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Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013)

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Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013) Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013) A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction ﺑﺴﻢ اﷲ اﻟﺮﺣﻤﻦ اﻟﺮﺣﻴﻢ In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful إِ نﱠ ا ﻟ ﻠّ ﻪَ ﻻَ ﻳُ ﻐَ ﻴﱢ ﺮُ ﻣَﺎ ﺑِ ﻘَ ﻮْ مٍ ﺣَﺘﱠﻰ ﻳُ ﻐَ ﻴﱢ ﺮُ و اْ ﻣَﺎ ﺑِ ﺄَ ﻧْ ﻔُ ﺴِ ﻬِ ﻢْ Verily, never will Allah change the condition of people unless they change it themselves (013,011) VISION FOR AFGHANISTAN By the solar year 1400 (2020), Afghanistan will be: A stable Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbors, standing with full dignity in the international family. A tolerant, united, and pluralistic nation that honors its Islamic heritage and the deep seated aspirations toward participation, justice, and equal rights for all. A society of hope and prosperity based on a strong, private-sector led market economy, so- cial equity, and environmental sustainability. OUR GOALS The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) serves as Afghanistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and uses the pillars, principles and benchmarks of the Af- ghanistan Compact as a foundation. The pillars and goals of the ANDS are: 1. Security: Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal security for every Afghan. 2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights: Strengthen democratic processes and in- stitutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government ac- countability. 3. Economic and Social Development: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A further vital and cross-cutting area of work is eliminating the narcotics industry, which remains a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond. Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) i Map of Afghanistan iii Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Foreword iv Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate Six and half years ago, the people of Afghanistan and the international community joined hands to liberate Afghanistan from the grip of international terrorism and to begin the journey of rebuilding a nation from a past of violence, destruction and terror. We have come a long way in this shared jour- ney. In a few short years, as a result of the partnership between Afghanistan and the international community, we were able to create a new, democratic Constitution, embracing the freedom of speech and equal rights for women. Afghans voted in their first-ever presidential elections and elected a new parliament. Today close to five million Afghan refugees have returned home, one of the largest movements of people to their homeland in history. Thousands of schools have been built, welcoming over six million boys and girls, the highest level ever for Afghanistan. Hundreds of health clinics have been established boosting our basic health coverage from a depressing 9 percent six years ago to over 85 percent today. Access to diagnostic and curative ser- vices has increased from almost none in 2002 to more than forty percent. We have rehabilitated 12,200 km of roads, over the past six years. Our rapid economic growth, with double digit growth almost every year, has led to higher income and better living conditions for our people. With a developing road net- work and a state-of-the-art communications infrastructure, Afghanistan is better placed to serve as an economic land-bridge in our region. These achievements would not have been possible without the unwavering support of the interna- tional community and the strong determination of the Afghan people. I hasten to point out that our achievements must not distract us from the enormity of the tasks that are still ahead. The threat of terrorism and the menace of narcotics are still affecting Afghanistan and the broader region and ham- pering our development. Our progress is still undermined by the betrayal of public trust by some functionaries of the state and uncoordinated and inefficient aid delivery mechanisms. Strengthening national and sub-national governance and rebuilding our judiciary are also among our most difficult tasks. To meet these challenges, I am pleased to present Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy (ANDS). This strategy has been completed after two years of hard work and extensive consultations around the country. As an Afghan-owned blueprint for the development of Afghanistan in all spheres of human endeavor, the ANDS will serve as our nation’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. I am con- fident that the ANDS will help us in achieving the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks and Millen- nium Development Goals. I also consider this document as our roadmap for the long-desired objec- tive of Afghanization, as we transition towards less reliance on aid and an increase in self-sustaining economic growth. I thank the international community for their invaluable support. With this Afghan-owned strategy, I ask all of our partners to fully support our national development efforts. I am strongly encouraged to see the participation of the Afghan people and appreciate the efforts of all those in the international community and Afghan society who have contributed to the development of this strategy. Finally, I thank the members of the Oversight Committee and the ANDS Secretariat for the preparation of this document. Hamid Karzai President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Foreword v Message from the Oversight Committee For the preparation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy vi Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate We are pleased to present the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, which reflects the com- mitment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to poverty reduction and private sector-led economic growth for a prosperous and stable Afghanistan. The ANDS Oversight Committee (OSC) was man- dated by the Government to produce a Millennium Development Goals-based national strategy that is Afghan-owned and meets the requirements for a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. The OSC met on a regular basis to design, discuss and oversee the development of the strategy, including the iden- tification of the needs and grievances of the people, and the prioritization of resource allocations and actions. To embrace ‘Afghanization” and ownership, the OSC facilitated inclusive and extensive con- sultations both at national and sub-national levels. Sustained fiscal support and continuous evaluation and monitoring are essential now to meet the challenges ahead related to ANDS implementation. The democratic aspirations of the Afghan people are high, yet financial resources remain limited. While much has been accomplished since 2001, more remains to be done as we move from “Compact to Impact”. The Afghan Government with support from the international community must act decisively, strategically, and with an absolute commit- ment to the ANDS goals and vision. We look forward to working with our government colleagues, civil society representatives, tribal eld- ers and religious scholars, the private sector, the international community and, most importantly, fel- low Afghans to implement the ANDS, to help realize the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks and Mil- lennium Development Goals. Prof. Ishaq Nadiri Senior Economic Advisor to the President Ahmad Zia Masoud Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta Chair, ANDS and JCMB First Vice-President Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Amin Farhang Dr. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady Sarwar Danish Minister of Commerce and Minister of Finance Minister of Justice Industry Dr. Zalmay Rassoul Dr. Jalil Shams National Security Haneef Atmar Minister of Economy Advisor Minister of Education Message from the Ovresight Committee vii Acknowledgments viii Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) In the name of Allah, the most Merciful, the most Compassionate The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) could not have been developed without the generous contribution of many individuals and organizations. The ANDS was finalized under the guidance of the Over- sight Committee, appointed by HE President Hamid Karzai and chaired by H.E. Professor Ishaq Nadiri, Senior Economic Advisor to the President and Chair of the ANDS Oversight Committee. The committee included: H.E. Rangeen Dadfar Spanta, Minister of Foreign Affairs; H.E. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, Minister of Finance; H.E. Jalil Shams, Minister of Economy; H.E. Sarwar Danish, Minister of Justice; H.E. Haneef Atmar, Minister of Education; H.E. Amin Farhang, Minister of Commerce; and H.E. Zalmai Rassoul, National Security Advisor. We would like to sincerely thank the First Vice-President and Chair of the Economic Council, H.E. Ahmad Zia Massoud. Special thanks are also due to H.E. Hedayat Amin Arsala, Senior Minister and H.E. Waheedulah Shah- rani, Deputy Minister of Finance and the Ministry of Finance team. In addition, we would like to thank the Su- preme Court, the National Assembly, Government Ministries and Agencies, Provincial Authorities, Afghan Em- bassies abroad, national Commissions, the Office of the President, Civil Society Organizations, and International Community. All Ministers, deputy ministers and their focal points, religious leaders, tribal elders,
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