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Introduction Dhirubhai Ambani International Model United Nations 2019 Forum: GA1 – Disarmament and International Security Issue: Tackling Violent Extremism in South East Asia Student Officer: Aman Ladia Position: Head Chair Introduction Since the 1990s, the activity of constantly shifting militant groups in South East Asia has risen as a consequence of both modernization efforts by governments and the influence of radicalism within Islam. Both these factors have had a multiplier effect in that they have given rise to a violent and resilient form of extremism within the region. While many of these groups are small and locally acting, there are a few that have grown to such an extent that they now pose a threat to the security of multiple nations in which they operate. Demographically, South East Asia has a total population of more than 625 million people, with a large Sunni Muslim population of around 240 million people. This amounts to about 15% of the total global Muslim population, making the South East an important Islamic centre.1 While the majority of this population subscribes to syncretic and moderate forms of Islam, the more conservative communities have shown a tendency to become pockets of radicalism. Whilst such communities have existed for many decades, the recent rise in radicalism is often associated with the growth in support from Gulf donors during the late 20th century. Pre and post 9/11 statistics tell a similar story: while Philippines was the only country in the region that appeared in the pre 9/11 list of top 10 most attacked global territories, the post 9/11 list now features Thailand as well, and the two countries alone account for around 9.7% of global terrorism.2 These figures reflect the surge of extremist activities in the region during the early 2000s. Notable attacks include the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, which killed several hundred people in crowded tourist districts. The 2009 bombings of JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta were also carried out in a highly planned and sophisticated fashion. 1 "Demographic Change in South East Asia," , accessed July 12, 2019, https://www.pecc.org/resources/labor/820- demographic-change-in-east-and-southeast-asia-and-the-implications-for-the-future/file. 2 Statista, "Terrorism Stats," Www.statista.com, , accessed July 12, 2019, https://www.statista.com/topics/2267/terrorism/. Research Report | Page 1 of 20 Dhirubhai Ambani International Model United Nations 2019 The most active, and perhaps the most dangerous, groups operating within the region include the Philippine Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf, and the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). It should be noted that the JI in particular is known for its cells not only in Indonesia but also in the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. This multi-national character of JI will be explored further as it exemplifies terrorism in the region. In addition to bombings on land, a unique dimension of groups operating in the region is their involvement in maritime terrorism. The region accounts for nearly 40% of global maritime trade, which makes it a target for hijacking. The Strait of Malacca, bordered by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, is particularly infamous for its high risk of terrorism. In 2017 alone, there were 101 maritime incidents in the region, of which 85 involved armed robbery and 16, piracy. The hijacking of vessels to steal oil cargo is of particular concern.3 While the economic and human impacts of violent extremism are evident through statistics, the true scale of damage cannot be gauged without considering the cultural impact it has on nations. As most extremist groups operating in the region have a religious or ideological motive, destruction of culture is a powerful tool used by groups to propagate intolerance and undermine socio-political institutions. Much the same way as economic and human losses have a global dimension, cultural destruction is also an international concern with violent extremism. Individual nations in the region have developed their independent counter terrorism task forces in the recent years, but in the absence of a region-wide effort, the issue of violent extremism in the region remains an unresolved one. Taking into account the threats to global peace and security posed by extremist groups in the region, this issue is of relevance to the First Committee. Definition of Key Terms Violent Extremism4 Violent extremism involves advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political objectives. 3 "U.S. Energy Information Administration - EIA - Independent Statistics and Analysis." The Strait of Malacca. Accessed July 12, 2019. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32452. 4 Katharina.kiener-Manu, "Counter-Terrorism Module 2 Key Issues: Radicalization & Violent Extremism," Violent Extremism, , accessed June 23, 2019, https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/terrorism/module-2/key-issues/radicalization- violent-extremism.html. Research Report | Page 2 of 20 Dhirubhai Ambani International Model United Nations 2019 Radicalism5 The belief that society needs to be changed, and that these changes are only possible through revolutionary means. Political Terrorism6 Political terrorism is violence—or equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim. Improved Explosive Device (IED) 7 A homemade bomb, constructed from military or non-military components, that is employed as a crude weapon. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP): A non-governmental (second track) process for dialogue on security issues in Asia Pacific. Counter Terrorism8 An all-encompassing term that includes the strategies, techniques and practices deployed by intelligence agencies, governments or international organisations to combat or prevent terrorist activities. Background Information Violent extremism in South East Asia is a highly complex issue with a multitude of groups, motivations, operating strategies, and funding sources that need to be examined in detail and tackled point by point. To this end, this section of the report details different aspects of extremism in the region that are within the scope of discussion at DAIMUN 2019. 5 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Radical," Encyclopædia Britannica, July 20, 1998, , accessed June 23, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/topic/radical-ideologist. 6 Ward and Antonia, "How Do You DeFine Terrorism?" RAND Corporation, June 04, 2018, , accessed June 23, 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/06/how-do-you-deFine-terrorism.html. 7 Peter Mansoor, "Improvised Explosive Device," Encyclopædia Britannica, August 30, 2018, , accessed June 23, 2019, https://www.britannica.com/technology/improvised-explosive-device. 8 "UN Global Counter-Terrorism," United Nations, , accessed June 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitF/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy. Research Report | Page 3 of 20 Dhirubhai Ambani International Model United Nations 2019 Historical background Rise of the MNLF (Renamed MILF) Between 1903 and 1973, the Philippine government encouraged the migration of landless Christian citizens from different parts of the country to Mindanao, the second largest island of the Philippines. The lack of any land titling system by the native residents of Mindanao meant that the settlers could exploit the situation and seize large areas of land. This led to heightened tensions between the Islamic residents of the island (called the Moro people) and the Christian settlers. The anguish caused by the Resettlement Policy led to a build-up of anger among native Moros, and they were driven to act after the Jabidah massacre of 1968 where Moro army recruits were allegedly shot by members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This incident led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the first batch of MNLF fighters was trained in 1969. The group was officially founded by Nur Misauri, a Moro revolutionary turned politician. The first major operation of the group was in early 1973, when MNLF revolutionaries parallelly attacked eight municipalities in Cotabato and exercised temporary control over them. The MNLF was beaten by the quick mobility of the army, but it quickly revised its modus operandi and started employing Guerrilla warfare techniques as early as 1974. However, throughout this period, the MNLF was controlled largely by a leadership situated outside Philippines – Nur Misauri too eventually operated from Libya. Although distance slightly weakened the MNLF, it remained by far the most significant separatist organisation of the time The MNLF transformed into a political party in 1996; this was partly as a result of 1987 negotiations which lead to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. One offshoot of the MNLF, however, continued to operate until very recently – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). A ceasefire was signed between the MILF and the Government of Philippines in 1997, but this was abolished under President Joseph Estrada’s administration in 2000. Consequently, MILF initiated a Jihad against the Philippine Government and its citizens, leading to numerous attacks such as the 2003 Davao Airport bombing. A ceasefire was signed again in March 2014, but considering the volatility of the region, the risk of a MILF uprising looms in the Philippines. Research Report | Page 4 of 20 Dhirubhai Ambani International Model United Nations 2019 Growth of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) The Jemaah Islamiyah is a trans-national extremist organisation based in Indonesia, with its roots as far as the early 1940s. The JI has its roots in the Darul Islam (DI), which was an anti-colonialist racial Islamist movement in Indonesia in the 1940s. Three men – Abu Bakar Bashir, Shahrul Nizam and Abdullah Sungkar – began propagating the DI movement under the banner of the JI around the year 1969. Sungkar and Bashir were both soon imprisoned by the Indonesian administration, and the two radical leaders spent several years in lockup. Upon their release in 1982, they moved to Malaysia with their supporters.
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