1-15 June 2011

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 75 1-15 June 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 While May concluded with component of the inclusive of this period) the 9 Northern Region the reporting of opposition campaign plan IMF and ANA are Western Region 17 extraordinary levels of (as indicated by the graphs averaging 30% of the last conflict related activity on p. 10) and serve as one years total, though the Eastern Region 20 (surpassing the previous peak of the key tactics driving ANP remain the most Southern Region 25 recorded in August 2010), present growth. Suicide affected at 45%. the opening period for June attack levels remain ANSO Info Page 29 Along with the indicates a continuation of relatively steady, and the considerable conflict this momentum, reporting use of indirect fire methods volumes reported, the 13 similarly high levels of continue to be a regular NGO direct incidents YOU NEED TO KNOW incidents (see p. 7). This feature of the conflict recorded this period well periods figures also reveal landscape. exceed all monthly volumes • Continued overall high that despite security force From a strategic previously recorded this levels of incidents efforts at interdiction and perspective, there is little year (see graph p. 12) disruption of AOG networks • Significant number of significant month to month While the incidents were NGO incidents this period (both manpower and supply change in the geographic varied, both in regards to related) through the winter distribution of incidents, attributing actor and type, • Numerous NGO and into early 2011, armed though periodic ‘hills and there were elements that casualties also reported opposition elements are far valleys’ do occur in various reflect the broader trends this period from being a spent force, and areas, the result of both in 2011. The majority of in fact appear more than intentional planning and incidents continue to occur capable of continuing their forced circumstance on in the North (Balkh & efforts unabated. Early June both sides. This period Badakhshan) and East generally serves as a reliable Logar, Paktya and Herat (Nangarhar & Kunar) while ANSO is supported by indicator for pending levels marked significant monthly Ghor alone accounts for of violence and marks a stage volume increases for AOG 67% of the total in the WR in the steady upwards trend attributed events, and (see graph p. 27). The leading into the later summer following periodic demining sector continues months, though this may be fluctuations in an otherwise to be consistently affected, affected by the early onset of meteoric rise, AOG activity accounting for 30% of the Ramadan this year (August). levels in Helmand are once NGO incidents reported As the conflict has never again on the upswing. this period. While there been defined by large scale, While this period accounted were numerous NGO staff conclusive engagements, the for 6 IMF, 22 ANA, and casualties this period, the state of the conflict is 110 ANP killed in action, overall rate remains well generally viewed through the and despite the overall below those recorded in volumes related to the increase in incident 2010. Including this standard tactics utilised by volumes, casualty rates for period, there have been 11 the parties to the conflict. security forces (with the fatalities and 14 wounded Comparative graphs by tactic exception of the ANP) are (all national staff) thus far indicate that close range, trending below those noted in comparison to the 37 direct attacks (i.e. SAF & last year. At this time (and fatalities and 45 wounded RPG) remain a key in total last year. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 3 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Besides the usual criminality, a 40 part of urban life which typically Police operations were visible 30 affects the residential mainly in parts of Paghman 20 (Arghandi, Khushkaki, neighborhoods (in this cycle 10 Parmankhel, Qalai Baki), Deh mainly Karte Naw & the 0 Company Area), Kabul City Sabz (Tarakhel, Bakhtiaran, Khoja remained calm. The majority of Gar, Qalai Zarin) and Bagrami significant events were authored (Deh Yaqub, Yakhdara, KABUL AOG KABUL Crime by ANSF and pertained to the on- Karizakhunda). While the going Operation Omeid 8, a searches in Paghman and Deh Sabz resulted in a limited number attacks since 2006, out of which 10 were stand- concerted ANSF-IMF effort off IEDs or indirect fire). aimed at disrupting AOG of arrests and cache discoveries, networks in the rural districts the operation in Yakhdara yielded The current operations have so far around Kabul. Of note, the a significant seizure of home- circumvented Surobi, which nevertheless operation has been linked up to made explosives (over 800 kg) and remains the main hub for direct AOG similar efforts in the northern blasting caps (300) as well as the escalations, typically SAF and RPG strikes districts of Logar, emphasizing the arrest of two AOG members against IMF-contracted fuel tankers, seconded strategic importance of the running the store. The strategic by ambushes against the security forces. The southern access to Kabul City via location of Bagrami, positioned data related to such attacks on the Deh Sabz, Paktya & Logar and Wardak. along the Jalalabad Road and Surobi and Qarghayi sections of the Highway While police operations within an easily accessible distance this year suggest that the attacks remain well- maintained a constant ratio of from major residential areas in PD targeted (collateral casualties are rare), with an 80% of all incidents recorded, 8 and 7, dictates that the district average staging time of 1045hrs, though the AOG activity remained limited to continues to be explored as a most significant portion of attacks (45%) are IED detonations in Chahar Asyab staging area for sporadic AOG staged before 0930 hrs. The Tangi Abreshum & Musayi, and a typical SAF strikes in Kabul City though direct – Surkhakan section appears as the area of attack against an IMF-contracted AOG-initiated escalations in this choice, while the frequency rarely exceeds 1 fuel tanker in Tangi Abreshum of part of the province have been attack a week. Surobi. minimal (11 AOG-authored

GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 15th of June 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 4 LOGAR This Report Period 2 50 The conflict volumes doubled 40 victim did not have any during this cycle, with the June 30 record of AOG-initiated attacks outstanding feuds in the area. 20 already surpassing the volumes However, the victim’s accumulated during four weeks in employment was commonly 10 May. Attesting to this uptick, shared knowledge, and likely the 0 AOG also authored two incidents factor which called the AOG which affected two demining attention. The exemplary killing NGOs. In a mere replication of would indicate that the AOG LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime associated the employee either the AOG raid on a demining ANP members and the GOA staff were found camp in Zarghun Shahr on 28 with a security force, or with ‘spying’ for the government, an executed in the area the next day. Moreover, May (which resulted in the seizure this section of the highway, in particular of VHF equipment from the accusation often used to legitimize the killings for the mere sake of Niyazi, Qalai Ali Khan and Qalai Juma Khan, deminers, although the AOG did was the scene of AOG ambushes on security not seem to reject the NGO putting pressure on the communities. forces and checkpoints, recorded less typically programming and did not harm also across the district border in Muhammad any staff), the same local NGO Indeed, AOG intimidation efforts Agha. 6 IEDs detonated (mainly against was targeted in its main base in continued unabated in other areas security targets) and an additional four devices the evening of 9 June in Dadokhel of the province, getting ever were neutralized by the security forces, further (Puli Alam). This time, a group of closer to the strategic illustrating the evident AOG focus on at least eight gunmen handcuffed communications and the main challenging the IMF-ANSF control of the the NGO guards, and took away population centers, including the main road network. Besides the entry avenues an assortment of materiel capital. The northern section of from the East, the Baraki Barak – Saydabad including a number of VHF the highway in Puli Alam also link seems to be of pivotal importance for handsets, GPS locators, witnessed several cases of illegal AOG coordination in the region, including the binoculars and digital cameras. checkpoints and abductions. It is reliance of Baraki Barak IEA networks on The AOG team leader reportedly assumed that AOG intentionally logistical chains established along the highway incited the NGO staff to take plant IEDs on the highway, in Wardak. distance from GOA and anticipating their discoveries and ‘foreigners-sponsored’ initiatives, the consequent road closures by Further, the distribution of AOG-incidents yet his group left the camp the security forces, while the overlapped with the target areas of numerous without expressing any other AOG units remain deployed in ANSF-IMF operations, staged in Baraki Barak concerns, leaving all staff the villages adjacent to the main & Charkh, as well as in Muhammad Agha and unharmed. The deed was road in order to scrutinize the Azra. NGOs based in Logar emphasized the different for a staff member of passengers taking detours along immediate consequences of such operations another demining NGO, the secondary roads. Such a for the civilian population, such as reduced employed on a project in situation led to the abduction of access to district centers and by extension to Nangarhar, who was spending his 11 occupants of a flying coach health services, frequent arrests for the leave in his home in Sajawand taking detour via Kamal Khel – purpose of investigation with the custody (Baraki Barak). While visiting the Nasir Baloot Area on 6 June. stretching over several days, and the extremely bazaar on 3 June, the deminer was Among the latter, five were off- unpopular and feared night raids. The kidnapped by four armed AOG duty ANP officers (wearing perceived heavy-handed approach of the members driving two motorbikes. civilian clothes), three passengers security forces towards the communities, and Four days later, his dead body was were employed with the its adverse effect on the acceptance of the IMF discovered beheaded and dumped Governor’s office and the in particular, were quite frequent comments in the vicinity of the bazaar. The remaining passengers were shared among the NGO community in the community confirmed that the shopkeepers from Puli Alam. The province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 The incident volumes in Kapisa 30 remained low (though marking a NGOs continued to enjoy safe slight increase) with a dozen of access into the western/northern 20 escalations reported, including districts. 10 several IMF-ANSF operations in Well in line with the established 0 Tagab and Nejrab, followed by 7 patterns, Tagab bore the brunt of AOG-initiated attacks. violent escalations during this Mahmudi Raqi remains a cycle, due in particular to several KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime peripheral district when it comes joint ANSF-IMF operations to which the AOG responded with to AOG presence. Nevertheless, Afghan Local Police program. While the IMF- the usual harassing close-range the provincial capital experienced GOA target the approved tashkil of 300 ALP attacks (3 such strikes recorded in a lethal SVBIED strike, most men at arms for each of the two districts likely directed at the DAC. On 15 Nawrooz Khel, Omar Khal, Shah (Tagab & Nijrab), the AOG commanders Kot). In Nijrab, two pressure- June, two passengers in a Toyota scrutinize the communities for any association plate IEDs detonated against Corolla approached a temporary with the program, ready to retaliate where security patrols (ANP & IMF) in ANP checkpoint on the access necessary. In the morning of 10 June, a group road towards the DAC. Seeing the Shukhi and Qalai Shir, while an of 9 ALP recruits were ambushed on the road additional device was neutralized ANP determined to check the in Anaar Juy-Shahkot (Tagab), while returning in Shir Khel (Tagab). Overall, vehicle, the couple triggered the from an ALP-organizational session in the NGOs reported a ‘safer-than- device, killing 2 ANP and 5 DAC. Two recruits were left injured on the civilians on the spot in addition to usual’ access along the main spot, whereas the remaining seven were communications in Nijrab & a combined 8 individuals injured, abducted by the AOG. Tagab, merely reflecting a down- incl. 2 ANP. The checkpoint had A brief look into ANSO statistics reveals that actually been established to scale in police operations which were often the main triggers for since the beginning of May, each two-week reinforce the DAC perimeter in cycle has marked in average double the the anticipation of a high-profile AOG attacks earlier this year. In counter-point, NGOs noticed a amount of AOG-initiated attacks compared to visit to the Governor’s Office. the levels recorded during the January-April The incident marked the first use continued influx of AOG fighters into Tagab, portraying the district periods. The current trends for May – June of the SVBIED tactic in Kapisa remain in line with the seasonal patterns and since the 30 March strike in Tatar as a hotly contested territory in spite of the low number of actual the volumes recorded in 2010. A cumulated Khel (Tagab), when a single 60 AOG-initiated incidents were recorded attacker detonated his vehicle clashes. Local communities also observed a transition on the side between January and mid-June, both in 2010 against an IMF-ANSF patrol, and and 2011. The 2010 incident volumes reached a previous strike against IMF in of IMF-ANSF efforts. Following the period of clearing operations saturation in May, and remained steady Puli Sayat (29 May 2009). Of throughout the summer. It is yet to be seen note, the three attacks combined of scale, the majority of current IMF-ANSF operations appear as whether the ALP roll-out, the ambition on the caused in minimum 20 civilian IMF side to prepare the ground for the casualties, making the SVBIED a targeted tactical strikes, which often capitalize on an element of handover of security control to ANSF, as well particularly lethal threat for the as the AOG encroachment in the province will population. Yet, suicide attacks surprise. The scheme for financial incentives paid out by IMF for not escalate the conflict further, making for an remain a rare occurrence, and one eventual departure from the seasonal patterns which requires a considerable information on AOG movements (and specifically on the IED of 2010. The geographical proximity to mobilization of resources on the Surobi, which will likely see military operations AOG side. Earlier this cycle, deployment) is likely an important factor in the overall strategy, of scale in the summer, and to Laghman, a Mahmudi Raqi also witnessed an province undergoing a targeted AOG ineffective two-fold IDF strike which however brings the conflict stakes inside the communities. campaign in the anticipation of the security against the DAC, a TTP more transition this year, constitute additional effectively and frequently used Even more stringent communal aspects have been observed in the conflict vectors to observe for the upcoming against IMF installations in the season. neighbouring Parwan. Otherwise, current aggressive roll-out of the THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 An uneasy peace among the 80 Kuchi nomads, the local Hazara 50% of all security incidents, the 60 spill-over effect marked in Chaki communities and the security 40 forces buffering the two sides has Wardak since the early May has 20 been reported from the western also been maintained, partly due districts of Wardak and the to AOG networks using the 0 adjacent areas in Ghazni and on a district for attacks along the highway in Saydabad. In Maidan positive note. While no WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime escalations have erupted so far, Shahr, the ANSF carried out a localized poppy eradication (Kote the stakes were further raised with and arresting an additional three attackers. an additional influx of Kuchi Ashru). More importantly, the provincial capital witnessed an The Dashti Towp ANP Training Center also families (currently an approximate hosted an inauguration ceremony, attended by two hundred households are IED strike at the entrance of the Kabul Bank branch office on 5 top GOA and IMF officials on 15 June. prepositioned in camps in Behsud Shortly after the end of the event, a single 1 & 2 and Daymirdad) and a June. Whereas the blast killed two security guards employed by the projectile (reports differ whether a rocket or a modest though organized attempt mortar) impacted in the vicinity of the center. at the formation of Hazara bank, the IED was likely part of the generic targeting of GOA and The AOG elements were far more successful militias. These are aimed at in harassing the IMF-supply convoys on the establishing checkpoints to ‘foreign’ installations in the city. The use of a time-delay highway, with Salar area alone marking four monitor the Kuchi settlements close-range and IED strikes. The ALP (several dozens of militia men mechanism to trigger the device was suggested by the authorities, initiative came to the fore as a target of AOG mobilized) while there is a operations in the Worsek Area of Nirkh, hesitant stance of GOA linking up the incident to the series of IEDs targeting the music where an IED detonated against an ALP foot authorities involved in multi-track patrol, killing one and injuring an additional negotiations (an effort which is shops/carts in early March of this year. member on 2 June. In total 5 IED increasingly seen by the parties detonations against the security forces were Throughout the province, AOG involved as a wait-out strategy reported from the main roads in Jalrez, Nirkh, maintained the tempo of an rather than a proactive move Maidan Shahr and Saydabad, whereas 3 towards a negotiated resolution). aggressive intimidation campaign, additional devices were discovered and specifically targeting IMF Despite the tensions, the armed neutralized in Nirkh and Saydabad. The contractors and local employees/ elements on both sides have so far highway in the latter district remained the members of security forces. On 1 demonstrated restraint, and the center of IED activity, as confirmed with an scope for a peaceful June in Onkhai (Saydabad), AOG additional arrest of two AOG members in encircled the house of a local accommodation of interests is still possession of IED components in Onkhai, resident employed as security in play. and a more significant discovery of an IED guard in the Dashti Towp ANP For the rest, the conflict manufacturing and storage facility in a ramifications in Wardak Training Center. His son resisted madrassa in Musakhel. maintained the high incident and killed one of the attackers before the ANP repelled the For the upcoming season, NGOs may expect volumes recorded during the further increase in military activity along the previous cycle, encompassing the attackers. In another such attempt in Shashgaw (Saydabad) main route network in Saydabad, Nirkh, full spectrum of AOG tactics and Maidan Shahr and Jalrez in particular. AOG intimidation efforts. This was one week later, AOG attempted to abduct an ANA member from effectives & resources concentrated along the countered by IMF and ANSF Highway in Saydabad will likely continue to deployments at staging areas along his residence, which they set on fire when an ANA QRF unit shape the environment in the adjacent areas of the strategic communications. Ghazni and Logar. While Saydabad hosted the usual stormed the location killing three THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 The killing of Mr. Ahmad Jawad 40 Zohak, the head of Bamyan the current course of the 30 Provincial Council in the reconciliation process. In the 20 view which Mr. Zohak Ghorband Valley (following his 10 represented, the reconciliation abduction by an AOG force on 3 0 June) marked the single most policy embodied in the APRP and significant AOG-initiated incident the Peace Council initiatives is in the province since 2001. The judged too permissive towards the BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime murder has shattered the AOG, and too uncertain when it comes to safeguards for the community, inspired fears and however, the commotion that the killing anger over the GOA’s approach security and rights of the Hazara community achieved with the inspired has not translated into any tangible to AOG, and highlighted the security developments, including the timid uneasy access into the province regime change in 2001. A perspective which is strongly response of the ANSF-IMF. In the last days from Kabul. However, the of this reporting period, ANSF, likely acting province itself remains one of the echoed in Bamyan, where the prospects of IEA return to shared under considerable political pressure, most permissive NGO conducted a series of arrests and search operational environments. or independent rule evoke the atrocities committed by Taliban operations in Do Ab Mikhzarin (Kahmard) The killing fits into this year’s militias against the civilian and Ghandak (Shibar), areas locally associated pattern of AOG targeting GOA population. with sporadic AOG presence. In Ghorband, VIPs, announced as a part of the killing and the repeated signs of AOG Operation Badr, and was rendered Besides the strict political and entrenchment in Qemchak inspired yet historical considerations, the possible by an unhindered AOG another one-time IMF-ANA incursion. expansion in the side-valleys of killing also inspired frustration and fear among the community Almost lost in the attention which the above Ghorband. The AOG strike also incident received, on 8 June, reports came in revealed ‘a meticulous military over GOA’s current inability to secure the roads leading to of two simultaneous cases of a mysterious plan’ and ‘brought the combat intoxication of female students during the where it matters’, to paraphrase Bamyan. At times, local leaders in Bamyan and Yakowlang were morning classes in two schools in Waras other key aspects of the (DAC, Shahbed) and Panjab (DAC, Operation Badr’s statement. The putting blame on the Pashtun communities in the Ghandak Kajmazar). In total, over 50 girls (8 in Waras timing of the incident is and 48 in Panjab) sought medical treatment particularly compelling, as the Valley (Shibar), in particular when rumors hit the bazaar that the with symptoms indicating intoxication, murder happened right prior to although the authorities have not determined the transition. Deconstructing the AOG responsible for the abduction had requested the the origin of the disease, and the community local interpretation of the killing has so far remained silent as to the elucidation brings one to appreciate the release of Mullah Burhan, a prominent Taliban leader from of the incident. It is noteworthy that both murdered politician as a leading districts remain virtually devoid of AOG personality inside Hizbi Wahdat, Ghandak, in exchange for Mr. Zuhak. In concrete terms, structure and neither is there any legacy of namely when it came to opposing concerted attacks against girls’ education. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents harden when it comes to the stereotype picture PANJSHIR Year to Date 0 of ‘armed foreigners’, a mental image inspiring This Report Period 0 Whereas political and criminal negative connotations in the eyes of many violence remains rare in Panjshir, section. Shortly afterwards, a among the local community. unrelated to the main conflict relative of the villager arrived to Another unusual incident was registered on the vectors between the GOA/IMF the scene, and shot the Italian main road in Astana (Rukha) on 2 June, when and AOG, an escalation of officer dead with his AK-47. ANP a driver in transit to his home in Dara died significance occurred during this performed a series of arrests for following the ignition of an explosive cycle in Khenj. During a hike in the purpose of investigation while substance inside his vehicle. the Afghan victim received Safid Sher - Dehi Muquni The focus on security transition on the side of treatment for serious injuries to (Khenj), a group including a the authorities, incl. IMF assurances about the his internal organs. In light of the senior Italian police officer planned presence of the PRT beyond the information currently available, stationed with the embassy in departure of the IMF ‘security’ element, raised the incident did not result from Kabul and another female attention this cycle. According to IMF views any pre-mediated criminal or expatriate, encountered a local presented at a media conference in Kabul, the political intent on the side of the young man transporting supplies transition process will not mean the villagers, putting in question the on a donkey in the opposite withdrawal of the PRTs from Panjshir and judgement made by the expatriate direction. Under circumstances Bamyan. Rather, the ‘reconstruction’ officer and his consequent which remain unclear, some sort component of the IMF strategy for Panjshir decision to use his handgun. of a physical contact occurred will undergo a similar transition with ‘ANSF While such an escalation between the villager and the developing capacity and taking lead in undoubtedly affects the expatriate female. The posture of reconstruction activities as security transition acceptance of foreigners’ presence the villager was identified as a process begins’. Needless to say, this message in the community, NGOs have threat by the police officer, who raised more question marks than answers, and not sensed significant changes in consequently fired two shots from is yet to be experienced and assessed on the their operational environment in his hand gun, impacting the young ground. man in his leg and his mid- the district. Local perceptions

Country Level AOG Initiated Incidents: 2006-1011 1800

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0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR DEC APR May AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG June NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 A series of dramatic AOG- 40 road was illustrated a week later, initiated events in the Ghorband 30 Valley dominated the security when the AOG force reappeared 20 reporting from Parwan during this in Qemchak, mentoring the cycle. In addition, three IDF community on how to run boys’ 10 cases in Chaharikar (IMF base), and girls’ education (beards and 0 Jabalussaraj and Sayed Khel (the hats for the former, no education DACs), and two AOG figures beyond the third grade for the joining the reconciliation process latter) and mounting a road PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime upon negotiations brokered by checkpoint in Abe Bala in the local elders in Bagram morning of the next day. The pointless response by ANSF-IMF forces, complemented the picture. move provoked a more robust which are not able or willing to deploy troops response on the side of IMF- The morning of 3 June saw a into the area on a permanent basis. This ANA, both forces moving force of two dozen AOG come allows local AOG to retreat towards their safe overland and by air into the valley, down on the main Bamyan – heavens anytime a one-time hit operation and engaging the AOG at least on Parwan Road in Siyagerd, comes any near, without necessarily loosing one occasion. Of note, the ANP anticipating the transit of the head positions as they return back into the ‘cleared’ force was left behind, recovering of Bamyan Provincial Council areas immediately after the withdrawal of the from the attacks and understaffed thru the area. The force abducted security force. beyond the point of being able to the politician, and engaged the meaningfully contribute to the As of yet, there is no conclusive indication that ANP in several clashes around the effort. In the mean time, AOG NGO access, incl. the safe passage between DAC. Attempting to counter the sent an additional message of Bamyan – Parwan, would be significantly abduction, the District Deputy force to the ANP in Shinwari in changed in the short to mid-term. However, Chief of ANP was killed. The the form of a 2,5 hour IDF and the aggressive AOG expansion and their AOG withdrew towards the SAF harassing attack in the night success in carrying out such a bold spectacular Qemchak and Wazgher Valleys, of 9 June, while the IED attack caution against underestimating the taking along another kidnapped deployment, a stable feature of threats of further AOG interest in exploring ANP. Although ANA and IMF AOG package in the previous the access route to Bamyan. Meanwhile, the engaged in a minor search cycles, reappeared close to the recent AOG messages communicated to the operation, the efforts were soon Shinwari DAC in Dahane Estama community in Qemchak, including the halted, reportedly to give way to a on 14 June. This set of events deliberations on the education of girls, collide negotiation process. Four days created a discrepancy between the with the current services provided by the later, the politician had been demonstrated AOG capacity to NGOs. If the AOG tendencies at regulating found dead alongside the ANP, crack down on several sections of the social order in the communities grow in their bodies covering a three-fold the Bamyan – Parwan Road, strength, NGOs in Ghorband will soon face IED trap. The ease with which especially if the benefit is the the need to reconfirm the level of community the AOG move across the upper interception of a high-profile acceptance for the educational components of side-valleys north of the main target/asset, and quite the their programming. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 6 BALKH 50 This Report Period 2 Balkh continues to produce 40 progressively more active attacks occurring on the same day 30 in February 21st. The district has reporting cycles, with 29 security 20 incidents reported this period, a been mostly quiet since those 2 10 number that almost matches incidents, despite reports that Kunduz—the regional focal point AOGs are active in exercising 0 for conflict in the North. influence over some of the local Amongst these 29 were 2 NGO community, as well as regularly BALKH AOG BALKH Crime related incidents which included using it as a transit point to move the armed robbery of an NGO east and west across the region. harassing fire or a shoot-and-retreat. vehicle in Kishindih, and the The district, and specifically this Elsewhere in the province, in Khulm, an killing of an NGO doctor’s road, is crucial to AOGs as it links influential Jamiat leader was killed—allegedly assistant in Sholgara. But also of the strongholds in the Tri- by another Jamiat leader—and his supporters importance to the NGO Provincial area to Baghlan, threatened to destabilize the quiet district with community, Chimtal and Chahar Kunduz, and Takhar via Dara-I revenge oriented violence. The GOA—which Bolak combined for 11 incidents Suf Payin. The fact that this is a had strong ties with all of the Jamiat as Operation Ebtekar 2 well travelled AOG route means community involved—was able to keep the commenced (with the mandate to that as the summer picks up, it is situation under control, but how this shift in clear the main road west of likely that the AOG presence, and the balance of power will affect the district Mazar), strong inter-Jamiat the potential for security remains to be seen. commander tensions led to incidents, will increase along with Chimtal and Chahar Bolak remained the violence in Khulm District, the it. epicentre of manifested insecurity in the ANP were attacked by AOGs In Sholgara, a district which has province as a new military operation to clear during the daytime in Dawlatabad, seen increasing insecurity this the main road from Mazar to Fayzabad and a small explosion occurred in year, a doctor’s assistant from an (Jawzjan) began, with the 2 districts accounting PD#2 of Mazar-e Sharif City. NGO run clinic in the Kochek for more than 1/3rd of the reported incidents In Kishindih, NGO national staff area was killed on June 3rd when between them. However, a SAF/RPG attack members were roughed up and someone entered his residence in in the middle of the day on an ANP patrol in robbed of their cash and the middle of the night, strangled Dawlatabad was equally important, as it belongings when their vehicle was his wife, and stabbed him to displayed a physical example of the rarely stopped along with 3 other death. At this time, there is no manifested AOG presence that has begun to vehicles at an illegal checkpoint evidence to suggest that this was turn up in anecdotal reports in the northern on the Kishindih – Dara-I Suf anything other than a personal district, as NGOs and the media posture that Payin road. The Kishindih – Dara conflict, or that his death had Dawlatabad is seeing an increase in AOG -I Suf Payin road connects anything to do with his work, and activity. The ANP were returning from setting southern Balkh to Samangan via as such, it offers little shift to the up a checkpoint in response to internal reports areas that have often been under existing security paradigm. that an armed group had moved into Hashim the fairly heavy influence of Perhaps of more importance to Abad, Khairabad, and Zadian villages to AOGs. Evidence of an AOG the security assessment of the intimidate and tax the villagers. It is worth presence in Kishindih has been district, the District Chief of noting that Hashim Abad was the site of the sporadic, with only 8 incidents Police’s vehicle came under last incident to occur in Dawlatabad before recorded in the district, but extended SAF/RPG fire along the this, when an IED was discovered and reports from the district suggest a main Sholgara – Mazar road on subsequently defused on May 30th. Although stronger presence than incident the evening of the 12th. there have only been 10 incidents recorded in reporting denotes. It is also Although conflicting reports still the district this year, there seems to be an worthwhile to note that a exist as to the extent of the fight AOG presence there which is not yet disproportionate 4 of the 8 and the number of actors conducting operations, but may be actively incidents in Kishindih have involved, all sources agree that it seeking to extend its influence throughout the involved NGOs, with 2 of these 4 was a full assault rather than district. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Although the overall volume of 40 security reporting remained targeting GOA structures that 30 consistent in Kunduz this cycle, drew civilians towards the GOA 20 an exceptionally high percentage (an ANA recruitment center and a 10 of the insecurity (15 of 30 census center with a large group 0 incidents) involved IEDs. Most outside waiting to sign up to notable amongst these, a BBIED become militia members) and KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime attack was carried out at a Mosque GOA officials. The most recent large scale BBIED in the in Kunduz City at 0945 hrs on Force (QRF). ANP at the location identified Northeast prior to this one was June 10th, targeting some of the and moved to intercept the individual, who the May 28th attack that killed top ranking security officials in detonated his BBIED before he could enter General Daoud in Takhar. the province. the mosque, killing 4 ANP, and injuring 14 Although this took place in The increase in IED related AOG others (9 ANP and 5 civilians). Both of the Takhar, not Kunduz, the AOGs attacks has been noted quite often above high profile security chiefs were inside operating in the 2 provinces are since increased IMF operations the mosque and remained physically often linked. began, which significantly unaffected by the attack. The June 10th attack was another deteriorated the physical presence It is widely understood that Kunduz remains attempt at a high profile target. of AOGs in the province. the primary AOG objective in the North. Multiple sources suggest that a However, IED attacks in Kunduz While the ability of AOGs to carry out civilian hosting a BBIED walked and Takhar have bridged the gap physical attacks is deteriorated due to the up to the Mosque where a service effectively. 4 large scale IED ongoing military operations, their ability to for General Daoud was being attacks took place over the first carry out IED attacks remains strong. With attended by the Provincial Chief quarter of the year, between the summer here, it is likely the IED attacks of Police and the Commander of February 10th and March 14th, such as these will continue and even increase. the Kunduz Quick Reaction

CLOSE RANGE ATTACKS 2010

1000

800 789 769 677 696 600 612 628 526 465 448 400 381 328 274 200

0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC

CLOSE RANGE ATTACKS 2011 1000 942 800 685 650 600 476 444 400 394

200

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 4 FARYAB 50 This Report Period 0 Pashtun Kot (6) and Dawlatabad 40 (7) recorded the most security release from Kohistan District on 30 incidents in Faryab this reporting the 10th. 20 period, despite the ongoing Although Qaysar and Almar 10 conflict in Ghormach which has remain significantly unstable due 0 bled into Qaysar and Almar to large scale military operations Districts, with open source ongoing in both districts and in FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime reports suggesting that as many as Ghormach, it was the Andkhoy – 12,000 IDPs have filed into the Maymana road which registered “clearing” the Andkhoy – Maymana road. The District Administrative Centers of the other significant boost in IMF led operation presents a target rich all 3. In Pashtun Kot, a national security reporting this period, with environment for AOGs who are likely to INGO staff member was 7 incidents in Dawalatabad that decrease their physical presence over this time abducted in Ming Darakht Village included 2 day time attacks on while they increase asymmetric attacks (such as on June 5th and released on June convoys, 2 IED discoveries and IEDs) against IMF and ANSF. To the south 15th after the intervention of seizures, and the detonation of an of Dawlatabad, Qaramqol District also saw a elders. Elsewhere in the district IED in Jar Qala Village (not the noteworthy incident when an education (Jar Qala Village), an IO member same Jar Qala mentioned above) finance officer was shot while distributing the was warned to provide an AOG which killed 2 teenage boys. Of salaries of teachers on the 11th. However, with 2 motorcycles or face severe particular note was an incident unlike the killing on the highway, this is consequences. Ming Darakht in along the main road on the 13th assessed as likely a personal vendetta since the particular is known to have a when an AOG established a large individual did not have strong political strong AOG presence, and as illegal checkpoint (over 15 affiliations and the shooter did not rob him of discussed in the previous motorcycles) and shot and killed a the education money he was distributing. reporting period, anecdotal civilian while in the process of In all, Faryab saw a significant 24 security reports suggest that the entire fleeing the ANP. Reports suggest incidents this reporting period, however, in the district is seeing a general increase that they captured and tortured contested south-western districts, only 1 of AOG members and activities. the civilian, whom they claimed incident occurred in Qaysar, when on the 1st However, until this period, that worked for NDS, before killing an AOG ambushed 2 vehicles in Daobi Village increase had not necessarily him with a message that other which had been contracted by IMF, burning 1 registered a corresponding trend GOA employees would share a of them and killing 1 driver while injuring the in security reporting. A second similar fate. other. Despite this relative lull in the abduction took place in Pashtun An increase in attacks and IED southwest, reports suggest that conflicts in the Kot in the Sar-e Awz area, where seizures in areas along the main Ghormach/Qaysar/Almar districts are not 4 telecommunications workers road should be expected over the likely to subside anytime in the near future, were abducted on the 8th, with 3 coming weeks, with the ongoing and the potential for insecurity there remains released immediately but 1 Operation Wahdat 2 tasked with high. remaining in custody until his THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 No less than 5 gatherings 40 occurred in Taloqan to mourn the perceived lack of proper vetting 30 death of General Daoud (or and/or accountability. With 20 petition the lack of arrests General Daoud’s passing, 10 following his death) over the accountability becomes that much 0 course of this reporting period. further removed. The actualization of these concerns Takhar is the home province of TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime the deceased General, as well as came to fruition during a dispute the location where he was killed in between 2 Jamiat commanders in in the May 28th attack that killed the General. a dramatic IED attack that Farkhar this reporting period. It is worth noting that there are often a occurred at the end of the When the dispute saw extended number of initial arrests conducted after high previous reporting cycle. violence, the ANP were forced to profile security incidents such as this one that Paramount to the political dispatch to the house of 1 of the do not necessarily pan out. commanders whom had allegedly situation in Takhar, there remains As in Badakhshan, the drug harvest is likely to no clear replacement for the claimed personal involvement in the death of General Daoud. play a significant role in security in Takhar, General, but the effect of his which is also heavily involved in drug death is being felt in the While the incident escalated to the point where multiple ANP trafficking. The province saw a total of 20 relationships between competing security incidents (11 of these in Taloqan) this arbakis within (and outside of) the vehicles were dispatched to the commander’s house, it ultimately reporting period. The number includes the 5 province. General Daoud was peaceful gatherings. Amongst these, in 2 known for—amongst other subsided without reaching any significant climax, however it separate incidents IEDs were found along the things—his presence and ability to main Takhar-Kunduz road in Taloqan district, keep the arbakis in Takhar and brings the question of whom will take over the General’s position, and an arrest was made in Baharak of an throughout the North in control. individual in possession of weapons and IED The formation of ALPs (vetted by and will that person be able to control the various competing making materials. IED incidents have picked the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and up significantly in Kunduz, and has often been IMF) and arbakis (local unofficial powerbrokers, arbakis and ALPs to the forefront. As an aside to mentioned here, the security paradigm in pro-government militias) has been Kunduz directly influences that in Takhar. key to IMF strategy, but has come this, on the 8th of June, 5 ANP under widespread criticism for a were charged for being complicit

Monthly NGO Incidents (Combined AOG/ACG)

14 13 13 12 12 11 10 9 9 8

6

4

2

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPT OCT NOV DEC THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 A relatively sustained lull in AOG 40 initiated attacks was broken by an and on the 7th an RCIED 30 IED strike on an ANP vehicle in detonated on a pro-government 20 the City Center of Puli Khumri on militia vehicle in Dand-e Ghuri 10 area of Puli Khumri, injuring 4 May 31st, the last day of the 0 previous reporting period. Prior pro-government militia members. In the latter event, a secondary to this explosion there had not BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime been an AOG initiated incident device was found as well. since April 27th, and 11 of the Baghlani Jadid and Burkha make as the surge in military operations. other 14 incidents that took place up the majority of northern Baghlan, and along with Puli Amongst the other 6 security incidents during May had been initiated by recorded this period (for a relatively low total IMF or GOA security forces. Khumri, have historically been the focal point of AOG activity in the of 8) the surrender of 50 AOG members in However, early June has shown Dahana-I Ghuri sticks out due to the large signs that the lull is passing. 2 province. While the continuation of Operation Nowruz activities in physical number. The ALPs and arbakis of IED attacks took place this Baghlan, due to their political affiliations and reporting period, 1 on June 2nd the form of IMF and ANSF strikes in the area are likely to well known repeated changes of allegiance and the other on June 7th, between AOGs and GOA, have been the suggesting that like the rest of the continue to keep AOG activities below the levels which they had subject of many reports. Like elsewhere in the country, AOG initiated conflict is region, external actors have accused arbakis on the rise in Baghlan Province. previously risen too, it also appears that claims that the AOG and ALPs in Baghlan of doing more to On the 2nd, an IED detonated on presence in the province had destabilize the province than stabilize it, but an IMF vehicle in Anarkhil Village mostly disappeared are this is a dynamic that will continue to be in Baghlani Jadid at 1100 hours, exaggerated, and that the lull in monitored here and throughout the North. injuring 4 soldiers and killing 1, attacks is likely to last only as long

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Fayzabad continued to be the 40 unlikely focal point for insecurity acting there are primarily home 30 in Jawzjan following the recently grown, from Chahar Bolak and 20 completed Operation Wahdat’s Chimtal, or from the Tri- 10 clear phase operations in the Tri- Provincial Area), the district is 0 Provincial Area (including Qush now showing a significant level of Tepa and Darzab Districts). In sustained insecurity, and the main JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime all, Jawzjan witnessed a relatively road through it is beginning to be moderate 10 security incidents grouped in with its’ insecure attack on the ANP). ALPs and arbakis in the this reporting period, with 4 in neighbours to the east (Chahar Tri-Provincial area have been a point of Fayzabad and a combined 5 in the Bolak and Chimtal in Balkh). contention since the beginning of the year, and Tri-Provincial area (3 in Qush However, unlike its’ neighbours, appear likely to continue to be, largely due to Tepa and 2 in Darzab). even with this increased the fact that both draw from the same insecurity, NGOs across the In Fayzabad, AOG operations ran population. AOGs seek to gain recruits and board have reported having no the full spectrum of activities community acceptance in order to support significant access issues within the including an attack on a convoy, them with numbers, and to house and hide district despite noting this increase an attack on an ANP checkpoint, them, while arbakis and ALPs are made of of AOG presence and activities. an IED discovery, and the killing civilian communities who have actively of a civilian who was accused of Security incidents in the Tri- decided to support the GOA, and turn to them spying for the GOA. Although Provincial Area were primarily for support and protection. The targeting of mixed reports continue to surface comprised of AOG attacks on pro ALPs and arbakis by AOGs is likely to sustain, about the extent of AOG -government militia checkpoints and increase over the summer, as AOGs seek infiltration into Fayazabad, as well and units (which made up 4 of the to maintain their influence in their home as its’ origins (whether the AOGs 5 incidents, with the 5th being an communities, especially in strongholds such as the Tri-Provincial area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN 50 This Report Period 0 Although only 7 incidents 40 occurred in Samangan this poses a number of questions for 30 reporting period, with 4 occurring the district, and reports suggest 20 in Aybak District, this volume that the GOA is taking their 10 actually represents a notable spike presence seriously. While there 0 in incident reporting for the are conflicting reports regarding quietest province in the North. their origin, reliable sources are SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime Although a rare IED detonation suggesting that this group started occurred along the main road with a small home-grown Aybak District, but just south of Aybak City between Puli Khumri and Aybak population, which has since been along the main road en route to Baghlan, and on the 1st, it was the visual joined by an unknown number of for the sake of security assessment, should presence of a new armed group in foreign elements. If the above probably be grouped with the new round of the eastern areas of Dara-I Suf assessment is accurate and the IED detonations that took place in Baghlan Payin that gathered the most groups origins are local, the this reporting period after a considerable lull. attention in the province. chances that they will stay (if The RCIED was made out of an artillery shell allowed) are likely. Further Multiple reports noted the that detonated just after a VIP convoy passed assessment (and time) will be presence of this new AOG, with at 1900 hours in the Kotal Akham area, required to understand the impact numbers estimated between 30 suggesting a faulty trigger detonator. The use (if any) this group may have. So and 100. Dara-I Suf Payin has of RCIEDs vs the use of VOIEDs (victim far, the existing AOGs in Dara-I been under the strong influence operated IEDs such as pressure plate) remains Suf Payin have not hindered of AOGs since before 2011 an important trend to follow for NGOs and NGO access much, however, new began. In the beginning of this civilians alike. While reports about RCIEDs groups often seek to make strong year, most estimates suggested remain more common, if VOIEDs begin to first impressions as they attempt that between 2-3 groups were surface, it would mean an increased potential to intimidate their host operating there, while as the year for accidental triggers from “wrong time, populations and demonstrate a progressed, 1 of these groups wrong place” detonations. Outside of this mastery of their territory. surrendered to the GOA, while incident, at 1400 on the 6th, ACGs robbed another group firmed up its The IED explosion along the passengers from 2 cars in Qaria Tai Khonak infrastructure and took solid main road which occurred on the Village, along the Aybak-Tai Khonak Road in control over much of the district. 1st was also a significant incident Aybak as well, creating for a rather full The arrival of this new group for Aybak. This occurred in reporting period for otherwise quiet Samangan. THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 4 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 1 50 Sar-e Pul saw a moderate number 40 of security incidents this reporting abduct two villagers. 30 period, but of those that occurred, In assessing this incident, it is 20 some were notable to the security necessary to understand whether 10 paradigm for NGOs operating the NGO was being actively 0 there. Of primary concern, 2 targeted because of their presence, parked NGO vehicles took small or mistaken for another entity. SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime arms fire at Zaka Village when an The NGO was using silver AOG of 2 motorcycles—quickly unmarked vehicles which could Mohammad Omar area at 1800 on May 31st. followed by an additional 5 have easily been mistaken for Also of note to NGOs operating in the motorcycles—baring armed men government vehicles, and thus far province, an explosion was heard in Sar-e Pul approached the village during a all abductions along this road this City on the evening of the 13th when an villager/NGO meeting on June year have been well targeted unknown individual threw a grenade at an IMF 6th. Zaka, which has been the site strikes, ie: a businessman and then patrol, injuring 2 (including the translator). of a number of prior incidents, a number of GOA employees. Although this does not represent a notable lies directly along the main Negotiations between the village shift in the security paradigm, it remains an Shibirghan - Sar-e Pul road. The elders and individuals representing outlier in a city that has seen only 4 incidents villagers apparently received a the AOG eventually took place, (including this one) within its borders this year. warning from one of their and both villagers were released. The only other incident within the city this lookouts that the motorcycles Whether this is a case of the year that resulted in physical damages occurred were approaching, and hid the AOG (or a nearby village relatively recently, on April 23rd, when RPG/ NGO staff while one of the associated with that AOG) not SAF was shot towards District 2 resulting in an villagers grabbed an AK-47 and wanting to widen a gap with the hour long fire fight between AOG and ANP. opened fire on the 2 approaching community, or whether they Although such incidents within Sar-e Pul City motorcycles, likely firing warning mistakenly thought that they were are extremely rare, anecdotal reports continue shots. The individuals—believed targeting GOA officials and later to surface that GOA control around the to be members of an AOG—fired learned that it was an NGO, is district is shrinking to just outside the city back, and the villager with the AK unclear at this time. At present it walls. In all, Sar-e Pul saw 13 incidents this -47 was killed during the fire fight appears that this likely involved reporting period, with 7 in Sar-e Pul District while another villager took up his villagers competing for resources and 4 in Sayyad, including a conflict between weapon and continued to shoot. or inter-village grievances. What pro-government militia members and AOGs The AOG grew to 7 motorcycles is clear is that the Shibirghan – Sar in the Pista Mazar area on June 11th that was and eventually overtook the -e Pul road continues to witness destabilizing enough that the villagers in the opposition, then searching the the most manifested insecurity in area moved to relocate. Sayyad, like the other area for the NGO staff members the North, with its’ 10 illegal districts in the Tri-Provincial area, has seen a (and not finding them), before checkpoint taking place at the end strong reaction by AOGs to arbakis and ALPs leaving as ANA re-enforcements of the last reporting period (but whom they feel infringe upon their target arrived on site. During their not reported until this reporting population. departure, they were able to period) in the Hawzi Haji THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 5 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 The drug harvest has arrived, and 40 it is likely that no North Region conducting a late night attack on 30 province’s security will be as an ANP checkpoint just up the 20 directly affected by this as hill from Fayzabad City at Kohi 10 Badakhshan. Sharing northern Jalghar Area on the 2nd. The 0 and eastern borders with attack was conducted with SAF and RPGs, and could be seen by Tajikistan, Badakhshan is home to BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime large numbers of drug producers the residents from the city approximately 2 kilometers away. and trafficking routes, which are slightly more substantial attack when an IED the source of much of the As the GOA deals with the ACGs that was placed under a parked mini-bus province’s political importance (and other power brokers) who detonated on the 7th, destroying the bus and and insecurity. As the harvesting control the drug trade over the damaging 4 nearby vehicles. Although 3 season comes into bloom, next month, it is likely that there suspects were arrested in conjunction with the Badakhshan has also witnessed an will be an increase in criminal latter event, like elsewhere in the province, it is increased number of military activity. One of the areas this is likely that crime in Baharak, a district seriously operations to destroy extensive likely to become increasingly involved in the drug trade, will continue to plots of drug crops throughout volatile is the area around Sufian increase during the harvest season. Already the province (most notably this Village in Warduj, along the main this year, Baharak has been the primary source period in Argo). Not surprisingly, Baharak – Ishkashim road, a road of manifested insecurity in the province. local populations have not often used by traffickers to get to Of the other 12 incidents that took place (15 in responded kindly to the Afghan the Tajik border before circling all), most notable was the clash between 2 Government’s efforts to reduce the province to the north. AOGs in Darayim—one of the few districts in their most lucrative crop, and the Anecdotal reports have surfaced Badakhshan known to host a strong AOG onset of operations combined that armed men have been seen presence—which occurred on June 7th in the with the harvest and increased use along this road—potentially laying Pirgani Area when 1 AOG objected to of trafficking routes have caused a mines—and that the area around another’s attempt to reconcile with the GOA. seasonal shift in the security Sufian in particular has a history The clash injured 1 AOG member before paradigm. of insecurity. subsiding, and the AOG—which consisted of Nowhere did this create a more Closer to the main body of 40 members including 2 commanders—was noticeable effect this period than Badakhshan Province, a new able to surrender to the GOA. Clashes such as just outside Fayzabad City. After round of attacks surfaced in these are common as arbakis and ALPs make 3 different ANSF missions into Baharak District, which had up natural competitors to AOGs, not only neighboring Argo District, quietly simmered down a bit prior because they fall on opposite sides of the destroying hundreds of hectares to this. 2 attacks took place this conflict, but because they draw from the same of drug crops, ACGs baring the period, 1 a relatively common populations for the support necessary to financial liability of those losses RPG attack on the DAC late on sustain them. registered their malcontent by the evening of the 1st, and a

NOTICE: Contact details for all ANSO staff is located on the last page of this report. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

W ESTERN REGION

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 4 50 This Report Period 1 During this reporting period, 40 AOG activity was notable again in Herat City on 12th of June. In 30 the northern and eastern districts, Karukh, the usual AOG/ACG 20

as well as in Shindand District in activities on the eastern part of 10 the south where it concentrated the main road to Qala-I-Naw 0 on IED deployment in the Zirkoh started with an armed robbery in area. Herat Province also Khaja Charshanbi, followed by an HERAT AOG HERAT Crime recorded an NGO incident from AOG attack against a fuel tanker the western part of the Herat - convoy in Ghorombow. Further the local AOG commander, who attacked Obe Main Road in Obe on 9 June incidents on this part of the road ANP on the 12th, was killed by an IED when an AOG attacked a convoy – particularly east of Amalik Area outside a mosque in Zala Village of Chesht of four commercial trucks in – are to be expected. Similarly, in Area while on 14th of June, ten supporters of Turkabad Area. The convoy was Pashtun Zarghun District, AOG the killed AOG commander joined the transporting items belonging to an activity continued with an ambush government. However, this series of events INGO to Ghor Province. This on an ANP convoy in Sayed Abad did not prove to be the end of AOG activities part of the road has already seen a and an illegal checkpoint on the as on the same day an AT mine hit an ANP notable AOG activity during the main road to the DAC in vehicle on the main road to the DAC in Tagab previous reporting periods, a Pashakan area. As well, the killing Ghaza Area and AOG ambushed ANSF/IMF trend that is expected to continue. of two civilians by AOG close to – also on the main road to Chishti Sharif’s Langar Area of Obe was recorded. After the attacks in Herat City on DAC but on the Obe side. These hostilities These civilians were reportedly 30 May, the city itself remained are expected to continue for the next reporting working on reconciliation matters quiet though there was an increase period. in ANSF/IMF operations. Until in the area and already established the 2nd of June the operations contact with an interested AOG The northern districts of Gulran and Kushk were focused on the city itself and prior, though whether they were both hosted direct fire attacks against their then subsequently moved onto killed by the group they were in DACs starting at around 2300 hrs. Whereas the districts of Injil and Guzara. contact with or another AOG the fighting in Gulran lasted for around four hours and was the second recorded attack Injil district also saw IED related opposing the APRP remains unclear so far. against the DAC, the attack in Kushk was the incidents targeting ANSF in rather first and reportedly ended after 20 minutes. The district, which saw the most unusual areas such as Karizak, Of note, after the attack in Kushk AOGs significant developments during Darghara and Shaydaee. Whereas reportedly escaped in the direction of Gulran this period, was Chishti Sharif, the IEDs in Karizak and and an IED was discovered on the main road where power struggles between Darghara represent efforts to to Gulran the next morning, probably local commanders, as well as with challenge and intimidate ANSF in emplaced to cover the AOGs retreat. In both the GoA, reached a new height the vicinity of Herat City, the ones districts AOG activity has been on the rise this this year. On 12th of June, AOGs in Shaydaee appear more related year and will likely continue to expand. under the command of a to disagreements over land rights However, it remains to be seen if this will also prominent local commander between former ANA-personnel include a push to the usually quieter south in ambushed an ANP convoy in and IDPs in the area. In this Kushk or, if the intention behind the latest Dahana Shir Khwaj Area. As a regard, a group of former ANA attack was limited to a show of force in the result, the ANA launched an members also expressed their district centre, whether the activities will operation in the area, which was disapproval of what they perceive continue to concentrate on the northern areas reportedly supported by two other as an usurpation of their land by in Kushk. IDPs at the Governor’s Office in local commanders. One day later, THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 Farah Province saw notably less 30 IED related incidents during this operation, which lasted for several reporting period while direct fire days and reportedly resulted in the 20 attacks by AOGs and armed arrest of around 24 AOG 10 clashes between AOGs and members. However, AOG 0 ANSF prevailed. 70% of the activity continued with two direct fire attacks against ANSF on the direct fire attacks and clashes were FARAH AOG FARAH Crime recorded in Bala Buluk. Of note, 9th of June and an IDF attack the number of incidents in Pusht against an ANSF CP on 13th. likely that AOG activity in all these districts Rod, which had been the hotspot Further and intensified fighting in will continue at similar levels during the during previous reporting periods, the Shiwan, but also in Bala Buluk upcoming summer months. It is also worth decreased significantly. AOG - District in general, should be noting that the recruitment process for ALP in ANSF/IMF hostilities clearly expected in the coming weeks. Khaki Safed has reportedly started, marking concentrated on Bala Buluk, In regard to civilians, on 5 June the second district after Pusht Rod where ALP where the focus was again on AOG abducted a local civilian in will be institutionalized. Shiwan and, to a lesser extent, also Shahnawaz Khan Village of Khaki The western districts of Farah Province on the Farah Rod area. Safed. Although hostilities remained calm again during this reporting Shiwan saw an armed clash as well between AOG and ANSF/IMF period – although in Anar Dara an IED as a direct fire attack against an clearly shifted from Pusht Rod detonated while being defused by ANP – and ANP CP on 6th of June. On 7th and Khaki Safed to Bala Buluk the shift of AOG activity to the west in April/ of June, ANSF/IMF launched an during this reporting period, it is May seems to have been only temporary.

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 During this reporting period, 40 Qadis saw for the first time more another, as one of the groups had 30 incidents than Murghab, which intended to join the government. 20 seems very much linked to In regards to Murghab, the district 10 tensions triggered by AOGs saw mainly IED discoveries (75%), 0 joining the GoA and their which indicate that AOG have subsequent return to their areas as switched to less offensive tactics BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime ALP. Incidents were concentrated during the last two weeks. Most in Ghal Charkh and Khair Khana affected was again the Murghab – The wounding of the ALP members areas, with each accounting for Murichaq Main Road and to a demonstrates that the ALP are at times used 25% of all incidents in the district. lesser extend the main road to the in offensive operations, although their formal Of note, in both areas hostilities DAC. Worth noting is that in mandate bounds the members to a purely between AOG and ALP were Murghab and Qadis Districts, defensive role. Furthermore, on 11th of June recorded while a further 23 AOG incidents including Afghan Local AOG and ALP clashed in Khair Khana, members joining the APRP from Police were recorded in areas of where at the same time a significant ANSF/ Ghal Charkh, Kariz Haji Nazar ANSF/IMF operations. On 8th IMF operation took place (including an and Badrawak areas. Armed of June, ANSF/IMF conducted an airstrike) and resulted in a high number of clashes between these former and operation targeting AOGs in the killed and injured AOG members. However, present AOGs occurred, Paniak area of Murghab District in this case it is unclear (but not unlikely) if demonstrating the increasing with four AOG members, one ALP were taking part in the operation. efforts of AOG to disrupt the IMF soldier and one ANA soldier Whether such cases remain isolated and reconciliation process. Tensions being killed as a result. In bound to specific circumstances, or if they in this regard became very obvious addition, two ANA soldiers and will become a more routine procedure in on 7th of June in Ghal Charkh two ALP members were wounded. ANSF/IMF operations, remains to be seen. Area, when one AOG attacked THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 8 GHOR 50 This Report Period 3 Ghor’s southern districts saw one 40 direct NGO incident in Pasaband District, reportedly on his way 30 and another indirect case in from Pasaband to Charsada. The 20 Taywara, while a third incident AOG commander escaped and no 10 was reported from Du Layna. In arrest was reported with 0 Pasaband, the abduction of a unconfirmed reports indicating former or non-permanent INGO that the commander had recently GHOR AOG GHOR Crime staff member on 31st of May returned from Helmand and was ended with a public execution on responsible for the public by an NGO. The shepherds were released the 4th of June in the AOG execution of the abductee. In unharmed on 4th of June but the AOG kept hotspot Kakuri Village. So far, it addition, anecdotal reports the livestock. Generally, the security situation is still unclear why negotiations suggests that this commander may along the main road between Pasaband and failed, though the AOG had attempt to conduct attacks while Taywara reportedly remains concerning due to requested a prisoner exchange (a on his way back to Charsada, but AOG presence and further AOG activity request that was denied) and why this will very much depend on his along the road needs to be expected. the abductee was singled out in actual capacity to do so as well as The third NGO related incident took place in the first place. The most likely on the level of local support he Siya Khak Area of Shahrak on the main road explanation is that he was may depend on. It would appear to Du Layna District. On 10th of June, considered suitable candidate for a that he was reportedly forced to unknown armed men on motorbikes stopped a prisoner exchange as his brother go back to Pasaband due to the private vehicle, whose driver was on his way to holds a high position with ANSF operation and it is not unlikely Chaghcharan City to sign a contract with an in Kabul and it is possible his link that ANSF will again launch NGO. The armed men searched the vehicle (however tenuous) with an INGO operations if he tries to come in and physically assaulted the driver, but released further heightened his profile. the vicinity of Chaghcharan City him and the vehicle afterwards. In addition, again. It is also worth mentioning in this unconfirmed reports indicate that at present a regard that on 8th of June ANSF In Taywara, four shepherds were small but mobile AOG is present in Du Layna. conducted an operation in Zartaly kidnapped in Quchi Area on the However, it is worth noting that AOG related Village (approx. 30 km south-east main road while transporting a incidents directly or indirectly affecting NGOs of Chaghcharan City) targeting an consignment of sheep to the in Shahrak were mainly concentrated on AOG commander from Charsada district centre which were ordered infrequent armed robberies of truck convoys.

Western Region RSA Departure: Rachel Adam will be concluding her employment with ANSO as of the 26th of June 2011. We would like to take this opportunity to thank her for the excellent work performed during her time as the West RSA. Her keen work ethic and active engagement with the community served as assets to both ANSO and the community as a whole. We wish her the best of luck in her future endeavors. Please note that a replacement RSA has been engaged and once their start date has been confirmed we will announce it accordingly. THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 9 NANGARHAR This Report Period 2 100 Similar to the previous PRP, a 80 series of NGO related incidents specific intent on the part of AOG to target NSP (assessed as 60 continued in Nangarhar Province. 40 On 7th June in Khogyani District, such at present) the sheer size and 20 Pirakhel area, a locally hired NGO scope of the program suggests employee working on an NSP that the likelihood of NGOs 0 project was shot and injured on implementing portions of this program incurring incidents is a his way to the NGO’s office. NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime Following this incident the NGO statistical inevitability. asked their employees to close the With 28 AOG initiated incidents, within the city this reporting period was office and to stay in their houses AOG remained very active relatively quiet, however on 2 June a threat for the remainder of the day. Yet, throughout the province, with this report indicating that a number of BBIED another employee was targeted by reporting period noting five AOG operatives had entered parks located in Zone 1 gunmen as he was walking in the initiated direct attacks, targeting led ANSF to launch a large search operation in DAC Area though fortunately the ANP/ANBP CPs in Nazyan, the area that ended without reported results. injuries of both NGO staff Khogyani nad Lal Pur and ANP Another significant incident occurred in members were not life- personnel in Kuz Kunar. IED Bihsud Distirct, also on 2nd June, when an threatening. It should be noted emplacement continued apace IED planted under a bridge detonated in that this double shooting occurred across the province with at least Walyati Area of Jalalabad-Asadabad Highway a week after a local malik, and 31 IED incidents, of which 13 causing damage to the structure. Dur Baba head of the district’s NSP devices detonated. These in District came to the fore on 9 June with an Council, was killed in Patiri Area particular affected Bihsud, attack carried out by a group of unknown of Chaparhar District. Whereas Khogyani and Achin districts. Of armed men that broke into a house where a this earlier killing can be seen as note in Shinwar District, an IED groom and his relatives were preparing for a being linked with the developing detonated inside a local music/ wedding. The gunmen shot and killed 9 of the AOG campaign of targeting DVD shop, injuring one civilian. wedding participants, including the groom, and influential local elders across the On the 4th of June in Jalalabad seriously injured 6 others, all men. The groom Eastern Region, there is the City, an IED detonated in Zone 1, and his family were close relatives of the Dur possibility that the in the vicinity of the ANBP CP, Baba District Governor reputed for being an aforementioned NGO incidents injuring one civilian and one important opponent to the AOGs operating are related to this trend. While it ANBP servicemen. Apart from across the border and into the district. doesn’t appear that there is any the said incident the situation THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 7 KUNAR 200 This Report Period 1 Kunar Province continued to 150 are still being kept in captivity. experience a decrease in the 100 overall number of security The incident marks the first NGO incidents, the process that had incident in Asadabad District this 50 already been observed in the last year, however, it should be noted 0 period. The number of AOG that a record of NGO abductions initiated incidents has sharply exists already in Kunar, more precisely in Manogai, which has declined from 54 to 36. In KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime addition, in the last fortnight the recorded 2 previous instances of province saw another NGO direct temporary abductions of NGO The incident marked the second suicide attack incident. On 11 June, a group of staff members. In these incidents in the Marawara-Sirkanay area in the past 3 13 persons, including 10 NGO it appears that the NGOs weeks, after the SVBIED against a stationary national staff involved in acceptance level plays a major role IMF convoy in Sirkanay on May 28th. vocational training, were travelling in the safe and rapid release of the However, the extremely rare involvement of a on the main road from Asadabad abductees. female operative separates this incident from in a rented vehicle when they were In the last two weeks, the districts the usual patterns. As usual in Kunar, the stopped in Saagy Area by around of Asadabad, Nurgal, Shirkanay, AOG tactic of choice was related to direct 10 AOG members. The group Wata Pur and Khas Kunar attacks and was focused on Asadabad (4), abducted 8 NGO staff while the experienced the majority of AOG Wata Pur (4), Nurgal (3) and Sirkanay (3). driver, 2 students who were initiated incidents. However, a Noteworthy, several ANSF/IMF-AOG travelling in the vehicle, as well as notable event occurred on 4th engagements resulted in civilian casualties. For 2 NGO staff who identified June in Lahore Daag area of instance in Chawkay, following an AOG attack themselves as students were Marawara District, where a female on a military base, IMF conducted an air strike, released. The next day another 5 BBIED detonated her device in killing a female child. In Shegal District, 3 NGO staff were released due to close proximity to ANP elements, civilians were injured when their vehicle was the intervention of local elders; who were escorting IMF in the hit by a rocket during the cross fire during an however the remaining 3 persons area, wounding 3 ANP officials. AOG attack on an ANA convoy.

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 Following the take-over of Do Ab 40 District by ANSF/IMF from casualties. The second rocket 30 AOG, Nuristan province has once attack was more deadly as a single 20 again returned to a precarious rocket killed an ANP officer and 10 calm with only five incidents wounded another one. One 0 being reported from the province instance of AOG direct attack was during the present period. reported from Wama District as Nonetheless, the lack of reporting an ANP check post came under NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime is linked to inaccessibility and fire in Kordar Village on 4th June. isolation of the province rather Whereas the military situation In addition, requests have been expressed than to the real picture of the concerning Do Ab Distict has demanding to open an inquiry in order to security environment. In the last reached a sort of status quo, at investigate this issue. fortnight AOGs manifested least temporarily, numerous While past periods have been more volatile themselves once again in Do Ab questions in regard to the IMF District where they carried out than the present, and Nuristan has entered a bombing involving multiple period of calm, the AOG presence remains two IDF assaults targeting the civilian and ‘friendly forces’ DAC. On 3rd June, three rockets significant and more contesting of areas can be casualties continues to arise expected. This will concern in particular Bargi were fired towards the DAC but among civil society in both did not involve reported Matal, where on 15th June, a night time AOG Nuristan and beyond its borders. attack on the DAC was reported. THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 3 KHOST This Report Period 1 150 The security situation in Khost Province continued to be volatile addition, for the second 100 and challenging for NGO consecutive reporting period, operations with the overall level Khost City experienced a high- 50 of security incidents on the profile incident. Following the 5- increase. On 14th June in hour long engagement between 0 Ghoshah Village of Tani District, AOG and security forces during a unknown armed individuals complex attack on the joint KHOST AOG KHOST Crime attacked with SAF a team of Traffic Police/ANP QRF (Quick NGO deminers clearing the area. Response Force) compound the last fortnight, six IED strikes were The attack slightly damaged one reported in the previous cycle, this reported in the city injuring a total of one NGO vehicle, but caused no period on 11th June, a BBIED ANA, seven ANP and six civilians. casualties. Shortly afterwards, attacker detonated himself against members of the local community the ANP QRF commander's Regarding the province as a whole, besides engaged the attackers in a brief vehicle. As a result, the QRF Khost City, AOGs were particularly active in fire fight and caused them to flee commander, two ANP guards and Sabar and Tere Zayi. Although the AOG the area. This represents the one child, who happened to walk tactic of choice remains IED emplacement second NGO direct incident in by, were killed. In addition, five with at least 31 incidents (both detonations the district this year and, at the ANP guards and 16 locals, and discoveries), the diversification of AGO same time, the second incident including one female, were TTPs continued as well with 11 direct attacks involving NGO demining staff. wounded. Of note, another and 15 IDF. IDF intended targets include The previous escalation occurred suicide bomber was reported in ANSF/IMF facilities and personnel as well as on 11th May in Eqbal Village of Sabari District, where on the same DACs with Nadir Shah Kot, Sabari and Bak Tani District, where 21demining day a BBIED attacker prematurely administrative centres being attacked. personnel were abducted. detonated close to a joint IMF/ Lastly ANSF/IMF conducted at least 18 Although it is too early to point ANSF foot patrol, wounding one documented operations/arrests, with Sabari out the exact motivation for the IMF soldier and one local District experiencing the large majority of attack, it should be noted that translator. Apart from this them. Besides weapons and ammunitions despite their humanitarian agenda, spectacular attack it should be seizures and arrests of suspected combatants, demining NGOs may be noted that in Khost City IED an air strike was also reported, targeting AOG perceived by AOGs as a threat to deployment remains the main while they were planting an IED on a sub-road their own military effort. In threat for the local population. In in the area of Nooray village, killing two. THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 0 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 AOG demonstrations of force in 40 the provincial center, the latter a 15-min combined SAF and 30 IDF attack against an NDS proximity of the northern districts 20 to Nuristan where the majority of premise). Perhaps in the most incidents were concentrated, and significant attack in the district, 10 sporadic AOG and ACG AOG attacked a road construction 0 movements along the highway in site in Kafirgalai with SAF and Qarghayi characterized this cycle heavy weapons for 20 minutes. in Laghman. Although, the attack did not result LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime in any reported casualties. In Rod NGOs noticed a bold AOG Gar Danjawa, a set of 5 IEDs the harassment of the security forces (3 such effort at mainstreaming the completed the AOG campaign of attacks concentrated across the span of one communication with the fear in the provincial capital, which week, but did not result in any casualties or constituency by instituting official matters as the deadline for the damage). In counter-point, Kanda area in phone numbers for the security transition approaches. Alingar witnessed two IED blasts against IMF sanctioned spokespersons of the convoys, with one of them turning against Nevertheless, the majority of ‘Mujahideen of Laghman’, civilian by-passers, killing four and injuring AOG initiated strikes were seemingly in reaction to a number one. of ‘fake’ personifications of AOG confined to the Alingar and In the southern tier of the province, Qarghayi authority by local criminal Alishing districts, where the level District, the interests of armed players elements. This was of combat operations in the naturally converge on the Qarghayi section of communicated thru a nightletter previous cycles often included the Kabul – Jalalabad Highway. In the late campaign, with posters attached IMF air-strikes and lethal close- evening of 6 June, the husband of a Nangarhar to several mosques in the DAC range clashes on a regular basis. parliamentarian was killed by unidentified area. In a more concrete military An IMF multiple air-strike against gunmen while transiting thru the Surkhakan action, which yet remained mainly AOG positions in the Nuralam junction, his body recovered and identified by inaccurate, hence symbolic in Valley of Alingar was recorded this ANP in the morning hours of the next day. purpose, two incidences of period, marking basically the only While the motives of the attack are yet to be harassing fire against security operation of scale (yet, the elucidated, the incident nevertheless serves as a installations were reported from information remained scarce as to caution against NGO travelling late night on the DAC area on two consecutive the impact of the action). the highway (for more data on the Surobi – evenings (on 6 and 7 June, the Otherwise, AOG remained timid Qarghayi portion of the highway, refer to the former incident being a three-fold and concentrated their efforts on Kabul section of the report). IDF against an IMF base, and the brief and direct engagements; again, achieving hardly more than THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 2 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 1 The events in Paktya sustained the 80 trend of recent attacks against absolute number of incidents 60 demining NGOs, more equally shared between police 40 particularly the robbery of operations (incl. IED 20 communication equipment (a interception) and the AOG development also recorded in the activity. The latter was dominated 0 neighboring Logar during the by 4 IED detonations (two previous two cycles). In the Zaho premature ones), 4 IDF attacks – area of Gardez, the members of another traditional component of PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime an NGO demining team were the conflict dynamics in the city - relieved of their mobile phones 2 abductions and a close-range Local Police (ALP) recruitment and training and VHF handsets on June 1, attack against a PSC. The restive buildings located nearby. The 2011 record so while the same NGO saw their Zurmat followed with a similar far lags behind the 2010 statistics, with 6 VHF handsets and other AOG portfolio which included 4 suicide attacks reported respectively from equipment stolen by AOG in IED detonations, the most Gardez (4), Dand Wa Patan (1) and Jaji (1). In Muhammad Agha and Puli Alam significant being a pressure-device Ahmedabad, two abductions including a high- districts on two separate occasions detonating against a party of profile case in Waro Kala have been recorded, shortly before and after this civilians that ultimately killed two alongside with 3 IED related incidents. One incident (and an additional students and injured an additional of the IED strikes, Salam Khel on 4 June, hit escalation caught this NGO in 6 passengers (Mamozai, 12 June). an ANA vehicle and was followed by SAF Khost on June 14). This string of The IEDs were paired by 4 close- from a close range. The attack subsequently incidents points to the fact that range engagements of the security sparked a local vendetta, with the Salam Khel the NGO had been meticulously forces, and a beheading of a community (siding with the ANA) putting tracked in the field, although none former bodyguard of a district blame for the attack on a neighbouring Kuchi of the robberies included any administrator (the body of the tribe. The Salam Khels actually raided the harm caused to the NGO victim was recovered on 7 June in Kuchi settlement later on in the afternoon, personnel, or an explicit negative Sahak). Sayed Karam and leaving behind two Kuchis killed (and two stance of the AOG towards their Ahmadabad jointly equaled the tents burned). Shwak joined the category of programming. amount of AOG incidents in the essentially kinetic districts with 6 close-range attacks aimed at the security forces, and a case Paktya province returned to an capital, with the former district of a local tribe (Suri Khel), clashing with upwards trends in AOG including this cycle’s attempt at a passing AOGs. Following the escalation on 14 escalations, with the levels spectacular attack, a failed plan to June, a part of the tribe relocated from the recorded over this cycle already breach the DAC by a suicide area. matching the amount of AOG- attacker equipped with a BBIED initiated incidents for the two on 15 June. Though the attacker NGOs may expect similar dynamic previous cycles combined. AOG was spotted and shot by the developments to continue into the summer maintained the momentum, guards, the BBIED detonated months. While the NGO-incident patterns in outnumbering the police killing one ANP and a civilian. the Loya Paktya & Logar region currently operations and IMF strikes by 2:1 According to ANSO data, the pertains mainly to the perusal of demining with the most significant activity attack marked the second suicide NGOs by AOGs, targeted kidnappings of related to IED deployment, close- mission in Paktya this year, with elders – often NGO beneficiaries, the range attacks and orchestrated the first one occurring on 14th omnipresent IED placement and the recurrent abductions of community elders. April in Jaji District (the attack escalations along the main routes incl. IMF- was carried out in the vicinity of ANSF clearing operations will likely continue The provincial capital, Gardez Jaji DAC) with two 2 BBIED to challenge all sectors of NGO programming City, witnessed the highest operatives targeting the Afghan in Paktya. THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 1 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 During the present reporting 150 IED/RCIED emplacement cycle, the security environment in 100 Kandahar Province, was marked remains another AOG tactic of by a surge in the number of choice, also frequently used in 50 targeted killings as well as by targeted attacks. On 3rd June, 0 prevailing IED/RCIED two explosions took place inside deployment. At least 13 cases of the Kandahar University assassinations were recorded Compound. The first device, a KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime across the province, with the vast motorcycle-mounted RCIED, majority of them taking place in killed the secretary of the motorcycle-mounted RCIED detonated when Kandahar City. Besides serving Kandahar COP as well as a KU an ANP vehicle was passing by. In a single political goals, the tactic, usually student. A secondary device, occurrence of a day-time IDF in District 10 of featuring gangs moving around on another RCIED rigged on a Kandahar City, an additional four civilians motorcycles and approaching the motorcycle, detonated shortly were wounded. However, the most significant target in transit, is also often afterwards, killing one ANP and incident in regard to civilian casualties explored by criminal groups. On injuring an additional five KU occurred in Arghandab District, Dilawor 4th June AOG targeted a tribal students. Of note, IED attacks Village, when a roadside IED hit a private elder in the Bazaar area of Spin resulted in a significant number of vehicle, killing 15 civilians including eight Boldak while in Kandahar City; casualties. Besides three ANP children, four women and three men. the victims included ANSF and killed and further seven ANP and GOA personnel as well as locals four IMF wounded in separate On the ANSF/IMF side, documented associated with the IMF presence. IED blasts, numerous civilians operations marked an upwards trend with at In District 2 of Kandahar City were also caught up in the strikes. least 27 cases, concentrated in Panjwayi and another tribal elder was shot and For instance on 2nd June in Kandahar City. In the latter area, 33 suspected killed on 2nd June. District 4 of Kandahar City, three AOG members were detained throughout two civilians were wounded as a separate operations.

ACRONYMS: Please see the final page for a list of ANSO-utilized acronyms. THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 In Uruzgan the geographical 80 distribution of incidents remained Sarmurghab area of the said 60 consistent with the previous cycle. district when a PSC post came Tirin Kot, Chora and Dihrawud under AOG attack. ANP 40 accounted for the bulk of responded to the assault and the 20 incidents yet statistics show that in fire fight lasted for one hour, 0 the past two weeks, AOGs were resulting in two PSC guards and particularly active in Tirin Kot one ANP killed. URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime District which witnessed a Despite the fact that the level of significant level of direct attacks Nawa Area, AOG killed the nephew of an direct attacks seems to be on the ALP commander. Subsequently, ALP that this period outnumbered rise, IED deployment continues IED related incidents. deployed to the area and killed four AOG as the main challenge across the members. The following day another Although the majority of the province. This reporting period, noteworthy incident occurred in Shali Nawa, direct attacks recorded in Tirin Tirin Kot remained the district when, following an argument, a Hazara ALP Kot remained limited to short where the IEDs were most member killed one civilian and wounded engagements with security forces frequent, followed by Chora, another, both victims being local Pashtun and did not involve casualties, Dihrawud and Shahidi Hassas and tribesmen. On a different note, ANSF/IMF there were several exceptions. IED strikes accounted for a total were quite active this period and conducted at For instance, in Pershad Area of of six ANP wounded. least nine documented operations, primarily in Tirin Kot, two ANP were In the second week of this Tirin Kot and Chora districts. Notably, in the wounded following an AOG reporting period tensions have later district IMF carried out an air strike attack targeting an ANP patrol been reported in Khas Uruzgan targeting an AOG compound, killing four though the most deadly District. On 12 June, in Shali AOG members and arresting another one. engagement was recorded in

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 In Zabul Province the overall 80 incident volumes have decreased incidents recorded in Qalat 60 District occurred on 9th June in in comparison with the 40 the Qalat City bazaar, when an particularly ‘active’ previous 20 period which had also marked a IED detonated in front of the Eid 0 two year high in incident volumes. Gah Mosque injuring three ANP During the present cycle, the and six civilians. Although the main AOG targets remain the majority of security events were ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime reported from Qalat, Shahjoy and security forces, the prevalence of Tarnak Wa Jaldak. Along with the IED deployment, as highlighted AOG direct attacks played just a minor role in geographical distribution of by the said incident, is related with the context, and this period were reported incidents that remained consistent a significant risk of collateral from Qalat, Shahjoy, Daychopan and Tarnak with previously observed patterns, involvement. A high-profile Wa Jaldak targeting IMF patrols, ANP check AOG tactics have not recorded attack took place on 13th June, as points and PSC escorts of IMF contracted significant changes as almost 50% an RCIED detonated against the logistical convoys. In particular, Qalat District of all recorded security incidents vehicle of the Qalat ANP Security witnessed quite effective AOG attacks against were related to IED deployment. Chief. The explosion occurred in the PSCs. On 4th June, four PSC guards were Qalat District has been the vicinity of the ANP officer’s wounded and one truck was burnt in Salam increasingly marked by effective residence while the Security Chief Rockety Village as an IMF contracted convoy AOG IED activity, the trend that was on his way home. The came under fire while the following day in has been observed since the official escaped the attack Maghlizi Area, four trucks were set ablaze beginning of May and which has unharmed and following the during another attack. detonation, ANP detained two continued throughout this period. One of the most significant suspects along with a remote control device in the area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 27

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 300 During this reporting period 250 Helmand experienced an ANP patrol, killing four ANP and 200 extremely high number of security wounding six others. In Sangin, 150 incidents with AOGs most active Naway Karez area, an RCIED 100 in Nahri Sarranj, Marja and Sangin mounted on a motorcycle and 50 districts, where they initiated a parked on the side of the road 0 large number of attacks and IED detonated against a passing convoy of a commercial demining strikes against security targets. HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime Although significant, the number organization, injuring two staff of AOG initiated direct attacks members. From the details of the death of three ANP officials, respectively two was still outnumbered by the occurrence, this incident seems to in Naw Zad and one in Marja and Sangin. In IEDs—at least 154 IED related be a case of a mistaken targeting addition, a District Council member was killed incidents were reported across the as a PSC convoy was passing by, in Nahri Sarranj on 10th June. Finally, Lashkar province, of which 46 % the likely target of the attack. Gah City experienced an AOG IDF attack, detonated. Sangin and Nahri Helmand Province witnessed also while on 12 June two rockets were fired Sarranj were the most affected, several incidences of AOG towards an IMF base. The attack was followed by Marja and Musa Qala. intimidation. Although figures inaccurate and the projectiles impacted two IED strikes also accounted for the associated with targeted killings houses, causing some structural damages. vast majority of ANSF/IMF have been moderate as compared Occurrences of IDF are not very frequent in casualties. One of the most to the neighbouring province of Lashkar Gah City as this incident marks the deadly incidents occurred in Kandahar, Marja and Naw Zad sixth rocket attack recorded this year with IMF Shindak Manda area of Nahri experienced attacks involving base being the AOG favoured target. Sarranj, when on 9th June an AOG elements deployed on RCIED detonated against an motorcycles which resulted in

NGO DIRECT INCIDENTS-2011 REGIONAL DATA CENTRAL 15% NORTH 33%

EAST 31%

WEST 18% SOUTH 3% THE ANSO REPORT Page 28

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 0 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 The incident volumes in Ghazni 200 topped the spike in AOG activity districts marked between 1-7 150 noticed in the neighbouring escalations, Muqur and Gelan provinces (Wardak, Logar, Paktya) (positioned on the Southern 100 with nearly one hundred AOG- extremity of the highway) again 50

initiated incidents, and an on the top within this group. The 0 additional 20 IED neutralized by IMF-ANSF basically reproduced

the security forces recorded the pattern, with Andar, Ghazni GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime during this cycle. The volume of and Dah Yak hosting over 60 % AOG incidents basically equaled of all operations. Although the Similarly to other ‘kinetic’ provinces such as the aggregated amount of overall statics for criminal Kandahar, Helmand, Wardak and Logar, IEDs incidents recorded in the escalations may be misleading in concentrated in the district centers represent a provinces mentioned above, while the sense that a portion of AOG- tangible risk for the civilian population. security forces provided 30 entries initiated attacks in Ghazni is Among more spectacular incidents, the convoy this period. Typically for the area, actually ‘out-sourced’ to criminal of Ghazni Chief of Police came under a the conflict vectors in Ghazni groups, there were virtually no complex SAF & RPG attack in the DAC of pursued a clear geographical properly criminal incidents Qarabagh, ultimately repelled by the COP’s pattern, with the primary recorded this period. escort. Following the attack, the force distribution of AOG-initiated Besides the attacks on the collected 12 IEDs emplaced on the exit incidents encompassing the highway, a distinctive feature this avenues from the perimeter. In the provincial districts positioned on the Kabul period was IED placement. Out capital, an IED rigged inside an ice-cream – Ghazni Highway and easily of 40 occurrences including handcart detonated in circulation, killing one accessible from the East. Ghazni, multiple ‘daisy-chained’ systems, and injuring three children on 11 June. The Andar, Qarabagh and Deh Yak every second IED-related incident target and the definite TTP (a suicide mission each tallied between 10 to 20 took place in a district center or a drop-off method) have not been AOG-initiated strikes, that is two (mainly within Andar, Dah Yak, determined, as the incident most probably thirds of all recorded AOG Gelan, Qarabagh, and in Ghazni). marked a premature explosion. escalations. The remaining

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ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) provinces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Daykundi Nimroz NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Paktika Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 To Register with ANSO Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we contact: do not know enough [email protected] EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the Naseer - [email protected] - 077 2546 242 significance of the ANSO is managed by an NGO incidents occurring Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) there. feedback, good or bad, let Vacant - [email protected] 0796 688 416 them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 If you can help us [email protected] understand the ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) province better, Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 please contact us. ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / ANCOP-Afghan National Civil Order Police / Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 AOG-Armed Opposition Group / Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local deputised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES: Advisory Board email address Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / PSC-Private Security Company ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the / RPG-Rocket Propelled Grenade / SAF-Small Arms Fire ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device / PDO-Private Development Organisation / ALP-Afghan Local Police / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- District Shadow Governor (IEA) / APRP-Afghan Peace and