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COUNTRY INFORMATION BULLETIN UKRAINE 01/2005 May 2005 1.SCOPE OF THE DOCUMENT 1.1 This Bulletin has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office, from information about Ukraine obtained from a wide variety of recognised sources. It does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. 1.2 This Bulletin has been prepared for background purposes for those involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The information it contains is not exhaustive. It concentrates on the issues most commonly raised in asylum / human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. 1.3 The Bulletin is sourced throughout. It is intended to be used by caseworkers as a signpost to the source material, which has been made available to them. The vast majority of the source material is readily available in the public domain. 1.4 This Bulletin is intended to cover major developments that have taken place in Ukraine since publication of the Ukraine Country Report in April 2003. 1.5 This Bulletin and the accompanying source material are publicly disclosable. Paper copies of the sources have been distributed to nominated officers in Asylum Caseworking Directorate and all Presenting Officer Units. Advisory Panel on Country Information 1.6 The independent Advisory Panel on Country Information was established under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to make recommendations to the Home Secretary about the content of the Home Office's country information material. The Advisory Panel welcomes all feedback on the Home Office's Country Reports and other country information material. Information about the Panel's work can be found on its website at www.apci.org.uk. 1.7 It is not the function of the Advisory Panel to endorse any Home Office material or procedures. In the course of its work, the Advisory Panel directly reviews the content of selected individual Home Office Country Reports, but neither the fact that such a review has been undertaken, nor any comments made, should be taken to imply endorsement of the material. Some of the material examined by the Panel relates to countries designated or proposed for designation for the Non- Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Panel's work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself. Advisory Panel on Country Information PO Box 1539 Croydon CR9 3WR Email [email protected] Website www.apci.org.uk 2.Presidential Election 2004 2.1 Regional Surveys of the World 2005 for Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia [commenting on the prior constitutional changes] stated: "The pro-presidential majority were unable to muster the 300 votes required for the Verkhovna Rada to approve constitutional changes without the support of other groups. After failing to obtain the support of the centre-right Our Ukraine and YuTB factions, the pro-presidential majority turned to the left, who had always preferred a parliamentary to a presidential system?.The left-wing factions only agreed to support constitutional reforms if the law on parliamentary elections was amended to provide for a system of fully proportional voting?.The law on parliamentary elections was adopted. However, when the proposition to change the Constitution was put to the vote in April 2004 it failed to win the requisite 300 votes, primarily because some centrists had defected to the opposition. Furthermore, attempts to change the constitution in an election year were widely condemned by Western governments and the Council of Europe. After the failure of the attempts to implement constitutional changes, the pro-presidential centrist groupings immediately proposed Prime Minister Yanukovych as their presidential candidate". [1] 2.2 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office noted on 9 February 2005 that: "Campaigning for the presidential elections started in earnest in August [2004]. Reformist former Prime Minister and leader of the "Our Ukraine" block, Victor Yushchenko, and PM Victor Yanukovych were the clear front runners in a field of 26 candidates. After some initial prevarication, Kuchma endorsed the latter's candidacy in July. Although behind in the polls for much of the race, Yanukovych benefited from a high profile as Prime Minister (e.g. he attended the Olympics rather than Kuchma) and, according to the OSCE's reports, from media reporting heavily tilted in his favour. President Putin of Russia also gave Yanukovych his public support, including in Kiev on the eve of the first round of the elections (31 October) during the anniversary of Ukraine's liberation during WWII. By contrast, Yushchenko's campaign was stymmied by his severe illness which Austrian doctors have now confirmed as due to the poison dioxin." [3] (p.4) 2.3 It was reported in the US State Department Background Note dated February 2005 that: "The campaign leading to the October 31, 2004 presidential election was characterized by widespread violations of democratic norms, including government intimidation of the opposition and of independent media, abuse of state administrative resources, highly skewed media coverage, and numerous provocations." [2] (p.4) 2.4 The FCO Country Profile of 9 February 2005 noted that: "The OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) stated that the first round of the elections did not meet a considerable number of OSCE, Council of Europe and other European standards for democratic elections, and that during the pre-election period, the campaign did not permit fair conditions for all candidates. Despite these handicaps, and a delay in the announcement of the results, Yushchenko narrowly beat PM Yanukovych by 39.87% to 39.32%. Socialist leader Moroz, who had come third with 7%, publicly backed Yushchenko for the run-off between the two leading candidates scheduled for 21 November." [3](p.4) 2.5 The USSD 2004 Background Note stated that "The November 21 [2004] runoff election was marred by credible reports of widespread and significant violations, including illegal expulsion of opposition representatives from election commissions, multiple voting by busloads of people, abuse of absentee ballots, and an abnormally high number of (easily manipulable) mobile ballot box votes. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Kiev and other cities to protest electoral fraud and express support for Yushchenko, and conducted ongoing peaceful demonstrations." [2b](p.4) 2.6 The International Election Observation Mission [IEOM] in its preliminary conclusions stated: "As for the first round, the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections did not meet a considerable number of OSCE commitments and Council of Europe and other European standards for democratic elections. Despite a number of serious shortcomings being identified by the IEOM in its statement of 1 November [2004], the authorities failed to take remedial action between the two rounds of voting to redress biased coverage on State media, misuse of State resources, and pressure on certain categories of voters to support the candidacy of Mr. Yanukovych?.On voting day, although voting was conducted in a generally calm manner, overall, observers' assessed election day less favourably, particularly in the central and eastern regions, than 31 October. Observers noted a high incidence of serious violations, including some isolated incidents of violence, and a pattern of intimidation, including directed towards observers, polling commission members and individual voters". [11] 2.7 BBC News reported that the Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych was declared the Official winner of the disputed presidential election by the Ukraine election commission on the 24th of November 2005. [4] (p.1) 2.8The FCO Country Profile of 9 February 2005 noted that "Although opinion and exit polls showed Yushchenko with a clear lead (7-15%), the results tallied by the Central Election Commission on 22 November gave Yanukovych a lead of 49.4% to 46.7% over Yushchenko. The OSCE issued a statement the same day saying that the election was not free and fair and the EU?s Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels issued a Conclusions condemning the election process and agreed to co-ordinate the summoning of Ukraine's Ambassadors. Large-scale opposition demonstrations began in Kiev and other cities across Ukraine to protest at the result. Despite the widespread condemnation of the elections, on 24 November the Central Election Commission declared Yanukovych the winner. But the next day the Supreme Court banned the official publication of the results while it heard the opposition?s complaints. "[3] (p.4) 2.9 The USSD 2004 reported that: "The Supreme Court invalidated the results and ordered a revote set for December 26. In order to reduce the scope for fraud, the Parliament and President cooperated to amend the presidential election law to limit absentee and mobile ballot voting, and appointed a new Central Election Commission. The December 26 revote was judged by reputable international observers, including the OSCE, to have reflected the will of the people and brought Ukraine substantially closer to meeting international standards for free and democratic elections." [2a](p.19) 2.10 The USSD 2004 Background Note stated that: "On January 10, 2005, after the CEC and the Supreme Court had considered and rejected numerous complaints and appeals filed by the Yanukovych campaign, the CEC certified the results. Yushchenko won 51.99 percent of the votes, with 44.20 percent for Yanukovych. 2.34 percent voted against both, and 1.45 percent of ballots were invalidated. The Yanukovych campaign filed one last appeal with the Supreme Court, which rejected it on January 20 and authorized the publication of the results in "Government Courier" and "Voice of Ukraine," rendering them official and final. President Yushchenko was inaugurated January 23, 2005." [2b](p.5) 2.11 BBC News stated on 2 March 2005 that, " President Yushchenko nominated Ms Tymoshenko as prime minister immediately after taking the oath of office; parliament subsequently confirmed her for the post.
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