THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 08 August 1st to 15th 2008

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 One of the most important 5 Total AOG Initiated Attacks per Month - 2008 Northern Region developments in the context (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks) Eastern Region 7 of the conflict in 2007 was the significant deterioration 700 9 Western Region of security along Hwy 1, pri- 600 602 571 marily in the portion between Southern Region 10 500 Ghazni in the south and 463 13 400 ANSO Info Page Farah in the west. 2008 has 318 seen a furthering of this, with 300 301 218 the section of this road im- 200 189 YOU NEED TO KNOW mediately south of Kabul 100 (through Wardak) now facing • Significant deterioration in 0 a similar reality. In addition, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL road security country wide there has also been a deterio- • Consistently high volumes ration in the security along rity forces and logistical NGO vehicles in the of NGO security incidents other important routes, in- cluding the Kabul-Jalalabad convoys illegal checkpoints north as well as the recent • Increasing severity of road. This clearly indicates and abductions. AOG ele- incident in Logar (and NGO related security inci- that the influence, and domi- ments have effectively en- taking ACG activity into dents nance, of security along these sured their freedom of consideration) indicate critical arterials has been an movement while denying that road travel can no • Continued escalation and the same to others; includ- longer be considered a spread of the conflict ongoing AOG operational focus and goal. Through ing the NGO community. routine matter in large regular attacks against secu- Frequent attacks against portions of the country. ANSO is supported by NGO DATA & TRENDS

NGO INCIDENTS PER MONTH - ANNUAL COMPARISON June and July reported record levels of NGO (All incident types as of 13 August 2008)

related security incidents with this month 21 trending similarly. The first 2 weeks of Au- 18 gust alone already account for 15 such incidents. While this may be partially attributed 15 to the general increase and spread of the con- 12 flict country wide, it also serves as clear sup- 9

port to the previous assessment that AOG 6

are now actively targeting NGO activities and 3 staff, a factor that is now part of the opera- 0 tional reality for those working in the devel- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG opment and humanitarian sectors. In addi- 2006 2007 2008 tion, there has also been a concomitant increase in the severity of these incidents, as indicated by the 65% increase in NGO staff fatalities for 2008 in comparison to 2007 (17-for all of 07/23-by 14 August 08). THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 15 25

This Report Period 1 20 The security situation in Surobi is deteriorating, with attacks on the Jalalabad for at least thirty days. 15 Kabul-Jalalabad road becoming During this time NGO should 10 monitor security reports to assess more frequent. During this re- 5 the status of the security situation porting period three fuel tankers 0 were burned in two attacks, and on this route to determine if a JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL heavy fighting between AOG and longer moratorium is necessary. security forces has occurred. A 2nd August RPG attack on an AOG ACG There is every reason to believe INGO medial clinic in the Sare such incidents will continue, as Jegdalek area may signal a spread might be expected with a large city, roughly AOG reportedly now have two in AOG targeting activity in the 90% of provincial crimes recorded by cells operating against the road: Surobi area, and in the wake of ANSO this year were reported from within one to the north of the road based recent events in Logar (see Logar Kabul. In regards to this, there are two no- in Laghman and Kabul attacking assessment), any additional evi- table points: 1) the quality and availability of near Surobi, and one based in dence of this must be taken with reports recording criminal incident levels Nangarhar attempting to operate the requisite gravity. may fluctuate more than AOG reporting levels, thus affecting the trend line and 2) closer to Jalalabad. Given the po- IED attacks are a prominent many of the crimes recorded are relatively tential danger this poses to travel threat, as demonstrated by the small crimes related to property, drugs, and between Kabul and Jalalabad, RCIED attack on the 3rd of Au- personal disputes that pose little direct con- ANSO recommends NGO cease gust on a U.S. coalition vehicle in cern for NGO. That said, there have been road travel between Kabul and Hussein Khel, and an 11 August criminal incidents directly affecting NGO VBIED attack on an ISAF con- which should be considered likely in areas KEY THREATS & CONCERNS voy on Jalalabad Road. with pervasive criminality, a situation that !"Collateral damage from IED Criminal incidents in Kabul city !"Deteriorating security in Surobi will likely continue for the mid to long term. are now on par with AOG attrib- Likely threats include street crime, armed !"Complex/spectacular attacks uted incidents, an anomaly when against high profile targets robberies of residents and offices, and crimi- compared to other districts. As nal abduction.

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 4 This Report Period 0 10 There were very few incidents re- 8 corded during this reporting pe- particularly on the main road, with the most recent incident 6 riod. NGO with combined opera- 4 tions throughout the province occurring on 12 August when a 2 have reported no recent problems, policeman was killed in an IED attack in Ghorband. 0 with the exception of a 31 July JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL burglary of an NGO office in Cha- There is anecdotal reporting that harikar. some communities in Shinwari AOG ACG Collateral damage from IEDs or District are concerned about the reports received suggest no particular trend rockets intended for security nature of some NGO work, find- salient to NGO. However, there are unoffi- forces is a notable threat for ing it incompatible with local cul- cial reports of a notable amount of local NGO. Through the summer, there ture or community wishes. While crime, primarily various manifestations of have been periodic attacks be- this may not pose an immediate extortion. While this is reported to be mostly tween Chaharikar and Bamyan, threat, deteriorating NGO support could presage future security confined to the local business community or problems, and warrants NGO other moneyed groups, an environment of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS monitoring. criminality can affect NGO for their per- !"IED along main routes ceived value as a kidnap or extortion target. There are limited official reports !"Criminality of criminal incidents, and those THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 6 50 40 This Report Period 2 Heavy fighting in eastern Wardak 30 Nirkh, four NGO staff were mis- has made it the most volatile Cen- 20 tral Region province. The threat takenly seized (and later released) 10 to NGO operations in proximity by armed abductors seeking workers from a local road construction 0 to active combat areas was evi- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL denced earlier this month in May- project. This incident furthers to dan Sharh when an INGO guard highlight the inherent instability AOG ACG was killed by a stray ordinance. that exists along all main routes in While there are indications that the area. NGO should deem Kunar in the ER. Any progress in improv- the Bihsud districts are more se- roads to be covertly monitored by ing the security situation in Wardak, or any cure than the restive eastern dis- AOG and in conjunction to this, one of these provinces individually, will be tricts, it should be noted that the and the abduction threat, should temporary as long as the situation in the bor- area has some AOG presence, count on the possibility of AOG dering provinces remains anything close to and while reporting from the area check points, especially in the late their present states. Currently, there is noth- is limited, fighting in the east afternoon/early evening as such a ing to suggest solutions will arrive in the mid could push AOG west, providing check point was reported last to long term. These factors, taken along a further destabilising factor to week in the Haftasya area of with the inherent instability and volatility this area. Sayadabad. along the province’s main roads, result in Abduction also remains a preva- In addition to the dangers within Wardak being assessed as high-risk for NGO lent risk in Wardak. On the 6th of Wardak itself, the situation in the operations. INGO and local NGO that August on the main road in province needs to be viewed in have, or can be perceived to have, links with the general the context of the either the Afghan government or interna- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS area, particularly in conjunction tional donors should consider a moratorium with Logar and Ghazni. Ghazni in their operations there for a period of 30- !"Ongoing clashes between AOG and security forces (to the immediate south) remains 60 days in order for them to further assess !"Abduction/kidnapping threat a volatile AOG stronghold with the prevailing security situation and allow for !"Overarching area instability AOG incident levels second only a re-evaluation of their security protocols to Kandahar and in line with and procedures.

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 There is active fighting in Kapisa, 15 for NGO operations. mostly in the District of Tagab 10 though Nijarab and Alasay are In Tagab there are conflicting re- also susceptible to clashes. Over- ports of civilian casualties form an 5

all, the entire province should be IMF air-strike, with ISAF claiming 0 considered unstable and high risk no civilian casualties and media JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL and locals reporting up to 30 casu- AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS alties. Regardless of the actual !"Attacks against DC number, rumours of casualties Of a more immediate concern, the incident !"Collateral involvement in air may fuel enmity toward interna- strikes and other military opera- tionals in Tagab and other areas, is indicative of the danger that military options thus increasing support for AOG. erations can pose to civilians and NGO. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 7 30 This Report Period 3 On 13 August four NGO staff (3 female internationals and a local the region it occurred in. Logar 20 driver) were executed in an am- exists within the fertile AOG bush on their vehicle in the Ko- “triangle” of Wardak, Logar, and 10 langar area of Puli Alam District. Ghazni. Wardak, with its heavy fighting, has been the most obvi- 0 As in the abduction and subse- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL quent (assumed) execution of the ously dangerous Central Region international INGO staff member province, and Ghazni is a volatile AOG ACG in Kandahar in January, this inci- AOG stronghold with AOG incident may indicate a “threshold” dent levels second only to Kanda- have indicated a high degree of AOG event which indicates AOG intent har (and in line with Kunar). Any monitoring, as well as direct actions, along to more actively target the hu- progress in the security situation both the main road from Kabul and many manitarian community, though at within Logar will be temporary as of the provincial secondary roads. this time more data and analysis is long as Wardak and Ghazni re- These factors, taken along with the inherent required to support this possibil- main volatile. Currently, there is instability and volatility along the provinces ity. As well, this incident, while nothing to suggest any improve- main roads, results in Logar being assessed significant in itself, also needs to ment is likely in the mid to long as high risk for NGO operations. INGO be taken into context regarding term. and local NGO that have, or can be per- provincial incident trends as well Logar is also known to be highly ceived to have, links with either the Afghan as the general security context of conservative and maintains a con- government or international donors should siderable AOG presence. NGO consider a moratorium in their operations KEY THREATS & CONCERNS have report a heightened uneasi- there for a period of 30-60 days in order for !"Decreasing stability province wide ness among local communities them to further assess the prevailing secu- !"Multiple threats along Hwy 1 regarding the province’s current rity situation and allow for a re-evaluation !"Abduction security situation, and reports of their security protocols and procedures.

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 10 This Report Period 0 Information with which to assess 8 Daykundi’s security situation re- nity. This was evidenced in last 6 month’s kidnapping of INGO mains limited. Information re- 4 staff members over a dispute with ceived indicates that government 2 control is limited and that there local government in Nili. 0 are local commanders who are There are also limited security JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL able to operate with relative impu- forces in the province and most security is imposed by local tribes AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS who are reportedly able to control !"AOG presence in south of prov- much of the AOG movement. north is unknown. Given the absence of ince However, AOG are known to government control and information, NGO !"Limited security presence and move freely on the south and the should factor this into their risk assessment reporting extent of their presence in the for staffing in Daykundi.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN

JAWZJAN Year to Date 5 10

This Report Period 0 8 Local politics and criminality continue to be the main issues in Jaw- which a school was set ablaze. 6 zjan, with both a major robbery NGOs have not been targeted 4 and a political assassination of a during the last few reporting peri- 2 village headman occurring during ods, though this should not be 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL this reporting period. Addition- taken as an indicator that existent ally, there was in an incident in threats have abated and should AOG ACG maintain their interest in the hap- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS penings within the local govern- nor reshuffling, the fallout from which will !"Political infighting ance structures. Many of the re- likely continue for some time. !"Criminal activity cent incidents have been the result of a province-wide district gover-

NGO Incidents BALKH

BALKH Year to Date 8 20 This Report Period 2 The NGO-related incidents for 15 this period in Balkh reflect and the other attack NGO vehicles compliment the pattern of ran- with targeted with small arms fire. 10 dom attacks against NGOs wit- In previous such attacks, the as- 5 nessed across the north. Both sailants have been unknown to the beneficiary community, there- 0 attacks featured assailants on mo- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL torcycles, in one case setting fire fore having no influence over to an NGO vehicle and then them. These types of attacks AOG ACG threatening/admonishing the oc- most commonly occur along the cupants to stop their work, and in main routes; primarily the inter- should review their movement protocols provincial routes. Along with with the understanding that such incidents these attacks, a school was also have become more prevalent and that they KEY THREATS & CONCERNS struck by an RPG. are likely to occur in the future. The Cha- !"Criminal activity While these types of attacks are by harbolak District is where the plurality of !"Attacks on NGO along main such attacks have occurred. routes their nature unpredictable, NGOs THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN

SAMANGAN Year to Date 1 10

This Report Period 0 8 Samangan has been relatively 6 quiet with the exception of com- gateway to the north of the coun- plex attack on a police checkpoint try continues to give rise to the 4 which has been attributed AOGs. concern that AOGs will seek to 2 The location of Samangan as a use it as a staging ground for fur- 0 ther spectacular attacks, but no JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL

KEY THREATS & CONCERNS specific threats have been indi- AOG ACG !"Abduction threat cated at this time.

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 4 This Report Period 2 20

The first weeks of August have 15 seen a dramatic upsurge in AOG NGO-run clinic with the aim of activity. Aside from the usual stealing drugs during this report- 10 threat of suicide and IED attacks ing period. 5 Traditional elites such as elders on IMF, NGOs, and clinics have 0 been threatened with more fre- have been helpful in helping JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL quency, and there has been a ma- NGOs identify threats and point jor increase in attacks on schools. out the rationale behind them, but AOG ACG The school attacks have increased it remains to be seen how much from the usual average of one a latitude or interest they will have AOG upsurge is still unknown, and it cannot month to almost ten for the first to influence the overall situation. be ruled out that the major motivating factor is half of this month. Some NGOs Elders point out that NGOs are not provincial political disputes. Social and have been receiving regular likely to be targeted as a result of political units in Kunduz, as elsewhere in the threats in the form of night letters their perceived association with north, tend to be rather highly structured and as well as verbal threats. Armed the government. therefore even AOGs there may be more an- swerable to political considerations than else- individuals also broke into an The deterioration of the situation where. Hence while it remains to be seen in Kunduz is already encouraging whether the situation will continue to deterio- NGOs to rethink their missions KEY THREATS & CONCERNS rate or the violence will face political limits, and operations procedures and !"Upsurge in AOG activity NGOs should exercise the utmost prudence those NGOs who have not done !"Increased threats against schools with regards to security-related decision mak- so should now consider it. The and clinics ing for the time being. proximate impetus for the recent

NGO Incidents SAR-E-PUL SAR-E-PUL Year to Date 0 10 This Report Period 0 Reporting from Sari Pul indicates 8 limited activity in the province, in Sari Pul District peacefully pro- 6 tested the government’s dismissal although a few events in this re- 4 porting period raise concern over of a local commander. The tar- 2 local support for the GoA. ACGs geting of a government vehicle (with money for education, which 0 stole a significant sum of cash JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL from a District Department of is held in relatively high esteem Education vehicle in Sangcharak according to surveys) is distinct in AOG ACG District and also over 500 people that almost all incidents in Sari Pul this year have been instances of portend a more general trend development for KEY THREATS & CONCERNS petty theft or uncovering of weap- the province or represent the more common ons caches. It remains to be seen aberrations in security reporting previously !"ACG activity however whether these incidents witnessed. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents KHOST KHOST Year to Date 5 40 This Report Period 0 The security situation deteriorated 30 in Khost this period with approxi- were IEDs of which four deto- mately twice (15) as many serious nated killing a total of five civil- 20 incidents reported as last period. ians and one ANA soldier with 10 Nonetheless, this is volume is still the wounding of one other. Roughly half of the reported inci- 0 below those reported last month JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL which accounted for 28 incidents. dents were in Khost district with Nine of the 15 reported incidents the large majority of those in the AOG ACG city itself. The Sabari IED cell remains active with three devices can expect the security situation to remain KEY THREATS & CONCERNS being set to target Afghan security volatile, with NSP projects a likely NGO !"Increased IED in Sabari forces. Intimidation of locals related AOG target. At present it is un- !"Ongoing AOG infiltration continued as illustrated with the known if such attacks will remain limited to !"Attacks against NSP related facili- murder of a judge in Khost and a property damage or will escalate to include ties/projects tribal leader in Tere Zayi. NGOs staff members.

NGO Incidents KUNAR

KUNAR Year to Date 3 80 This Report Period 1 70 Kunar continues to be the scene 60 of high levels of violence with 31 who was taken while returning 50 from a wedding in Kuz Kunar 40 serious security incidents reported 30 st this period. The most notable District on the 1 of August. He 20 incidents were three kidnappings. was taken to Pakistan and ANP 10 0 A local employee of an INGO and locals who pursued the kid- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL was kidnapped by AOG in Wata nappers engaged them in a fire AOG ACG Pur District on the 2nd of August. fight in a failed attempt to rescue As of this report he has not been the Governor. As a result of this released and it’s believed that the engagement, a policeman was success rate. The three IED incidents this motive behind this kidnapping is killed and a local was wounded. period resulted in the deaths of four IMF ransom. Another local, this one The Governor was later reported soldiers, a translator and a driver of a civilian employed by a road construction to have been brought back into construction vehicle. Of note, there was a company, was also taken at the Afghanistan but his exact where- direct attack against an ANP post on the 1st same time, though from a nearby abouts remain unknown at this of August in Asadabad District. Over the village. time. past year Asadabad City has been the target of rockets and of suicide bomb plots, but The third kidnapping was of the The majority of violent incidents has been spared the harassing small arms Governor of Marawara District (19) occurred as usual in Pech District with the majority being and RPG attacks on police posts that are KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ineffectual direct fire attacks on common in other districts. !"Abduction/kidnapping threat security forces. While IEDs con- At present Kunar remains too volatile for !"Ongoing AOG infiltration tinue to be rare in this province, widespread movements of international staff !"Clashes between AOG and secu- with 3 reported this period, unlike and these should be limited to the main rity forces other provinces they occur with a highway and Asadabad City. higher targeting and detonation

NGO Incidents NANGAHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 3 This Report Period 0 35 The security situation in Nan- 30 garhar has remained stable this onstration. 25 20 period. The most notable incident The deteriorating security situa- 15 was the kidnapping of local em- tion in Pakistan has resulted in 10 ployees of an International Devel- negative effects on the safety of 5 opment Organization (involved in NGO local employees who travel 0 road construction) in the Pachir regularly to Peshawar. A number JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL Wagam District on 29 July. They of murders were reported of Af- AOG ACG were subsequently released un- ghan citizens accused by AOG for harmed on the 5th of August. In “spying” and a list of Afghans travel by road to Pakistan and locals should addition to this, there were multi- working for IMF, UN and NGOs limit travel while observing strict security pre- ple IED events as well as a dem- to be targeted is rumoured to ex- cautions. ist, though this remains uncon- Reports of large numbers of AOG in the firmed. Pakistani security forces southern districts have not resulted in an up- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS exert limited control of the surge of attacks on security forces pointing to !"Threat of suicide attack against Torkam-Peshawar Highway and the conclusion that the reports were exagger- GoA targets groups of AOG are known to ated. The rural districts of Nangarhar, how- !"Attacks along Hwy 1 operate freely in the area, some ever, should still be avoided by international !"AOG presence in southern dis- within sight of Pakistani police. staff and local staff should continue to observe tricts International staff should not low profile travel protocols.

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 0 Laghman continues to lead all 15 other provinces in IED incidents this period in conjunction with with 16 devices planted by the reports of heavy AOG traffic 10 transiting through the district, AOG being located and safely 5 defused. The IEDs were evenly leading to the conclusion that AOG freedom of movement here 0 split between Mitharlam, Alishing JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL and Alinghar Districts with the may occur with the complicit majority being planted along roads agreement of local authorities. AOG ACG leading to DAC. Dawlat Shah Serious AOG attempts to disrupt recorded no incidents of any kind traffic on Highway from bases in from Nangarhar into Laghman appear to have eastern Laghman have not yet been successful during this period, though it is KEY THREATS & CONCERNS materialized, with most attacks on unclear what long term affects this may have !"Increased threat of attacks along police and fuel convoys occurring on the overall security of the province. NGO Hwy 1 in the Sorubi District of Kabul are advised to continue limiting their interna- !"IED along roads leading to DAC Province. In addition, IMF inter- tional staff operations to within Mitharlam diction of AOG infiltration routes City.

Combined NGO Incident Types (ACG/AOG as of 13 Aug 08)

Searches 2

Missile/Mortar 2

Arson 7

Armed Robbery 30

IED/Explosives 2

Beatings 2

Threats 17

Abduction 23

Armed Attacks 17

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 1 40 This Report Period 1 The security situation for NGOs 30 and the wounding of a fifth on within Paktya has deteriorated 20 sharply during this reporting pe- the Gardez- Kabul Highway on riod. On 2 August two INGO 13 August in Logar Province, Puli 10 Alam District (see the Logar local employees were kidnapped 0 for ransom by AOG in Jaji Dis- Province report for more details). JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL trict. They were freed safely on When taking into the context of the 7th after the families arranged general road insecurity, it would AOG ACG for their release with intervention appear at present that safe passage of local elders. Much more serious for humanitarian workers along ments) are recommended for international were murders of four INGO staff this route and throughout this staff for movement in and out of Paktya. area is gone. NGOs are advised Security incidents continue at a high level to restrict their international staff KEY THREATS & CONCERNS (25), half of which occurred in Gardez Dis- operations to Gardez City and !"Threat to NGO staff along trict and another six in Zurmat. Gardez City Gardez-Kabul road local staff should observe low remains quiet while the Gardez-Khost road !"Spread of AOG operations to Jaji profile travel measures when continues to be the target of IEDs. and Sayid Karam Districts moving outside city limits. Alter- nate travel options (i.e. air move-

NGO Incidents BADGHIS BADGHIS Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 20

Even though Badghis only had 15 four reported incidents for this attack was on a police check post, month, previous years have never two were the result of personal 10 had more than one incident noted disputes, and the last was an acci- 5 dental weapons discharge. While it during this same period. One 0 is presently assessed that these JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL KEY THREATS & CONCERNS incidents have no direct impact on !"Violence erupting from personal NGO safety and security, the con- AOG ACG disputes tinued maintenance of situational !"Attacks against police installations awareness for insitu NGO staff is recommended.

NGO Incidents HERAT

HERAT Year to Date 8 20 This Report Period 0 As in previous reports, criminal 15 covery of large weapons caches, activity continues to be a major 10 element within the security con- arrests of counterfeiters, and the text of Herat. In recent weeks the kidnapping of four Afghans (staff 5 of the Herat attorney general’s province (and the city itself) has 0 seen multiple robberies, the dis- office). The Shindand District in JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL the south of the province has AOG ACG been directly impacted by the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS volatility of neighboring Farah, and activities in this portion of the province as !"Criminality with an increased AOG presence it is likely that this present insecurity signals !"Abduction/kidnapping there resulting in ongoing clashes the beginning of a long term reality. !"Deterioration of security within with security forces. NGO are Shindad District advised to limit their movements THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents GHOR GHOR Year to Date 1 This Report Period 1 10 Ghor province witnessed its first 8 NGO-related incident in the form overall during this period, with ten 6 of an RPG attack on an NGO incidents reported as opposed to 4 the average of one or two. The clinic. In an unrelated incident, 2 incidents were nearly all AOG in there was also the occurrence of a 0 hand grenade being thrown into a nature (attacks on police check- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL points and district headquarters), local doctor’s residence. Ghor AOG ACG saw an unusual spike in violence with the exception of one that resulted from a dispute between KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Kuchis and villagers. It is unclear nal in an increase in AOG activity and ANSO !"Upsurge in AOG activity at present if this represents an will monitor the situation and advise NGO aberration in reporting or the sig- accordingly.

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 40 On the 25th of July an INGO national staff member (engineer) trol of a different group, though 30 travelling in his personal vehicle the affiliation of this group is un- 20 on Kabul-Kandahar main route known at this time. Operations to 10 went missing in the vicinity of secure release remain underway. Hazartak area, Shar-e-Safa district ANSO SR strongly advises the 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL of Zabul province. The where- NGO community to observe and

abouts of this staff member was maintain anti-surveillance/anti- AOG ACG unknown for a period of 9 days, kidnap protocols. In addition, after which the INGO main office staff members should also be was contacted by telephone, con- briefed on how to implement There has been a considerable escalation in firming that the staff member had these protocols as the threat ex- complex attacks on the Kandahar-Kabul main been kidnapped. Though the staff tends beyond their place of em- route during the reporting period. The most member was travelling on per- ployment. NGOs are also advised significant events encompassed a series of sonal business, the ACG responsi- to ensure that all staff are IEDs detonations/recoveries under bridges ble had clear information regard- ‘sterilised’ prior to travel, particu- along Highway 1, though there was also a sig- ing his movements, indicating the larly on Kandahar-Kabul main nificant attack against a PSC convoy in the possibility that he had been under route. While this protocol will Hazartak area of the Shar-e-Safa District. observation prior to the abduc- have the greatest impact on miti- These incidents, coupled with a number of tion. At present, security force gating the threat of opportunistic other serious attacks (that have been under- operations have been underway in abductions/kidnappings (which taken by AOGs against ANP, IMF as well as attempts to free the staff member. generally occur following on site PSC elements during this reporting period) Recent information indicates that identification of a person of inter- highlights the extreme risk to all the high pro- the individual has changed cus- est), it can also limit personal risk file movements along Hwy 1 in this prov- tody, and is now under the con- levels to the individual affected, ince. It is believed that AOG attacks of this particularly in those incidents per- nature will continue at their present pace, or petrated by AOG. This incident increase due to the regularity of their suc- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS also supports previous analysis cess. The scope of AOG activity, which in- !"Abduction/kidnapping threat which indicated that engineers are cludes ambushes, IED, destruction of bridges !"Instability along Hwy 1 a prime target for financially moti- and culverts, as well as abductions and the es- !"Destruction of culverts/bridges vated kidnappings due to their tablishment of illegal checkpoints, makes any perceived value. travel along Hwy 1 extremely hazardous. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR

KANDAHAR Year to Date 10 100 This Report Period 0 The issue of Force Protection 80 shootings have once again come incidents, 70% have occurred 60 to the fore within Kandahar. A within Kandahar City limits, fur- 40 spate of such shootings in the past ther illuminating the risk it pre- 20 sents to NGO staff members as few weeks have highlighted the 0 threat this poses to NGO safety, they are primarily concentrated to JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL particularly in regards to move- within the city. While no NGO AOG ACG ments within Kandahar City. For staff have been directly involved 2008 thus far, ANSO has re- in such an incident this year, corded 24 separate incidents, 80% ANSO continues to advise all measures that can be utilised to mitigate the which are attributed to ISAF with NGO staff to strictly observe all risks. the remainder to ANSF elements, security force movement proto- Overall incident volumes within Kandahar accounting for the deaths of at cols. Maintaining distance from have continued at the considerable rates which least 15 local nationals. Of these security force convoys, following began in late May-early June. At present there all issued directions at either are no indicators of any abatement of these checkpoints or from convoys, and rates for the short to mid term. Geographi- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS maintaining an awareness of sur- cally, the Zhari District and Kandahar City !" Force protection shootings roundings (early identification of account for the highest incident concentra- !"Consistently high volumes of such convoys can allow for ade- AOG activity tions, with Panjwai, Shah Wali Kot, and Ar- quate time to pull over) are all ghandab maintaining their established high !"ACG/AOG abduction threat levels of volatility.

NGO Incidents GHAZNI G HAZNI Year to Date 2 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL This Report Period 0 80 On the 15th of August the Nawa DC was occupied by a large force ANA/IMF, the occupation is the 60 of AOG. As the District Gover- goal and it has been very clear 40 nor and insitu ANP were fore- from previous such occurrences warned of this action, they had that the AOG have no intent to 20 previously departed, allowing the hold the ground. Instead, they AOG to occupy the location un- will displace in the face of heavy 0 opposed. This is the second such opposition, allowing them to con- AOG ACG occupation within Ghazni during serve manpower and resources the past few months. While in the after already achieving their pri- consider any activities outside of Ghazni City previous incident they were dis- mary tactical and operational extremely hazardous and adjust any service lodged by a responding force of goals. delivery plans accordingly. In addition, NGO These types of attacks will likely should cease any road travel between Ghazni KEY THREATS & CONCERNS continue as the volatility level in and Kabul along Hwy 1, not only because of !"Attacks on District Centers Ghazni has remained extremely the inherent instability of this province, but !"High levels of AOG activity high, and there have been no indi- due to the deterioration of the security context !"Instability along Hwy 1 cators that it will decrease in the within Wardak (as well as Logar), areas which short to mid term. NGO should need to be transited through in order to reach Kabul.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents HELMAND HELMAND Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 AOG operational capacity has 40 continued unimpeded despite the creased focus by AOG elements 30 ongoing security force operations on Lashkar Gah City was illumi- 20 to counter their presence. This nated by the 6 August assault 10 reality is supported by the attack, against an ANP checkpoint in the 0 and subsequent destruction, of the Safiyano area of the city which JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL resulted in the death of at least 10 Nad Ali District Centre by a con- AOG ACG siderable force of AOG on the police officers. Having said this, 14th of August. In addition, previ- security forces have reported suc- ous reports indicating an in- cess in interdicting IED cells in- success seen in Zabul and Ghazni. tent of deploying devices in the Due to the overarching volatility of the major- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS vicinity of the city. These devices ity of this province, as well as ongoing security !"Security force operations were primarily targeted at bridges force operations in multiple areas, NGO are !"Significant AOG infiltration and culverts, a trend that has de- advised to continue limiting their activities to veloped throughout the SR, !"IED threat within Lashkar Gah. though without the regularity or

AOG Initiated Attacks per Region per Month -2008

CENTRAL EAST WEST SOUTH NORTH NORTH EAST

350

300

250

200

150

100

0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) MISSING ANSO is hosted by Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Blake Kehler - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Hedayatullah - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 This report ANSO could not provide NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) analysis for the prov- Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 inces of: Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 To Register with ANSO !" Panjshir contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) [email protected] !" Nuristan John Binns - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 !" Farah Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 !" Takhar ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) !" Badakhshan Board. If you have any Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 !" Faryab feedback, good or bad, let Mohammadi - [email protected] - 0700 300 730 !" Baghlan them know on: !" Paktika [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) !" Nimroz Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 !" Uruzgan Najma Fazly - [email protected] - 0799 446 820 ANSO ACRONYMS

This is because we IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 do not know enough sition Groups / GOA- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 about the area to Government of Afghanistan Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797-093-073 comment on the sig- / ACG-Armed Criminal Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- THE ANSO MANDATE Improvised Exploding De- Scope of Services, P.1, 2008 vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- tion Forces / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / IDF- The community of NGOs has established ANSO in recognition of their interdependence and shared Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / responsibility towards security management. VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- They have acknowledged that ANSO is important in maintaining the impartiality, independence vised Exploding Device / PRP-Previous Reporting and political neutrality of NGOs by allowing them to be free from dependence upon security informa- Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- tion originating from political or military sources. tional Border Police / SAF- They have also recognized the need to avoid association with the military in the complex Afghani- Small Arms Fire / NDS- stan environment and have therefore perceived a valuable role for ANSO in protecting NGO from National Directorate of Se- direct contact with the military. curity (intelligence) / PSC- Private Security Company / The community recognizes that the success of ANSO in fulfilling these functions is dependant upon DC-District Centre the willingness of NGOs to cooperate with one another in the area of security management and to support ANSO in delivering these objectives. In so forming ANSO then, the NGO community has accepted the inherent obligation to contribute and participate for the effective management of their own security.