University of Louisville ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository Electronic Theses and Dissertations 8-2005 "Jack of all trades" : the metamorphosis of armored cavalry in Vietnam. Robert Manson Peters 1966- University of Louisville Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd Recommended Citation Peters, Robert Manson 1966-, ""Jack of all trades" : the metamorphosis of armored cavalry in Vietnam." (2005). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 1119. https://doi.org/10.18297/etd/1119 This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact [email protected]. "JACK OF ALL TRADES:" THE METAMORPHOSIS OF ARMORED CAVALRY IN VIETNAM By Robert Manson Peters B.A., Randolph-Macon College, 1989 A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Louisville in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Depm1ment of History University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky August 2005 “Jack of All Trades:” The Metamorphosis of Armored Cavalry in Vietnam By Robert Manson Peters B.A., Randolph-Macon College, 1989 A Thesis Approved on June 10, 2005 by the following Thesis Committee: Thesis Director ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would first like to thank Dr. Wayne Lee for all his help with this project. I could not have done this without his guidance, patience, and professionalism. His ability to quickly get to the essence of an issue amazes me. Thanks to Dr. Scott Levi and Dr. Michael Cunningham as well. Thanks to Dr. Robert Cameron, Armor Center Historian for his insights and time, and to the Armor School Library staff under Mr. William Hansen, a special thanks for allowing me to make liberal use of your resources. To Mr. Charles Lemons and the Patton Museum staff, thanks for your help. Thanks to my family - my wife and children, who gave up a lot of time with me so that I could work on this project, and who encouraged and motivated me. To my grandmother Charlotte Myers whose recent 90th birthday celebration I missed because I was working on this, who helped instill in me a love of history. Lastly, to the dedicated U.S. soldiers who served in Vietnam, thank you again for your honorable service and sacrifice. As part of this, I'd like to specially thank my father, a Marine Vietnam Veteran who always made me proud, and Thorn Richason, the model of the cavalry trooper veteran. III ABSTRACT "JACK OF ALL TRADES:" THE METAMORPHOSIS OF ARMORED CAVALRY IN VIETNAM Robert Manson Peters August, 2005 This thesis is a chronological historical examination of armored cavalry doctrine and execution during the Vietnam War, with a focus on comparison of the armored cavalry's doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, security, and economy of force with the reality of execution on the ground. In Vietnam, a metamorphosis occurred between these doctrinal missions and actual execution due to a series of factors, such as the nature of area warfare and a relative lack of doctrinal preparedness, the latter largely due to the doctrinal flux of the early 1960s, myths about warfare in Vietnam, and institutional resistance. The metamorphosis also occurred because it had to, and could, because of the many positive attributes of the cavalry, and because a series of other new enablers supplanted and masked the loss of cavalry in performing their doctrinal missions. The enablers ranged from new reconnaissance concepts and units, to the rise of technologies and increased surveillance abilities. Despite all the changes in execution from doctrine due to the demands of an extremely complex and multi-faceted war, cavalry and armor doctrine returned to its conventional focus following the war, while most of the adapted doctrine was relegated to peripheral manuals. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................... .iii ABSTRACT ................................................................................... .. .iv CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 1 II. THE ROAD TO VIETNAM ............................................................... 8 III. ARMORED CAVALRY DOCTRINE AND EXECUTION IN VIETNAM ..... 33 IV. THE METAMORPHOSIS EXAMINED ............................................... 143 V. THE POST-VIETNAM LEGACy ....................................................... 165 REFERENCES ................................................................................... 176 CURRICULUM VITAE ........................................................................ 183 v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In accordance with Webster's dictionary, doctrine has several meanings, all interrelated and applicable in the military sense. The definitions represent the entire range of Army operations from the smallest unit levels up to national level policy. First, doctrine is "something taught." Second, it is "a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system, or organization for acceptance or belief." In the case of the cavalry, it is part of the proponent of armor and cavalry, a branch of the combat arms. Doctrine according to this second definition also serves as a common language with the other combat arms, infantry and artillery. Third, doctrine can be a "rule or principle of law, especially when established by precedent," which are universally applicable concepts such as mass, speed, agility, tempo, surprise, etc, which can be used in the application of more specific doctrine. Fourthly, it can be a "statement of government policy, especially in foreign affairs." This is where doctrine connects military activities with government policy objectives. I Doctrine is at times prescriptive, outlining specific actions to take; at other times it is a general guideline, not to be followed all the time to the letter, but to be adjusted on the ground as needed, dependent on the factors of METT - mission accomplishment, enemy factors, friendly troops capability, and the dictates of the terrain. So, while it can 1 Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1988), S.Y. "doctrine." be specific, doctrine is also set of guidelines within which to operate. To add to this, doctrine can, and must change if determined that something entirely different or some variation of doctrine works better. If an army cannot adapt when necessary, it will fail. Doctrinally, the history of the mission of the cavalry is lively and varied. From the earliest times, cavalry (mounted warfare) contributed in many different ways to the conduct of warfare, including providing greater speed, mass, and shock affect. Cavalry has always been characterized by speed, but yet aspects of the cavalry have been emphasized differently at different times. For example, shock affect was used by the cuirassiers of Napoleon, while shock effect was not used by cavalry during the U.S. Civil War in the same sense. Perhaps cavalry's greatest and most significant doctrinal role, however, has been reconnaissance. The ability to conduct reconnaissance was greatly improved by the mobility of the horse, using it to transport the soldier in order to find the enemy more quickly. The cavalry used its speed and mobility to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, preferably with stealth, in order to gain intelligence for and protect the remainder of maneuver forces. Typically the cavalry gained and maintained contact with the enemy in order to allow the rest of the friendly maneuver forces to destroy the enemy at a critical point on the battlefield. Cavalry also confirmed or denied the disposition of enemy elements for planning purposes for friendly missions, and countered enemy reconnaissance. Reconnaissance was the primary mission of cavalry leading into World War II, but by the end of the war, U.S. cavalry came to be associated with a more robust set of 2 "trinity" doctrinal missions: reconnaissance, security, and economy of force. 2 The ability and requirement doctrinally to conduct these missions set the cavalry apart from pure tank forces. The goal of security is to keep the main force from being under observation by the enemy, and to keep them safe from surprise. Security missions consisted of screening, guarding, or covering the main body of forces from enemy reconnaissance and enemy main forces, with each mission representing increasing levels of protection. Economy of force is both a principle of war and an operation, and consists of offensive or defensive missions that direct cavalry forces to find the enemy, and then conduct an array of military operations once contact is made. The principle of economy of force is to occupy as many of the enemy's forces as possible with a smaller, armed and mobile force specially trained and equipped for the task (such as the cavalry), thus allowing and facilitating the bulk of friendly force maneuver units' ability to achieve their objectives, which mayor may not be the destruction of that particular enemy force. Thus, by the end of World War II, regarding reconnaissance, it was an accepted concept that cavalry needed to have the means to fight for information; stealth, while worthwhile, was not always