-3 (SI), 2010 European Journal of Economic and Political Studies
Syro-Lebanese migration to Colombia, Venezuela and Curacão: From mainly christian to predominantly Muslim phenomenon
Philipp Bruckmayr1
Abstract: This study provides a long term perspective on Syro-Lebanese migration to the southern (Circum-) Caribbean. Starting in the late 19th century this still continuing migratory process has witnessed major waves of arrivals in the area from its inception until the 1930s and then again since the beginning of the Lebanon war. Characteristically, these two periods are also representing a shift from a mainly Christian to a predominantly Muslim phenomenon now subject to the forces of globalization. With respect to current European immigration and integration debates, the latter provides us with a glimpse on Muslim immigrant affairs outside of the exclusive club usually meant by the term “the West” and taken to be the sole recipient of such migratory movements. Focusing mainly on the Colombian experience of Syro- Lebanese migrants, the modes of adapting to local culture and environment of both waves, as well as those of an intermediary wave directed mostly at Venezuela, shall be compared and evaluated in search for differences, continuities and similarities.
Keywords: Syro-Lebanese, Migration, Caribbean, Religion, Language
1 University of Vienna, Austria. [email protected]
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Introduction Arab migration from the territories of the modern-day states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and Palestine2 to the Caribbean coast of Colombia and Venezuela, as well as to the island of Curacão (Dutch Antilles), already began in Ottoman times in the 1880s. Although taking place on a much smaller scale than migration to the USA, Brazil or Argentina, the Syro-Lebanese migration had in some instances a profound impact on their new host countries. The newcomers mostly came to settle in important port towns and coastal trading centers, where they initially engaged in small-scale peddling. Yet, due to their good sense of business, they often made a fortune becoming whole-sale import-export traders, fabric and plantation owners and the like. The prosperous Syro-Lebanese community played a major part in the rise of the city of Barranquilla to become Colombia’s most important port in the first quarter of the 20th century. Whereas Venezuela witnessed also an important intermediary wave of Syro- Lebanese immigration (post-1947 to early 1970s), two major immigration waves can be clearly discerned in Colombia (and to a lesser degree in Curacão), with a much smaller amount of arrivals in between them. The first phase can be placed into the period between the late 19th century and the 1930s, while the second started in the mid 1970s and continues into the new millennium3. Focusing mainly on the Colombian experience of Syro-Lebanese
2 Henceforth immigrants from these territories, formerly known as Greater Syria, will be referred to with the generic “Syro- Lebanese”. However, in order to repeat the same designation over and over again, the term “Arab” will likewise be applied at times, as Arab immigration to the Americas was plainly a Syro-Lebanese one. Usage of these generic terms is of course avoided, whenever distinctions are necessary, especially after the foundation of the respective nation states. The area had been incorporated into the Ottoman empire in 1516, where it constituted a single province. After Ottoman disintegration, the former province was in 1920 divided into areas of French (Lebanon and Syria) and British (Transjordan [Jordan and the Palestinian West Bank] and Palestine) mandate rule and minor Arab regional states, with partly arbitrarily delineated borders. The 1940s then witnessed the independence of Lebanon (1943), Syria and Jordan (both in 1946), as well as the foundation of Israel (1948). Lebanon recognizes 17 different religious communities. Muslim-Christian ratio is now estimated at 60% Muslims (mainly Shiites, followed by Sunnites) and 40% Christians of various persuasions (the three numerically most important being Maronites, Greek Orthodox and Melkites [POC 1997: 360-361, 366]). Figures for Syria are the following: 75% Sunnites, 15% Christians (mostly Greek Orthodox, followed by Armenian Apostolic and Melkite [POC 1997: 358, 360, 366], 6% Alawites (see n. 34), 2% Druzes (see n. 33) and 1% Shiites (Weiss 2007: 328). Jordan and the areas under Palestinian authority (both overwhelmingly and homogenously Sunnite) have small and steadily decreasing Christian minorities (around 2.7 [predominantly Greek Orthodox, followed by Roman Catholic and Melkite] and 3% [mostly Greek Orthodox, followed by Roman Catholic] respectively). Similarly, Israel inhabits an Arab Christian minority of various persuasions, in their majority Melkites and Greek Orthodox (Weiss 2007: 114; 264; POC 1997: 360, 366-367). All the areas in question also had substantial communities of Arabic-speaking Oriental (Mizrahi) Jews interspersed with (meanwhile often similarly Arabic-speaking) Sephardim, whose ancestors had been expelled from the Iberian peninsula. Since the Arab- Israeli wars only small numbers of Jews remain in Lebanon and Syria, whereas most have migrated to either Israel or the new world (Shenhav 2006). 3 Nweihad (1997: 240-242) has proposed a different periodization involving a “pioneer” (1880-1920), an “intermediary” (1920-1945) and a “contemporary” period (1945-now). Although more or less in accordance with major changes in the political geography of the Near East, this scheme has certain shortcomings. Firstly, Syro-Lebanese immigration to Colombia continued unabated way into the 1920s, and to regard these arrivals as part of another distinct migratory movement, simply because of a change in passport issuing agencies from Ottoman to mandate bureaucracy, appears to be misleading. Secondly, the long-drawn contemporary period minimizes the stark contrast between decades of comparably small numbers of arrivals and a reinvigorated migratory movement to Colombia since the middle of the 1970s. However, the problem could be merely terminological, as given these particularities, I have chosen to differentiate between waves (e.g. discernable times of high immigration rates, whose participants would be sharing many particularities) rather than general periods. This distinction is also the basis of my recourse to an intermediary wave as far as Venezuela is concerned.
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migrants, the modes of adapting to local culture and environment of both waves, as well as those of an intermediary wave directed mostly at Venezuela, shall be compared and evaluated. Differences between these can not only be encountered as far as preferred places of residence and dominant religious affiliation within the group are concerned. Indeed, as the second wave falls into the age of globalization, it is obvious, that the possibilities of staying in touch, both in a physical and intellectual sense, with the respective lands of origin or descent, as well as their culture and people have increased considerably. Thus, the question must be raised how these new realities impact firstly on the issue of integration into Latin American society, and secondly, on the quest for identity preservation, issues which were of similar importance for migrants arriving a hundred years ago at the shores of the southern Circumcaribbean long before globalization. Taking into account, that the second major migratory period is also characterized by the unprecedented high proportion of Muslims involved, world-wide Islamic resurgence, a major factor especially in European migration and integration debates among both sides, and its implications for contemporary immigrant communities cannot be separated from such considerations. In comparing and reviewing the experiences of over a hundred years of Arab diaspora in the area, particular attention will be paid to the retention or loss of the Arabic mother tongue and original religious persuasions, as well as to participation in local cultural, political and commercial affairs, and to interaction with the majority populations. It will be argued here, that the networking possibilities of the era of globalization are indeed conducive to a preservation of the Arabic language and original sectarian identity (either Christian or Muslim) among later immigrants, whereas both were rapidly lost among their early predecessors and their descendants, among whom networking was in the long term mainly confined to business and political ventures. At first we will focus on the course and destinations of early Syro-Lebanese immigration (1880s to 1930s) and the role of cultural factors among its participants, to proceed with an assessment of their political, economic and social integration. Subsequently, the changed pattern of the migratory movement between the 1940s and early 1970s, and the new factors relevant to community formation, which had emerged in the meantime, will be discussed, before we will turn to the most recent immigration wave starting in the mid-seventies. Here, the increased possibilities of guarding cultural characteristics in the era of globalization, otherwise often associated with a general trend towards assimilation to dominant western culture, will be highlighted.
Whereas we may rightfully talk of an intermediary period with little immigration in Colombia between the end of the second world war and the 1970s, Venezuela received another wave of (mostly Syrian) immigrants between the mid-1950s and mid- 1960s (Escher 2000: 358).
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Finally, Syro-Lebanese immigration’s development from a predominantly Christian phenomenon to a multi-religious or now even mostly Muslim one, will be under scrutiny. Of course the observations on recent immigration suffer from an inherent deficiency, namely the absence of a long term perspective comparable to the one we have regarding immigration at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century.
From Beirut and Haifa to Puerto Colombia: Early Syro-Lebanese migration to Caribbean shores (c. 1880-1930s) Naturally, the establishment of Syro-Lebanese in Colombia, Venezuela and the Dutch Antilles was triggered by the same developments, which brought about the much more substantial migratory movements to the foremost American immigration states, namely the USA, Brazil and Argentina (Karpat 1985). These developments included most prominently socio-economic decline in many rural areas of Greater Syria as well as changes of the socio-cultural demography in the region due to the influx of displaced Muslim populations of the Caucasus and Zionist settlers on the one hand, and the sudden availability of both actual and alleged opportunities for socio- economic improvement in the Americas on the other. The Near East of the late 19th and early 20th century not only witnessed a remarkable trend towards urbanization, during which especially port cities grew rapidly, but also severe alterations in agriculture and commerce, both related to the general patterns of decline within the Ottoman empire and the growing dominance of Europeans in the area, finally culminating in the French and British mandates. Even though the emigrants were mostly Arab Christians, Ottoman oppression and inter-religious strife appear to have only played a secondary role among the causes leading to emigration at the time in question, with economic considerations occupying a dominant position. Early Syro-Lebanese immigrants to Colombia mostly embarked in Puerto Colombia4, the former port outlet of the city of Barranquilla, situated half way between the country’s two other major Caribbean ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta. Incidentally, it was in this very region of arrival, that the Syro-Lebanese should make their strongest impact on Colombia5. The majority of migrants chose to settle in the afore-mentioned port cities, but smaller groups also established themselves in towns and villages along the coast between Cartagena and the barren Guajira peninsula
4 A contemporary description of the port is to be found in Muller (1905: 364). Its similar relevance for Jewish (including Oriental) immigration becomes evident in Manco Bermúdez & Watnik Barón (2000: 50-55). 5 In the Venezuelan case, Syro-Lebanese are not known to have had a comparable imprint on any specific region during the period in question, although some had become millionaires and important politicians by the 1950s. Consequently, even less is known about their early immigration than in Colombia. Early migrants appear to have likewise settled mostly in major inland cities as well as in the coastal region (Safa 1960: 86; Escher 2000: 357).
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bordering Venezuela with its port Riohacha, while others took up residence along important water ways like the Rio Magdalena and Sinú (Fawcett 1992: 362-3, 367) in settlements, which were, although located in some distance to the coast, still geographically part of a larger coastal trading sphere in the making. Nevertheless, turcos (Turks), as the Arabs from the area of Greater Syria came to be called throughout Latin America due to their provenience from the Ottoman empire (Klich & Lesser 1996 & 1998) spread far and wide and also proceeded way into the interior to major cities like Bogotá and Cali, which in 1945 had the largest agglomerations of Syro-Lebanese after Barranquilla and Cartagena (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 11)6. Through recent research it has become evident, that the Syro-Lebanese immigrants made a major contribution not only to the spread of commerce in the whole coastal region and adjacent parts of the country, but also played a decisive part in the rise of Barranquilla to become Colombia’s dominant Caribbean port as well as in regional industrialization (Fawcett & Posada-Carbo 1998; Posada Carbó 1998: 323- 328) 7. This contribution has to be viewed against the very humble beginnings of most immigrants from Greater Syria in Colombia and their small number, which is hard to estimate, but amounted probably to between 5000 and 10000 people in the 1930s, when including their offspring (Hashimoto 1992: 91-92; Fawcett 1992: 366 n.21)8. Although partly coming from prestigious families and leaving behind important positions in their homelands9, they mostly started out as peddlers with little capital, and soon set out to sell their wares in rural areas neglected by local commerce, whereby formerly untapped markets were opened up to a growing commercial network in the region (Posada Carbó 1998: 327-328). Moreover, their introduction of purchase on credit and door to door sale served to increase consumption among rural as well as poor urban populations, and was an outright commercial revolution, paralleled slightly later only by the similar methods adopted by eastern European Ashkenazi Jewish immigrants (Fawcett & Posada-Carbo 1998: 65-67; Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 16). Whereas many Syro-Lebanese made a stunningly rapid and successful
6 A locally composed “guide to the Arabic-speaking population of Colombia” (Mattar 1945), although surely incomplete, lists 72 towns and villages with a Syro-Lebanese population in 1945 (Posada Carbó 1998: 323 n. 28). Cunninghame Graham testified to their stunning distribution during the first world war by noting: “Both in Colombia and Venezuela, Syrians seem to have monopolized the stores. In the smallest hamlet in the interior they are to be found” (1922: 196). 7 Syro-Lebanese played a comparable role in the formation of Honduras’ industrial capital San Pedro Sula in the country’s North Coast region, where in the 1930s Arab merchants wielded commercial dominance in most municipalities of importance in the whole area (Euraque 1998). 8 As Hashimoto’s figures derive from French consular estimates (the highest being 5000 in 1925), Palestinians, then under British rule, are certainly not included in the count. 9 Among the forefathers of the Lebanese Habeich family settling in Bucaramanga (Colombia) were Maronite bishops of the 18th and 19th century. Nicolás Chain, arriving in the country in 1936, was former mayor of Bethlehem (Harker Valdivieso n.d.: 146, 152, 157).
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transition from peddlers to shop owners, and the more successful even to wholesale import-export traders as well as fabric and plantation owners, others, motivated by the fortunes of such pioneers, arrived certainly with capital and specific plans for businesses. While Barranquilla and Cartagena boasted a considerable number of Syro-Lebanese owned firms in the first decades of the 20th century, smaller towns like Lorica, where nothing was more common than to hear Arabic spoken (Cunninghame Graham 1922: 9), were even subject to an almost complete Arab monopoly on local trade (Viloria de la Hoz 2003; Fawcett & Posada Carbó 1998: 68-73). However, as the economic activities of the early Syro-Lebanese immigrants have already been thoroughly studied, and are lying outside of the scope of this article, apart from constituting an important component to the historical framework necessary for any discussion of Arab presence in the area, we will now turn our attention to cultural factors playing a role in early Syro-Lebanese settlement and integration in the region.
Cultural factors among first wave Syro-Lebanese immigrants Most Near Eastern immigrants in Colombia, Venezuela and Curacão, as elsewhere during the period in question, were Christians of various persuasions. Nevertheless, also Muslims and Jews were part of the migratory movement, both of which surely encountered more of a religious barrier in respect to the Catholic Colombian population than their fellow Oriental Christians. Thus, even though the different currents of Oriental Christianity had guarded and cultivated their separate sectarian identities for centuries, and were at that particular time in their homelands not only at times in opposition to each other, but also in some places internally divided10, they generally fit well into their new religious environment without establishing their own religious structures11. Indeed, many migrants from Bethlehem and Bayt Jala (both in Palestine) were Roman Catholics, and the presumably numerically most important group, the Maronites, are like the Syriac Catholics and the Melkites, albeit still independent, unified with the Catholic church (Oeldemann 2006: 111-114; 117-118). There is also no information about the foundation of any churches by Syriac or Greek Orthodox (Patriarchates of Antiochia and Jerusalem) members of the community, as
10 The Orthodox patriarchates of Antiochia (including Syria and Lebanon) and Jerusalem (Palestine and Jordan) may be regarded as examples. Local disputes (mostly over succession) repeatedly led to unrest and at times even violence between the late 1890s and the 1930s (Graf [1932] 2005: 42-46). 11 It has been noted, that the Oriental churches in Argentina, which was a prime recipient of Syro-Lebanese migrants (an estimated 136000 between 1888-1914), generally displayed an accommodating tendency towards the Catholic church regardless of specific religious persuasions (Klich 1992: 256-257). Thus, if even institutionalized Oriental religion underwent such a process in Argentina, it should not be surprising, that similar developments occurred in Colombia on an individual basis.
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was done elsewhere in Syro-Lebanese strongholds in Latin America12. The reason for this failure was most probably the absence of notable concentrations of these sectarian affiliations in one place. Intriguingly, the presence of (apparently Cathlolic) Syro- Lebanese priests was noted in the wider coastal region (Cunninghame-Graham 1922: 6), where foreigners (most notably Italians and Spaniards) were well represented in the local clerical hierarchy (Posada Carbó 1998: 322-323). Also the presumably small number of Muslim migrants appears to have eventually accepted Catholicism. In Curacão Muslim families like the Hamuds converted in the first decades of the 20th century13. Moreover, it has been noted in the USA, that the ratio of female Muslim migrants from the Near East was minimal and much smaller than among Christians after 1900 (Karpat 1985: 180)14. Assuming that the situation was similar in our region of concern, it was therefore certainly not only the pressures of the Christian environment, but also their generally small number combined with this absence of Muslim women, which led to the disappearance of a first wave Muslim identity in the southern Circumcaribbean. On the contrary, Oriental Jewish families, like the Mezrahis and Safdeye brothers, settling in Barranquilla after 1908, and soon to become influential figures in the city’s Jewish community (Manco Bermúdez & Watnik Barón 2000: 91-92, 135, 184-185), encountered Jewish families from Curacão15, who had migrated to the port town already in the early 19th century and had acquired a place among the local elite by the dawn of Syro-Lebanese immigration, but had in the meantime ceased to practice their religion (Rosenthal 1956; Fawcett & Posada-Carbo 1998: 64). Since the arrival of the mentioned Syro-Lebanese families and other Sephardic and then Ashkenazi Jews, a lively Jewish community has remained in Barranquilla (Manco Bermúdez & Watnik Barón 2000). We will now focus our attention on the topic of language, which has to be dealt with in connection with the questions of intermarriage and integration. As elsewhere in the Americas, early Syro-Lebanese migrants were mostly unaccompanied males. However, over time with consolidation of the community, the pattern steadily changed, until for example in 1928 a third of the community in Barranquilla were women
12 The first Greek Orthodox churches in Latin America were founded in 1904 in São Paulo (Brazil) in 1904 (www.catedralortodoxa.com.br) and 1914 in Santiago del Este (Argentina) (Humphrey 1998: 171), Maronite and Orthodox churches in Tucuman (Argentina) in the 1920s (Valverde 1992: 322), and the first Maronite one in Buenos Aires already in 1902 (Klich 1992: 258). 13 Information derived from interviews conducted in Willemstad (Curacão) in August 2004. 14 The usual pattern of Syro-Lebanese migration to the Americas was, that after an almost exclusively male immigration in its first decades, a greater number of women and families arrived in subsequent years. 15 Sephardic Jews from the Netherlands settled on the island, which came to host the largest Jewish community in the Western Hemisphere, in the 17th century. Willemstad boasts the oldest synagogue in continuous use in the New World (since 1732), as well as its oldest Jewish cemetery. On the history of the community see Emmanuel 1970.
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(Fawcett & Posada Carbó 1998: 69). Yet, even though the ratio of consequential intermarriages with local women must therefore have been gradually decreasing, it was estimated in 1945, that one out of six Syro-Lebanese family fathers was married to a Colombian (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 14). Naturally the descendents of mixed marriages were very likely to lose knowledge of Arabic in the absence of schools teaching the language and of distinctive Oriental religious community structures, in which Arabic would have at least preserved its relevance as religious language. Similarly, as Spanish was of prime importance for Syro-Lebanese traders once they had left the sphere of small-scale peddling, either in a cosmopolitan city like Barranquilla or in the villages, also families relying on endogamy could not escape the drag of Hispanization, notwithstanding their internal commercial networking16. As non-European foreigners, Arabs in Latin American countries were usually torn between keeping their identity on the one hand, and shedding their label as undesired immigrant group17 on the other, wherein the latter factor surely accelerated acquaintance with, if not espousal of the dominant language and culture to a certain degree. Reviewing the names of Arab shopkeepers and businessmen, it also appears, that many Syro-Lebanese took on Spanish first and/or surnames or were given such by the immigration authorities, as was also observed in Argentina (Klich 1992: 254-256) and Brazil (Nabhan 1997: 227). Thus, the Colombian Nobel prize winning author Gabriel García Márquez, himself originating from the coastal region (born 1927), is quite an accurate observer, when he notes in one of his frequent references to the Colombian Syro-Lebanese in his literature, that the third generation of this Catholic community, were almost entirely “answering their Arabic-speaking parents in Spanish [translation mine]” (1981: 130-131)18. Still it must be noted, that the gradual loss of Arabic language and distinctive religious identities is not to be equated with a loss of remembrance of Arab descent and cultural features, hence the numerous restaurants serving the renowned comida árabe (Arab cuisine) of the Colombian coastal region and the larger Venezuelan cities. More importantly, also notable Syro-Lebanese literates writing in Arabic enriched the
16 Accordingly, Cunninghame Graham relates how the Syro-Lebanese used to “chatter in their guttural Spanish” (1922: 220) in the late 1910s. 17 Many American countries, even those which, unlike Colombia, actively encouraged immigration, advocated a selective immigration policy focusing on the settlement of West and Central Europeans (Klich 1992: 259-267; 1998: 13-15; Hamui- Halabe 1998: 127-129). Whereas legislative efforts to restrict the entry of Arabs and other groups took shape in the USA with the Johnson-Reed law of 1924, Colombia only adopted such measures in 1937, when Syro-Lebanese migration was already waning (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 6). 18 It is noteworthy, that the novel featuring the above quotation even has a locally-born Arab as its main figure (Márquez 1981).
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local communities at least temporarily. The Damascus born Jurj Sayda (George Saydah), author of the major (Arabic) work on Arab literature in the Americas (Saydah 1956), stayed in Venezuela from 1927-1947 (Nweihad 1997: 246-247), whereas the poet Youssef Haddad (b. 1912), who was a corresponding member of the al-Usba al- Andalusiyya (Andalusian League; est. 1933) (Nabhan 1997: 222-224; Ostle 1992: 223- 224), São Paolo’s counterpart to the New York based al-Rabita al-Qalamiyya (The Pen Club; est. 1920) group of Arab emigrant literates (featuring most prominently Jibran Khalil Jibran) (Ostle 1992: 209-223), sojourned even a few years longer than the former in Caracas (Nweihad 1997: 252-253). However, the exceptional status of such figures is testified to by Sayda himself, as he remarks in his book’s section on Venezuela, that Arabic was by then neither used in journalism, on the pulpits nor in meetings of the community leaders (Sayda 1956: 315). Not subject to the loss of their mother tongue was naturally the small minority of descendents of first wave immigrants, who were sent to their parents’ homelands to study. Out of this group, Manuel Yunis, born in Caracas and educated in Beirut, may be mentioned. After his return from Lebanon, he received his doctorate in philosophy and later on held the chair of Arabic Philosophy and History at the Central University of Caracas (UCV). His Spanish dissertation on cultural philosophy was also published in his own Arabic translation in Beirut (Sayda 1956: 315; Nweihad 1997: 247). Although written in Spanish, another form of relating to ancestral lands is embodied by a work of the Colombian scholar of law Elías Antonio Muvdi (similarly a descendent of first wave immigrants), who deals with the Palestine question in his Palestina y el derecho de gentes (Palestine and international law), published in 1983. While displaying a firm criticism of Zionism, the author frequently stresses the cultural unity of Palestinian Christians, Muslims and Oriental Jews, their common mistreatment by the Israeli state and the contradiction of a Jews versus Arabs scheme by the existence of Arabic speaking Jewish communities on Palestinian soil (Muvdi e 1983: 104, 121-126, 150-154, 165-169)19. In line with this advocacy of Arab cultural unity and the plight of the Palestinians, Muvdi is also highly critical of the Lebanese Maronite Phalange (see n. 36), which he charges just as the Zionists as adhering to racist doctrines (Muvdi 1983: 366). Interestingly, first wave immigrant Arab Christians and Oriental Jews indeed often cooperated closely in Latin America, and such cooperation also extended at times to non-Arabic speaking Sephardic Jews. In Venezuela, longer established Sephardim (perhaps originally coming from Curacão) are said to have
19 Zionist de-Arabization of the Oriental Jews has been most recently discussed by Shenhav 2006.
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initially supplied the earliest Syro-Lebanese peddlers (Klich 1998: 15), and in Argentina Arab Christians, Muslims and Jews jointly founded companies as well as the Syro-Lebanese Bank and the Syro-Lebanese Chamber of Commerce (Klich 1998: 1- 37). Although relations were subsequently marred by the developments in Palestine, a considerable faction of the Jewish community in Barranquilla, Muvdi’s hometown, is still on very good terms with the local Syro-Lebanese20.
The first wave Syro-Lebanese and economic, political and social integration Obviously, the Syro-Lebanese’s main road to integration into Colombian society was their commercial activity. In 1916 Barranquilla, Syro-Lebanese firms were an integral part of the recently founded Chamber of Commerce, and firms run by Colombian and Syro-Lebanese partners were not uncommon. Naturally, the prosperous nature of the community also led to opposition, especially where native commercial interests were threatened. However, occasional negative press and isolated lootings of Syro-Lebanese stores, have to be measured against more frequent evidence for the contrary in contemporary newspapers and reports of outside observers21. Intriguingly, already members of the second generation of Syro- Lebanese immigrants made their way into all kinds of liberal professions such as doctors, lawyers and writers, to make their mark in Colombian society. Already in the 1910s a Lebanese contributor to Cartagena’s valued magazine El Porvenir (The Future) introduced topics on Arab history and culture to a wider audience. Two decades later the community of Santa Marta aired an “Arab hour” on the local radio and circulated a monthly magazine (Alef22), which was under the direction of a Colombian editor (Fawcett 1992: 372-376). In 1916 a conservative daily edited by two brothers of Lebanese descent was distributed in Bogotá (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 18). However, the most visible proof for the successful integration of the Syro- Lebanese in Colombia was their prominence in politics, especially if the timing of their ascendancy to high levels of politics is compared with other states in the Americas.
20 Interviews conducted in Barranquilla in July 2004 by the author and Christian Cwik. 21 Márquez, growing up in Aracataca, one of the places listed among villages housing Syro-Lebanese families in 1945 (see n. 5), which is still a sleepy town near Santa Marta and considered to be the role model for the author’s fantastic village of Macondo (Oviedo 1989: 27), presents the arrival of Arab traders as a synonym for rural development in his most famous novel (Marquez 1973: 39-40). Such views from fiction are corroborated by facts. In Bucaramanga, for example, Syro- Lebanese enterprise was responsible for the first establishment of textile factories, a pharmacy, a public transportation firm (using animal-drawn carts), the importation of the first automobile to the city in 1912, and the introduction of a credit system for village mayors (Harker Valdivieso n.d.: 145, 147; Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó: 11). Cunninghame Graham remarks, that the Syro-Lebanese stores sell “all those products of modern life that naturally appeal so much” to the local people (1922: 220). 22 First letter of the Arabic alphabet.
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The outstanding figure of this development is Gabriel Turbay Abunader, son of a Lebanese-born Colombian parliamentarian (Harker Valdivieso n.d.: 141), and himself member of the house of representatives (1926), ambassador, minister of foreign affairs (1934)23, and eventually presidential candidate in 1946, who was among the leading figures of the Colombian liberal party during the 1930s and 1940s24. Notwithstanding the wide acceptance and success of this Syro-Lebanese politician, his alien ethnic origins and the perceived history of his compatriots in Colombia provided room for polemics. Thus, the most notorious literary attack on Syro-Lebanese presence in the country came as response to Turbay’s candidacy, in form of the book El camino de Damasco: Parábola de Gabriel Turbay (The path from Damascus: Parable of Gabriel Turbay) by Juan Roca Lemus, an inside Colombia well known author active until the early 1980s. Apart from invalidating Turbay’s Colombian nationality and other xenophobic charges, the author stresses the absence of any Turbays (or any Syro- Lebanese for that matter) in the history of Colombia’s conquest, its colonial past, its struggle for independence and its subsequent civil wars (Roca Lemus 1946: 82). What is presented as a deficiency by Roca Lemus, namely the staying aloof of civil wars and conflicts in violence ridden Colombia by the Syro-Lebanese, is actually regarded as an important factor in both the community’s economic as well as political success (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 18)25. That the Syro-Lebanese could actually identify themselves with their new homelands is evident in their contributions to commemorate the independence of the countries liberated by Simón Bolívar between 1813 and 1824 (Johnson 1968). The communities of Barranquilla as well as of Caracas and Valencia in Venezuela donated statues in memoriam of hundred years of independence (Fawcett 1992: 376; Escher 1997: 199 & 2000: 357), whereas that of Bolivia issued a full page advertisement in a special issue of a La Paz daily devoted to the 150th anniversary of the founding of the republic in 1975, in which
23 Such early political prominence of an Arab migrant in the Americas is only paralleled by the case of two Syro-Lebanese serving in the Brazilian Federal Assembly in the 1930s and eight Brazilian mayors of Syro-Lebanese stock in 1938 (Knowlton 1992: 306-307; Klich 1992: 254 n. 25). However, this comparison is even more suggestive, if one takes into account, that Syro-Lebanese arrivals in Brazil, estimated at over a 100000 between 1888 and 1941 (Klich 1992: 271; Knowlton 1992: 292), ranged at a completely different scale than in Colombia. In Venezuela early political ascendancy of Syro-Lebanese was presumably hampered by the dominant political position of military figures originating in the Andean provinces (Nweihad 1997: 269), where the former hardly chose to settle and were therefore unable to tap into local networks of clientele and patronage. 24 Although Turbay’s candidacy was marred by a split in the liberal block, which brought about the counter-candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, he nevertheless gained victory in three provinces, and came in second only to the conservative winner Mariano Ospina Pérez. Turbay’s political mentor, the liberal president Alfonso López Pumarejo (1934-1938) stands out as one of the very few Colombian leaders in the 20th century to be credited with introducing effective reforms (Drekonja- Kornat 2004: 148). Turbay died prematurely in 1947 in an accident in Paris. 25 The most devastating conflict in the period in question was the “Thousand Days War” between Liberals and Conservatives from 1899-1902, which entailed the death of tens of thousands of the country’s only 4 million strong population (Drekonja-Kornat 2004: 149).
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it emphasized its full integration with the Bolivian people (Osterweil 1998: 159-160). Moreover, the Lebanese businessman Abduh Zkur is said to have donated two planes to the Colombian air force during the second world war (al-Badawi 1955: II, 717). Eventually, long after Gabriel Turbay, Colombia indeed came to have a Syro- Lebanese president of the liberal camp from 1978-1982 with Julio César Turbay Ayala (1916-2005), born from a Lebanese-Colombian marriage. Especially in the coastal region political influence of descendents of Syro-Lebanese, which was not confined to males26, continued on a significant scale afterwards, with 32 per cent of its senators belonging to this group in 1990 (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 20), presumably mostly offspring of first wave immigrants27. Venezuela had a presidential candidate of Arab extraction in 1973 with Jorge Dáger Menessa. Moreover, the country has had a number of provincial governors of Syro-Lebanese descent (Nweihad 1997: 250). Similar successes occurred in the Dutch Antilles, where the Ramez Isa (Greek Orthodox, b. 1917) was prime minister (1971-1973), Ricardo al-Hadj minister of education and Ilyas Marcos (both Catholics) governor of Curacão (Kettani 2001a: 293). It appears that the lack of specific religious congregations coupled with the desire to maintain a distinct identity without contradicting or inhibiting the envisaged integration was compensated with the founding of secular community organizations, which sprang up in all places with sizeable Syro-Lebanese communities in Colombia and Venezuela beginning in the late 1920s (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992: 15; Fawcett 1992: 376-377; Safa 1960: 88, 96)28. In the following Arab secular-minded socialist nationalism as embodied by Syro-Lebanese of the Latin American diaspora such as Antun Saada (Schumann 2004) gained prominence in the community, which was also not conducive to making the foundation religious institutions a priority, a trend which was to be reversed by the failure of Arab nationalism and consequential Islamic resurgence decades later, as will also be evident in our case.
Between the two waves: Syro-Lebanese immigration from the 1940s to the 1970s In Colombia Syro-Lebanese immigration faltered in the aftermath of the Great Depression during the 1930s. However, the foundation of the Israeli state and the ensuing Arab-Israeli wars prompted the arrival of new migrants, now mostly
26 For example, Maria Susana Awad de Ojeda was mayor of Ocaña in 1963 (Fawcett 1992: 372 n.49). 27 Remarkably both Turbays did not originate from the coast, as Gabriel’s family had settled in Bucaramanga and Julio César was born in Bogotá (both cities with a notable Arab presence). On the Syro-Lebanese in the former city see Harker Valdivieso (n.d.: 137-160). 28 In Venezuela the first such club, baptized Centro libano-sirio (Lebanese-Syrian Centre) was founded in 1931 in the capital (Escher 1997: 125).
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Palestinians. Also the early 1950s witnessed the settlement of small numbers of Palestinians and Syrians in Cartagena (García Usta n.d.: 2)29. Presumably, among the Palestinian migrants, Christians still constituted an important segment, as the Christian population of the coastal towns and of Jerusalem shrank to less than its former half after the turmoil of 1947-1949, due to emigration (Hanf 1981: 29 n.1). Nevertheless, the Islamic element among Syro-Lebanese in Colombia gained more importance during the period, and the first Islamic Club was eventually established in 1964 in Bogotá by Palestinians (al-Ahari 1999: 459)30. In the same year the first mosque of the Caribbean was founded in Curacão. In general, Colombia presented itself in a particularly unfavorable condition to prospective immigrants from the late 1940s way into the 1960s. The 1950s in Colombia are plainly known as the era of la violencia (the violence), actually lasting from 1946 to 1964, while reaching its climax during 1948- 1953 with around 200000 deaths (Drekonja-Kornat 2004: 149)31. Naturally, civil war fostered neither business nor immigration in the country. On the contrary, the situation was quite different in Venezuela. Colombia’s oil- rich neighbor was a much more attractive destination for immigrants32. It is here, that one can also numerically speak of another immigration wave beginning after the second world war and reaching its climax from the mid 1950s to mid 1960s, with the great majority of migrants originating in western Syria33. Again mostly Christians, however, due to their places of origin, rather Melkites and Greek Orthodox than Maronites, these migrants also comprised a significant number of Druzes34 (up to one
29 Personal conversation with Prof. Jorge García Usta in Cartagena (July 2004). 30 A presence of Palestinian Muslims, originating mostly from Jerusalem and Nablus, was already noted in Bogotá in 1948 by the Palestinian activist Akram Zu’ayter (Kettani 2001b: 567-568). 31 The repercussions of these events are still casting a shadow on Colombian affairs. Most notable, 1964 was also the birth of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) guerilla, Latin America’s longest running and still active guerilla organization. 32 In the words of Sayda, writing in the 1950s, there were “small dispersed colonies in this vast land, rich in natural resources, but poor in inhabitants, subject to Yankee authority, and living off what is spat out by the petrol pumps [translation mine]” (1956: 313-314). 33 It is not surprising, that Lebanese are neither featuring prominently in reports about Arab immigration to Colombia nor Venezuela during this period, as there was generally little Lebanese emigration between 1945-1960, due to internal economic growth, whereas the ensuing one and a half decades before the war, an once more increasing migratory trend was mainly directed to Arab oil-producing countries (Labaki 1992: 605). Nevertheless, Safa notes, that Venezuela was among the recipients of emigrants leaving Lebanon after the 1958 conflicts in Lebanon (1960: 203). 34 The Druzes are a religious group, which has developed out of the Ismaili strand of Shiism in 11th century Egypt, when a splinter group broke away from this Shiite sect, proclaiming the divinity of the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim (d. 1021), whose reappearance is still awaited by the Druzes. Subsequently, the group developed its own doctrines and sacred literature (fully disclosed only to a minority of initiates) and turned into a closed community, which permits neither conversion nor apostasy. Today the Druzes are distributed mostly in Syria, as well as in Lebanon, where they are constituting the fourth largest religious group, and Israel (Abu-Izzedin 1984; Daftary 2004: 195-200). An early Druze stronghold in Venezuela was El Tigre, which already housed an Arab association with a majority of Druze members in the 1940s (Kettani 2001b: 567).
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third) and a small minority of Alawites35 and Sunnites (Escher 2000: 358-359). Again economic deprivations were the chief motor behind these migrations. Whereas the problems of many rural areas merely persisted or were aggravated, parts of the urban Christian bourgeoisie were adversely affected by the socialist measures taken by the regime in Syria in the 1950s and 1960s. Socialist interventions, such as the nationalization of the banking sector and state control over commerce, even though not specifically aimed at Christians but rather at the bourgeoisie as a whole, had especially negative effects on the former, which constituted a disproportionately large element within the latter (Hanf 1981: 32-33; 38-39).
New factors in community formation: young national identities, their reinforcement through religious persuasion, and the encounter with locally established predecessors Economically, intermediate wave immigrants took the same route as their predecessors, with especially the first generation migrants mostly confined to the commercial field. However, new developments occurred concerning Syro-Lebanese clubs and religious institutions. Now many clubs started to be organized along national lines and marked as either Syrian or Lebanese (Escher 1997: 125; 2000: 362). This development was of course made possible only by sufficient numbers of immigrants of the respective nationalities in one place, and was paralleled by, and at times correlated with developments in the religious field, wherever chain migration had caused the emergence of different majority sects within local Syrians and Lebanese. Such was already perceptible in Argentine Syro-Lebanese strongholds earlier, where the former identification became increasingly connected with Greek Antiochian Orthodoxy and the latter with the Maronite church (Humphrey 1998: 171). The first institutional manifestations of oriental religion in the region, apart from the aforementioned instance in Curacão, were the establishment of the first Melkite (1957) and Antiochian Orthodox church (1975), as well as the first two Islamic centers in Caracas including mosques and Quranic schools (1968-1972) (Escher 1997: 128-129; 2000: 364; al-Ahari 1999: 453; Nweihad 1997: 248). Obviously, this development marks the return of Arabic to the pulpit in the countries in question. Naturally, the arrival of new large numbers of Syro-Lebanese migrants coupled
35 Like the Druzes, the Alawites (also known as Nusayris) are similarly regarded as a (doctrinally) extremist Shiite sect (ar. ghulat). Already mentioned in Islamic heresiographical works of the 10th century, the Alawites believe in the divinity of Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali (Halm 1982). A strong community is still to be found in (mostly rural) Syria (constituting approximately 6% of the population), which is in fact since 1970 ruled by Alawi presidents, namely by Hafez al-Assad (1970- 2000), who was succeeded by his son Bashar. Minor communities are to be found in Lebanon and Turkey.
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with an increase in Arab social clubs and the new establishment of distinct Oriental religious structure and institutions must have led to a certain process of rediscovery of Arab-ness among earlier migrants. In Colombia, with its considerably smaller number of new-comers during the time in question, such effects were certainly also not absent, but had a much less decisive impact. For the Barranquillan case, it has been suggested, that the migrants of the intermediary wave were faced with a cosmopolitan and open-minded local society, contrary to their predecessors arriving in a rather hostile environment, which forced them to be culturally more adaptive than the former (Slebi 2003: 1-4). While varying degrees of acceptance towards Syro-Lebanese immigrants between the 1930s and the late 1940s and 1950s are hardly assessable36, the later migrants surely profited from the good entrenchment of Syro-Lebanese and Arabo-Colombians in society, as well as from a prolonged period of contact between Colombians and Syro-Lebanese.
Syro-Lebanese immigration since the beginning of the Lebanon war37 With the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon (1975), the latest phase in Syro- Lebanese immigration to the areas in question began. However, the most recent wave was in no way confined to Lebanese citizens and did not come to an end with the suspension of hostilities in the country after the Treaty of al-Ta’if in 1989. Indeed, this migratory process continues until today, and Syrian nationals are actually an important element, especially in Venezuela and Curacão. Whereas the immigrants in Venezuela continued to be evenly distributed among all major cities in the population-rich northern provinces, and the new arrivals in Curacão served to enlarge the community in Willemstad, the Colombian case was now characterized with new focal points of Arab immigration, the free trade zones of the island of San Andrés, and more importantly of Maicao on the Guajira peninsula near the border to Venezuela, where they have been able to replicate the Arab dominance of retail trade described in cities
36 Wherever immigrants compete or are perceived as competing with locals, there is room for negative sentiments. However, the above discussion has shown, that Colombians appeared not particularly hostile to the first wave of immigration (Fawcett de Posada & Posada Carbó 1992), and Barranquilla was rather cosmopolitan already during the latter part of the first wave anyway (Posada Carbó 1998: 329-332). On the other hand, it is doubtful that those, who generally disapproved of Arab immigration should have changed their minds when new immigrants arrived after the founding of Israel, given the fact, that more restrictive immigration laws were only passed in 1937 and that Gabriel Turbay’s candidacy was greeted by adversaries with the cry “turco no!” (No Turk) as late as 1946 (García Usta n.d.: 4). 37 The Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975 as a consequence to the continuing weakening of central authority since the 1960s and the eventual disbandment of the Lebanese army. Until 1990 a variety of clan- as well as party-financed militias fought each other in rapidly changing coalitions. Main actors were the Maronite Phalange (ar. Kata’ib), the Shiite Amal (hope), the Druze Progressive Socialist Party militia and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Whereas fighting initially pitted pro- versus anti-Palestinian and pro- versus anti-Syrian forces against each other, serious intra-group infighting within the Shiite, Palestinian and Maronite camps characterized the latter part of the war since the middle of the 1980s. Moreover, the protracted conflict prompted four foreign interventions, by Syria in 1976 and 1990 and Israel in 1978 (leading to occupation of South Lebanon until 2000) and 1982 (resulting in the forced relocation of the PLO to Tunis) (Hiro 1993).
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like Lorica in the early 20th century. This new commercial and geographic focus is mirrored in the Venezuelan free trade zone of the Isla Margarita38. In most areas the 1980s can be regarded as the apogee of the migratory process, which was triggered not only by the Lebanon war, but also by the subsequent instability in Lebanon and the wider region, as well as by prevailing socio-economic deprivations in both Syria and Lebanon. One of the most striking features of this recent migratory phase is, that it marks the transition of Syro-Lebanese immigration to the areas in question from a mainly Christian to a mainly Muslim phenomenon, at least regarding Colombia (Slebi 2003: 4) and Curacão39. As far as Lebanese emigration in general is concerned, the trend from a predominantly Christian movement to a multi-communal one is well observable since 1978, and at the latest by 1989 Muslim immigration appears to have taken the lead (Labaki 1992: 623-625). Likewise, the number of Syrian Muslims choosing to leave their homeland, due to the ban and crackdown on the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood between 1980 and 1983, which was accompanied by a wave of repression directed against other oppositional groups as well (Degeorge 2006: 214- 215), should not be overlooked apart from economic concerns40. Now we will turn our attention to the prevailing of cultural characteristics among Arab immigrants of this period.
Guarding cultural characteristics in the era of globalization Concerning the possibilities to retain Arabic language, distinct Arab cultural features and sectarian identities, the later intermediary and the second wave immigrants can hardly be compared with the individuals of the first wave. Meanwhile the world had moved from oral messages, letters, hardly accessible telegraphy and tedious steamship travels to quotidian telecommunication and air travel, and further to video, E-mail and even more comfortable and frequent air travel. Moreover, local communities of Syro-Lebanese descendents and immigrants had been steadily growing, or at least re-supplied and therefore reified for a century now, not to forget the continuing increase in secular as well as religious community organizations. Thus, practicing endogamy, a major factor in the retention of cultural and linguistic
38 Other Latin American free trade zones with a strong Syro-Lebanese presence are Colón (Panama), and in the border region of Paraguay and Brazil, Ciudad del Este (Paraguay) and Foz do Iguazú (Brazil). 39 The situation is harder to assess in Venezuela. However, it is above doubt, that also here the proportion of Muslims rose considerably. Interviews conducted in Willemstad (Curacão), Maracaibo, Coro, Valencia and Caracas (all Venezuela) in August 2004. 40 Especially among Syrian Muslims in Curacão and Maicao (Colombia) persecution by the regime featured prominently after economic considerations as reason for emigration (Interviews conducted in Maicao and Willemstad in July and August 2004).
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particularities, was now much easier, and marriages outside of the community are indeed seldom. Consequently, out of approximately 400000 persons of Arab descent in Venezuela, almost the half speak Arabic (Escher 1997: 120)41. Globalization has brought about new degrees of networking and segmentation of the distinct Syro- Lebanese groups in the area as well as on a global scale. Accordingly, whereas Syrian clubs in Venezuela now tend to split into smaller exclusively Christian and Druze organizations, marriages within parochial groups of specific sectarian identities and places of origin are often arranged between families originating from the same region or often even villages, some of which appear to be, at least in summertime, connected with the diaspora communities via an air bridge (Escher 1997; 2000; 2004; Humphrey 1992: 455). Regarding organizational endeavors, the formation of community organizations has increased at an unprecedented scale. This involves mainly the segmentary sphere, namely clubs and religious as well as cultural institutions along national and/or religious lines, but also overarching foundations, such as the Arab-Venezuelan Chamber of Commerce. More specifically, adherence to Sunnite Islam usually blurs national divisions, and the same also goes to a lesser degree for Druzes and Christian sects transcending national borders, a communal potential which in the latter case appears nevertheless to be more easily curbed by the realities of chain migration than among Sunnites. Of course, the new reinforcement of religious identity is also related to the, by the 1970s already obvious, failure of Arab (socialist) nationalism, a major factor behind Islamic resurgence and the sudden emergence of both Islamic social movements and militant groups in the Arab world during the 1970s (Kepel 2002: 85-93). However, naturally the Syro-Lebanese only display a high degree of segmentation, where considerable numbers of them, showing a certain degree of diversity, are concentrated42. Consequently, Colombia appears to host a higher number of overarching organizations such as the Colombo-Arab Chamber of Commerce, the Foundation for the Colombo-Arab Cultural Encounter and the Associations of Parliamentarians and Congressmen of Arab Origin. The two latter organizations strikingly testify to the continuing relevance of Colombo-Arabs in the country’s politics. A both entirely new and remarkable development of the last two decades of the 20th century was the foundation of officially accredited private schools by the Syro-
41 No numbers available for Colombia. 42 In the religious sphere new foundations of specific sects, include the Shiite Centro Islamico Venezolano Imam al-Hadi (Venezuelan Islamic Centre Imam al-Hadi [Ali al-Hadi was the tenth Shiite imam]) in Caracas as well as a Shiite centre in Maicao, a Maronite church in Ciudad Bolivar (2005), and a monastery of the Lebanese Maronite order in Caracas (1988). The Syriac Catholic church has a bishop seated in Maracay (POC 2004: 164-165).
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Lebanese communities, whose importance lies in their crucial role in the quest to preserve Arab language and cultural values, and in their outreach into local society. Such have been opened in the quarter of El Paraiso in Caracas (1977) (Delval 1992: 258-259), in Maicao (1987) (Kettani 2001b: 588) and in Barranquilla (1993). Strikingly, all of these schools not only emphasize Spanish and Arabic but also education in English. Whereas Barranquilla’s Colegio Colombo Árabe (Arab-Colombian College) is predominantly frequented by Christians, Maicao’s Dar al-Arkam (named after the meeting place of the early Muslims) and the Colegio Venezolano Islamico (Venezuelan Islamic College) have an explicitly Islamic character and are almost mosque attached. Nevertheless, their good reputation as high standard learning facilities serves as a guarantor for the likewise enrolment of non-Arab Colombians and Venezuelans, even though female students have to wear a head-covering in school. Local Syro-Lebanese Christian families, who want to provide their children with classes in Arabic, also send their children preferably to such educational facilities. The school in Barranquilla is an example of official involvement of the Syrian state in immigrant endeavors in Colombia and Venezuela. Indeed, the institution in question was inaugurated by Hafiz al-Assad. In Venezuela it has been observed, that Syria, through its embassy, actively supports the foundation of clubs and seeks to organize them on a international basis (Escher 2000: 363). Also apart from these educational activities, the Syro-Lebanese in the region are still displaying a readiness to learn Spanish (and English)43, as did their predecessors. In Caracas’ Sheikh Ibrahim mosque and the Willemstad mosque the second part of Friday sermon is delivered in Spanish and English respectively44, and imams were chosen due to their language abilities45. Moreover, an espousal of democratic principles can not only be inferred from the activities of Arab descended politicians in Colombia and Venezuela (today most prominently Tarek el-Ayssami, vice-minister of interior affairs), but likewise from the organizational structures of clubs and foundations (and to a lesser degree Islamic centers46), whose leaders are mostly elected. Besides Arab-Spanish schooling another new remarkable development and symbol of cultural exchange is the translation of Arabic
43 On Curacão members of the local (mostly Syro-Lebanese) Muslim community even compose newspaper articles on a regular basis in the locally prevalent Creole language Papamiento (Kettani 2001a: 295). 44 The Muslim Friday sermon (ar. khutba) consists of two parts. Outside of the Arab-speaking regions, it is often only the first part, which is held in Arabic, whereas the second is pronounced in the local language. However, this is frequently not the case in Europe, as specific mosques are more often than not only frequented by immigrant Muslims of the same ethnic background. Consequently, the sermon’s second part is then rather held in Turkish, Urdu, Persian, Bosnian or again Arabic than in the local European languages. English is of course not the official language of the Dutch Antilles, but is widely used and understood. 45 Interviews conducted in Caracas and Willemstad in July and August 2004. 46 Elected presidents are leading the Islamic Commitee of Caracas (Delval 1992: 253) and the Moslem Gemeente (Muslim Community) of Curacão (Interviews in Willemstad in August 2004).
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literature into Spanish by locally born as well as immigrant Syro-Lebanese. In this respect the figure of Antonio Chalita Sfeir may serve as an example, as he has not only translated a number of works by Jibran Khalil Jibran and the classical Arabic fables collection Kalila wa- Dimna, but has also published an essay about the great Tunisian Muslim thinker Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) (Nweihad 1997: 264-265). Moreover, Syro-Lebanese in Colombia and Venezuela have recently again embarked on research about their own migratory history47. Such endeavors include a research project at Barranquilla’s Universidad del Norte and the, to this date, major publication on historical Arab-Latin American relations, which was edited by the Lebanese born Venezuelan professor and politician Raymundo Kabchi (1997) and includes an contribution by the Arab-Venezuelan historian Kaldone Nweihad (Nweihad 1997).
The new prominence of Muslim Syro-Lebanese immigrants In general the appearance of the new Muslim element within the Syro-Lebanese communities is worth noting. It is not coincidental, that Maicao, where Syro-Lebanese settlement is of rather recent date, has developed into Colombia’s Muslim stronghold. Kettani estimated the city’s Muslim community to constitute five thousand people or 5% of the population in 2001 (2001b: 587)48. Similarly, the Muslims of San Andrés belong to the most recent migratory wave (Kettani 2001b: 592). Caracas, which inhabited around 1000 Muslims in 1948, many of whose descendents have probably embraced Christianity over the years, was estimated to be home to 20000 Muslims in 1994 (Kettani 2001b: 570)49, a number which has certainly grown in the meantime due to further immigration and natural growth. Whereas, as was mentioned above, the first mosques in Venezuela and Curacão were already established during the intermediary phase of immigration, the same process only took place in Colombia during the 1990s after the new constitution of 1991 enshrined the recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity. Combined with the important influx of Muslim migrants in the preceding and following decade, this new psychological incentive led to a proliferation of Islamic centers and also mosques. Likewise new mosques have been constructed in Venezuela. The most striking
47 Such research was likewise already pursued by first wave immigrants and their descendents. For example by the Colombo-Lebanese George Moanak (1943). 48 However, meanwhile the community has been subject to a decrease, as many families chose to relocate to the nearest major Venezuelan city (Maracaibo), Panama, Costa Rica or other destinations, due to the high crime rates in Maicao and the temporal extension of the Colombian civil war into the usually unmolested Guajira peninsula. Certain interviewees claimed, that up to half of the one thousand Syro-Lebanese families in Maicao left in the first years of the century (Interviews conducted in Maicao in July 2004). 49 This estimate could be too optimistic, if we compare Kettani’s 1991 figures for Venezuela as a whole (2001b: 568) with the more conservative 1992 estimate of Delval (1992: 252), which show a great discrepancy (60000 against 41000).
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examples of this development are the Al-Quds al-Sharif (Noble Jerusalem)50 mosque of Valencia (1987) (Kettani 2001b: 574), Maracaibo (inaugurated 1994, yet still not actually completed in 2004), Caracas’ Sheikh Ibrahim mosque (1993), incidentally facing the Maronite monastery of San Charbel, and, in Colombia, the mosques of San Andrés (1993) and Maicao (1997). Those of Caracas and Maicao being the second and third largest in South America respectively. Whereas most mosques are built as private efforts of the communities51, the giant Sheikh Ibrahim mosque stands out as a work of Islamic internationalism with its planning and financing through a Saudi- Arabian foundation52, and was therefore not appreciated by the whole community (al- Ahari 1999: 454)53. Moreover, the mosque is also effectively proselytizing among Venezuelans with the aid of local converts. Thus, we are confronted with the first instance, in which Syro-Lebanese immigrants are not only having an impact on the religious landscape of their host countries, but also on the religious demography of the native population. Indeed, conversion to Islam among Latin Americans and Latinos in the USA has recently been observed as a common trend (Anonymous 2000). However, apart from the activities of the afore-mentioned mosque, I have found no evidence of active proselytizing on part of the Syro-Lebanese so far, although local converts, now the driving force behind the propagation of Islam among Latin Americans besides international Islamic NGOs, are naturally frequenting their local mosques. The employed imams are mostly al-Azhar (Cairo’s famous Islamic university founded by the Fatimids in the 10th century) educated Syro-Lebanese sent to the diaspora communities, although Egyptians as well as locally-born Arabs, who have pursued religious studies in the Arab world are also to be found54. The new importance of Syro-Lebanese Muslim communities in the area has, in the post- 9/11 world, also brought common problems with it, namely charges of links to terrorism. These include unsubstantiated charges of alleged money-laundering for the Lebanese Hizbollah as well as of passport forgery for groups such as Hamas and al-Qa’ida leveled against Syro-Lebanese in Maicao (Zambelis 2006 & 2005). Doubtlessly, the most startling accusation came from US intelligence, which claimed that al-Qa’ida training camps were located on the Isla Margarita. Such charges
50 This denomination hints at a dominant Palestinian element in the city’s Muslim community. 51 Most strikingly, the mosque of Porlamar on the Islam Margarita, was fincance by sixty families from the same Lebanese village (Kettani 2001b: 573-574). 52 Sheikh Ibrahim bin Abdulaziz Al-Ibrahim Foundation. 53 In fact many mosques and Muslim schools in the region are supported by, or are at times even largely dependent on aid from Saudi Arabia (and Egypt on a much smaller scale), as well as formerly also from Libya (Delval 1992: 258-260; Kettani 2001a: 294; Kettani 2001b: 571-572), yet are still perceived as community endeavors. 54 Interviews conducted in Maicao, Maracaibo, Willemstad and Caracas in July/August 2004.
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obviously have to be viewed in the context of the latent US-Venezuelan conflict, and have indeed developed a campaign-like character for the Venezuelan opposition to president Hugo Chavez. Strikingly, an alliance between Chavez and Islamist terrorists was also sensationally “uncovered” in oppositional TV spots in the run-up to the 2007 referundum on a new constitution. At the time of writing a hardly convincing article appeared in a Venezuelan daily, denouncing the afore-mentioned Raymundo Kabchi (p. 16), currently professor in International Politics of the Middle East at the Instituto de Altos Estudios Diplomáticos (Institute of Higher Diplomatic Studies) “Pedro Gual” (IAEDPG) in Caracas, as decisive link between the Chávez government and Hizbollah55, while depicting him as a “Nasserist56 fundamentalist [translation mine]”, formerly financed by both Libya and (Saddam Hussain’s) Iraq, and actively supporting the Lebanese Hizbollah as well as the Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Poleo 2008). Notwithstanding such developments, Syro-Lebanese Muslims in the region have been emphasizing their desire for mutual peaceful coexistence. The mosque of Medellín (Colombia) has been organizing seminars on Christian-Muslim relations employing priests and philosophers as lecturers. The Islamic center of Willemstad has not only housed the Third Meeting of the Heads of Islamic Associations and Cultural Centres in Latin America in 200357, which stressed dialogue, peaceful coexistence and integration, but has also co-organized a public exhibition of a female Jewish painter. In Caracas, the lawyer Farid Matar was pushing for the foundation of monuments highlighting the symbiosis of the three Abrahamic religions (Nweihad 1997: 250).
Conclusion Syro-Lebanese immigration history in Colombia, Venezuela and Curacão now encompasses a period of over 120 years. A time span, during which the world has progressed rapidly towards globalization, which has caused places like Cartagena and Beirut to draw closer to each other. Little seems to have changed in the economic realm for Syro-Lebanese newcomers in the area. Where most would have become traders and shop-owners in Colombian Caribbean ports a century ago, it is now
55 Again alleged terrorist training camps lie at the heart of the affair, yet this time not on Venezuelan but Lebanese soil, where Venezuelan citizens are said to be trained before being sent back home. Leaving aside the presented, presumably trumped up cases, it is of course highly probable that, for example, successful Lebanese Hizbollah sympathizers in Latin America, are providing financial aid to the group, which, like Hamas, is also a political party, by way of remittances. 56 Jamal Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) was president of Egypt from 1954-1970 and championed his own brand of (pan-) Arab socialism which came to be denominated after him as Nasserism. 57 A similar, though even more international effort was made by the Venezuelan Melkite church, which organized the second Conference of (Melkite) Bishops in Emigration in Caracas in 1998 including participants from North and South America as well as Australia (POC 1998: 394-395).
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mostly the Latin American and Caribbean tax free zones to which they flock to do the same business with different wares. Similarly, a part of the offspring of the more successful went on to university and into liberal professions. Globalization also led to the deliberate split of related migrant groups to pursue business interests in different locations with maximum feasibility. Such seems to be the case with former villagers (Shiite Muslims) of Ba’lul in the South Lebanese Bekaa valley, which have settled in both Maicao (Colombia) and Isla Margarita (Venezuela) (Nweihad 1997: 279-280), and have thus established an important link between the two places. Materially, it appears, Syro-Lebanese immigration was mostly a success story from the beginning, and the same also goes for integration. Yet, the quest for preservation of an Arab identity, retention of mother tongue and distinct religious identity for one’s self and the offspring, was initially, at least as far as the last two categories are concerned, more often than not lost. Nevertheless, being of Arab descent has become a cherished trademark (especially in Colombia) even among those apparently showing no outward signs of Arab-ness except their names. Just recently members of Barranquilla’s historically important Syro-Lebanese community have started efforts to trace the development of their cultural identity by way of appropriation and rediscovery through a concerted project with the city’s Universidad del Norte (Slebi 2003). Obviously, whereas early migrants at times had little chance but to assimilate linguistically and culturally, the situation has changed drastically since the middle of the 20th century. New networking possibilities have entailed a far greater segmentation along national, regional and religious lines. Yet, segmentary identities can rapidly withdraw into the background, when other facets of surely multiple identities come to the fore, as was the case in the protest against the 2006 Israeli strike against Lebanon, which united all Syro-Lebanese nationalities and confessions. In the absence of schools teaching Arabic and mosques or Oriental churches it is not surprising, that the descendents of first wave immigrants gradually lost touch with both, especially if we add intermarriage with local women to the picture. With the founding of distinctive religious structures in the second half of the 20th century, and most importantly of Arabic schools, as well as the much closer connection to the countries of origin, preservation of cultural values like religion and language was facilitated through community efforts. As far as the preservation of the Arabic language is concerned, the significance of the now much stronger Muslim element is not to be underestimated, given the importance of the idiom in Islamic religion. Accordingly, statistics for Argentina show a greater proportion of persons with Arabic language skills among second and third generation Muslim Arabs than among their Christian counterparts (Akmir 1997: 91, 95). If these measures and developments are really
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conducive or rather a hindrance to integration is a matter of dispute. Indeed, Muslim Syro-Lebanese appear to be less likely to reach highest political positions as was achieved by Christian descendents of the first and intermediary waves since the 1930s. Here western Islamophobia and the critical stance towards democracy among certain currents of present-day globalized Islam may play a role. However, the 120 years of Syro-Lebanese settlement, including its latter heavily globalized part, in which cultural contact leads not consequentially to assimilation, seem to suggest, that those who have come to stay, and especially their offspring, are quick to include their attachment to the host country into their multi-layered transnational identities.
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