Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: IDN30273 Country: Date: 6 July 2006

Keywords: IDN30273 – Indonesia – – Nurdin Mohammed Top – State protection – Internal relocation

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions 1. Please provide information about Nurdin’s group. Is it limited to Bali? 2. Please provide information as to whether the authorities protect the citizens of Bali/Indonesia. 3. Are there regions other than Bali within Indonesia to which a Hindu could relocate? 4. Any other relevant information.

RESPONSE

1. Please provide information about Nurdin’s group. Is it limited to Bali?

Networks associated with Noordin Mohammed Top are widely considered to be responsible for the October 2002 Bali suicide/ attacks, the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in , the September 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and the October 2005 triple suicide bomb attacks in Bali. An extensive report on Noordin’s networks was recently completed by the International Crisis Group (ICG) and, according to this report, the persons involved in Noordin’s activities have, for the most part, been based in (p.16) (the vicinity of Solo, in Central Java, has been of particular importance). The report also makes mention of Noordin affiliates operating out of numerous localities across Indonesia, including, for example, , Semarang, Ungaran, Pasaruan, Pekalongan and Bangil, in Java; Bukittinggi, , and , in ; and in the areas of , Poso and Ambon (and also, beyond Indonesia, the and ). The persons involved in the aforementioned attacks have principally been drawn from the (JI) organisation but have also involved, in more recent times, persons from related organisations such as Darul and Kompak, with whom Noordin has either established a connection or who he has drawn into his own autonomous organisation, “al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago” (sometimes referred to as “the working group for the Malay archipelago of Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad, the formal name of al-Qaeda”) (pp.i, 1-2). Indonesian police have been conducting a major campaign against Noordin’s networks and this has resulted in the killing of a number of suspected members and the capture of others in raids across Java. The ICG now believe that “[t]he Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin” himself (p.i). According to this report: “Noordin [recently] eluded capture in Semarang. He has since been traced to Solo; Rengasdengklok and Krawang, ; Surabaya; and Wonosobo, Central Java” (p.18). Extracts from the report follow below.

The Indonesian police are closing in on Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist. In a dramatic pre-dawn raid on 29 April 2006 in Wonosobo, Central Java, they shot and killed two members of his inner circle and arrested two others. If and when they capture Noordin, they will have put the person most determined to attack Western targets out of commission.

…For four years Noordin has tapped into jihadist networks to build a following of diehard loyalists, and those same networks may be available to others. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region’s largest jihadist organisation, continues to provide the hard core of that following: the two killed in the Wonosobo raid were longstanding JI members, as was at least one of those arrested. But beginning in 2004, Noordin began reaching out to young men from other organisations and some with no previous organisational affiliation.

Many JI members reportedly see the group he has cobbled together – he grandly calls it al- Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago – as a deviant splinter that has done great harm to the organisation they joined in the mid-1990s. Noordin, however, reportedly sees himself as leading JI’s military wing, even though he answers to no one. He justifies his actions by citing jihadist doctrine that under emergency conditions – for example if surrounded by the enemy – a group of two or three or even a single individual can take on the enemy without instructions from an imam.

…For the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta in August 2003, he used a small circle of Sumatra-based JI members who had either been associated with a JI school in Malaysia, Lukman al-Hakiem, or with its prototype, the al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school in Ngruki, near Solo, Central Java.

For the Australian embassy bombing in September 2004, he relied on three networks: the division of JI; alumni of JI schools in Central Java; and a West Javabased faction of an old insurgency, , whose members supplied the key operatives. While individuals from that Ring faction had worked with JI before, military operations had never before been outsourced in this way. It was one indication that Noordin was working on his own.

After the embassy bombing, Noordin was short of funds, weapons and experienced fighters. He turned to two men who had access to all these, neither of whom was JI. One was from a different Darul Islam faction with long experience in the Philippines; the other had been head of the Ambon office of the Islamic charity KOMPAK and could mobilise veterans of Indonesian communal conflicts. Intense negotiations followed with couriers used to relay messages between the bosses. It turned out that neither the Darul Islam nor the KOMPAK leader was interested in joining forces but both were arrested in mid-2005 and began to lose control over their followers, some of whom went over to Noordin.

For the second Bali bombing in October 2005, Noordin relied on his inner circle, including the two who were killed on 29 April, to find and train new members. Recruitment appeared to be rather ad hoc, despite written materials attributed to Noordin suggesting a tightly organised cell structure designed to undertake military operations. Noordin has shown remarkable determination and capacity to plan operations even as he loses his closest colleagues to police dragnets and remains the target of Indonesia’s biggest ever manhunt. It is not clear who among potential successors could do as well.

But his behaviour following Bali II suggests he is running short of money and experienced cadres. The loss on 29 April of the men who served as both couriers and recruiters has to be a significant blow. The Wonosobo raid was a triumph for the police, and Noordin’s arrest will be an even greater one. But the networks he drew on will survive as a potential source of recruits for future operations (International Crisis Group 2006, in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report no.114, 5 May, p. i http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/114_terrorism_in_indonesia_no ordin_s_networks.pdf – Accessed 5 May 2006 – Attachment 1).

The ICG does not refer to Bali as an area in which persons associated with Noordin reside or are based though it is obviously a of operations for Noordin in terms of bombing attacks. According to the ICG, the staging area for the October was East Java and Noordin himself was in Samarang (p.18). Following the attacks Indonesian police arrested a number of persons in these areas in connection with the bombings.

As plans for Bali II advanced, Noordin conducted training on the second floor of the “Selera” restaurant in Semarang for the three suicide bombers and Anif Solchanudin.69 Anif was originally to have been a fourth “bridegroom” – the code word for suicide bomber – but he was an Ambon veteran, and Azhari reportedly decided he was needed to train others.

On 1 October, Salik Firdaus, Misro, and Aip Hidayat strolled into three cafes in Bali and blew themselves up, killing another twenty in the process. From a base in East Java, Azhari seems to have supervised construction of the bombing backpacks, while Noordin stayed in Semarang.

Over the next few weeks, Subur led a short military training course for five members of the group on the slopes of Mount Unggaran, just south of Semarang; all of the participants paid their own way.

On 9 November, police arrested Cholily in Semarang as he was bringing an Azhari-made bomb from for Noordin via Tedi, a member of the Semarang group who is still at large. From Cholily police learned of Azhari’s hideout in Batu, Malang, and immediately surrounded it. During the ensuing gunbattle, Azhari was killed; Arman blew himself up (International Crisis Group 2006, : Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report no.114, 5 May, p.18 http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/114_terrorism_in_indonesia_no ordin_s_networks.pdf – Accessed 5 May 2006 – Attachment 1).

In the aftermath of the October 2005 bombings it was argued by a number of commentators, including the ICG’s Sidney Jones and B.Raman of the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), that Bali had again been selected by Noordin for attack because of the abundance of western tourists and because of the scarcity of in this predominantly Hindu region. Both analysts have argued that western tourists were the targets and that Balinese were seen by the attackers as being more acceptable as incidental casualties than the Javanese Muslims who had died as a consequence of bombings in Jakarta. Relevant extracts follow on the views of Sidney Jones and B.Raman in this regard:

The view of the ICG’s Sidney Jones: The bombers may have returned to predominantly Hindu Bali because they can maximise damage to foreign victims while minimising harm to Muslims, says Sidney Jones, an expert on Muslim extremism at the International Crisis Group, an international think-tank (Kearney, M. 2005, ‘Bali a soft target, experts say’, Aljazeera.Net (English language) website, 3 October http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/7A4027DD-1AEB-49A1-BA07-3F180D8667FB.htm – Accessed 5 July 2006 – Attachment 2).

…Dr Jones agrees with the Prime Minister’s view that Australians were probably not specifically targeted in the latest attack.

“I think probably the reason that Bali was chosen this time round again is because after the last two bombings in Jakarta, it was mostly Indonesian Muslims that died and at least in Bali you have a chance of getting a few foreigners,” she said.

“I doubt very much whether they had the intention of going after Australians per se” (‘Expert says PM’s wrong on Bali motivation’ 2005, ABC News Online, 4 October http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1473775.htm – Accessed 5 July 2006 – Attachment 3).

The view of SAAG’s B. Raman: 7. Amongst the questions which come to mind are: Why Bali a second time? Were the explosions deliberately timed to almost coincide with the Hindu and Muslim religious occasions? Why suicide terrorism? Who were the real targets – foreign tourists in general or the Australian tourists in particular? Did the explosions also reflect any anger against the present Indonesian Government?

8. One of the possible reasons for choosing Bali a second time figuring in some analyses is the fact that being a predominantly Hindu island , the possibility of collateral Muslim casualties would be less. While this reason is plausible, it cannot be the over-riding factor, which influenced the decision of the jihadi terrorists to organise another strike in Bali. More likely reasons are the availability of more soft targets in the island, the greater international attention which a successful strike in Bali would bring the terrorists in view of the congregation of a large number of tourists from different countries there, and either the easy availability of explosive materials locally or the greater possibility of smuggling explosive material into the island undetected by the police.

9. There is as yet no reasons to believe that the explosions were deliberately timed to coincide with the Hindu religious festival. The JI and other jihadi terrorist groups in Indonesia have so far shown no sign of anger against the Hindus, though there is considerable anger against the Christians, who are seen as their enemy and as the pawns of the West. However, the LET, which has been playing an increasingly global role and on which the Al Qaeda is coming to depend for the recruitment of Pakistani and other non-Arab volunteers for suicide missions, is a strongly anti-Hindu organisation. When it came into being in in the 1980s, one of its objectives was to rid Islam in the Indian sub-continent of what it portrays as the corrupting influence of . In the madrasas controlled by it in Pakistan, in one of which in Karachi the brother of Hambali, the former operational chief of the JI, and a dozen other and Malaysians were caught studying by the Pakistani authorities and deported, one of the subjects taught is the importance of the Arabisation of Islam in Indonesia by ridding it of the lingering influence of Hinduism. The LET projects the Hindus of Bali as a corrupting influence on the Muslims of Indonesia and wants the JI to target them. However, the explosions of October 1, 2005, were not directed at the local Hindus (Raman, B. 2005, ‘Jihadi Terrorism in S.E.Asia’, South Asia Analysis Group website, no.1566, 6 October http://www.saag.org/papers16/paper1566.html – Accessed 5 July 2006 – Attachment 4).

Even so, some evidence does exist to indicate that persons affiliated with Noordin’s networks may see Balinese Hindus in a manifestly hostile way. In June 2003 The Morning Herald reported that one of the suspects arrested in connection with the October 2002 bombings had told police that “[t]he alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings”, “”, had “targeted the tourist island because he wanted to take revenge on the island’s mainly Hindu population for the Muslims massacred in ”. The relevant extracts follow:

The alleged mastermind of the Bali bombings targeted the tourist island because he wanted to take revenge on the island’s mainly Hindu population for the Muslims massacred in India, a suspect in the attack has told police.

Hernianto, 26, says in his official police statement that Imam Samudra argued Bali was a perfect site for a terrorist strike.

It was a favourite leisure destination for tourists from the and its allied nations. These countries had mistreated, attacked and humiliated Muslims across the globe. But Bali also had a dominant Hindu population – and Samudra was incensed, the statement said, that Hindus had slaughtered 200 Muslims in sectarian clashes in the Indian state of Gujarat.

Hernianto’s record of interview, set out in the witness list for the Samudra trial, is the first time anti-Hindu feeling has been mentioned as a motivating factor for the bombing of the Sari Club and Paddy’s Irish Pub on October 12 last year in which 202 people, including 88 Australians, died.

…In March last year, six months before the Bali bombings, nearly 300 people were killed in fierce fighting in Gujarat. Described as the worst Hindu-Muslim bloodshed for a decade, the attacks are thought to have started when a train full of Hindus was torched, killing 58 people. More than 200 Muslims were killed in four days of retaliatory clashes.

In one such attack a gang of Hindus locked a Muslim family of eight inside a kerosene- covered jeep and set them alight (Goodsir, D. 2003, ‘Why Bali was chosen: to kill Hindus, claims suspect’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/06/06/1054700383939.html – Accessed 5 July 2006 – Attachment 5).

2. Please provide information as to whether the authorities do protect the citizens of Bali/Indonesia.

As is noted above, commentators and analysts are generally of the opinion that Indonesia’s police have been aggressive and effective in their pursuit of persons associated with Noordin in recent years. Analysis produced by the Security Consulting Intelligence Agency (STRATFOR) has argued that the emergence of Noordin’s network as an entity which is somewhat separate from JI, has been beneficial to the Indonesian authorities in terms of garnering support for its crack down on persons thought to be responsible for the recent bombings.

On Jan. 31, Indonesian authorities announced that investigations were under way to find ties among terrorist organizations al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and a newly formed group – “Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad” – allegedly headed by JI militant Noordin Mohammed Top. Indonesian police recently received information that Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad was operating in the Malay Archipelago, which includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines – the same areas originally covered by JI. Top – known for his alleged involvement in the 2002 Bali resort bombings, attacks against Jakarta’s Marriot Hotel in 2003 and the Australian Embassy in 2004 and the 2005 Bali bombing – is the former partner of suspected JI bomb- maker Azahari bin Husin, whom Indonesian police killed Nov. 9 in the East Java district of Malang. The announcement reinforces earlier assessments that JI is a split organization, and comes at a key time for Jakarta, which is in the process of signing an important security pact with .

In naming the group “Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad,” or “Organization for the Base of Jihad,” Top has intentionally established a clear association with ’s al Qaeda, mimicking early moves by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as he was seeking to establish his credibility in . For Top, this is an attempt to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of international Islamist militants and financiers, particularly after bin Husin’s death.

But it also highlights JI’s failure to fully take root in Indonesia. Initially a domestic movement, JI was co-opted by Ridhwan Isam al-Deen al-Hanbali to take on a more internationalist tone. While its ostensible leader Abu Bakar Bashir was in prison and al- Hanbali was detained in Thailand, JI fractured. The internationalist faction headed by Top and Husin continued its annual operations, and the more Indonesian faction returned to its local focus – with most acts of violence involving smashing bars and other “un-Islamic” locales.

This does not mean militancy in Indonesia has ended; there were militants of Islamist and other bents long before JI’s emergence, and these have not gone away. However, the between JI’s factions shows that the Wahhabist ideology and the internationalism of JI and al Qaeda continue to face recruiting trouble in Indonesia, despite the nation’s massive Muslim population. Indonesian Islam is much different from that which al Qaeda proselytizes.

For Jakarta, the announcement that Top has spun off from JI to form his own regional group offers benefits both in dealing with internal sentiments and in tightening security relations with Australia and other Western nations. Australia has incentive to aid in Top’s capture, as Indonesian police recovered a videotape believed to be from Top in November, which threatened attacks against Australia, the United States, Italy and the .

Furthermore, with Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad being run by an outsider – Top is Malaysian – Jakarta can couch the militant Islamist threat as one of an external force exploiting and damaging Indonesia. Indonesia becomes the victim, as it were, rather than the source of terrorism.

Internally, this will help better sell defense and counterterrorism cooperation with Australia, as the Australian police and security forces would be assisting in going after Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad rather than targeting the local JI, which has much sympathy in the country. Externally, it shows that Indonesia is serious and ready to target the militant problem, rather than walk softly to avoid causing too much internal disruption over action against JI and Bashir (Security Consulting Intelligence Agency 2006, ‘Indonesia: JI Militant Noordin Top’s New Group’, 31 January http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=261600 – Accessed 1 July 2006 – Attachment 6).

It should also be noted that, at the local level in Bali, the task force responsible for tracking down the persons responsible for the bombings has been headed-up by the highly praised Police General Made Mangku Pastika, who is himself Balinese. Nonetheless, in spite of the put in “Bali’s hero” there is also a widespread feeling in Bali that the region is exposed to such attacks, and to other problems, by its lack of independence. General Pastika himself shares this view. In recent times Pastika has involved himself with a Balinese nationalist movement (“Ajeg Bali – or Bali First”) which is seeking special autonomy status for Bali in order to safeguard the region from influences which might compromise the peaceful nature and the unique identity of the region. Extracts follow from an October 2005 report which explores the local police commander’s loyalty to the Balinese identity and also the reactions of local Balinese following the October 2005 bombings and the subsequent arrests.

The recent attacks have reinforced a perception that Westerners are being targeted but the biggest impact has been on the Balinese themselves.

The bombs and drugs appear to have worked as a wake up call to the easy going Balinese, and they are now standing up and demanding to be masters of their own universe.

Helen Vatsikopoulos: The Hindu holy week of is supposed to be a time of joy, a celebration of the triumph of good over evil. But this sacred event has been desecrated yet again. For the second time in three years, the demons of terror have exploded their bombs on this predominantly Hindu island in the world’s most populous Muslim nation. The bombers were Islamic fundamentalists from the neighbouring island of Java. In 2002, they killed 202. This time, it was 20. This deeply spiritual society that thrives on order has been plunged into chaos.

Three years ago, the bombers took out the Sari nightclub and Paddy’s Bar, so-called symbols of western decadence. The Balinese felt sadness, shame, and a spiritual culpability. But when terror returned on October 1, its target was the Jimbaran Beach precinct and Raja’s Restaurant – not exclusively western, favourites of the Balinese and their families. The mood had changed to anger and outrage. Why Bali again? Why couldn’t the authorities protect them? And why are the first bombers still alive?

The anger has spilled onto the streets.

Protester: We have been caught unguarded.

Second protester: This isn’t being caught unguarded. You can’t say we’re unguarded every day.

Third protester: I want brought back to Bali.

Helen Vatsikopoulos: Bali’s prison has become a rallying point. This is where the bombers of Jemaah Islamiah were kept on death row. The angry young men of Bali want them dead. They’ve been moved to Java, but this has not placated the mob. Their very existence has become a rallying point for all things troubling Bali – terror, identity, tourism, drugs. And the latest bombings are a dangerous trigger.

…Helen Vatsikopoulos: Back in the capital, , there’s an extraordinary gathering of Bali’s powerbrokers. The guest of honour, Bali’s hero – the man known the world over for catching the 2002 bombers – Police General Made Mangku Pastika. Now a man under pressure in the middle of a new bombing investigation, nevertheless he finds time to be here to address Bali’s elite. Priests, media tycoons, government officials, businessmen and women, they’ve all come together as supporters of Ajeg Bali – or Bali First – a movement galvanised by the bombings, a rallying cry for Balinese assertiveness. General Pastika may be Indonesia’s most famous policeman, but here he is Balinese first.

I Made Mangku Pastika, Bali Police Chief: If we don’t change we will be annihilated. We cannot just talk, we need action.

Helen Vatsikopoulos: General Pastika knows about surviving. He’s become Asia’s hero in the so-called ‘war on terror’. He’s now determined to save his people, and he has a solution – the creation of a Balinese diaspora, modelled on the Jews. I Made Mangku Pastika: I have an obsession, and it’s related to the Jewish people. The Jewish people are a small group but they are very influential in the world. Even though we are not like them there is a certain quality, and the , not just in Bali, but those living in Jakarta or wherever, even those living overseas, also have that quality.

Helen Vatsikopoulos: It’s a provocative analogy to make for the three million Hindu Balinese surrounded by more than 200 million Muslim Indonesians. Like the Jews, the Balinese, he says, should draw strength from adversity.

I Made Mangku Pastika: We have to be able to take this attack to become our opportunity. We have to make this moment as a sign to wake up, rise up, speak up.

…Helen Vatsikopoulos: If the Islamic fundamentalists intend driving a wedge between the Hindu Balinese and their Muslim rulers, then they may well be succeeding. Anonymous SMS messages have been inciting the Balinese since the bombings, specifically calling for Javanese Muslims to be slaughtered.

…Helen Vatsikopoulos: The spectre of Bali as another Ambon, another , a separatist conflict along religious lines – that’s something even those born to lead will not dare contemplate (Vatsikopoulos, H. 2005, ‘Indonesia: Putting Bali first: Feature on the push for special autonomy in Bali’, ABC Asia Pacific Focus, 29 October – Attachment 7).

3. Are there regions other than Bali within Indonesia to which a Hindu could relocate? 4. Any other relevant information.

The US Department of State’s most recent report on religious freedom in Indonesia makes no mention of there being any serious problems for Hindus living in Indonesia in regions outside Bali. “Hindu minorities (called “Keharingan”)…reside in Central and East , the city of Medan (North Sumatra), South and , and ().” The US Department of State notes that, “[i]n Medan, Muslims and Christians criticized Hindus for cremating their dead”. Further information follows below:

The Indonesian Central Statistic Bureau (BPS) conducts a census every 10 years. The latest data available, from 2000, drew on 201,241,999 survey responses; the BPS estimated that the census missed 4.6 million persons. According to the BPS report, 88.2 percent of the population label themselves Muslim, 5.9 percent Protestant, 3.1 percent Catholic, 1.8 percent Hindu, 0.8 percent Buddhist, and 0.2 percent “other,” including traditional indigenous , other Christian groups, and . The country’s religious composition remains a politically charged issue, and some Christians, Hindus, and members of other minority argue that the census undercounted non-Muslims.

…The Hindu association Parishada Hindu Indonesia (PHDI) estimates that 18 million Hindus live in the country, a figure that far exceeds the government estimate of 3.6 million. Hindus account for almost 90 percent of the population in Bali. has developed various local characteristics that distinguish it from Hinduism as practiced on the Indian subcontinent. Hindu minorities (called “Keharingan”) also reside in Central and East Kalimantan, the city of Medan (North Sumatra), South and Central Sulawesi, and Lombok (West Nusa Tenggara). Some of these Hindus left Bali as part of the Government’s . Hindu groups such as Hare and followers of the Indian spiritual leader Sai Baba also exist, although in small numbers. Some indigenous faiths, including the “Naurus” on Seram Island in Maluku Province, incorporate Hindu beliefs. The Naurus combine Hindu and animist beliefs, and many also have adopted some Protestant principles. The Tamil community in Medan represents another important concentration of Hindus. North Sumatra has a Sikh population of more than 10,000, most residing in Pematang Siantar or Medan. The population is part of the North Sumatra Punjabi community, which is otherwise primarily Hindu. There are seven Sikh gurdwaras (Sikh schools) in North Sumatra. The Government registers Sikhs as “Hindus,” a practice many Sikhs object to but have been unable to change.

…The Ministry of Religious Affairs extends official status to five faiths: Islam, Catholicism, , , and Hinduism. Religious organizations other than the five recognized faiths can register with the Government, but only with the Ministry for Culture and Tourism and only as social organizations. This restricts certain religious activities. Unregistered religious groups cannot rent venues to hold services and must find alternative means to practice their faiths.

…The armed forces provide religious facilities and programs at all major housing complexes for servicemen and servicewomen who practice one of the five officially recognized religions. Organized services and meetings are available for members of each recognized . Although every military housing complex must provide a mosque, a , a Protestant church, and centers or temples for Buddhists and Hindus, smaller compounds rarely offer facilities for all five religions.

The Government requires all adult citizens to carry a National Identity Card (KTP), which identifies, among other things, the holder’s religion. Members of faiths not recognized by the Government generally cannot obtain KTPs unless they incorrectly identify themselves as a member of a recognized religion. During the period covered by this report, some Civil Registry officials rejected applications submitted by members of unrecognized faiths, while others accepted applications but issued KTPs that inaccurately reflected the applicants’ religion. Some animists ended up receiving KTPs that list their religion as Islam. Some Confucians ended up with Buddhist KTPs. Even some Protestants and Catholics ended up receiving KTPs listing them as Muslims. It appears that Civil Registry staff used Islam as the “default” category for many members of unrecognized faiths. Some citizens without a KTP had difficulty finding work. Several nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and religious advocacy groups urged the Government to delete the religion category from KTPs.

Men and women of different religions faced serious obstacles to marrying and officially registering their marriages. Such couples had great difficulty finding a religious official willing to perform an interfaith marriage ceremony, and a religious ceremony is required before a marriage can be registered. As a result, some persons converted, sometimes superficially, in order to marry. Others traveled overseas, where they wed and then registered the marriage at an Indonesian Embassy. In addition, despite being among the officially recognized faiths, Hindus stated that they frequently had to travel long distances to have their marriages registered, because in many rural areas the local government could not or would not perform the registration.

…There are high-ranking Hindu officers in the armed forces.

…In January 2005, at least six Hindu temples in Legian, Tuban, , and Kedoganan, Bali, were reportedly vandalized. The Bali police made two arrests, but the motive for the crimes remained unknown.

…In Medan, Muslims and Christians criticized Hindus for cremating their dead (US Department of State 2005, International Religious Freedom Report for 2005 – Indonesia, 8 November http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51512.htm – Accessed 5 October 2006 – Attachment 12).

In 2001 the University of ’s Thomas Reuter published an anthropological study of Hinduism in Java which concerned itself with the growing number of nominal Muslims who were officially converting to Hinduism. Reuter argues that the “Javanese Hindu movement is part of a wider national phenomenon of Hindu revivalism and expansion”; noting that, the “[p]roblems with estimating rates of conversion aside, it is remarkable that, despite their local minority status, the total number of Hindus in Java now exceeds that of Hindus in Bali. Data collected independently during my preliminary research in eastern Java further suggest that the rate of conversion accelerated dramatically during and after the collapse of former President ’s authoritarian regime in 1998.” The study provides an extensive overview of the nature of Java’s diverse Hindu communities and their connections and discontinuities with the Hindu communities of Bali. Some extracts follow:

My interest in Java is recent and arose inadvertently from nearly a decade of earlier research on the neighbouring island of Bali. The majority of Balinese consider themselves descendants of noble warriors from the Hindu Javanese empire which conquered Bali in the 14th century. A growing number of Balinese are, today, conducting pilgrimages to Hindu temples in Java, most of which have been built in places identified as sacred sites in traditional Balinese texts (often written in the Old ). Balinese have been heavily involved in the construction and maintenance of these new Hindu temples in Java. They further dominate organisations representing Hinduism at a national level. Finally, many Javanese Hindu priests have been trained in Bali.

I had the opportunity to gain a first hand impression of the expansion of Hinduism in Java and of Balinese involvement therein during a field trip in late 1999. Following preliminary ethnographic research in eight different Hindu Javanese communities it became evident that this movement has its own dynamics and rationale, no matter how much it may have been spurred on by Balinese support.

…On an earlier field trip in 1995, I was also able to visit central and southern Kalimantan where a large Hindu movement has grown among the local Ngaju Dayak population. The lead-up to a mass declaration for ‘Hinduism’ on this island was rather different to the Javanese case, in that conversions followed a clear ethnic division. Indigenous Dayak were confronted with a mostly Muslim population of government-sponsored (and predominantly Javanese) migrants and officials and deeply resentful at the dispossession of their land and its natural resources. Compared to their counterparts among Javanese Hindus, many Dayak leaders were also more deeply concerned about Balinese efforts to standardise Hindu ritual practice nationally, fearing a decline of their own unique ‘Hindu ’ traditions and renewed external domination.

…Adding to the concern of Muslim observers, the Javanese Hindu movement is part of a wider national phenomenon of Hindu revivalism and expansion. Situated at the heart of Indonesia, however, the Hindu movement in Java may have the most serious implications yet for the social and political stability of the nation as a whole. In addition, the same mood of apocalyptic fear, utopian expectation and revivalist zeal is shared by many Javanese Muslims. This is made evident in a number of revivalist Islamic movements, whose members also tend to describe the present as an age of moral and social decay.

…Recent incidents of inter- in the Moluccas and Lombok, and the major importance afforded to religious affiliation in Indonesia’s recent parliamentary and 1998 presidential elections, are both indicative of a national trend towards religious polarisation (Ramstedt 1998). Such polarisation has not been characteristic of Javanese society, particularly at a community level, where neighbourhood cooperation and social peace have been valued more highly than religious convictions (Beatty 1999). With nominal Muslims now openly converting to Hinduism this could well change, tearing away at the delicate web of compromises that is the very fabric of Javanese society. On a more positive note, Indonesians of all confessions also share an urgent desire for political reform and genuine democracy, and may still be prepared to cooperate in the struggle to achieve this common aim.

Hindu revivalism in historical and political context

Although many Javanese have retained aspects of their indigenous and Hindu traditions through the centuries of Islamic influence, under the banner of ‘Javanist religion’ (kejawen) or a non-orthodox ‘Javanese Islam’ (abangan, cf. Geertz 1960), no more than a few isolated communities have consistently upheld Hinduism as the primary mark of their public identity. One of these exceptions are the people of the remote Tengger highlands (Hefner 1985, 1990) in the province of eastern Java. The Javanese ‘Hindus’ with whom this paper is concerned, however, are those who had officially declared themselves ‘Muslims’ prior to their recent conversion to Hinduism.

Problems with estimating rates of conversion aside, it is remarkable that, despite their local minority status, the total number of Hindus in Java now exceeds that of Hindus in Bali. Data collected independently during my preliminary research in eastern Java further suggest that the rate of conversion accelerated dramatically during and after the collapse of former President Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998.

In an unpublished report in 1999, the National Indonesian Bureau of Statistics tacitly admits that nearly 100,000 Javanese have officially converted or ‘reconverted’ from Islam to Hinduism over the last two decades. At the same time, the East Javanese branch of the government Hindu organisation PHDI (below) in an annual report claims the ‘Hindu congregation’ (umat hindu) of this province to have grown by 76,000 in this year alone. The figures are not entirely reliable or objective, nor can they adequately reflect the proportions of Java’s new Hindu revival movement, based as they are on the religion stated on people’s identity cards (kartu tanda penduduk or ‘KTP’) or on other measures of formal religious affiliation. According to my own observations, many conversions are informal only, at least for now. In addition, formal figures often do not adequately distinguish between religious conversions and general population growth, given that most government agencies only record people’s religion at birth.

Officially identifying their religion as Hinduism was not a legal possibility for Indonesians until 1962, when it became the fifth state-recognised religion. (2) This recognition was initially sought by Balinese religious organisations and granted for the sake of Bali, where the majority were Hindu. The largest of these organisations, Parisada Hindu Dharma Bali, changed its name to P.H.D. Indonesia (PHDI) in 1964, reflecting subsequent efforts to define Hinduism as a national rather than just a Balinese affair (Ramstedt 1998). In the early seventies, the Toraja people of Sulawesi were the first to realise this opportunity by seeking shelter for their indigenous ancestor religion under the broad umbrella of ‘Hinduism’, followed by the Karo of Sumatra in 1977 and the Ngaju Dayak of Kalimantan in 1980 (Bakker 1995).

…A common feature among new Hindu communities in Java is that they tend to rally around recently built temples (pura) or around archaeological temple sites (candi) that are being reclaimed as places of Hindu worship. One of several new Hindu temples in eastern Java is Pura Mandaragiri Sumeru Agung, located on the slope of Mt Sumeru, Java’s highest mountain. When the temple was completed in July 1992, with the generous aid of wealthy donors from Bali, only a few local families formally confessed to Hinduism. A pilot study in December 1999 revealed that the local Hindu community now has grown to more than 5000 households. Similar mass conversions have occurred in the region around Pura Agung Blambangan, another new temple, built on a site with minor archaeological remnants attributed to the kingdom of Blambangan, the last Hindu polity on Java. A further important site is Pura Loka Moksa Jayabaya (in the village of Menang near ), where the Hindu king and prophet Jayabaya is said to have achieved spiritual l iberation (moksa). A further Hindu movement in the earliest stages of development was observed in the vicinity of the newly completed Pura Pucak Raung (in the eastern Javanese district of Glenmore), which is mentioned in Balinese literature as the place where the Hindu saint Maharishi Markandeya gathered followers for an expedition to Bali, whereby he is said to have brought Hinduism to the island in the fifth century AD. An example of resurgence around major archaeological remains of ancient sites was observed in Trowulan near . The site may be the location of the capital of the legendary Hindu empire Majapahit. A local Hindu movement is struggling to gain control of a newly excavated temple building which they wish to see restored as a site of active Hindu worship. The temple is to be dedicated to , the man attributed with transforming the small Hindu kingdom of Majapahit into an empire. Although there has been a more pronounced history of resistance to Islamisation in east J ava, Hindu communities are also expanding in central Java (Lyon 1980), for example in Klaten, near the ancient Hindu monuments of Prambanan (Reuter, T. 2001, ‘Great expectations: Hindu revival movements in Java’, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, source: Find Articles website, December http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2472/is_3_12/ai_80757462/print – Accessed 5 July 2006 – Attachment 12).

List of Sources Consulted

Government Information & Reports US Department of State website http://www.state.gov International News & Politics ABC News Online http://www.abc.net.au/news/ Aljazeera.Net (English language) website http://english.aljazeera.net Find Articles website http://www.findarticles.com The International Crisis Group (ICG) website http://www.crisisgroup.org The Jamestown Foundation website http://jamestown.org/ South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) website http://www.saag.org The Sydney Morning Herald website http://www.smh.com.au Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/ Online Subscription Services Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO) website http://www.ciaonet.org Security Consulting Intelligence Agency (STRATFOR) website http://www.stratfor.biz/index.php

Databases: FACTIVA (news database) BACIS (DIMA Country Information database) REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database) ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports) RRT Library Catalogue List of Attachments

1. International Crisis Group 2006, Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report no.114, 5 May. (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/indonesia/114_terrorism_in_indo nesia_noordin_s_networks.pdf – Accessed 5 May 2006)

2. Kearney, M. 2005, ‘Bali a soft target, experts say’, Aljazeera.Net (English language) website, 3 October. (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/7A4027DD-1AEB-49A1- BA07-3F180D8667FB.htm – Accessed 5 July 2006)

3. ‘Expert says PM’s wrong on Bali motivation’ 2005, ABC News Online, 4 October. (http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1473775.htm – Accessed 5 July 2006)

4. Raman, B. 2005, ‘Jihadi Terrorism in S.E.Asia’, South Asia Analysis Group website, no.1566, 6 October. (http://www.saag.org/papers16/paper1566.html – Accessed 5 July 2006)

5. Goodsir, D. 2003, ‘Why Bali was chosen: to kill Hindus, claims suspect’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June. (http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/06/06/1054700383939.html – Accessed 5 July 2006)

6. Security Consulting Intelligence Agency 2006, ‘Indonesia: JI Militant Noordin Top’s New Group’, 31 January. (http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=261600 – Accessed 1 July 2006)

7. Vatsikopoulos, H. 2005, ‘Indonesia: Putting Bali first: Feature on the push for special autonomy in Bali’, ABC Asia Pacific Focus, 29 October.

8. US Department of State 2005, International Religious Freedom Report for 2005 – Indonesia, 8 November. (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51512.htm – Accessed 5 October 2006)

9. Reuter, T. 2001, ‘Great expectations: Hindu revival movements in Java’, The Australian Journal of Anthropology, source: Find Articles website, December. (http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2472/is_3_12/ai_80757462/print – Accessed 5 July 2006)