THE ASSAD REGIME’S PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION THROUGH MESSAGING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ARAB SPRING UPRISING IN SYRIA

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of The School of Continuing Studies And of The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Studies

By

Chams Eddin, B.A.

Georgetown University Washington, DC October 30, 2013

THE ASSAD REGIME’S PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION THROUGH MESSAGING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ARAB SPRING UPRISING IN SYRIA

Chams Eddin, B.A.

MALS Mentor: John Brown, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

Propaganda is used by authoritarian regimes to maintain political order and influence internal and foreign opinion. With this general observation as a starting point, this thesis will analyze the presentation of events and dissemination of information by the

Syrian government during the first sixteen months of the Syrian uprising, from March

2011 to July 2012. This was a critical opportunity period during which pro-democracy activists might have developed international support resulting in the ousting of the Bashar

Assad regime early in the uprising. To the extent it can be assessed, how effective was the official Syrian propaganda in dictating a narrative description of events on the ground in Syria which inhibited effective international support for democratic change? This is the key question this thesis seeks to answer as it examines the regime's propaganda efforts and delineates the limits of traditional media and nontraditional media to question, invalidate, and counter propaganda, as exposed by the Syrian experience.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am indebted to all of the persons interviewed for this thesis who generously shared with me their experiences and insights. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis mentor, Professor John Brown, for his enthusiasm for and support of my research and invaluable comments that assisted me in producing this work. Last but not the least,

I would like to thank my family for their encouragement and patience, my wife, Ashley and my son, Raif.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

ABSTRACT ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT iii

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I: THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN SYRIA 5

Syria’s Mosaic Ethnic Composition and Political Power Pre-Independence 5

Post-Colonialism: the Ba’ath Party and Realization of Arab Nationalism 8

Hafez Assad, the Alawites, and the Ba’ath Party and the Use of Propaganda 10

External Use of Propaganda 15

Propaganda in Response to challenge 16

Succession of Power to Bashar 18

CHAPTER II: THE BEGINNING AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE 2011 SYRIANUPRISING AND THE REGIME’S PROPAGANDA 24

Information vs. Propaganda 25

Deraa and the Beginning of the Syrian Uprising 27

The Protest Movement Spreads from Deraa and Grows 33

Propaganda During the Early Months of Protest 36

Assad’s Failed Attempts to Appease Protestors 37

The Regime’s Propaganda Response to the Full-Fledged Protest Movement 43

Development of New Modes of Communicating Propaganda 44

Depicting Democratic Movement as a Precursor to Sectarian Conflict 50

Christians as a Target Audience for Regime Propaganda 55

CHAPTER III: OPPOSTION AND REGIME MESSAGING AND PROPAGANDA DIRECTED OUTSIDE SYRIA AND THE DECENT TOEXTREME VIOLENCE 61

The Composition of the Protestors and Their Use of Social Media for Organizing, Messaging and Propaganda 62

iv

The Social Media Reporting of the Syrian Activists 65

Opposition Propaganda Aims to Weaken the Regime and Grow the Opposition 69

Assad’s Restrictions on Foreign Journalists and the Clash of Competing Narratives 73

Regime Monopolization and Control of Traditional Media Emerging from Syria 74

Assad Takes to the International Airwaves 78

The Culmination of the First Year of the Rebellion at the Siege of Homs 84

The Development of Homs as the Capital of the Revolution 84

The Siege of Homs and Assault on Baba Amr 87

Regime Propaganda and Baba Amr Assault 89

The Deaths of Foreign Journalists in Baba Amr 91

CHAPTER IV: THE TRAGEDY OF HOULA AND THE ASSAD REGIME VICTORY IN THE INFORMATION WAR AT THE END OF THE FIRST 16 MONTHS OF THE SYRIAN UPRISING 94

The Houla Massacre and Reporting of Regime Propaganda as News by Western Media 94

Assessment of the Success of the Assad Regime Propaganda Following the End of the First Year of the Syrian Uprising 101

CONCLUSION 106

BIBILIOGRAPHY 109

v

INTRODUCTION

One of the most famous slogans of the movement that swept the Arab world was first chanted in December 2010 in Tunisia and repeated in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya during the following months before reaching the streets of the Syrian cities later in the period known as the Arab Spring: Alsha’ab yuridu iskat alnizam , Arabic for

The people want the fall of the regime . The regime of Bashar Assad was aware from the beginning of the Arab Spring that the movement threatened its existence. The four fateful Arabic words were chanted by thousands of people first in Tunisia, then in Cairo, and then in Sana’a in Yemen and Manama in Bahrain. The refrain became well known in

Syria through nonstop coverage of the Arab revolts by government-sponsored and pan-

Arab print and visual media outlets as well as online media outlets and social networks.

Then the same four words appeared in the form of graffiti scrawled by young students on the wall of their school in the southern city of Deraa. The Assad regime had no tolerance for the utterance of this bold slogan and it committed itself to eradicating the democratic aspirations it embodied by deploying propaganda and leveraging its controlled and allied media outlets. Those clear and direct words iskat alnizam, Arabic for the fall of the regime, were not to be uttered in the Syria of the Ba’ath party and the Assad family.

As of the writing of this thesis, the Syrian uprising has morphed into what some describe as a civil war. It is an ongoing conflict that is constantly changing and is still in many ways inscrutable to academic inquiry due to limited sources of authoritative, confirmable information and due to continually evolving events. This thesis places the conflict under the lens of media studies to investigate the regime’s use of official propaganda, its success in terms of influencing and dominating discourse, and the

1 effectiveness of traditional and social media as a counter to the official propaganda during the first sixteen months of the uprising from March 2011 through July 2012. This time period is at once sufficiently wide to delineate significant aspects of the role of media in the earliest stages of the conflict but also purposefully limited so as to meaningfully assess what transpired during a critical time in the development of the conflict.

This analysis begins with an overview of the religious and ethnic composition of

Syria and how power dynamics between sectarian groups, particularly the Sunni Muslim majority and the Alawite religious minority, have developed in modern Syrian history starting with a brief description of the social system under the Ottoman Empire and tracing the evolution of sectarian groups through the French occupation and the emergence of the Ba’ath party in post-independence Syria. I will develop a working definition of propaganda and explain how the Ba’ath party, and later the regime of Hafez

Assad, relied on the usage of propaganda since the early years of Syria’s independence to consolidate and expand their power and political dominance. I will examine the development of the Syrian media under the control of the regime of Hafez Assad and the subsequent rule of his son, Bashar Assad, and describe the content and style of its propaganda known for its fossilized language and rhetoric and depictions of events in divergence from reality, qualities still evident in the regime’s propaganda.

I will then turn to an examination of direct oral, written, audio and visual accounts of events in Syria during the first sixteen months of the uprising and recorded material made available by defectors and cyber activists. The available eyewitness accounts from activists and the narrative that emerges from those accounts is contrary to the narrative

2 description of events as depicted by the official propaganda broadcasted by the television stations controlled by the Assad regime and allied to it, such as the official Syrian TV, Al

Ikhbariya, Addounia, Hezbollah Al Manar television, Russia Today, and other media outlets that took part in spreading the desired message of the regime. I will explain how both the regime and its allies attempted to misrepresent events on the ground in a country where foreign and pan-Arab media outlets have had no meaningful consistent presence because they were expelled since the beginning of the uprising, targeted militarily or through abductions, or have been otherwise forbidden from covering the uprising. I will also examine how opposition activists used social media to attempt to counter the regime’s propaganda messages and assess the effectiveness of those efforts. Propaganda dominated traditional media broadcasts and at the same time the regime and its allies endeavored to deploy their message using the vehicle of new media but with propaganda content and the stilted tone and rhetoric identical to what the regime has deployed through traditional media vehicles. On the other hand, the activists, young people limited by their lack of organization and inexperience but adept at leveraging new media, attempted to overcome the limitations of their online networks by accessing more traditional methods of mass communications.

My analysis culminates in an examination of the effectiveness of the Syrian regime’s propaganda measured by the extent to which the regime’s narrative of events seeped into the conventional wisdom on and widespread view of events in Syria. An important slogan chanted repeatedly by protestors at the start of the uprising was “one, one, the Syrian people are one,” and “Sunnis, Christians, Druze and Alawites all are one.” Essential to defeating a unified movement against the Assad regime was a

3 propaganda effort that sought to characterize a diverse and arguably secular movement as one made up of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorists who posed a threat to minorities in

Syria and to the West. The notion that demonstrators peacefully calling for democratic change were terrorists and that the ousting of Assad could lead to the emergence of a hostile Islamist force in Syria was repeated ad nauseam by the outlets for the regime’s propaganda. These concerns soon dominated the public debate as reflected in editorials in leading Western newspapers and the public remarks of world leaders justifying widespread international inaction and allowed the Assad regime to respond to the uprising with increasing levels of violence, eventually slipping past a point of no return.

Unchecked by any serious world power or even seriously cautioned by any outside threat, the Assad regime was emboldened to ruthlessly oppress peaceful protestors through arrests, torture, and killings and undertake violent military actions against civilian populations starting with the siege of Homs in February 2012, and later in various areas across Syria, permanently transforming what had started as an iteration of the generally peaceful protests of the Arab Spring into one of the bloodiest and most violent conflicts currently taking place anywhere in the world.

4 CHAPTER I

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN SYRIA

Syria’s Mosaic Ethnic Composition and Political Power Pre-Independence

Despite a considerable measure of Arab cultural uniformity in Syria, its population is often characterized as a mosaic of various ethnic and sectarian communities. An understanding of how the power dynamics among the main sectarian groups has changed and evolved over modern Syrian history illuminates the reasons for the confrontation between President Bashar Assad and pro-democracy activists and also explains the origins and purpose of the propaganda messages communicated by the regime and its allies. The Arab ethnic identity dominates the cultural character of the country constituting approximately 90 percent of the Syrian population; the remaining approximate 10 percent is made up of comparatively small populations of non-Arab groups, namely Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, and Turkomans. 1 Within the

Arab majority, there are religious sectarian divisions that diminish whatever societal cohesion may be said to exist among the Arabs. 2 Sunni Muslims comprise 74 percent of the population overall, 8 percent of whom are Kurds. 3 Therefore, Syria’s Sunni Arab majority represents roughly 68 percent of the populace. Sixteen percent of the population, although they are Arabs in ethnicity, consists of various offshoots of Shi’a

Islam including the Alawites (the sect to which Bashar Assad belongs which is regarded

1 William M. Habeeb, The Middle East in Turmoil (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood, 2012), 189.

2 Flynt Lawrence Leverett, Inheriting Syria: Bashar’s Trial by Fire (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2005), 36.

3 Ibid., 2.

5 by many Sunni Muslims as heretical), Druze, and Ismaelies, and less than 100 thousand

Iranian-style Twelver Shias. 4

Amongst the Shia off-shoot groups in Syria, the Alawites are the largest group.

The Alawite minority is estimated at 11 to 12 percent of the overall population. 5

Christians of all sects, including Orthodox, Catholics, and Protestants, make up another ten percent. 6 Most of Syria’s small community of Jews, formerly concentrated in

Damascus and Aleppo, emigrated from Syria in the early 1990s. 7

At the beginning of the modern era and into the early 20 th century, the land which is now Syria was part of the Levantine lands inhabited by Arabic speaking people under the control of the Ottoman Empire. 8 Although all of these communities spoke Arabic, no

Arab national identity, let alone Syrian national identity, existed. The inhabitants of what is now Syria identified primarily with those of the same religious affiliation. 9 Intolerance and suspicions existed among Sunnis and Shi’is and the heterodox Muslim sects, such as the Druze, Alawites, and Ismaelies. Christians and Jews enjoyed a form of minority protection under the Ottoman system 10 but non-Sunni Muslim minorities were generally

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 33.

7 Robin Wright, Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 241.

8 Efraim Karsh , Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 182.

9 Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba’th (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 2-3.

10 Ibid.

6 marginalized and shut out from power. Divisions among sectarian groups which existed under the Ottoman Empire have long been and remain the source of political and social tension in Syria. 11

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Syria was under French mandate. France shaped Syria’s legal, political and educational system in ways evident until today. After the First World War and the direct involvement of France, England, and Russia in the lands once under Ottoman Empire, the opportunities for religious minorities in Syria and throughout the Levant were vastly improved. These powers acted as self-appointed protectors of religious minorities. France claimed the responsibility to protect the

Christians of Lebanon and elevated the position of the Alawites in Syria. Russia claimed the responsibility to protect the Greek Orthodox Christians. England established alliances with Druze and the Jewish population of what would become the State of

Israel. 12

The ascendance of the Alawites to the seat of power did not come by coincidence.

Rather, France’s policy of divide and rule functioned to elevate the Alawites. France recruited special military units comprised of Alawites, as well as Druze, Kurds, and

Circassians, to crush rebellions initiated by Sunnis. 13 The French attempted to cultivate a loyal community in the Alawite minority by bestowing on them weapons and special

11 Albert Habib Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 22.

12 Shakeeb Salih, The British-Druze Connection and the Druze Rising of 1896 in the Hawran (London: Routledge, 2006), 251-257.

13 Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria , 4.

7 opportunities. 14 Alawites were afforded new opportunities to enlist and advance in the

French military, a choice that was looked down upon by many Syrians as participating in colonial appeasement. 15

Hafez Assad, born in 1930 to a poor Alawite family in the village of Al Qurdaha in northwestern Syria, was one such Alawite able to take advantage of educational and military opportunities the French created for minorities, specifically Alawites, to achieve upward social mobility. Where once dominance of the Sunni majority in Syria was the norm, colonialism disrupted this allocation of power and created the possibility for minority groups to compete for influence. As a result, when Syria obtained independence from the French in 1946, the Alawites were well positioned to exert influence which eventually led to the Alawite political and economic dominance observed in Syria over the past four decades. 16

Post-Colonialism: The Ba’ath Party and Realization of Arab Nationalism

After independence from France in 1946, Syria ostensibly succeeded in forming constitutional institutions capable of supporting a pluralistic democracy. It was an immense challenge, however, for the new country’s leaders to govern and develop the sectarian and divided society. 17 The political system immediately following independence proved fragile and was undone by a series of consecutive military coups

14 Peter R. Demant and Asghar Ali Engineer, Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2006), 106.

15 David W. Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar al-Asad and Modern Syria (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005), 6.

16 Ibid.

17 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945–1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 88-89.

8 and regime changes. 18 In March 1963, the Ba’ath party came to power in Syria after a number of army officers, including Hafez Assad, staged a successful coup d’état. 19 In

1966, an intra-Ba’ath coup brought the air force officer Hafez Assad to the position of defense minister and commander of the Air Force. 20

Two Syrian intellectuals, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar, founded the Ba’th party in 1940. 21 Its name means resurrection or “renaissance” in Arabic and the motto of the party is “Unity, Liberty, Socialism.” 22 Although the Ba’th party’s teachings spread across the Middle East and North Africa, it held power only in two countries, Iraq and

Syria, and eventually split into two rival organizations -- the Qotri (or Regionalist) Syria- based party and the Qawmi (or Nationalist) Iraq-based party. The success of the Ba’ath party in Syria can be explained by the coherence it provided to a socially fragmented society. The party opposes what it characterizes as Western imperialism and advocates for the resurrection or renaissance of the Arab people into one Arab state. The party defines itself as secular and professes international socialist ideologies. The “Alnizam

Aldakhili” (“internal doctrine”) of the Arab Ba’th Party officially states:

The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any difference existing among its sons are accidental and unimportant. They will disappear with the awakening of the Arab consciousness…The national bond will be the only bond existing in the Arab state. It ensures harmony among the

18 Rami Ginat, Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence (Portland, Oregon: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 40-41.

19 Ibid., 226-231.

20 Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1990), 120.

21 Ibid., 29.

22 Paul Salem, Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 69.

9 citizens by melting them into the crucible of a single nation, and combats all other forms of factional solidarity such as religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional factionalism. 23

It is self-evident why, from its early days, the Ba’th Party attracted followers from

Syria’s religious minorities. A resolutely secular political party would avoid the extreme outcome of the establishment of an Islamic faith-based government, as well as be a bulwark against discrimination against minority citizens. 24

Hafez Assad, the Alawites, and the Ba’ath Party and the Use of Propaganda

Following independence, a large number of Alawites joined the Ba’ath party for the aforementioned reasons. 25 The Ba’athist ideology also provided the minority

Alawites legitimacy in their quest to rule the country. The concept of Arabism was promoted in their rhetoric to de-emphasize ethnic and religious differences in the Syrian society. But the rhetoric did not match the reality. In practice, Hafez Assad depended on the support of his Alawite community and he installed Alawites in controlling leadership positions across the 12 branches of the security forces and the military. 26 He was thus able to create a centralized and powerful government that has held on to power for over

40 years.

Hafez Assad’s seizure power on November 16, 1970, in what is termed the

Corrective Movement ( al-Harakah al-Tashihiyah ), was a turning point in the modern

23 Sylvia G. Haim, ed., Arab Nationalism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1962), 232.

24 Carsten Wieland, Syria: Ballots or Bullets? (Seattle, Washington: Cune Press, 2006), 106.

25 Demant, Islam vs. Islamism, 105.

26 Mordechai Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press under Hafiz and Bashar (Brighton; Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 206.

10 history of Syria. 27 He continued to utilize the apparatus of the Ba’ath Party to legitimize his rule, create loyalty to his regime, and control all aspects of the government, including the military and the security services. Hafez Assad worked relentlessly to improve the military security apparatus and established a solid base of Alawite support. He established an authoritarian state controlled by an extensive security apparatus of secret police (called mukhabarat in Arabic) made up of multiple and overlapping security agencies to exert control over the Syrian people. While he relied on his fellow Alawites’ support leading to a familial and tribal character to his regime, Hafez Assad was the central figure and his regime revolved around him. 28

Hafez Assad adapted the Arab nationalist and secularist ideas of the Ba’th Party.

In 1973, the prominence of the Ba’ath Party became enshrined in the constitution and the party came to dominate all areas of public life. 29 The principal role of the party was to

“issue directives from the central government to regional representatives, mobilize the masses for political activities, and gauge the ‘mood’ of the general population.” 30 The party’s teachings and ideology formed the basis for educational curricula and controlled the state media, unions, and the army. Hafez Assad essentially used the Ba’ath Party as a tool to maintain his control and hold over Syria, a practice continued by his son and successor Bashar.

27 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 2002), 61.

28 Ibid., 3-7.

29 Ibid., 62.

30 “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Ba’th Party,” BBC , July 9, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-18582755 (accessed February 25, 2013).

11 The party ideology legitimized the Assad regime because the party became the

“flag bearer” and “guardian of the walls” of Arabism. 31 The party sought to mask the heterogeneous Syrian society with the uniformity of Arabism. 32 Top officials in the

Ba’ath Party, many of them members of Assad’s Alawite sect, enjoyed privilege. The rest of Hafez Assad’s ruling military and political apparatus was also from the Alawite minority sect, a practice continued by his son Bashar, successfully excluding the majority

Sunni community from significant power and influence. 33

Over the last five decades, the regimes of Hafez and Bashar Assad effectively co- opted the Ba’thist ideology and transformed it from, ostensibly, a nationalist movement seeking to de-emphasize the ethnic and religious differences among people in public life into a vast institution protecting the dominance and privilege of the Alawite sect. The brutal and authoritarian nature of the regime contributed in large extent to Assad’s control of the country. This coopting of the party’s ideology and maintenance of power was also carried out in large part through centralized, continuous, and organized propaganda 34 efforts. “The main goal of the Ba’ath Party mass media was political orientation of the groups in the nation, and the creation of formulas which will fuse these groups in a melting pot which will serve the basic goals of the party.” 35

31 Eyal Zisser, “What Does the Future Hold for Syria?” The Middle East Review of International Affairs 10, no.2 (June 2006), http://www.naba.org.uk/Content/news/Daily/MERIA/MERIA_60615.pdf (accessed January 20, 2013).

32 Demant, Islam vs. Islamism , 105.

33 David W. Lesch, Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012), 22.

34 For the definition of propaganda and how it differs from information, see pp. 25-27.

35 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 5.

12 Assad managed his messaging through a powerful aid, Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, an Alawite journalist from the central city of Homs, who was information minister from

1974 to 1983. Ahmad led a “team of seven men concerned with information (the heads of radio-television, the three daily newspapers, al-Baath , al-Thawra and Tishreen , the state news agency SANA; advertising; and press distribution” who would use their respective media vehicles to “prepare opinion for changes of policy.” 36 One of the main personalities in the Syrian press was the head of the daily newspaper al-Thawra

(Revolution in Arabic), Muhammed Al Wadi. Al Wadi stated that the Syrian press served three functions: organizational, energizing, and propaganda function that aims to convince the population of the validity and correctness of the ideas and principles that rule the society. 37 He also wrote in the daily Tishreen newspaper in June 6, 1995 that

President Assad’s sponsorship of Syrian media gave journalists immunity and protected them from media campaigns carried out to defame Arabs in the present and the future. 38

From 1970 on, Syrian journalists were required to grant their support to the internal and external policies of Assad’s government, 39 as can be clearly discerned in an article that appeared in 1999 in the state-sponsored al-Thawra newspaper four days after Hafez

Assad won a referendum by 99.98 percent of votes.

36 Seale, Assad of Syria , 339-40.

37 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 3-9.

38 Ibid., 8.

39 William Rugh, The Arab Press- News Media and Political Process in the Arab World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 68.

13 The article expressed journalists’ allegiance to Assad:

The Men of Media are your Faithful Soldiers. Under your wing, O Leader, we have grown, from the fountain of your everlasting book we have quenched our thirst, through your marvelous love we have learned to step forward, we have enjoyed, we have benefited and we have gained; under your shadow our pens have become free and our communications have achieved the status that you have earmarked from them. With every word, with every letter, with every sentence, we realize our loyalty, our love and our trust in you. O Captain, who will not stray in the choice of the path of security, stability and tranquility. We, your children, the people of the media, your faithful soldiers, your devoted children, renew the oath with our honored masses, to continue in the performance and in the struggle behind your wise leadership. Felicitations to ourselves! Felicitations to the homeland! Felicitations to the nation, and Assad pledge crowned with permanent stability, victory and liberation. 40

It is reported that written press, television and radio personalities held regular meetings with Hafez Assad and with the Minister of Information to receive the central ideas of their media campaigns and propaganda they carried to further promote the aims of the government. 41

In addition to advancing the notion of Arab unity, propaganda spoke directly to the image of the country’s leader. During his presidency, Hafez Assad was the subject of a personality cult which was also essential to the promotion of his regime. The Syrian media frequently depicted Hafez Assad as a strong, brave, and determined leader, who could stand up to his adversaries, as a philosopher and visionary, and as the father of the

Syrian family and the builder of the state. 42 He was identified with heroes of Arab history as shown, for example, in an al-Thawra newspaper headline reporting on the

40 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 9.

41 Ibid.

42 Seale, Asad of Syria , 339.

14 October 1973 war that likened Hafez Assad to Salah al-Din, the Arab hero of the

Crusades in the Middle Ages, and Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasir, celebrated by

Arabs for heroism in the Suez campaign. To foreign audiences, Syrian propaganda depicted Assad as the hero and the leader of all Arabs in their struggle against Zionism and Western imperialism embodied by the United States. 43

Hafez Assad’s portrait accompanied by words expressing loyalty was printed in newspapers daily, distributed on stickers, and was ubiquitous on billboards and in television broadcasts. The regime rhetoric also presented every Arab leader whose opinion differed from Assad’s as an illegitimate leader, making him the only true head of state in the region. Syrian media also presented non-Arabs who did not share his ideology as criminals and other media sources that did not share his rhetoric as unreliable and a tool in the hands of hostile regimes to spread propaganda to destroy the Syrian nation and the goals of Arab nationalism. Syrian media consistently described Western media as an evil interference. 44

External Use of Propaganda

Under the regime of Hafez Assad, propaganda was also used as a tool to exert pressure on other states to act in accordance with his visions and policies. For example, after the first Gulf War, in 1993, the Palestinians, Jordan, and Syria conducted a number of separate peace negotiations with Israel. Assad did not want the Palestinians and

Jordanians to strike a peace deal with Israel alone. He preferred forming a united Arab position to exert pressure on the Jewish state.

43 Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria, 118.

44 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 17.

15 The Information Minister at the time, Dr. Mahmoud Salman, had a meeting with the

Algerian minister of culture and communications to discuss efforts to be undertaken by the Arab media to “strengthen Arab solidarity” and frustrate peace efforts. 45 The Syrian press has also been known to cooperate with foreign information agencies, including those of Iran and the former Soviet Union, as well as opposition groups in Iraq and

Jordan to provide a platform for the promotion of positions favorable to the government. 46

Propaganda in Response to Challenge

The preceding section outlines how the primary propaganda messages of the

Assad regime co-opted the ideology of Arab nationalism and sought to glorify the personage of Hafez Assad in an effort to assert control over the diverse Syrian society by the minority Alawite sect. Rather than repeating the slogans of Arab unity and extolling the virtues of the Assads, the current Assad regime’s propaganda has, in contrast, taken on an aggressive quality in the face of serious internal threat. Without any doubt, the brutal autocracy of the Assad regime survived by oppressive tactics such as torturing and executing their political rivals. The regime has, however, also sought to maintain power by repeatedly framing its enemies as either conspirators with Western nations against the

Syrian people or as violent Islamic extremists. 47

45 Ibid., 16.

46 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 17-18.

47 Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1990), 92- 102.

16 The rule of Hafez Assad was challenged by the Muslim Brotherhood at the end of

1970s and into the early 1980s in Aleppo, Hama, and the capital Damascus. Assad violently suppressed the opposition to his rule posed by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Regime media campaigns were also escalated during the challenge posed to his power by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Hafez Assad regime utilized a propaganda campaign using negative connotations to describe the opposition movement of the Muslim Brotherhood.

The state-sponsored Al-Ba’th newspaper stated in 1979, “The conspiracy conducted by the gang of the Muslim Brotherhood is aimed at striking at the stability of our country and its patriotic unity.” The article continued to accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking “to sow anarchy and turmoil among the ranks of our masses by means of actions connected to imperialists and Zionists plots.” 48 The article contains words with negative emotional connotations that are similarly used today by the regime of Bashar Assad to describe the opposition movement against his regime, such as “plot,” “gang,” “anarchy,” and “turmoil.” It also contains terms with a contextually negative connotation such as

“imperialism” and “Zionism.”

In addition to the negative expressions that described the revolt of the Muslim

Brotherhood, the Ba’ath Party propaganda publications and communications used terms that generated positive connotations, such as “The steadfastness of our country,” “its patriotic unity,” “the ranks of our masses.” Therefore, the confrontation between the

Assad regime and the Muslim Brotherhood was depicted as a struggle between good and

48 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 26.

17 evil as the regime exploited sectarian insecurities to undermine any unified political movement among the Syrian citizens. 49

Hafez Assad’s authoritarian regime prevented all media outlets from accessing the areas where the Assad regime confronted rebellion. By the end of 1982, tank divisions surrounded the city of Hama, the epicenter of the uprising, and leveled it in a period of weeks. It is estimated that 20,000 to 40,000 people died. 50 The brutality of the Hafez

Assad regime in reaction to the Muslim Brotherhood uprising ushered in a long period of overall quiet, meaningful opposition to the Assad regime having been effectively squelched.

Succession of Power to Bashar

Hafez Assad’s original heir apparent, his son Basil Assad, was killed in a car accident in 1994. Hafez Assad settled instead for his son Bashar as his successor. After

Hafez Assad’s death in 2000, Bashar, a 34-year old eye doctor, succeeded him. Bashar ascended to power after the constitution, which had specified that the president must be at least 40 years old, was amended. Bashar was widely viewed as lacking the charisma, leadership qualities, experience, and maturity of his father. Hafez Assad, however, had spent the final years of his life preparing for Bashar to succeed him by removing those opposed to his succession plan. 51

49 Ibid.

50 Thomas A. Johnson, ed., Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events: Challenges Confronting America, China, and Iran (Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, 2012), 163.

51 Eyal Zisser, “The Succession Struggle in Damascus,” Middle East Quarterly 2, no. 3 (Sept. 1995), http://www.meforum.org/264/the-succession-struggle-in-damascus (accessed February 18, 2013).

18 In the early years of his presidency, Bashar Assad cultivated the image of an open-minded intelligent young man with a modern, Western outlook. There was hope both within and without Syria that Assad recognized the need for and desirability of reform in Syria. 52 Shortly after assuming the presidency, he initiated some limited political and economic reforms. For example, he allowed the establishment of political forums, in which Syrian intellectuals could discuss issues related to democracy, civil society, and human rights permitting a movement of open criticism called the Damascus

Spring which arose in 2000. 53 But it was not long before Bashar’s actual determination to preserve the status quo at any price became manifest. Once the limited free speech tolerated turned to repeated criticism of the regime, there were arrests of participants and

Bashar reverted to the propaganda methods used by his father to challenge opposition.

He labeled the reformers as “agents of the West whose only aim is the undermining of domestic stability, in the service of the enemies of the state.” 54 As a result, all forums were disbanded and the government’s critics were put in prison, including notable intellectuals Ma'mun al-Humsi, Riyyad as-Sayf, Michele Kilo, and many others. 55

After abandoning his experiment with free political debate, Bashar Assad refocused on modernization of the economy. A process of economic liberalization started in April 2001, which allowed the operation of private banks and investments in communications infrastructure leading to increased public access to mobile

52 Eyal Zisser, “Does Bashar Al-Assad Rule Syria?” Middle East Quarterly X, no. 1 (Winter 2003), http://www.meforum.org/517/does-bashar-al-assad-rule-syria (accessed February 18, 2013).

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

19 communications and the Internet. However, economic opportunities were bestowed on regime insiders, such as Assad’s maternal cousin Rami Makhlouf who was the majority owner of the SyriaTel, the country’s largest telecommunications corporation. Rami developed into an economic oligarch who monopolized significant sectors of the Syrian economy and functioned as the gatekeeper of Syria’s business sector. No domestic or foreign investor could do business in Syria without striking a deal with the president’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf. 56 Therefore, it became clear to Syrians that the only goal Assad was meaningfully pursuing involved further entrenching his family’s and control of the country and expanding Alawite wealth and economic opportunity.

As with his father’s regime, Bashar Assad’s rule has used mass media to manipulate individuals, society, and the outer world. His pictures have been published daily on the front page of Syria’s three main newspapers. The state-controlled television stations continue to begin their news bulletins with statements glorifying him. 57 Syrian media, as it did in the case of his father, constantly promotes him as steadfastness against all internal and external enemies. 58 Assad routinely opened his speeches by urging

Syrians to remain strong in the face of what he described as cultural and psychological warfare ignoring the main challenges and problems the Syrian people were facing, such

56 Lesch, Syria , 63.

57 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 228-240.

58 Ibid.

20 as corruption, lack of opportunities for the non-Alawite population, and the shortage of services offered by the government. 59

In one notable example, when Syria was forced to withdraw its forces from

Lebanon in 2005, Assad gave a speech at the University of Damascus in which he utilized the standard regime speak, framing the crisis facing Syria as a U.S. or Israeli conspiracy. In the same speech, he reminded his listeners that “this region has two options: chaos or resistance...In the end, we are going to win, one way or another, even if it lasts a long time.” 60 The regime has worked to influence public opinion in the Arab world and beyond utilizing the Syrian News Agency SANA as its voice to foreign audiences. In the first decade of his rule, Assad raised the same specter of chaos and

Islamist threat as a justification for his policies and non-democratic rule, obviously for the consumption of Western, international audiences, particularly in the wake of

September 11, 2001 and the ensuing international war on terrorism. He sent a cable to

President George Bush offering his condolences to the American people in which he

“condemned the terrorist attacks that targeted innocent civilians and vital centers in the

United States.” 61 He also called for international cooperation to eradicate all forms of terrorism. The government propaganda at this time began to compare the United States war on Islamic terrorism and extremism with its own struggle against the Muslim

59 Andrew Tabler, In the Lion’s Den: An Eye Witness Account of Washington’s Battle with Syria (Chicago, Illinois: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011), 118.

60 Ibid.

61 Lesch, The New Lion of Damascus , 101.

21 Brotherhood. 62 The regime stressed that it too had been a victim of Islamic terrorism, with Assad stating that “In Syria, we are very familiar with this issue, and we were the first in the world to deal with terrorist movements that threatened the regime.” 63

Despite the fact that the Assad regime used rhetoric condemning terrorism, it supported terrorism and radical groups. It reportedly allowed up to 3,000 Arab fighters and jihadists, including members of Hezbollah, to enter to Iraq via Syria from Southern

Lebanon to join the Iraqi insurgency against the coalition forces lead by the United

States.64 The regime also supported Palestinian extremist groups such as Hamas and

Islamic Jihad following the United States’ introduction of the road map for peace. 65 In

2003, Colin Powell met with Assad to raise the United States’ concerns over the Syrian support of terrorist groups. Powell said after the meeting that Assad agreed to close the offices of several militant groups in Syria. However, four months later the militants’ offices were still operational in Damascus. These groups were still involved in transferring funds from Damascus to terrorist groups targeting Israelis and continued to offer bomb-making classes in Damascus. 66

*************************

The Assad regime since its earliest stages has utilized propaganda to consolidate and develop its power in Syria. Coopting the Ba’ath ideology of Arabism and

62 Ibid., 102.

63 Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, eds., Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan, and Beyond (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 136.

64 Anthony H. Cordesman and Jennifer Moravitz, The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2005), 241.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

22 sectarianism allowed Assad and his Alawite sect to legitimize their minority dominion over the military and political sphere. Upon the arrival of the Arab Spring in Syria in

2012, the regime quickly deployed propaganda to counter the challenge to its rule.

23 CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE 2011 SYRIANUPRISING AND THE REGIME’S PROPAGANDA

Chapter I of this thesis provided historical background on the evolution of political power in Syria leading to the 2011 uprising and explained how the regimes of

Hafez and Bashar Assad have generally used propaganda messages in the past to promote their leadership internally, discredit challengers, and manipulate opinion at home and abroad. The propaganda of the Assad regime, since the beginning of the uprising, has sought to promote its narrative of the conflict. That narrative depicts Syrian society as showing “fundamentalist, sectarian, violent, seditious proclivities that can be uprooted, and stopped by a ruthless power structure embodied in the rule of the Assad regime.”

According to this narrative, the removal of Assad will result the hegemony of the extremists that will impose Islamic laws dated to the Middle Ages and will threaten the pluralistic and sectarian Syrian society. 1 While promoting its version of reality, the regime simultaneously sought to invalidate the narrative of its opponents, which charged it with using brutal means to crackdown on dissent and maintain Alawite domination. 2

The long-term vision of Assad’s opponents predicts that without him, the country will finally be free to achieve its suppressed economic potential, communal coexistence and harmony, and an open democratic system that represents all of the country’s religious and ethnic communities. 3

1 David A. McMurray and Amanda Ufheil-Somers, eds., The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 198.

2 Ibid., 199-200.

3 Ibid.

24 Before delving into a detailed discussion of the use official propaganda to advance the regime’s narrative during the first 16 months of the current Syrian uprising, I will first develop a systematic working definition of propaganda, which, “At its core, . . . refers to any technique or action that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of a group, in order to benefit the sponsor.” 4

Information vs. Propaganda

Initially, it is important to differentiate between providing information versus the dissemination of propaganda. Media is a vehicle for spreading messages of multiple types. These types vary from marketing, entertainment, general knowledge, news, commentary, or interpretation in justification of positions, decisions, and actions. 5

Propaganda, in contrast, can be defined as messaging with the intent of influencing people’s opinions and behaviors concerning controversial issues. 6 The boundary between providing information and propaganda can be difficult to discern. This distinction lacks clarity because “explaining and justifying positions, decisions and actions of the entities that are responsible for sending the messages” can be intended to “influence people’s opinions and their behavior concerning controversial matters.” 7 In the process of identifying and analyzing propaganda generated by the Assad regime, it is helpful to draw the following distinction between providing information and propaganda: media

4 Kenneth A. Osgood, “Propaganda,” Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy , 2002, http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3402300123.html (accessed May12, 2013).

5 Kedar , Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 2.

6 Lindley Fraser, Propaganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 1-3.

7 Kedar, Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 2-5.

25 outlets act as information providers when they explain a position without definitively labeling contrary opinions as illegitimate. Media outlets are functioning as instruments of propaganda, in contrast, when they aim to eliminate an environment of conceptual pluralism. 8 In other words, propaganda manipulates and seeks to change people’s opinions by undermining the contrary positions and strives to create an intellectual monopoly. At the same time, propaganda is designed to exploit emotions while the provision of information is characterized by a logical expression seeking endorsement by rational persuasion as opposed to fear. 9 Information also tends to be more objective while propaganda tends to be subjective and has a component of incitement against everyone who is holding an opposite opinion. 10 If propagandists find that their message is not gaining sufficient acceptance, they will expend seemingly unlimited resources to intensify their efforts by using more aggressive tools such as extreme and aggressive language, excessive publications and broadcasts over an expansive timeline according to the significance of the message. 11

From the history of the Assad regime as discussed in the preceding chapter, we can fairly conclude that the primary task of the Syrian press is to disseminate propaganda rather than information. While instilling concerns over physical safety and loss of life is central to the maintenance of the dictatorial power of the Assads, it is also evident that systematic propaganda has been an essential component to the regime’s maintenance of

8 Ibid.

9 Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes (New York: Knopf, 1965), 187- 188.

10 Noe ʗl Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 235.

11 Kedar , Asad in Search of Legitimacy , 3.

26 power. The remainder of this chapter discusses the unfolding of propaganda techniques of the regime of Bashar Assad during the first 10 months of the uprising and describes them in terms of message and form, delivery mode, intended audience, and intended effect.

Deraa and the Beginning of the Syrian Uprising

The inception of the Syrian uprising has been pinpointed at Deraa, a city in southwestern Syria just across the border from Jordan, home to a population of approximately 100,000, predominantly Sunni Muslims. In March 2011, fifteen schoolchildren in Deraa were arrested for writing anti-regime graffiti on the walls of their school, Alsh’aab yourid iskat alnizam , Arabic for The people want the fall of the regime .

The children, all from the same family and some as young as six, were abused and even tortured in detention by the Mukhabarat, the secret police. 12 In response, protests broke out at the city’s main public gathering point, the city’s main mosque, Al-Omari. The government forces escalated the situation quickly, with security forces ordered to shoot to kill protestors and also fire on mourners in funeral processions. Snipers spread out in the city and targeted anyone who was taking to the street. 13 At least two hundred people were killed in Deraa over the first ten days of the protests. Deraa was under siege from regime security forces and suffered food, medicine, and water shortages. Its communications with the outside world were cut. Security forces opened fire at

12 Fouad Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2012), 73- 74.

13 Ibid.

27 paramedics and everyone who came from neighboring towns to help the besieged citizens. 14

Even in these early weeks of the uprising, the regime’s propaganda machine was operating. Its message labeled the countless number of protestors who were marching carrying olive branches, bare-chested to show that they did not have weapons and chanting “peaceful, peaceful,” as extremists, terrorists and conspirators in the hands of

Western, American imperialism, and Zionism. 15 The regime’s intention in spreading its message was to stop the protests from extending to other cities, particularly the neighboring capital Damascus.

The Assad government blamed Jund as-Sham, a fundamentalist group with links to al-Qaeda, and Fatah al-Islam, another Islamist group, which was routed by the

Lebanese army in a months-long standoff at the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp back in 2007, as responsible for the protests 16 and employed regime appointed religious clerics to spread its propaganda. On the front page of the state-sponsored Tishreen newspaper, Deraa cleric Sheikh Ahmad al-Sayasina was quoted as saying “There were elements from outside Deraa determined to burn and destroy public property.” 17 The regime also employed the top cleric in the country, Saeed Ramadan Al Buti, to spread its propaganda. In a sermon addressing prayers about the events in Deraa used as part of the

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 Rania Abouzeid, “Syria’s Revolt: How Graffiti Stirred an Uprising,” Time , March 22, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2060788,00.html (accessed May 12, 2013).

17 Ibid.

28 Syrian television news bulletins, he said those who protest asking for reforms were killers who cause bloodshed and saboteurs who destroy what is around them. 18

The propaganda message that those protesting in Deraa were violent extremists was delivered through a direct and concrete mode locally. The regime encouraged leaders among the Druze religious minority living in the mountainous region adjacent to

Deraa to distribute weapons to defend themselves against “violent extremists” from neighboring Deraa. Thereby, the regime made evident from the beginning of the uprising its willingness to manipulate sectarian insecurity in a divide and rule approach by using propaganda in an effort to dissuade its audience from identifying with protestors and joining them.

On March 28, 2011, the state-controlled Syrian TV reported that the government had intercepted arms sent from Iraq to spread unrest and prevented boats loaded with weapons from Lebanon from reaching Syrian ports. 19 Syrian TV’s political analysts spoke of a plot by the United States to return Syria to the Middle Ages. 20 Syrian TV stoked fears of sectarian violence by reporting that foreigners had entered Syria to threaten the religiously diverse Syrian people's coexistence and wage sectarian war against minorities. The state-controlled Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that a million text messages were sent mostly from Israel to encourage Syrians to use

18 Shkh, “Saeed Al-Butti’s Opinion on Deraa Events,” YouTube video, 3:01, March 26, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thzSEvS-8xQ&feature=c4- overview&playnext=1&list=TLBvKjTXOqOxg (accessed February 12, 2013).

19 Ibid.

20 Garrett Therolf and Jeffrey Fleishman, “In Syria, a Taste for Bashar Assad,” Los Angeles Times , March 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/28/world/la-fg-syria-20110328 (accessed May 4, 2013).

29 mosques as a basis for rioting. 21 Syrian TV broadcasted forced confessions of “terrorists” including Muhammad Bakr Radwan, a dual U.S.-Egyptian citizen who was documenting the protests and accused of being paid by Israel. 22 The state-sponsored Addounia channel also broadcasted forced confessions of so-called terrorists in Deraa. A supposed witness in one the video reported that he saw almost 500 people armed with weapons and that he was paid over one million Syrian Liras to shoot protestors on the orders of clerics. 23

Syrian TV regularly broadcasted celebrations of the Syrian Army presenting them as heroes and liberators from terrorists and troublemakers. 24 On March 23, 2011, after regime forces killed 15 protestors at the Al-Omari Mosque in Deraa, SANA reported that the authorities routed an “armed group” that had forced people to take to the streets, stocked weapons and targeted paramedics. 25 Syrian TV showed footage of weapons and money allegedly stored by terrorist and armed groups in the Al-Omari Mosque. 26

21 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East, 2011,” under “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon /Syria/109%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20VII %20--%20The%20Syrian%20Regimes%20Slow-motion%20Suicide.pdf (accessed April 8, 2013).

22 Garrett Therolf and Jeffrey Fleishman, “In Syria, a Taste for Bashar Assad,” Los Angeles Times , March 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/28/world/la-fg-syria-20110328 (accessed May 4, 2013).

23 Syrian Revolution, “Confessions of Terrorists from Deraa and Jableh,” YouTube video, 6:16, April 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7IgT8ru6bo (accessed March 12, 2013).

24 International Crisis Group, “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East, 2011,” under “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide,” http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon /Syria/109%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East%20VII %20--%20The%20Syrian%20Regimes%20Slow-motion%20Suicide.pdf (accessed April 8, 2013).

25 Ibid.

26 Fater 4100, “Deraa-3-23-2001,” YouTube video , 3:06, March 23, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EhWlIUZyINk (accessed March 22, 2013).

30 However, local residents denied all these accounts.27 The regime’s description of the activists as terrorists was not persuasive to the tribal society of Deraa because its inhabitants witnessed the killing of their relatives, close and distant, while protesting peacefully.

On March 25, 2011, not only in Deraa, but throughout the country people took to the streets under the name of the Friday of the Martyrs. 28 Syriatel, the telecommunications firm owned by Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf that controls most of the mobile market in Syria, sent messages warning people not to protest and directing government employees to rally to show their support of Assad. 29 Syrian TV provided live and continuous coverage of these pro-regime rallies. 30

In an interview conducted by the author of this thesis, Hisham Marwah, the head of the legal division of the Syrian National Council, affirmed that, based on reports from his network of activists on the ground, the protests in Deraa were “peaceful” and that although protestors were shot at by regime forces the demonstrations continued to be peaceful until early 2012. 31 He denied that the protests in 2011 had a sectarian nature, as claimed by the Assad regime, stating rather that “the revolution’s motto was Freedom,

27 Ibid.

28 Rania Abouzeid, “Syria's Revolt: How Graffiti Stirred an Uprising,” Time , Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2060788,00.html (accessed May 12, 2013).

29 “Syria Lifting Emergency Law, Official Says,” CNN , March 28, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/27/syria.unrest/index.html (accessed April 9, 2013).

30 Naram Dababieh, “March 26 th Pro-Bashar Assad Rally in Damascus,” YouTube video, March 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJCLPQhLgqA (accessed April 10, 2013).

31 Hisham Marwah, telephone interview by author, Saudi Arabia, May 22, 2013.

31 Dignity, and Reform” and their motivation was national, not sectarian. 32 In another interview, Rami Abdul Rahman, Head of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, stated that the state-sponsored media played a large role in transforming the Syrian revolution to a sectarian one. 33 Initially, however, the Syrian people took to the streets against Assad motivated by their desire for democracy, not sectarianism. 34

A 20-year-old Syrian Christian law student at the University of Aleppo, Hadeel

Jouki, testified to the 4th Geneva Summit for Human Rights and Democracy about the regime’s tactics to dissuade Christians from supporting the protest movement in Syria. In her testimony, Hadeel gives her account of the first year of the uprising. She observed that the regime actively discouraged Christians and other minorities from participating in the revolution by depicting the protestors as Salafists. But she denied the truth of the regime’s propaganda and affirmed that Christians and other minority groups participated in the protests. 35

The regime did not rely on propaganda alone in its effort to isolate the uprising to

Deraa and eradicate it. Violence to instill fear was also employed as a technique to prevent the protests from gaining the momentum needed for a more popular revolt. 36 The

32 Ibid.

33 Rami Abdul Rahman, telephone interview by author, London, July 2, 2013.

34 Ibid.

35 Human Rights UN, “4th Geneva Summit: Session 5: Massacre in Syria: Victim Testimony,” YouTube video, 11:43, April 3, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j9I-UszCo5c (accessed April 23, 2013).

36 “Will Outrage at the Torture of a 13-Year-Old Help Syrians Overcome their Fear of the Regime?” Time , June 1, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075002,00.html#ixzz2WrTUgIhh (accessed April 22, 2013).

32 arrestees in Deraa were psychologically humiliated and physically tortured with the bodies of those who died as a result of torture, given back to their families. The body of

Hamza al-Khatib, a 13-year-old boy who was arrested during the first few weeks of the revolt in the Deraa, was returned to his family severely beaten and disfigured leaving in the minds of all no doubt as to the brutality of which the Assad regime was capable. 37

The Protest Movement Spreads from Deraa and Grows

What happened in Deraa emboldened protestors in other towns to take to the streets, including the cities of Homs and Latakiya and smaller towns such as Hama,

Banyas, Idlib, Jisr al-Shugour, Houla, Qusayr, and Tartus and the predominantly Kurdish town of Quamishli. Large-scale protests did not immediately spread to Damascus and

Aleppo due to a heavy security presence and perhaps in part because of the utilization of state-funded clerics to spread government propaganda; the Sunni merchant class in these cities largely stayed on the sidelines, especially during the first 10 months of the revolution. 38

Unlike in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, where the large-scale protests of the 2011

Arab Spring began within the first weeks of the uprising, when the Syrian protest movement ensued in March and April of 2011 it was much smaller and activists faced greater challenges in attracting protestors to join them in public demonstrations. 39 This

37 Hugh MacLeod and Annasofie Flamand, “Tortured and Killed: Hamza al-Khateeb, Age 13,” Aljazeera , May 31 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/201153185927813389.html (accessed April 22, 2013).

38 Thomson Reuters, “Syrian Students Mount Protests in Aleppo, Capital,” The Jerusalem Post , April 14, 2011, http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Syrian-students-mount-protests-in-Aleppo-capital (accessed March 19, 2013).

39 Lesch, Syria, 57.

33 initial reluctance is attributable to the fear that the police state instilled in the public over the preceding five decades and through its actions in Deraa. Perhaps reluctance was also due in part to the unconvincing and quite obviously false propaganda that the regime was promoting about the nature of the protestors in Deraa. After the first two months of the

Syrian uprising, Human Rights Watch estimated the number of people killed to be 887 people, almost 418 of them in Deraa alone. 40

In fact, the persons who did take to the streets in the early months of the uprising notably reflected the broad spectrum of Syrian society. Orthodox Catholic Bishop Tony

Phillipos Yazji of the Roman Orthodox Patriarch in Damascus emphasized in an interview that “People wanted to be free. Sunnis, Christians, and Alawites all participated at the beginning of the demonstrations; however, they started to distance themselves from the demonstrations and the uprising when the demonstrators used violence .” 41 The bishop uttered the regime’s message that the demonstrators were the initiators of violence, but also affirmed the view that the initial protests were not sectarian. As 2011 continued, almost 20 to 30 protestors were killed across the country every Friday. It was these deaths that motivated a few armed men with light arms to attempt to protect the demonstrators against regime violence. In response, the regime started using tanks and heavy guns in the areas demonstrations were taking place and the deaths mounted.

Contrary to regime propaganda, Hisham Marwah asserts that the government forces

40 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Crimes against Humanity in Deraa, 2011,” under “Killings, Torture in a Locked-Down City Under Siege,” http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/01/syria-crimes-against- humanity-daraa (accessed April 19, 2013).

41 Bishop Tony Yazgi, telephone interview by author, Damascus, Syria, June 10, 2013.

34 started shooting protestors and that the protests themselves continued to be peaceful until the beginning of 2012. 42

In the mass rallies across Syria, young people of different sects and religions called out for and laid claim on al karama , Arabic for dignity . Friday was the day of protest. Participants would gather at mosques 43 and were guided by “the triple rejection”: no violence, no sectarianism, and no foreign intervention . From the beginning of the uprising, Sunni activists tried to reach out to minorities to be part of their movement, giving the protests the image of being a collective movement against the oppression of the Assad regime for all Syrians. 44 One popular slogan protestors chanted in their demonstrations was “One! One! One! The Syrian People are One!” – an amalgamation of

Sunnis Christians, Alawites, and Druzes stood as one against the regime of Assad. 45

Certainly the demonstrations were not without dramatic physical outbursts: posters of

Assad were torn down and statues of his father were destroyed. One protestor, Rami

Jarah, 28, described the moment when he joined hundreds of people chanting for freedom

42 Hisham Marwah, telephone interview by author, Saudi Arabia, May 22, 2013.

43 A Damascene female activist was quoted explaining why mosques were the centers of protests every Friday because they offered a safe place to gather out of the sight of the Mukhabarat. She stated even “Christians are now going to mosques, because they know that the mosque is a safe place to gather.” She added “Once there are enough people, the men flood into the streets and start chanting.” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075156,00.html (accessed March 12, 2013).

44 Alexander Dziadosz and Oliver Holmes, “Special Report: Deepening Ethnic Rifts Reshape Syria’s Towns,” Reuters, June 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-syria-rebels- sectarianism-specialrepo-idUSBRE95K08J20130621 (accessed June 21, 2013).

45 The Syrian Days of Rage Channel, “The Syrian people are One,” YouTub e video, 0:27, September 5, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gd6252L1Hs4 (accessed June 19, 2013).

35 in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus: “it was better than joy, it was better than love.

What was amazing was that suddenly everyone felt like family.” 46

Propaganda During the Early Months of Protest

Alarmed by the spread of the movement from Deraa to other towns, the regime communicated its propaganda message that the protests would lead to sectarian strife directly to the public by hanging posters with written warnings in the coastal city of

Banyas on April 10, 2011 and in Homs on July 18, 2011. 47 The regime’s propaganda furthered its strategy of creating a wedge between the Sunni community and the Alawite and Christian communities in religiously diverse cities. This strategy was employed in reaction to sizeable participation by Alawites and Christians in the early protests. 48

Syrian TV showed staged footage of arms being found in a mosque in Deraa in an attempt to substantiate its fear-mongering that armed extremists were behind the opposition to the regime. It also warned that a sit-in in Homs that took place on April 18,

2011 was an attempt to erect a mini-caliphate. 49

Assad delivered two speeches as the protests gathered steam, first on March 30,

2011 and second on April 16, 2011. His main message revolved around the theme of conspiracies being hatched for Syria and labeling the protestors as lawbreakers and sectarian extremists. He said “Sedition had overtaken the quest for reform, because Syria

46 Lesch, Syria , 70.

47 McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, eds., The Arab Revolts, 198-199.

48 “Syrian Activists: Sectarianism is Made by the Regime,” Asharq Al Awsat , July 25, 2011, http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=632685&issueno=11927#.Udjrw47B5UQ (accessed March 15, 2013).

49 McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, eds., The Arab Revolt, 198-199.

36 was in the crosshairs as a target for conspiracies. Incitement had come from outside.

Fake information, voices, images, etc., they forge everything. The conspiracies had been skilled.” 50 The regime also tried to incite sectarian fears by sending masked men into diverse neighborhoods to knock on doors and tell inhabitants that armed men from other sects were taking to the streets.” 51 Although Assad is not known for Islamic piety, he used a rhetorical line preferred by many Islamic rulers faced with rebellion: “the Holy

Quran says, sedition is worse than killing and all are called upon to bury this sedition in defense of the homeland.” 52

Assad’s Failed Attempts to Appease Protestors

By the time of his April speech, Assad was engaged in a strategy of superficial appeasement. In a seeming effort to show he was receptive to the needs of the protestors, he spoke in his speech of the need for dignity. He emphasized, “Syrians are civilized, disciplined people who abhor chaos and hooliganism.” 53 As the number of protestors increased week after week, the government had raised the wages of government workers by 20 to 30 per cent. On April 20, 2011, Assad lifted the state of emergency law that had been in effect since the Ba’athists seized control of Syria in 1963 in order to appease the population. 54 The emergency law was ostensibly designed to prevent the perceived threat from Israel. But it was used effectively to arbitrarily eliminate internal threats and

50 Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion , 73-78.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Heather Kerrigan, ed., Historic Documents of 2011 (Los Angeles: CQ Press, 2012), 169.

37 challenges to the Assad regime through pre-emptive arrests and derogation of individual rights. 55 Assad also dismissed the government of the long-serving Prime Minister Naji

Al Otari, emulating other Arab regimes responses to uprisings. He removed Deraa’s governor and appointed Khalid al-Hannus, scapegoating the outgoing governor for the violence and deaths in Deraa, and granted 250,000 stateless Kurds who live in the northeastern part of the country Syrian citizenship after many decades of the government denying their cultural identity and rights. 56

But these so-called reforms were in vain. The protest movement continued to grow. These changes were perceived as simply for show since the regime continued its brutal crackdown on the peaceful protests and the arrest of activists and intellectuals who demanded democracy, freedom, and dignity. 57 The regime’s purported concessions to the protestors were proven disingenuous as it brutalized peaceful protestors and defined them through propaganda.

The removal of the emergency law in April 2011 did not put an end to the shooting of peaceful protestors and the arbitrary detention of people. On April 17, 2011, the largest demonstrations to date took place in the city of Homs as protestors took to the streets to participate in the funeral processions for seven people killed by the security forces. Thousands of demonstrators spontaneously headed to the main square of the town, chanting while they were passing the Christian areas “Christians and Muslims want

55 Lesch , Syria , 71.

56 Ibid., 75-84.

57 Ibid., 83-101.

38 freedom.” 58 The crowd cheered when a speaker proclaimed that “fellow Alawites from

Qurdaha are standing with us.” The protestors chanted “One! One! One! The Syrian people are one!” and “The people want the fall of the regime!”

The protestors staged a sit-in on this day in Homs and by the early hours of the morning, security forces began firing at them. Syrian TV aired interviews the next day of alleged witnesses saying that killers and saboteurs had been the targets 59 A video taken on that morning, however, showed the irregular forces loyal to Assad known as Shabiha and government forces celebrating by randomly firing their guns after massacring protestors and setting on fire the clock tower that sat in the central square in Homs. 60

On the next Friday, April 22, 2011, demonstration organizers called for the Great

Friday protests. People took to the streets in Homs, Hama, Damascus, Jableh, Banyas,

Abu Kamal, Tartus, and Deraa. More than 100 people were killed. Syrian TV aired and government news sites reported purported confessions of so-called “terrorists,” among them three young men who said that they received money from Saudi Arabia to purchase weapons to kill army officers and rape their female relatives. 61 The regime-sponsored website Day Press also published articles stating that the Syrian Army was fighting

58 Homs Live, “The Clock Tower Massacre,” YouTube video, 6:31, April 20, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cv8WJa28K2U (accessed June 22, 2013).

59 Jaky, “The Disinformation of the Syrian Television at the Clock Tower,” YouTube video, 3:12, April 21, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P6MKFZnyViA (accessed June 2, 2013).

60 Syrian 2000, “The Massacre at the Clock Tower After Demonstrations,” YouTube video, 1:48, June 25, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S75SH-eUoW8 (accessed May 2, 2013).

61 “Confessions of a Terrorist,” Syria Steps , April 29, 2011, http://www.syriasteps.com/index.php?p=110&id=67455 (accessed May 3, 2013).

39 terrorists in Deraa, Homs, Rastan, and Talbiseh to provide peace and protect people. 62

On April 27, 2011, Addounia reported that a man named Mostafa Ayash confessed that he was asked to kill civilians by a cleric in the Al-Omari Mosque who promised him to provide him with weapons and money. 63

Addounia commenced airing a daily segment called Altadlil Alilami , Arabic for

The Disinformation of Media . In its daily segment, the network discredited international news broadcasters such as CNN, France 24, Aljazeera, BBC, and Alarabiya accusing them of presenting “made-up” coverage of the uprising. On one of the segments,

Addounia attempted to reach a young audience in a particularly creative way. It aired what it described as an interview with the internationally famous Argentinian football player on the Barcelona team, Lionel Messi, under the title Messi’s Confession , suggesting that he was conspiring against the Assad government. Arabic voice-over was used to make it appear that Messi said that the news channel Aljazeera paid him a large sum of money to send coded messages to the opposition during an internationally televised football match that would inform extremist fighters how to transport weapons from Lebanon to Syria. 64 The regime was attempting to instill in the minds of everyday

Syrians of all ages that everywhere they looked they would find evidence of a conspiracy among malevolent international forces working to undermine peace and stability in Syria.

62 “Four Army Martyrs Killed by Terrorist Groups in Homs and Deraa,” Day Press , April 30, 2011, http://www.dp-news.com/pages/detail.aspx?articleid=82123 (accessed May 3, 2013).

63 Wake Up Wahabiten TV, “Capturing a Terrorist Cell in Deraa and Jableh,” YouTube video, 4:56, April 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PMxDXSf6zDs; and Syrian Agent 2011, “Terrorists Confessions from Deraa and Jableh,” YouTube video, 6:16, April 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=endscreen&NR=1&v=x7IgT8ru6bo (accessed May 7, 2013).

64 Maama 2088, “Messi’s Confessions About Syria,” YouTube video, 2:58, April 20, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZAkSKwtdOEg (accessed May10, 2013).

40 Peter Harling from the International Crisis Group wrote in April 2011:

In more parts of the country than one can count, protestors now face only the most brutal, repressive side of the regime. For those who mourn the dead and know them not as saboteurs and traitors, but as relatives, neighbors, and friends, there is nothing left to discuss. Slowly but surely, these ink spots of radicalized opposition are spreading and joining in an increasingly determined and coordinated movement to topple the regime. 65

In April 2011, as the bloodiest demonstrations yet in the uprising were taking place, the regime’s propaganda spread the disinformation that the victims were killed by terrorists and armed men. 66 It continued to paint the uprising as a foreign conspiracy carried out by armed gangs and Islamic terrorists. Rami Abdul Rahman stresses that the government media outlets used the term “Salafi” in order to alarm non-Muslims, secular

Muslims, as well as the outside world. The regime attempted to align the protestors with what it portrayed as fanatic Sunni clerics from throughout the Muslim world, such as

Yousef Al-Qardawi, an Egyptian cleric living in Qatar. These associations were asserted and stressed to advance the notion that the revolution was sectarian and the objective of the protestors was to kill Alawites. 67

On March 29, 2011, Bouthaina Shaaban, the main political and media advisor to

President Assad, said in a press conference that Al-Qardawi incited the Sunni Syrians to rebel against their government during his Friday sermon on March 25, 2011. 68 She added

65 Lesch, Syria ,101.

66 Ibid., 97.

67 Rami Abdul Rahman, telephone interview by author, United Kingdom, July 2, 2013.

68 “Syrian Parliament Asks President Assad for Clarifications about His Reforms,” BBC Arabic , March 28, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/03/110328_syria_monday.shtml (accessed June 22, 2013).

41 that Al-Qardawi’s words were a clear and direct call for a sectarian conflict in Syria. 69

But her depiction of his remarks was inaccurate. In his sermon, Al-Qardawi merely praised the Syrian revolution and spoke metaphorically of the train of revolution arriving at the important station, likening the uprising to recent events in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia. 70 Addounia aired lengthy reports about Al-Qardawi followed by interviews with regime supporters labeling him as a source of sedition encouraging Syrians to kill each other. 71

Adnan Arour, another cleric who lives in Saudi Arabia and is a regular guest on the Islamic Safa television station that broadcasts from Saudi Arabia, declared to all

Syrians including Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, Druzes, and Alawites that they should not carry out the actions and the violations of the regime against the people. He predicted that those who would do so would suffer negative ramifications after the rebels succeeded in toppling Assad. He argued that the Alawites who did not take part in the regime’s violence would be companions in building the Future Syria that would be established on the basis of citizenship. He cautioned that those who would carry out the regime’s brutal violence would be “killed, chopped and fed to dogs,” a hyperbolic Arabic expression for very severe punishment. A pro-Syrian regime entity uploaded only the last part of his statements onto YouTube under the headline “Arour Is Inciting the Killing

69 Ibid.

70 Rami Alassad, “Al-Qardawi Incites Sedition in Syria,” YouTube video , 1:48, March 25, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zhZGb5_z88 (accessed May 20, 2013).

71 Syrian Revolution 315, “Qardawi, The Cleric of Sedition,” YouTube video, 6:30, April 21, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pVGk9vix_c (accessed May 20, 2013).

42 of Alawites in Syria.” 72 Rami Abdul Rahman concludes that the regime succeeded to a large extent in frightening the Druze, Christians, and Alawites with the messages of Al-

Qardawi and other clerics. 73 It is important to note that the Syrian government drew attention to (and manipulated the statements of) these clerics who did not actually represent protestors, let alone Syrian Muslims, to serve the regime’s propaganda strategy.

The Regime’s Propaganda Response to the Full-Fledged Protest Movement

As the Syrian uprising moved into the summer of 2011 it became an increasingly widespread revolution enveloping many parts of the country. The protests grew steadily with Friday as the day of the week on which protests were held. The protest organizers designated every Friday with a name and a theme such as Your Silence is Killing Us , The

Friday for International Protection , The Friday of the Free Syrian Army , and so forth. 74

The regime steadily escalated its violent crackdown and concomitant propaganda effort.

On July 8, 2011, the U.S. ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, received a boisterous welcome in the city of Hama.

Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators poured onto the streets and gathered in Alassi

Square and draped his vehicle with flowers and olive branches. 75 The people of Hama interpreted the physical presence of Ambassador Ford as indicative of U.S. support for

72 Alkondor Aldahabi, “Arour Incites to Kill Alewites in Syria,” YouTube video, 3:35, June 26, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DnJyqrMngC8 (accessed May 22, 2013).

73 Rami Abdul Rahman, telephone interview by author, United Kingdom, July 2, 2013.

74 Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion , 4.

75 Jason Ukman, “U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, Greeted in Hama with Flowers and Olive Branches,” The Washington Post , July 8, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint- washington/post/us-ambassador-to-syria-robert-ford-greeted-in-hama-with-flowers-and-olive- branches/2011/07/08/gIQA1Faz3H_blog.html (accessed June 1, 2013).

43 their protests and democratic demands and a condemnation of the aggression by the security forces.

In countering the growing protest movement, the regime gave special focus to its media strategy. In leadership circles, effective media was considered “the number one weapon” and “the most important factor” in responding to the crisis, according to Ahmed

Haj Ali, Syrian Ba’ath Party media official. 76 To this end, the Assad government worked as the movement developed to improve its message delivery and also fine-tune it to meet the requirements of the growing crisis.

Development of New Modes of Communicating Propaganda

While the regime had largely been relying on the modes of direct messaging and traditional broadcasting as described above, the same basic propaganda approach it had pursued 30 years ago during the Muslim Brotherhood uprising, the use of social media by the opposition, as well as the international and pan-Arab news sources now available to

Syrians, required increased effort on the part of the regime to communicate its messages to desired audiences. It launched multiple new television stations to spread its rhetoric, including (somewhat ironically), given that the Assad government is Alawite and frequently professes secularism, a new Islamic television channel called Nour Al-Sham in

July 2011. Ahmed Haj Ali stated that “the channel will present Islam’s comprehensive and moderate message.” 77 The stated purpose of the channel was to counter Islamic messages broadcasted from Saudi Arabia that sided with the protestors and supported

76 Ahmed Haj Ali, a Syrian media official and political analyst and one of the principle participants in writing the political doctrine of the Syrian Ba’th party, telephone interview by author, Damascus, June 10, 2013.

77 Ibid.

44 their movement as an uprising against tyranny.

The state-sponsored television stations were employed to aggressively message the regime’s desired depiction of events on the ground. For example, Addounia television station, Arabic for The World , is part-owned and supervised by Assad’s maternal cousin Rami Makhlouf, a key member of the Assad entourage. It has voiced the official narrative that the uprising was a plot by the West and key Sunni Arab powers to use al-Qaida-linked insurgents to overthrow the government. Addounia reports attempted to discredit videos by protestors showing atrocities committed by security forces labeling them as fabrications and encouraged Syrians to take to the streets to fight back. 78

Another regime-sponsored news outlet, Al Ikhbariya , Arabic for The News , a satellite news channel continuously praised the actions of Assad and described the Syrian

Army as a heroic force fighting gangs of terrorists. It embedded reporters in the Syrian military 79 who were expected to counter information broadcasted on pan-Arab stations such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, and the BBC. For example, On April 22, 2011, Al-

Jazeera broadcasted live protests in the Midan district of Damascus. Al Ikhbariya aired interviews of alleged witnesses claiming that they were in Midan and observed no protests stating, “Aljazeera is lying and spreading propaganda.” 80

78 Ronald J. Deibert, Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace (Toronto: Mcclelland & Stewart, 2013), 157.

79 Nick Sturdee, “BBC Documentary Examines Syria's State TV Channel Al Ikhbariya,” The Guardian , February 10, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2013/feb/10/bbc-documentary-syria-state- television (accessed February 10, 2013).

80 Amara Amer, “Al Ikhbariya: No Protests in Midan,” YouTube video, 3:00, April 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHwiGBBnUsg (accessed May 23, 2013).

45 In an interview, Salam Diab, a resident of Midan, however confirmed that protests actually took place in that district. 81 Syrian TV reported on the same day “We are in

Midan. There are no protests. What you see refutes the propaganda some channels are spreading.” 82 In another report, Al Ikhbariya stopped its programming to announce that as a matter of fact there were dozens people gathered in Midan. Their chanting, however, was not against Assad, according to the report. They chanted and cheered instead in celebration of a rain fall after a long period of drought, according to the report. 83

Al Ikhbariya aired videos promoting and extolling the power and victories of the

Syrian military with footage depicting sophisticated naval, air and ground capability. The station broadcasted images of thousands of people carrying the picture of Assad with a scripted voice-over stating, “When the masses gather, they vow loyalty to the leader and swear not to be defeated. Then the army roared. The ground started to shake. The waves became high by the power of our naval force. The sky also cried by the power of our air force.” 84 The same segment suggested that the Lebanese political party, long a nemesis to the Assad regime, Al-Mustaqbil , Arabic for Future , headed by Saad Hariri, was covertly transporting soldiers into Syria. The accompanying footage showed masked men entering a gate while carrying weapons. 85

81 Salam Diab, telephone interview by Author, Damascus, February 15, 2012.

82 Amara Amer, “Al Ikhbariya: No Protests in Midan,” YouTube video, 3:00, April 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHwiGBBnUsg (accessed May 23, 2013).

83 Googl Seif, “The Protests Are for Rain Fall,” YouTube video, 3:38, April 25, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WfxmpgKfQyw (accessed May 24, 2013).

84 Doubai Fy, “The Syria AL Ikhbariya Channel,” YouTube video, 2:35, February 8, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Stpp-s3hm8 (accessed May 24, 2013).

85 Ibid.

46 Defectors have proved to be a valuable source of information for understanding how Addounia and other state-controlled media outlets operated with the sole function of furthering Assad’s messages. A longtime reporter, Ghatan Sleiba, worked for both the state-owned Al Ikhbariya network and the Addounia channel. He defected on July 2,

2012. 86 He was the first high-profile defector from Damascus's powerful propaganda apparatus and was formerly responsible for television coverage of the eastern Syria.

According to Sleiba, his work for the stations “was not reporting. It was simply acting as the tongue of the regime.” He stated that before interviews he regularly told his interviewees how to respond to questions he was about to ask them. “Those answers and the subjects of things to talk about were given to us by the head of the Ba'ath party in the area, or by the political security division.” 87 Sleiba has explained that he advanced the propaganda objectives of the regime due to fear: “Many of us knew then it wasn't terrorists they were fighting. It was people wanting their rights. But it was very difficult to do anything about it. We have families and we need to protect them.” 88

The former anchorman of the evening news bulletin on Syrian State TV, Hani al-

Malathi, publicly resigned on February 13, 2012 citing as the reason a system of “state- orchestrated misinformation.” 89 In an interview with FRANCE 24, he said he resigned because he could no longer speak of “armed insurgents” and “terrorist gangs” at the

86 Martin Chulov, “Syrian Regime TV Reporter Defects,” The Guardian , July 2, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/02/syrian-regime-tv-reporter-defects (accessed March 13, 2013).

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 “Ex-Syrian News Anchor Slams State Propaganda,” France 24 , February 21, 2012, http://www.france24.com/en/20120220-former-syrian-news-anchor-hani-malathi-bashar-assad-regime- resign-dubai (accessed March 13, 2013).

47 behest of the Assad regime when protestors took to the streets. Al-Malathi described a policy of silence regarding violence against protestors and described as provocative his station’s “broadcast footage of cheering pro-regime rallies when on the other side of town, families of victims of the repression were burying their dead.” 90

With respect to new media, the government established dozens of websites and

Facebook pages in the early months of the uprising. Staff Colonel Hanan Noura Al-

Hayek, a woman nicknamed Syrian Girl, 91 established a YouTube television channel to spread propaganda. She described herself as the first Syrian girl on YouTube. Her channel provided multiple reports from Syrian TV which revolve around the themes of army units pursuing armed terrorists; the confiscation of weapons; confessions of terrorists; accounts by people affirming the need for a military response to the protests; and expressions of happiness for the return of security to the region; and exposing international media lies about, and incitement against Syria. She launched a program on her channel, titled “Saboteurs’ Victims in Syria” 92 in which she claimed a terrorist campaign was targeting the country in the name of a revolution for freedom. Al Hayek spread reports aired by Syrian TV and Addounia on the funerals of two Christians and attributed their deaths to Islamic terrorists in Homs in June 2011. 93

The Assad regime also leveraged its international allies by depending on media

90 Ibid.

91 “Dr. Noura Hannan Al Hayek, Facebook , September 5, 2011,” ,accessed June 14) 194349957277682/ ا- را- ن- ا- اآرة- /https://www.facebook.com/pages 2013).

92 Hanan Noura TV, “Saboteurs Victims in Syria,” YouTube video, 15:12, April 20, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_GasijaTnIU (accessed May 12, 2013).

93 Ibid.

48 outlets funded by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, among others, to deliver messages on its behalf. These media outlets repeated the stories promoted by the Syrian Arab News

Agency (SANA) such as reports that the demonstrators were Islamic terrorists and Israeli agents who were supported by the Mossad and Western intelligence entities, and utilized roof-top snipers who killed members of the military and citizens. 94 The Chinese news agency Xinhua, 95 Lebanese media entities, Addiyar, Almayadeen TV, Al Manar TV,

Elakhbar, and Alsafeer as well as the Arabic-language channel Russia Today provided the same reports and an interview under the headline “Western Media Lies About Syria:

Eyewitness” with Anhar Kochneva, director of a Moscow-based tourism firm, who went to Syria to observe the protest movement. 96 There are also non-Syrian online venues that spread the SANA propaganda such as the Lebanese sites Elakhbar, Elnashra, Al Manar

(the site of the Hezbollah’s Al Manar TV), Tayyar, and Elmarada.

Assad brought his electronic and new media efforts to a new level with the establishment of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) in May 2011. In speeches, Assad likened SEA to the government’s own online security corps, referring to the group as “a real army in a virtual reality.” 97 The group propagated the regime’s message through multiple online media outlets in Syria such as Tube News, Sama Syria, Alwatan Online,

94 Alexandra Valiente, “Syria’s Mystery Snipers Revealed,” Syria 360 , April 24, 2011, http://syria360.wordpress.com/2011/04/24/syrias-mystery-snipers-revealed/ (accessed May 2, 2013).

95 Xinhua, “Terrorists Attack Residence of Syrian Servicemen,” Xinhua News , April 29, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-04/30/c_13852429.htm (accessed May 3, 2013).

96 Nadezhda Kevorkova, “Western Media Lie About Syria: Eyewitness Reports,” Russia Today , April 29, 2011, http://rt.com/news/syria-lies-interview (accessed May 3, 2013).

97 Nicole Perlroth, “Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain of Command,” The New York Times , May 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/technology/financial-times-site-is- hacked.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed May 17, 2013).

49 Syrian Masah, Baladna Online, Damas Post, Syria Steps, Syria Now, and Alhakika news site. In addition to depicting themselves as journalists to show “the real story” SEA has been known to launch cyber attacks on activists as well as international media outlets and other organizations such as The Financial Times , The Associated Press, BBC, NPR,

Human Rights Watch, The Washington Post , and The Onion , the parody news site. 98

Depicting Democratic Movement as a Precursor to Sectarian Conflict

It is important to understand the makeup of the regime forces in order to perceive the sectarian contours of the protest movement as it developed. As noted above, the protestors initially reflected the makeup of Syrian society: they were mostly members of the majority Sunni Muslim population but also included religious minorities that shared aspirations for democracy and human rights.

Assad, following his father’s modus operandi, filled the highest positions of the military with members of his Alawite sect, his family Baath party loyalists. Until he sustained serious injuries in a July 2012 bombing in Damascus, Maher Assad, Bashar’s brother, headed “the Fourth Division,” a group of well-trained and hard-line fighters who have been accused of committing atrocities against protestors. The rank and file of the regular army consists mostly of Sunni conscripts who are tightly controlled with limited access to media or any other sources of information outside the military. 99 Much of the violence against protestors has been carried out by groups of irregular fighters, Alawite

98 SEA is allegedly the party that hijacked AP’s twitter feed in April 2013 and planted the fake headline that explosions had taken place at the White House. SEA has also defaced prominent websites with pro-Assad messages.

99 “Chaos in Syria: Are Army Deserters Helping to Arm the Opposition?” Time , June 7, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2076250,00.html (accessed April 23, 2013).

50 paramilitaries known as “Shabiha” who were unleashed on unarmed protestors. The involvement of these Alawite gangs functioned very early in the conflict to exacerbate sectarian tensions and alter the originally secular nature of the protest movement. 100

In addition to the use of Shabiha, the regime employed propaganda to stir sectarianism in an attempt to diminish support for the movement among minorities. As protests grew in 2011 and the regime became increasingly threatened, it circulated the message that Sunnis intended to kill Alawites in the mountainous costal line of the eastern Mediterranean and the countryside surrounding the area where Sunnis and

Alawites live.

The following slogan was attributed to the protestors in the coastal town of Jableh in the early days of the uprising in April 2011: Alawites are to the grave and the

Christians are to Beirut . The slogan was written as graffiti in multiple cities including

Banyas, Latakiya, and Homs. The Syrian authorities claimed the graffiti were scrawled by Sunni opponents to the regime as an indication of the fate of minorities if the Assad regime were to be replaced by a state run by Islamic extremists. 101 One activist from

Jableh stated that the graffiti was the work of the Shabiha or other regime supporters in order to incite sectarian ill-feeling and to gain the support of minority sects for the regime. 102

The head of the legal division of the Syrian National Council, Hisham Marwah,

100 Ibid.

101 Nicholas Blanford, “ Assad Regime May Be Gaining Upper Hand in Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor , May 13, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0513/Assad-regime- may-be-gaining-upper-hand-in-Syria (accessed February 6, 2013).

102 Ali Albanyasi, telephone interview by author, Banyas, December 12, 2012.

51 stresses that this message with its sectarian dimension was out of line with the actual spirit of the protests and is likely a fabrication of the Assad regime. Professor Marwah explains that footage of the protestors indicates that the overall rhetoric exhibited in the demonstrations was focused on a call for freedom and democracy. The protestors called for putting Assad on trial and a civil state that would represent all the religious and ethnic backgrounds of the Syrian society. 103 Nevertheless, on the government-sponsored

Addounia television and on many social media outlets such as the website Syria Steps, the government attributed the anti-Alawite and anti-Christian slogans to the protestors.

Lebanese news sites such as Tayyar, Al Manar, 104 Elnashra, 105 and Elakhbar 106 cited the slogans as proof that the protestors, who were actually mostly secular, were Islamic fundamentalists and their victory would mean the demise of the Alawites and other religious minorities. This “proof” was repeated by the most prominent Western publications, such as The New York Times and The Christian Science Monitor .107

According to a number of Syrian political analysts and observers, this is the turning point

103 Hisham Marwah, telephone interview by author, Saudi Arabia, May 22, 2013.

104 Sadeq Khanafer, “Only in Syria,” Almanar , September 14, 2011, http://www.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?fromval=2&cid=171&frid=31&seccatid=171&eid=105076 (accessed February 5, 2013).

105 Joseph Abu Fadel, “Alrai’e Critics,” Elnashra , September 26, 2011, http://www.elnashra.com/news/show/388913/news/ (accessed February 5, 2013).

106 Khalil Issa, “The Lebanese Left Falls in Syria,” Al Akhbar , June 4, 2011, http://www.al- akhbar.com/node/13895 (accessed February 5, 2013).

107 Nicholas Blanford, “Assad Ragime May Be Gaining Upper Hand in Syria,” The Christian Science Monitor , May 13, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0513/Assad-regime- may-be-gaining-upper-hand-in-Syria (accessed February 6, 2013).

52 when minorities started to move to support the regime. 108 Syrian Catholic priest Faez

Mahfoud stressed that when Christians saw anti-Christian slogans they feared that massacres and expulsion of religious minorities would be imminent if Assad fell. 109

Bashar Ja'afari, Syrian Ambassador to the United Nations, continuously connected the protestors to Al Qaeda. “We believe some of the statements heard today against Syria can only be considered an encouragement of extremism and terrorism,” he said before the United Nations in one of the early emergency meetings at the Security

Council on April 26, 2011, organized to address the government’s brutal crackdown.

Ja'afari reiterated the regime propaganda that some armed groups had become

“unacceptably violent” during the demonstrations and started firing their weapons, which led to the death of security officers. He stated to the UN that Assad ordered security forces not to shoot at protestors and that “dozens and dozens of security officers” were shot and killed. 110

In a third speech delivered at Damascus University on June 20, 2011, faced with a growing protest movement, Assad returned to the theme of conspiracy. He said

“Conspiracies are like germs, which increase every moment.” He also labeled the protestors as “those with extremist ideologies.” 111 By this time, Assad’s brutal

108 Ali Abdullah, “Syrian People Decided to Support the Regime After the Alawites are to the Grave and the Christians are to Beirut Slogan,” Burathan News Agency , May 10, 2011, http://www.burathanews.com/news_article_124627.html (accessed February 6, 2013).

109 Andrea Kirk Assaf, “Amid Unrest, Syria’s Christians Fear for Future,” Our Sunday Visitor , October 16, 2011, http://www.osv.com/tabid/7621/itemid/8527/Amid-unrest-Syrias-Christians-fear-for- future.aspx (accessed June10, 2013).

110 “Tread Lightly on Syria, Russia Warns UN Security Council,” Russia Today , April 28, 2011, http://rt.com/politics/syria-russia-united-nations-protests/ (accessed May 12, 2013).

111 Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion , 76-82.

53 crackdown on the revolution was decried by most Arab and the Western countries.

However, Russia, Iran, China, the government of Maliki in Iraq and his faithful ally

Hezbollah in Lebanon continued to embrace and reiterate the rhetoric of the regime through their official media. Syrian government spokespersons constantly reiterated that their country was fighting extremism and defending moderate Islam against the dark

Islam of the extremists opposed to the regime.

The regime more and more resorted to lies and disinformation. On November 28,

2011, Syrian TV aired a press conference by the Syrian Foreign Minister Waleed

Moalem in which he showed gruesome video footage he claimed displayed “terrorist” groups killing Syrian troops. 112 In one segment, a group of armed men are shown, with the caption “Footage of the members of the terrorist armed gangs, at training” and they are accused of killing the civilians in Jisr al-Shugour, a town in northwestern Syria.

Another section of the video showed a man allegedly killed by opponents to the regime. 113 But in fact, the footage was taken in Lebanon in 2008 during clashes between

Lebanese factions. The six men appeared in the video held a press conference in Tripoli in which they showed the original video they had shot and posted it on Facebook to expose the Assad regime’s lies. 114 As for other video shown by Moalem, it was actually an image of an Egyptian foreign worker, Mohamed Mosalam, who was killed in

112 Souria 2011 Archives, “Syria Fakes Footage to Fool Public-Foreign Minister Walid,” YouTube video, 2:42, November 29, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9ToShpOV0Q (accessed May 15, 2013).

113 Ibid.

114 “Lebanese Call Syria Terrorist Footage a Fabrication,” Ya Libnan , November 28, 2011, http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/11/29/lebanese-call-syria-terrorist-footage-a-fabrication/ (accessed May 14, 2013).

54 Lebanon’s Kafrnaya district in April 2010. 115

Christians as a Target Audience for Regime Propaganda

Since the beginning of the uprising, the Syrian Christian minority, which compromises around 10 percent of the population, 116 has attracted the attention of scholars and the media. Recent history raised concern for how this sizeable minority would fare should political change come about in Syria. Specifically, in Iraq since 2003, the Christian minority was the victim of persecution and violent attacks by Islamist militants after the fall of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The Assad regime used this example as a part of its propaganda to dissuade Syrian Christians from allying with protestors and rally all Syrian Christians behind the regime to quell the uprising.

To this end, the state media and the outlets of its allies spread dubious, and even fabricated, claims of Christians being persecuted and killed, but made no comparable mention of civilians killed by the security forces. The story of Sari Saoud is a prime example of the regime’s propaganda intending to spread fear among minorities, particularly Christians. Sari Saoud, a 9-year-old Syrian Christian, was killed on

November 26, 2011, in the Bayada neighborhood of Homs as he ventured out to buy cookies. Aljazeera aired video footage of the boy in a report about the civilians killed by the security forces. 117 In the footage, the boy’s mother wept and cursed Assad, blaming

115 Souria 2011 Archives, “Syria Fakes Footage to Fool Public-Foreign Minister Walid,” YouTube video, 2:42, November 29, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B9ToShpOV0Q (accessed May 15, 2013).

116 Jenkins, The Next Christendom, 33.

117 Syrian Freedom for Ever, “Aljazeera Report on Sari Saoud Killing,” YouTube video, 3:32, January 10, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESM_befIqho (accessed May3, 2013).

55 regime forces for the death of her son. 118 The next day, Syrian TV described the boy’s death as an attack on childhood and a sectarian crime committed by Islamic terrorists. 119

Al Ikhbariya attacked the pan-Arab stations Aljazeera and Alarabiya, accusing them of fabricating news surrounding the murder of Sari. 120 Addounia also aired a report blaming

Sari’s death on terrorists. The news item featured civilians beseeching the Syrian army to protect them. 121 Many other media outlets supportive of the regime reported that Sari was killed by armed men and terrorists including Russia Today, 122 Syrian Free Press, 123 and the Lebanese channel Aljadid. 124 One month later, SANA stated that the Syrian authorities had captured Sari’s killer. 125 Al Ikhbariya, Addounia, and Syrian TV claimed that a man named Mazen Majed al-Dabdoub had confessed that he and his cohorts had

118 Live Leak, “Response to Al Ikhbariya Propaganda Tactics,” YouTube video , 1:09, November 27, 2011, http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=20c_1351365732 (accessed May 3, 2013).

119 Hanan Noura, “Sari Saoud’s Mother About Aljazeera Channel,” YouTube video, 10:20, November 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xoljs2KBcWI (accessed April 23, 2013).

120 Syrian All Star, “The Truthful Story of Sari Saoud,” YouTube video, 3:20, November 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7xn4kU1w3G8 (accessed May 4, 2013).

121 Syrian All Star, “Al Dounnia Report on Sari Saoud,” YouTube video, 7:36, November 27, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sS2UwqX2V6k&bpctr=1373560363 (accessed May 4, 2013).

122 Russia Today Forum, “Sari Saoud’s Mother Testimony,” YouTube video, 3:20, November, 2011, http://arabic.rt.com/forum/showthread.php/136550-%D9%82%D8%B5%D8%A9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%81%D9%84- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A- %D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF- %D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A1- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4 (accessed May10, 2013).

123 Syrian Free Press, “Syrian Child Sari Saoud Killed by Terrorists Gangs in Bayada,” YouTube video, 9:03, December 1, 2011, http://syrianfreepress.wordpress.com/2011/12/05/syrian-child-sari-saoud- killed-by-terrorists-gangs-in-bayada-homs-video-eng-subtitle/ (accessed May 10, 2013).

124 Nahda News Network, “Sari Saoud Family Tells the Story of His Killing,” YouTube video, 3:05, December 2, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVLkFvgSAjk (accessed May 10, 2013).

125 “Sari Saoud Killed by a Terrorist,” Syrian Arab News Agency , January 16, 2012, http://sana.sy/ara/336/2012/12/16/457460.htm (accessed April 25, 2013).

56 opened fire on the child and then fled, planning to blame the death on the Syrian Army. 126

State-controlled media also announced that he had acknowledged taking part in setting up roadblocks, opening fire on civilians in other locations, and sexually assaulting women in

Christian and Alawite neighborhoods. 127

The regime portrayed the uprising as a foreign conspiracy and a revolt dominated by extremists and Salafists targeted both at Christians and other minorities within Syria and the Western nations sympathetic to the call for democratic change urged by the protestors. The regime’s relentless message to Christians internally and to the outside world concerned with the fate of Syrian Christians was that only Assad could ensure the protection of minorities in Syria. 128 In 2011, the opposition attempted to counter this depiction. Burhan Ghalyoun, leader of the Syrian National Council, pronounced that a new Syria would not be “new” if it discriminated between Muslims and non-Muslims, concluding that the Syrian people would choose its leadership through elections. 129 But the very notion of majority rule, combined with the fear-mongering of the regime, was successful in convincing Syria’s Christian population that it would face persecution were

Assad to fall.

Orthodox Catholic Bishop Tony Phillipos Yazji from the Roman Orthodox

126 Extra PC Forum, “The Confessions of Sari Saoud’s Killer,” YouTube video, 3:32, December 16, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YbpY0-wsOc (accessed May 3, 2013).

127 “Syria: Murderer of Sari Saoud Imprisoned,” Syria: The Real Deal , December 16, 2011, https://arabisouri.wordpress.com/2012/12/16/syria-murderer-of-sari-saoud-imprisoned/ (accessed March 22, 2013).

128 Hassan Abbas, “The Dynamics of the Uprising in Syria,” Jadaliya , October 19, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2906/ (accessed May17, 203).

129 “Ghalyoun: We Understand Al Rai’s Fears; Democracy is the Solution,” Elnashra , September 10, 2011, http://www.elnashra.com/news/show/393872 (accessed May 29, 2013).

57 Patriarch in Damascus stated that when Christians saw on television reports of killings in their areas, they started distancing themselves from the revolution. 130 The state propaganda appears to have succeeded in turning them away from the opposition.

The regime also used Christian clerics to spread its propaganda message. One of these figures was Mother Agnes Mariam of the Cross, a controversial Lebanese-

Palestinian Catholic nun, based in Syria as the mother superior of the monastery of James the Mutilated in Qara, Syria. 131 In a press conference in Damascus on November 11,

2011, attended by foreign journalists who came to Syria on a tour organized by the Syrian

Ministry of Information and the Catholic Media Center, Mother Agnes said there were no people demanding democracy, freedom, and human rights in Syria. She claimed rather that there were armed groups killing innocent people in the name of democracy. 132 She asserted that these evil criminals murdered civilians and then took footage of the deceased persons claiming that government forces were behind the killing. 133 In Syria, she posited, there were armed men possessing limitless amount of sophisticated weapons used to terrorize civilians and the security forces. 134

Other clerics bore accurate witness to the democratic movement. An Italian Jesuit priest, Father Paolo Dall’Oglio, who lived in Syria for the past 30 years and established

130 Bishop Tony Yazgi, telephone interview by author, Damascus, Syria, June 10, 2013.

131 “Mother Anges Mariam of the Cross,” Fanoos , http://www.fanoos.com/society/mother_agnes_mariam_of_the_cross.html (accessed May 22, 2013).

132 Boris Dolgov, “On Current Situation in Syria,” Ria Novosti , January 2, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/international_affairs/20120201/171067470.html (accessed May 23, 2013).

133 Syria Online TV, “Mother Anges Mariam Al-Saleeb From the Catholic Media Center,” YouTube video, 7:06, November 19, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysKtld_VGbk (accessed May 22, 2013).

134 Ibid.

58 St. Moses the Abyssinian Monastery, north of Damascus, posted a Christmas message on the monastery’s web site on November 25, 2011. The message was not well received by the Assad government which asked Father Paolo to leave the country. His message was as follows:

Our country is in danger. Some of us have sided with one party, others with another. Let us ask ourselves: where is our duty as a community obeying the Gospel? Is not our role to speak for harmony and reconciliation, now as in the past? Will citizens gain more freedom, or lose the little they have? Will they achieve a pluralistic, civilian, consensual democracy, where everyone is respected? We feel our role in this crisis is to encourage dialogue, communication, reconciliation and bridge building… Reconciliation is between enemies, not friends! It can succeed through an agreement that considers the reasonable demands of all sides. This is why we offer, in all humility, our service as Christians, not as a party but as mediators… But reconciliation requires several fundamental conditions. In their absence, it would be tantamount to submission and surrender. The most important of those conditions are to accept pluralism, freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, and respect of citizens’ dignity and basic rights… Our salvation will not come from the mantra of plots. It will come by seeking cooperation with every free individual of goodwill in the region and in the world. This can occur only through access to Arab and international media in all their diversity. Truth springs up from media pluralism and independence. We also suggest cooperation with independent humanitarian organizations such as the Red Cross or Red Crescent to help in stopping armed clashes and protecting unarmed civilians. Dear Christians, the third point comes from the manifesto and teachings of the Oriental Patriarchs, and from the commandments of the Bishops’ Synod for the Middle East, held under the Pope’s direction in 2010.

59 They determine that our existence, side by side with the Muslims in harmony and understanding, is a condition that God wants…” 135

********************************

The Assad regime’s reflexive response to the first protests of the Arab Spring in

Syria in Deraa was to mischaracterize the nature and aims of the demonstrators and move against them with lethal and intimidating force. This approach continued as the movement spread to other cities and towns in Syria. The claim that peaceful demonstrators taking to the streets to voice their desire for the most basic of human and democratic rights were Salafists, Islamic extremists bent on the eradication of Christians and other minorities was contrary to the reality described by those taking part. It aimed to deny the peaceful, religiously diverse, and non-secular nature of the protest movement through traditional and innovative modes of communication. The propaganda also aimed to effectively alter the nature of the regime’s opposition by creating fear and apprehension among Christians and other minorities and move them to reject the calls for change and support the Assad regime.

135 “Edgy Damascus: Jesuit Priest Asked to Leave Syria,” Middle East Posts , December 12, 2011, http://mideastposts.com/middle-east-society/religion-in-the-middle-east/edgy-damascus-jesuit-priest-asked- to-leave-syria/ (accessed May 28, 2013).

60 CHAPTER III

OPPOSTION AND REGIME MESSAGING AND PROPAGANDA DIRECTED OUTSIDE SYRIA AND THE DECENT TO EXTREME VIOLENCE

In the previous chapter, I detailed developments in the Syrian uprising from

March to December 2011 with a focus on propaganda spread by the Assad regime that falsely characterized the early protests as actions of violent Muslim extremists and attributed deaths caused by government forces to the acts of rebel terrorists. This propaganda was primarily directed inside Syria to create fear on the part of Alawites,

Christians, and other minorities who might otherwise agree with the protestors’ aspirations for increased democracy, human rights, and the fall of the Assad regime.

This chapter will explore the methods by which protestors and (later and increasingly) armed, organized rebel groups set forth a contrary narrative of events, in some instances also manipulating facts, to discredit the regime and grow support for the revolution internally and externally.

The Syrian conflict illustrates how, in the age of the Internet and widespread use of mobile devices, activists have an unprecedented ability to reach wide audiences with their messages. At the same time, this conflict illustrates the limits of the technology to persuade audiences of the authenticity and reliability of non-traditional media generated by dispersed individuals, particularly when confronted with opposing reports from traditional sources of news and information.

In a final analysis of the first 16 months of the uprising, the Assad regime won the information war by controlling and curtailing the access traditional media outlets had to

Syria and successfully sowing uncertainty and suspicion in the outside world with the

61 protestors and, later, the armed rebels. The regime propaganda was successful in creating reluctance on the part of international actors to credit reports detailing the sheer brutality with which Assad systematically crushed a movement for democracy and in creating doubts as to the motives of the anti-government activists. The propaganda strategy of the regime was made plain in the assault on the Baba Amr district of Homs in February and

March of 2012 when accounts of western journalists exposed the mistruths underlying

Assad regime propaganda.

The Composition of the Protestors and Their Use of Social Media for Organizing, Messaging and Propaganda

To better understand their motivations and abilities, it is useful to describe in summary fashion some of the different diverse groups of Syrians who took part in the protest movement during the first 16 months of the uprising. Their ranks included many university students and degree holders with facility in utilizing mobile and Internet technologies and new media. Some of the early activists were known freelance journalists who worked for foreign media outlets. Many of these people had no specific political affiliations and were mainly secularists, although a large part of the youth participating were religious and principally identified with others with whom they shared a place of worship. Other early participants in the protests had developed political and human rights commitments and were members of various organizations such as the

Damascus Declaration, the Communist Labor Party, the Marxist left movement and the

Democratic People's Party, as well as some Syrian Kurdish groups. In other parts of the country, the demonstrations were carried out largely by people with only tribal

62 affiliations from Deraa in the South and Deir al-Zour in the East. 1 After Assad expelled and banned members of the foreign and pan-Arab press from the country, these activists, possessing video cameras on their cell phones and with access to Internet connections, became the main source of news and information for many foreign and pan-Arab media outlets, including the prominent Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya television channels that provided extensive coverage of the Arab revolts. 2 As one activist said, “Without the

Internet, there is no life.” 3

University of Southern California Professor Manuel Castells observed that “The emergence of social mass self-communication offers an extraordinary medium for social movements and rebellious individuals to build their autonomy and confront the institutions of society in their own terms and around their projects.” 4 This has certainly been true in other countries that participated in the 2011 Arab Spring and was true in

Syria. Similar to the practices of activists in the 2011 Tunisian and Egyptian protests, long before events erupted in Deraa, Syrian activists first used Facebook to mobilize people to participate in sit-ins in front of the Egyptian embassy in Damascus to show solidarity with Egyptians seeking to topple the regime of Hosni Mubarak and as an indirect way to protest against the Assad regime. The security forces dispersed the

1 Hassan Abbas, “The Dynamics of Uprising in Syria,” Jadaliyya , October 19, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2906/ (accessed August 3, 2013).

2 Although, some foreign journalists, such as the late Anthony Shadid of the New York Times and others, took great personal risk to enter the country and sadly, many paid the ultimate price to report from Syria.

3 Anthony Shadid, “Syria’s Sons of No One,” The New York Times , August 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/magazine/syrias-sons-of-no-one.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed August 5, 2013).

4 Paul Mason, Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions (London; New York: Verso, 2012), 138-139.

63 protestors immediately. A Damascene activist named Shahin recalled that the success in simply organizing the event was noteworthy, remarking that “The call on Facebook had worked.” 5

On January 26, 2011, The Assad regime, fearing the organizing potential of social media, deployed software that blocked the capability of Facebook communications from mobile phones. Two weeks later, the regime suddenly changed its strategy since activists started using alternative proxies to access Facebook, YouTube, and other social media outlets. Instead, the government allowed access to these sites hoping to monitor the anti- regime activists and it launched numerous profiles on social outlets enthusiastically praising Assad. 6 In February 2011, a group of Syrian activists launched a media project called Sham News Network (SNN). The group does not have any affiliation with any

Syrian political opposition group and does not receive any funding from other states.

SNN uses Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube to distribute its content. 7

After forty years of Assad regime rule, a protest took place on February 17, 2011 when people marched the streets the Alhariqa quarter in the heart of Damascus in protest of the police brutality against a young man, chanting “Syrian people will not be humiliated.” The protestors held their mobile phones and filmed the protest. Within a

5 Shahin, interview with Lorenzo Trombetta, Beirut, August 16, 2011.

6 Lorenzo Trombetta, “Altering Courses in Unknown Waters: Interaction between Traditional and New Media during the First Months of the Syrian Uprising,” Global Media Journal , Spring/Summer 2012, http://www.globalmediajournal.de/2012/05/07/altering-courses-in-unknown-waters-interaction-between- traditional-and-new-media-during-the-first-months-of-the-syrian-uprising/ (accessed July 16, 2013).

7 Philip Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in Social Media Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 53.

64 few hours, YouTube was flooded with videos of the rally in Alhariqa Square. 8 The activists made this footage available to many Syrians to see and realize that citizens had broken a barrier of fear and challenged the government. The popularity of social media continued to grow among Syrians who wanted reforms and activists were poised to use with these important tools by the time the Arab Spring came to Deraa as discussed in the previous chapter.

The Social Media Reporting of the Syrian Activists

Syrian activists created a tight electronic network of coordination groups called

Tansiqiyat when the uprising began in March 2011 9 to coordinate their actions on the ground and act as main press offices for the protestors and outside world. These coordination groups provided daily reports of the protests and victims killed by the regime forces in each neighborhood. 10 On March 11, 2011, an umbrella group for all the local coordination groups was created under the banner Local Coordination Committees of Syria (LCC), which represented 14 local coordination groups from the main towns across Syria. 11 The LCC was the most organized entity of the anti-government

8 Hblackhorse1, “Alharika Protests,” YouTube video, 4:55, February 17, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrRBELwyFhU (accessed July 22, 2013).

9 Local Coordination Committees, “About the LCCs,” http://www.lccsyria.org/about (accessed August 7, 2013).

10 Lorenzo Trombetta, “Altering Courses in Unknown Waters: Interaction between Traditional and New Media during the First Months of the Syrian Uprising,” Global Media Journal , Spring/Summer 2012, http://www.globalmediajournal.de/2012/05/07/altering-courses-in-unknown-waters-interaction-between- traditional-and-new-media-during-the-first-months-of-the-syrian-uprising/ (accessed July 16, 2013).

11 Local Coordination Committees, “About the LCCs,” http://www.lccsyria.org/about (accessed August 7, 2013).

65 movement in Syria and played a large role in the continuity of the protests. 12 The LCC provided news and information about the situation in Syria via email to media outlets around the world, mainly pan-Arab media outlets such as Aljazeera and Alarabiya as well as the Arabic television service of the BBC and the US-funded Arabic language news station, Alhurra. The LCC also sent its news via Facebook and Twitter. By the end of

May 2011, activists in small rural areas and neighborhoods formed many groups of coordination online to communicate with the other Syrians and the outside world. 13

The activists heavily relied on the Sham News Network (SNN) that came to be regarded by many regional and international news outlets as the primary source of information about the protests and events unfolding in Syria. SNN has content on

Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. Using these tools, every Syrian with a cell phone with a camera could function as a citizen journalist and uploaded footage of the protest movement on the SNN site. 14 Another important source of news and information about the uprising is the UK-based Syrian Observatory form Human Rights, which is run out of a two-bedroom terraced home in Coventry, UK, by one person, Rami Abdul Rahman.

Rahman has been cited as a source by many western news outlets. 15

12 Hassan Abbas, “The Dynamics of Uprising in Syria,” Jadaliyya , October 19, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2906/ (accessed August 3, 2013).

13 Local Coordination Committees, “About the LCCs,” http://www.lccsyria.org/about (accessed August 7, 2013).

14 Ibid.

15 Mohammed Abbas, “An Unlikely Home to Prominent Syria Activist,” Reuters , December 8, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/08/uk-britain-syria-idUKTRE7B71XG20111208 (accessed August 8, 2013).

66 Social media enabled entrepreneurial activists to assemble quickly and post their reports faster than the government-sponsored media.16 They provided Aljazeera and other international and regional television stations with footage documenting the regime’s atrocities and the bloodied victims of the government crackdown lying in the streets of

Syrian towns. 17 The Facebook page of the Syrian Revolution 2011 had more than

250,000 friends by August 2011. 18 When phone networks failed them, activists provided memory cards to others who would smuggle them to Jordan where they could upload the photos and videos of attacks on protestors to the Internet. 19

Syrian expatriates also participated in the revolution on social media platforms.

Some of them tweeted information from Syria about the protest movement. Others donated satellite phones and phone cards to assist the activists with documenting the movement and avoid the surveillance of the Assad regime. 20 Additionally, protestors used social media programs such as Qik to send videos and images to friends outside of the country to be uploaded to YouTube. 21 Aljazeera and Alarabiya started showing the images of the regime’s brutality and humiliation of actual and suspected activists including images of dead bodies. Activists used mobile phones connected to satellite

16 Mason, The New Global Revolutions, 138-139.

17 Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy, 52-53.

18 Ibid.

19 Nour Malas, “Syria Revolt Fueled by Roof Fires and Tweets,” The Wall Street Journal , July 15, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303406104576445864072772194.html (accessed February 15, 2013).

20 Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy , 53.

21 Ibid.

67 lines or Skype to enable eyewitnesses to speak from areas targeted by the regime forces and places where protests took place and made speaking appearances on the stations

Aljazeera and Alarabiya on a regular daily basis.

These videos coming out from Syria were effective in developing sympathy for the protestors in some respects. While it may have been unknown to foreign observers precisely who the activists were and what their objectives were, it was clear from the footage coming out of Syria that they were being brutally silenced and that their basic human and political rights were being trounced upon.

International outrage became sufficiently aroused that European countries and the

United States imposed sanctions against the Assad regime. On July 31, 2011, President

Obama stated “I am appalled by the Syrian government’s use of violence and brutality against its own people…Once again, President Assad has shown that he is completely incapable and unwilling to respond to the legitimate grievances of the Syrian people. His use of torture, corruption and terror puts him on the wrong side of history and his people…In the days ahead, the United States will continue to increase our pressure on the

Syrian regime, and work with others around the world to isolate the Assad government and stand with the Syrian people.” 22

22 “Statement by the President on the Violence in Syria,” The White House , July 31, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/31/statement-president-violence-syria (accessed August 2, 2013).

68 By August 18, 2011, President Obama for the first time called on Assad to step down by stating, “For the sake of the Syrian people, the time has come for Assad to step aside.” 23

Opposition Propaganda Aims to Weaken the Regime and Grow the Opposition

Activists did not attempt to solely rely on accurate, objective reporting of regime violence to expand their movement and draw sympathy and support from the outside world. It can be argued that the opposition also resorted to propaganda as understood by the working definition of this paper discussed in the previous chapter, i.e. any technique or action that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of a group, in order to benefit the sponsor, 24 often involving the manipulation of information and discrediting those who hold opposite views.

As discussed above, the opposition activists from the early days of the uprising realized the effectiveness of social media to win the hearts and minds of people, locally, regionally, and internationally, a lesson they learned from observing the important role media played in the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Opposition groups also mounted propaganda campaigns to give the false perception that the regime was cracking from within and that the Alawite community, Assad’s primary support base, was splintering.

They appeared on Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya stating that Assad was losing his community support. One of the opposition’s preeminent figures, Monzer Makhos, relentlessly promoted the view on Al Arabiya’s popular show Nouktit Nizam that the

23 Macon Phillips, “President Obama: The Future of Syria Must be Determined by its People, but President Bashar Al-Assad is Standing in their Way,” The White House Blog , August 18, 2011, http://whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be-determined-its-people- president-bashar-al-assad (accessed August 25, 2013).

24 Kenneth A. Osgood, “Propaganda,” Encyclopedia Britannica Online , http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/propaganda.aspx#1-1G2:3402300123-full (accessed July 27, 2013).

69 majority of Alawites were against Assad and that the Alawite community was divided. 25

The purpose of the propaganda was to create insecurity among the regime's most powerful figures and cause them to perceive each other as threats to be eliminated. The opposition expected that this type of Alawite in-fighting would precipitate the fall of the regime. But most of the opposition’s claims in this regard were exaggeration and untruth. 26

In a December 9, 2011 statement issued to the London-based, Saudi-funded newspaper Asharq al-Awsat , a group calling itself the Alawite League of Coordinating

Committees claiming to represent Syria’s Alawite community contended that

Alawites rejected the regime’s barbarity and its Shabiha forces-- the pro-government militia-- upon whom the regime relied to crack down on protestors. However, no other record or evidence of the existence of the Alawite League of Coordinating Committees exists. 27

Other questionable reports that Syrian opposition groups, including the Syrian

National Council, the FSA, and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, disseminated concerned the besieged city of Homs. On December 9, 2011, opposition sources stated that the regime had issued a 72-hour ultimatum for army defectors in Homs to turn themselves in to the Syrian authorities with their weapons or face a massacre. Although regime forces had been continuously cracking down on opposition and dissidents, as a

25 Alawi Latakia, “Many Alewites are Anti-Bashar Assad,” YouTube video, 4:46, October 12, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sZgDpG29DlU (accessed August 2, 2013).

26 “Missteps in the Syrian Opposition’s Propaganda Effort,” Stratfor Global Intelligence , December 14, 2011, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/missteps-syrian-oppositions-propaganda- effort (accessed August 10, 2013).

27 Ibid.

70 matter of fact, there were no warnings issued by the Syrian authorities to carry out a massacre similar to the one Moammar Gadhafi issued against the residents of Benghazi. 28

The opposition’s interest was to create fear of an impending human tragedy and create a condition similar to that in Libya when a western military intervention prevented

Moammar Gadhafi's forces from crushing the stronghold of the opposition, Benghazi. 29

Other anti-regime sources arguably exaggerated the number of protestors and attempted to give the false impression that there were demonstrations all over Syria, particularly in

Damascus, 30 and the economic hub of Syria, Aleppo. 31 On December 12, 2011, the LCC called for a protest and strike under the slogan Strike of Dignity . The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the strike spread to Aleppo. But in fact, shops in Aleppo remained open and Alepponians did not respond to the call for a strike. 32

As these examples illustrate, the core objectives of the opposition’s propaganda campaign was to (1) to convince Syrians, particularly the minorities, that the regime was splintering and there was no point in supporting it, (2) to convince international audiences, particularly the western nations and NATO, that the regime was collapsing and preparing to commit massacres to put down the uprising and (3) to convince “Syrians and external stakeholders that the collapse of the al Assad regime will not result in the

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Sham SNN, “Homs: The Funeral of Al Khalidiya Massacre,” YouTube video, 0:47, July 19, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5XTmxfwxQ6o (accessed August 12, 2013).

31 “Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera Fabricate Facts on Syria: Figres Reveal,” Press TV , April 12, 2012, http://www.presstv.com/detail/235902.html (accessed August 10, 2013).

32 “Missteps in the Syrian Opposition’s Propaganda Effort,” Stratfor Global Intelligence , December 14, 2011, http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/missteps-syrian-oppositions-propaganda- effort (accessed August 10, 2013).

71 level of instability that has plagued Iraq for nearly a decade, or in the rise of Islamist militias, as appears to be happening in Libya.” 33

While not necessarily emblematic of organized opposition efforts to mislead consumers of its news, there occurred a couple of colorful examples of individuals flagrantly fabricating information to win sympathy for the protestors and rebels. Danny

Abdul Dayem is a British citizen of Syrian descent and supporter of the opposition whose reports from Homs in 2011 and 2012 were picked up by CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, and Al

Arabiya. Regularly calling for Western military intervention in Syria, he was the subject of criticism when a video leaked online showed him appearing to stage a broadcast for

CNN. Prior to being interviewed, he is seen requesting colleagues to fire weapons to dramatize his live report with Anderson Cooper.

In another example, a blogger self-identifying as “Gay Girl in Damascus” described the anti-government protests in Syria as the backdrop for the life a young lesbian Syrian named Amina. Major Western news outlets republished Amina’s blogs about her exploits working in support of the opposition including her arrest by Syrian regime forces in June 2011. After some international outcry, an American student at the

University of Edinburg, Tom McMaster, revealed that he was the writer of the fictitious blog. 34 Syrian Television reported at length about “Amina” citing the incident as support for the view that Syria was a target of fabricated news and international conspiracy. 35

33 Ibid.

34 David Kenner, “Straight Guy in Scotland,” Foreign Policy , June 13, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/13/straight_guy_in_scotland (accessed August 27, 2013).

35 Lion Heart, “The Truth of Amina in Syrian Jail,” YouTube video, 4:30, June 15, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKuQCDeIpV8 (accessed August 22, 2012).

72 Addounia channel also reported the event as an example of interference in Syrian internal affairs by means of the Internet. 36 The Assad regime and its supporters launched

Facebook pages to counter the reports of activists. In more than one instance the regime was able to show that photos allegedly documenting atrocities in Syria actually depicted events that took place earlier in Iraq or Lebanon. 37

Assad’s Restrictions on Foreign Journalists and the Clash of Competing Narratives

Assad certainly attempted to counter the activists’ online communications revealed the brutal treatment of Syrian citizens at the hands of regime forces. The regime launched the state-sponsored Al Ikhbariya channel on YouTube on March 21, 2011. Al

Ikhbariya aims to discredit the amateur videos by techniques that include editing some videos filmed by activists so the viewers will doubt their authenticity and by altering some elements in videos to suggest foreign support for the opposition. 38 Many videos that revolve around this theme were broadcasted on Al Ikhbariya throughout the course of the uprising, asserting that foreign powers including the United States, the Persian

Gulf states, and Turkey were inciting the opposition. One report showed men lying down in a room watching television with the narration “these are the terrorists and this is where they hide. They go out to terrorize people. These terrorists receive support and weapons from countries that claim they are fighting terrorism.” Footage of Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton appears when the narrator speaks of countries supporting the so-called

36 Hanan Noura, “Syria News,” YouTub e video, 15:18, June 13, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cwqfV81q55M (accessed August 15, 2013).

37 Seib , Real-Time Diplomacy , 54.

38 Lorenzo Trombetta, “Altering Courses in Unknown Waters: Interaction between Traditional and New Media during the First Months of the Syrian Uprising,” Global Media Journal , Spring/Summer 2012, http://www.globalmediajournal.de/2012/05/07/altering-courses-in-unknown-waters-interaction-between- traditional-and-new-media-during-the-first-months-of-the-syrian-uprising/ (accessed July 16, 2013).

73 terrorists. The commentator goes on to state that “the terrorists” fighting the Syrian government were armed with American weapons at that these are “the peaceful activists the world in talking about.” 39

In another example, a video aired on Al Ikhbariya, and the Iranian Al Alam television station of opposition fighters dousing men (supposedly a Syrian soldier loyal to

Assad) with gasoline and burning them alive. The atrocity, however, took place in Iraq, not in Syria. 40

Regime Monopolization and Control of Traditional Media Emerging from Syria

While these efforts to discredit the credibility of the opposition played an important role in the regime’s propaganda, it is important to remember that its primary tactic was to monopolize the traditional media coming out of Syria which it accomplished by severely restricting and eventually banning foreign journalists while relentlessly communicating to the outside world that the protestors and rebels were Islamic terrorists to be feared.

In 2011, journalists permitted to enter the country had their movements monitored and limited and were accompanied by security agents continuously. 41 By April 2011, most foreign reporters had been asked to leave the country leaving behind in operation almost exclusively media outlets which functioned to advance the government’s

39 Syrians on Utube, “Al Ikhbariya Reveals the Conspiracy against Syria,” YouTube video, 3:36, August 8, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hxm8X9HvAPI (accessed August 14, 2013).

40 The World Daily News in Utube, “BBC News Syria War Videos Key in Online Battle for Support,” YouTube video , 3:23, September 10, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sO88nhBkHmI (accessed August 22, 2013).

41 Charles Walford and Nabila Ramdani, “She Wanted One More Story,” The Daily Mail , February 23, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2104711/Marie-Colvin-Sunday-Times- reporter-leave-Syria-day-died-says-mother.html (accessed August 15, 2013).

74 objectives and spread its messages to the Syrian people and abroad. 42 Despite the government’s efforts to limit foreign coverage of events in Syria, some intrepid correspondents sneaked into the country and embedded themselves in various hotspots.

In addition, a group of foreign journalists went to Syria in August 2011 on a tour entitled “Syria is Fine” organized by a youth group connected with the Assad regime.

NPR’s Kelly McEvers was the only American reporter in the group. Other reporters came from Russia, China, Iran, and some European countries. Minders accompanied the media representatives around Damascus to areas with no signs of an uprising. They were not permitted to venture to hotspots such as Deraa. But while they were in the city of

Hama, a group of young people started chanting “The people want the fall of the regime!” – upon which the minders instructed the journalists to return immediately to their bus. The minders then gave the journalists a tour of buildings they claimed were bombed by opposition forces and showed them a bridge from which they claimed

“terrorists” threw bodies of soldiers into a river.43

Due to the limits imposed by the Assad regime, foreign correspondents were left in a difficult position with respect to how to report events in Syria. The typical formulation that many news articles followed was first to relay the version of events officially announced by the government. In one of many examples, after the Syrian security forces brutally raided the northern town of Jisr al-Shugour on June 11, 2011,

CNN reported that Syria: Soldiers kill, arrest “armed terrorist groups” and that SANA

42 Lesch, Syria, 94.

43 Kelly McEvers, “A Controlled Glimpse of a Restive Syrian Town,” NPR , August 22, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/08/22/139858852/a-controlled-glimpse-of-a-restive-syrian-town (accessed August 16, 2913).

75 stated that “Syrian soldiers working to retake a rebellious northern town killed, wounded, and arrested members of “armed terrorist groups” operating in the region…in an operation to restore security and tranquility to the area which was being terrorized by armed terrorist groups” 44

But the actual events were quite different. On June 4, 2011, the Syrian army, backed by tanks, helicopters, and heavy amour vehicles started an operation in Jisr al-

Shugour, trying to crush the protests in the town where pro-democracy and freedom demonstrations prevailed. The operation lasted until June 12, 2011. 45 As a result of the government’s brutal campaign, most of the town’s residents fled to nearby Turkey.

Ahmed, one of the people who fled, told an Associated Press reporter at his hospital bed that he was hit by three bullets during a protest in Jisr al-Shugour. “The snipers suddenly started firing at us from three buildings,” a Turkish relative quoted him as saying in

Arabic. “I was hit in the neck and chest first but a third bullet found my right arm when I raised it while on the ground.'' 46

Following the official news as dictated by regime controlled media, Western reports would often continue to make reference to contrary information or video footage from activists generally taken from a social media website. With respect to the social media footage, journalists would often append a caveat stating that there was no way to independently verify the activists’ account. For example, the British newspaper The

44 “Syria: Soldiers Kill, Arrest Armed Terrorist Groups,” CNN , June 11, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/11/syria.unrest/index.html (accessed August 16, 2013).

45 “Thousands of Syrians Flee to Turkey,” Al Jazeera , June 11, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/06/2011611145043659900.html (accessed August 17, 2013).

46 Ibid.

76 Telegraph posted a video on its website of footage released by the Shams News Network of regime tanks firing during an assault on Hama. 47 The same report in The Telegraph began by saying “The clip, which cannot be independently verified, appears to show tanks firing on the Al-Bahra roundabout.” It was not typical to hear similar caveats added to reports relaying official government news agency statements.

Among many other examples, CNN interviewed Syria’s deputy foreign minister,

Fayssal Mekdad, who claimed that Syria was fighting extremist groups financed outside

Syria. CNN also reported the government media version that the killings in Syria were committed by armed groups. The article went on saying that YouTube videos showed marches and demonstrations in Damascus, Latakiya, Idlib, Hama, and Homs, although stating that CNN was not able to independently verify their authenticity. 48

In another example, a BBC article from November 2011 reported that Syrian TV showed a rally in support of Assad in Damascus. The article then stated that at least 23 people were killed according to activists’ accounts. However, the article concluded, “the claims cannot be independently verified as most foreign media are banned from entering

Syria.” 49 The Los Angeles Times’ Alexandra Zavis from Beirut published excerpts from

Assad about events in Syria on December 7, 2011. In his statements, Zavis reported that

Assad denied ordering a deadly crackdown in Syria, saying “no government in the world

47 “Syria: Tanks Continue Assault on Hama,” The Telegraph , August 3, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8679320/Syria-tanks-continue-assault-on- Hama.html (accessed August 17, 2013).

48 “Syrian Official: There is no Crackdown,” CNN , June 25, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/25/syria.unrest/index.html (accessed August 19, 2013).

49 “Syria Security Forces Commit Crimes Against Humanity,” BBC , November 28, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15926364 (accessed August 17, 2013).

77 kills its people unless it's led by a crazy person.” The article then stated that “Opposition activists reported 15 people killed Wednesday, a claim that could not be independently verified.” 50

Due to the general mistrust of traditional news reporters toward the social media, the many broadcasts and reports such as those described above provided not equal, but actually more weight to the depiction of events from the Assad regime’s perspective. By this traditional method of reporting, international journalists in many instances became unwitting accomplices in advancing the regime’s position and subtly discrediting the opposition. For example, news articles generally did not state that the government version of the unfolding events in Syria could not be verified due to the Syrian government’s ban on journalists being in the country, as described in the previously mentioned examples. The need for verification was mentioned most frequently with respect to videos coming from the opposition.

Assad Takes to the International Airwaves

Many would likely dispute the notion that during the July 2011 through December

2012 time frame, the uprising was the work of thugs and armed gangs-- or of Salafists who espouse violent jihad against civilians-- as a legitimate expression of Islam and violent extremists. Indeed, Assad himself was apparently concerned that the accounts from the protestors themselves were sufficiently persuasive and his own messaging overly weak, that he himself eventually began taking to the airways to present his case internationally. In addition to countering the activists’ narrative through an online

50 Alexandra Zavis, “Syrian President Bashar Assad Denies Ordering Crackdown,” Los Angeles Times , December 07, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/07/world/la-fg-syria-assad-20111208 (accessed August 20, 2013).

78 presence and by news releases from SANA to the traditional media, Assad and his proxies directly interjected into the global debate their view that the government’s crackdown on the opposition was justified in the name of crushing terrorism and Islamic extremism.

In 2011, the most vocal regime figure internationally was Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar Jaafari. From the beginning of the uprising, Jaafari relentlessly repeated the government propaganda that the unrest in Syria was the work of unidentified foreign agitators trying to undermine Syria’s stability and that armed infiltrators were responsible for the shooting of protestors. On April 26, 2011, he responded to the Security Council on the question of a collective response to the brutality of Assad regime: “This unrest and riots in some of their aspects have hidden agendas…Some armed groups take advantage of the demonstrations; they get within the demonstrators and start shooting on the military men and the security forces. This is why there are many casualties.” 51 He asserted that “President Assad is a reformer himself, and he should be given the chance to fulfill his mission in reforming the political life in the country.” 52 The Security Council failed to issue the mildest of statements criticizing the

Assad regime due to the opposition of Russia, China, and Lebanon.

In an interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper on August 19, 2011, Mr. Jaafari claimed that all of the videos allegedly of brutal crackdowns on protestors were fabricated. He asserted that armed terrorist groups were killing civilians and the armed

51 Neil MacFarquhar, “Syria Tries to Defend Its Record to United Nations,” The New York Times , April 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/middleeast/27nations.html (accessed August 22, 2013).

52 Ibid.

79 forces. 53 He said the government was not going after Syrian civilians but after “terrorists and Salafists and Jihadis that are the outcomes of the American and British invasion of

Iraq... The government allows the protestors to take to the street and the police protect them.” 54

On October 4, 2011, Western nations tried to push another resolution at the

Security Council that contained a weak reference to the possibility of sanctions against

Damascus because of the regime’s use of soldiers and tanks to attack pro-democracy protestors, but they failed. Jaafari spoke before the Security Council repeating the same propaganda that “his government acknowledged reforms were needed” but “the needs of the masses were being misused by the external opposition.” 55 He reiterated his government’s now well-known characterization of the Syrian uprising as violence by terrorists and armed groups. 56 Russia and China again used their veto power on the

Security Council to defeat a resolution condemning the Assad regime, while Brazil,

India, South Africa, and Lebanon, in rotating seats on the Council, abstained. 57

53 Reynaldo Orio, “Syrian Ambassador to the UN Bashar Jaafari Interviewed by Anderson Cooper,” YouTube video, 13:41, August 19, 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ObTcJ7oxmoQ (accessed August 18, 2013).

54 Ibid.

55 Saeed Shabazz, “Did Syrian Resolution Veto Reflect Power Shift at UN?” The Final Call , October 17, 2011, http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/World_News_3/article_8228.shtml (accessed July 17, 2013).

56 Ahmad Azizi, “Double Veto Blocks Security Council Resolution on Syria,” Morocco World News , October 5, 2011, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2011/10/11053/double-veto-blocks-security- council-resolution-on-syria/ (accessed August 22, 2013).

57 Saeed Shabazz, “Did Syrian Resolution Veto Reflect Power Shift at UN?” The Final Call , October 17, 2011, http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/World_News_3/article_8228.shtml (accessed July 17, 2013).

80 On October 29, 2011, Assad gave his first interview to the Western media since the uprising started to the British newspaper The Sunday Telegraph . The interview was reported by most regional and international news outlets among which were the US- funded Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 58 NPR 59 , Reuters, 60 and CNN 61 and many others. Assad warned of threats of an “earthquake” and “ten Afghanistans” in the region if the protestors were to continue and his regime destabilized. With his rhetoric stressing that après moi le déluge ,62 he described the uprising as threatening to the West and the

Middle East and insisted that his government was targeting only terrorists. 63

On December 7, 2011, Assad sat for an interview with the American

Journalist Barbara Walters of ABC, his first with a U.S. news organization since the beginning of the uprising. 64 During the interview, held in Damascus, he denied he ordered a bloody crackdown against protestors. He stressed that “We don’t kill our people,” and said

58 “Syria’s Assad Warns of Earthquake If West Intervenes,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty , October 30, 2011, http://www.rferl.org/content/syria_assad_warns_against_western_intervention_earthquake/24375870.html (accessed August 24, 2013).

59 “Syria’s Assad Warns against Foreign Intervention,” National Public Radio , October 30, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/10/30/141842965/syrias-assad-warns-against-foreign-intervention (accessed August 24, 2013).

60 “Syria’s Assad Warns of Earthquake If West Intervenes,” Reuters , October 29, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/29/us-syria-assad-idUSTRE79S33O20111029 (accessed August 24, 2013).

61 “Syrians Set Out to Draft New Constitution Amid Clashes,” CNN , October 30, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/30/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed August 24, 2013).

62 McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, eds., The Arab Revolt, 2-25.

63 Jim Muir, “Syria’s Assad Warns of Earthquake If West Intervenes,” BBC , October 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15508630 (accessed August 24, 2013).

64 “ABC’s Barbara Walters’ Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” ABC News , December 7, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-abcs-barbara-walters-interview-syrian- president-bashar/story?id=15099152 (accessed August 26, 2013).

81 “No government in the world kills its people, unless it’s led by a crazy person.” 65 He described this regime as fighting a threat that is shared by the West: terrorism. He said that his police forces were fighting al-Qaeda. He asserted that “now, we are only fighting terrorists.” 66

Shahrazad Jaafari, the daughter of the Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations and a former aide to Assad, helped arrange the Barbara Walters interview. 67 Email communication between her and Assad allegedly obtained by hackers and leaked to the international media reveal a cynical attempt on the part of Assad to deliberately manipulate the audience of the interview. Ms. Jaafari had prepared a list of talking points advising Assad “Don’t talk reform. Americans won’t care, or understand that, American psyche can be easily manipulated when they hear that there are ‘mistakes’ done and now we are ‘fixing it.’” 68 She recommended that he admit “some mistakes were made but should stress his government was part of the solution.” 69 As he was advised, Assad blamed some of the violence on “individual mistakes.” 70 He said “There is a difference

65 Ibid.

66 “Syrians Set Out to Draft New Constitution amid Clashes,” CNN , October 30, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/30/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed August 24, 2013).

67 Raf Sanchez, “Barbara Walters Apologizes over Links to Syria Aid of Bashar al-Assad,” The Telegraph , June 5, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9312558/Barbara- Walters-apologises-over-links-to-Syrian-aide-of-Bashar-al-Assad.html (accessed August 27, 2013).

68 “Barbara Walters Apologizes for Conflict of Interest over Aid to Syria’s Bashar al-Assad,” National Post , June 5, 2012, http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/06/05/barbara-walters-apologizes-for- conflict-of-interest-over-aide-to-syrias-bashar-al-assad/ (accessed August 27, 2013).

69 Ibid.

70 Raf Sanchez, “Barbara Walters Apologizes Over Links to Syria Aid of Bashar al-Assad,” The Telegraph , June 5, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9312558/Barbara- Walters-apologises-over-links-to-Syrian-aide-of-Bashar-al-Assad.html (accessed August 27, 2013).

82 between having a policy to crackdown and between having some mistakes committed by some officials. There is a big difference.” 71

In the hacked emails, Ms. Jaafari recommended that Assad should parry questions about the bloody Syrian government crackdown against protestors, including referring to protestors as “armed gangs.” Assad stressed that most of the thousands of people who had died in the unrest were his supporters and soldiers, killed by armed groups. He repeatedly emphasized that his country was fighting terrorism. He spoke of “fighting terrorism” following the 9/11 attacks on American soil by al-Qaeda, likening the U.S. response to those events to his “mission . . . to protect the people to stand against any chaos or any terrorists.” He added “Now we are having terrorists in many places killing

[innocent people].” He said that his regime was not fighting peaceful protestors but armed groups, drugs smugglers, and people who share the Al Qaeda ideology. 72

The interview may have had his desired impact on American and Western public opinion given the widespread support of policies tough on terrorism in the era following the tragic attacks on September 11, 2001 and instances of terrorism on a smaller scale in

Europe and elsewhere that have occurred since. In retrospect, it appears that this public relations effort in the Walters’ interview was in preparation for the next phase of the conflict, which would see more brutal methods applied against civilians and challenge the decision of the international community to remain silent about these atrocities.

71 Alan Cowell, “In Rare Interview, Assad Denies Ordering Crackdown in Syria,” The New York Times , December 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/in-rare-interview-assad- denies-ordering-crackdown-in-syria.html?_r=0 (accessed August 24, 2013).

72 “ABC’s Barbara Walters’ Interview with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad,” ABC News , December 7, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-abcs-barbara-walters-interview-syrian- president-bashar/story?id=15099152 (accessed August 26, 2013).

83 The Culmination of the First Year of the Rebellion at the Siege of Homs

Throughout 2011, government forces responded with increasing force against the protestors and their communities and the peaceful protest movement was morphing into an armed rebellion. The rebels were made up of Syrian army defectors and protestors turned combatants with light arms attempting to defend themselves and their communities from regime perpetrated violence. 73 The city of Homs in particular faced siege upon siege by government forces throughout 2011 and became the center of the revolution. In early 2012, Homs was the scene of yet unseen savagery as the regime bombarded the city with rockets and mortars on a daily basis. Throughout all of this,

Syrian Television resorted to new levels of absurdity when it announced that Homs residents were setting fire to piles of rubbish on the roofs of their homes to fabricate attacks. 74 The security forces’ crackdown on Homs forced people to defend themselves and their families. In a video purportedly on January 30, 2012, a man was filming Assad forces attacking innocent civilians and can be heard saying “This is not Hollywood. This is not a film. We have tired of taking pictures…We will put down the camera and take up the gun.” 75

The Development of Homs as the Capital of the Revolution

Homs, Syria’s third largest city of 1.5 million people, took part in the uprising in its earliest weeks. The city’s self-image is that of pious burial place of Khalid Ibn

73 Hisham Marwah, telephone interview by author, Saudi Arabia, May 22, 2013.

74 “Homs: Syria Revolution’s Capital,” BBC , March 12, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-15625642 (accessed August 30, 2013).

75 Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion , 190.

84 Alwaleed, the Islamic conqueror who defeated the Byzantine Empire. 76 It has provided

Syria with three presidents since its independence from France in 1946 and countless members of the political class, including parliamentarians, ambassadors and ministers. 77

The demography of the city has changed in recent years. Historically, the town had an overwhelmingly Sunni majority and a 10 percent Christian minority. After Hafez Assad assumed power, a recruitment of minorities into the armed forces, particularly Alawites, resulted in the change in the city’s demography. The Alawites now constitute a quarter of the city’s population. 78 An American diplomatic cable from 2010 contained the reports of the Melkite Catholic Archbishop Isidore Battikha and Greek Patriarchate

Deputy Patriarch Father Afram who said that their churches enjoyed “Excellent relationships with their Muslim counterparts.” Archbishop Battikha, who moved from

Damascus to Homs, said inter-religious relations between Christians and Muslims were better in Homs than elsewhere in Syria because the two communities lived “closer together.” 79 The archbishop was invited to speak in mosques and Muslim imams were invited to speak in Homs churches.

When the uprising broke out in Deraa, Homs residents took up the call to protest in large numbers and the city became known as “The Capital of Revolution.” 80 In early mid-April 2011, protestors tried to recreate the fervor of the Tahrir Square in Cairo in

76 Ibid., 135.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., 136.

80 Ibid., 135.

85 downtown Homs. 81 On April 19, 2011, the regime decided to violently disperse demonstrators staging a sit-in in the city’s main square, the Clock Tower Square, the day after Assad pledged to end the emergency law, as discussed in the previous chapter. 82

After several unsuccessful attempts to break up the protests, the security forces and

Shabiha violently did so by firing into the crowd from rooftops around the square and sending in riot police. 83 Following this incident, the security forces started detaining activists and firing at anyone who resisted. Starting on May 6, 2011, the government troops isolated Homs for one week, cut all communications in the city, entered with tanks and armored vehicles, and arrested countless young men. 84

The cycle of protests and crackdown continued throughout the summer in and around Homs and by late August, the main towns surrounding Homs –Talbiseh, Qusayr,

Rastan – were fully participating in the uprising. Many soldiers defected and joined in the protests. 85 In reaction to the brutal use of force by the regime, peaceful demonstrations were giving way to armed resistance,86 particularly in smaller towns around Homs such as Rastan, Houla, and Qusayr. In early September, many soldiers and officers started to defect in Rastan, which had provided many military recruits because it

81 “Capital of the Revolution,” Al-Ahram Weekly Online , December 15, 2011, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1076/re4.htm (accessed August 30, 2013).

82 Joseph Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011 (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2011), 9-24.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid.

85 Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion , 137.

86 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011 , 9-24.

86 was the home of the former minister of defense. This marked the point when protestors began to face the Assad’s forces with arms. On September 27, 2011, security forces besieged and captured Rastan in an operation that required 250 armored vehicles and lasted four days. 87 Assad’s troops and Shabiha commandeered hospitals and transformed schools into detention centers. From this point, light weapons were increasingly smuggled from Lebanon to Homs and there were elements from the Syrian military that sold weapons to the opposition on the black market.88 The regime could not tolerate that the protest movement was having such impact in Homs. It feared that Damascus would follow in the footsteps of Homs.

The Siege of Homs and Assault on Baba Amr

In this section, I resume where Chapter II ended, at the end of 2011 when it became apparent that the conflict was becoming increasingly violent. While military actions were directed at the countryside of Homs, the opposition grew in Homs and was centered in the Baba Amr district of the city. Activists and army defectors grouped in

Baba Amr which was viewed as a refuge from the brutality of the government forces.

Assad’s forces then escalated its punishing attacks against Homs. In late

December 2011, following the Arab League plan to put a stop to attacks targeting unarmed, peaceful protestors, a number of Arab observers went to Homs. The town welcomed them with 20,000 protestors gathered in an event dedicated to Revealing the

87 Ibid.

88 Ajami, The Syrian Rebellion , 138.

87 crimes committed by the regime .89 The heavy bombardment of the city stopped when observers arrived and tanks were seen pulling out. 90

However, following this withdrawal, in February 2012 the Syrian Army launched an offensive against Baba Amr, shelling the entire district and blocking all supply routes.

The regime used heavy weapons, artillery and jet fighters against the one million and a half residents of the city. The assault on Homs was bolstered by Russian and China, which on February 4, 2012 blocked the Arab-League inspired, Western-backed attempts to pass a resolution at the United Nations Security Council condemning the violence and suggesting a plan for a solution by which Assad would have stepped down and formed a unity government before general elections. 91

In early March, government forces launched a ground assault into Baba Amr, killing civilians as well as opposition fighters and forcing them to withdraw from the neighborhood. 92 Such use of force on civilians had not been seen in Syria since the

1980s conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood. It marked a turning point in the conflict and one that required a multi-tiered propaganda effort directed at multiple audiences including the Syrian people and the outside world.

89 “Arab League Observers Arrive in Syria,” The Independent , December 27, 2011, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/arab-league-observers-arrive-in-syria-6281910.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

90 Ibid.

91 McMurray and Ufheil-Somers, eds., The Arab Revolt, 2-25.

92 Holliday, The Struggle for Syria in 2011 , 9-24.

88 Regime Propaganda and Baba Amr Assault

As described above, Homs generally and Baba Amr specifically were the symbol of defiance to the Assad regime of the uprising to oust him. To justify the Baba Amr assault, the government launched a media campaign aimed at multiple audiences stating that the security forces were going to cleanse the area of terrorists and restore security. 93

Government forces cut off communications to Baba Amr, jamming satellite phone signals to block any messages.

The government propaganda used two narratives to explain its brutal actions at

Baba Amr. The first was directed internationally claiming that army troops carried out mass “cleansing operations” in the restive neighborhood to search the cellars and tunnels in Baba Amr for weapons and terrorists. 94 An unnamed Syrian official vowed to the AP that Baba Amr would be “cleansed” within hours. Another unnamed Syrian security official told AFP: “The army has started combing the area building by building and house by house. Now the troops are searching every basement and tunnel for arms and terrorists.” 95

The second message, directed locally, emphasized that foreign powers and

Zionism backed these terrorists and the mission of the operation was to restore peace and

93 Lama Hasan, “Syria: Grip tightens on Homs’ Baba Amr District,” ABC News , February 29, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/02/syria-grip-tightens-on-homs-baba-amr-district/ (accessed September 2, 2013).

94 “Rebellious Baba Amr Area in Syria’s Homs Largely Under Control,” CNTV , March 1, 2012, http://english.cntv.cn/20120301/110383.shtml (accessed September 2, 2013).

95 Tom Nagorski, “The global Note: Cleaning Homs,” ABC News , February 29, 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/02/the-global-note-cleaning-homs-iran-israel-the-u-s- porcupines-putins-suggestive-ads/ (accessed September 2, 2013).

89 security in the neighborhood abandoned by 60 percent of its inhabitants. 96 A Syrian sergeant who defected from the Syrian army, Jamal, described the message communicated by his division commander one day before attacking Homs:

The people of Syria are depending on you. This menace of terrorists has gone too far unchecked. Tomorrow morning you will be facing the worst enemies. They are all terrorists who are trying to destroy our country with the help of western nations. They are the agents of Israel, targeting Syria because we are the last stand in the face of Zionism. They tell the world they are innocent people being killed, and we all know these are lies and propaganda against our beloved Bashar. You will shoot to kill, and you must stand fast and obey your orders. We will destroy the city if need be, but will extricate all terrorists from Homs. Long Live The Blood Line of The Assad! Long Live Bashar!

The company commander, Major Hashem Sulieman, went even further by saying “We want to see a body count tomorrow, and no one will stop us.” Jamal asked his officer

“What do we do with the civilians when they are in the way, sir?” The response: “If they are stupid enough to be there, then you shoot them too.” 97

Another defector who worked in the press office in the president’s palace,

Abdullah al-Omar, said in an interview with CNN that during the government's bombardment of Baba Amr pro-Assad regime loyalist women were disguised as locals for government television interviews. “The women would say that the massacres against men, women, and children were perpetrated by armed gangs, when it was actually the

96 “Baba Amr is Under Full government’s Control,” Syria Steps , February 22, 2012, http://www.syriasteps.com/?d=110&id=82997 (accessed September 3, 2013).

97 Husam Wafaei, Honorable Defection (Victoria, BC, Canada: Friesen Press, 2012), 62-63.

90 regime, security forces, and the Shabiha who were behind these horrendous acts,” al-

Omar said. 98

The Deaths of Foreign Journalists in Baba Amr

At the time of the siege of Homs, the regime had long banned foreign journalists from approaching areas where they might witness the government’s brutal crackdown on demonstrations as discussed above. Some foreign journalists, nevertheless, were smuggled into the country from Lebanon and Turkey. Marie Colvin, the award-winning

American journalist who worked for the British newspaper The Sunday Times , was one such war correspondent who believed passionately in the need to report on the conflict from the frontline. From Baba Amr, Colvin delivered reports which refuted the regime’s propaganda that its shelling of 28,000 defenseless civilian men, women, and children was to fight Islamic terrorists. In an interview by satellite telephone with CNN’s Anderson

Cooper, the day before she was killed along with French photographer Remi Ochlikin,

Colvin said “There are more young men being killed, we see a lot of teen-aged young men, but they are going out to just try to get the wounded to some kind of medical treatment. So it's a complete and utter lie that they're only going after terrorists. There are rockets, shells, tank shells, anti-aircraft being fired in parallel lines into the city. The

Syrian Army is simply shelling a city of cold, starving civilians.” 99

98 Ivan Watson, Raja Razek, and Saad Abedine, “Defecting Syrian Propagandist Says His Job Was to Fabricate,” CNN , October 9, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/world/meast/syria-propagandist- defects (accessed September 4, 2013).

99 “Transcript: Marie Colvin’s Final CNN Interview,” CNN , February 22, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/22/world/marie-colvin-interview-transcript (accessed September 5, 2013).

91 Colvin took off her shoes upon entering the makeshift press center building as a custom in Syria when people enter houses. She was on the ground floor when rockets started hitting the upper floors. Realizing that the building was a target, Colvin rushed to get her shoes her in the hall to run away. A rocket landed just a few yards away and killed her and Ochlik. 100 There were reports that the attack against the makeshift media center where Colvin and Ochlik were holed up was no accident. According to multiple observers, they were deliberately targeted by the government forces to prevent them from further spreading accurate information about what was going on in Baba Amr. The

Syrian government simply denied responsibility for their deaths and asked all foreign journalists in Syria to report to the government. But communication between Syrian

Army officers intercepted by Lebanese intelligence staff has revealed that direct orders were issued to target the makeshift press center in which Colvin had been broadcasting from Baba Amr. According to the intercepted radio traffic, the Syrian military was ordered to announce that the journalists were killed in cross fire with terrorist groups. 101

**********************

Colvin’s reporting from and death in Baba Amr reveal much about the Assad regime’s propaganda in its fight against opposition to authoritarian rule. First protestors, and then opposition rebels, made use of technological tools at their disposal to communicate to the world the brutality of the Assad regime’s response to those who

100 “Journalist Marie Colvin Died Trying to Get her Shoes, Her Paper Reports,” CNN , February 27, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/26/world/syria-marie-colvin (accessed September 5, 2013).

101 Charles Walford and Nabila Ramdani, “She Wanted One More Story,” The Daily Mail , February 23, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2104711/Marie-Colvin-Sunday-Times- reporter-leave-Syria-day-died-says-mother.html (accessed August 15, 2013).

92 sought change. But through his monopolization of traditional media by, on one the hand, banning foreign journalists from the country and, on the other hand, relentlessly defaming the opposition as terrorists and extremists to be feared and eliminated, Assad seemed to succeed in arresting the development of meaningful support of or faith in the opposition movement. Overall, the opposition lacked the central organization to counter the regime’s propaganda with counter-messaging to the outside world. In Colvin’s last report before she was killed by Syrian forces, she could not have stated more plainly that in Baba Amr the Assad regime was unleashing its military might on defenseless civilians.

It remained at that time to be seen whether so clear an indictment of the Assad regime, from so trusted a source, would participate meaningful international action to stop the

Assad regime from using such overwhelming and indiscriminate force against innocent civilians.

93 CHAPTER IV

THE TRAGEDY OF HOULA AND THE ASSAD REGIME VICTORY IN THE INFORMATION WAR AT THE END OF THE FIRST 16 MONTHS OF THE SYRIAN UPRISING

The Houla Massacre and Reporting of Regime Propaganda as News by Western Media

Violence in Syria continued to increase throughout 2012, resulting in the deaths of many civilians who perished in the government’s brutal crackdown on protestors and bombardments of cities. An attack on regime opponents took place on May 25, 2012 in the town of Houla, Homs Governorate, resulting in a massacre of more than 100 villagers, nearly half of them children, which the United Nations and Arab League

Special Envoy to Syria Kofi Annan described as a “tipping point” in the conflict which called for international action. 1 After the regular Friday Prayers, government forces fired on protestors in Taldaou, a village near Houla, to disperse the demonstration and later shelled the village with tanks and heavy mortars. Later, the pro-government militia,

Shabiha, conducted house-to-house searches in the almost destroyed village, summarily executing at close range at least 108 people, including 49 children and 34 women. 2

On June 3, 2012, Assad made a public speech denying his government’s participation in the Houla massacre and blamed terrorists and extremists for the attack.

His claims of innocence were reported by several news sources such as The New York

1 John Rosenthal, “Rebels Responsible for Houla Massacre,” National Review Online , June 9, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/302261/report-rebels-responsible-houla-massacre-john- rosenthal (accessed August 29, 2012).

2 Alexander Mikaberidze, ed., Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 2013), 267.

94 Times ,3 BBC, 4 CNN, 5 and many others. The government’s news agency, SANA, reported that foreign-funded armed terrorist groups committed the crimes in Houla. 6

Syria’s foreign minister sent identical letters to the UN Security Council, the UN

General Secretariat, and the Geneva human rights bodies stating that the crime was premeditated by al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups, indicating that the residents of this area were targeted because they were supporters of the Syrian Army. 7 These claims were in line with the Assad regime’s propaganda message that warned that if Assad were to fall,

Syria would turn into another Iraq where minorities would be forced to leave their homes and a Sunni Islamist majority would take control of the country.

While the Assad regime spread the propaganda that the Houla massacre was carried out by armed terrorists, the United Nations found evidence that the pro-Assad

Shabiha had carried out the attack. 8

3 Neil MacFarquhar, “Assad Condemns Houla, Blaming Terrorists,” The New York Times , June 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/world/middleeast/assad-condemns-houla-massacre-blaming- outside-terrorists.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

4 “Syrian Crisis: Assad Denies Role in Houla,” BBC , June 3, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18313129 (accessed September 2, 2013).

5 “Syrian President Condemns Houla Massacre, Rejects Accusations,” CNN , June 3, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

6 “Syria: Armed Terrorist Groups Committed Taldao, Al-Shoumarieh,” Day Press , May 29, 2012, http://www.dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=121906 (accessed September 3, 2013).

7 Ibid.

8 Neil MacFarquhar, “Assad Condemns Houla, Blaming Terrorists,” The New York Times , June 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/world/middleeast/assad-condemns-houla-massacre-blaming- outside-terrorists.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

95 A UN report stated “The neighborhoods where the killings took place appeared aligned to the opposition more than the Government,” 9 and were inhabited by Sunnis. The report added “It was opposition groups who first arrived to the scene, cared for the wounded, prepared the deceased for burial, and were present in large numbers during the funeral.” 10

Given the evidence that regime supporters were responsible for the human rights catastrophe at Houla, and following shortly on the heels of the Baba Amr assault and the siege of Homs, the event should have been a tipping point at which time the global community took action to stop the Assad regime killing machine. But no meaningful steps were undertaken to protect vulnerable civilian populations. Regime propaganda vociferously denied responsibility for the events at Houla and laid blame on the regime’s opponents, messaging which seeped into the Western media and gave justification to global inaction after Houla.

Assad’s propaganda on Houla found its way into reputable news outlets throughout the international media. The high-profile German daily paper with global circulation, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungi (FAZ ), published the regime’s account stating that the bulk of the victims were Alawites and minorities killed by anti-Assad

Sunni militants.11 The well-known and longtime Middle East journalist Patrick Seale

9 Human Rights Council, “Human Rights Situations That Require the Council’s Attention,” under “Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” Twentieth Session, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/OralUpdateJune2012.pdf (accessed September 5, 2013).

10 Ibid.

11 Von Rainer Hermann, “Abermals Massaker in Syrien,” Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung , June 7, 2012, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/neue-erkenntnisse-zu-getoeteten-von-hula-abermals-massaker- in-syrien-11776496.html (accessed September 9, 2013).

96 adopted the German newspaper’s account. He stated on June 13, 2012, that “a very serious German newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , has recently published a report quoting its sources on the ground saying this is not the case, that the massacre was conducted by anti-Assad Sunni militias, who then filmed their victims and posted videos on the internet blaming the regime.” Seal even went on to reiterate the regime’s propaganda line that foreign powers are plotting to bring down the regime by saying “The

United States seems to have adopted Israel’s position, to attempt to bring down regimes, the regime in Tehran and the regime in Damascus.” 12

A National Review article quoted Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung regarding

Houla and cited Mother Agnes Mariam de la-Croix, of the St. James Monastery in Syria, an Assad regime propagandist, who asserted that rebels were responsible for atrocities committed in Homs. She claimed that “Rebels gathered Christian and Alawi hostages in a building in Khalidiya and blew up the building with dynamite. They then attributed the crime to the regular Syrian army.” 13 Father Paolo Dall'Oglio, an Italian Jesuit expelled from Syria in June due to his outspoken criticism of government violence, has accused

Mother Agnes Mariam of peddling “regime lies” about the crisis there. He described her as “an instrument” of Assad’s regime. “She has been consistent in assuming and spreading the lies of the regime, and promoting it through the power of her religious

12 “Is Syria in a Civil War? Journalist Patrick Seale Debates Activist Rafif Jouejati on a Just Response,” Democracy now , June 13, 2012, http://www.democracynow.org/2012/6/13/is_syria_in_a_civil_war (accessed August 12, 2013).

13 John Rosenthal, “Rebels Responsible for Houla Massacre,” National Review Online , June 9, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/302261/report-rebels-responsible-houla-massacre-john- rosenthal (accessed August 29, 2012).

97 persona.” 14 Almost two weeks after the Houla massacre, Mother Agnes Mariam conducted an interview with the Irish Radio in which she stated that “Rebels in Syria were terrorizing Syria's Christian community…and taking Christians as human shields.” 15 She repeatedly echoed the regime propaganda that the uprising in Syria was a plot by the West and was cited by several publications including the French newspaper

Le Monde .16 According to an article, published on January 19, 2012, in the Swiss newspaper, Le Courrier , Agnes Mariam was “comfortable among [Assad’s] security services,” 17 and she told their reporter it was hoped he could “dismantle the propaganda of Western media.” She repeatedly claimed that the opposition was just a puppet in a conspiracy guided by foreign powers. 18

The well-known French journalist, activist, and 9/11 conspiracy theorist, Thierry

Meyssan, published on his Voltaire Network on June 5, 2012 an article repeating the points set out in the FAZ article. 19 Meyssan cited Mother Agnes's statements to Vox

Clamantis , on May 26, 2012 claiming that the Syrian Army was not in the vicinity of

14 Ibid.

15 “US-Backed Rebels Committing Christian Genocide in Syria,” Assyrian International News Agency , June 15, 2012, http://www.aina.org/news/20120615125537.htm (accessed September 9, 2013).

16 “A Homs, l'Armée a Pris le Contrôle de Baba Amro,” Le Monde , March 1, 2012 , http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/03/01/homs-pilonnee-et-encerclee-par-les-forces- syriennes_1649971_3210.html?xtmc=mere_agnes_syrie&xtcr=1 (accessed September 12, 2013).

17 “Mort de Gilles Jacquier: au Cœur du Piège Fatal dans la Ville de Homs,” Le Courrier , January 19, 2012, http://www.lecourrier.ch/mort_de_gilles_jacquier_au_coeur_du_piege_fatal_da (accessed August 20, 2013).

18 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Phillip Smyth, “Assad’s Houla Propaganda,” National Review Online , June 12, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/content/assad%E2%80%99s-houla-propaganda (accessed March 13, 2013).

19 Thierry Meyssan, “The Houla Affair Highlights Western Intelligence Gap in Syria,” Voltaire , June 5, 2012, http://www.voltairenet.org/The-Houla-affair-highlights#nb3 (accessed September 12, 2013).

98 Houla when the massacre took place and did not bombard the area. He supported this conclusion with the account of an anonymous eyewitness from Kfar Laha, an Alawite town near Houla, who blamed the massacre on armed men and extremists backed by foreign powers. 20

False reports of the expulsion of Christians from Homs can be traced to a report published by the pro-regime propaganda website, Syria Truth, on March 13, 2012. 21 An examination this website by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), found that its suggestion of an extensive presence of al-Qaeda and international Jihadists among the Syrian opposition was without factual support. 22 But information from Syria Truth eventually seeped into outlets such as the Los Angeles Times .23 Pro-Assad propaganda also found its way into Christian news outlets. The official Vatican news agency Agenzia

Fides , for example, republished (almost verbatim) news reports provided by the regime propaganda website Syria Truth. On March 21, 2012, Fides claimed that Jihadists and

Wahabi groups expelled almost 90 percent of Christians from Homs and confiscated their homes by force. The report declared its source to be “a note sent to Fides by some

20 Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi and Phillip Smyth, “Assad’s Houla Propaganda,” National Review Online , June 12, 2012, http://www.nationalreview.com/content/assad%E2%80%99s-houla-propaganda (accessed March 13, 2013).

21 “Syrian Disinformation about Christian Persecution,” Haaretz , April 6, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/syrian-disinformation-about-christian-persecution-1.422943 (accessed September 14, 2013).

22 Ibid.

23 “Christians Fears Ethnic Cleansing of Christians in Homs, Syria,” Los Angeles Times , March 23, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/church-fears-ethnic-cleansing-of-christians- in-homs-syria.html (accessed July 15, 2013).

99 sources in the Syrian Orthodox Church.” 24 On March 26, 2012, the Jesuits of Homs stated that there were no cases to their knowledge of Christians being forced out of their homes by Islamists. 25 In addition, Christian refugees from Homs in Lebanon refuted the

Syria Truth story. 26 In actuality, most of the people who fled their homes in Homs in the month of March 2012 were Sunni Muslims from the Baba Amr neighborhood. 27 The report of the Jesuits in Homs, however, was reported only by Fides and did not attract as broad of international media attention as stories that alleged atrocities against Alawites and Christians.

In another example, USA Today reported that, according to the Assyrian

International News Agency (AINA), Saudi Arabia had sent 1,200 death-row inmates to fight in Syria. That claim, however, had circulated on pro-Hezbollah websites before

AINA had publicized it. 28

24 “Abuse of the Opposition Forces, Ethnic Cleansing of Christians in Homs, Where Jesuits Remains,” Agenzia Fides , March 21, 2012, http://www.fides.org/en/news/31228?idnews=31228&lan=eng#.Uj81sHeLGH8 (accessed September 6, 2013).

25 “The Jesuits: Christians Have Fled from Homs, not Thrown out by Islamists,” Agenzia Fides , March 26, 2012, http://www.fides.org/en/news/31262- ASIA_SYRIA_The_Jesuits_Christians_have_fled_from_Homs_not_thrown_out_by_Islamists#.Uj830HeL GH8 (accessed September 6, 2013).

26 David Enders, “Rare Inside View of Syria’s Rebels Finds a Force Vowing to Fight on,” McClatchy , April 23, 2012, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/04/23/146425/rare-inside-view-of-syrias- rebels.html (accessed September 14, 2013).

27 Nicholas Blanford, Syrian Refugees Huddle in Lebanon: 30 People, One Candle, and No Food,” The Christian Science Monitor , March 8, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle- East/2012/0308/Syrian-refugees-huddle-in-Lebanon-30-people-one-candle-and-no-food/%28page%29/2 (accessed July 22, 2013).

28 David Kenner, “How Assad Wooed the American Right, and Won the Syrian Propaganda War,” Foreign Policy , September 10, 2013, http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/10/how_assad_wooed_the_american_right_and_won_the_syri a_propaganda_war (accessed September 10, 2013).

100 Assessment of the Success of the Assad Regime Propaganda Following the End of the First Year of the Syrian Uprising

Unlike the regimes of Mubarak of Egypt, Abideen of Tunisia, Saleh of Yemen, and Gadhafi of Libya, the Assad regime survived past the first year of the 2011 Arab

Spring and is still in power (as of the completion of this thesis in 2013). Despite defections from the Syrian Army, the core security forces on which Assad relies are comprised mostly of Alawites and other minority groups and remain functioning, loyal, and determined to support the regime. Relentless sectarian propaganda has fueled the

Assad regime by persuading Alawites and other minorities that only the Assad regime can protect them from, at best, disenfranchisement, and, at worst, brutal retribution, should a Sunni-led rebellion triumph. 29 In the same way, propaganda directed outside of

Syria has depicted the Assad regime as the force preventing Syria from slipping into the hands of Islamic extremists.

The success of the Assad regime propaganda both internally and externally was due to its disciplined central organization – built, tested, and solidified after more than 40 years of Assad rule – which controlled the output of the regime’s desired message in relentless and systematic fashion. The primary themes of regime propaganda – which focused on warnings of jihadism, extremist takeover, and threats to Christians, other minorities, and the West – reflected shrewd calculation with respect to the anxieties and concerns of key constituents in Syria as well as world leaders which could be aroused to further the interests of the Assad regime.

29 Tony Karon, “Five Reasons Why the Assad Regimes Survives,” Time , August 30, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/08/30/five-reasons-why-the-assad-regime-survives/2/ (accessed September 20, 2013).

101 On the other hand, the messaging and communications efforts by the opposition were insufficient to counter or dispel regime propaganda. Activists were dispersed and lacked leadership and sufficient organization and control. 30 Tireless efforts to coordinate between different opposition groups , at both regional and national levels, were unsuccessful in overcoming the fragmentation among the different groups. 31 The opposition’s organizational and communications failures served as a pass for the regime propaganda to dominate the national and international discourse and reinforced the reluctance of Western powers to meaningfully intervene in the crisis.

The international community was virtually unanimous, starting three months from the beginning of the uprising, in its condemnation of the regime’s brutal crackdown on the uprising by dissidents and reformers in Syria. The United States, the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Vatican criticized and condemned Assad’s violent response to cries for freedom and democracy and called it inhumane and unacceptable. 32 On August

18, 2011, President Obama called on Assad to step down 33 and the United States expressed sympathy with the Syrian opposition, but this stated support did not materialize into concrete actions leading to Assad’s timely removal. Instead, the United States provided humanitarian aid and “nonlethal” assistance, like communications equipment

30 Leonard W. Doob, Propaganda: Its Psychology and Technique (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1935), 300-304.

31 Hassan Abbas, “The Dynamics of the Uprising in Syria,” Jadaliyya , October 19, 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2906/ (accessed June 12, 2013).

32 Jerry Philipson, “If Assad Falls,” American Thinker , February 13, 2012, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/02/if_assad_falls.html (accessed September 21. 2013).

33 Jay Solomon, “World Leaders Urge Assad to Resign,” The Wall Street Journal , August 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903639404576516144145940136.html (accessed September 20, 2013).

102 and medical supplies, to opposition groups inside Syria .34 By March 2012, there were mounting calls from the opposition and regional powers to arm the opposition, but the

U.S. declined to do so. 35

Statements from US officials characterizing the opposition as dominated by

Islamic extremists and terrorists echoed the messaging of the Syrian regime. In an interview with the CBS News correspondent Wyatt Andrews on February 27, 2012,

Secretary Hillary Clinton said on arming the Syrian opposition “ We know al-Qaeda.

Zawahiri is supporting the opposition in Syria. Are we supporting al-Qaida in Syria?”

Despite the Assad regime’s brutal force that would equal or surpass the brutality of the

Gadhafi regime that triggered a NATO intervention, Secretary Clinton added “So I think,

Wyatt, despite the great pleas that we hear from those people who are being ruthlessly assaulted by Assad, you don’t see uprisings across Syria the way you did in Libya. You don’t see militias forming in places where the Syrian military is not trying to get to

Homs. You don’t see that.” 36

In May 10, 2012, two bombings took place in Damascus that killed at least 55 people. The regime quickly blamed al-Qaeda for the bombings. On May 18, 2012, the

British newspaper The Telegraph published an article under the title: “Ban Ki-moon

34 Anne Barnard, “U.S. and Turkey to Step up Nonlethal Aid to Rebels in Syria,” The New York Times , March 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/middleeast/us-and-turkey-to-step-up- nonlethal-aid-to-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0 (accessed September 22, 2013).

35 Michele Salcedo, “McCain: Lack of US Aid to Syrian Rebels Shameful,” Associated Press , June 17, 2012, http://news.yahoo.com/mccain-lack-us-aid-syrian-rebels-shameful-141437248.html (accessed October 1, 2013).

36 Wyatt Andrews, “Clinton: Arming Syrian Rebels Could Help Al Qaeda,” CBS , February 27, 2012, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57386279/clinton-arming-syrian-rebels-could-help-al- qaeda/ (accessed September 24, 2013).

103 Boosts Assad by Blaming al-Qaeda for Syria Bombings.” The UN Secretary General stated “Very alarmingly and surprisingly, a few days ago there was a huge, serious, massive terrorist attack,” the Secretary General said. “I believe that there must be al-

Qaeda behind it.” 37 It is difficult to understand how the UN Secretary General could have arrived at this conclusion based on a solid investigation and credible evidence in such a short time.

In June 11, 2012, Britain’s Foreign Minister William Hague said for the first time in a speech to the British Parliament “We … have reason to believe that terrorist groups affiliated to al-Qaeda have committed attacks designed to exacerbate the violence, with serious implications for international security.” 38 However, Hague offered no details nor pointed to evidence to support this claim.

On July 8, 2012, in an interview with the German broadcaster ARD, Assad stated that the situation in Syria was different from what happened in Libya and Egypt. He said that his government was fighting terrorism and “The U.S. is partnering with those terrorists ... with weapons, money or public and political support at the United Nations.”

Assad added “They offer the umbrella and political support to those gangs to ... destabilize Syria.” 39 Assad described himself as a reformer who fights terrorism. The majority of the people asks for reforms, political reforms (but) not freedom . . . But as

37 Adrian Blomfield, “Ban Ki-moon Boosts Assad by Blaming Al-Qaeda for Syria Bombings,” The Telegraph , May 18, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9275194/Ban-Ki-moon-boosts-Assad-by- blaming-al-Qaeda-for-Syria-bombings.html (accessed September 24, 2012).

38 “Britain Claims Presence of Al-Qaeda Affiliates in Syria,” Al Arabiya News , June 12, 2012, http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/12/220205.html (accessed September 25, 2013).

39 “In Tv Interview, Assad Accuses US of Fueling Syrian Uprising, Says no Comparison to Libya,” Fox News , July 8, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/08/assad-accuses-us-fueling- syrian-uprising/ (accessed July 4, 2013).

104 long as you have terrorism and as long as the dialogue didn't work, you have to fight the terrorism. You cannot keep just making dialogue while they are killing your people and your army,” he said. 40 Assad’s statements were reported by news outlets including

CNN 41 and The New York Times .42

Several think tanks analyzed the question of what composition the Syrian government would take after the fall of Assad. In an op-ed posted by the Brookings

Institution on July 20, 2012, Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, stated that after Assad “A Sunni military dictator may emerge.

The Muslim Brotherhood, which led the 1982 Hama revolt and plays a large role in the current insurrection, may emerge dominant.” 43 A July 21, 2012 The Economist article stated that Syria after Assad will be a danger to its own people and its neighbors due to

“sectarian bloodletting.” 44 Thus, in this time frame, conventional wisdom began to reflect Assad’s message that he was the protector of minority sects and his fall would trigger disastrous sectarian strife and rule by Muslim extremists.

40 Ibid.

41 “Assad: U.S. Trying to Destabilize Syria,” CNN , July 8, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/08/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed July 4, 2013).

42 Rick Gladstone, “Writer Defends His Handling of Interview with Assad,” The New York Times , August 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/world/middleeast/fallout-continues-over-germans- assad-interview.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed July 4, 2013).

43 Bruce Riedel, “What Comes After Assad in Syria?” Brookings , July 20, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/20-syria-riedel (accessed July 4, 2013).

44 “Towards the Endgame,” The Economist , July 21, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21559330 (accessed July 5, 2013).

105 CONCLUSION

At the end of the first 16 months of the Syrian uprising in the summer of 2012,

Assad had succeeded in stifling any meaningful international action to stop the Assad’s regime brutal useful force against civilian populations. The world stood by as spectator as Assad ordered the power of the Syrian air force to bomb large areas of the second largest city of almost three million inhabitants, the economic capital of Syria, Aleppo, in

August 2012. 1 Time will tell whether the Assad regime or a like-minded successor will maintain an authoritarian grip on the country in the long run, but, at a minimum, Assad’s propaganda success has won his regime the time to arrest, expel, and kill pro-democracy activists, consolidate power around, grow, and secure Alawite-dominated areas of the country, devastate the remainder of the country physically, and polarize what was once a tolerant and heterogeneous society. Assad’s claims that the uprising was dominated by jihadists and extremists were specious and demonstrably an exaggeration in the first year of the uprising. The regime propagandized that it was the protector of minorities in

Syria. It can be said to have ultimately succeeded in convincing internal and external audiences that its opposition was comprised of Islamic extremists who sought to establish an Islamic state despite the fact that activists from minority groups were victims of the regime’s brutal crackdown as well. One of many was Bassel Shehaddeh, a Christian

Syrian activist and a Fulbright scholar from Syracuse University who was killed, along with three other activists, while documenting the regime’s crackdown on Homs in May

1 “Syria Today 26-5-2012,” Local Coordination Committees , May 26, 2012, http://www.lccsyria.org/8623 (accessed September 12, 2013).

106 30, 2012. 2 Eventually, Assad’s characterization of his opponents became a self-fulfilling prophecy, much to Assad’s benefit. 3 In the words of Hussein Ibish, Senior Fellow at the

American Task Force on Palestine , Assad’s argument that his opposition were armed jihadists “began as a fiction during the period of peaceful, unarmed protests but is now

[in part at least] a reality” because of Assad’s own interest in dividing the country. 4

In this thesis, I have traced how Assad was successful in building international consensus around his propaganda message that he was the only alternative to a failed state overrun with militants from every corner of the Muslim world. In Chapter One, I reviewed the origins Ba’athist, Alawite, and Assad rule of Syria and detailed how propaganda emerged as a powerful tool to assert regime control starting with Hafez al

Assad’s rule and continuing with his son Bashar. In Chapter Two, I described the inception of the uprising in Syria and recounted how the Assad regime deployed its propaganda strategy reflexively and immediately, targeting internal and external audiences, in order to preserve the regime by falsely characterizing peaceful protestors representing Syrians of all walks of life as armed gangs motivate by Islamic extremism.

In Chapter Three, I explored the opposition’s efforts to leverage social media to counter regime propaganda and proposed that they ultimately failed because of Assad’s

2 Michael Schwirtz, “Syracuse University Filmmaker Killed in Syria,” The New York Times , May 30, 2012, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/syracuse-university-filmmaker-reportedly-killed-in- syria/?_r=0 (accessed July 4, 2013).

3 Christopher Phillips, “After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?: Syria’s Bloody Arab Spring,” LSE Research Online , May 2012, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43464/1/After%20the%20Arab%20Spring_Syria%E2%80%99s%20bloody%20Ara b%20Spring(lsero).pdf (accessed August 19, 2013).

4 Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, “As Foreign Fighters Flood Syria, Fears of a New Extremist Haven,” The New York Times, August 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/09/world/middleeast/as- foreign-fighters-flood-syria-fears-of-a-new-extremist-haven.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed August 8, 2013).

107 monopolization of traditional media. Assad’s triumph in the information war became manifest following the siege of Homs, assault on Bab Amar, and finally, as discussed in

Chapter Four, the massacre at Houla. By the end of the first 16 months of the Syrian uprising, the regime’s depiction of the conflict was echoed in Western reporting and in the statements of influential world leaders. If, by the summer of 2012, there was any truth to the view that the Syrian uprising and the fall of Assad risked precipitating rule by

Islamic extremists in Syria, this was due to the efforts of the Assad regime to exacerbate sectarianism and eradicate the existence and influence of the peaceful, largely secular protestors who first took to the streets in 2011.

With respect to Syria, these insights into how the discourse on the Syrian uprising has been influenced by Assad regime propaganda may result in a more balanced historical view of the conflict. The Syrian experience should educate journalists as well as consumers of media as to the dilemmas posed by a conflict in which one side the

Assad regime has near total control of traditional media. In the final analysis of the

Syrian case, it should be recognized that propaganda disseminated by Assad and his allies was given voice in Western traditional media and may have actually had undue influence on policy makers. To casual observers it may come as a surprise that in the age of mass electronic information and open communications, a party with undemocratic and nefarious objectives could advance propaganda as successfully as the Assad regime. It is incumbent upon those with a commitment to democracy and human rights, as well as a commitment to accurate and objective information, to better ensure that the messages of notorious propagandists are exposed in real-time for their motivations.

108 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Ajami, Fouad. The Syrian Rebellion . Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 2012.

Buckley, Mary, and Rick Fawn, eds. Global Responses to Terrorism 9/11, Afghanistan, and Beyond . London: Routledge, 2003.

Carroll, Noel. Theorizing the Moving Image . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Jennifer Moravitz. The Israeli-Palestinian War Escalating to Nowhere . Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International, 2005.

Deibert, Ronald. Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace . Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2013.

Demant, Peter R., and Asghar Ali Engineer. Islam Vs. Islamism The Dilemma of the Muslim World . Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2006.

Doob, Leonard W. Propaganda; Its Psychology and Technique . New York: H. Holt and Company, 1935.

Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda; The Formation of Men's Attitudes . New York: Knopf, 1965.

Fraser, Lindley Macnaghten. Propaganda . London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Friedman, Thomas L. From Beirut to Jerusalem . New York: Anchor Books, 1990.

Ginat, Rami. Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence . Portland, Or: Sussex Academic Press, 2005.

Habeeb, William M. The Middle East in Turmoil: Conflict, Revolution, and Change . Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood, 2012.

Hinnebusch, Raymond A. Syria Revolution from Above . London: Routledge, 2002.

Holliday, Joseph. The Struggle for Syria in 2011 . Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, 2011.

Hourani, Albert Habib. Minorities in the Arab World . London: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Jenkins, Philip. The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Johnson, Thomas A. Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events: Challenges Confronting America, China, and Iran . Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, 2012.

109 Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh. Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789 - 1923 . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1999.

Kedar, Mordechai. Asad in Search of Legitimacy: Message and Rhetoric in the Syrian Press Under Hafiz and Basha r. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005.

Kedourie, Sylvia. Arab Nationalism, An Anthology . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

Kerrigan, Heather. Historic Documents of 2011 . Los Angeles: CQ Press, a division of SAGE, 2013.

Lesch, David W. The New Lion of Damascus: Bashar Al-Asad and Modern Syria . New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005.

———. Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad . New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012.

Leverett, Flynt Lawrence. Inheriting Syria Bashar's Trial by Fire . Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005.

Mason, Paul. Why It's Kicking Off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions . London: Verso, 2012.

McMurray, David A., and Amanda Ufheil-Somers, eds. The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

Mikaberidze, Alexander, ed. Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes . Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio, 2013.

Righetti, Nicolas. Yes to a Rosy Future . Paris: Work in Progress, 2012.

Rugh, William A. The Arab Press: News Media and Political Process in the Arab World . Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1979.

Salem, Paul. Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World . Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994.

Salih, Shakeeb. The British-Druze Connection and the Druze Rising of 1896 in the Hawran . London: Routledge, 2006.

Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 . London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

———, and Maureen McConville. Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East . London: Tauris, 1990.

110 Seib, Philip M. Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Tabler, Andrew. In the Lion's Den An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria . Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011.

Taylor, Philip M. Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era . Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003.

Van Dam, Nikolaos. The Struggle for Power in Syria Politics and Society Under Asad and the Ba'th Party . London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.

Wafaei, Husam. Honourable Defection . Victoria, British Colombia: Friesen Press, 2012.

Wieland, Carsten. Syria--Ballots or Bullets?: Democracy, Islamism, and Secularism in the Levant . Seattle: Cune Press, 2006.

Wright, Robin B. Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East . New York: Penguin Press, 2008.

Interviews

Abdul Rahman, Rami. Interview by author. Phone interview. Birmingham, July 2, 2013.

Albanyasi, Ali. Interview by author. Phone interview. Banyas, Syria, December 12, 2012.

Bishop Yazgi, Tony. Interview by author. Phone interview. Damascus, June 10, 2013.

Diab, Salam. Interview by author. Phone interview. Damascus, February 15, 2012.

Haj Ali, Ahmed. Interview by author. Phone interview. Damascus, June 10, 2013.

Marwah, Hisham. Interview by author. Phone interview. Saudi Arabia, May 22, 2013.

Shahin, Shahin. Interview by Lorenzo Trombetta. Personal interview. Beirut, August 16, 2011.

Web Publications

Abbas, Hassan. “The Dynamics of Uprising in Syria.” Jadaliyya.com. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2906/ (accessed August 3, 2013).

Abbas, Mohammed. “An Unlikely Home to Prominent Syria Activist,” Reuters, December 8, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/12/08/uk-britain-syria- idUKTRE7B71XG20111208 (accessed August 8, 2013).

Abdullah, Ali. “Syrian People Decided to Support the Regime After the Alawites are to the Grave and the Christians are to Beirut Slogan.” Burathanews.com. http://www.burathanews.com/news_article_124627.html (accessed February 6, 2013).

111 Abouzeid, Rania. “Syria’s Revolt: How Graffiti Stirred an Uprising.” Time.com. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2060788,00.html (accessed May 12, 2013).

Abu Fadel, Joseph. “Alrai’e Critics.” Elnashra.com. http://www.elnashra.com/news/show/388913/news/ (accessed February 5, 2013).

Agenzia Fides. “Abuse of the Opposition Forces, Ethnic Cleansing of Christians in Homs, Where Jesuits Remains.” Fides.org. http://www.fides.org/en/news/31228?idnews=31228&lan=eng#.Uj81sHeLGH8 (accessed September 6, 2013).

Al-Ahram. “Capital of the Revolution.” Ahram.com. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1076/re4.htm (accessed August 30, 2013).

Al Arabiya News. “Britain Claims Presence of Al-Qaeda Affiliates in Syria.” Alarabiya.net. http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/06/12/220205.html (accessed September 25, 2013).

Alexander Dziadosz, and Oliver Holmes. “Special Report: Deepening Ethnic Rifts Reshape Syria’s Towns. Reuters.com. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-syria-rebels- sectarianism-specialrepo-idUSBRE95K08J20130621 (accessed June 21, 2013).

Aljazeera Channel. “Thousands of Syrians Flee to Turkey.” Aljqzeera.com. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/06/2011611145043659900.html (accessed August 17, 2013).

Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad, and Phillip Smyth. “Assad’s Houla Propaganda.” Nationalreview.com. http://www.nationalreview.com/content/assad%E2%80%99s-houla- propaganda (accessed March 13, 2013).

American Broadcasting Corporation. “ABC’s Barbara Walters’ Interview With Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.”ABC.com. http://abcnews.go.com/International/transcript-abcs- barbara-walters-interview-syrian-president-bashar/story?id=15099152 (accessed August 26, 2013).

Andrews, Wyatt. “Clinton: Arming Syrian Rebels Could Help Al Qaeda.” CBSnews.com. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57386279/clinton-arming-syrian-rebels- could-help-al-qaeda/ (accessed September 24, 2013).

Asharq Al Awsat Newspaper. “Syrian Activists: Sectarianism is Made by the Regime.” AAwsat.com. http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=632685&issueno=11927#.Udjrw4 7B5UQ (accessed March 15, 2013).

112 Assaf, Andrea Kirk. “Amid Unrest, Syria’s Christians Fear for Future.”OSV.com. http://www.osv.com/tabid/7621/itemid/8527/Amid-unrest-Syrias-Christians-fear-for- future.aspx (accessed June 10, 2013).

Assyrian International News Agency. “US-Backed Rebels Committing Christian Genocide in Syria.” Aina.org. http://www.aina.org/news/20120615125537.htm (accessed September 9, 2013).

Azizi, Ahmad. “Double Veto Blocks Security Council Resolution on Syria.” Moroccoworldnews.com. http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2011/10/11053/double- veto-blocks-security-council-resolution-on-syria/ (accessed August 22, 2013).

Barnard, Anne. “U.S. and Turkey to Step up Nonlethal Aid to Rebels in Syria.” NYtimes.com http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/middleeast/us-and-turkey-to-step-up- nonlethal-aid-to-syrian-rebels.html?_r=0 (accessed September 22, 2013).

Blanford, Nicholas. “Assad Regime May Be Gaining Upper Hand in Syria.” CSMonitor.com. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0513/Assad-regime-may-be- gaining-upper-hand-in-Syria (accessed February 6, 2013).

———. “Syrian Refugees Huddle in Lebanon: 30 People, One Candle, and No Food.” CSMonitor.com. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/0308/Syrian- refugees-huddle-in-Lebanon-30-people-one-candle-and-no-food/%28page%29/2 (accessed July 22, 2013).

Blomfield, Adrian. “Ban Ki-moon Boosts Assad by Blaming Al-Qaeda for Syria Bombings.” Telegraph.com. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9275194/Ban-Ki-moon- boosts-Assad-by-blaming-al-Qaeda-for-Syria-bombings.html (accessed September 24, 2012).

British Broadcasting Corporation. “Homs: Syria Revolution’s Capital.” BBC.com. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15625642 (accessed August 30, 2013).

———. “Profile: Syria’s Ruling Ba’th Party.” BBC.com.uk. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- middle-east-18582755 (accessed February 25, 2013).

———. “Syrian Crisis: Assad Denies Role in Houla.” BBC.com. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18313129 (accessed September 2, 2013).

———. “Syrian Parliament Asks President Assad for Clarifications about His Reforms.” BBC.com.uk. http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/03/110328_syria_monday.shtml (accessed June 22, 2013).

113 ———. “Syria Security Forces Commit Crimes Against Humanity.” BBC.com. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15926364 (accessed August 17, 2013).

Cable News Network. “Assad: U.S. Trying to Destabilize Syria.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/08/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed July 4, 2013).

———. “Journalist Marie Colvin Died Trying to Get her Shoes, Her Paper Reports.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/26/world/syria-marie-colvin (accessed September 5, 2013).

———. “Syria Lifting Emergency Law, Official Says.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/27/syria.unrest/index.html (accessed April 9, 2013).

———. “Syrian Official: There Is No Crackdown,” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/25/syria.unrest/index.html (accessed August 19, 2013).

———. “Syrian President Condemns Houla Massacre, Rejects Accusations.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

———. “Syrians Set Out to Draft New Constitution Amid Clashes.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/30/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (accessed August 24, 2013).

———. “Syria: Soldiers Kill, Arrest Armed Terrorist Groups.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/11/syria.unrest/index.html (accessed August 16, 2013).

———. “Transcript: Marie Colvin’s Final CNN Interview.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/22/world/marie-colvin-interview-transcript (accessed September 5, 2013).

China Network Television. “Rebellious Baba Amr Area in Syria’s Homs Largely Under Control,” CNTV.com. http://english.cntv.cn/20120301/110383.shtml (accessed September 2, 2013).

Chulov, Martin. “Syrian Regime TV Reporter Defects.” Guardian.com.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/02/syrian-regime-tv-reporter-defects (accessed March 13, 2013).

Cowell, Alan. “In Rare Interview, Assad Denies Ordering Crackdown in Syria.” NYtimes.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/08/world/middleeast/in-rare-interview-assad-denies- ordering-crackdown-in-syria.html?_r=0 (accessed August 24, 2013).

114 Day Press. “Four Army Martyrs Killed by Terrorist Groups in Homs and Deraa.” Dp-news.com. http://www.dp-news.com/pages/detail.aspx?articleid=82123 (accessed May 3, 2013).

———. “Syria: Armed Terrorist Groups Committed Taldao, Al-Shoumarieh.” Dp-news.com. http://www.dp-news.com/en/detail.aspx?articleid=121906 (accessed September 3, 2013).

Democracy Now. “Is Syria in a Civil War? Journalist Patrick Seale Debates Activist Rafif Jouejati on a Just Response.” Democracynow.org. http://www.democracynow.org/2012/6/13/is_syria_in_a_civil_war (accessed August 12, 2013).

Dolgov, Boris. “On Current Situation in Syria.” Rianovosti.com. http://en.rian.ru/international_affairs/20120201/171067470.html (accessed May 23, 2013).

Elnashra. “Ghalyoun: We Understand Al Rai’s Fears; Democracy Is the Solution.” Elnashra.com. http://www.elnashra.com/news/show/393872 (accessed May 29, 2013).

Encyclopedia Britannica. “Propaganda.” Encyclopedia.com. http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/propaganda.aspx#1-1G2:3402300123-full (accessed July 27, 2013).

Enders, David. “Rare Inside View of Syria’s Rebels Finds a Force Vowing to Fight on.” Mcclatchydc.com. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/04/23/146425/rare-inside-view-of- syrias-rebels.html (accessed September 14, 2013).

Fanoos. “Mother Anges Mariam of the Cross.” Fanoos.com. http://www.fanoos.com/society/mother_agnes_mariam_of_the_cross.html (accessed May 22, 2013).

Fox News. “In Tv Interview, Assad Accuses US of Fueling Syrian Uprising, Says No Comparison to Libya.” Foxnews.com. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/07/08/assad- accuses-us-fueling-syrian-uprising/ (accessed July 4, 2013).

France 24 International News. “Ex-Syrian News Anchor Slams State Propaganda.” France24.com. http://www.france24.com/en/20120220-former-syrian-news-anchor-hani- malathi-bashar-assad-regime-resign-dubai (accessed March 13, 2013).

Gladstone, Rick. “Writer Defends His Handling of Interview with Assad.” NYtimes.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/world/middleeast/fallout-continues-over-germans- assad-interview.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed July 4, 2013).

Haaretz Daily Newspaper. “Syrian Disinformation About Christian Persecution.” Haaretz.com. http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/syrian-disinformation-about-christian-persecution- 1.422943 (accessed September 14, 2013).

115 Hasan, Lama. “Syria: Grip tightens on Homs’ Baba Amr District.” ABC.com. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/02/syria-grip-tightens-on-homs-baba-amr- district/ (accessed September 2, 2013).

Hermann, Von Rainer. “Abermals Massaker in Syrien.” Faz.net. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/neue-erkenntnisse-zu-getoeteten-von-hula-abermals- massaker-in-syrien-11776496.html (September 9, 2013).

Human Rights Council. “Human Rights Situations that Require the Council’s Attention,” under “Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.” Ohchr.org. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/OralUpdateJune2012. pdf (accessed September 5, 2013).

Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Crimes against Humanity in Deraa, 2011,” under “Killings, Torture in a Locked-Down City Under Siege.” Hrw.org. http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/01/syria-crimes-against-humanity-daraa (accessed April 19, 2013).

International Crisis Group. “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East, 2011,” under “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide.” Crisisgroup.org. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20 Syria%20Lebanon/Syria/109%20Popular%20Protest%20in%20North%20Africa%20and %20the%20Middle%20East%20VII%20--%20The%20Syrian%20Regimes%20Slow- motion%20Suicide.pdf (accessed April 8, 2013).

Issa, Khalil. “The Lebanese Left Falls in Syria.” Al-Akhbar.com. http://www.al- akhbar.com/node/13895 (accessed February 5, 2013).

Karon, Tony. “Five Reasons Why the Assad Regimes Survives.” Time.com. http://world.time.com/2012/08/30/five-reasons-why-the-assad-regime-survives/2/ (accessed September 20, 2013).

Kenner, David. “How Assad Wooed the American Right, and Won the Syrian Propaganda War.” ForeignPolicy.com. http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/10/how_assad_wooed_the_american_right_a nd_won_the_syria_propaganda_war (accessed September 10, 2013).

———. “Straight Guy in Scotland.” ForeignPolicy.com. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/13/straight_guy_in_scotland (accessed August 27, 2013).

Kevorkova, Nadezhda. “Western Media Lie About Syria: Eyewitness Reports.” RT.com. http://rt.com/news/syria-lies-interview (accessed May 3, 2013).

116

Khanafer, Sadeq. “Only in Syria.” Almanar.com. http://www.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?fromval=2&cid=171&frid=31&seccatid=171&e id=105076 (accessed February 5, 2013).

Le Courrier. “Mort de Gilles Jacquier: au Cœur du Piège Fatal dans la Ville de Homs.” Lecourrier.ch. http://www.lecourrier.ch/mort_de_gilles_jacquier_au_coeur_du_piege_fatal_da (accessed August 20, 2013).

Le Monde. “A Homs, l'armée a pris le contrôle de Baba Amro.” Lemonde.fr. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/03/01/homs-pilonnee-et-encerclee-par- les-forces-syriennes_1649971_3210.html?xtmc=mere_agnes_syrie&xtcr=1 (accessed September 12, 2013).

Local Coordination Committees. “About the LCCs.” Lccsyria.org. http://www.lccsyria.org/about (accessed August 7, 2013).

Los Angeles Times. “Christians Fears Ethnic Cleansing of Christians in Homs, Syria.” LAtimes.com. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/church-fears-ethnic- cleansing-of-christians-in-homs-syria.html (accessed July 15, 2013).

MacFarquhar, Neil. “Assad Condemns Houla, Blaming Terrorists.” NYtimes.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/04/world/middleeast/assad-condemns-houla-massacre- blaming-outside-terrorists.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

———. “Syria Tries to Defend Its Record to United Nations.” NYtimes.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/27/world/middleeast/27nations.html (accessed August 22, 2013).

MacLeod, Hugh, and Annasofie Flamand. “Tortured and Killed: Hamza al-Khateeb, Age 13.” Aljazeera.com. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/05/201153185927813389.html (accessed April 22, 2013).

Malas, Nour. “Syria Revolt Fueled by Roof Fires and Tweets.” WSJ.com. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303406104576445864072772194.html (accessed February 15, 2013).

McEvers, Kelly. “A Controlled Glimpse of a Restive Syrian Town.” NPR.org. http://www.npr.org/2011/08/22/139858852/a-controlled-glimpse-of-a-restive-syrian-town (accessed August 16, 2013).

117 Meyssan, Thierry. “The Houla Affair Highlights Western Intelligence Gap in Syria.” Voltairenet.org. http://www.voltairenet.org/The-Houla-affair-highlights#nb3 (accessed September 12, 2013).

Middle East Posts. “Edgy Damascus: Jesuit Priest Asked to Leave Syria.” Mideastposts.com. http://mideastposts.com/middle-east-society/religion-in-the-middle-east/edgy-damascus- jesuit-priest-asked-to-leave-syria/ (accessed May 28, 2013).

Muir, Jim. “Syria’s Assad Warns of Earthquake If West Intervenes.” BBC.com. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15508630 (accessed August 24, 2013).

Nagorski, Tom. “The global Note: Cleaning Homs.” ABCnews.com. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/02/the-global-note-cleaning-homs-iran- israel-the-u-s-porcupines-putins-suggestive-ads/ (accessed September 2, 2013).

National Post. “Barbara Walters Apologizes for Conflict of Interest over Aid to Syria’s Bashar al- Assad.” Nationalpost.com. http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/06/05/barbara-walters- apologizes-for-conflict-of-interest-over-aide-to-syrias-bashar-al-assad/ (accessed August 27, 2013).

National Public Radio. “Syria’s Assad Warns Against Foreign Intervention.” NPR.com. http://www.npr.org/2011/10/30/141842965/syrias-assad-warns-against-foreign- intervention (accessed August 24, 2013).

Perlroth, Nicole. “Hunting for Syrian Hackers’ Chain of Command.” NYtimes.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/18/technology/financial-times-site-is- hacked.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed May 17, 2013).

Philipson, Jerry. “If Assad Falls.” Americanthinker.com. http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2012/02/if_assad_falls.html (accessed September 21, 2013).

Phillips, Macon. “President Obama: The Future of Syria Must be Determined by its People, but President Bashar Al-Assad is Standing in their Way.” Whitehouse.gov. http://whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/08/18/president-obama-future-syria-must-be- determined-its-people-president-bashar-al-assad (accessed August 25, 2013).

Press Television. “Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera Fabricate Facts on Syria.” Presstv.com. http://www.presstv.com/detail/235902.html (accessed August 10, 2013).

Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty. “Syria’s Assad Warns of Earthquake If West Intervenes.” RFERL.com. http://www.rferl.org/content/syria_assad_warns_against_western_intervention_earthquak e/24375870.html (accessed August 24, 2013).

118 Riedel, Bruce. “What Comes After Assad in Syria?” Brookings.edu. http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/20-syria-riedel (accessed July 4, 2013).

Rosenthal, John. “Rebels Responsible for Houla Massacre.” Nationalreview.com. http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/302261/report-rebels-responsible-houla-massacre- john-rosenthal (accessed August 29, 2012).

Russia Today. “Tread Lightly on Syria, Russia Warns UN Security Council.” RT.com. http://rt.com/politics/syria-russia-united-nations-protests/ (accessed May 12, 2013).

Salcedo, Michele. “McCain: Lack of US Aid to Syrian Rebels Shameful.” News.Yahoo.com. http://news.yahoo.com/mccain-lack-us-aid-syrian-rebels-shameful-141437248.html (accessed October 1, 2013).

Sanchez, Raf. “Barbara Walters Apologizes Over Links to Syria Aid of Bashar al-Assad.” Telegraph.com. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9312558/Barbara-Walters- apologises-over-links-to-Syrian-aide-of-Bashar-al-Assad.html (accessed August 27, 2013).

Shabazz, Saeed. “Did Syrian Resolution Veto Reflect Power Shift at UN?” Finalcall.com. http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/World_News_3/article_8228.shtml (accessed July 17, 2013).

Shadid, Anthony. “Syria’s Sons of No One.” NYTimes.com. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/magazine/syrias-sons-of-no- one.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed August 5, 2013).

Solomon, Jay. “World Leaders Urge Assad to Resign.” WSJ.com. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903639404576516144145940136.html (accessed September 20, 2013).

Stratfor Global Intelligence. “Missteps in the Syrian Opposition’s Propaganda Effort.” Stratfor.com. http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/missteps-syrian-oppositions- propaganda-effort (accessed August 10, 2013).

Sturdee, Nick. “BBC Documentary Examines Syria's State TV Channel Al Ikhbariya.” Guardian.com.uk. http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2013/feb/10/bbc-documentary-syria- state-television (accessed February 10, 2013).

Syrian Arab News Agency. “ Sari Saoud Killed by a Terrorist.” Sana.com.sy http://sana.sy/ara/336/2012/12/16/457460.htm (accessed April 25, 2013).

Syria Steps. “Baba Amr is Under Full government’s Control.” Syriasteps.com. http://www.syriasteps.com/?d=110&id=82997 (accessed September 3, 2013).

119 ———. “Confessions of a Terrorist.” Syriasteps.com. http://www.syriasteps.com/index.php?p=110&id=67455 (accessed May 3, 2013).

Syria the Real Deal. “Syria: Murderer of Sari Saoud Imprisoned.” Arabisouri.wordpress.com. https://arabisouri.wordpress.com/2012/12/16/syria-murderer-of-sari-saoud-imprisoned/ (accessed March 22, 2013).

The Economist. “Towards the Endgame.” Economist.com http://www.economist.com/node/21559330 (accessed July 5, 2013).

The Independent. “Arab League Observer Arrive in Syria.” Independent.com.uk. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/arab-league-observers-arrive-in- syria-6281910.html (accessed September 2, 2013).

The Jerusalem Post. “Syrian Students Mount Protests in Aleppo, Capital.” Jpost.com. http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Syrian-students-mount-protests-in-Aleppo-capital (accessed March 19, 2013).

Therolf, Garrett, and Jeffrey Fleishman. “In Syria, a Taste for Bashar Assad.” LAtimes.com. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/28/world/la-fg-syria-20110328 (accessed May 4, 2013).

The Telegraph. “Syria: Tanks Continue Assault on Hama.” Telegraph.com. uk. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/8679320/Syria-tanks- continue-assault-on-Hama.html (accessed August 17, 2013).

The White House. “Statement by the President on the Violence in Syria.” Whitehouse.gov. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/31/statement-president-violence- syria (accessed August 2, 2013).

Thomson Reuters. “Syria’s Assad Warns of Earthquake If West Intervenes.” Reuters.com. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/29/us-syria-assad-idUSTRE79S33O20111029 (accessed August 24, 2013).

Time Magazine. “Chaos in Syria: Are Army Deserters Helping to Arm the Opposition?” Time.com. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2076250,00.html (accessed May 10, 2013).

———. “Will Outrage at the Torture of a 13-Year-Old Help Syrians Overcome Their Fear of the Regime.” Time.com. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075002,00.html#ixzz2WrTUgIhh (accessed April 22, 2013).

Trombetta, Lorenzo. “Altering Courses in Unknown Waters: Interaction Between Traditional and New Media During the First Months of the Syrian Uprising.” Globalmediajournal.com. http://www.globalmediajournal.de/2012/05/07/altering-courses-in-unknown-waters-

120 interaction-between-traditional-and-new-media-during-the-first-months-of-the-syrian- uprising/ (accessed July 16, 2013).

Ukman, Jason. “U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, Greeted in Hama With Flowers and Olive Branches.” Washingtonpost.com. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/us-ambassador-to- syria-robert-ford-greeted-in-hama-with-flowers-and-olive- branches/2011/07/08/gIQA1Faz3H_blog.html (accessed June 1, 2013).

Valiente, Alexandra. “Syria’s Mystery Snipers Revealed.” Syria 360.wordpress.com. http://syria360.wordpress.com/2011/04/24/syrias-mystery-snipers-revealed/ (accessed May 2, 2013).

Walford, Charles, and Nabila Ramdani. “She Wanted One More Story.” Dailymail.com.uk. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2104711/Marie-Colvin-Sunday-Times-reporter- leave-Syria-day-died-says-mother.html (accessed August 15, 2013).

Watson, Ivan, Raja Razek, and Saad Abedine. “Defecting Syrian Propagandist Says His Job Was to Fabricate.” CNN.com. http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/09/world/meast/syria- propagandist-defects (accessed September 4, 2013).

Xinhua News. “Terrorists Attack Residence of Syrian Servicemen.” Xinhuanet.com. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-04/30/c_13852429.htm (accessed May 3, 2013).

Ya Libnan. “Lebanese Call Syria Terrorist Footage a Fabrication.” YaLibnan.com. http://www.yalibnan.com/2011/11/29/lebanese-call-syria-terrorist-footage-a-fabrication/ (accessed May 14, 2013).

Zavis, Alexandra. “Syrian President Bashar Assad Denies Ordering Crackdown.” LAtimes.com. http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/07/world/la-fg-syria-assad-20111208 (accessed August 20, 2013).

Zisser, Eyal. "Does Bashar al-Assad Rule Syria?” MEforum.com. http://www.meforum.org/517/does-bashar-al-assad-rule-syria (accessed February 18, 2013).

———. "The Succession Struggle in Damascus.” MEforum.com. http://www.meforum.org/264/the-succession-struggle-in-damascus (accessed February 18, 2013).

———. “What Does the Future Hold for Syria?” Naba.org.uk. http://www.naba.org.uk/Content/news/Daily/MERIA/MERIA_60615.pdf (accessed January 20, 2013).

121