes Thousands From Voting in Elections,” Voice of America, 17 September 2010. Retrieved May 20, 2011 from http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Burma-Excludes-Thousands- 103126854.html

Map 2: Areas Where Voting Was Cancelled

Source: “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011.

In constituencies that had only one candidate, representatives were elected without a vote. This applied to ten constituencies in the House of Representatives, eight constituencies in the House of Nationalities and thirty-seven in the fourteen Regions and States Parliament.

The SPDC barred international election monitors from observing the polls. Also, widespread evidence of fraud and procedural irregularities characterized the vote, including: intimidation of voters, advance voting, proxy votes, lack of voter privacy, stuffing ballot boxes, ballot invalidation, and lack of transparency in the vote count.195

195 “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean 86

5.5. 2010 ELECTION RESULTS

The election developed into a contest between three main blocs: the military government-backed USDP; the NUP, and pro-democracy and ethnic minority parties that challenge the military government.196

As is obvious, the USDP had several advantages in comparison with other political parties. The USDP was originally created from a mass organization, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which has 15,000 offices around Myanmar and a total of twenty-four million members.197 Several former or retired generals are members of this organization, with former Premier Thein Sein as its chairman. The USDP used its financial resources and tried with small-scale development projects to gain support of the population.

Also, when there is no election held in constituencies where there is only one candidate, the relevant State or Division Election Sub-Commissions declares the sole candidate the winner. And as such, the USDP and NUP were able to stack up more votes without much trouble. Moreover, adding in the one-quarter of both chambers of the parliament reserved for military appointees, the military effectively secured about three- quarters of all seats.

The final results were announced by the Myanmar Union Election Commission eleven days after the Burmese went to polls, on 17 November 2010.198

Unsurprisingly, the military-established Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) led by the former Premier of Myanmar Thein Sein won by an overwhelming

196 Kudo Toshihiro, “Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis,” IDE-JETRO Institute of developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, January 2011. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Research/Region/Asia/20110104.html

197 Ibid.

198 “Myanmar election commission publishes election final results,” Xinhuanet English News, 17 November 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010- 11/17/c_13611242.htm

majority in the national parliament 883 seats (76.5% out of the final total of 1,154 seats) at three levels:199

• 259 seats (79.6% out of 325 seats) in the House of Representatives, Pyithu Hluttaw; • 129 seats (76.7% out of 168 seats) in the House of Nationalities, Amyotha Hluttaw; • 495 seats (74.8 % out of 661 seats) in the Regions and States Parliament.

The USDP was followed by the National Unity Party (NUP) with sixty-three seats (twelve at the House of Representatives, five at the House of Nationalities, and forty-six at the Regions and State Parliament).

Among ethnic minority parties, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP), widely known as “White Tiger” from the party logo, and popular in Shan State, took the most seats, fifty-seven (eighteen in the House of Representatives, three in the House of Nationalities, and thirty-six in the Regions and States Parliament).200 SNDP Chairman, Sai Ai Pao, is also the former chairman of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD), the second largest winner in the 1990 elections after the NLD. The Rakhine Nationalities Development Party took thirty-five seats (nine in the House of Representatives, seven in the House of Nationalities, and nineteen in the Regions and States Parliament), while the All Mon Region Democracy Party (AMRDP) took sixteen seats (at three levels of the parliament).201 In Burma/Myanmar, ethnic groups have been marginalized for several decades. The presence of three ethnic-based parties in the top five winner parties in the 2010 elections, however, is only a symbolic victory. Their potential influence is very limited.

Fifteen out of thirty-seven political parties that contested the polls did not win any seats. The largest opposition party, the National Democratic Force (a splinter group of the NLD), won sixteen seats. The first two (military-backed) parties won together almost 81% of the seats. The first seven parties won more than 1% of the seats; the rest took less than 1% or no seats at all. See Table 11 for the first ten winning parties in the 2010 elections.

199 Ibid.

200 “Myanmar election commission publishes election final results,” Xinhuanet English News, 17 November 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010- 11/17/c_13611242.htm

201 Ibid.

Table 11: 2010 Election Results

Party Total seats % Uncontested (in three levels) seats 1. Union Solidarity and Development Party 883 76.52 38 2. National Unity Party 63 5.46 1 3. Shan Nationalities Democratic Party 57 4.94 - 4. Rakhine Nationals Progressive Party 35 3.03 - 5. All Mon Region Democracy Party 16 1.39 - 6. National Democratic Force 16 1.39 - 7. Chin Progressive Party 12 1.04 - 8. Pa-O National Organization 10 0.87 6 9. Chin National Party 9 0.78 - 10. Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party 9 0.78 - 11. Kayin People’s Party 6 0.52 - 12. Taaung (Palaung) National Party 6 0.52 6 13. Wa Democratic Party 6 0.52 3 14. Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin 4 0.35 - State 15. Democratic Party (Myanmar) 3 0.26 - 16. Inn National Development Party 3 0.26 - 17. Kayan National Party 2 0.17 - 18. Kayin State Democracy and Development 2 0.17 1 Party 19. National Democratic Party for 2 0.17 - Development 20. 88 Generation Student Youths (Union of 1 0.09 - Myanmar) 21. Ethnic National development Party 1 0.09 - 22. Lahu National Developmet Party 1 0.09 - 23. Independent candidates 6 0.52 - Source: “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean, modified by the author. 89

The estimated total number of eligible voters was about 29 million.202 The voter turnout was over 76% of eligible voters that had cast their vote in the polls (see Table 12). However in some areas reported turnout was as low as 35%.203

Table 12: Voter Turnout in the 2010 Elections

Voter turnout for the House of Representatives 77.3% Voter turnout for the House of Nationalities 76.8% Voter turnout for the Regions and States Parliament 76.6% Source: Union Election Commission Notification No.143/2010, 7 December 2010.

The elections have determined the basic composition of the new assemblies at national and regional levels (see Figure 2), but they have not indicated how they will function.

202 Union Election Commission Notification No.143/2010, 7 December 2010. Retrieved June 20, 2011 from http://euro-burma.eu/doc/EM_No_52_-_15-12-10.pdf

203 Yan Paing, “Few Surprises in First Poll in 20 Years,” The Irrawaddy, 10 November 2010. Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=20022

Figure 2: The Political Make-up of the Parliament after 2010

The House of Representatives

USDP

Military-appointed representatives Ethnic parties

NUP

NUF

Independent candidates

The House of Nationalities

USDP

Military-appointed representatives Ethnic parties

NUP

NUF

Independent candidates

Source: Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean, modified by the author.

5.6. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE 2010 ELECTION

The international community has given a mixed response to the November 2010 elections. The result of the elections was mostly met with a lot of criticism, while some countries took a more positive line.

The United Nations rejected the elections as flawed and not transparent. Also the United States declared that the polls did not meet international standards.204 US President Barack Obama said that the elections “demonstrated the regime’s continued preference for repression and restriction over inclusion and transparency.”205

The European Union and its member states condemned the SPDC elections for not being inclusive enough, and held under very repressive conditions. Catherine Ashton, EU’s foreign affairs chief, said in an official statement that the EU regrets that the SPDC did not ensure a “free, fair and inclusive electoral process.”206

Japan said it was “deeply disappointed” about the elections which excluded Aung San Suu Kyi. However, Japan, unlike Western countries, has maintained trade and dialogue with Myanmar.207

As usual, China remained the military regime’s strongest supporter and praised the Myanmar polls. Foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told the reporters that the PRC

204 Htet Aung, “US Response To Sudan Election Omen for Burma?,” The Irrawady, 21 April 2010. Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18287

205 “Obama calls out India for abandoning Burma,” Mizzima, 8 November 2010. Retrieved June 18, 2011 from http://www.mizzima.com/news/regional/4556-obama-calls-out-india-for-abandoning-burma.html

206 “Myanmar elections not free and fair: EU,” Hindustan Times, 8 November 2010. Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.hindustantimes.com/Myanmar-elections-not-free-and-fair-EU/Article1-623510.aspx

207 “Japan ’deeply disappointed’ by Myanmar vote,” Hindustan Times, 8 November 2010. Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.hindustantimes.com/Japan-deeply-disappointed-by-Myanmar-vote/Article1- 623357.aspx

welcomed the 2010 elections as a critical step in implementing the roadmap for democracy.208

The ASEAN in general initially welcomed the elections as a step towards political change, however, the reactions differed after the conclusion of the elections. On 8 November 2010, Vietnam, at that time the presiding member of ASEAN, issued an official statement that it welcomed the November polls as “a significant step forward.”209 However, in contrast to Vietnam’s stance, Indonesia and the Philippines expressed serious concerns over the elections and the way they were organized.

The chronic lack of transparency in Myanmar continues to raise profound doubts about how the formal return to constitutional and parliamentary government might raise prospects for better governance.

5.7. THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR

According to the 2008 Constitution, the Parliament must hold regular sessions at least once a year. On 31 January 2011, the House of Representatives and the House of Nationalities convened amid tight security in Naypyidaw for Myanmar’s first parliamentary session in twenty-two years.210 The fourteen Regions and States Parliaments also convened in their respective areas.211

208 “China praises Myanmar polls,” Straits Times, 9 November 2010. Retrieved June 17, 2011 from http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_601074.html

209 Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean

210 Aye Aye Win, „Tight Security as New Myanmar Parliament Opens,“ Deseret News, 30 January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700105642/Tight-security-as-new- Myanmar-parliament-opens.html

211 “Myanmar parliament set for 1st session in 22 years,” Boston Herald, 10 January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/asia_pacific/view.bg?articleid=1308538

Before the day of the first convention, special instructions for the parliament were released. The public is barred from the Parliament (in case of violation of this rule, a one- year jail term is applicable). Also, no cameras, no laptops, no mobile phones or any other recording devices are allowed.212

The Parliament’s first task is to elect the president for the next five years. The USDP’s overwhelming majority in both houses of Parliament means that the junta-backed party has complete control over the selection process. 213 The House of Nationalities Parliament selects the President from among three Vice-Presidents who are nominated from: a) the elected representatives from the House of Representatives; b) the elected representatives from the House of Nationalities; and c) the appointed Defense Services personnel from both Houses.214

On 30 March 2011, the SPDC was officially dissolved, and former Premier of the Union, U Thein Sei, was sworn-in as the new President.215 The new leadership took over power from the military government. The executive, legislative and judicial powers were handed-over to the new government.

The country has formally returned to constitutional rule, but in the absence of rule of law, the formal constitutional re-arrangement of law-making and law-enforcing institutions will do little to overcome the immense difference between what is on paper and what happens in reality.

212 Ahunt Phone Myat, “Rules for parliament released,” Democratic Voice of Burma, 18 January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.dvb.no/news/rules-for-parliament-released/13742

213 “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.scribd.com/doc/48026066/BURMA-ISSUES-CONCERNS-VOL- 6-Altsean

214 Aye Aye Win, „Tight Security as New Myanmar Parliament Opens,“ Deseret News, 30 January 2011. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700105642/Tight-security-as-new- Myanmar-parliament-opens.html

215 Feng Yingqui, “Myanmar new government takes office,” Xinhuanet English News, 30 March 2011. Retrieved June 5, 2011 from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-03/30/c_13805846.htm

5.8. COMPARISON OF THE 1990 AND 2010 ELECTIONS

Both elections were the outcome of international criticism from the outside of the country, as well as internal problems and people’s dissatisfaction with the regime within the country. However, the junta learned from the 1990 elections a valuable lesson: to hold elections is risky, and thus it needs to be well prepared. The 2010 elections were not free and fair as were the 1990 elections; the whole electoral process was tightly controlled by the military regime, and thus the elections flawed. Election results strengthen this matter: the 1990 elections were won by the democratic opposition, while the 2010 elections were won by the military-backed party. The process in which the multi-party elections were conducted was very different, but the outcome was the same: the military continues to control Burmese politics.

In 1990, the Election Commission for Holding Multi-Party Elections created by the SLORC was responsible for the election management. Other elements of the electoral process, as the campaigning, were legally treated by Martial Law Orders decreed by the SLORC. With the adoption of the 2008 Constitution, several changes were introduced to the electoral system. The number of contested constituencies raised from 492 in 1990 to 1,171 constituencies in 2010. Moreover, the 2008 Constitution guarantees 25% of seats in each house to military appointed representatives.

In both elections, parties had to apply for registration before the general elections. In 1990, over two hundred parties registered – however, almost two thirds were not authorized by the Election Commission to participate; in 2010, only forty-seven parties registered, out of which thirty-seven were authorized. The 2010 elections counted a lot less participating parties than the 1990 elections also due to limited time for party registration. The number dropped from ninety-three parties in 1990 to thirty-seven parties in 2010. In 1990, parties and their candidates had over one year to prepare for the elections; in 2010, they had only three months. The number of candidates representing parties in 2010 was higher in both absolute and relative terms, even though there were less participating parties than in the 1990 elections.

The voter turnout in the 2010 elections, 76% of eligible voters (29 million), was higher than in the 1990 elections, 72,6% of eligible voters (21 million), because of the many ways the junta encouraged the Burmese to go vote (for example, those who spoke for the boycott of the elections, were detained).

Table 13: Overview of the 2010 Elections in Comparison with the 1990 Elections

1990 2010 Total number of constituencies 492 1171 Number of constituencies with elections (including single- 485 1154 candidate constituencies) Number of political parties that applied for registration 235 47 Number of political parties that participated in the election 93 37 Number of candidates representing political parties 2209 2987 Number of independent candidates 87 82 Total number of candidates 2296 3069 Estimated number of eligible voters 21 mil. 29 mil. Source: Kudo Toshihiro, “Results of the 2010 Elections in Myanmar: An Analysis,” IDE-JETRO Institute of developing Economies Japan External Trade Organization, January 2011, modified by the author.

The process of acquiring legitimacy in Myanmar was not legitimate, and thus Myanmar’s government can still not be considered legitimate, even though it has accomplished the elections in 2010. Following indicators explain why the government is not legitimate: 1. No political freedom: Burmese people are not free to organize political parties according to their own beliefs and to attend the political parties they want; 2. No civil rights: Burmese people are not free to participate in social organizations; 3. Political intervention over the whole electoral process: the junta tightly controlled every aspect of the electoral process; and 4. Government controlled media.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

The main aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the electoral system of Myanmar since the controversial name change on 18 June 1989, when the country became formally known as the Union of Myanmar, until the most recent general elections on 7 November 2010. Detailed study has been conducted on the most recent out of two elections that occurred during the studied time period. The 2010 elections, which formally returned the country to constitutional rule, were the first elections in the last twenty years, and the second in the last fifty years.

A major problem of the study is the lack of scholarship on many aspects of political life in Burma/Myanmar. Government policies prevent from field research, and thus limit access to information. A relevant example concerning the latest elections in 2010 in Myanmar is the authorities barring foreign monitors from observing the polls on the day of the election. In general, there is insufficient data on Burma/Myanmar issues, and the existing statistics are often manipulated.

This research is not entirely driven by academic curiosity, but also by a personal motivation. Over the course of my studies in the area of international relations both in Europe and Asia, I have focused on third-world countries and their recent development. My visit to Myanmar in July 2010 turned out to play an instrument role in choosing a topic for my Master thesis at NSYSU. It was during this time that I became particularly interested in the Burma issue. Once embarking upon research, I was especially fortunate to have been given the opportunity to write my thesis under the supervision of a renowned scholar and Professor Dr. Wen-cheng Lin.

My study has looked at the two elections, which occurred after the military has seized power in a coup in 1989 and renamed itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC; in 1997 renamed the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC). The first People’s Assembly elections in May 1990 were the first held in thirty years. The

National League for Democracy (NLD) led by the democratic icon Aung San Suu Kyi won 392 out of 485 seats, which accounts for 80% of the seats. In contrast to this landslide victory stands the military-backed National Unity Party, an indirect offspring of Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which hardly won 2% of the parliamentary seats.

The 1990 elections were originally meant to be hold for constituencies in the national parliament. During the election campaign, however, when it became clear that the opposition party, NLD, would win, the junta started changing its position. And so, the people faced a very curious situation. On the day when people went to the polls it was not clear what office they were voting for. The election results were subsequently annulled and the winning party was denied the ability to rule the country. The junta claimed retrospectively that the elections were not multi-party general elections, but they were just to elect a group that would work out a constitution.

When comparing the two elections in 1990 and 2010, a radical difference is found. The process in which the multi-party elections in 1990 were conducted was fair, while one in the 2010 elections was flawed. The process was different – the outcome the same: the military continues to control the Burmese government. One may ask him/herself, why did the government suddenly push ahead with elections after so many years without any (elections) if it does not genuinely want to introduce any changes? Myanmar has been facing strong criticism and economical sanctions from the international community for many years, also people inside Burma have throughout the years grown more dissatisfied. The latest elections were meant to give to the outer as well as the Burmese population the impression that the elections will create a legitimate government. In reality, they were designed to adapt and to preserve military rule under a façade of democracy.

Growing dissatisfaction within the country and international criticism along with economical sanctions encouraged the military junta to organize general elections. However, the 2010 elections were not planned to be free and fair, they were aimed to upgrade the regime to a more sophisticated authoritarian model, the so-called SPDC Version 2.0. The junta learnt a valuable lesson in the 1990 election, which ended in a fiasco for the military- backed parties. To hold elections is risky. The junta knew it had to be well prepared and did not leave it to the people’s free choice in 2010. The first step in this process was the 2008 Constitution, which was adopted in a manipulated referendum in the immediate

weeks after the Nargis cyclone had devastated the country. Given the fact that a constitution establishes the basis for a country’s electoral system, it becomes obvious, that the SPDC election laws were the result of a unilateral, non-transparent, and non-inclusive process.

The SPDC tightly controlled the entire electoral process through the Union Election Commission, which was due to its military-appointed members a far cry from being an independent entity. The SPDC election laws were not in accordance with international standards, and prevented the exercise of fundamental freedoms and political rights, as are freedom of expression, assembly and movement. The authorities imposed a censorship of election-related news, and the state-run media’s political coverage was unbalanced and favored the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Moreover, foreign journalists were not allowed to enter Myanmar.

The new election laws imposed restrictions and limited political participation. The unreasonable financial requirements and short deadline for candidate registration hindered the ability of political parties to field candidates. Several political parties and candidates were barred by the Election Commission’s discriminatory restrictions from the November elections. The SPDC also severely restricted the ability of political parties, candidates, and their supporters to campaign. Those who spoke out against the polls and favored a boycott of the elections were detained by the authorities.

Taking all these measures undertaken by the junta into account, there is no wonder that the USDP led by the former Premier Thein Sein won by an overwhelming majority in the national parliament 76.5% of the seats. However, the chronic lack of transparency in Myanmar raises profound doubts about how this formal return to constitutional government might contribute to better governance. In Myanmar, hierarchical relations are generally accepted as a fact. As an unfortunate result, many people have little, if no confidence in their ability to effect changes.

Bertil Lintner aptly describes in one of his articles the latest army sponsored election in Myanmar: “Rather than being "the first step toward democracy" the … [November] election is the final step in the military's consolidation of its absolute grip on

power, and a way for the regime to acquire the legitimacy it desires.”216 The government achieved what it had planned – to give the impression so to the outer world as to the Burmese population, that it created a representative legitimate government.

The government claims it is legitimate, because it followed certain rules (the 2008 Constitution, the Union Election Commission Law, and the Political Parties Registration Law) to achieve this status. But one needs to consider, by whom and how were these rules created, and what was their purpose? These discriminatory rules ensured the victory of pro-junta parties by handicapping free competition (sidelining the opposition parties by various means) in the elections.

Elections are meant to reflect the will of the people. However, in the case of Burma, this did not happen and the will of Burmese people was not heard out. Therefore, the government of Myanmar cannot be considered completely legitimate, it is a government dressed in a guise of legitimacy. As long as this system continues, the governments is illegitimate. No matter how many elections the military government has accomplished, as long as the 2008 Constitution is used as a basis for future elections, the government is still illegitimate.

216 Bertil Lintner, “The Generals’ Election,” The Wall Street Journal, 24 October 2010. Retrieved June 30, 2011 from http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303436904575570912556428170.html

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Basic information about Burma/Myanmar

Official name: Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Pyidaunzu Thanmăda Myăma Nainngandaw) 217

Independence: 4:20 A.M., 4 January 1948 (from the UK)218

Capital: Naypyidaw (since 2006; literally means “the royal national site”)

Largest city: Yangon (Rangoon), 5 million inhabitants

Area: total: 676,578 sq km (Country comparison to the world: 40th)219

Population: 56 million220 (no trust worth nationwide census has been taken since 1931, the last partial census was conducted by the Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs under the control of the military junta in 1983; the Myanmar Population Information Network estimated in 1995 about 49 million increasing by 800,000 persons annually)221

Ethnic & linguistic groups: The majority of inhabitants living in the lowlands, two-thirds of the population, are Burmans (Bamah), and the highlands are inhabited by minority peoples. The Burmese call them lu myo (Burmese for “races, people types”), the governments acknowledges over 100 such groups. The biggest ones are: Burman (Bamah)

217 4 Jan 1948 - Union of Burma; 4 Jan 1974 - Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma; 18 Jun 1989 - Union of Myanmar; 29. Oct 2010 - Republic of the Union of Myanmar

218 The date and time were decided with the help of astrological calculations.

219 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

220 Asia Times Online: Southeast Asia news and business from Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Vietnam. Atimes.com. 10 July 2008. Retrieved December 17, 2010 from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JG10Ae01.html

221 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific: Myanmar population information network. 2010. Retrieved December 18, 2010 from: http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/popin/profiles/myn.asp

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68%, Shan 9%, Karen (Kayin) 7%, Arakanese (Rakhine) 4%, Chinese 3%, Indian 2%, Mon 2%, other 5% 222

Religions: Buddhist 89%, Christian 4% (Baptist 3%, Roman Catholic 1%), Muslim 4%, animist 1%, other 2% 223

Languages: four linguistic families: Sino-Tibetan (Burmese = official; Karen, Kachin, Chin, Chinese), Kradai (Shan), Austro-Asiatic (Palaung, Wa), Indo-European (English, Pali =the liturgical language of Theravada Buddhism)224

Administrative divisions:

• 7 divisions, called regions in the 2008 constitution, indicating Burman ethnic areas (Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, Yangon)

• 7 states, ale called provinces, indicating minority regions (Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine (Arakan), Shan) 225

• 6 ethnic self-administered enclaves, since 2010 (Naga, Danu, PaO, Palaung, Kokang, and a division of the Wa)

Government type: military regime

Executive branch:

• Chief of state: Chairman of SPDC Sr. Gen. Than Shwe (since 23 April 1992)

• Head of government: Prime Minister Lt. Gen Thein Sein (since 24 October 2007)

• Cabinet is overseen by the military regime that assumed power 18 September 1988 under the name SLORC, changed in 1997 to SPDC226

222 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

223 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

224 M. P. Lewis (ed.): Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 16th edition, (Dallas: SIL International, 2009) [online version] Retrieved December 17, 2010 from http://www.ethnologue.com/show_country.asp?name=MM

225 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

102

Legislative branch: bicameral;

• House of Nationalities [Amyotha Hluttaw] (224 seats, 168 directly elected and 56 appointed by the military; members serve five-year terms)

• House of Representatives [Pythu Hluttaw] (440 seats, 330 directly elected and 110 appointed by the military; members serve five-year terms)

Judicial branch: remnants of the British-era legal system are in place, but there is no guarantee of a fair public trial; the judiciary is not independent of the executive 227

Military branches: Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw): Army (Tatmadaw Kyi), Navy (Tatmadaw Yay), Air Force (Tatmadaw Lay)

Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal228

Constitution:

• 1947 – This was a democratic constitution with regular rule of law and separation of powers. It attempted to make a compromise between the Burmans and the minorities. Although, it was federal in theory, in practice, it was unitary. It was drafted by Chan Htoon (written by fifteen Burmans) and adopted on 24 September 1947. It was used from the country's independence in 1948 to 1962, when the constitution was suspended by the Socialist Revolutionary Council led by Ne Win. The national government consisted of three branches: judicial, legislative and executive. The legislative branch was a bicameral legislature called the Union Parliament, consisting of two chambers.229 This constitution avoided establishing a state religion, but allowed three states (the Shan and Kayah states) to opt out of the Union of Burma (secession clause) after a ten year hiatus and a plebiscite. This constitution suffered from a lack of acceptance by the people.

226 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

227 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

228 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

229 The Constitution of the Union of Burma (1947), Chapter VI: Parliament 103

• 1974 – This constitution mandated a single party socialist state along an Eastern European model. The new constitution transfers power from the armed forces to a People's Assembly of former military leaders headed by Ne Win, who was installed as President. The constitution created a unicameral legislature (Pyithu Hluttaw = the People's Assembly), represented by members of the Burma Socialist Party Programme (BSPP). Each term was four years. There was no secret ballot in the referendum to approve the constitution.230 This constitution was suspended inter alia on 18 September 1988 by issuing Order 1/88 and calling a constitutional convention in 1993, which was suspended in 1996, and there was no constitution until 2008.231 In 1996, the SLORC passed Order 5/96 that prohibited anyone from involving in constitutional matters with a penalty of 20 years sentence.232

• 2008 – In 2004, the National convention reconvened just to adjourn a few months later, talks resume and end with no clear progress until the convention was reopened for the last time and completed in 2007. 233 In 2008, the military government of Myanmar released the proposed constitution for a vote in a public referendum on 10 May 2008, as part of the roadmap to democracy. The constitution officially received 92.48% support in a flawed referendum and took effect after the 2010 elections. The new constitution is a tool for continuing military control of the country. The legislative branch is the Union Assembly (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw; which is a bicameral legislature consisting of the 440-seat People's Assembly and the 224- seat National Assembly). Military (Tatmadaw) member delegates are reserved a maximum of 56 of 224 seats in the National Assembly and 110 seats of 440 in the People's Assembly.234

230 In the referendum there were separate “yes” and “no” ballot boxes at the polling booths.

231 Timeline - Myanmar’s slow road to a new constitution, Reuters, 9 February 2008. Retrieved December 17, 2010 from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKBKK26169420080209

232 Speech by Janelle Saffin MLC (18th – 19th August 2000), Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07- Saffin_Snapshot.htm

233 Speech by Janelle Saffin MLC (18th – 19th August 2000), Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs/LIOB07- Saffin_Snapshot.htm

234 Timeline - Myanmar’s slow road to a new constitution, Reuters, 9 February 2008. Retrieved December 17, 2010 from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKBKK26169420080209 104

Elections: last held in 2010 (next to be held in 2015)235

• Jun 1951 - Apr 1952 - Burma’s first general multi-party election (AFPFL236 won 60% of the vote).237 It took 7 months to complete due to the civil war.

• 27 Apr - 22 May 1956 - general multi-party elections (AFPFL won 47,7% of the vote)238

• 6 Feb 1960 - general multi-party elections to decide which faction of AFPFL (the "Clean AFPFL" led by U Nu, or the "Stable AFPFL" led by U Kyaw Nyein and U Ba Swe), should take over from Ne Win's interim military-led administration, established in 1958.239 The "Clean AFPFL" won the election with a majority of seats with 52.7% of votes.

• 1974 - one-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates

• 1978 - one-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates

• 1984 - one-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates

• 1986 - one-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates

• 27 May 1990 - general multi-party election (after thrity years) won by NLD240, who took 392 of the 492 seats. NUP241 won only ten constituencies.242 The military junta refused to recognize the results.

235 CIA - The World Factbook (2010). Retrieved December 8, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html

236 AFPFL=Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, a confederation of political parties with left-center political opinions, socialist to some degree

237 Taylor, The Politics, 173.

238 Robert I. Rotberg, Burma: Prospects for a Democratic Future, (Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 43.

239 A split in the main AFPFL party occurred in April 1958. There were no major ideological differences between the two factions, although the "Stable" faction favored industrialization and the "Clean" faction spoke more of agricultural development. (The Age - 8 Feb 1960. Retrieved December 16, 2010 from http://news.google.co.uk/newspapers?id=iX41AAAAIBAJ&sjid=GKwDAAIBAJ&pg=6787,1182226&dq=)

240 National League for Democracy was founded on 27 September 1988.

241 SLORC-supported National Unity party

242 Speech by Janelle Saffin MLC (18th – 19th August 2000), Legal issues on Burma Journal no. 7, December 2010. [electronic journal] Retrieved December 18, 2010 from http://www.burmalibrary.org/ Saffin_shot.htm

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• 7 Nov 2010 – general multi-party election held in accordance with the new constitution which was approved in a referendum in May 2008.243 The NDL boycotted the election.

President / Chairman of SLORC/SPDC:

1948-1952 Sao Shwe Thaik 1952-1957 Ba U 1957-1962 Win Maung 1962-1974 Ne Win (Chairmen of the Revolutionary Council) 1974-1981 Ne Win 1981-1988 San Yu 1988 Sein Lwin 1988 Aye Ko 1988 Maung Maung 1988-1992 Saw Maung 1992-1997 Than Shwe 1997-2011 Than Shwe 2011 Thein Sein

Burmese names: There are no surnames and names are usually preceded by a title:

Bo (military officer) Bogyoke (supreme commander) Daw (aunt) Ko (elder brother) Ma (younger sister) Maung (younger brother) Thakin (lord) U (uncle or Mr.)244

243 This was the 5th step of the seven-step "roadmap to democracy" proposed by the SPDC in 2003, the 6th and 7th steps being the convening of elected representatives and the building of a modern, democratic nation, respectively.

244 David I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone, Preliminary notes. 106

Last SPDC Members (before the dissolution of SPDC in March 2011):

• Sr Gen Tan Shwe (Chairman of SPDC, Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, Minister of Defense) • Vice Sr Gen Maung Aye (Vice-Chairman of SPDC, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, Commander-in-Chief) • Gen Shwe Mann (Joint Chief of Staff of Defense Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) • Gen Thei Sein (Prime Minister) • Lt Gen Tin Aung Myint Oo (Quartermaster General) • Lt Gen Tha Aye (Commander of Bureau of Special Operations - 1 [Kachin State, Sagaing Division, Mandalay Division]) • Lt Gen Min Aung Hlaing (Commander of Bureau of Special Operations - 2 [Karenni State, Shan State]) • Lt Gen Ko Ko (Commander of Bureau of Special Operations - 3 [Pegu Division, Irrawaddy Division]) • Lt Gen Khin Zaw (Commander of Bureau of Special Operations - 4 [Karen State, Mon State, Tenasserim Division]) • Lt Gen Myint Swe (Commander of Bureau of Special Operations - 5 [Rangoon Division, Naypyidaw]) • Lt Gen Ohn Myint (Commander of Bureau of Special Operations - 6 [Arakan State, Chin State, Magwe Division]) • Maj Gen Hla Htay Win (Chief of Armed Forces Training) • Lt Gen Tin Aye (Chief of Military Ordnance)245

245 SPDC Members, Alternative Asian Network on Burma [database online]. Retrieved April 15, 2011 from http://www.altsean.org/Research/SPDC%20Whos%20Who/SPDCMembers.htm26

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Appendix 2: Historic Flags of Burma/Myanmar

The Golden Hintha flag (1300–1500)

Flag of the Third Burmese Empire under Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885)

Flag of British Burma as a colony of British India (1824–1939)

Flag of a separate colony, British Burma (1939–1943)

Flag of the State of Burma (1943–1945)

Simplified flag of the State of Burma (1945)

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Flag of British Burma (1945–1948)

Flag of the Union of Burma (1948–1974)

Flag of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974–1988) and the Union of Myanmar (1988–2010)

Flag of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2010-current)

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Appendix 3: Key Dates in Burmese History after Gaining Independence

Japanese granted Burma nominal independence. Dr. Ba Maw became the dictator of this pseudo-independent state. The capital was called Rangoon Naypyidaw. He assumed charge of the Burmese cabinet and named himself 1 Aug 1943 “anashin” dictator 24 Sep 1947 New Constitution adopted (valid till 1962) 4 Jan 1948 Independence from Britain; “Union of Burma” 1949 the Karen rebellion started (still going on) Jun 1951 - Burma’s first general multi-party election. It took 7 months to complete the Apr 1952 election due to the civil war. AFPFL won 60% of the vote 27 Apr - 22 Burma’s second general multi-party elections were again won by the May 1956 AFPFL with47,7% of the vote. 28 Apr 1958 official split between AFPFL leaders: Clean AFPFL and Stable AFPFL Constitutional coup which resulted in the rule of the military Caretaker 24 Sep 1958 Government General multi-party elections to decide between the two factions of AFPFL. 6 Feb 1960 U Nu’s Clean AFPFL won. Military coup. The Revolutionary Council (a junta with 17 officers with Ne 2 Mar 1962 Win the head of Council) took over. 30 Apr 1962 "Burmese Way to Socialism" introduced BSPP established (also called Lanzim Party; a cadre party until 1971 when 4 Jul 1962 it became a mass party) Jun 1967 Anti-Chinese protests; crisis in Sino-Burmese relations 1974 One-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates. New Constitution adopted (suspended inter alia on 18 Sep 1988 by issuing 2 Mar 1974 Order 1/88; no constitution until 2008) Name change: “Socialist Republic of the Union of Myanmar”, one-party 4 Jan 1974 system with BSPP, generals took civilian posts. 1978 One-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates. A discriminatory Citizenship Act passed: full citizenship only for Burmans 15 Oct 1982 and other acknowledged ethnic groups, 200 000 Indians were expelled 1984 One-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates. 1986 One-party election for the People’s Assembly – only BSPP candidates. Economic liberalization (most significant since 1962): rice being sold at the 1 Sep 1987 open market. Demonetization (the most strict of all three since 1962: 1964, 1985 and 5 Sep 1987 1987) UN declared Burma one of the Least Developed Nations (literacy rate too Dec 1987 high, LDN status achieved by lobbing in order to receive loans) 18 Sep 1988 Military coup 110

23 Sep 1988 SLORC was created Dec 1988 SLORC has opened the country to investment – new investment law enacted SLORC declared martial law and changed the name of Burma to 18 Jun 1989 “Myanmar” SLORC placed Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U, the two founders of NDL, 20 Jul 1989 under house arrest. Tn U was later sentenced to jail. People's Assembly elections – not clear what kind of election. NDL = 27 May1990 winner. Announcement that Aung San Suu Kyi has been awarded Nobel Peace 14 Oct 1991 Prize. 9 Jan 1993 National Convention started to draft the constitution, on and off. Dec 1996 Student demonstrations in Yangon. More than 600 students arrested. July 1997 Joining ASEAN (and also BIMSTEC in the same year) 15 Nov 1997 SLORC renamed to SPDC A coup plot involving Ne Win’s family was discovered. The Ne Win family Mar 2002 was arrested. Ne Win died. His death was not covered in the official press. He did not 5 Dec 2002 even have a state funeral. General Khin Nyunt announced the seven-step process in restoring 30 Aug 2003 democracy in the country “Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy” The junta moved the national capital from Yangon (Rangoon) to a site near Nov 2005 Pyinmana March 2006 The junta officially named the new capital Naypyidaw (“City of the Kings”) Sept 2007 Saffron Revolution Feb 2008 “Road map to disciplined democracy” announced by the junta 2 May 2008 Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar Referendum on a military-sponsored draft constitution (24 May - for the 10 May2008 damaged delta region) 19 Oct 2010 Name change: “Republic of the Union of Myanmar” 07 Nov 2010 General elections 13 Nov 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi's release of house arrest Final results of the 2011 election: Thein Sein’s party USDP won almost 17 Nov 2010 80% of the vote. Thei Sein elected President by the Parliament; the first civilian President 4 Feb 2011 after military rule. Mar 2011 SPDC officially dissolved

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Appendix 4: 2010 Election Timeline

8 March 2010 The SPDC issues election laws The SPDC appoints a seventeen members to the Election 11 March 2010 Commission. 17 March 2010 The Election Commission issues election bylaws. 18 March 2010 The Election Commission opens political party registration. 29 March 2010 The NLD officially announces its election boycott. Premier General Thein Sein and his ministers resign from their 26 April 2010 military posts to run as civilians in the upcoming elections 6 May 2010 Deadline for existing political parties to re-register The Election Commission officially announces that it allows Thein 12 May 2010 Sein to form a political party to contest the upcoming elections. 23 June 2010 The Election Commission imposes restrictions on political parties. The SPDC declares that Aung San Suu Kyi can participate in the 21 July 2010 upcoming elections once she is released from house arrest. The Election Commission announces that the parliamentary elections 13 August 2010 will be held on 7 November 2010. The Election Commission issues Notification No. 91/2010, which 19 August 2010 specifies rules for the election campaign. The Election Commission issues Notification No. 98/2010, which requires parties to apply to the sub-commission for a special permit at least seven days prior to public events or speeches on radio or 14 September 2010 television. The Election Commission officially dissolves the NLD and three other 14 September 2010 parties that failed to re-register within the prescribed deadline. The Election Commission cancels voting in over 3,400 villages in 16 September 2010 Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and Shan States “for security reasons.” 30 September 2010 Deadline for political parties to submit their candidate lists The Election Commission officially prohibits international observes in 18 October 2010 the upcoming elections. The Election Commission cancels voting in another 12 villages in 2 November 2010 Karenni State. 7 November 2010 General elections 13 November 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi released from her house arrest 17 November 2010 The Election Commission announces the final results of the polls. The Election Commission announces the voter turnout of the elections 7 December 2010 (over 76%). Source: “Burma Issues & Concerns Vol. 6: The 2010 Generals’ Election,” ALTSEAN Burma, January 2011, modified by the author.

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Lintner, Bertil. “Poll Controls: Military Authorities Restrict Election Campaigning.” The Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 April 1990.

Lintner, Bertil. “The election Charade: Government Eliminates Liberal Poll Contenders.” The Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 January 1990;

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Seibert, Sam, and Moreau, Ron. “Stacking the Deck: Burma’s Military Rulers are Prepared For an Election – But Not For an Opposition Victory.” Newsweek, 28 May 1990.

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Smith, Colin. “Burma’s Elections: A Private Affair.” The Times of India, 22 May 1990.

Tasker, Rodney, and Lintner, Bertil. “The Plot Thickens: Military Rulers Seek to Stall Power Transfer.” The Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 June 1990.

Tasker, Rodney. “Military Manouvres: Generals Force Democracy to Mark Time.” The Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 July 1990.

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Legal documents:

Law Relating to the Sangha Organization: Chapter II/ 5 of State Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 20/90 of 31 October 1990

The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)

The Constitution of the Socialistic Republic of the Union of Burma (1974)

The Constitution of the Union of Burma (1947)

The Political Parties Registration Law, the State Peace and Development Council Law No. 2/2010 of 8 March 2010

The State Law and Order Restoration Council Order No. 1/90 of 17 July 1990

The Union Election Commission Law, the State Peace and Development Council Law No. 1/2010 of 8 March 2010

The Union Election Commission Notification No. 91/2010 of 18 August 2010

The Union Election Commission Notification No. 97/2010 of 14 September 2010

The Union Election Commission Notification No.143/2010 of 7 December 2010

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Other electronic sources:

Asia society: http://asiasociety.org/

BBC news: http://news.bbc.co.uk

BookRags.com: http://www.bookrags.com/

Burma Center Prague: http://www.burma-center.org/

Burma Centrum Netherland: http://www.burmacentrum.nl/

Burma Lawyers’ Council: http://www.blc-burma.org/activity_pub_liob.html

Burmanet: http://www.burmanet.org/

Democratic Voice of Burma: http://www.dvb.no/

Encyclopædia Britannica Online: http://www.britannica.com/

Federation of American Scientists: www.fas.org

Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/

Mizzima news (specializing in Burma related news): http://www.mizzima.com

Online Burma/Myanmar Library: http://www.burmalibrary.org

Open Democracy: http://www.opendemocracy.net/

Reuters: http://uk.reuters.com/

The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/

The Irrawady (Covering Burma and Southeast Asia): http://www.irrawaddy.org/

Transparency International: http://www.transparency.org/

UPI Asia: http://www.upiasia.com/

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