Slamming the Door in Bucharest: Soviet Steps in Imposing the Groza Government March 1St to 6Th, 1945

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Slamming the Door in Bucharest: Soviet Steps in Imposing the Groza Government March 1St to 6Th, 1945 ANALELE BANATULUI, S.N., ARHEOLOGIE ISTORIE, XXII, 2014 http://muzeulbanatului.ro/mbt/istorie/publicatii/ab.htm SLAMMING THE DOOR IN BUCHAREST: SOVIET STEPS IN IMPOSING THE GROZA GOVERNMENT MARCH 1ST TO 6TH, 1945 Marian-Alin Dudoi* Keywords: Soviet Union, Romania (Roumania, Rumania), Communism, dictatorship, political regime Cuvinte cheie: Uniunea Sovietică, România, Comunism, dictatură, regim politic Abstract e paper focuses on the evolution of Romanian political turmoil during the timeframe 1 – 6 March 1945 in the light of new information from British documents that provides a comprehensive analysis. As occupying Soviets required the dismissal of the Rădescu Government, King Michael had to accept. e Romanian King and the democratic/historical parties hoped to form a national union Government, excluding as before Antonescu’s collaborators and Legionaries, based on the percentage held by each party in the Rădescu Government. With Soviet help, Petru Groza, one of the leading members of the National Democratic Front, dominated by Communists, was nominated Prime Minister by the King. Groza o erred only a minimal participation to the historical parties, which rejected the proposal argumenting they were representing the political majority of the Romanian people. Warned by the Soviets, King Michael had to accept the installment of the Groza Government. e new Government informally represented the rst Communist Government of Romania. Introduction Government.1 e phase of the real coalition con- sisted in three Cabinets: two of Prime-Minister he imminent end of the Second World General Constantin Sănătescu (August 23rd- War determined Joseph Stalin, the Soviet November 3rd, 1944 and November 4th- December dictator,T to make steps in imposing Communist 5th, 1944) and the last of General Nicolae Rădescu regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. e (December 6th, 1944 – March 6th, 1945). Rădescu installment of the loyal Communist Governments resigned on February 28th, 1945 and remained in in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania became the rst o ce until March 6th, 1945, when he was granted major issues of the three Big Allies (the United sanctuary within British Legation in Bucharest).2 States and the United Kingdom, on one side, and e National Democratic Front (hereaf- the Soviet Union, on the other). ese frictions, ter NDF), political coalition dominated by determined by ideological di erences, would not Communists, organized the demonstration on the be tempered and would later degenerate into the 24th February 1945 in order to create the turmoil Cold War. politically required to overthrow the Rădescu 6th March 1945 represents a key moment in Government. Benetting from the occupation of Romanian history when, according to Hugh Romania, Andrey Januarevich Vyshinski, Deputy Seton-Watson’s theory from 1951, the second step People’s Commissar for Foreign A airs, threatened of a Soviet plan to communize an Eastern Europe King Michael to revoke Rădescu, the latter being country began: the fake coalition government was installed to replace the real coalition then in power, 1 Cfr. Jean François Soulet, Istoria Europei de est de la al and would be later followed by a truly Communist Doilea Război Mondial până în prezent, Translation by Marius Roman, Iași, Editura Polirom (2008), 52. * Ph.D., the School Grades I–VIII Segarcea (Dolj County, 2 See details to Marian-Alin Dudoi, „Acordarea azilului Romania), Unirii 35 Street, e-mail: marianalindudoi@yahoo. pentru Generalul Rădescu la Legaţia Britanică,” Analele com. Universităţii din Craiova. Istorie 1(17)/(2010), 233 – 240. 435 ANALELE BANATULUI, S.N., ARHEOLOGIE ISTORIE, XXII, 2014 falsely accused by Soviets and NDF of “Fascism” Under Soviet pressure, Prince Ştirbey failed and murders; the Romanian King had to accept. to form the Government and Petru Groza is As Vyshinski’s four meetings on 26th, 27th and 28th nominated Prime-Minister February and 1st March with the King are known Despite Vyshinski’s interferences, Maniu and since Vişoianu’s letters from 1949 to Warren Brătianu agreed to support General Rădescu Austin, the U.S. Permanent Representative at the fearing a Communist regime would be imposed.7 United Nations, we would not insist on them.3 eir attitude marked the beginning of a erceless After the audience to King on 28th February, opposition to the Communism which later caused 15,30 hours, the furious Vyshinski left the room them to be prosecuted and to die in prison. “slamming the door with such force that the plaster However, on February 28th, 17,30 hours, around it cracked”.4 General Rădescu, as required by King Michael, e Allied Control Commission for Romania had to resign from his o ce. At 22.00 hours, (hereinafter ACC), headed by the Soviet High King Michael o ered the o ce to Prince Ştirbey, Command of Romania, supervised that Romania who accepted the nomination; the prince was should respect the Convention of Armistice. proposed to Michael by Dinu Brătianu. Ştirbey Marshal Rodion Malinovski had been appointed stated that the policy of his Government would the Chairman of ACC. Because he was normally be based on the Declaration on Liberated front commander, Lieutenant General Vladislav Europe, issued at Yalta, and on preserving order. Petrovitch Vinogradov, Deputy Chairman, had e new Government would respect the same been in charge with ACC activity; on February proportion for political parties; Maniu decided 28th 1945, Colonel-General Ivan Zaharovitch his party should receive the same number of Susaikov replaced Vinogradov. e British and the ministers; if not, the National Peasant Party Americans were only formal members of ACC.5 would withdraw.8 In Bucharest, Romanian sol- British documents provide a clear insight into the diers were disarmed by Soviets, the Soviets took Romanian political turmoil, as the British and the control over the Romanian anti-aircraft batter- United States Government disagreed with Soviet ies, the army headquarters were occupied on the interferences and protested on the matter not only midnight of February 28th – March 1st and the in Bucharest, but also in Moscow.6 Romanian police force had to be decreased by nd 9 3 Mircea Ciobanu, Convorbiri cu Mihai I al României. 50 percent until March 2 . No vehicle could (București: Editura Humanitas, 1991), Vișoianu’s letter leave Bucharest as the Soviets controlled all of 25.11.1949 to Warren Austin and His Excellency Mr. points of access.10 On March 1st, Soviet censor- A. Y. Vyshinski’s audiences of 27.02, 28.02, and 1.03.1945 ship modied the announcement of the Royal to the King, 232 – 233 and 238 – 243 (in Romanian); Ion Decree concerning the nomination of Prince Calafeteanu, “Audienţele lui Vîșinschi la rege”, Magazin istoric XXXIV, no. 3 (396)/2000: 9 – 14 (in Romanian); Id., Ştirbey, from a Government of “the representa- Politică și exil. Din istoria exilului românesc, 1946 – 1950 tives of all democratic parties” to a Government (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2000), doc. 57, Vișoianu’s letter of 13.12.1949 to Warren Austin, 241 – 248 (in English). 7 Marjoribanks’ telegram no. 200 of 28.02.1945 to Foreign 4 Ibid., 246. O ce, e Microches of Great Britain, Public Record 5 e British Military Representative was Air Vice Marshal O ce, Foreign O ce (hereinafter PRO FO) 371/48537. Donald F. Stevenson, the British Foreign O ce Representative 8 Marjoribanks’ telegram no. 207 of 1.03.1945 to Foreign John Le Rougetel (temporarily out of Romania and replaced O ce, Ibid.; See also Misiunile lui A.I. Vâșinski în România by the Acting Political Representative John Marjoribanks), (Din istoria relaţiilor româno-Sovietice, 1944 – 1946). the United States Military Representative Brigadier General Documente secrete, Colegiul de redacţie al ediţiei române: Radu Cortlandt Van Rensselaer Schuyler and the State Department Ciuceanu (responsabil), Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu și Representative Burton Y. Berry – See also Marian-Alin Dudoi, Vitalie Văratec, (București, 1997), doc. no. 41, Vyshinski’s “Situaţia economică din România re ectată de un document telegram to Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People’s britanic (septembrie 1945),” Historica. Revistă de cultură Commissar for Foreign A airs, of 28.02.1945, 134. istorică și pedagogică, Editată de liala Dolj a Societăţii de Liviu Marian Nicola, “Lovitura de stat“, in 6 Martie 1945. Știinţe Istorice din România, 1 (12 – 13)/2009 – 2010: 59 – 60. Aservirea (Munchen: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1983), 24. For Stevenson’s activity, see Marian-Alin Dudoi, e activity 9 Marjoribanks’ telegram no. 210 of 1.03.1945 to Foreign of Air Vice Marshal Donald F. Stevenson, Head of the O ce, PRO FO 371/48537. British Military Mission in Romania (1944 – 1945), Analele Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944 – 1947, Edited Banatului, S.N., Arheologie-Istorie, XX, 2012, 355 – 360. by Cornelia Bodea (Iaşi- Oxford-Portland: e Center for 6 See the Great Britain and the United States Governments Romanian Studies, 2000), 93. disagreement with Soviet interferences on February and 10 Constantin Hlihor, “Rolul armatei sovietice de ocupaţie March 1945 in Liliana Saiu, e Great Powers and Rumania, în schimbarea regimului politic din Romania,” in 6 Martie 1944 – 1946. A Study of the early Cold War Era (New York/ 1945. Începuturile comunizării Romaniei, Bucureşti, Editura Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992), 93 – 104. Enciclopedică (1995), 21. 436 of “the representatives of certain democratic Marjoribanks sought advice in London in parties” – unpublished in the press but broadcast the case of King Michael as the only solutions at Radio Bucharest upon Romanians’ insistence, remained referred to the acceptance of Vyshinski’s still without the knowledge of the Palace –, while demand – the King announcing Marjoribanks Communist Anna Pauker proposed to Romanian he was not going to act without consulting the Communists the formation of a Government ree Powers – or the abdication.16 Eden, British without consulting the King.11 Pauker’s proposal Foreign Secretary, proposed King Michael not clearly indicated the Soviet decision to impose a to abdicate or to badly upset the Soviets (“not to loyal Government.
Recommended publications
  • Trials of the War Criminals
    TRIALS OF THE WAR CRIMINALS General Considerations The Fascist regime that ruled Romania between September 14, 1940, and August 23, 1944, was brought to justice in Bucharest in May 1946, and after a short trial, its principal leaders—Ion and Mihai Antonescu and two of their closest assistants—were executed, while others were sentenced to life imprisonment or long terms of detention. At that time, the trial’s verdicts seemed inevitable, as they indeed do today, derived inexorably from the defendants’ decisions and actions. The People’s Tribunals functioned for a short time only. They were disbanded on June 28, 1946,1 although some of the sentences were not pronounced until sometime later. Some 2,700 cases of suspected war criminals were examined by a commission formed of “public prosecutors,”2 but only in about half of the examined cases did the commission find sufficient evidence to prosecute, and only 668 were sentenced, many in absentia.3 There were two tribunals, one in Bucharest and one in Cluj. It is worth mentioning that the Bucharest tribunal sentenced only 187 people.4 The rest were sentenced by the tribunal in Cluj. One must also note that, in general, harsher sentences were pronounced by the Cluj tribunal (set up on June 22, 1 Marcel-Dumitru Ciucă, “Introducere” in Procesul maresalului Antonescu (Bucharest: Saeculum and Europa Nova, 1995-98), vol. 1: p. 33. 2 The public prosecutors were named by communist Minister of Justice Lucret iu Pătrăşcanu and most, if not all of them were loyal party members, some of whom were also Jews.
    [Show full text]
  • Romania Redivivus
    alexander clapp ROMANIA REDIVIVUS nce the badlands of neoliberal Europe, Romania has become its bustling frontier. A post-communist mafia state that was cast to the bottom of the European heap by opinion- makers sixteen years ago is now billed as the success story Oof eu expansion.1 Its growth rate at nearly 6 per cent is the highest on the continent, albeit boosted by fiscal largesse.2 In Bucharest more politicians have been put in jail for corruption over the past decade than have been convicted in the rest of Eastern Europe put together. Romania causes Brussels and Berlin almost none of the headaches inflicted by the Visegrád Group—Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia— which in 1993 declined to accept Romania as a peer and collectively entered the European Union three years before it. Romanians con- sistently rank among the most Europhile people in the Union.3 An anti-eu party has never appeared on a Romanian ballot, much less in the parliament. Scattered political appeals to unsavoury interwar traditions—Legionnairism, Greater Romanianism—attract fewer voters than do far-right movements across most of Western Europe. The two million Magyars of Transylvania, one of Europe’s largest minorities, have become a model for inter-ethnic relations after a time when the park benches of Cluj were gilded in the Romanian tricolore to remind every- one where they were. Indeed, perhaps the aptest symbol of Romania’s place in Europe today is the man who sits in the Presidential Palace of Cotroceni in Bucharest. Klaus Iohannis—a former physics teacher at a high school in Sibiu, once Hermannstadt—is an ethnic German head- ing a state that, a generation ago, was shipping hundreds of thousands of its ‘Saxons’ ‘back’ to Bonn at 4,000–10,000 Deutschmarks a head.
    [Show full text]
  • Corpses, Dead Body Politics and Agency in Human Geography: Following the Corpse of Dr Petru Groza
    Corpses, dead body politics and agency in human geography: following the corpse of Dr Petru Groza This paper follows the mobilities of the dead body of Dr Petru Groza (1884-1958), a significant political figure in post-World War II socialist Romania, to explore the implications for human geography of engaging with the dead. Although there has been a considerable interest in ‘geographies of the body’ and ‘deathscapes’ human geography has had relatively little to say about dead bodies. The paper draws on literatures from death studies, memory studies, history, anthropology, law and dead body politics to develop an interdisciplinary approach to understanding the role of the corpse in society, and argues that human geography should do more to consider how dead bodies contribute to the formation of contemporary geographies. To illustrate these points the analysis first explores how the treatment of Groza’s corpse and the ‘deathwork’ associated with it is an example of ‘dead body politics’. Second, the analysis draws out the agency of the corpse and its role in a variety of ‘deathscapes’. The conclusion considers the implications for human geography of engaging with dead bodies more generally. key words corpses dead body politics mobility agency Death Studies Romania 1 Corpses, dead body politics and agency in human geography: following the corpse of Dr Petru Groza Introduction This paper follows the mobilities of the corpse of Dr. Petru Groza (1884-1958) to explore the implications for human geography of engaging with the dead. Petru Groza lead the first post- War Romanian Communist government, was Prime Minister 1945-52, and titular Head of State 1952-58.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tragicomedy of Romanian Communism
    RESEARCH REPORT T O NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : THE TRAGICOMEDY OF ROMANIAN COMMUNIS M AUTHOR : Vladimir Tismanean u CONTRACTOR : Foreign Policy Researc h Institute PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Vladimir Tismanean u COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 903-0 4 DATE : September, 198 9 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author . a NOTE This report, based on an article to be published i n Eastern EuropeanPolitics andSocieties, is an inciden- tal product of the Council Contract identified on the title page . It is not the Final Report, which wa s distributed in August, 1989 . TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction 1 Stalin's Romanian Disciples 1 1 The Comintern and the RCP 1 6 Stalinism for All Seasons 3 4 The Anti-De-Stalinization Platform 3 9 The Road to Absolute Power 43 The Manipulated Manipulator 47 Assault on the Party Apparatus 5 2 Notes 57 The Tragicomedy of Romanian Communis m Vladimir Tismanean u Un monde sans tyrans serait aussi ennuyeux qu'un jardi n zoologique sans hyenes . E . M . Cioran, Histoire et utopi e Now, despite eternal cabals in the inner clique and unendin g shifts of personnel, with their tremendous accumulation o f hatred, bitterness, and personal resentment, the Leader' s position can remain secure against chaotic palace revolution s not because of his superior gifts, about which the men in hi s intimate surroundings frequently have no great illusions, bu t because of these men's sincere and sensible conviction tha t without him everything would be immediately lost .
    [Show full text]
  • Numerotarea Și Delimitarea Secțiilor De
    MUNICIPIUL ORADEA În conformitate cu prevederile art. 20 alin.5 din Legea nr. 208/2015, se aduce la cunoștința alegătorilor delimitarea și numerotarea secțiilor de votare la alegerile pentru Senat și Camera Deputaților din 06.12.2020 Localitate Număr secţie Sediul secției de votare Nume arteră Numar inceput Numar sfarsit COLEGIUL ECONOMIC ” PARTENIE COSMA ” integral ORADEA 1 Strada Armatei Române (Calea Armatei Române) Strada Alexandru Vaida Voievod (Strada Vadului) ; Nr. 1F Corp A ORADEA 1 Strada Armatei Române (Calea Armatei Române) integral ORADEA 1 Calea Armatei Române integral ORADEA 1 Calea Armatei Roşii integral ORADEA 1 Strada Bacăului integral ORADEA 1 Strada Călimanului integral ORADEA 1 Strada Ceyrat (Strada Toamnei) integral ORADEA 1 Strada Făgăraşului 2 84 ORADEA 1 Strada Făgăraşului 3 7 ORADEA 1 Strada Gen. Leonard Mociulschi (Strada G-ral Leonard Mociulschi) integral ORADEA 1 Strada Islazului integral ORADEA 1 Aleea Lavandei integral ORADEA 1 Strada Mărăşti integral ORADEA 1 Calea Matei Basarab integral ORADEA 1 Strada Mimozei integral ORADEA 1 Strada Moţilor integral ORADEA 1 Aleea Trandafirilor integral Strada Universităţii (Strada Umbrei) str. Universității (fostă Umbrei și fostă Armatei integral ORADEA 1 Române; segmentul cuprins între str. Făgărașului și Ogorului. ORADEA 1 Strada Vadului integral ȘCOALA GIMNAZIALĂ ” LUCREŢIA SUCIU ” ORADEA Calea 1 Mai 1 49 2 Strada Griviţei ; Nr. 2 ORADEA 2 Calea 1 Mai 2 14 ORADEA 2 Strada 12 Octombrie integral ORADEA 2 Strada Avântului (Strada Avîntului) integral ORADEA 2 Strada Avîntului integral ORADEA 2 Calea Clujului 1 77 ORADEA 2 Calea Clujului 2 60 ORADEA 2 Strada Constantin Dobrogeanu Gherea integral ORADEA 2 Strada Griviţei integral ORADEA 2 Calea Mareşal Alexandru Averescu (Calea 1 Mai) 1 49 ORADEA 2 Calea Mareşal Alexandru Averescu (Calea 1 Mai) 2 14 ORADEA 2 Strada Mărţişorului integral ORADEA 2 Strada Râului (Strada Rîului) integral ORADEA 2 Strada Redutei integral ORADEA 2 Strada Rîului integral LICEUL TEHNOLOGIC SANITAR ”VASILE ORADEA Calea Clujului 62 88 3 VOICULESCU” Calea Clujului ; Nr.
    [Show full text]
  • Assimilation, Segregation, Integration: State Control on Minority Policies in Modern Romania (1918-2007)
    W&M ScholarWorks Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 6-2011 Assimilation, Segregation, Integration: State Control on Minority Policies in Modern Romania (1918-2007) Doina Anca Cretu College of William and Mary Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Cretu, Doina Anca, "Assimilation, Segregation, Integration: State Control on Minority Policies in Modern Romania (1918-2007)" (2011). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 436. https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/436 This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Introduction Looking back across Romania‟s twentieth century, Romanian philosopher Emil Cioran once said: "Some countries are blessed with a sort of grace: everything works for them, even their misfortunes and their catastrophes. There are others for whom nothing succeeds and whose very triumphs are but failures. When they try to assert themselves and take a step forward, some external fate intervenes to break their momentum and return them to their starting point."1 Interestingly enough, this particular concept of fate has always been part of socio-political discourse in Romania. Often times the focus shifted towards the benefits of a suprastate, mirrored by what is often called a Romanian inability for decision- making. The idea of the impossibility for Romanians to make their own decisions and determine their own fate has, in fact, become a national cliché as of late.
    [Show full text]
  • Local and Counter-Memories of Socialism in Post-Socialist Romania
    CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by E-space: Manchester Metropolitan University's Research Repository Local and counter-memories of socialism in post-socialist Romania Duncan Light and Craig Young In: Beyen, M. and Deseure, B. (eds) Local Memories in a Nationalizing and Globalizing World, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2015, pp 221-243 INTRODUCTION Any radical political change produces a dramatic reformulation of national history and public memory among both elites and publics and at a variety of scales. The post-socialist states of East-Central Europe (ECE) represent one of the best contemporary examples. In the two decades since overthrowing authoritarian socialist regimes, the countries of this region have struggled with their recent past. Debates around history and memory in the post-socialist period have predominantly focused on World War II, the Holocaust and various inter-War periods of independence. However, at the heart of this issue, and the focus of this chapter, is the tension between remembering and forgetting the socialist era. At the ‘official’ level – the arena of national politics - there is generally little interest in remembering socialism. In some countries there is the possibility of officially recognizing anti-Communist resistance (such as Solidarity in Poland) or the victims of Communism, and in some cases there is recognition of the importance of some Communist figures for the nation (for example, the reburial of Imry Nagy in Hungary in 1989). However, the dominant imperative to demonstrate allegiance to global political and economic orthodoxies (and make a claim for membership of transnational organisations such as NATO or the EU) requires an emphatic repudiation of socialist rule.
    [Show full text]
  • The Supreme Commander of the Army the Department of the Civil Government of Transnistria Ordinance No
    Annex The Supreme Commander of the Army the Department of the Civil Government of Transnistria Ordinance no. 23 We, ION ANTONESCU, Marshal of Romania, Commander-in-Chief of the Army: Through Professor G. ALEXIANU, Civil Governor; With regard to the fact that there is a large jewish population on the territory of Transnistria which has been evacuated from various battle-zones, in order to protect the rear of the front; With regard to the need to organize communal living for this evacuated population; Seeing that this population must find a means of existence on its own account and through labour; By virtue of the full powers accorded by Decree no. 1 of 19 August 1941, issued at Tighina; We command: Article 1 All jews who have come from the battle-front in Transnistria, as well as jews from Transnistria, who for the same reasons were moved into various centres, or those who remain to be moved, are subject to the rules of life established by this present ordinance. Article 2 The Inspectorate of Gendarmes in Transnistria determines the localities where the jews can be housed. The Jews will be housed with regard to the size of their family in the dwellings abandoned by the Russian or jewish refugees. Each family of jews who receive a dwelling will be obliged to tidy it up forthwith and to keep it clean. If there are not enough of these dwellings, the Jews will also be housed in private homes, which will be allocated to them, for which they will pay the determined rent.
    [Show full text]
  • The Communist Authorities' Refusal to Recognize the Roma As a National
    peer-reviewed article 51 The communist authorities’ refusal to recognize the Roma as a national minority by Viorel Achim A moment in the history of the Roma in Romania, 1948 –1949 abstract he Roma in Romania were recognized as a national This paper deals with the moment in 1948–1949, when the represen- minority only in 1990. During the communist regime, tative organization of the Romanian Roma unsuccessfully tried to although they were important in numerical terms,1 obtain for them from the communist authorities the status of a national and in the censuses, they were registered as a separate minority. For the Romanian Communist Party, the Roma represented a ethnicity, the Roma were not among the “coinhabiting nationali- population that had to be brought into its sphere of influence. Discus- ties” (in Romanian, naţionalitate conlocuitoare, the name used in sions on the establishment of the People’s Union of the Roma lasted that era for minorities). The Romanian Communist Party (PCR), for several months but eventually led to the rejection of the request which took over all state power on December 30, 1947, — the day of the Roma leaders. The institutions involved in these discussions when King Mihai was forced to abdicate and the Romanian Peo- created documents, some of which are kept in the archives and allow ple’s Republic (RPR) was proclaimed — established the founda- us to study this moment in time. An archival document of particular tion of its policy towards minorities in 1948. Policies in the field importance for understanding what happened in those years and for changed over the next four decades of communist rule in Roma- understanding the motivations behind the communist authorities’ nia, but the overall lines remained roughly the same.
    [Show full text]
  • Arhive Personale Şi Familiale
    Arhive personale şi familiale Vol. 1 Repertoriu arhivistic 2 ISBN 973-8308-04-6 3 ARHIVELE NAŢIONALE ALE ROMÂNIEI Arhive personale şi familiale Vol. I Repertoriu arhivistic Autor: Filofteia Rînziş Bucureşti 2001 4 • Redactor: Ioana Alexandra Negreanu • Au colaborat: Florica Bucur, Nataşa Popovici, Anuţa Bichir • Indici de arhive, antroponimic, toponimic: Florica Bucur, Nataşa Popovici • Traducere: Margareta Mihaela Chiva • Culegere computerizată: Filofteia Rînziş • Tehnoredactare şi corectură: Nicoleta Borcea, Otilia Biton • Coperta: Filofteia Rînziş • Coperta 1: Alexandru Marghiloman, Alexandra Ghica Ion C. Brătianu, Alexandrina Gr. Cantacuzino • Coperta 4: Constantin Argetoianu, Nicolae Iorga Sinaia, iulie 1931 Cartea a apărut cu sprijinul Ministerului Culturii şi Cultelor 5 CUPRINS Introducere……………………………….7 Résumé …………………………………..24 Lista abrevierilor ……………………….29 Arhive personale şi familiale……………30 Bibliografie…………………………….298 Indice de arhive………………………...304 Indice antroponimic……………………313 Indice toponimic……………………….356 6 INTRODUCERE „…avem marea datorie să dăm şi noi arhivelor noastre întreaga atenţie ce o merită, să adunăm şi să organizăm pentru posteritate toate categoriile de material arhivistic, care pot să lămurească generaţiilor viitoare viaţa actuală a poporului român în toată deplinătatea lui.” Constantin Moisil Prospectarea trecutului istoric al poporului român este o condiţie esenţială pentru siguranţa viitorului politic, economic şi cultural al acestuia. Evoluţia unei societăţi, familii sau persoane va putea fi conturată
    [Show full text]
  • Education in Romania: a Decade of Change. SPONS AGENCY Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 065 419 SO 003 774 AUTHOR Braham, Randolph L. TITLE Education in Romania: A Decade of Change. SPONS AGENCY Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C. REPORT NO DHEW-0E-14161 PUB DATE 72 CONTRACT OEC-0-70-3272 NOTE 155p. EDRS PRICE MF-$0.65 HC-$6.58 DESCRIPTOR'S Adult Education; *Comparative Education; *Educational Administration; *Educational Change; *Educational Development; Educational History; Educational Philosophy; Educational Policy; *Educational Practice; Educational Programs; Elementary Education; Government Role; Higher Education; Preschool Education; Secondary Education; Vocational Education IDENTIFIERS *Romania ABSTRACT This second study of Romanian education reports important reforms that have strengthened the educational system and, moreover, provides a picture of the system at all education levels as of the 1969-70 academic year. Since Communist acquisition of power late in 1947, three major educational reforms have reflected a progressive nationalistic educational trend. The first, in 1947, aligned Romania's Western-oriented educational system with that of the Soviet Union; the second, in 1955, called for reorganization of the schools along polytechnical lines. Revealing a bolder posture toward national independence and also reflecting political aspirations and educational objectives of the regime, the third reform in the 1960's was designed to further Romania's long-range plans for industrialization and technical development and fostered change in general education, higher education, teacher education, and the vocational system. Among the achievements of this latter reform were: 1)the revitalization and modernization of higher education, and alignment of Romania's higher education with the modernization process occurring in the west; 2) extension from 8 to 10 years of free and compulsory education; 3) a rise of enrollment at all levels; and, 4) reorganization of vocational education.
    [Show full text]
  • Romania from Fascism to Communism in the BBCM Reports
    Romania from Fascism to Communism in the BBCM Reports Dan Stone, Royal Holloway, University of London During the years 1938–1948 Romania went through a series of remarkable changes. From a parliamentary democracy and monarchy to a fascist regime-cum-military dictatorship to a communist satellite of the Soviet Union, Romania was not simply caught between the machinations of the superpowers, as many historians of the country like to put it. Certainly the Romanian decision to ally itself with Nazi Germany — taken before Ion Antonescu came to power — was made out of fear that this represented the only chance of retaining some independence and having the possibility of regaining lands ceded to the USSR (Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia) and Hungary (Northern Transylvania) in June and August 1940 respectively. But the fact that the choice was Hitler’s Germany rather than Stalin’s Soviet Union tells something about the country’s political culture: monarchist, nationalist, xenophobic, antisemitic and, despite Bucharest’s interwar cosmopolitanism, by 1938 moving decisively into Germany’s orbit. In short order, the country lost a third of its territory, following which King Carol II, under German pressure, was forced to offer dictatorial powers to General Antonescu and then to abdicate in favour of his son Mihai. At first Antonescu shared power with the Iron Guard, with the Guard’s leader, Horia Sima, appointed Deputy Prime Minister when the ‘National Legionary State’ was declared on 14 September 1940. After a few chaotic months, characterised by Iron Guard violence, culminating in the Bucharest pogrom of January 1941 in which 120 Jews were murdered, Antonescu dissolved the National Legionary State on 14 February and established a new government which offered less wayward rule, a more stable partnership with Germany, and, in Antonescu’s eyes at least, a stronger likelihood of regaining northern Transylvania.
    [Show full text]