The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 08 August 1st to 15th 2008 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 One of the most important 5 Total AOG InitiatED AttaCks pEr Month - 2008 Northern Region developments in the context (Close Range + Indirect Fire + Suicide Attacks) Eastern Region 7 of the conflict in 2007 was the significant deterioration 700 9 Western Region of security along Hwy 1, pri- 600 602 571 marily in the portion between Southern Region 10 500 Ghazni in the south and 463 13 400 ANSO Info Page Farah in the west. 2008 has 318 300 301 seen a furthering of this, with 218 the section of this road im- 200 189 YOU NEED TO KNOW mediately south of Kabul 100 (through Wardak) now facing • Significant deterioration in 0 a similar reality. In addition, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL road security country wide there has also been a deterio- • Consistently high volumes ration in the security along rity forces and logistical NGO vehicles in the of NGO security incidents other important routes, in- cluding the Kabul-Jalalabad convoys illegal checkpoints north as well as the recent • Increasing severity of road. This clearly indicates and abductions. AOG ele- incident in Logar (and NGO related security inci- that the influence, and domi- ments have effectively en- taking ACG activity into dents nance, of security along these sured their freedom of consideration) indicate critical arterials has been an movement while denying that road travel can no • Continued escalation and the same to others; includ- longer be considered a spread of the conflict ongoing AOG operational focus and goal. Through ing the NGO community. routine matter in large regular attacks against secu- Frequent attacks against portions of the country. ANSO is supported by NGO DATA & TRENDS NGO INCIDENTS PER MONTH - ANNUAL COMPARISON June and July reported record levels of NGO (All inCiDEnt typEs as of 13 August 2008) related security incidents with this month 21 trending similarly. The first 2 weeks of Au- 18 gust alone already account for 15 such inci- dents. While this may be partially attributed 15 to the general increase and spread of the con- 12 flict country wide, it also serves as clear sup- 9 port to the previous assessment that AOG 6 are now actively targeting NGO activities and 3 staff, a factor that is now part of the opera- 0 tional reality for those working in the devel- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG opment and humanitarian sectors. In addi- 2006 2007 2008 tion, there has also been a concomitant increase in the severity of these incidents, as indi- cated by the 65% increase in NGO staff fatalities for 2008 in comparison to 2007 (17-for all of 07/23-by 14 August 08). THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 15 25 This Report Period 1 20 The security situation in Surobi is deteriorating, with attacks on the Jalalabad for at least thirty days. 15 Kabul-Jalalabad road becoming During this time NGO should 10 monitor security reports to assess more frequent. During this re- 5 the status of the security situation porting period three fuel tankers 0 were burned in two attacks, and on this route to determine if a JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL heavy fighting between AOG and longer moratorium is necessary. security forces has occurred. A 2nd August RPG attack on an AOG ACG There is every reason to believe INGO medial clinic in the Sare such incidents will continue, as Jegdalek area may signal a spread might be expected with a large city, roughly AOG reportedly now have two in AOG targeting activity in the 90% of provincial crimes recorded by cells operating against the road: Surobi area, and in the wake of ANSO this year were reported from within one to the north of the road based recent events in Logar (see Logar Kabul. In regards to this, there are two no- in Laghman and Kabul attacking assessment), any additional evi- table points: 1) the quality and availability of near Surobi, and one based in dence of this must be taken with reports recording criminal incident levels Nangarhar attempting to operate the requisite gravity. may fluctuate more than AOG reporting levels, thus affecting the trend line and 2) closer to Jalalabad. Given the po- IED attacks are a prominent many of the crimes recorded are relatively tential danger this poses to travel threat, as demonstrated by the small crimes related to property, drugs, and between Kabul and Jalalabad, RCIED attack on the 3rd of Au- personal disputes that pose little direct con- ANSO recommends NGO cease gust on a U.S. coalition vehicle in cern for NGO. That said, there have been road travel between Kabul and Hussein Khel, and an 11 August criminal incidents directly affecting NGO VBIED attack on an ISAF con- which should be considered likely in areas KEY THREATS & CONCERNS voy on Jalalabad Road. with pervasive criminality, a situation that !"Collateral damage from IED Criminal incidents in Kabul city !"Deteriorating security in Surobi will likely continue for the mid to long term. are now on par with AOG attrib- Likely threats include street crime, armed !"Complex/spectacular attacks uted incidents, an anomaly when against high profile targets robberies of residents and offices, and crimi- compared to other districts. As nal abduction. NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 4 This Report Period 0 10 There were very few incidents re- 8 corded during this reporting pe- particularly on the main road, with the most recent incident 6 riod. NGO with combined opera- 4 tions throughout the province occurring on 12 August when a 2 have reported no recent problems, policeman was killed in an IED attack in Ghorband. 0 with the exception of a 31 July JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL burglary of an NGO office in Cha- There is anecdotal reporting that harikar. some communities in Shinwari AOG ACG Collateral damage from IEDs or District are concerned about the reports received suggest no particular trend rockets intended for security nature of some NGO work, find- salient to NGO. However, there are unoffi- forces is a notable threat for ing it incompatible with local cul- cial reports of a notable amount of local NGO. Through the summer, there ture or community wishes. While crime, primarily various manifestations of have been periodic attacks be- this may not pose an immediate extortion. While this is reported to be mostly tween Chaharikar and Bamyan, threat, deteriorating NGO sup- port could presage future security confined to the local business community or problems, and warrants NGO other moneyed groups, an environment of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS monitoring. criminality can affect NGO for their per- !"IED along main routes ceived value as a kidnap or extortion target. There are limited official reports !"Criminality of criminal incidents, and those THE ANSO REPORT Page 3 WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 6 50 40 This Report Period 2 Heavy fighting in eastern Wardak 30 Nirkh, four NGO staff were mis- has made it the most volatile Cen- 20 tral Region province. The threat takenly seized (and later released) 10 to NGO operations in proximity by armed abductors seeking work- ers from a local road construction 0 to active combat areas was evi- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL denced earlier this month in May- project. This incident furthers to dan Sharh when an INGO guard highlight the inherent instability AOG ACG was killed by a stray ordinance. that exists along all main routes in While there are indications that the area. NGO should deem Kunar in the ER. Any progress in improv- the Bihsud districts are more se- roads to be covertly monitored by ing the security situation in Wardak, or any cure than the restive eastern dis- AOG and in conjunction to this, one of these provinces individually, will be tricts, it should be noted that the and the abduction threat, should temporary as long as the situation in the bor- area has some AOG presence, count on the possibility of AOG dering provinces remains anything close to and while reporting from the area check points, especially in the late their present states. Currently, there is noth- is limited, fighting in the east afternoon/early evening as such a ing to suggest solutions will arrive in the mid could push AOG west, providing check point was reported last to long term. These factors, taken along a further destabilising factor to week in the Haftasya area of with the inherent instability and volatility this area. Sayadabad. along the province’s main roads, result in Abduction also remains a preva- In addition to the dangers within Wardak being assessed as high-risk for NGO lent risk in Wardak. On the 6th of Wardak itself, the situation in the operations. INGO and local NGO that August on the main road in province needs to be viewed in have, or can be perceived to have, links with the general the context of the either the Afghan government or interna- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS area, particularly in conjunction tional donors should consider a moratorium with Logar and Ghazni. Ghazni in their operations there for a period of 30- !"Ongoing clashes between AOG and security forces (to the immediate south) remains 60 days in order for them to further assess !"Abduction/kidnapping threat a volatile AOG stronghold with the prevailing security situation and allow for !"Overarching area instability AOG incident levels second only a re-evaluation of their security protocols to Kandahar and in line with and procedures.