Afghan Narcotrafficking Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development Afghan Narcotrafficking Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development

Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking

July 2016 A young boy helping with the final irrigation of the opium poppy season in Dawlat Yar district, Ghor province. Principal Author:

David Mansfield Independent Consultant

Contributors:

Ilnur Batyrshin Former Head (July 2010 – May 2016), Scientific Research Center, Russian Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) George Gavrilis Visiting Scholar, Institute for Religion, Culture and Public Life (IRCPL), Columbia University Author of The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute Oleg V. Kulakov Professor of Area Studies, Military University, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation Marlene Laruelle Research Professor of International Affairs, The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs Director, Central Asia Program, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs Austin Long Assistant Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University Ivan Safranchuk Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) Editor in Chief, Great Game: Politics, Business, Security in Central Asia Konstantin Sorokin Adviser, Department of Education and Science, International Training and Methodology Centre for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM) Adviser, State Civil Service of the Russian Federation, Third Class Ekaterina Stepanova Head, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) Yuri Tsarik Chairman, Supervisory Board, Center for Strategic and Foreign Policy Studies (CSFPS) H. Douglas Wankel Former Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Former Director, Kabul Counter-Narcotics Task Force, Embassy of the United States in Afghanistan

Project Director:

David Firestein Perot Fellow and Senior Vice President, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative and Track 2 Diplomacy, EastWest Institute

Expert Group Coordinators:

Vladimir Ivanov Director, Branch in the Russian Federation, EastWest Institute

Euhwa Tran Senior Associate, Strategic Trust-Building Initiative, EastWest Institute _

This publication was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author and contributors. Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 5 Afghanistan Enayat Qasimi Enayat M. Ashraf Ashraf Haidari M. Farhad Basharyar Basharyar Farhad Andrey Kazantsev Andrey Acknowledgements process of conceptualizing and drafting this report: this report: and drafting conceptualizing of process share with us their thoughts and feedback on our work. feedback and with us their thoughts share these two organizations that have made this report possible. possible. made this report that have organizations two these Director, Analytical Center, Moscow State Institute of International Relations International of Institute State Moscow Center, Analytical Director, Former Minister of Civil Aviation and Transport, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan of Islamic Republic Transport, and Aviation Civil of Minister Former Director-General, Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Republic Islamic Affairs, Foreign of Ministry Strategy, and Policy Director-General, We would also like to express our appreciation to several individuals at the EastWest Institute Institute at the EastWest individuals several to appreciation our express to like also would We Kathryn Davis Peace Initiative and, in particular, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which York, New of the Carnegie Corporation in particular, and, Initiative Peace Davis Kathryn Desk Manager, Counter Narcotics, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan of Republic Islamic Affairs, Foreign of Ministry Narcotics, Counter Manager, Desk Russian contributors. We are also truly grateful for the generosity of our financial sponsors: the our financial sponsors: of the generosity for truly grateful also are We contributors. Russian indispensable assistance in coordinating the working group meetings, without which the report without which the report meetings, group the working in coordinating assistance indispensable Val for their editorial support and to Anna Renard-Koktysh for her assistance in liaising with the her assistance for Anna Renard-Koktysh support and to their editorial for Val for their contributions. Our deep gratitude goes to Andi Zhou for his impeccable notetaking and notetaking his impeccable Zhou for Andi to goes deep gratitude Our their contributions. for We would especially like to thank the following experts for their invaluable early input during the early invaluable their for experts following thank the to like especially would We who generously offered his/her expertise to this project and to the many experts and officials in experts to the many and this project to expertise his/her offered who generously Russia, the United States, Afghanistan and other key regional stakeholders who took the time to the time to who took stakeholders regional and other key Afghanistan States, the United Russia, We at the EastWest Institute owe a deep debt of gratitude to every member of the working group group the working member of every to gratitude of a deep debt owe Institute at the EastWest We would not have been possible. Additional thanks go to Michael Grouskay, Ben Mulford and Teresa Teresa and Ben Mulford Michael Grouskay, to go thanks Additional been possible. not have would has unfailingly supported this project since its inception. Our whole-hearted appreciation goes to to goes appreciation whole-hearted Our inception. its since this project supported has unfailingly velopment velopment tive De a ltern tive to A a ltern n A a ing d Fin

6 Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 7 8 15 15 18 10 27 22 32 23 29 39 20 20 40 CONTENTS 3.1 Alternative Livelihoods: Alternative Development in a Changing Development Alternative Livelihoods: Alternative 3.1 Paradigm Development Building Ownership Environment: in a Drugs Development 3.2 Community the Development amongst Quorum of and the Loss Engage to Reluctance A Veneer: the Beneath 3.3. Community the Development by Filling the Gap Left Type: to Reverting 3.4. 2.1 Alternative Development 2.1 Alternative Ban 2.2 The Taliban Conclusion and Recommendations Conclusion Afghanistan in Operations Bank World in Problem the Opium Treating 1: Annex Acronyms Endnotes Executive Summary Executive 1. Introduction 1. 2001 Prior to Cultivation Poppy Opium Reduce to Efforts 2. Livelihoods Alternative from The Shift to and 3. district, Nangarhar province. Nangarhar district, Left: Khogiani crop, and wheat Poppy Executive Summary

fter almost three decades of experi- that we see in Western government bureau- ence with rural development in opium- cracies, but also an example of the teleologi- Apoppy-growing areas in Afghanistan, cal prism through which many officials and there remains a great deal of confusion over scholars continue to see the world, where terms and what kinds of interventions are outcomes such as a reduction in drug crop required to support farmers’ transitions out production are a direct result of the specific of opium poppy cultivation. It is clear that line of activities funded. Surprisingly, this “alternative livelihoods” is not what it set out view of the world prevails as much in fragile to be. The idea behind moving away from and conflict-affected states as it does in the boundaried, integrated rural development investments made in developed Western na- programs—known as alternative develop- tions. This is despite the challenges of weak ment—was to work within the development institutions, conflict, lack of domestic sover- architecture that was being established in eignty and high levels of poverty that make Afghanistan post-2001. Many believed that conflict-affected and fragile states qualita- velopment velopment alternative development programs were un- tively different. coordinated with wider development thinking and, in particular, with how assistance was The lessons learned from the last decade tive De

a being structured in Afghanistan after the fall of assistance in Afghanistan—where reduc- of the Taliban. tions in cultivation have been found to be a function of a much wider process of develop- ltern This report shows that attempts to reframe ment that includes improvements in secu- the debate on and practice of conducting rity, governance and diversification in rural development in drug-crop-growing areas of livelihoods—are ignored. Although there is Afghanistan have faltered. Many senior poli- growing recognition that the degree of de- tive to A

a cymakers look to find a simple solution to pendency on opium production differs by so- illicit drug crop cultivation—a solution that cio-economic group and by both the resource they understand and can sell easily to their endowments and state societal relations in a ltern political superiors. This is often a rural devel- given area, these lessons are still rarely built

n A opment project linked to what is described as into program design and seldom inform the a a “credible” eradication campaign and con- pace of reduction that policymakers might

ing ditionality—the “carrot-and-stick” approach. expect from the initiatives they fund.

d Success is still measured by reductions in the

Fin amount of crop destroyed or the net level of Programs continue to promise to deliver re- cultivation and not in terms of sustained im- ductions in opium production over a wide 8 provements in the quality of life of rural com- area and a short time frame. Current fund- munities and a lower dependency on opium ing mechanisms only make matters worse, production as a livelihood strategy. compelling those looking for the financial resources to implement a program in a drug- The persistence of the “carrot-and-stick” crop-growing area to overstate what they can approach lies with its simplicity. It is a con- hope to achieve within the life of a project or sequence of not only the high staff turnover program. To gain traction with those making Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 9 - hoods” or “alternative development” because because development” “alternative or hoods” - cultiva poppy of in areas located were they - the crop—al ignored largely if they even tion, claim that they to donors development lowed when problem opium the addressing were their within ministries from under pressure - devel alternative with As governments. own - com these the 1990s, of opment programs worked rarely interventions partmentalized operating were they the specific area beyond - develop wider the with engage did not and in and processes. debates ment policy donor- of development category The final - Afghani in issue on the drugs engagement mainstreaming—has stan—counternarcotics - develop by driven It was been intermittent. who technocrats and practitioners ment un- to that it is not appropriate understood Afghanistan in development rural dertake the multifunctional without understanding in rural plays that opium production role might impact programs and how livelihoods The approach opium dependency. of levels the de- reduce to that efforts recognizes also Af in cultivation poppy opium on pendency political wider the address to need ghanistan - develop national across integrated economy be lim- than and planning rather ment policy It efforts. development rural discrete, to ited a take to organizations development requires the harms of in addressing role explicit more on focused and a drug policy both illicit drugs This is the only viable ap- targets. short-term efforts placing today, Afghanistan in proach the within cultivation opium poppy reduce to Development Sustainable the of framework - recommen offers This report (SDGs). Goals the counternarcotics achieving dations for development conducting of mainstreaming environment. in a drugs - - - - This report demonstrates that one of the that one of demonstrates This report Af in missing major funding components of the form has taken typically Reluctance This type altogether. issue ignoring the drugs the de- dominated has largely engagement of decade the last over community velopment in the inter by many failure the and reflects drugs the of compartmentalization Donor discrete, to a return of the form took issue - Compartmental boundaried interventions. - liveli “alternative labeled as ization—often budgetary decisions, they are required to to required are they decisions, budgetary thereby achieve, to what it is possible oversell the of “failure” the of the perception adding to - devel alternative many so and—like program the 1990s—increasing in programs opment funds. withdrawing of the likelihood - construc has been consistent, ghanistan - com the development by engagement tive and international. internal munity—both on the donor-engagement Development categories: broad three into falls issue drugs and (2) compartmentalization (1) reluctance, (3) mainstreaming. development just national community—not dynamic with complex, engage donors—to of mandate the beyond sit that phenomena or agency, department a single government ef concentrate to tendency the as well as It has priorities. political on short-term fort on a number that have, programs rural led to increased worse, made things occasions, of as groups—such marginal of the vulnerability levels in growing the land poor—and resulted is The approach cultivation. opium poppy of use best the making neither counterintuitive, out on development nor delivering funds of comes or objectives. counternarcotics 1. Introduction

llegal opium poppy cultivation is well suited (full-time equivalent)—more than the num- to the challenging socio-economic politi- ber employed by the Afghan National Secu- Ical and ecological terrain of rural Afghani- rity Forces (ANSF) that the U.S. government stan. For landed farmers, opium poppy offers has invested over 53.5 billion USD in since relatively high returns on one of the coun- 2002.1 Indeed, the economic benefits to the tries’ scarcest resources—irrigated land. It Afghan economy are such that commenta- also yields a high-value-low-weight product, tors have periodically suggested that were it ideal for the limited road network and for the not for the fact that the end product is illegal, proven demand within the country, region opium poppy would be the ideal crop for Af- and the world as a whole. The marketing net- ghanistan and development agencies might velopment velopment work is such that traders will often purchase promote its uptake. at the farmgate, mitigating the challenges to farmers of transporting goods across, what The recognition that illegal drug crop cultiva- tive De

a can sometimes be, violent and contested tion has benefited many in rural Afghanistan, territory and reducing the transaction and as it has in other source countries, presents transportation costs they incur when tak- the development community with a number of ltern ing other agricultural goods to market. For conceptual and institutional challenges when those farmers with insufficient land to meet it comes to identifying a constructive and their basic needs, the labor intensity of the consistent way to engage in efforts to reduce opium crop creates significant off-farm em- the negative impact of opium production. For tive to A

a ployment through opportunities to work as example, for development donors tied to the a sharecropper; itinerant harvester; or—for Washington Consensus and its emphasis on those with more capital—as a tenant farmer, “market-based solutions,” it is counterintui- ltern leasing the land of others. tive to intervene and actively seek to under-

n A mine one of the few value chains that works in a For those with access to the right patronage conflict-affected environments where illegal networks, there are further opportunities of drug crops are concentrated. Rather, donors ing

d employment and income generation in the like the United States Agency for Interna-

Fin opium economy: the transportation of both tional Development (USAID) and the United drugs and precursor chemicals within the Kingdom’s Department for International De- 10 country and across its borders, the conver- velopment (DFID) look to work with markets, sion of opium to morphine base and heroin, intervening in order to make them “work for Right: the sale of agricultural inputs and services, the poor.” They do not look to destroy a mar- A farmer shows and the provision of security through each of ket entirely, as is the intent of the prohibition a poppy plant in a northern the stages in the value chain. The scale of the of opium, and they would no doubt question Afghanistan opium economy is such that it is estimated whether such an aim is achievable. poppy field. to provide as many as 410,000 direct jobs Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 11 There are further institutional challenges for most complete absence of government insti- the development community in the narra- tutions in remote areas where these commu- tives about drug-crop-growing households nities live. and the communities to which they belong. Some donors,2 institutions and academics Moreover, many of the development initia- talk of the “poverty” of those growing opium tives designed to directly address drug crop and coca—referring to low levels of literacy, cultivation are often weak and ill-conceived. poor health, limited social and physical infra- Initiatives falling under the rubric of counter- structure and prevailing levels of conflict and insurgency—such as the Quick Impact Proj- violence—and press for assistance to these ects (QIPs) and “stabilization” initiatives— areas. At the same time, other donors will re- have jarred with a development community fer to the relative wealth3 of those that grow that has often expressed doubts as to the ef- drugs—typically referring to their income— ficacy (and ethics) of these efforts. The kind and argue that scarce development funds of alternative development programs typical- should be focused on more vulnerable popu- ly formulated in Afghanistan have been short lations to comply with “pro-poor” mandates. term and suboptimal. They are designed pri- marily to either (1) provide largess to local Moreover, donors may not be consistent in officials and politico-military leaders so that these arguments, changing their views on they can gain access to rural areas to enforce the socio-economic position of those that prohibition, or (2) mitigate the negative eco- grow drug crops and therefore the prior- nomic and political outcomes of dramatic ity given to them following staff turnover or reductions in opium poppy cultivation due shifting political priorities, often drawing on to eradication or the imposition of an opium inconsistent data sets to justify their change ban. in position.4 Indeed, some of the major devel- opment donors have pursued specific “drug An exemplar of this kind of initiative would control” interventions in rural areas that have be the Helmand Food Zone (HFZ), a coun- made development assistance contingent ternarcotics program funded by the UK and on communities agreeing to abandon opium U.S. that provided wheat seed and fertilizer velopment velopment production altogether. These same donors to farmers in the southern province at the subsequently have adopted a position that start of each winter cropping season, from seems to ignore the fact that opium poppy is late 2009 to 2012. This was at a time when tive De

a produced in Afghanistan, failing to mention there was a significant uptick in Afghan and the drugs issue in their strategy papers or in international military forces in Helmand. Al- documents for agricultural programs, includ- though the HFZ helped build some support ltern ing in provinces where opium production is among local political actors, including the concentrated.5 provincial governor at the time—largely due to the patronage they gained from acting as Aside from the challenge of whether wide- intermediaries in the distribution of inputs—it tive to A

a spread illicit drug production is a develop- did nothing to address the long-term causes ment problem, there are also obvious opera- of cultivation in the province. tional challenges associated with working in ltern highly contested areas and understandable To some extent, the causes of cultivation were

n A questions concerning what is realistically addressed—at least in some areas—by the a achievable. Although the mandates of de- wider development, security and governance

ing velopment agencies mention targeting the effort in Helmand. That said, it was not un- d “poorest of the poor” and working with “ex- der the rubric of alternative development or

Fin cluded” and “marginal” populations, access drug control but instead was under the wider to these groups can be particularly problem- “state-building effort” and involved the inflow 12 atic in conflict-affected areas with concen- of large amounts of resources into the well- trated drug crop cultivation. The commitment irrigated area around the provincial center. by some of the large bilateral development Further afield—where resource endowments donors to sector-based programming and were not as favorable, local political struc- “working through government” presents a tures were less hierarchical and development further operational challenge given the al- investments were less dramatic—the rural Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 13 - Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Afghan on Group Working Joint U.S.-Russia - ongo from an It emanates Narcotrafficking. Russia from experts between ing dialogue on identi- focuses that States and the United and potential interest of areas fying common convergence and policy operational of areas - that illicit drug produc the threat concerning both nations. to poses Afghanistan tion in The sections. three is divided into The report reduce to attempts examines section first prior Afghanistan in cultivation opium poppy - Trea Atlantic North the of intervention the to Initially, 2001. in late (NATO) Organization ty - devel alternative of at the experience it looks ini- development the rural opment projects, drug crop at reducing aimed directly tiatives outlines It 1990s. and 1980s the in cultivation Afghanistan in the approach of the failings - les salient the of this period and some over the Subsequently, be drawn. that can sons on ban Taliban the considers section first in fall the regime’s before opium production - this prohi how in particular, explores, It 2001. concept the reinforced and upon built bition politico- and how assistance, conditional of traded often Afghanistan in military leaders funds development in opium for reductions - develop for than rather kudos and political communities. in rural ment outcomes the traces the report of section The second how and livelihoods alternative to evolution both to as a response emerged this concept the in development alternative of the failure architecture development 1990s and the new in Taliban the of the fall following constructed an under to integrate efforts It charts 2001. culti- opium poppy of the causes of standing and programs development rural into vation and why involved, institutions the different faltered. ultimately this approach - recommenda section provides The final States United the and Russia how on tions traction greater gain to together might work best that can interventions development for opi- out of transition farmers’ Afghan support a of context the in livelihoods um-dependent - This is an envi environment. post-transition - and coun both development where ronment increasingly are opportunities ternarcotics reductions security, worsening by hampered and rising investment in public and private opium production. of levels - -

6 population experienced increasing levels of of levels increasing experienced population the opium from This resulted vulnerability. as area growing an ever over imposed ban Force Assistance Security International the their increased soldiers ANSF and (ISAF) area. command canal the central of control did fertilizer and seed wheat of The provision experienced in income not meet the shortfall and the ban households, rural the bulk of by to access restricted on opium production for especially and shelter, water land, credit, The result and sharecroppers. farmers tenant the for into the area out of migration was the in- where the north, to areas mer desert more ultimately cultivation of levels creased canal area. reductions in the than offset This report provides an analysis of the char of an analysis provides This report There are many other examples of these these of other examples many are There - interven single-sector short-term, of kinds the underlying address to tions that failed those for particularly cultivation, of causes dependent on the opium crop most farmers - interven these of Many their livelihood. for development by funded been have tions pressure— to respond to compelled donors international government, Afghan the from to respond and the military—to diplomats - eradica like interventions counternarcotics these of Most plant. not to tion or coercion like and, format had a common interventions assistance development trade to looked HFZ, poppy; grow not to agreement farmers’ for as- simply programs development other economy in the legal sumed that investments in a contraction to automatically lead would a genuine the whole, On opium production. the challenging to response development de- a by hampered lacking, been has problem the tools that lacked community velopment decided that often constructively, engage to was cultivation opium poppy that addressing it did not need yet and that felt hard, too just hands. on its problem another intractable in interventions development of acteristics drug reducing the aim of with Afghanistan al- under the rubric of cultivation—some crop suc- under its others development, ternative - devel rural livelihoods—as alternative cessor, of with the intent designed opment programs opium-de- from move supporting farmers’ earning of ways legal to livelihoods pendent of in a series is the latest The report a living. Institute’s the EastWest by produced papers velopment velopment tive De a ltern tive to A a ltern n A a ing d Fin

14

Kutchi traders at a livestock market, Chaghcharan district, Ghor province. Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 15 - 2.1 Alternative Development 2.1 Alternative the of much throughout and 1980s late the In development a number of were there 1990s, Afghanistan in implemented interventions opium reducing of with the primary objective more a along with UNODC, cultivation. poppy directly funded projects of number limited of the Section (NAS) Affairs the Narcotics by of funded most in Islamabad, Embassy U.S. efforts these the time, At the interventions. development as alternative to referred were de- to used often was term the but programs, ini- development rural of array wide a scribe aimed include activities could These tiatives. yields and incomes, agricultural at improving sistance conditional on reductions in opium on reductions conditional sistance to came Conditionality cultivation. poppy worked process the development shape how institutions how It impacted areas. rural in through communities rural with engaged and “opium clause” the mechanisms like It affect Plans (DCAPs). Action Control Drug Na- the United between ed the relationship organizations, tions and other development shaped the dialogue It also including donors. culminating in actors, with politico-military includ- opium bans, short-term a number of 2000-2001 in the prohibition Taliban the ing season. growing

7 - -

ural development interventions have have interventions development ural ef drug control of been a component first when 1960s, late the since forts

introduced in Thailand. Initially, these de- these Initially, Thailand. in introduced in limited rather were programs velopment on and focused in nature technical scope, alternatives agricultural specific providing illicit drug cultivating who were farmers to high be to tended crops Substitute crops. on opium the returns to value—comparable flowers included coffee, production—and the of the course Over and medicinal plants. sub- crop of as the limits and 1980s, 1970s the gov apparent, more became stitution countries, drug-crop-producing of ernments Drugs for Fund Nations the United along with Na- the United (UNFDAC)—as Control Abuse and Crime (UNODC) Drugs on tions Office By the late 1980s and 1990s, alternative alternative 1980s and 1990s, the late By vehicle primary the became development in il- assistance development delivering for including areas, licit drug-crop-producing - devel alternative of heart the At Afghanistan. during this pe- Afghanistan in opment efforts “conditionality”—in of the concept riod was as- development making act of the this case, was then known—began to experiment with with experiment to then known—began was investments, development of set broader a development alternative of and the concept emerge. to began Prior to 2001 Prior Opium Poppy Cultivation Cultivation Poppy Opium 2. Efforts to Reduce to Efforts 2. R such as irrigation projects; the provision of ag- pected to abandon opium poppy in return for ricultural inputs and livestock interventions; assistance was short (between two to four and more all-encompassing multi-sector pro- years); the development assistance was in- grams that looked to improve the health and sufficient, geographically dispersed and failed education of the local population, as well as to account for both the uneven nature of the local incomes. The common feature of these development process and the fact that mo- alternative development programs was their tivations and factors that influenced opium specific tie to achieving drug control targets poppy cultivation varied across population within a given geographic boundary. groups. The approach was so unrefined that it was often hard to tell the difference between Problems beset each of these projects and projects funded under the rubric of “alterna- programs: all closed early, and none suc- tive development” and those designed simply ceeded in reducing opium poppy cultivation. to offer respite to a rural population that was For example, both UNODC’s projects—the experiencing vulnerability due to conflict and Afghanistan Drug Control and Rural Reha- poverty. bilitation Programme (ADCRRP), which ran from 1989 to 1996, and its Afghanistan Pilot ADCRRP represents an exemplar of such an Program’s8 Poppy Reduction Project (C28), alternative development intervention. Con- which ran from 1997 to 2000—ended earlier sisting of over 200 subprojects implemented than planned due to a lack of funding. The U.S. by more than 40 different international and government also ceased its support to an al- national NGOs and with a budget of only 9.2 ternative development project implemented million USD,11 its activities were scattered

velopment velopment by Mercy Corps International (1989-1999), a across the five provinces of Badakhshan, U.S.-based non-governmental organization, Helmand, Kunar, Nangarhar and Qandahar. a year early due to increased opium poppy There was little hope that ADCRRP could

tive De cultivation in the communities targeted in achieve much beyond the delivery of reha- a Helmand.9 bilitation and reconstruction activities in the different funded sectors: agriculture, health,

ltern A review of these alternative development education, income-generation and infra- interventions, particularly ADCRRP and C28, structure.12 suggests that each suffered from the same structural weakness: the lack of a coherent Yet, despite the limited development impact

tive to A and effective strategy for addressing the that ADCRRP was expected to achieve, the a causes of opium poppy cultivation and, as a program stipulated that communities that re- consequence, the setting of what were unre- ceived assistance should cease opium poppy

ltern alistic goals and timeframes. In the absence cultivation altogether regardless of what ac- of a clear “change model” and how interven- tivities were delivered and who accrued the n A

a tions might address the multifunctional role benefits. It was not apparent how the delivery that opium played in livelihood strategies, of the particular subprojects selected could

ing each project adopted a rather crude model, actually manifest in reducing opium poppy d trading development assistance for reduc- cultivation beyond the requirement that com- Fin tions in opium poppy cultivation. Sometimes, munities sign an agreement to abandon the this was directly with the community and its crop—“a poppy clause.”13 16 political elite; sometimes in conjunction with local political-military actors; and, in the case The poppy clause itself was criticized by im- of UNODC’s C28, sometimes with the Taliban plementing NGOs14 as well as UNODC’s own authorities themselves.10 review team, which went so far as to suggest it was counterproductive. The signed agree- The timeframe that communities were ex- ments brought communities, NGOs and the Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 17 - - -

28 and lack and 26 inappropriate inappropriate 25 - and the then Execu 22 which would undoubtedly undoubtedly which would 23 24 - Proj the final ADCRRP, with As 27 expressed concerns regarding regarding concerns expressed 20 the technical and financial assistance and financial assistance the technical 21 ect Impact Report described C28 as “largely “largely C28 as described Report ect Impact de- agricultural level village wide, a district it distinguish to little with project velopment implemented projects such other many from and NGOs.” agencies international by have led to the channeling of further support the channeling of led to have to the Taliban. the ambition of C28 and the targets that it C28 and the targets the ambition of - cultiva opium poppy reducing for had set about questions raised The donors tion. as or, Taliban the with relationship UNODC’s - “the pre at the time, to referred were they the capacity-building authorities;” sumptive - institu Taliban with doing were they work tions; that UNODC provided to the Taliban’s efforts efforts Taliban’s the to that UNODC provided Kandahar; electrify to The DCAPs and the “conditionality” under “conditionality” and the The DCAPs crit to subject also were which C28 operated as inflexible, Perceived icism. tion over a short period. In the case of C28, C28, of case In the period. a short tion over of in each be eliminated to was opium poppy - Fu period. a four-year over districts the target contingent was assistance development ture reductions of schedule an agreed meeting on as Drug known became in what formalized up by drawn which were Plans, Action Control authorities Taliban the by UNODC and signed of local communities. and representatives Afghanistan UNODC’s of Multiple reviews program ing community ownership, the DCAPs often often the DCAPs ownership, ing community negotiating for than fora more little became authori- local the Taliban, the by assistance - More representatives. and community ties elimination of breach the yearly despite over, not was assistance development schedules, withdrawn. In sum, by the turn of the millennium, alter the millennium, the turn of by In sum, disrepute into had fallen development native tive Director’s efforts to launch a 10-year na- 10-year to launch a efforts Director’s tive tional program, for what was meant to be a pilot program de- be a pilot program to meant what was for and implement replicable develop “to signed in reductions achieving for methodologies Afghanistan,” in cultivation poppy The United 17 At the time, some of of some the time, At 15 In most cases, continued continued cases, In most

16 19

18 UN into the dispute. UN into - deemed ineffec was ADCCRP In the end, opium poppy. in reducing tive cultivation did not lead to the termination of of the termination to did not lead cultivation activities. project Finally, like ADCRRP, C28 also committed to to committed C28 also ADCRRP, like Finally, - cultiva poppy opium in reductions dramatic the NGOs involved in humanitarian work, work, in humanitarian involved the NGOs of the ethics questioned such as demining, on reducing conditional making assistance the poppy cases, In some cultivation. poppy to military commanders local pressed clause - com rural remote of opium crop the destroy - devel of evidence limited despite munities opment impact. - De International for Department Kingdom’s further and—unable went (DFID) velopment that dis- strategy program clear a discern to - devel other rural from ADCRRP tinguished the efficacy opment programs—questioned what ap- undertake funding UNODC to of development rural be conventional to peared projects. However, C28 also consisted of more than more of consisted C28 also However, NGOs, by implemented subprojects 200 Units and Coordination Control the Drug Taliban the to belonged (DCCUs)—which Agricultural the time—and the of authorities - Kanda of the Universities of Departments the budget ADCRRP, Like har and Nangarhar. Of for the task. insufficient also C28 was for in that UNODC received million USD the 10.5 was million USD three approximately funds, as on as well districts, target spent in the four aimed initiatives provincial-level a number of - Tali the provincial support of the at gaining authorities. ban UNODC’s follow-up Poppy Reduction Project Project Reduction Poppy follow-up UNODC’s - pre on its some improvements offered (C28) few. very but ultimately ADCRRP, decessor, ADCRRP of the experience from Learning did C28 spread, geographic disparate its and Shin- districts: four target on efforts its focus of the districts and in Nangarhar district war in Kandahar. and Maiwand Khakrez Ghorak, in Afghanistan. In the absence of a coherent 2.2 The Taliban Ban strategy to address the different reasons why farmers produced opium and the multiple In July 2000, the Taliban announced a com- roles that the crop played in livelihood strate- prehensive ban on opium poppy cultivation gies, alternative development became close- across Afghanistan, contrasting with previ- ly associated with crude efforts to encourage ous counternarcotics efforts in the 1980s those who had gained military power—first and 1990s. Although there had been earlier local warlords and then the Taliban—into efforts to prohibit opium production by lo- coercing the rural population to abandon cal politico-military actors—such as Nasim opium poppy. To those in the drug control Akhundzade in Helmand in the 1989-1990 community, the provision of development as- growing season and Hajji Qadeer in Nangar- sistance appeared to be the means by which har in 1994-1995—these were imposed over to persuade those in positions of power to relatively limited areas. Considerable doubt coerce the population to desist from cultiva- remains as to the effectiveness of these cam- tion rather than a means by which to improve paigns due to the challenges associated with the quality of the lives of those cultivating the estimating levels of cultivation at the time. crop. Devoid of a clear understanding of the The Taliban prohibition in the 2000-2001 multifunctional role of opium production and growing season was markedly different. Ef- how to replace it, alternative development fective across the vast majority of Afghan largely engaged in horse-trading—making of- territory and verified by an international mis- fers of assistance to the local authorities and sion of donor nations,31 the Taliban ban cre- elites within communities in return for poppy ated a precedent that succeeded in changing elimination. perceptions of the nature of state-power in Afghanistan. In reality, none of those involved in this horse- trading kept their end of the deal. For those It is not for this report to offer a detailed delivering the development assistance, the analysis of the Taliban ban, as this has been funds received were insufficient and too done elsewhere.32 Nevertheless, it is worth short-term to deliver the necessary devel- drawing on some of the salient points with opment outcomes required for farmers to regard to the imposition of the ban and how meet their basic needs. Moreover, the ben- it relates to rural development, particularly velopment velopment efits accrued from development assistance the way that a variety of regional and national tended to go to the wealthier members of the actors use drug control to gain both political community who were the least dependent support and development assistance from 29 tive De on opium. Regarding the rural population,

a the international community. Furthermore, few reduced opium poppy cultivation even it is also important to understand the impact where they had signed agreements to refrain of pursuing a course of action that imposes ltern from production, arguing that they could what James Scott refers to as “patterns of not sustain themselves on the limited assis- collective insecurity that affect substantial tance provided without recourse to opium numbers of peasants” on a population with production. “strong communal traditions” and a history

tive to A 33

a of challenging the hegemony of the state. Finally, those charged with imposing a ban and eradicating the crop were reluctant to With regard to drug control, the opium ban ltern compel farmers to abandon the crop if the successfully reduced cultivation in Afghani- rural population were not provided with vi- n A stan as a whole from 82,000 hectares to a able alternatives. Indeed, the local authori- 8,000 hectares between 2000 and 2001, and ties rarely acted against the crop, aware of in Taliban-held areas, from 78,885 hectares to ing

d the fact that power in rural Afghanistan is 1,220 hectares. This was an unprecedented negotiated, decentralized and contested. In

Fin fall in cultivation over a single season, not just the absence of the concentration of coercive in Afghanistan but also in any drug-crop-pro- power, the politico-military leadership in rural 18 ducing countries. Of far greater significance, Afghanistan remained concerned that mar- the ban on opium served a number of more ginalizing large sections of the rural popula- important political objectives for the Taliban tion through eradication or imposing a ban on regime. opium poppy would result in a loss of support and ultimately, political power.30 First and most importantly, the ban on opium projected an image of a regime that had ac- Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 19 - - - - - come of numerous farmers, not only in those those only in not farmers, numerous of come but cultivated was poppy opium where areas of no tradition was there where in areas also and off- both on-farm of loss The cultivation. during opium production from income farm significant. was ban Taliban the the wide- of in the face Maintaining order the by caused dislocation economic spread par been a challenge, have would opium ban did not Taliban the where ticularly in areas the of The imposition presence. a strong have the relationship of the nature changed ban and Taliban the communities, rural between part a played had who elite rural the in those Although coercion prohibition. in imposing the bar element of had been an important and the lo- elites with rural process gaining judiciously used largely it was population, cal critical more far A compliance. encourage to au- more in these consent element in gaining - patron for potential the was areas tonomous as- development future from and rent age that development The expectation sistance. high was be forthcoming would assistance among but particularly society, of at all levels who had tribes population and key the rural the of in the imposition been instrumental ban. - settle the political on opium shifted The ban and much Taliban the between ment reached It is im- rule. during its Afghanistan rural of ev Afghanistan, in that recognize to portant well as has both his constituents ery leader who are adversaries military and political as - fail on their opponent’s adept at capitalizing deals The fragile patronage. deliver to ure im- to order in areas rural in struck were that would dissent without widespread a ban pose ev maintain without some to been hard have economic population’s that the rural idence on a downward not continue would prospects without the that, It is highly likely trajectory. - Tali the assistance, development of delivery under considerable come have would ban to groups tribal key from pressure political that the It is equally likely the ban. abandon - particu capitulated, have would leadership within weaponry of the availability larly given the the region, throughout and Afghanistan own in- Taliban’s and the conflict ongoing served the ban Ultimately, struggles. ternal in position political Taliban’s the weaken to on the the attacks following the countryside, mak 2001, 11, on September States United once collapse to the regime for ing it easier intervened. allies and its the U.S. ------interna their and challenged 34 This was particularly important important particularly was This 35 tional legitimacy as the recognized author as the recognized tional legitimacy Finally, the prohibition of opium production opium production of the prohibition Finally, with the engage nations to Western forced - com it interlocutor; credible as a Taliban short-term provide to donors Western pelled the to in response assistance development - con and to the ban of humanitarian impact with the regime might engage they sider how development long-term to medium- through support. ity and occupiers of the official seat at the at seat official the of occupiers and ity Nations. United - co of concentration necessary the quired and large the population over power ercive - fol persisted image This territory. of tracts in November Taliban the of the fall lowing allies Western the and is something 2001, of with the establishment replicate to sought the of the course over government the new the opium Second, project. state-building inter regime’s Taliban the recast helped ban the following state as a pariah national image the due to criticism it received widespread op- its Laden, Bin Osama to gave it succor and and women groups minority of pression in the engaged directly that it was allegations the ban Third, opium. of and trade production the official embarrass to on opium served the the time, of Afghanistan of government Front, United In terms of domestic politics, the ban was was the ban politics, domestic of In terms banned Taliban When the successful. less far op- other economic few were there opium, - the cessa With Afghanistan. in portunities the across cultivation opium poppy tion of of cultivation widespread and the area entire the oppor had not only lost farmers wheat, given the impact that the ongoing conflict conflict that the ongoing the impact given the drought population, Afghan had on the countryside the of parts some had beset that that problems growing the and 1998 since Af their for donor funds the UN had raising high opium, of price The low ghan program. in rural unrest and a growing prices wheat heart Taliban’s the of in some areas—even that the region—meant lands in the southern funds raise to as an opportunity served ban losing rapidly population that was a rural for im- deliver to failing with a regime patience welfare. in economic provements land, own opium on their cultivate to tunity they the daily wages had lost also but they harvesters as itinerant working from earned At afield. or further in a neighboring district had opium production from income the time, in- the overall of an important part become 3. The Shift to and from Alternative Livelihoods

3.1 Alternative Livelihoods: The Security Sector Reform (SSR) process also placed key donors in charge of coordi- Alternative Development nating the international effort in the reform in a Changing Development of the Afghan Army (United States), Police (Germany), Disarmament and Reintegration Paradigm (Japan), Justice (Italy) and Counter Narcot- ics (United Kingdom) units. These “lead na- With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the po- tions,” initially charged with coordinating in- litical landscape changed significantly. Along- ternational assistance with the newly formed velopment velopment side shifts in development thinking, there Interim Administration and supporting the was a move away from the small-scale geo- authorities in developing comprehensive graphically focused alternative development strategies, soon acquired a growing responsi-

tive De interventions implemented in Afghanistan in

a bility for funding and implementing programs the 1990s. There was little appetite for inter- in their particular area of security sector ventions that placed drug control at the fore- reform.

ltern front of international state-building efforts to extract reductions in cultivation from Afghan Within the development architecture of sec- leaders in return for development assistance. toral assistance, NPPs and SSR, there was less space for the kind of alternative develop-

tive to A Furthermore, at the turn of the 21st century,

a ment projects of the past. Many rural areas donors began to prioritize sector-based in- were also decidedly more congested than terventions, with Western nations and mul- they were in the 1990s, with multiple agencies ltern tilateral institutions supporting wide-scale and initiatives operating in the same districts reform across entire areas of government de- n A and communities, often regardless of wheth- a livery, including health, education, rural devel- er opium poppy was cultivated or not. With opment and roads. In Afghanistan, sectoral

ing large national sectoral programs being de-

d assistance often took the form of technical signed and implemented and a multitude of support to central ministries in Kabul, as well Fin national, international and non-governmental as funds for the delivery of national develop- organizations working across rural Afghani- ment programs. Much of this assistance was 20 stan, there were few areas where drug control directed through the World Bank, which took organizations like UNODC could set apart, Right: the lead in the design and oversight of the Na- call their own, and implement a range of dif- View over tional Priority Programs (NPPs) and admin- ferent sectoral programs tied to reductions in Surkhrud istered the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust district, opium production. The policy of conditional- Nangarhar Fund (ARTF) from which donor funds were ity was also rejected in the initial years after province. pooled and prioritized. the fall of the Taliban by most of the major do- Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 21 nors on the grounds that it would undermine implemented between 2003 and 2007 cost efforts to build a social contract between the 600 million USD. Bilateral programs, such as Afghan state and the rural population, one the U.S. government’s Rebuilding Agricultural of the core objectives of the reconstruction Markets Program (RAMP), had a budget of effort. 143 million USD between 2003 and 2007. The development landscape of the post-Taliban In fact, there was broad support for an ap- era was fundamentally different from that of proach that put reconstruction and de- the 1990s. velopment first. Even those leading global counternarcotics efforts within the U.S. ad- ministration—who had long been advocates 3.2 Development in a Drugs of aggressive eradication in other parts of the Environment: Building world—realized that the situation in Afghani- stan was qualitatively different from other Ownership amongst the drug-producing nations. For example, Rand Development Community Beers, the then head of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics It was also recognized that there was no and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), argued single project or program that could ad- that the scale of cultivation within the coun- dress the multiple factors that have led to try, the formidable challenges the population the expansion of opium poppy cultivation in faced following the civil war, drought, the col- Afghanistan, and that a more concerted and lapse of state institutions, and the amount of comprehensive effort was required. Counter- reconstruction and development assistance narcotics had been made a cross-cutting is- that was to be made available meant that re- sue under the Interim Afghanistan National sponses to drug production in Afghanistan Development Strategy (I-ANDS), and the Na- needed to be different from those in other tional Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) of 2003 source countries. As such, neither INL nor called for the mainstreaming of counternar- USAID pressed for rural development pro- cotics policy in national and provincial plans grams specifically aimed at reducing opium and strategies.37 Intimately linked with the poppy cultivation or for making development concept of counternarcotics mainstreaming, assistance contingent on reductions in pop- the intention of alternative livelihoods was

velopment velopment py cultivation. Instead, the emphasis in these to integrate efforts to address the causes of initial years was on designing a wide range of opium poppy cultivation in the wider policies development interventions that would meet and programs of international, national and

tive De the immediate needs of the Afghan popula- non-governmental organizations working in a tion and, in part, address the causes of opium rural Afghanistan. This move was a recogni- poppy cultivation. tion that the drugs issue in Afghanistan, as

ltern it is elsewhere, was a complex and “wicked Indeed, the term “alternative livelihoods” problem”38 where a “whole-of-government” was established to signify change and to approach was needed, not only by the Afghan move away from the alternative develop- government but also by the donors and, par-

tive to A ment model that had been rejected by the ticularly, the development institutions within a development community in Afghanistan and Western governments that programmed more broadly.36 It represented a break from much of the assistance being given to

ltern an approach to development assistance that Afghanistan. had—perhaps unfairly—become increasingly n A

a associated with crop substitution as well as Over time, the Russian government began to with UNODC, an organization whose develop- support a more comprehensive development ing

d ment capacity was being questioned by many response to opium production in Afghani- donors following its experience with ADCRRP stan. Although Russian government support Fin and C28 in the 1990s. The development fund- for development had been negligible since ing available for Afghanistan far exceeded the 1990s and it did not invest directly in ef- 22 any of the alternative development programs forts to reduce opium poppy cultivation, de- of the past, and was beyond the capacity of a spite requests,39 its thinking was shaped by single agency to manage. For example, multi- the investments the Union of Soviet Socialist lateral initiatives, such as the first phase of the Republics (USSR) had made in Afghanistan in National Solidarity Program (NSP)—a com- the 1970s and 1980s.40 In particular, in 2014, munity-based rural development program— Russia mounted an initiative that called for a Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 23 - - - - the drugs the drugs 43 - cross-govern required Afghanistan in issue within just not ownership, and support ment West among but also government Afghan the achieved. not was This nations. donor ern showed Hamid Karzai President Afghan Then the despite the subject and, in little interest and then nation” “lead Kingdom’s United prime UK successive role, nation” “partner was what fully understand to failed ministers required. leadership neither the political What is more, allies Western nor among the Afghanistan in - understand and consistent had a common the to it related or how issue the drugs ing of forms— various its in project” “Afghan wider building or counter state counterterrorism, with charged institutions Those insurgency. counternarcot on deliver to responsibility and Inter- Drugs Afghan as the UK ics—such and the Bureau Unit (ADIDU) Departmental - Enforce and Law Narcotics International of of Department U.S. in the (INL) Affairs ment did nor levers, the all control not State—did to capacity the technical have always they institutions those with constructively engage gover security, delivering for responsible growth. and economic nance and institutions of strand parallel as a up Set of in a state themselves found they activities, and the resources for competition constant did who leaders, political senior of attention is- the drugs of the relevance see not always - a com and lacked the wider mission, sue to manage best to how of mon understanding widespread of consequences negative the - con the drugs Moreover, opium production. as pursuing seen often was community trol targets—specifically, drug control short-term opium of in annual levels reductions dramatic viewed often were cultivation—that poppy 3.3. Beneath the Veneer: A A the Veneer: Beneath 3.3. Reluctance and the to Engage QuorumLoss of those by made efforts of number a Despite - pro livelihoods in rural involved most donors - devel into drugs integrate better to grams made was progress little programs, opment this for The reasons with implementation. and political largely and were manifold were chal- the ubiquitous in addition to technical, interested of quorum a maintaining of lenge Kabul. in turnover staff the rapid given donors problem,” “wicked a complex, As - - -

41 This - re 42 comprehensive response that looked beyond beyond looked that response comprehensive - and agricul crops in high-value investments in- wider that impact the for pressed and ture enterprises large infrastructure, in vestment had that the USSR in the sectors (including and job and 1980s) the 1970s in supported on opium production. have would creation funding and lacked Although this approach - the evo it highlighted traction, gain to failed of and a wider recognition thinking lution of development. alternative of the limits The World Bank also developed a guide- developed Bank also World The Problem Opium the “Treating for line note Afghanistan” in Bank Operations World in “counternarcot as known or what became There were periods when some of the larg of periods when some were There en- Afghanistan in donors development est an un- to integrate in efforts heavily gaged the and cultivation crop drug of derstanding livelihood in rural it plays multifunctional role plan- development broader into strategies - the Eu Bank, Development Asian The ning. Bank all World and the Commission ropean their aimed at designing initiatives pursued - effec be more could that they so programs opium poppy of the causes in addressing tive ap- also were NPPs number of A cultivation. to and implementation during design praised the of account better took that they ensure and traded produced, were that opiates fact were programs These Afghanistan. in used might bet that their activities so adjusted not make at least, or, causes the address ter such This included programs worse. matters - Proj Access Rural as the National Emergency and the National Horticulture ect (NERAP), Emergency the and (NHLP) Project Livestock (EIRP). Project Rehabilitation Irrigation Annex (see guidelines” mainstreaming ics further, Bank went World the DFID and I). de- how examining a major report producing the address better might efforts velopment cultivation. opium poppy of causes port served as the justification for the design for the design as the justification port served and Rural Agriculture the Comprehensive of de- a rural (CARD-F), - Facility Development and identify to designed program velopment in operations turnkey then support potential where opportunity economic of areas rural opium poppy had been all but eliminated. by members of the development, diplomatic would be held responsible for any subsequent and security communities as detrimental to fluctuations in opium poppy cultivation. They their institutional objectives. were of the view that no good would come of being part of what might be perceived as a The development community itself faced counternarcotics mandate and would argue

velopment velopment major challenges building ownership over that doing so would run contrary to the pro- the drugs issue in Afghanistan. This was par- poor development objectives of their institu- ticularly true for senior officials in Afghan de- tion. Afghan leadership would typically follow

tive De velopment ministries and Western donors. this lead, absent pressure to engage from a Both preferred to see the drugs issue as one their main development donors. for someone else to deal with—typically the

ltern growing drug control community that inhab- Another challenge, particularly in the forma- ited institutions such as the Afghan Ministry tive years of the Western allies’ intervention in of Counter Narcotics (previously the Coun- Afghanistan, was the largely bilateral strategy ter Narcotics Directorate); INL; the British of USAID. The scale of the U.S. development

tive to A Embassy Drugs Team (BEDT); and law en- budget and its focus on implementing bilater- a forcement organizations within the Afghan al programs through contractors meant that Ministry of Interior and the international it could pursue its own agenda, separate from

ltern community, such as the U.S. Drug Enforce- that of the other major donors. Thus, while ment Administration (DEA) and the UK’s Se- some of the largest development donors in- n A

a rious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). volved in rural development—such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, the ing

d Regarding Western development donors, se- European Commission and the DFID—would nior managers were particularly resistant to meet to discuss how to better integrate the Fin engaging with the drugs issue. Although tech- drugs issue into their development plans and nocrats in Kabul responsible for programs even pursue joint initiatives between 2005 24 promoting development in rural Afghanistan and 2009, USAID often was absent from the would rarely countenance designing or fund- discussions. Instead, it pursued large bilat- ing an intervention that ignored the country’s eral programs, some of which were described most valuable export, many senior officials as alternative livelihoods (and then, following in capitals did not want to see their organiza- a change of ambassador, alternative develop- tion engage on counternarcotics, fearing they ment) and others as rural development, often Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 25 powered tubewell tubewell powered province. irrigating former former irrigating of the Boghra the Boghra of Ali Nad e in canal, desert land north land north desert Helmand district, Left: A reservoir A reservoir Left: filled by a solar by a filled - - - cal population. This was all to be worked out be worked all to This was population. cal individual NPPs during the implementation of programs. or bilateral dif these between synergies to build Efforts the at programs designed centrally ferent, of were level provincial and district local, - Pro The National Solidarity hampered. ten local establish to intended was (NSP) gram planning in the development mechanisms for Councils Development Community of form programs and ministries but some (CDCs), At them. through work to reluctant were plans development provincial build to tempts Development Area-Based under the National This led faltered. also (NABDP) Programme - develop community the counternarcotics to a plans for provincial ing counternarcotics - the tech through provinces key number of of the Ministry to support it provided nical on focus a heavy to Due Narcotics. Counter - trac gain to and the failure counternarcotics community, development wider the in tion this initiative strings, which held the purse unsuccessful. proved - provin coherent of the problem to Related plans was development cial- and district-level the Integrating capacity. technical of the issue rural into cultivation opium poppy of causes - understand interventions; development by differ cultivation for the reasons ing how - - - - donor discus from USAID of The absence that it per as the perception well as sions, - the integra preventing further constraint A was the wider development into drugs tion of mostly Designed itself. the planning process were programs development Kabul, from and provinces the identifying generic, rather in with little de- work would that they districts of context on the specifics lacked They tail. endowments the resource areas, particular the of nature and diverse and the complex lo- the by pursued strategies livelihood rural with no clarity as to what differentiated one what differentiated as to with no clarity the other. from - liveli alternative distinct of with a set sisted match not did projects, hoods/development present in Kabul technocrats the messages The ministries. development Afghan the to ed - devel “alternative of a type of continuation - the ten the 1990s reinforced from opment” donors Western in managers senior of dency projects boundaried development for look to “counternarcotics.” label as could that they to managers senior allowed This seemingly within their own pressure political to respond in counternarcot and engage governments distance— while maintaining a strategic ics, their into drugs integrate to did not have they and programs development of wider portfolio Afghanistan. dialogue in policy socio-economic group; and designing inter- It was assumed that less harmful interven- ventions that, at best, reduce the dependency tions that increased irrigation would lead to on opium as a livelihood strategy and, at least, higher wheat yields and an uptake of value do not make matters worse, required a deep in annual and perennial horticulture; this as- knowledge of rural Afghanistan.44 This was sumption failed to recognize that without the knowledge that many donors and the con- agricultural inputs and market support for tractors that implemented their programs— these crops, these interventions could just including those that provided technical assis- as easily lead to an increase in the amount of tance to Afghan development ministries—did land dedicated to a higher yielding poppy.53 not possess. Although this lack of knowledge For example, the initial appraisal of the World became a consequence of the deteriorating Bank’s Agriculture Sector Review that began security conditions and the stringent duty of in 2012 ignored opium production despite care that Western donors imposed upon their plans to bring tens of thousands of hectares staff, it was also a function of high staff turn- of land under irrigation, including in some of over beleaguering the Afghan reconstruction the major opium-growing provinces in the effort since its start. southern region. It was only after 12 months into the appraisal process that a review was In the absence of knowledge about rural Af- done to look at the potential impact the pro- ghanistan, the default scenario for develop- posed interventions might have on opium ment organizations was to assume that an production.54 intervention that promotes growth in the le- gal economy would lead to a contraction in Ultimately, the lack of senior political leader- the opium economy. There is a litany of de- ship, the inconsistent and insufficient owner- velopment programs that followed just such ship of the drugs issue among the develop-

velopment velopment a lead, including the current USAID Regional ment community, centralized and disparate Agricultural Development Programs (RADPs) development planning processes, and the for South (125 million USD),45 North (78.5 limited technical capacity described above 46 47 tive De million USD) and West (70 million USD) as resulted in intermittent and inconsistent en- a well as the Commercial Horticulture and Ag- gagement by development organizations on ricultural Marketing Program (CHAMP) (45 the drugs issue in Afghanistan. Indeed, the 48 ltern million USD). Criticized by USAID’s own In- degree of involvement was a function of the spector General,49 this approach—according personality and persistence of technical staff to a recent evaluation—rested on a false as- with responsibility for rural development pro- sumption in the case of the program, Incen- grams, and the degree of political pressure

tive to A tives Driving Economic Alternatives-North applied by Western governments. a East West (160 million USD)50 in the province of Nangarhar.51 Periods of peak engagement often occured

ltern when levels of opium poppy cultivation in- Indeed, programs like the Helmand Food creased nationally or in a particular province, n A

a Zone highlight the consequences of failing to especially one where a Western government consider adequately the impact that encour- led the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), ing aging widespread wheat cultivation would and development staff would find themselves d have on different population groups, margin- compelled to engage directly in counternar- Fin alizing the land-poor and driving them into cotics efforts. This was largely driven by the the former desert areas of Helmand. There, perception that rising levels of cultivation re- 26 they became more dependent on opium pro- flected a failure in the state-building project in duction, as well as ardent supporters of the Afghanistan or, worse still, represented poor insurgency, whose agricultural practices led performance of a Western nation’s military to increasing levels of salinization and falling and civilian effort within the province where levels of ground water.52 cultivation was increasing. When levels of cul- tivation were static or falling, there would be Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 27 - - - Sec not exist. it does has shown Afghanistan specificity of an appearance it provides ond, - funds and reduc of an investment between spe- that development tions in cultivation the particularly given offer, rarely can cialists and monitoring prevailing in the weakness the development of mechanisms evaluation and the reliance Afghanistan in community on attitudinal surveys. aspect of valuable the most perhaps Finally, a it provides is that conditionality of a policy recriminations subsequent for target political cultivation in opium poppy when reductions not sustained. are or when they do not occur is a resur there or fall to fails cultivation Once - blame the national lead to it is easy gence, officials district governors, provincial ership, “lack of their for leaders community or even their cynicism drug control; to commitment” and not living monies in taking development and perhaps the bargain; their side of up to in the and involvement their corruption even claims these of Although many trade. drugs - fundamen conditionality be true in part, may - the decentral reflect to fail to tally continues power political of nature and contested ized is that those The reality Afghanistan. in rural - the capac do not have power of in positions impose to were if they that power retain to ity - sec on large hardship periods of prolonged population. the rural tions of - ca coercive of kind the to recourse Without conditionality, enforce to required pacity cul- in drug crop reductions looking for those at a dif work to have Afghanistan in tivation instruments. unfamiliar with and pace ferent with the understanding a common Reaching improved how as to community development and economic protection social welfare, opium of the causes address can growth dependency and reduce cultivation poppy would strategy as a livelihood on drug crops and donors development with Working help. and pipe- that current ensure to ministries of levels growing to lead not do programs line increasing the population’s or to cultivation - as a liveli on opium production dependency an invaluable prove also would hood strategy exercise. Over Over 55

56 no such pressure, and senior development development and senior no such pressure, from staff their dissuade even would officials when at all—even issue in the drugs engaging providing were funding were they programs opium production where in areas assistance concentrated. was The reality is conditionality, and what ap- what and conditionality, is reality The - devel of exchange be a simplistic to pears reduce to a commitment for opment inputs - attrac a certain retains cultivation, crop drug leadership. political senior to particularly tion, directly assistance development tying First, causality infers in cultivation reductions to - and drug con inputs development between in rural evidence where even outcomes, trol time, alternative livelihoods came to be seen seen be to came livelihoods alternative time, development alternative with synonymous as notably with the areas—most and in some under in Helmand seed wheat of provision look to began initiative—even Zone the Food that even an approach substitution, crop like had abandoned community the drug control that designed those In 2012, in the 1980s. Zone Food the Kandahar and implemented and representatives community asked (KFZ) sign agreements to authorities the provincial this inputs—in development committed that - sys irrigation the of the rehabilitation case, to commit to communities for return tem—in two-year a within poppy opium growing not time frame. In the absence of a more consistent and consistent a more of In the absence by issue on the drugs engagement meaningful Afghan and donors development a quorum of filled community the drug control ministries, default the that say to fair is it fact, In gap. the - institu been one where has typically position of Ministry Afghan the tions such as UNODC, pushed what have and INL Narcotics Counter model in as a development perceive they - condi for calls repeating areas, drug-growing to aid tied that compact” “social a or tionality cultivation. in opium poppy reductions 3.4. Reverting to Type: 3.4. Reverting to Type: the Left by Filling the Gap CommunityDevelopment Afghan police destroy poppy in the eastern province of Kunar, Afghanistan. velopment velopment tive De a ltern tive to A a ltern n A a ing d Fin

28 Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 29 - production are a direct result of the specific the of result direct a are production this Surprisingly, funded. activities line of as much in fragile prevails the world of view in the as it does states and conflict-affected na- Western made in developed investments weak of challenges the is despite This tions. sover domestic of lack conflict, institutions, that make poverty of and high levels eignty qualita- states fragile and conflict-affected different. tively the from learned lessons the Unfortunately, Afghanistan— in assistance of decade last been have in cultivation reductions where - a much wider pro be a function of to found - improve that includes development of cess - and diversi governance in security, ments to be livelihoods—continue in rural fication - recogni is growing there Although ignored. on opium dependency of tion that the degree group socio-economic by differs production and endowments both the resource and by these area, a given in relations societal state de- program built into rarely still are lessons reduction of the pace inform sign and seldom - the ini from expect might that policymakers fund. they tiatives - re deliver to promise to continue Programs wide a over production opium in ductions fund- Current and a short time frame. area worse, matters ing mechanisms only make the financial looking for those compelling in a drug- a program implement to resources can what they overstate to area crop-growing or a project of within the life achieve hope to making with those traction gain To program. to required are they decisions, budgetary thereby achieve, to what it is possible oversell the of “failure” the of the perception adding to - devel alternative many so and—like program the 1990s—increasing in programs opment funds. withdrawing of the likelihood the ma- that one of has shown This report - Afghani in missing components funding jor constructive has been consistent, stan -

- experi of decades three almost fter in opium- development with rural ence Afghanistan, in areas poppy-growing

Recommendations Conclusionand The persistence of the “carrot-and-stick” “carrot-and-stick” the of persistence The - It is a con simplicity. with its lies approach turnover not only the high staff of sequence - bureau government Western in see that we - the teleologi of an example also but cracies, officials and which many prism through cal where world, the see to continue scholars in drug crop such as a reduction outcomes ing development in drug-crop-growing areas areas in drug-crop-growing ing development It remains falter. to continue Afghanistan of look policymakers senior that many the case to illicit drug crop solution a simple find to understand that they solution cultivation—a superi- their political to easily sell and can project development a rural This is often ors. “credible” as a is described what to linked and conditionality— campaign eradication is Success approach. “carrot-and-stick” the of amount in the reductions by measured still cultivation of or the net level destroyed crop improvements sustained of and not in terms and communities rural of life of in the quality as production opium on dependency lower a strategy. a livelihood - re to attempts that shown has report This conduct of on and practice the debate frame there remains a great deal of confusion over over confusion of deal a great remains there are interventions of kinds what and terms out transitions support farmers’ to required that is clear It cultivation. poppy opium of out it set is not what livelihoods” “alternative from away behind moving The idea be. to development rural integrated boundaried, - develop as alternative programs—known within the development work to ment—was in established being that was architecture that believed Many post-2001. Afghanistan - un were programs development alternative thinking with wider development coordinated was assistance with how in particular, and, the fall after Afghanistan in being structured of the Taliban. A engagement by the development commu- lem when under pressure from ministries nity—both internal and international. Devel- within their own governments. For example, opment donor-engagement on the drugs is- between 2004 and 2009, when the drugs is- sue falls into three broad categories: (1) sue was a priority for the U.S. government, reluctance, (2) compartmentalization and much of USAID’s expenditures on rural de- (3) mainstreaming. velopment were labeled as “alternative devel- opment.” After 2009, the proportion of total The first category of engagement—reluc- expenditures on rural development that were tance—has typically taken the form of ignor- considered “alternative development” fell ing the drugs issue altogether or “assuming it significantly, even if some of the programs away.” Without political pressure to engage in being funded remained largely the same. any substantive way—including the concomi- The Afghan government’s flagship program, tant quantitative targets and performance the National Solidarity Program (NSP) went indicators that often accompany counter- from being labeled as counternarcotics ex- narcotics when it is deemed a priority—the penditures by some donors to being labeled development community has taken a rather as counterinsurgency, after 2009. As with circumscribed view of the importance of the alternative development programs of the drugs economy within the wider political 1990s, these compartmentalized interven- economy of Afghanistan. This approach has tions rarely worked beyond the specific area often been adopted by development donors they were operating in and did not engage during periods when other priorities—includ- with the wider development policy debates ing growing insecurity, corruption, concerns and processes. over the transfer of civilian power during the 2014 presidential elections, as well as the The final category of development donor-en- transition of Western military forces—have gagement on the drugs issue in Afghanistan— been considered more pressing to the suc- counternarcotics mainstreaming—has been cess of the “Afghan project.” intermittent. It was driven by development practitioners and technocrats who under- The reluctance engagement approach has stood that it is not appropriate to undertake

velopment velopment dominated the development community over rural development in Afghanistan without un- the last decade. This reflects the failure by derstanding the multifunctional role opium many in the international community, not just production plays in rural livelihoods and how

tive De development donors, to engage with complex programs might impact levels of opium de- a and dynamic phenomena that sit beyond pendency. The approach also recognizes that the mandate of a single government depart- efforts to reduce the dependency on opium

ltern ment or agency, as well as the tendency to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan need to ad- concentrate efforts on short-term political dress the wider political economy integrated priorities. As this paper has shown, it has led across national development policy and plan- to rural programs that have, on a number of ning rather than be limited to discrete, rural

tive to A occasions, made things worse, increased the development efforts. It requires development a vulnerability of marginal groups—such as the organizations to take a more explicit role in land-poor—and resulted in growing levels of addressing the harms of both illicit drugs and

ltern opium poppy cultivation. The approach is a drug policy focused on short-term targets. counterintuitive, neither making the best use n A

a of funds nor delivering on development out- Challenges to this approach are numerous comes or counternarcotics objectives. and remain so, largely due to the lack of politi-

ing cal commitment by the development donors d Donor compartmentalization of the drugs and the Afghan government. Yet, counternar- Fin issue took the form of a return to discrete, cotics mainstreaming remains the only viable boundaried interventions. Compartmental- way forward, particularly given the reduction 30 ization—often labeled as “alternative liveli- in development funds and the significant hoods” or “alternative development” be- challenges associated with implementing de- cause they were located in areas of poppy velopment programs in what is an increasing- cultivation, even if they largely ignored the ly insecure space in rural Afghanistan. Given crop—allowed development donors to claim this, this report recommends the following: that they were addressing the opium prob- Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 31 - - - - - ments in each of these sectors could either either could sectors these of in each ments impact the negative reduce to support efforts opiates, of and use trade the production, of USAID worse. matters make could or they adopt a po- programs its that should ensure “do-no-harm.” sition of - Afghani in measurement Performance the assessment to prioritize needs stan Em diversification. and income crop of opium that replacing shows research pirical is typically or other staples with wheat poppy and that coercion to response a short-term - produc opium resume soon will farmers that endur demonstrates Experience tion. a function are in cultivation ing reductions into movement diversification, livelihood of - reduc and crops, horticultural high-value as well and maize, wheat like tions in staples move to need a is There income. non-farm as - fail and success the measuring from away on the based efforts counternarcotics of ure It has prov grown. opium poppy of hectares policy and has distorted be unhelpful en to discussions. towards move is a need to there In this regard, evaluation monitoring and effective more - both develop that capture (M&E) systems in- outcomes, ment and counternarcotics and imagery geospatial of cluding the use - assess of methods Current . mapping crop development rural of performance the ing These on attitudinal surveys. rely programs verifiable not provide do and unreliable are what is actually happening data concerning - sys information Geographic on the ground. - pro imagery and high-resolution (GIS) tems diversification data on livelihood vide robust of the results assessing to invaluable that are and ef investments development both rural on opium dependency farmer reduce to forts of has a program already USAID production. great give support but needs to monitoring Both mapping. crop of the use to er priority States—through United and the Russia press Vienna—should in their missions its analytical and GIS UNODC to improve in GIRoA that it can support so capacity that M&E systems of the development amount the changing not only measure - re of the type assess but also poppy, of understanding thereby crops, placement are in cultivation reductions whether any sustainable. - and that this assistance, and that this assistance, need to be reviewed to see if to see need to be reviewed , USAID has a USAID , perspective a bilateral From programs development rural number of ad- to designed are claims that it currently cultivation, drug crop of the causes dress - Re (KFZ), Zone Food such as the Kandahar Program Development Agricultural gional and RADP-West RADP-North, (RADP)-South, another designing is also USAID CHAMP. Agricultural Regional the east, for program these All of (RADP-East). East Development programs of should be conducted similar review A to program wider development USAID’s growth, in economic interventions include its Invest and education. health governance, Russia and the United States and the United States Russia In particular, at the Bank World the should approach is- on the drugs to reengage level highest Bank The World . urgency of matter a as sue - creden development necessary the both has - with coun experience tials and considerable Afghanistan in mainstreaming ternarcotics and support GIRoA to equipped and is best national into drugs factor to other agencies and planning. policy development in their de- practices build on best they the multi- signs and adequately address - in the live opium poppy of functional role population groups the different lihoods of areas. geographic in their target Through their delegations, Russia and the the and Russia delegations, their Through - should mount similar advo States United financial with international efforts cacy - develop and multilateral institutions Na- —such as the United institutions ment to (UNDP)— Programme tions Development - their pro ensure also that they request as a include drugs Afghanistan in grams . issue cross-cutting Russia and the United States should jointly States and the United Russia Government the press individually and Afghanistan of the Islamic Republic of issue drugs that the to request (GIRoA) development into national be factored and the U.S. Russia this, achieve To planning. Finance that the Ministry of should request a mandatory review introduce GIRoA of to ensure assistance all development of on its impact of full account that it takes counternarcotics “do-no-harm” with conforms at a minimum, principles. ANNEX 1

Treating the Opium Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan

A Draft Guideline (Final version - Drafted 23/11/2007)

A. Strategic Approach

The opium problem

Reducing opium production is one of the greatest challenges facing Afghanistan. Opium is central to the macroeconomy, contributing one third of GDP and significant support for ag- gregate demand and the balance of payments. In the rural economy, opium is a key liveli- hoods coping strategy for as many as 350,000 farm families, most of them poor. In the area of security, opium is fuelling warlordism and terrorism, and in governance the illegal economy is capturing or undermining state building efforts at all levels.

Government strategy

Government’s strategy to reduce and ultimately eliminate opium from the Afghan economy comprises essentially three elements. The first is to improve governance and the rule of law, velopment velopment strengthening public institutions and mechanisms to control drugs, together with the devel- opment of responsible governance structures and the “social contract” at all levels from the community up. The second is to raise the general level of economic activity and services,

tive De improving living standards and providing social protection. The third is to emphasize in devel- a opment programs specific components that can have a significant impact on farmer behavior, with a focus on poorer farmers, laborers and more vulnerable areas. ltern World Bank approach

With this background, the World Bank’s working approach to the opium problem is: tive to A a • to factor considerations of the opium problem into analysis and dialogue at all levels, including the macroeconomic dimension ltern • to support and engage in analytical work on the development dimensions of the drug

n A problem in Afghanistan and associated options for addressing it a • to help support the development elements of the Government’s strategy through Bank-financed programs as appropriate ing

d • to ensure that the activities supported by the Bank do not inadvertently contribute in

Fin any way to the opium economy

32 Screening Under this approach, the Bank proposes to screen all its activities in Afghanistan, both opera- tions and analytical and advisory work, to ensure that counter-narcotics aspects are treat- ed consistently and in a way that can make the maximum contribution to the national ef- fort against drugs. The screening process will demonstrate to what extent the operation or activity: Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 33 - - - es synergies to deliver broad livelihoods impacts at the community and at the community impacts livelihoods broad deliver to synergies es coverage area geographical by impacts counter-narcotics specific more es s risks and develops an approach to ensure that Bank support “does no “does that Bank support ensure to an approach and develops s risks ontains a monitoring and reporting capability that can effectively track outcomes outcomes track effectively that can capability and reporting ontains a monitoring ontributes to the governance agenda the governance to ontributes related to the opium economy the opium to related harm” and does not create risks to the Bank’s reputation the Bank’s to risks not create does and harm” household level household which strengthen components with groups, target the poorer addressing and by livelihoods legal and diversify C Maximiz Maximiz Identifie C

1. 2. 5. 3. 4. With these characteristics – and despite law enforcement efforts – opium poppy is a relatively relatively is a – opium poppy efforts enforcement law – and despite characteristics these With farmers both – for a high risk environment in what is generally areas in many risk crop low pay an advance that provides as salaam, known system credit The traditional and traders. to the according differ opium poppy with cultivating associated advantages The economic opium poppy landowners, large few relatively the For at their disposal. have farmers assets immediately if it is not sold value greater even accrue that can crop a high-value represents other income have farmers larger As rise. when prices on, but later season the harvest after Moreover, in the year. later selling by higher prices realize can they and liquid assets, streams better: do even can opium production for arrangements sharecropping who make landlords Opium poppy can be cultivated almost anywhere in the country, although it grows best in free in free best although it grows in the country, anywhere almost be cultivated can poppy Opium that conditions agro-climatic Afghanistan’s to suited well is so It soils. loam sandy draining and maximizes opium and morphine raw of yields average higher than the global it produces cru- proven have marketability and its attribute This latter water. irrigation scarce to returns where areas in remote particularly families, and large with small landholdings farmers cial to farmers small marginal For concentrated. increasingly is becoming cultivation opium poppy when opi- returns; the same provide that can conditions under current is no other crop there also will such households for income farm for the opportunities areas, in those um declines driving people off the land. decline, of opium production benefits the considerable of distribution Uneven ing opium poppy. It is a high-value, low-weight, durable commodity, for which there is strong is strong which there for commodity, durable low-weight, It is a high-value, ing opium poppy. mar well-developed value chain and of the stage each returns at sufficient are There demand. which function well all of and processing, transport, purchase, credit, of in terms linkages ket at to purchase willing are Traders infrastructure. fractured Afghanistan’s despite and flexibly the harvest. of in advance often cash, for gate the farm cultivation opium poppy favored has increasingly crop, a future of amount ment on an agreed credit to access entrenched, has become poppy in which opium In areas other crops. over and willingness This crop. this cultivate to willingness farmer’s a on dependent become has determined increasingly have opium poppy cultivate skills to the requisite of the possession - poten by determined has become land also of value The rental land. to access sharecroppers’ productivity. wheat than by tial opium yields rather In Afghanistan’s current economic and political climate there are many advantages to cultivat to advantages many are there climate political and economic current Afghanistan’s In Reasons for the “success” of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in cultivation poppy of “success” the for Reasons B. Understanding Opium in Livelihood Strategies the Role of Responses Development and Devising Appropriate some inequitable sharecropping arrangements allow the landowner to take two thirds of the final opium yield, despite contributing only 20% of the total costs of production. Landlords may also make advance purchases of opium at rates considerably less than the harvest price, generating further considerable profits on the opium crop. These profits can then be reinvest- ed in further diversifying assets and income sources or in the opium trade itself – an ascend- ing spiral of wealth accumulation for the larger landowner.

The position for the land-poor is quite different. For this group, opium poppy is not just a source of income. Opium poppy cultivation increases the opportunity to obtain land on a sharecrop- ping or tenancy basis and draws on the labor supply of the household. It provides access to both cash income from opium poppy and, in the typical mixed cropping system practised in Afghanistan even among poppy growers, to the means of producing food crops for household consumption. Without opium poppy cultivation, the opportunity to access land diminishes considerably, as happened in the province of Nangarhar in 2004/05.

Opium poppy cultivation also creates a demand for itinerant labor to assist in the weeding and harvesting of the crop. Based on UNODC’s estimate that 104,000 hectares of opium poppy were cultivated in the 2004/05 growing season, the crop would have generated ap- proximately 36.4 million days of employment, of which one-third would have been daily wage labor opportunities. Where a household has more than one male able to follow the staggered weeding and harvesting seasons, the off-farm income generated from opium poppy can last up to five months and is typically higher than the on-farm income earned from cultivating the crop as a sharecropper.

Opium poppy also provides an important source of credit for the resource-poor. In areas where opium cultivation is entrenched, it defines the “creditworthiness” of the land-poor. Without it, access to basic food items, agricultural inputs, and funds for health care becomes severely constrained. In addition to the above direct benefits, the cultivation and trade of opium has considerable multiplier effects in the rural economy. Some estimates even suggest that for every hectare of opium poppy cultivated, as many as 5-6 jobs are created in the rural non-farm economy. velopment velopment Typology of opium farmers

tive De For the purposes of this Guideline, rural households involved in the opium economy have been a classified as (1) “better off” and not dependent; (2) less affluent but not dependent; and (3) poor and highly dependent. As a general rule, Class (1) “better off” farmers have more diversi-

ltern fied livelihood strategies. They reside in areas in close proximity to provincial or district cen- ters, they cultivate a variety of crops including high-value horticulture, and they have better access to land and irrigation, and to the commodity and labor markets. They are not depen- dent on opium for a decent living and could be considered to be “opportunist producers”, for

tive to A whom application of the law is the primary instrument of drug control. More marginal farmers a (Class 2) and the poor (Class 3, landless or with very small landholdings) are considered to be the target group for development programs that aim at contributing to the reduction of drug

ltern production. As such, poverty reduction and opium poppy reduction strategies are closely en- twined. The characteristics of these three classes are summarized in Table 1. n A a Appropriate development responses ing d Opium poppy cultivating households are diverse and dynamic, and their decision as to how Fin much land to dedicate to opium is influenced by a range of different factors – not just price. Policies and programs that treat opium poppy farmers as homogenous will not only be in- 34 effective, they could prove counterproductive. It is necessary to work with the diversity that exists among opium poppy cultivators. Understanding the contribution of the different socio- economic groups involved in opium poppy cultivation and the multiple benefits (for example social, economic, and political) they derive from their involvement are critical for identifying the entry points for developing effective strategies for the sustainable elimination of the crop in Afghanistan. Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 35 - Class 3 Class - Highly Dependent Single Crop 70%+ Poppy 20-30% Wheat - con for solely Vegetables sumption – 5 per jerib 3.5 Goats/sheep - milk prod for cow Dairy household for ucts labor – mainly wage Daily season throughout poppy Limited sig debts Accumulated of as proportion nificant incometotal of only source Opium loans harvest Pre Remote presence Government delivery and service limited difficult finds Government will beyond impose to center district (<7.5 Small cultivable jeribs) and mountain Karez spring cultivator Owner Sharecropper » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » Class 2 Class Dependent Poppy 50%+ Poppy Wheat sale for –some Vegetables for –some Fruits/nuts sale 2 – 3 per jerib dairy of sale Some products labor – poppy wage Daily during harvest Construction Skilled Semi debts accumulated Some sources of Variety but some harvest Pre surplus Accessible but limited Accessible infrastructure physical <15 (>7.5 Medium sized jeribs) also but Canal and river and mountain karez spring cultivator Owner Tenant in but limited Crop Double summer » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » - Class 1 Class Not Dependent Variety of sources of sources of Variety credit loans Gives harvest time after Some 1 – 1.5 per jerib and dairy products of Sale cattle Limited Govt), (NGO, Salaried transport trade, debt mar Accumulated Canal or main river Landlord cultivator Owner Crop Double Diversified 30%-50%. Poppy Wheat sale for Vegetables sale for Fruits/nuts ginal - and pro district to Close vincial centers impose can Government - reac will with minimum tion land cultivable Larger (>15 jeribs) » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » Table 1: Typology of Opium Producing Areas and Farmers within Them within and Farmers Areas Producing Opium of Typology 1: Table Access to markets/services/ Governance Cropping density Population Livestock farm Off Non Farm Credit Sales Opium Land cultivated (winter+summer) Irrigation Land Tenure Crops of No. Development programs that offer farmers real livelihoods alternatives would need to have as have to would need alternatives livelihoods real farmers that offer programs Development par economy, opium the of attractions the “mimic” that possible as characteristics many are whom choices for 2 and 3), (Classes and laborers farmers smaller and poorer ticularly for to simply attempting of adopting a strategy avoid to need Programs at present. limited very 1 (Class the resource-rich by opium as derived from income of high level the relatively replace 2 and (Class smaller farmers of the access needed that improve are Interventions farmers). - pro to their willingness only through to access have currently which they assets those 3) to income non-farm and and off-farm land, to credit, access Improving opium poppy. duce opportunities to the poor should be a priority. Table 2 lists some of the development re- sponses that should be emphasized to address the situation of these Class 2 and 3 farmers. For those farmers who are not economically reliant on opium poppy cultivation (i.e. Class 1 farmers), greater emphasis should be given to applying social and legal pressure.

In addition to the development responses that may directly offer income earning opportunities to poor farm families, much might be done to improve governance and so develop responsible reciprocity between rural communities and the state. The spread of efficient and responsive delivery of services like health and education, and the development of counterpart community structures like parent-teacher associations, increase respect for the Government’s develop- ment capability, build responsible local community social capital, and open paths for dialogue on the drugs issue. In addition, specific programs like education, health, and the National Soli- darity Program may offer multiple entry points for education and dialogue and for the building of trust and good governance. The problem of opium is thus a consideration that may be factored in across a whole range of development activities in rural areas.

Finally, institutional development at the broader level – for example strengthening the central and local administration or improving institutions and mechanisms in specific sectors bearing on the opium economy, such as financial services (e.g. anti-money laundering actions) – can support the Government strategy to improve governance and thereby control drugs. Many aspects of governance and institutional development at the broader level can thus have an impact on the opium economy.

C. Implementing counter-narcotics screening for Bank activities

This section sets out a checklist for screening Bank activities, assesses the benefits to be gained, and discusses institutional responsibilities for implementation.

The checklist

The following eight questions provide an analytic framework for screening Bank activities. The velopment velopment questions are designed to highlight how activities may contribute to the counter-narcotics ef- fort, and also to underline any risks that need to be managed. tive De

a 1. How does the activity touch the target population or areas? Review the activity description and assess the “interface” with the opium economy in terms of the target population, the causes of cultivation, the type of actions envisaged, and the target- ltern ing, timing, and geographical location in relation to opium production. 2. Does the activity promote governance and institution building? Do governance and institution building under the activity create the possibility at some stage of de- velopment of responsible interaction between the state and the population on the tive to A

a subject of drugs? Within the governance and institutional set up of the activity, is there scope to conduct dialogue or transmit information, provide education, and en- gage in communication about drugs? What measures could improve the impact on ltern governance?

n A 3. Is there an impact on the standard of living and on livelihoods in general? Does a the activity contribute to improvements in living standards and incomes in drug pro- ducing areas or “vulnerable” areas? What measures could improve the impact on ing

d the standard of living? Is the activity coordinated with other development efforts to

Fin avoid overlap or gaps and to achieve a critical mass of impacts on livelihoods at the local level that would increase the attractiveness of licit activity over opium produc- 36 tion? 4. Are there direct impacts on the target population? Are components of the ac- tivity likely to directly affect actual or potential drug producing households, and are these components adapted to maximize the chances of raising the opportunity cost of opium poppy cultivation and providing an alternative to opium? How can direct impacts be optimized? Is there a case for targeting actual or “at risk” opium produc- ing areas and households by selection of project areas growing or at risk of growing Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 37 - Development responses Development Advance payments on other crops crops on other payments Advance cumin) sometimes onions, (orchards, linkages market promote available, of provision including growing, Contract agricultural inputs - con for opportunities credit Improve MISFA through sumption and investment processing agro intensive labor- Develop such as in dried fruit opportunities labor family of cost opportunity Raise income potential expanding through includ- women, for opportunities earning - process agro dairy, poultry, ing livestock, etc ing, opportunities income non farm Develop peak of during periods Work Cash For law strong where labor demand in areas is occur cultivation against enforcement ring for inputs agricultural to access Improve of share greater allow to sharecroppers crops. of legal final yield larger Increase agricultural land under irrigation land under irrigation agricultural Increase seasons) and summer (winter and horticulture high-value Promote provide to processing agro level cottage added value and by- livestock from income Increase products opportunities, income non-farm Develop skills development through example for linkages market of and development land under irrigation agricultural Increase and winter) (summer value improving to approach Integrated efficient water through added in farming value and high techniques/technologies packages added production » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » - Advantages of the opium economy the opium of Advantages Labor-intensive crop, significant labor op- significant crop, Labor-intensive and during weeding created portunities periods harvesting family unremunerated of use Maximizes including women labor, of share greater receive Sharecroppers opium than cultivate they when final crop crops legal do for they opium harvesting those for provided Food poppy High return per unit of water, poppy par poppy water, per unit of High return areas in single crop ticularly attractive and capital meet to crops few of One tubewells of costs recurrent - facili crop on future payment Advance inputs agricultural of purchase tates opium poppy, that cultivate Those - con are poor, the resource particularly access can They ‘creditworthy’. sidered credit, including consumption credit, and both seasonal repay able to and are loans outstanding - sharecrop for land to access Preferential cultivation poppy of with experience pers the high land rents: pay can poppy Only the is concentrated poppy where in areas to such land is inflated a of value rentable crops legal cultivating point that farmers rent meet their not be able to would preferred land, per unit of High returns land holdings with limited those for crop » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » » - produc drug promote may activity the that risk a Is there harm? e a risk of How would any any would How outcomes? capture and reporting evaluation, o monitoring, Land D Is ther and targeted, timed, be interventions Could that risk be managed? can tion and how this risk? reduce to with other initiatives coordinated agreed contribution of the activity to national drug control objectives be monitored be monitored objectives national drug control to the activity of contribution agreed - licit liveli illicit to from the movement of an understanding could How and evaluated? risks emerging any would How and policy? both operations inform to hoods be used and reported? be captured opium, or by modifying the components to address the production systems of those those of systems the production address to components modifying the or by opium, and desirable, – or who might be? Is such targeting in the opium economy engaged is it feasible? if so, Asset Labor Water Water Credit

6. 5. Table 2: Development Responses to Counterbalance the Advantages of Opium for the Rural Economy the Rural for Opium of Advantages the to Counterbalance Responses Development 2: Table 7. Overall, does the activity contribute to Afghanistan’s counter narcotics effort? Overall, to what extent does the activity contribute to Afghanistan’s strategy to re- duce and ultimately eliminate the opium problem? 8. Can more impact be obtained through the activity? What solutions could in- crease the contribution of the activity to Afghanistan’s fight against drugs? At what cost could those impacts be obtained, and what operational changes would be re- quired?

Examples

For an illustration of the use of this checklist, see the four annexed examples:

Annex 1 summarizes the case of the Emergency Horticulture and Livestock Project which was approved by the Bank Board in May 2006. On the basis of the analysis, a set of guidelines for implementation was agreed with government, together with recommendations for the design of subsequent operations within the broader national program in the future.

In the case of the Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (Annex 2), a series of opera- tional changes were made to the project, with government agreement, at the mid-term review in April, 2006. These included: (1) a survey of sites to assess whether opium poppy is grown and a dialogue with the communities on how the potential for increased opium cultivation will be managed; (2) a signed Memorandum of Understanding with the communities committing not to cultivate opium poppy; (3) piloting of high-value alternative crops; and (4) inclusion in the M&E system of poppy monitoring, in coordination with UNODC. velopment velopment Two more summary analyses were conducted in 2004 for the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP, Annex 3) and the Health Sector Emergency Reconstruction and Develop- ment Project (Annex 4). The recommendations have been discussed with the Government tive De

a but so far have not been implemented.

Benefits ltern

It is expected that the approach outlined above can contribute materially to Afghanistan’s efforts to combat drugs. In addition, development effectiveness should be increased by tak- ing the opium economy into account, because of its strong links to Bank development goals tive to A

a of poverty reduction, governance building, and sustainability. Reputational risk will also be better managed. Finally, a lead from the Bank will provide a model that the Government and other donors can follow. ltern

n A Institutional responsibilities, scope, and key stages a

ing Within the region, the Operations Advisor for Afghanistan will be responsible for guiding teams d in the completion of the checklist and in formulating appropriate changes to activities. Advice

Fin will be provided by SASPR as needed based on past and ongoing analytical work on the opium economy. It is expected that the checklist should be applied to all activities, both investment 38 operations and analytical and advisory activities. For investment operations, an initial screen- ing would normally be carried out upstream at concept review stage. Thereafter, the analysis and reporting would be conducted, as appropriate, through appraisal and supervision. “Opi- um compliance” will form one aspect of the review of readiness for entry to the program.

[Annexes that accompanied this Guideline Note are not included but are available separately.] Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 39 s ym c A RON e and Livestock Project e and Livestock rug Control Strategy rug Control olidarity Program olidarity riority Program riority mergency Rural Access Project Access Rural mergency Food Zone Food Area-Based Development Programme Development Area-Based mbassy Drugs Team Drugs mbassy vernmental Organization vernmental tlantic Treaty Organization tlantic Treaty f Soviet Socialist Republics Socialist f Soviet aphic Information Systems aphic Information oring and Evaluation ed Nations Drug Control Programme Control ed Nations Drug Control Abuse Drug for ed Nations Fund and Crime Drugs on ed Nations Office Prevention and Crime Control Drug for ed Nations Office Development International for Agency ed States tainable Development Goal tainable Development cotics Affairs Section (United States) Section (United Affairs cotics eau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (United States) (United Affairs Enforcement Law and Narcotics International of eau entives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North, East, and West and East, the North, for Alternatives Economic Driving entives vernment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan of the Islamic Republic of vernment erim Afghanistan National Development Strategy National Development Afghanistan erim Force Assistance ernational Security evelopment-Oriented Drug Control Program] (Germany) Program] Control Drug evelopment-Oriented rganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Co-operation Economic for rganisation and Research Development Sustainable of rganization Project uick Impact eutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH Zusammenarbeit Technische für Gesellschaft eutsche rug Control Action Plan Action rug Control Unit and Coordination rug Control States) (United Administration rug Enforcement Kingdom) (United Development International for epartment omprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development — Facility (Afghanistan) — Facility Development and Rural Agriculture omprehensive Council Development ommunity Program Marketing Agricultural and Horticultural ommercial ounternarcotics Drugs on Narcotic ommission fghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund Trust Reconstruction fghanistan fghanistan Drug Control and Rural Rehabilitation Programme Rehabilitation and Rural Control Drug fghanistan Kingdom) Unit (United and Inter-Departmental Drugs fghan Forces Security National fghan Unit and Evaluation Research fghanistan andahar Food Zone andahar Food egional Agricultural Development Program Development Agricultural egional Program Markets Agricultural ebuilding erious Organised Crime Agency (United Kingdom) (United Agency Crime erious Organised Reform Sector ecurity rovincial Reconstruction Team Reconstruction rovincial mergency Irrigation Rehabilitation Project Rehabilitation Irrigation mergency Union uropean oppy Reduction Project Reduction oppy Unit Unit Unit Unit Union o Q R R Sus S S Unit Non-Go National Horticultur National P National S O O P Monit National Nar North A National D National E [D Helmand Int Inc Bur Int K D D E E Go Geogr D C C C C P D D A A A A British E C A

SSR UNDCP UNFDAC UNODC UNODCCP USAID USSR NPP RAMP SDG NDCS OECD OSDR PRT QIP RADP SOCA INL NABDP NAS NATO NERAP NGO NHLP NSP IDEA-NEW ISAF KFZ M&E

DCAP EU GIRoA GIS GTZ HFZ I-ANDS BEDT CDC CHAMP CN CND C28 DCCU DEA DFID EIRP CARD-F ADCRRP ADIDU ANSF AREU ARTF ENDNOTES

1. Special Inspector General Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report,” July 2015, page 82. https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr-section3-overview-funding.pdf 2. For example, the European Union stated: “Illicit drug crop cultivation is concentrated in areas where conflict, insecurity and vulnerability prevail. Poor health, illiteracy and limited social and physical infra- structure reflect the low level of human development experienced by the population in these areas.” UNODC Commission on Narcotic Drugs, “Key points identified by EU experts to be included in the con- clusion of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group on international cooperation on the eradication of illicit crops and alternative development,” UNODC/CNMD/2008WG.3/CRP.4 (Vienna: July 2-4, 2008), page 1. 3. For example, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforce- ment Affairs, “Fighting the Opium Trade in Afghanistan: Myths, Facts and Sound Policy,” March 11, 2008. http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/other/102214.htm. 4. In the preface to the 2007 Annual Survey (page iv), Antonio Maria Costa, the executive director of UNODC, denied any relationship between drug crop cultivation and poverty—a point that was subse- quently refuted by his own office in Vienna, as well as by UNODC’s Independent Evaluation Unit, and by researchers in the field. Walter Kemp, as cited in Barnett Rubin and Jake Sherman, “Counter-narcotics to stabilize Afghanistan: the false promise of crop eradication” (New York: Center on International Co- operation, 2008), page 56; UNODC, “Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to Af- ghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Volume 6: Illicit Crop Monitoring Program,” May 2008, pages 11-12, 52; David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Evidence from the Field: Understanding Changing Levels of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evalua- tion Unit, November 2007), page 14. 5. For example, DFID was the primary source of funding for the Helmand Food Zone, an initiative imple- mented between 2008 and 2011 that distributed wheat and fertilizer in central Helmand and required farmers to agree not to grow poppy on their land. Yet, by the time DFID Afghanistan’s operational plan for 2011-2015 was updated in June 2012, it made no mention of the opium or the illicit economy. “Op- erational Plans 2011-2015” (Kabul: Department for International Development, June 2012). https:// www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67417/afghanistan-2011. velopment velopment pdf. Furthermore, by 2015, its flagship rural development program, the Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development-Facility (CARD-F)—designed following its work with the World Bank examining economic alternatives to opium poppy cultivation and in response to concerns that there might be a

tive De resurgence in opium poppy cultivation in provinces where it had been dramatically reduced in 2009— a mentioned opium poppy only in passing. See “Afghanistan - Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and London: Department for International Development, February 2008). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Re- ltern sources/223546-1202156192201/4638255-1202156207051/fullreportAfghanistanOpiumIncentives. pdf. This was despite the fact that poppy cultivation had returned to some of the program’s target dis- tricts in Nangarhar and was increasing in target districts in Badakhshan. 6. Mansfield, Alcis Ltd., and OSDR, “Managing Concurrent and Repeated Risks: Explaining the Reduc- tive to A

a tions in Opium Production in Central Helmand Between 2008 – 2011” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, August 2011); Mansfield “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Counternarcotics efforts and their effects in the 2011-12 growing season,” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Oc-

ltern tober 2011); Mansfield, “‘From Bad They Made It Worse’: The concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar,” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, n A May 2014). a 7. UNFDAC was created in 1971. In 1990, it became the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UND-

ing CP) before merging into the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) in d 1997. The name was subsequently changed to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in

Fin 2002 with the arrival of the then Executive Director and Under Secretary General, Antonio Maria Costa. 8. The Afghanistan Pilot Program consisted of four interdependent sub-projects: (1) capacity-building 40 for drug control (C26); (2) the drug control monitoring system (C27); (3) the Poppy Reduction Project (C28); and (4) the drug demand reduction project (C29). A planned fifth project that addressed drug law enforcement was not undertaken due to the restrictions imposed by the UN on working with the presumptive authorities in Afghanistan. 9. Mansfield, “Alternative Development in Afghanistan: The Failure of Quid Pro Quo,” unpublished paper produced for GTZ, August 2001, page 7. 10. For a review of the experiences with conditionality in the 1990s, see Mansfield, “Conditionality and Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 41 - - ghanistan, May-July 1995,” pages 23-28. 23-28. pages 1995,” May-July ghanistan, - real set should shuras, or commanders individuals, with whether contracts, that important is “It 14. but if this is not the objective is obviously cultivation opium of Eradication compliance. of terms istic then set are targets If unrealistic it. not require must then contracts expectation short-term a realistic halt the to either having of in the position is placed and the agency not be achieved will inevitably they - with all the detrimental conse contracts; own its of the requirements ignore to having or of programme Nangarhar: District, Achin Programme, Substitution Crop “Opium Afghanaid, See this entails.” quences 22-24. pages 1989, Report,” Evaluation is- ‘development’ on ‘conditions’ placing enforcement, law of that in the absence appear “It would 15. conditionality,’ ‘reverse be termed to has come what to and lead be counter-productive in fact can sues grow to then lead not met will which if demands, own its make to starts community Afghan the whereby - com Afghan the UN and the between relationships of the whole question that danger is a There poppy. Suf demand. by demand being countered of round a fruitless to being reduced concerned munities UNDCP, See whole issue.” of the review complete a warrant to this occurring, of exists evidence ficient 24. page 1995,” May-July Afghanistan, to Mission and Programming Strategy “Assessment - real should set or shuras, commanders individuals, whether with “It is important that contracts, 16. but if this is not the objective is obviously cultivation opium of Eradication compliance. of terms istic then set are targets If unrealistic it. not require must then contracts expectation short-term a realistic halt the to either having of in the position is placed and the agency not be achieved will inevitably they - with all the detrimental conse contracts; own its of the requirements ignore to having or of programme Nangarhar: District, Achin Programme, Substitution Crop “Opium Afghanaid, See this entails.” quences 22-24. pages 1989, Report,” Evaluation - deriva 17. opium and its of the production on reducing has had little impact programme ADCRP “The and Programming Strategy “Assessment UNDCP, rehabilitation.” overall assisted It has however tives. 25. page 1995,” May-July Afghanistan, to Mission inputs other small-scale the numerous from no different appear projects development “UNDCP’s 18. UN orientated and other development the NGO’s being made by etc) centres health irrigation, (schools, - in develop advantage comparative in and some experience have at least agencies The latter agencies. schools etc. to build as an intermediary to fund UNDCP effective be cost to not appear It would ment. UNDCP that excessive concerned also are We do the work. to others out to simply contract when they which advantage comparative of the area from away attention distracts projects of a myriad to attention and Elizabeth Templar, Guy Kapila, Mukesh See agency.” drugs as a specialist their mandate to relate Department, Asia Department/Western Aid Emergency Afghanistan,” to Aid British of “Review Winter, 52. page June 1995, Administration, Development Overseas 2000, November C28,” Project of Assessment Impact Report: Impact “Project Sloane, 19. Peter See page 10. Mis- Appraisal Programme Afghanistan “UNDCP was the The first in total. reviews four were 20.There - pro Afghanistan the UNDCP Vienna, UNDCP from representation and involved 1997 in November sion” The States. the Netherlands and the United Germany, the UK, including donors, and a number of gram Strategy of Review “A Mackrell, Douglas of and consisted UNDCP by commissioned were other reviews of Assessment “An Gelbert, 1999; Rita September Programme,” Afghanistan UNDCP District in Shinwar Report: Impact “Project Sloane, and finally, 2000; October Development,” and Community Impact Social 2000. November C28,” Project of Assessment Impact build- of this programme through authorities presumptive recognizing of should be aware “UNDCP 21. of the establishment in factions rival strengthening of or authorities presumptive for institutions ing its effectiveness in Afghanistan: A discussion paper,” unpublished discussion paper for the UNODC/CND for the UNODC/CND paper unpublished discussion paper,” A discussion Afghanistan: in effectiveness its “Alternative Mansfield, and David June 2004; 22-23 of and Mainstreaming on Conditionality Workshop August GTZ, for produced paper unpublished Quo,” Pro Quid of Failure The Afghanistan: in Development 2001. 4. page 1996, Note,” Concept “Programme UNDCP, 11. programme that the positively state to evidence is insufficient there that as yet fact “It is a disturbing 12. the in undertaken Projects … opium production to reduction any had made development alternative of “Assessment UNDCP, reduction.” specific any to linked be cannot and scattered been have provinces 23-24. pages 1995,” May-July Afghanistan, to Mission and Programming Strategy which small sub-projects, funding a mix of UNDCP of strategy that the present believes “The mission 13. the impact identify to It is impossible is counterproductive. other agencies, of inputs the similar to are Af to Mission and Programming Strategy “Assessment UNDCP, control.” on drug sub-projects these of DCCUs.” “UNDCP Afghanistan Programme Appraisal Mission - Aide Memoire,” November 1997, page 17. 22. “UNDCP needs to consider whether investments in infrastructure might free up resources for the prosecution of war.” “UNDCP Afghanistan Programme Appraisal Mission - Aide Memoire,” November 1997, page 17. 23. “The proposed programme attributes a major role to the presumptive authorities in Afghanistan and proposes to support these through institution and governance building. This comes close to recog- nition of the presumptive authorities and contravenes present UN policies.” “UNDCP Afghanistan Pro- gramme Appraisal Mission - Aide Memoire,” November 1997, page 15. 24. See “UNDCP Afghanistan Programme Appraisal Mission - Aide Memoire,” November 1997, pages 15 and 17. 25. For example, Mackrell (page 7) recommended, “UNDCP should identify and pursue options which avoid a blueprint top-down approach and create better conditions for strategy evolution in a timely re- sponse to lessons learned during implementation. The current format of the DCAP is more or less a blueprint. UNDCP should consider reforming its institutional culture in order to allow such a strategy evolution in response to lessons learned during implementation, rather than through other means.” Ge- bert (page 27) concluded that “Poppy conditionality clauses which are not based on livelihood analyses and which are not based on the reality of the most opium dependent socio-economic groups, cause more harm than good. They are observed in breach.” Sloane (page 30) suggested, “The reduction in area set out in the DCAPs were highly arbitrary. A time limit of four years was adopted with zero production as the end result. A series of steps were written in the document with no consideration given to what might be needed to enable farmers to meet these goals. No such goals will be achieved unless they represent a practical possibility to the households who must reduce their poppy area. How the project actions will impact on the economy of the various poppy producing household groups should be thought-through so that project activities support the ways in which these households can respond positively to any poppy reduction goal.” 26. See “C28 Project Document,” UNDCP Afghanistan Programme, 1997. 27. “In pursuit of the conditional development approach, the project drew up DCAPs with specific area reduction targets and clauses to the effect that assistance would be withdrawn if the targets were not met. These plans were endorsed by the presumptive authorities. However, despite evidence that the area reduction targets have been clearly breached in every year, no assistance has ever been withdrawn. There is no evidence that the project has rigorously or consistently linked its development inputs to farmers individually or collectively reducing poppy plantings. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that had the project withdrawn its assistance that communities would have responded positively in pop- py reduction terms.” Sloane, page 27.

velopment velopment 28. Sloane, “Project Impact Report: Impact Assessment of Project C28,” UNDCP, November 2000, page 27. 29. Gebert (page 5) commented that “Poorer owner cultivators and sharecroppers have benefited from

tive De the project to a far lesser extent than the richer, even absentee landlords, with the former having no pros- a pect of being able to substitute any other mix of crops and activities for opium poppy.” Sloane (page 17) suggested that “While orchard development can make a genuine contribution to the reduction of land committed to opium, it has little or no real impact on the households which produce more than half the ltern opium.” 30. Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan. (London: Hurst Publishers, 2016). 31. Donor Mission, “The Impact of the Taliban Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan,” tive to A May 25, 2001, page 5. a 32. For a detailed review, including primary research in rural areas and discussions with senior mem- bers of the Taliban at the time, see chapter 6 in Mansfield, A State Built on Sand: How Opium Under-

ltern mined Afghanistan. 33. James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia n A

a (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1976), page 196. 34. Known in full as the United lslamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan and was under the leader-

ing ship of the former president, Burhanuddin Rabbani. d 35. Donor Mission, “The Impact of the Taliban Prohibition on Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan.”

Fin May 25, 2001, page 5. 36. UNODC estimates that “overall gross disbursements of alternative development funds from OECD 42 countries declines by 71 per cent” from 2009 to 2014 and that only 0.1 percent of overall development assistance was allocated to alternative development in 2013, down from 0.3 percent in 2008. For more details, see “UNODC World Drug Report 2015,” (Vienna: UNODC, 2015), pages 84 and 118. 37. “….it is crucial that counter narcotics is fully integrated into the broader national development agenda as set out in the National Development Strategy and the Government Security Sector Reform programmes laid out in the National Security Policy.” (page 7) “The Government’s CN policy must occur within the context of a broader stabilisation process. CN policy must therefore be mainstreamed, that is Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 43 - - - - irriga factories, house-building integrated plant, fertilizers nitrogen pipelines, gas oil and depots, age and as educational as well factories, and vegetable-processing fruit- farms, tion channels and networks, spending in of official volume Although the laboratories. and stations, veterinary institutions, scientific be- rubles billion Soviet 8.048 invested that the USSR it is estimated undisclosed, remains Afghanistan in 2016 billion USD than 24 and no less billion 1990 USD 13.4 of the equivalent and 1990, 1978 tween prices. Af in Production Drug Elimination of for Programs Development Alternative of Generation New “A 41. - Re and Migration Demography, for Institute (Moscow: Report,” and Project Analytical An - ghanistan - http://idmrr.ru/down 2014). Studies, Policy and Foreign Strategic for and Centre gional Development loads/AlternativeDevelopment-doklad-ENG.pdf. Production,” Opium Reduce to Initiatives and Development Incentives - Economic “Afghanistan See 42. Development. International for Bank and Department World http://www.cs.uml. 2001. Institute, CogNexus Complexity,” Social and Problems “Wicked 43.Conklin, edu/radical-design/uploads/Main/WickedProblems.pdf. Production,” Opium Reduce to Initiatives and Development Incentives - Economic “Afghanistan 44. Development. International for Bank and Department World page 2016, January 30, Report,” “Quarterly Reconstruction, Afghanistan 45. General Special Inspector 99. 46. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. and East the North, for Alternatives Economic Driving Incentives USAID/Afghanistan’s of “Audit 49. 5. page 2012), June 29, OIG, USAID (Kabul: F-306-12-004-P,” No. Report Audit Program, West page 2016, January 30, Report” “Quarterly Reconstruction, Afghanistan 50. General Special Inspector 99. A Case - Nangarhar Production: Opium on of IDEA-NEW the Impact “Examining Mansfield, See 51. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KCPT.pdf January 2015). DC: USAID, (Washington, Study,” Afghanistan (Kabul: Failure” to Crop response as a Migration “Helmand on the Move: Mansfield, 52. 2015). October Unit, and Evaluation Research A Case - Nangarhar Production: Opium on of IDEA-NEW the Impact “Examining 53. Mansfield, See USAID. Study,” - Eco for Agriculture Revitalizing Review: Sector Agriculture Afghanistan of “Islamic Republic 54. See 41. page June 2014), Bank, World DC: (Washington, Security,” and Food Job Creation nomic Growth, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/04/26/0902 and Byrd William 24b082e0bb80/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Afghanistan0000n00and0food0security.pdf; - Perspec and Governance Livelihoods Agriculture, An Economy: Opium “Afghanistan’s Mansfield, David 2014. June 23, revised Review, Sector Agriculture Afghanistan Bank World tive.” as compact a social for initially called Maria Costa Antonio Director then Executive example, 55. For loans receive would farmers where Kandahar for scheme micro-credit when announcing a as 2002 early Maria Antonio by “Statement Costa, opium poppy. not cultivate would that they on the understanding Coordination UNDCCP,” Director, Executive and Vienna Office Nations United General Director Costa, - https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speech 2002). July 23, (Kabul, on Drugs Conference assistance development for called again once USAID and INL 2004, In es/speech_2002-07-23_1.html. during an ex rejected was This too cultivation. in opium poppy on reductions be made contingent to the consider to especially convened group working livelihoods the alternative meeting of traordinary at the national level in cultivation reductions to assistance tie development to attempts Further matter. as 2012. UNODC as recently by introduced were 82. page July 2015, Report,” “Quarterly Reconstruction, Afghanistan 56. General Special Inspector https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-07-30qr-section3-overview-funding.pdf. included, and facilitated in both national and provincial plans and strategies.” (page 15) “National Drug Drug “National 15) (page strategies.” and plans provincial and national both in and facilitated included, of Ministry (Kabul: Problem,” Illicit Drug the Tackling for Strategy Year Five An Updated Strategy: Control VII. in Chapter on mainstreaming the discussion also See January 2006). Narcotics, Counter http://www. 2001. Institute, CogNexus Complexity,” Social and Problems “Wicked 38.Conklin, Jeff cs.uml.edu/radical-design/uploads/Main/WickedProblems.pdf for Zone” “Food in a invest that Russia requested Narcotics Counter of the Ministry example, 39. For declined. government but the Russian in Helmand, program the of the example building on Badakhshan, and infrastructure major industrial than 140 in more invested USSR the and 1990, 40. 1978 Between stor petroleum supply lines, electric power plants, power that included hydro-energy assets programs EWI Board of Directors

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMEN Maria Livanos Cattaui Gen. (ret) James L. Jones (U.S.) (Switzerland) Former U.S. National Security Ross Perot, Jr. (U.S.) Former Secretary-General Advisor Chairman International Chamber of Former Supreme Allied EastWest Institute Commerce Commander Europe Chairman Former Commandant of the Hillwood Development Co. LLC Michael Chertoff (U.S.) Marine Corps Executive Chairman and Co-Founder H.E. Dr. Armen Sarkissian (Armenia) The Chertoff Group Haifa al Kaylani Vice-Chairman (Lebanon/Jordan) EastWest Institute David Cohen (Israel) Founder and Chairperson President Chairman Arab International Women’s Forum Eurasia House International F&C REIT Property Management Ambassador Extraordinary and Zuhal Kurt (Turkey) Plenipotentiary Joel Cowan (U.S.) Chairman of the Board Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to Professor Kurt Group the United Kingdom Georgia Institute of Technology Former Prime Minister of Armenia Gen. (ret) T. Michael Moseley (U.S.) Addison Fischer (U.S.) President and CEO R. William Ide III (U.S.) Chairman and Co-Founder Moseley and Associates, LLC Counsel and Secretary Planet Heritage Foundation Former Chief of Staff Chair of the Executive Committee United States Air Force EastWest Institute Stephen B. Heintz (U.S.) Partner President Karen Linehan Mroz (U.S.) McKenna Long and Aldridge LLP Rockefeller Brothers Fund President Roscommon Group Associates Cameron Munter (U.S.) Hu Yuandong (China) CEO and President Chief Representative F. Francis Najafi (U.S.) EastWest Institute UNIDO ITPO-China CEO Former Ambassador Pivotal Group Embassy of the United States to Emil Hubinak (Slovak Republic) Pakistan Chairman and CEO Amb. Tsuneo Nishida (Japan) Logomotion Former Permanent Representative Permanent Mission of Japan to the MEMBERS John Hurley (U.S.) United Nations Managing Partner Hamid Ansari (U.S.) Cavalry Asset Management Ronald P. O’Hanley (U.S.) President and Co-Founder Former President, Prodea Systems, Inc. George Kadifa (U.S.) Asset Management Managing Director Fidelity Investments Tewodros Ashenafi (Ethiopia) Sumeru Equity Partners Chairman and CEO Admiral (ret) Southwest Energy (HK) Ltd. Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger William A. Owens (U.S.) (Germany) Chairman Peter Bonfield (U.K.) Chairman Red Bison Advisory Group LLC Chairman Munich Security Conference Chairman of the Board of Directors NXP Semiconductors CenturyLink Ralph Isham (U.S.) Matt Bross (U.S.) Managing Director Sarah Perot (U.S.) Chairman and CEO GH Venture Partners LLC Director and Co-Chair for Compass-EOS Development Anurag Jain (India) Dallas Center for Performing Arts Robert N. Campbell III (U.S.) Chairman Founder and CEO Laurus Edutech Pvt. Ltd. Ramzi H. Sanbar (U.K.) Campbell Global Services LLC Chairman SDC Group Inc.

* Deceased Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal Berthold Beitz* (Germany) Maria-Pia Kothbauer (Pakistan) President (Liechtenstein) Chairman Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Ambassador Security & Management Halbach-Stiftung Embassy of Liechtenstein to Austria, Services Ltd. the OSCE and the United Nations in Ivan T. Berend (Hungary) Vienna Amb. Kanwal Sibal (India) Professor Former Foreign Secretary of India University of California, Los Angeles William E. Murray* (U.S.) Former Chairman Kevin Taweel (U.S.) Francis Finlay (U.K.) The Samuel Freeman Trust Chairman Former Chairman Asurion Clay Finlay LLC John J. Roberts (U.S.) Senior Advisor Amb. Pierre Vimont (France) Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Germany) American International Group (AIG) Executive Secretary General Former Vice Chancellor and Minister European External Action Service of Foreign Affairs of Germany Daniel Rose (U.S.) (EEAS) Chairman Former Ambassador Donald M. Kendall (U.S.) Rose Associates Inc. Embassy of the Republic of France in Former Chairman and CEO Washington, D.C. PepsiCo Inc. Leo Schenker (U.S.) Former Senior Executive Vice Alexander Voloshin (Russia) Whitney MacMillan (U.S.) President Chairman of the Board Former Chairman and CEO Central National-Gottesman Inc. JSC Freight One (PGK) Cargill Inc. Non-Executive Director Mitchell I. Sonkin (U.S.) Vandex Company Mark Maletz (U.S.) Managing Director Former Chairman, Executive MBIA Insurance Corporation Amb. Zhou Wenzhong (China) Committee Secretary-General EastWest Institute Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway) Boao Forum for Asia Senior Fellow President Harvard Business School Norwegian Red Cross NON-BOARD COMMITTEE George F. Russell, Jr.* (U.S.) Liener Temerlin (U.S.) MEMBERS Chairman Emeritus Chairman Russell Investment Group Temerlin Consulting Laurent Roux (U.S.) Founder Founder Russell 20-20 John C. Whitehead* (U.S.) Gallatin Wealth Management, LLC Former Co-Chairman Goldman Sachs Hilton Smith, Jr. (U.S.) DIRECTORS EMERITI Former U.S. Deputy President and CEO Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Secretary of State East Bay Co., LTD CEO Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. CO-FOUNDERS Former Prime Minister of Poland

John Edwin Mroz* (U.S.) Emil Constantinescu (Romania) Former President and CEO President EastWest Institute Institute for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention (INCOR) Ira D. Wallach* (U.S.) Former President of Romania Former Chairman Central National-Gottesman Inc. William D. Dearstyne (U.S.) Former Company Group Chairman CHAIRMEN EMERITI Johnson & Johnson

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) John W. Kluge* (U.S.) 2008 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Former Chairman of the Board Former President of Finland Metromedia International Group Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking Previous Reports

Afghan Narcotrafficking:The State of Afghanistan’s Borders April 2015

In English: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-state-afghanistans-borders In Russian: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/афганский-наркотрафик-состояние-границ-афганистана

Afghan Narcotrafficking: Post-2014 Scenarios February 2015

In English: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking In Russian: https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/post-2014-scenarios-afghan-narcotrafficking-russian-edition

Afghan Narcotrafficking:A Joint Threat Assessment April 2013

In English: http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment In Russian: http://www.ewi.info/idea/afghan-narcotrafficking-joint-threat-assessment-russian-edition

Copyright © 2016 EastWest Institute ISBN: 978-0-9861751-4-5 Photos: Reporters.be, David Mansfield, Alcis Ltd. On the cover: A young boy helping with the final irrigation of the opium poppy season in Dawlat Yar district, Ghor province.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the position of the EastWest Institute, its Board of Directors or staff.

The EastWest Institute works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. We forge new connections and build trust among global leaders and influencers, help create practical new ideas, and take action through our network of global decision- makers. Independent and nonprofit since our founding in 1980, we have offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, D.C and San Francisco.

The EastWest Institute 11 East 26th Street, 20th Floor New York, NY 10010 U.S.A. +1-212-824-4100 [email protected] www.eastwest.ngo Finding an Alternative to Alternative Development 47 Building Trust Delivering Solutions

The EastWest Institute works to reduce international conflict, addressing seemingly intractable problems that threaten world security and stability. We forge new connections and build trust among global leaders and influencers, help create practical new ideas, and take action through our network of global decision- makers. Independent and nonprofit since our founding in 1980, we have offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow, Washington, D.C. and San Francisco. _

Learn more at www.eastwest.ngo

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