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An Incredible Opportunity for a $28-To-$1 Match to Save 158 Acres in the Gettysburg Campaign!
ABT 0621A1 June Appeal Letter: 8.5” x 11”; 6 pages/2 sheets; folds in half; prints 3 color Black, Pantones 1797 and 541 An incredible opportunity for a $28-to-$1 match to save 158 acres in the Gettysburg Campaign! Dear Dedicated Preservationist, In the time you and I have spent preserving our nation’s hallowed ground, we’ve had our share of opportunities to leverage $5-to-$1, $10-to-$1, even the occasional $20-to-$1 match to save critical at-risk battlefield land. But today, we have an opportunity that’s simply too important to ignore. Today, we have the chance to secure — are you sitting down? — a $28-to-$1 match to ensure the preservation of two key parcels of hallowed battlefield ground that figure prominently in the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863 — one of which you know and have seen and the other sits on a new-to-us battlefield. Together, the parcels add up to nearly 158 acres, the equivalent of 119 football fields, if you can imagine that. And this is truly essential battlefield land, having a combined value of $9.8 million. Now, if we had to come up with nearly $10 million to save this land on our own, we couldn’t do it, and it would likely be developed (or further developed!) and lost forever … But here’s the good news: Thanks to a great local partner organization, the Shenandoah Valley Battlefields Foundation (which has taken the lead on the preservation effort at the Second Battle of Winchester), a combination of expected federal and state government grants, a landowner donation, and large private gifts, 96.4% of the total has been raised. -
ROMAN REPUBLICAN CAVALRY TACTICS in the 3Rd-2Nd
ACTA MARISIENSIS. SERIA HISTORIA Vol. 2 (2020) ISSN (Print) 2668-9545 ISSN (Online) 2668-9715 DOI: 10.2478/amsh-2020-0008 “BELLATOR EQUUS”. ROMAN REPUBLICAN CAVALRY TACTICS IN THE 3rd-2nd CENTURIES BC Fábián István Abstact One of the most interesting periods in the history of the Roman cavalry were the Punic wars. Many historians believe that during these conflicts the ill fame of the Roman cavalry was founded but, as it can be observed it was not the determination that lacked. The main issue is the presence of the political factor who decided in the main battles of this conflict. The present paper has as aim to outline a few aspects of how the Roman mid-republican cavalry met these odds and how they tried to incline the balance in their favor. Keywords: Republic; cavalry; Hannibal; battle; tactics The main role of a well performing cavalry is to disrupt an infantry formation and harm the enemy’s cavalry units. From this perspective the Roman cavalry, especially the middle Republican one, performed well by employing tactics “if not uniquely Roman, were quite distinct from the normal tactics of many other ancient Mediterranean cavalry forces. The Roman predilection to shock actions against infantry may have been shared by some contemporary cavalry forces, but their preference for stationary hand-to-hand or dismounted combat against enemy cavalry was almost unique to them”.1 The main problem is that there are no major sources concerning this period except for Polibyus and Titus Livius. The first may come as more reliable for two reasons: he used first-hand information from the witnesses of the conflicts between 220-167 and ”furthermore Polybius’ account is particularly valuable because he had serves as hypparch in Achaea and clearly had interest and aptitude in analyzing military affairs”2. -
The Shadow of Napoleon Upon Lee at Gettysburg
Papers of the 2017 Gettysburg National Military Park Seminar The Shadow of Napoleon upon Lee at Gettysburg Charles Teague Every general commanding an army hopes to win the next battle. Some will dream that they might accomplish a decisive victory, and in this Robert E. Lee was no different. By the late spring of 1863 he already had notable successes in battlefield trials. But now, over two years into a devastating war, he was looking to destroy the military force that would again oppose him, thereby assuring an end to the war to the benefit of the Confederate States of America. In the late spring of 1863 he embarked upon an audacious plan that necessitated a huge vulnerability: uncovering the capital city of Richmond. His speculation, which proved prescient, was that the Union army that lay between the two capitals would be directed to pursue and block him as he advanced north Robert E. Lee, 1865 (LOC) of the Potomac River. He would thereby draw it out of entrenched defensive positions held along the Rappahannock River and into the open, stretched out by marching. He expected that force to risk a battle against his Army of Northern Virginia, one that could bring a Federal defeat such that the cities of Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington might succumb, morale in the North to continue the war would plummet, and the South could achieve its true independence. One of Lee’s major generals would later explain that Lee told him in the march to battle of his goal to destroy the Union army. -
Loudoun County African-American Historic Architectural Resources Survey
Loudoun County African-American Historic Architectural Resources Survey Lincoln "Colored" School, 1938. From the Library of Virginia: School Building Services Photograph Collection. Prepared by: History Matters, LLC Washington, DC September 2004 Sponsored by the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors & The Black History Committee of the Friends of the Thomas Balch Library Leesburg, VA Loudoun County African-American Historic Architectural Resources Survey Prepared by: Kathryn Gettings Smith Edna Johnston Megan Glynn History Matters, LLC Washington, DC September 2004 Sponsored by the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors & The Black History Committee of the Friends of the Thomas Balch Library Leesburg, VA Loudoun County Department of Planning 1 Harrison Street, S.E., 3rd Floor Leesburg, VA 20175 703-777-0246 Table of Contents I. Abstract 4 II. Acknowledgements 5 III. List of Figures 6 IV. Project Description and Research Design 8 V. Historic Context A. Historic Overview 10 B. Discussion of Surveyed Resources 19 VI. Survey Findings 56 VII. Recommendations 58 VIII. Bibliography 62 IX. Appendices A. Indices of Surveyed Resources 72 B. Brief Histories of Surveyed Towns, Villages, Hamlets, 108 & Neighborhoods C. African-American Cemeteries in Loudoun County 126 D. Explanations of Historic Themes 127 E. Possible Sites For Future Survey 130 F. Previously Documented Resources with Significance to 136 Loudoun County’s African-American History 1 Figure 1: Map of Loudoun County, Virginia with principal roads, towns, and waterways. Map courtesy of the Loudoun County Office of Mapping. 2 Figure 2. Historically African-American Communities of Loudoun County, Virginia. Prepared by Loudoun County Office of Mapping, May 15, 2001 (Map #2001-015) from data collected by the Black History Committee of the Friends of Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Va. -
Warfare in a Fragile World: Military Impact on the Human Environment
Recent Slprt•• books World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1979 World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbooks 1968-1979, Cumulative Index Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Other related •• 8lprt books Ecological Consequences of the Second Ihdochina War Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment Publish~d on behalf of SIPRI by Taylor & Francis Ltd 10-14 Macklin Street London WC2B 5NF Distributed in the USA by Crane, Russak & Company Inc 3 East 44th Street New York NY 10017 USA and in Scandinavia by Almqvist & WikseH International PO Box 62 S-101 20 Stockholm Sweden For a complete list of SIPRI publications write to SIPRI Sveavagen 166 , S-113 46 Stockholm Sweden Stoekholol International Peace Research Institute Warfare in a Fragile World Military Impact onthe Human Environment Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of disarmament and arms regulation. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed by the Swedish Parliament. The staff, the Governing Board and the Scientific Council are international. As a consultative body, the Scientific Council is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Dr Rolf Bjornerstedt, Chairman (Sweden) Professor Robert Neild, Vice-Chairman (United Kingdom) Mr Tim Greve (Norway) Academician Ivan M£ilek (Czechoslovakia) Professor Leo Mates (Yugoslavia) Professor -
James Longstreet and the Retreat from Gettysburg
“Such a night is seldom experienced…” James Longstreet and the Retreat from Gettysburg Karlton Smith, Gettysburg NMP After the repulse of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s Assault on July 3, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, knew that the only option left for him at Gettysburg was to try to disengage from his lines and return with his army to Virginia. Longstreet, commander of the army’s First Corps and Lee’s chief lieutenant, would play a significant role in this retrograde movement. As a preliminary to the general withdrawal, Longstreet decided to pull his troops back from the forward positions gained during the fighting on July 2. Lt. Col. G. Moxley Sorrel, Longstreet’s adjutant general, delivered the necessary orders to Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, commanding one of Longstreet’s divisions. Sorrel offered to carry the order to Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law, commanding John B. Hood’s division, on McLaws’s right. McLaws raised objections to this order. He felt that his advanced position was important and “had been won after a deadly struggle; that the order was given no doubt because of [George] Pickett’s repulse, but as there was no pursuit there was no necessity of it.” Sorrel interrupted saying: “General, there is no discretion allowed, the order is for you to retire at once.” Gen. James Longstreet, C.S.A. (LOC) As McLaws’s forward line was withdrawing to Warfield and Seminary ridges, the Federal batteries on Little Round Top opened fire, “but by quickening the pace the aim was so disturbed that no damage was done.” McLaws’s line was followed by “clouds of skirmishers” from the Federal Army of the Potomac; however, after reinforcing his own skirmish line they were driven back from the Peach Orchard area. -
Week 7: Gettysburg, Pennsylvania/Vicksburg, Mississippi
Week 7: Gettysburg, Pennsylvania/Vicksburg, Mississippi Lee Moves North Question 1. Josiah Gorgas, a Confed- erate official, wrote this in his diary on July 28th, 1863: Events have succeeded one another with di- sastrous rapidity. One brief month ago we were apparently at the point of success. Lee was in Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, and even Philadelphia. Vicksburg seemed to laugh all Grant’s efforts to scorn....Now the picture is just as sombre as it was bright then....It seems incredible that hu- man power could effect such a change in so brief a space. Yesterday we rode on the pinnacle of success—today absolute ruin seems to be our portion. The Confedera- cy totters to its destruc- tion. Using your reading and this week’s lectures, explain how Gorgas’ high expec- tations for Confederate success was dashed by the two Union victories at Warnings of a coming military storm Gettysburg and Vicksburg. began to appear throughout Pennsylvania In your opinion, how did (above), as emergency militia, like the military success or fail- minutemen of old, formed units. In early ure specifically affect the June, the first of Confederate General morale of the homefronts? Robert E. Lee’s men began to march Use specific examples in from Fredericksburg, Va. through the your answer. Shenandoah Valley. “The morale of the Key Terms army was superb,” remembered a young rebel soldier, “officers and men alike • Fredericksburg inspired with confidence in the ability • George Gordon Meade of the army to beat its old antagonist • The Pennsylvania Campaign anywhere he chose to meet us.” • Rebel Yell • James Longstreet Among the militia units raised was the • The Gettysburg Address 26th Pennsylvania, which included a • The Vicksburg Campaign company from the small but prosperous • Mississippi River town of Gettysburg (left). -
National Register of Historic Places Registration Form
NPS Form 10-900 OMB No. 1024-0018 United States Department of the Interior National Park Service National Register of Historic Places Registration Form This form is for use in nominating or requesting determinations for individual properties and districts. See instructions in National Register Bulletin, How to Complete the National Register of Historic Places Registration Form. If any item does not apply to the property being documented, enter "N/A" for "not applicable." For functions, architectural classification, materials, and areas of significance, enter only categories and subcategories from the instructions. 1. Name of Property Historic name: Little River Rural Historic District_____________________________ Other names/site number: VDHR File No. 030-5579 ___________________________ Name of related multiple property listing: _______N/A____________________________________________________ (Enter "N/A" if property is not part of a multiple property listing _________________________________________________________________________ 2. Location Roughly bounded on E by SR 629, on N by SR 776 & USR 50, on W by Cromwell’s Run RHD, on S ¾ mile N of SR 55, and on SE by Broad Run RHD City or town: The Plains_____ State: VA__________ County: Fauquier________ Not For Publication: Vicinity: N/A X ____________________________________________________________________________ 3. State/Federal Agency Certification As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended, I hereby certify that this X nomination ___ request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60. In my opinion, the property _X__ meets ___ does not meet the National Register Criteria. -
The Battle of Middleburg and the Fight at Goose Creek Bridge
"The Sentinel" September 2020 Newsletter of The James Creek Guards "Clubs Are Trump!" This Month: 1. The Battle of Middleburg and The Fight At Goose Creek Bridge 2. New Proposed Drill Event!! 3. Levi Fritz Letter 4. From The Desk Of The President 5. Upcoming Events 6. The Civil War Merchant I am always looking for newsletter content, so please forward your 7. Event Schedule articles, book reviews, event summaries/photos, stories, 53rd memories, rd etc. to me for inclusion in a future edition of “The Sentinel”. Matthew 8. 53 PVI Contact Info Steger, editor The Battle of Middleburg and the fight at goose creek bridge By Dan Welch – posted on nps.gov Explosion of a Rebel Limber at the Battle near Middleburg, June 21, 1863, by Alfred Waud (Library of Congress) The fighting on June 19, 1863, at Middleburg, Virginia, and the movements of Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart’s Confederate cavalry during the following day, led Army of the Potomac cavalry commander, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, to believe that Stuart’s cavalry was supported by infantry. Because of this, Pleasonton requested infantry to support his mounted command. The request was approved and orders were filtered down the chain of command. The assignment fell to Brig. Gen. James Barnes’s division of the Federal Fifth Corps, which was Page 1 of 9 “The Sentinel” The newsletter of the 53rd Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry marched toward Middleburg. The scene was now set for yet another day of fighting in the Loudoun Valley all due to the Army of the Potomac’s push to gather intelligence on the movements and intentions of the Army of Northern Virginia. -
A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations from 1941 to the Present
CRM D0006297.A2/ Final July 2002 Charting the Pathway to OMFTS: A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the Present Carter A. Malkasian 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Approved for distribution: July 2002 c.. Expedit'onaryyystems & Support Team Integrated Systems and Operations Division This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N0014-00-D-0700. For copies of this document call: CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 0 2002 The CNA Corporation Contents Summary . 1 Introduction . 5 Methodology . 6 The U.S. Marine Corps’ new concept for forcible entry . 9 What is the purpose of amphibious warfare? . 15 Amphibious warfare and the strategic level of war . 15 Amphibious warfare and the operational level of war . 17 Historical changes in amphibious warfare . 19 Amphibious warfare in World War II . 19 The strategic environment . 19 Operational doctrine development and refinement . 21 World War II assault and area denial tactics. 26 Amphibious warfare during the Cold War . 28 Changes to the strategic context . 29 New operational approaches to amphibious warfare . 33 Cold war assault and area denial tactics . 35 Amphibious warfare, 1983–2002 . 42 Changes in the strategic, operational, and tactical context of warfare. 42 Post-cold war amphibious tactics . 44 Conclusion . 46 Key factors in the success of OMFTS. 49 Operational pause . 49 The causes of operational pause . 49 i Overcoming enemy resistance and the supply buildup. -
The Crucial Development of Heavy Cavalry Under Herakleios and His Usage of Steppe Nomad Tactics Mark-Anthony Karantabias
The Crucial Development of Heavy Cavalry under Herakleios and His Usage of Steppe Nomad Tactics Mark-Anthony Karantabias The last war between the Eastern Romans and the Sassanids was likely the most important of Late Antiquity, exhausting both sides economically and militarily, decimating the population, and lay- ing waste the land. In Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Walter Kaegi, concludes that the Romaioi1 under Herakleios (575-641) defeated the Sassanian forces with techniques from the section “Dealing with the Persians”2 in the Strategikon, a hand book for field commanders authored by the emperor Maurice (reigned 582-602). Although no direct challenge has been made to this claim, Trombley and Greatrex,3 while inclided to agree with Kaegi’s main thesis, find fault in Kaegi’s interpretation of the source material. The development of the katafraktos stands out as a determining factor in the course of the battles during Herakleios’ colossal counter-attack. Its reforms led to its superiority over its Persian counterpart, the clibonarios. Adoptions of steppe nomad equipment crystallized the Romaioi unit. Stratos4 and Bivar5 make this point, but do not expand their argument in order to explain the victory of the emperor over the Sassanian Empire. The turning point in its improvement seems to have taken 1 The Eastern Romans called themselves by this name. It is the Hellenized version of Romans, the Byzantine label attributed to the surviving East Roman Empire is artificial and is a creation of modern historians. Thus, it is more appropriate to label them by the original version or the Anglicized version of it. -
Lincoln's Role in the Gettysburg Campaign
LINCOLN'S ROLE IN THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN By EDWIN B. CODDINGTON* MOST of you need not be reminded that the battle of Gettys- burg was fought on the first three days of July, 1863, just when Grant's siege of Vicksburg was coming to a successful con- clusion. On July 4. even as Lee's and Meade's men lay panting from their exertions on the slopes of Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, the defenders of the mighty fortress on the Mississippi were laying down their arms. Independence Day, 1863, was, for the Union, truly a Glorious Fourth. But the occurrence of these two great victories at almost the same time raised a question then which has persisted up to the present: If the triumph at Vicksburg was decisive, why was not the one at Gettysburg equally so? Lincoln maintained that it should have been, and this paper is concerned with the soundness of his supposition. The Gettysburg Campaign was the direct outcome of the battle of Chancellorsville, which took place the first week in May. There General Robert E. Lee won a victory which, according to the bookmaker's odds, should have belonged to Major General "Fight- ing Joe" Hooker, if only because Hooker's army outnumbered the Confederates two to one and was better equipped. The story of the Chancel'orsville Campaign is too long and complicated to be told here. It is enough to say that Hooker's initial moves sur- prised his opponent, General Lee, but when Lee refused to react to his strategy in the way he anticipated, Hooker lost his nerve and from then on did everything wrong.