Democracies Waging Counterinsurgency in a Foreign Context: the Past and Present
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Utah State University DigitalCommons@USU All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 5-2015 Democracies Waging Counterinsurgency in a Foreign Context: The Past and Present Scott J. Winslow Utah State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Winslow, Scott J., "Democracies Waging Counterinsurgency in a Foreign Context: The Past and Present" (2015). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 4475. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/4475 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DEMOCRACIES WAGING WAR IN A FOREIGN CONTEXT: THE PAST AND PRESENT by Scott J. Winslow A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in Political Science Approved: ________________________ _______________________ Dr. Veronica Ward Dr. Jeannie Johnson Major Professor Committee Member ________________________ ________________________ Dr. Abdulkafi Albirini Dr. Mark McLellan Committee Member Vice President for Research and Dean of the School of Graduate Studies UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY Logan, Utah 2015 ii Copyright © Scott Winslow 2015 All Right Reserved iii ABSTRACT Democracies Waging Counterinsurgency in a Foreign Context: The Past and Present by Scott J. Winslow, Master of Arts Utah State University, 2015 Major Professor: Dr. Veronica Ward Department: Political Science Why have Western democracies been successful in conducting external counterinsurgency operations in the past and unsuccessful recently? This thesis conducts a comparison between two successful past interventions, and a recent unsuccessful one using three variable groupings. These variable groupings contain factors drawn from non-kinetic areas related to counterinsurgency operations, in order to draw attention to the holistic nature of successful counterinsurgency operations. The results of this comparison did indicate differences in the variable groupings between the successful and unsuccessful campaigns. The resulting findings could have an impact on the formulation of future interventions of this nature. (104 pages) iv PUBLIC ABSTRACT Democracies Waging Counterinsurgency in a Foreign Context: The Past and Present Scott J. Winslow The lack of favorable outcomes produced by recent attempts at counterinsurgency by Western countries shows that the importance of uncovering a more effective approach for conducting external counterinsurgency operations cannot be downplayed. In an attempt to discover what this approach might entail, prior successful interventions conducted by democracies in the Philippines and Kenya were compared to the recent failure in Iraq, using three variable groupings as a lens through which to view all three conflicts and allow cross-conflict comparison of conditions that contributed to success or failure. Through evaluation of indicators linked to these variable groupings, it was determined that there were many similarities in conditions between the two successful examples and an inverse correlation for those conditions in the unsuccessful example. In order to be more successful in the future, intervening states should attempt to replicate the specified conditions found in Kenya and the Philippines, approach interventions with a strategic mindset, and execute interventions holistically instead of with a narrow tactical approach. Finally, planning for counterinsurgency contingencies during an intervention should start before the first dollar is spent or the first bullet fired. v DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Staff Sergeant Zachary Tomczak, 2nd Battalion 325 th Airborne Infantry Regiment, killed in action on the 25 th of September, 2007, in Baghdad, Iraq. vi CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT…….………………………………………..………….……………………………..………………iii PUBLIC ABSTRACT…..……….…………..……………………………………………………………………iv LIST OF TABLES…..…………..…………………………..…………………………………………………….ix INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................1 Problem Statement.....................................................................................2 Research Question......................................................................................2 VARIABLE SELECTION..............................................................................................8 Domestic Factors Variable Group............................................................10 Supplementary Actors Variable Group....................................................10 Host Country Institutions Variable Group...............................................11 CONFLICT CASE STUDY SELECTION.........................................................................14 Outcome One………..................................................................................16 Outcome Two……………………………………………………………………………………..16 Direction..................................................................................................17 LITERATURE REIVEW—UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM...........................................19 The State of Counterinsurgency Research..............................................19 Population-centric Counterinsurgency...................................................20 Enemy-centric COIN…………………………………………………………………………...26 Actor-centric COIN…………………..…………………………………………………………32 Other Ideas..............................................................................................35 Every Problem a Nail…………………………………………………………………………..36 vii THE MAU-MAU UPRISING….......................................................................................39 British Domestic Variables......................................................................40 Supplementary Actors in the Mau-Mau Uprising...................................46 Kenyan Institutions..................................................................................49 Findings……..............................................................................................51 THE PHILIPPINE INSURECTION..................................................................................56 American Domestic Variables.................................................................57 Supplementary Actors in the Philippine Insurrection.............................61 Filipino Institutions..................................................................................63 Findings……..............................................................................................65 THE IRAQ WAR (2003-2011)….…..............................................................................68 American Domestic Variables.................................................................71 Supplementary Actors in the War in Iraq...............................................75 Iraqi Institutions......................................................................................77 Findings……..............................................................................................79 CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................82 Outcomes..................................................................................................83 Reflections…………………………………………………….……………………………………..86 The Future.................................................................................................86 BIBLIOGRAPHY...….……………………………………………………….…………….…………………….90 viii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1 The Times Archive Sample……..……………………………………………………..42 2 New York Times Archive Sample…………………………………………………..58 3 New York Times Archive Sample 2…………………………….………………….71 INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Vietnam War, the United States and other like democracies have been involved in a variety of low and high-intensity conflicts across the globe. While the terrain and climate have differed, one thing remains the same; while being able to defeat determined opponents in ground combat operations, these states have been unable to prevent an insurgency from attaining their major political objectives in this time period. Currently, the United States and allies such as the United Kingdom and Germany are still engaged in combat with insurgent forces in Afghanistan, with the bitter specter of a failed campaign in Iraq hovering over their shoulders. It seems possible that in light of the considerable amounts of time and treasure unsuccessfully expended on recent counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, that it is not possible for the United States and their Western allies to achieve their stated and implied goals in a conflict while combating an insurgency. However, in the past this has not been the case. The practical definition of insurgency, given in a counterinsurgency guide issued by the U.S. Government, is “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.” The same publication defines COIN as “the blend of civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency 2 and address its root causes.” 1 For the sake of clarity, these definitions will be assumed for the length of this paper. The controversy generated from these recent involvements and the inability of these countries to meet their own stated objectives, or prevent