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Les Talibans Et L'iskp (Daech) Dans Le District De Khogyani (Province De Nangarhar) AFGHANISTAN

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Les Talibans Et L'iskp (Daech) Dans Le District De Khogyani (Province De Nangarhar) AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN 23/11/2018 Les talibans et l’ISKP (Daech) dans le district de Khogyani (province de Nangarhar) Avertissement Ce document a été élaboré par la Division de l’Information, de la Documentation et des Recherches de l’Ofpra en vue de fournir des informations utiles à l’examen des demandes de protection internationale. Il ne prétend pas faire le traitement exhaustif de la problématique, ni apporter de preuves concluantes quant au fondement d’une demande de protection internationale particulière. Il ne doit pas être considéré comme une position officielle de l’Ofpra ou des autorités françaises. Ce document, rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices communes à l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) [cf. https://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/lignes_directrices_europeennes.pdf ], se veut impartial et se fonde principalement sur des renseignements puisés dans des sources qui sont à la disposition du public. Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées. Elles ont été sélectionnées avec un souci constant de recouper les informations. Le fait qu’un événement, une personne ou une organisation déterminée ne soit pas mentionné(e) dans la présente production ne préjuge pas de son inexistence. La reproduction ou diffusion du document n’est pas autorisée, à l’exception d’un usage personnel, sauf accord de l’Ofpra en vertu de l’article L. 335-3 du code de la propriété intellectuelle. Afghanistan : Les talibans et l’ISKP (Daech) dans le district de Khogyani (province de Nangarhar) Table des matières 1. Un district majoritairement sous emprise talibane ............................................... 3 1.1. Un contrôle géographique effectif des talibans .............................................. 3 1.2. Gouvernance locale talibane exercée sur les civils ......................................... 3 2. Typologie non exhaustive des responsables talibans locaux .................................. 4 2.1. Gouverneurs de l’ombre au niveau de la province et du district ....................... 4 2.2. Commandants talibans actifs dans le district de Khogyani .............................. 5 3. Incidents sécuritaires liés aux insurgés............................................................... 6 3.1. Attaques récurrentes contre les forces de sécurités afghanes ......................... 6 3.2. Personnalités locales ayant été visées par les talibans .................................... 7 4. Confrontations armées entre les talibans et l’ISKP ............................................... 8 4.1. Un contrôle ponctuel de l’ISKP en 2015 ........................................................ 8 4.2. Des accrochages continus notamment dans la zone de Wazir Tangi ................. 8 Bibliographie ........................................................................................................10 Résumé : le district de Khogyani était en grande majorité sous contrôle des talibans avant les incursions de l’ISKP au printemps 2015. La zone de Wazir est particulièrement disputée entre les insurgés en raison de sa position stratégiques entre des mines et des carrières, source de revenus importantes pour les insurgés. Abstract: Khogynai district was mainly under taliban control before the spring 2015 when ISKP fighters came to It. Wazir area is particularly contested as it’s located in a strategic position between mines, which are an important source of income. Nota : La traduction des sources en anglais est assurée par la DIDR. 2 DIDR – OFPRA 23/11/2018 Afghanistan : Les talibans et l’ISKP (Daech) dans le district de Khogyani (province de Nangarhar) 1. Un district majoritairement sous emprise talibane 1.1. Un contrôle géographique effectif des talibans Sur les cartes publiées en décembre 2015, juin 2016, novembre 2016 et mars 2017, l’Institute for the Study of War (ISW) qualifiait le district de Khogyani comme une zone majoritairement sous influence des talibans avec un contrôle effectif sur une zone située au centre du district1. Selon un journaliste local interviewé par les homologues suédois de la DIDR, Landinfo, lors d’une mission de recueil d’information à Kaboul en avril 2016 : « Les autorités ont un meilleur contrôle à Khogyani que [dans les districts de] Sherzad et Hesarak. […] Cela signifie qu’il y a de nombreuses personnes qui soutiennent le gouvernement. En même temps, […] la dynamique du conflit est compliquée. En sus des talibans, il y a plusieurs autres groupes armés illégaux. [Il y a] un réseau criminel bien installé à Khogyani et responsable entre autres des enlèvements […]. De plus, les conflits tribaux et rivalités familiales sont aussi des facteurs contribuant aux incidents sécuritaires »2. En mars 2017, les talibans évaluaient qu’entre 70 et 95 % du district était sous leur contrôle et que seul le chef-lieu du district et plusieurs villages situés à proximité étaient sous contrôle des forces de sécurités afghanes3. Dans un article de décembre 2017, le New York Times affirmait que « Les autorités afghanes à Khogyani […] sont depuis longtemps confinées au bâtiment administratif et à ses alentours. Les talibans gouvernent le reste. […] la région s’est installée dans une sorte de calme étrange car les talibans et le gouvernement ont trouvé une façon de coexister comme cela arrive à différents degrés dans le pays» 4. 1.2. Gouvernance locale talibane exercée sur les civils Dans les zones sous leur contrôle, les talibans prélèvent l’ushr (taxe islamique) sur la production agricole. Dans le district de Khogyani, le montant de cette taxe varie de 1000 à 3000 roupies pakistanaises (soit entre 6,5 euros et 19.5, euros) par foyer durant la saison hivernale5. Contrairement à d’autres districts où les foyers reçoivent individuellement une demande de contribution, à Khogyani, des messages sont affichés dans la mosquée locale ou des annonces faites lors de la prière du vendredi quand arrive la saison des récoltes6. Le versement se fait auprès d’un représentant des talibans qui n’est pas forcément un membre du mouvement mais une personne de confiance7. A la suite d’incursions de combattants de Daech d’un district voisin, Chapahar, le comportement des talibans vis-à-vis des familles ayant un membre dans les forces de 1 ISW, 10/12/2015, ISW, 30/06/2016, ISW, 30/06/2016, ISW, 22/11/2016, ISW, 16/03/2017. 2 The Country of Origin Information Centre (Landinfo), 13/10/2016, p. 20 3 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 27/03/2017 4 The New York Times, 25/12/2017 5 AREU, 02/2016, p.10 6 AREU, 02/2016, p.10 7 AREU, 02/2016, p.11 3 DIDR – OFPRA 23/11/2018 Afghanistan : Les talibans et l’ISKP (Daech) dans le district de Khogyani (province de Nangarhar) sécurité afghanes a changé à partir de septembre 2015. Ces familles n’ont plus été obligées comme précédemment de quitter leur village pour s’installer au chef-lieu du district, Kaga, ou à Jalalabad8. Les actes d’intimidations à leur encontre ont aussi diminué tant que le membre incriminé travaillant au sein des forces de sécurité ne rentrait pas au domicile familial9. En raison de la présence de l’ISKP dans les districts septentrionaux de la province de Nangarhar en décembre 2015, « Les talibans ont tenté d’être plus proches des besoins de la population locale. […] par exemple, […] ils ont construit des routes dans la partie supérieure de Khogyani. Celles-ci sont des routes secondaires qui traversent les villages dans des endroits comme Khelago, Hakimabad, Ahmedkhel, Kozakhel, Pirakhel et Jawarah10.» Ces routes financées par les taxes talibanes prélevées auprès des civils ont servi à améliorer le quotidien de ces derniers tout en permettant un meilleur accès aux talibans dans les zones desservies pour contrecarrer les incursions de combattants de l’ISKP11. Dans le district de Khogyani, les trois cliniques existantes emploient des femmes et les filles sont scolarisées12. Les talibans ont fait état sur leur site web de l’organisation d’un rassemblement d’étudiants, de professeurs et d’oulémas afin de promouvoir et d’améliorer l’éducation. Au cours de cet événement, ils ont déclaré qu’ils « feraient tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour promouvoir une éducation de qualité et améliorer le niveau de l’éducation, garantissant l’alphabétisation de tous, particulièrement des jeunes »13. 2. Typologie non exhaustive des responsables talibans locaux 2.1. Gouverneurs de l’ombre au niveau de la province et du district En juin 2015, le gouverneur de l’ombre taliban pour la province de Nangarhar, Abdul Qahar, a été arrêté au cours d’une opération spéciale dans le district de DurBaba menée par le National Directorate of Security (NDS)14. Le même mois, le chef taliban chargé de l’organisation dans la province de Nangarhar Maulvi Mir Ahmad Gul Hashmi a été tué par balles à Peshawar (Pakistan)15. Quelques mois plus tard, Noor Rahman, le gouverneur de l’ombre taliban pour le district de Khogyani a été tué16. 8 AREU, 02/2016, p.7 9 AREU, 02/2016, p.7 10 AREU, 02/2016, p.7 11 AREU, 02/2016, p.7 12 The New York Times, 25/12/2017 13 Voice of Jihad, 24/12/2017 14 Tolonews, 29/06/2015 15 The express tribune, 15/06/2015 16 Raha press, 15/11/2015 4 DIDR – OFPRA 23/11/2018 Afghanistan : Les talibans et l’ISKP (Daech) dans le district de Khogyani (province de Nangarhar) En mai 2017, Waifullah alias Omar, gouverneur de l’ombre du district est décédé au cours de combats avec des milices locales17. Son successeur, Zakir alias Adal, a été tué quelques semaines plus tard au cours de bombardements aériens18. 2.2. Commandants talibans actifs dans le district de Khogyani En mai
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