The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 75 1-15 June 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 While May concluded with component of the inclusive of this period) the 9 Northern Region the reporting of opposition campaign plan IMF and ANA are Western Region 17 extraordinary levels of (as indicated by the graphs averaging 30% of the last conflict related activity on p. 10) and serve as one years total, though the Eastern Region 20 (surpassing the previous peak of the key tactics driving ANP remain the most Southern Region 25 recorded in August 2010), present growth. Suicide affected at 45%. the opening period for June attack levels remain ANSO Info Page 29 Along with the indicates a continuation of relatively steady, and the considerable conflict this momentum, reporting use of indirect fire methods volumes reported, the 13 similarly high levels of continue to be a regular NGO direct incidents YOU NEED TO KNOW incidents (see p. 7). This feature of the conflict recorded this period well periods figures also reveal landscape. exceed all monthly volumes • Continued overall high that despite security force From a strategic previously recorded this levels of incidents efforts at interdiction and perspective, there is little year (see graph p. 12) disruption of AOG networks • Significant number of significant month to month While the incidents were NGO incidents this period (both manpower and supply change in the geographic varied, both in regards to related) through the winter distribution of incidents, attributing actor and type, • Numerous NGO and into early 2011, armed though periodic ‘hills and there were elements that casualties also reported opposition elements are far valleys’ do occur in various reflect the broader trends this period from being a spent force, and areas, the result of both in 2011. The majority of in fact appear more than intentional planning and incidents continue to occur capable of continuing their forced circumstance on in the North (Balkh & efforts unabated. Early June both sides. This period Badakhshan) and East generally serves as a reliable Logar, Paktya and Herat (Nangarhar & Kunar) while ANSO is supported by indicator for pending levels marked significant monthly Ghor alone accounts for of violence and marks a stage volume increases for AOG 67% of the total in the WR in the steady upwards trend attributed events, and (see graph p. 27). The leading into the later summer following periodic demining sector continues months, though this may be fluctuations in an otherwise to be consistently affected, affected by the early onset of meteoric rise, AOG activity accounting for 30% of the Ramadan this year (August). levels in Helmand are once NGO incidents reported As the conflict has never again on the upswing. this period. While there been defined by large scale, While this period accounted were numerous NGO staff conclusive engagements, the for 6 IMF, 22 ANA, and casualties this period, the state of the conflict is 110 ANP killed in action, overall rate remains well generally viewed through the and despite the overall below those recorded in volumes related to the increase in incident 2010. Including this standard tactics utilised by volumes, casualty rates for period, there have been 11 the parties to the conflict. security forces (with the fatalities and 14 wounded Comparative graphs by tactic exception of the ANP) are (all national staff) thus far indicate that close range, trending below those noted in comparison to the 37 direct attacks (i.e. SAF & last year. At this time (and fatalities and 45 wounded RPG) remain a key in total last year. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL Year to Date 3 KABUL 50 This Report Period 0 Besides the usual criminality, a 40 part of urban life which typically Police operations were visible 30 affects the residential mainly in parts of Paghman 20 (Arghandi, Khushkaki, neighborhoods (in this cycle 10 Parmankhel, Qalai Baki), Deh mainly Karte Naw & the 0 Company Area), Kabul City Sabz (Tarakhel, Bakhtiaran, Khoja remained calm. The majority of Gar, Qalai Zarin) and Bagrami significant events were authored (Deh Yaqub, Yakhdara, KABUL AOG KABUL Crime by ANSF and pertained to the on- Karizakhunda). While the going Operation Omeid 8, a searches in Paghman and Deh Sabz resulted in a limited number attacks since 2006, out of which 10 were stand- concerted ANSF-IMF effort off IEDs or indirect fire). aimed at disrupting AOG of arrests and cache discoveries, networks in the rural districts the operation in Yakhdara yielded The current operations have so far around Kabul. Of note, the a significant seizure of home- circumvented Surobi, which nevertheless operation has been linked up to made explosives (over 800 kg) and remains the main hub for direct AOG similar efforts in the northern blasting caps (300) as well as the escalations, typically SAF and RPG strikes districts of Logar, emphasizing the arrest of two AOG members against IMF-contracted fuel tankers, seconded strategic importance of the running the store. The strategic by ambushes against the security forces. The southern access to Kabul City via location of Bagrami, positioned data related to such attacks on the Deh Sabz, Paktya & Logar and Wardak. along the Jalalabad Road and Surobi and Qarghayi sections of the Highway While police operations within an easily accessible distance this year suggest that the attacks remain well- maintained a constant ratio of from major residential areas in PD targeted (collateral casualties are rare), with an 80% of all incidents recorded, 8 and 7, dictates that the district average staging time of 1045hrs, though the AOG activity remained limited to continues to be explored as a most significant portion of attacks (45%) are IED detonations in Chahar Asyab staging area for sporadic AOG staged before 0930 hrs. The Tangi Abreshum & Musayi, and a typical SAF strikes in Kabul City though direct – Surkhakan section appears as the area of attack against an IMF-contracted AOG-initiated escalations in this choice, while the frequency rarely exceeds 1 fuel tanker in Tangi Abreshum of part of the province have been attack a week. Surobi. minimal (11 AOG-authored GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 15th of June 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 4 LOGAR This Report Period 2 50 The conflict volumes doubled 40 victim did not have any during this cycle, with the June 30 record of AOG-initiated attacks outstanding feuds in the area. 20 already surpassing the volumes However, the victim’s accumulated during four weeks in employment was commonly 10 May. Attesting to this uptick, shared knowledge, and likely the 0 AOG also authored two incidents factor which called the AOG which affected two demining attention. The exemplary killing NGOs. In a mere replication of would indicate that the AOG LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime associated the employee either the AOG raid on a demining ANP members and the GOA staff were found camp in Zarghun Shahr on 28 with a security force, or with ‘spying’ for the government, an executed in the area the next day. Moreover, May (which resulted in the seizure this section of the highway, in particular of VHF equipment from the accusation often used to legitimize the killings for the mere sake of Niyazi, Qalai Ali Khan and Qalai Juma Khan, deminers, although the AOG did was the scene of AOG ambushes on security not seem to reject the NGO putting pressure on the communities. forces and checkpoints, recorded less typically programming and did not harm also across the district border in Muhammad any staff), the same local NGO Indeed, AOG intimidation efforts Agha. 6 IEDs detonated (mainly against was targeted in its main base in continued unabated in other areas security targets) and an additional four devices the evening of 9 June in Dadokhel of the province, getting ever were neutralized by the security forces, further (Puli Alam). This time, a group of closer to the strategic illustrating the evident AOG focus on at least eight gunmen handcuffed communications and the main challenging the IMF-ANSF control of the the NGO guards, and took away population centers, including the main road network. Besides the entry avenues an assortment of materiel capital. The northern section of from the East, the Baraki Barak – Saydabad including a number of VHF the highway in Puli Alam also link seems to be of pivotal importance for handsets, GPS locators, witnessed several cases of illegal AOG coordination in the region, including the binoculars and digital cameras. checkpoints and abductions. It is reliance of Baraki Barak IEA networks on The AOG team leader reportedly assumed that AOG intentionally logistical chains established along the highway incited the NGO staff to take plant IEDs on the highway, in Wardak. distance from GOA and anticipating their discoveries and ‘foreigners-sponsored’ initiatives, the consequent road closures by Further, the distribution of AOG-incidents yet his group left the camp the security forces, while the overlapped with the target areas of numerous without expressing any other AOG units remain deployed in ANSF-IMF operations, staged in Baraki Barak concerns, leaving all staff the villages adjacent to the main & Charkh, as well as in Muhammad Agha and unharmed. The deed was road in order to scrutinize the Azra.