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Case Studies in Operations Other Than War, 1945-1999 Kevin Joseph Dougherty University of Southern Mississippi

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Case Studies in Operations Other Than War, 1945-1999 Kevin Joseph Dougherty University of Southern Mississippi The University of Southern Mississippi The Aquila Digital Community Dissertations Fall 12-2011 Following the Principles: Case Studies in Operations Other than War, 1945-1999 Kevin Joseph Dougherty University of Southern Mississippi Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations Part of the Military History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Dougherty, Kevin Joseph, "Following the Principles: Case Studies in Operations Other than War, 1945-1999" (2011). Dissertations. 521. https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/521 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The University of Southern Mississippi FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES: CASE STUDIES IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1945-1999 by Kevin Joseph Dougherty Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Southern Mississippi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2011 ABSTRACT FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES: CASE STUDIES IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1945-1999 by Kevin Joseph Dougherty December 2011 In the post-World War II-era, operations other than war (OOTW) were the types of conflict most commonly faced by the United States. This term for what had previously been called by such names as small wars and low intensity conflict was incorporated in the Army’s capstone manual, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, in 1993. Field Manual 100-5 also listed objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security as the six principles of OOTW. An analysis of eight OOTWs that occurred between 1945 and 1999 indicates that the balanced application of these principles is a reliable predicator of the operation’s outcome and that there is a relationship among several of the principles themselves. These findings suggest the principles of OOTW are a useful planning tool for military commanders and staffs. ii COPYRIGHT BY KEVIN JOSEPH DOUGHERTY 2011 The University of Southern Mississippi FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES: CASE STUDIES IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR, 1945-1999 by Kevin Joseph Dougherty A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Southern Mississippi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Approved: ____________________________________ Director ____________________________________ ____________________________________ ____________________________________ ____________________________________ Dean of the Graduate School December 2011 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer would like to thank the dissertation chair, Dr. J. J. St. Marie, and the other committee members, Dr. David Butler, Dr. Tom Lansford, and Dr. Robert Pauly, for their advice and support throughout the duration of this project. I would also like to thank Program Coordinator Elizabeth Hughes for her administrative support. This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my wife Rhonda who, like all good Army Wives, has fought and won many operations other than war of her own. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iii LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1 Literature Review Methodology The Principles of OOTW OOTWs Used in This Case Study II. THE GREEK CIVIL WAR: A PRETTY GOOD BALANCE ……….…40 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion III. LEBANON: FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLES, BUT BY CHANCE OR DESIGN? ………………………………….……….……66 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion IV. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: SECURITY ALLOWS RESTRAINT ….…94 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion iv V. VIETNAM PACIFICATION: THE PRIMACY OF OBJECTIVE….....122 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion VI. NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS: RESTRAINT ENABLES PERSEVERANCE ……………………………………………….……..157 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion VII. BEIRUT: UNITY OF EFFORT BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND FORCE……………………………………………………..……….…..192 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion VIII. SOMALIA: WEAK OBJECTIVE LEADS TO WEAK PERSEVERANCE…………………………..……………………….….231 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion IX. HAITI: RESTRAINT NEEDS EITHER SECURITY OR LEGITIMACY………………………………………………………….270 Background Analysis of the Principles Conclusion v X. CONCLUSION: THE USEFULNESS OF THE PRINCIPLES.........….296 Successful OOTWs Failed OOTWs Crisp Set Preliminary Model Subset/superset Analysis Analysis of Necessary Conditions Fuzzy Sets Conclusions Recommendations APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................315 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................317 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during (name of case study)... .......................17 2. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Greek Civil War.. 64 3. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Lebanon ...............93 4. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in the Dominican Republic. ………………………………………………………………………..121 5. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Pacification Effort in Vietnam...156 6. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Nicaragua and Honduras................................…………………………….….191 7. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Beirut.…………230 8. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Somalia .............269 9. Adherence to Principles of OOTW during US Intervention in Haiti. ..................295 10. Summary of Adherence to Principles of OOTW during Successful OOTWs….296 11. Summary of Adherence to Principles of OOTW during Failed OOTWs……....298 12. Crisp Set of Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Selected Cases 1945-1999.. 300 13. Subset/superset Analysis of Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Cases 1945-1999 ……………………………………………………………………....304 14. Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Selected Successful Cases 1945-1999 ................................................305 15. Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Selected Failed Cases 1945-1999 .......................................................307 vii 16. Calibrated Values for Principles of OOTW . …………………………………...308 17. Fuzzy Set (Calibrated Values) Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Selected Failed Cases 1945-1999.. …...309 18. Fuzzy Set (Calibrated Values) Analysis of Necessary Conditions for Principle of Perseverance in Selected Failed Cases 1945-1999 ..………………310 19. Fuzzy Set (Calibrated Values) Analysis of Necessary Conditions Concerning Adherence to Principles of OOTW in Selected Successful Cases 1945- 1999…………………..………………………………………………………....311 20. Comparison of Hierarchy of Principles among Model, Superset/subset Analysis, Crisp set, and Fuzzy set .......................................................................312 viii 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION After World War II, United States military forces increasingly found themselves involved in operations that have been described variously as small wars, low intensity conflicts, operations other than war, support and stability operations, and many other titles. This study will call such actions operations other than war (OOTW), using the name that was common for much of the 1990s when an explosion of doctrinal material on the subject was published. Among this material was the army’s capstone manual, FM 100-5, Operations, which appeared in 1993 and listed six principles of OOTW: objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, perseverance, restraint, and security. FM 100-5 asserts that “while these [principles] are not immutable, they serve as guides for action.”1 The manual also states that “commanders must balance these principles against the specific requirements of their mission and the nature of the operation.”2 These statements suggest that there is a relationship between the balanced application of the principles of OOTWs and the outcome of the operation, as well as a relationship among the principles themselves. This idea is grounded in the Enlightenment philosophy that emphasized rational objective analysis and the search for clarity in all fields. A series of military theorists, perhaps most notably Baron Antoine- Henri de Jomini, sought to uncover the natural scientific laws relating to the conduct of war, confident that the military art “like all others is founded on certain and fixed principles.”3 After twenty years of study, Jomini was convinced that “there exists a small number of fundamental principles of war, which could not be deviated from without danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, has been in almost all time 2 crowned with success.”4 It was pursuant to this theory that FM 100-5 presented its principles of OOTW. The research question associated with this dissertation
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