Self-interest or Self-importance: Afghanistan's Lessons for Canada's Place in the Modern World
Alex Wilner, Security and Defence Intern Atlantic Institute for Market Studies
On October 7, 2006, the 40th Canadian soldier rhetoric has gotten rather ugly. Political blows died in Afghanistan, his armoured vehicle struck have been traded; positions have been marked; by an improvised road-side bomb buried in the political futures are certainly at stake. sand. The soldier’s death marked the sad fact The constant chatter, however, is muddying the that Canadian military casualties had, for the first important fact that Canadian military forces time, matched those endured by our British allies continue to do battle with a resurgent Taliban to since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in secure Canada’s national interest. Humanitarian 2001. By month’s end, Canadian casualties relief, minority group protection, democratic would rank second highest of all coalition value promotion, provincial reconstruction, and fatalities, behind those of the United States alone. economic development are each solid foreign policy objectives for Canada to be emphasising That 80 percent of all Canadian causalities in in Afghanistan, but each must be understood as Afghanistan have occurred since March 2006 has part and parcel of a greater, ultimate policy not been lost on the Canadian media or the objective: defending Canada’s national security Canadian public. Canada’s role in the and protecting our national interest. beleaguered country, along with our government’s overarching policy objectives in Canada must do what it can to ensure that the Global War on Terrorism, has become the Afghan soil no longer remains the ripe, fertile principal foreign policy debate for Canadian ground upon which extremist groups can root citizens. News on the subject of Afghanistan has their activity. Fanatical organizations, like the become ubiquitous, the Canadian Forces the Taliban, must not be given the opportunity to re- central theme of radio and television news build symbiotic associations with terrorist shows. clients, as had developed during the 1990s with the companionable relationship between Mullah Political battle-lines have been drawn as a result, Muhammad Omar’s Taliban regime and Osama with supporters of the Afghan mission locking bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network. Rejecting a horns with their vocal detractors. At times, the territorial rallying point for terrorist proxies and AIMS Commentary – Self-interest or Self-importance: Afghanistan's Lessons for Canada's Place in the Modern World March, 2007
their government allies, a requisite factor needed was minimal, its lasting message one of general in training fanatical foot soldiers, indoctrinating disinterest.2 operatives, constructing and stashing weapons, and planning acts of catastrophic terrorism, is of The following year, the United Nations Security paramount importance to Canada and her allies. Council adopted Resolution 1267, levying This principal goal, above all others in the financial and travel restrictions on Taliban myriad of objectives pursued by NATO forces in officials. The consequences, however, were reconstructing Afghanistan, is of primary interest again only mildly influential.3 And in March to Canada’s national security and our collective 2001, the West, especially members of the NGO national interest. community, took notice of the Taliban’s threat to destroy the massive and ancient Buddha statues Remember the Taliban of Bamyan Province. Heavy diplomatic and "The [religious scholars] issued a fatwa that the popular pressure was levied against the Taliban, non-Muslim population of the country should but the stoic Buddhas eventually fell in a hail of have a distinctive mark such as a piece of cloth Taliban rocket and tank fire. They were, Mullah attached to their pockets so they should be Omar explained, “un-Islamic graven images”.4 differentiated from others." (Mohammed Wali, Chief, Taliban Religious Police, 2001)1 In each case, the world did something about the Taliban regime and its ally, al Qaeda, if only for On September 10, 2001, few states, Canada a brief moment. Certainly, pariah status was included, paid much attention to the Taliban levied against Kabul, but no Western leader, save regime in Afghanistan. It was simply one of the perhaps a few steadfast officials from the NGO dozen ineffectual rogue states with little, if any, community,5 overtly called for regime change, international weight or political importance. In the decades following the 1988 retreat of the Red 2 Army from Kabul, the Taliban was generally left In his related television address, President Clinton stated: “Our mission [in Afghanistan] was clear – to strike at the alone to run Afghanistan as an Islamic theocracy. network of radical groups affiliated with, and funded by, Only very meekly did the West intervene, Osama bin Laden, the pre-eminent organizer and financier coercively or otherwise, in Afghan affairs. of international terrorism in the world today.” President Clinton, quoted in: Jamie McIntyre and Andrea Koppel, In 1998, for instance, President Clinton ordered “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Somalia”, CNN, August 21, 1998 Operation Infinite Reach, a series of cruise
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coercive military engagement, or humanitarian of severe punishment: “thieves had their arms or intervention. Afghanistan might have been the legs amputated, adulterers were stoned to death, territorial embodiment of a callous strain of and drinking liquor resulted in lashings.” 7 political extremism, but as an international actor, especially in terms of its hard military power However unjust the Taliban, the international (tanks, bombs, and guns) Afghanistan was a community had little incentive, rightly or nuisance, not a clear and present global threat. wrongly, to intervene and topple the regime. The international mood for another multilateral, UN- Of course, the Taliban was sponsored humanitarian considered a threat to some intervention had soured of those living within Lest we forget, twenty- substantially following the Afghanistan. In 1994 the four of those murdered debacles in Somalia, Taliban rose to power with Rwanda, and Haiti, and the a promise to bring peace on 9/11 were Canadian lessons offered by the and prosperity to a country mujahideen in their wracked by decades of citizens. We too had protracted guerrilla war internal strife, foreign against the Red Army were occupation, and warfare. become casualties of this still fresh and troubling to Most Afghans, exhausted Western policymakers. as they were by years of new and uncertain war. famine, violence, and Perhaps most fundamentally, anarchy, were willing to however, states simply did give the Taliban’s political order a trial run. not consider Afghanistan a pressing threat to Perhaps Afghans believed a firm Taliban hand their own national interests and national security. would prove useful in catalyzing domestic No state intervened against the Taliban grip stability, stemming crime, combating because no state cared to risk its blood and warlordism, and checking the blossoming poppy treasure for a few ramshackle villages. Even on trade. September 10, 2001, the rationale for inaction was simple enough: so long as Kabul abused its But like most, if not all, fundamentalist groups own citizens – short, perhaps, of systemic and that have risen to political power in decades past, widespread genocide – but refrained from the Taliban’s populist agenda of peace, stability, threatening the citizens and interests of other and development was carried out with heavy states, the Taliban would be left to its own expense against women, ethnic, religious, and devices. cultural minorities and humanitarian law. Certain groups, especially Hindus, Hazaras, and Tajiks, Of course things changed on September 11, were targeted with extrajudicial arrests, beatings, 2001. The moment 19 terrorists, aided and and executions, their communities forcibly abetted by the Taliban regime, killed 3,000 expelled from villages, their creed victims of mass killing.6 The Taliban also reinstated forms 7 Anna Shoup, “Afghanistan and the War on Terror: The Taliban”, Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), October 3, 6 Amnesty International, “Executions, Amputations, and 2006 Possible Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings”, April 1, 1995,
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people, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban by proxy, had Laden established a network of training facilities made its business, everybody’s business. within Afghanistan, recruited thousands of foreign-born fighters, and trained them as an elite Lest we forget, twenty-four of those murdered on force with the dual tasks of defending the 9/11 were Canadian citizens. We too had Taliban from domestic groups and carrying out become casualties of this new and uncertain war. acts of terrorism abroad.
Al Qaeda’s Lesson: By 1996, al Qaeda had flourished as a coercive “In today's wars, there are no morals, and it organization. Sufficiently prepared, it called for is clear that mankind has descended to the open warfare. It issued a fatwa (a declaration of lowest degrees of decadence and war) – published in Al-Quds Al Arbi, a London- oppression. We do not have to differentiate based newspaper – declaring its intent to fight between military or civilian. As far as we jihad against Westerners. are concerned, they are all targets.” (Osama bin Laden, 1998)8 As a prelude to the coming conflict, the fatwa notes the many successes Islamic terrorists had It is important to note that while al Qaeda and the already secured against Western forces. Bin Taliban are two separate organizations, they Laden specifically comments on the “false nonetheless share common views concerning courage” of Westerners in three distinctive cases: militant Islam, religious governance, the retreat of American and French troops from international jihad, and so on. They share Beirut following the 1983 barrack attacks, the common strategic goals as well – the projection withdrawal of Western forces from Yemen (used of Islamic revolutions around the globe, the as a base in preparation for humanitarian action construction of theocracies in the Middle East, in Somalia) following the 1992 double-bombing Africa, and Asia, the purging of infidels from of the Gold Mohur Hotel in the city of Aden, and Muslim lands, and the coercive removal of the flight of American servicemen from Somalia foreign elements from Islamic territory. following the mob killing of 18 American soldiers during the Battle of Mogadishu in In one sense, bin Laden played a philosophical 1993.10 leadership role (and of course a financial role as well) to Afghan jihadists while the Taliban aided The fact that bin Laden makes specific and in operational logistics. There was also general careful note of these three events in his first consensus within al Qaeda’s leadership that declaration of war should not be interpreted as a Taliban Afghanistan was the only pure Islamic simple and curious historical footnote. Indeed, government; a model to be supported and they are of vital importance, offering us a rare emulated elsewhere.9 By the early 1990s, bin
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glimpse as to the nature of the ongoing struggle tiger. He was unable to endure the with modern terrorism and fundamentalist Islam. strikes that were dealt to his army, so he Because bin Laden interprets these events as fled... After a few blows, [the Western victorious lessons for al Qaeda and its struggle, Forces] rushed out of Somalia in shame we too do best to absorb them ourselves. and disgrace, dragging the bodies of [their] soldiers.11 In Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu, concentrated yet limited attacks had wildly uneven political Lesson learned. repercussions, resulting in substantial and monumental shifts in foreign policy. It was not Simply put: enough coercive force could turn the lost on the perpetrators, for tides in an asymmetric war instance, that French and with the West. The three American troops evacuated Concentrated yet limited aforementioned attacks are Lebanon within four attacks had wildly considered substantial victories months of the barrack for exactly that reason – attacks, that Yemen was no uneven political enough violence, exactly longer utilized as a Western positioned and expertly timed, forward-operating base, repercussions, resulting would likely result in a reversal that the UN mission in of policies in any weary Somalia collapsed in substantial and Western state. following the US retreat five months after the Battle monumental shifts in That this lesson evolved into of Mogadishu, and so on the modus operandi for the al and so forth. In a 1998 foreign policy. Qaeda network should come as interview with ABC no surprise. Just in case reporter John Miller, bin anybody had missed the first Laden himself gives call to arms (which, as we have credence to this important lesson plan. It is noted, almost all Western governments had), al worth quoting him at length. Bin Laden Qaeda issued a second fatwa in February 1998. explains, rather bluntly: This time, the message was curt. “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and After our victory [against the Soviet military – is an individual duty for every Muslim Union]… in Afghanistan, the legend who can do it in any country in which it is about the invincibility of the possible to do it.”12 And kill they did. superpowers vanished. Our boys no longer viewed America as a superpower.
They went to Somalia and prepared 11 Osama bin Laden, quoted from, Public Broadcasting themselves carefully for a long war. Service (PBS), “Frontline: Hunting Bin Laden, They had thought that the Americans Interviews”, were like the Russians, so they trained
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An emboldened al Qaeda carried out a number of Elsewhere, the tactic has been used with, as of catastrophic terrorist attacks. The Khobar yet, uncertain ends. Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamic Towers, housing US servicemen in Saudi Arabia, terrorist group associated with al Qaeda, attacked were bombed in 1996; Operation Bojinka, a plan Australian civilians twice, during the 2002 and to place over a dozen small bombs on various 2005 Bali bombings, in an attempt to reverse airlines (developed by Ramzi Yousef, perpetrator both the government’s policy concerning Iraq of the 1993 al Qaeda-linked bombing of the New and influence in Southeast Asia. The first of the York Trade Center), was botched in the two London transit attacks in 2005 has been Philippines in 1995; the American embassies in attributed to al Qaeda in Europe and was likely Kenya and Tanzania were destroyed in 1998; the an attempt to reverse England’s staunch support USS Cole was bombed in Sudan in 2000; and of for the Global War on Terror and the Iraq War. course al Qaeda carried out the attacks of 9/11 in 2001. Abu Sayyaf, a terrorist group with substantial ties to al Qaeda, took responsibility for numerous Following 9/11, al Qaeda, its various allies, and devastating attacks in the Philippines, most like-minded associates point to an extensive, and notably the 2004 bombing of a Manila Bay ferry growing, list of successes in their long war with which killed 130 passengers, in an attempt to the West. The Madrid bombings of 2004, which influence the Philippine’s friendly stance with killed 191 and wounded nearly 2000, contributed the American government.13 The 2004 Taba, the to Spain’s immediate reversal of policy 2005 Sharm el-Sheikh, and the 2006 Dahab concerning its involvement in the war that attacks in Egypt, along with the various other overthrew Saddam Hussein. Al Qaeda in Iraq, acts of terrorism conducted in the Sinai Peninsula then led by terrorist mastermind Abu Musab al- since 2001, have been attributed to various Zarqawi, targeted both the United Nations terrorists groups loosely associated with al Headquarters in Iraq and the International Qaeda, and have targeted Israeli, Egyptian, and Committee of the Red Cross in Baghdad in 2003, Western interests in the region. resulting in the closure of these, and virtually all other, international humanitarian agencies active Chechen terrorist activity, supported in part with in rebuilding the country. links to al Qaeda, has plagued Russian authorities since 2001, much of it targeting In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, al Qaeda points Moscow’s political will in its battle over to the victory Hamas and Islamic Jihad have had Chechnya’s sovereignty.14 in forcing an Israeli retreat form Gaza after a prolonged campaign of suicide terrorism on In the Middle East, Al-Zarqawi was responsible Israeli civilians, and note Israel’s inability to for the 2005 blasts in Amman, Jordan, which crush Hezbollah’s stronghold in Southern were intended to alter Jordanian support for Lebanon this past summer. And al Qaeda has regional stabilizing initiatives (Arab-Israeli ‘road continued to employ this tactic with its near daily massacre of Shia in Iraq in hopes of successfully 13 Council on Foreign Relations, “Terrorism Havens: fomenting destabilizing sectarian conflict that Philippines”, December 2005, might force a reluctant reversal of American,
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map’ and other regional peace overtures, for that are shaping the post-Cold War international instance) and for its ties with the United States environment. Our battle with Taliban and al and other Western states. The July 2006 Qaeda forces in Southern Afghanistan is based Mumbai train bombings in India, a series of on a policy calculation that seeks to protect our seven coordinated blasts that killed 209 people, national interest in light of worrisome was conducted by the Students Islamic developments concerning the spread and Movement of India (SIMI) in association with effectiveness of international terrorism. There the al Qaeda-linked Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) are three principal reasons behind this terrorist group15 in hopes of wresting Indian calculation. control over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. And of course there is the First, as we have noted case of Afghanistan, where extensively, terrorist terrorism is being “We’re not going to let organizations require a territory employed against Western those radical murderers from which to organize their forces and reconstruction activities. Allowing the teams in an overt attempt to and killers rob from Taliban to recapture and sway support for the control even small pockets of mission. others and certainly Afghanistan invites the resuscitation of its associated Canada’s Lesson: we’re not going to let links with al Qaeda and other “These are detestable like-minded terrorist groups. murderers and them rob from Canada” Consider, for instance, the scumbags…they detest our relationships that have freedoms, they detest our - General Rick Hillier, flourished between terrorist society, they detest our organizations and their liberties. We’re not going Canadian Forces government supporters in Iraq, to let those radical Somalia, Gaza, Iran, Lebanon, murderers and killers rob from others and and Sudan. That similar developments in certainly we’re not going to let them rob from Afghanistan contravene Canada’s national Canada.” (General Rick Hillier, Chief of interest is a simple understatement. To be sure, a Defence Staff, Canadian Forces, 2005)16 renewed Taliban foothold in Afghanistan would be devastating to the people of Afghanistan too, Canada’s continued and enhanced involvement though such a concern is a related, albeit in Afghanistan is a reaction to the global events secondary, interest to Canadian involvement in the region.
15B. Raman, “Kashmir and the Pro-bin Laden Terrorist Infrastructure in Pakistan”, South Asia Analysis Group, Last spring, Jim Judd, the head of the Canadian Paper No. 477, (June 17, 2002) Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada’s
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is now probable.”17 Canada’s entrenched when it turns into widespread concern that things presence in Afghanistan and the continued are simply not getting better that brings with it an contribution of our military personnel to fighting important victory for terrorist groups. Behind insurgent groups in the country is assisting in every policy reversal is political doubt borne of securing these principal Canadian interests. frustration.
Second, the nature of the violence utilized by To be sure, al Qaeda and its associates are well insurgents against NATO forces in Afghanistan, aware of this fact and indeed hope to catalyze the especially suicide bombings process of Western political and the use of hidden despair in Afghanistan as they improvised explosive devices al Qaeda has have nurtured in Iraq. We (IEDs), is a hallmark of the should remain aware of this lessons history has bestowed threatened Canada strategy and respond on al Qaeda: concentrated accordingly, with reinvigorated violence can provide, over specifically and and staunch support for Hamid the long- and short-term repeatedly, with Karzai’s Afghan government period, marked policy and the fledgling democratic reversals in Western states. terrorism process that is now an Afghan Insurgent attacks against reality. We must do so both Afghans, especially the diplomatically and militarily. targeted killing of women, Turning the tide against global teachers, government officials, and aid workers, jihad begins in Afghanistan with an important is a second strategy, likely adopted from the Iraq lesson of our own: a victory on the battlefield conflict, meant to foster domestic chaos and fear will frustrate the insurgency’s own desire to by driving out the forces that assist in developing continue its campaign of terror. an Afghan middle class. This tactic attempts to diminish Afghan development (which it has) Third, al Qaeda has threatened Canada while simultaneously impacting the political will specifically and repeatedly, with terrorism. of Western governments to continue in the Canada is, by virtue of its economic reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan. development, European historical and cultural descent, inclusive and secular political system, Consider the frustration expressed by Sgt. diplomatic and economic alliances, territorial Christopher Murdy of the Canadian Forces proximity to the United States, and close following a suicide attack on his convoy in diplomatic associations with the United Kingdom September 2006: “I just feel like this is not a and continental Europe, considered a legitimate stand-up fight. They won’t fight out in the target by al Qaeda and its fundamentalist allies. open.”18 Indeed, it is this frustration, especially In 2002, Canada was listed as an al Qaeda target, along with the UK, France, Italy, Germany, and 17 Jim Judd, quoted from, Canadian Broadcasting Australia, in a videotape attributed to bin Corporation (CBC), “Attack in Canada ‘now probable’: Laden.19 Canadian citizens were again targeted CSIS Report”, May 10, 2006,
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in 2004, in an 11-page al-Qaeda terrorist manual, like Afghanistan, take time to heal. It is certain listed fifth in priority below Americans, Britons, that a long and dizzying road lies ahead for Spaniards, and Australians. That citizens of each Canadian and NATO reconstruction teams. Yet of these Canadian allies have since died at the a failure to entrench our gains is a sure invitation hands of al Qaeda should be more than to the Taliban and al Qaeda to recoup their losses worrisome to all Canadian citizens.20 in the region.
And in the fall of 2006, Canada was marked for That Canada continues to fight in Afghanistan in attack on two separate occasions, first by bin order to assist in the reconstruction of the Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who country’s political, social, and economic systems referred to Canada as a “second-rate crusader”, is, to be sure, a noble and just endeavour. That and then later in an al Qaeda document which Canada does so in order to safeguard our shared stated, “[Canada] will either be forced to national security and common interest is of withdraw their forces in the fire [of South principal and unwavering concern. Afghanistan] or face an operation similar to New York, Madrid, London and their sisters.”21 That bin Laden and al Qaeda have proven their Alex S. Wilner, AIMS Security and Defence Policy Intern, willingness to follow through with their many is a Doctoral Candidate of Political Science at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, and a Doctoral Fellow threats against our allies should not be taken for with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at the granted by Canadians. We are at war and should university. He completed his Masters degree at Dalhousie expect to be engaged by our enemy. and his Bachelor's degree at McGill University.
And so Canada continues to fight alongside her NATO and Afghan allies in a maelstrom of Taliban and al Qaeda activity. We continue to absorb combat deaths and remain steadfast in sending our brave men and women serving with the Canadian Forces and diplomatic corps into uncertain battle.
That our mission of reconstruction and rehabilitation is a difficult, and as-of-yet uncertain one, is not in question. Fallen states,
2002,
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