ANALELE BANATULUI, S.N., ARHEOLOGIE ISTORIE, XXII, 2014 http://muzeulbanatului.ro/mbt/istorie/publicatii/ab.htm SLAMMING THE DOOR IN BUCHAREST: SOVIET STEPS IN IMPOSING THE GROZA GOVERNMENT MARCH 1ST TO 6TH, 1945 Marian-Alin Dudoi* Keywords: Soviet Union, Romania (Roumania, Rumania), Communism, dictatorship, political regime Cuvinte cheie: Uniunea Sovietică, România, Comunism, dictatură, regim politic Abstract e paper focuses on the evolution of Romanian political turmoil during the timeframe 1 – 6 March 1945 in the light of new information from British documents that provides a comprehensive analysis. As occupying Soviets required the dismissal of the Rădescu Government, King Michael had to accept. e Romanian King and the democratic/historical parties hoped to form a national union Government, excluding as before Antonescu’s collaborators and Legionaries, based on the percentage held by each party in the Rădescu Government. With Soviet help, Petru Groza, one of the leading members of the National Democratic Front, dominated by Communists, was nominated Prime Minister by the King. Groza o erred only a minimal participation to the historical parties, which rejected the proposal argumenting they were representing the political majority of the Romanian people. Warned by the Soviets, King Michael had to accept the installment of the Groza Government. e new Government informally represented the rst Communist Government of Romania. Introduction Government.1 e phase of the real coalition con- sisted in three Cabinets: two of Prime-Minister he imminent end of the Second World General Constantin Sănătescu (August 23rd- War determined Joseph Stalin, the Soviet November 3rd, 1944 and November 4th- December dictator,T to make steps in imposing Communist 5th, 1944) and the last of General Nicolae Rădescu regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. e (December 6th, 1944 – March 6th, 1945). Rădescu installment of the loyal Communist Governments resigned on February 28th, 1945 and remained in in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania became the rst o ce until March 6th, 1945, when he was granted major issues of the three Big Allies (the United sanctuary within British Legation in Bucharest).2 States and the United Kingdom, on one side, and e National Democratic Front (hereaf- the Soviet Union, on the other). ese frictions, ter NDF), political coalition dominated by determined by ideological di erences, would not Communists, organized the demonstration on the be tempered and would later degenerate into the 24th February 1945 in order to create the turmoil Cold War. politically required to overthrow the Rădescu 6th March 1945 represents a key moment in Government. Benetting from the occupation of Romanian history when, according to Hugh Romania, Andrey Januarevich Vyshinski, Deputy Seton-Watson’s theory from 1951, the second step People’s Commissar for Foreign A airs, threatened of a Soviet plan to communize an Eastern Europe King Michael to revoke Rădescu, the latter being country began: the fake coalition government was installed to replace the real coalition then in power, 1 Cfr. Jean François Soulet, Istoria Europei de est de la al and would be later followed by a truly Communist Doilea Război Mondial până în prezent, Translation by Marius Roman, Iași, Editura Polirom (2008), 52. * Ph.D., the School Grades I–VIII Segarcea (Dolj County, 2 See details to Marian-Alin Dudoi, „Acordarea azilului Romania), Unirii 35 Street, e-mail: marianalindudoi@yahoo. pentru Generalul Rădescu la Legaţia Britanică,” Analele com. Universităţii din Craiova. Istorie 1(17)/(2010), 233 – 240. 435 ANALELE BANATULUI, S.N., ARHEOLOGIE ISTORIE, XXII, 2014 falsely accused by Soviets and NDF of “Fascism” Under Soviet pressure, Prince Ştirbey failed and murders; the Romanian King had to accept. to form the Government and Petru Groza is As Vyshinski’s four meetings on 26th, 27th and 28th nominated Prime-Minister February and 1st March with the King are known Despite Vyshinski’s interferences, Maniu and since Vişoianu’s letters from 1949 to Warren Brătianu agreed to support General Rădescu Austin, the U.S. Permanent Representative at the fearing a Communist regime would be imposed.7 United Nations, we would not insist on them.3 eir attitude marked the beginning of a erceless After the audience to King on 28th February, opposition to the Communism which later caused 15,30 hours, the furious Vyshinski left the room them to be prosecuted and to die in prison. “slamming the door with such force that the plaster However, on February 28th, 17,30 hours, around it cracked”.4 General Rădescu, as required by King Michael, e Allied Control Commission for Romania had to resign from his o ce. At 22.00 hours, (hereinafter ACC), headed by the Soviet High King Michael o ered the o ce to Prince Ştirbey, Command of Romania, supervised that Romania who accepted the nomination; the prince was should respect the Convention of Armistice. proposed to Michael by Dinu Brătianu. Ştirbey Marshal Rodion Malinovski had been appointed stated that the policy of his Government would the Chairman of ACC. Because he was normally be based on the Declaration on Liberated front commander, Lieutenant General Vladislav Europe, issued at Yalta, and on preserving order. Petrovitch Vinogradov, Deputy Chairman, had e new Government would respect the same been in charge with ACC activity; on February proportion for political parties; Maniu decided 28th 1945, Colonel-General Ivan Zaharovitch his party should receive the same number of Susaikov replaced Vinogradov. e British and the ministers; if not, the National Peasant Party Americans were only formal members of ACC.5 would withdraw.8 In Bucharest, Romanian sol- British documents provide a clear insight into the diers were disarmed by Soviets, the Soviets took Romanian political turmoil, as the British and the control over the Romanian anti-aircraft batter- United States Government disagreed with Soviet ies, the army headquarters were occupied on the interferences and protested on the matter not only midnight of February 28th – March 1st and the in Bucharest, but also in Moscow.6 Romanian police force had to be decreased by nd 9 3 Mircea Ciobanu, Convorbiri cu Mihai I al României. 50 percent until March 2 . No vehicle could (București: Editura Humanitas, 1991), Vișoianu’s letter leave Bucharest as the Soviets controlled all of 25.11.1949 to Warren Austin and His Excellency Mr. points of access.10 On March 1st, Soviet censor- A. Y. Vyshinski’s audiences of 27.02, 28.02, and 1.03.1945 ship modied the announcement of the Royal to the King, 232 – 233 and 238 – 243 (in Romanian); Ion Decree concerning the nomination of Prince Calafeteanu, “Audienţele lui Vîșinschi la rege”, Magazin istoric XXXIV, no. 3 (396)/2000: 9 – 14 (in Romanian); Id., Ştirbey, from a Government of “the representa- Politică și exil. Din istoria exilului românesc, 1946 – 1950 tives of all democratic parties” to a Government (București: Editura Enciclopedică, 2000), doc. 57, Vișoianu’s letter of 13.12.1949 to Warren Austin, 241 – 248 (in English). 7 Marjoribanks’ telegram no. 200 of 28.02.1945 to Foreign 4 Ibid., 246. O ce, e Microches of Great Britain, Public Record 5 e British Military Representative was Air Vice Marshal O ce, Foreign O ce (hereinafter PRO FO) 371/48537. Donald F. Stevenson, the British Foreign O ce Representative 8 Marjoribanks’ telegram no. 207 of 1.03.1945 to Foreign John Le Rougetel (temporarily out of Romania and replaced O ce, Ibid.; See also Misiunile lui A.I. Vâșinski în România by the Acting Political Representative John Marjoribanks), (Din istoria relaţiilor româno-Sovietice, 1944 – 1946). the United States Military Representative Brigadier General Documente secrete, Colegiul de redacţie al ediţiei române: Radu Cortlandt Van Rensselaer Schuyler and the State Department Ciuceanu (responsabil), Ioan Chiper, Florin Constantiniu și Representative Burton Y. Berry – See also Marian-Alin Dudoi, Vitalie Văratec, (București, 1997), doc. no. 41, Vyshinski’s “Situaţia economică din România re ectată de un document telegram to Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People’s britanic (septembrie 1945),” Historica. Revistă de cultură Commissar for Foreign A airs, of 28.02.1945, 134. istorică și pedagogică, Editată de liala Dolj a Societăţii de Liviu Marian Nicola, “Lovitura de stat“, in 6 Martie 1945. Știinţe Istorice din România, 1 (12 – 13)/2009 – 2010: 59 – 60. Aservirea (Munchen: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1983), 24. For Stevenson’s activity, see Marian-Alin Dudoi, e activity 9 Marjoribanks’ telegram no. 210 of 1.03.1945 to Foreign of Air Vice Marshal Donald F. Stevenson, Head of the O ce, PRO FO 371/48537. British Military Mission in Romania (1944 – 1945), Analele Burton Y. Berry, Romanian Diaries, 1944 – 1947, Edited Banatului, S.N., Arheologie-Istorie, XX, 2012, 355 – 360. by Cornelia Bodea (Iaşi- Oxford-Portland: e Center for 6 See the Great Britain and the United States Governments Romanian Studies, 2000), 93. disagreement with Soviet interferences on February and 10 Constantin Hlihor, “Rolul armatei sovietice de ocupaţie March 1945 in Liliana Saiu, e Great Powers and Rumania, în schimbarea regimului politic din Romania,” in 6 Martie 1944 – 1946. A Study of the early Cold War Era (New York/ 1945. Începuturile comunizării Romaniei, Bucureşti, Editura Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992), 93 – 104. Enciclopedică (1995), 21. 436 of “the representatives of certain democratic Marjoribanks sought advice in London in parties” – unpublished in the press but broadcast the case of King Michael as the only solutions at Radio Bucharest upon Romanians’ insistence, remained referred to the acceptance of Vyshinski’s still without the knowledge of the Palace –, while demand – the King announcing Marjoribanks Communist Anna Pauker proposed to Romanian he was not going to act without consulting the Communists the formation of a Government ree Powers – or the abdication.16 Eden, British without consulting the King.11 Pauker’s proposal Foreign Secretary, proposed King Michael not clearly indicated the Soviet decision to impose a to abdicate or to badly upset the Soviets (“not to loyal Government.