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The Negative Consequences of Proportional Representation in Ukraine

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THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN UKRAINE SERHIJ VASYLCHENKO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHER Abstract: Ukraine has changed its electoral law numerous times. The first two elections to the parliament in 1990 and 1994 employed a single-member district majoritarian system. The Verkhovna Rada elections in 1998 and 2002 used a mixed system with single- member districts and proportional representation. The parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 were purely proportional representation. Finally, the elections in 2012 went back to the mixed system. This article argues that the use of proportional representation has facilitated extensive manipulation in the Ukrainian political system through the creation of “party projects” and by severing the link between parliamentarians and their constituents. fter Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, it faced an urgent need Ato reform its electoral legislation to address new political realities – most importantly, the development of a multiparty system in place of the previous one-party system that had ruled the Soviet Union. According to the existing law adopted during the Soviet era, parties other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had no legal basis. That law laid out a first past the post majoritarian system in which the winner had to win an absolute majority of the votes.1 The opposition national-democrat deputies in the People’s Rada group in the first years of independence supported electoral law reform Serhij Vasylchenko is an independent political geographer in Ukraine, [email protected]. 1 Law “On elections of the people’s deputies of the Ukrainian SSR” from October 27, 1987, Vedomosti Verkhnoi Rady USSR, 1989 addendum to N 45, article 626 <http://zakon4.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/8304-11/> 425 426 Demokratizatsiya and backed a mixed system that included single-member districts and proportional representation (PR) or various models of proportional repre- sentation. The declining political prospects of the national-democrats stimulated their interest in electoral reform. The standard of living in independent Ukraine was not improving and the deepening economic crisis hurt their popularity. Moreover, these politicians had concentrated all their strength on gaining independence and had no plans for what to do after they succeeded. As a result, several parties formed from their ranks and each of these new parties had its own vision for the future development of Ukraine. Having failed to create a powerful network across Ukraine and constantly fighting among themselves, the national-democrats could not divide the districts among themselves to avoid competition with each other. At the same time, the leftists, particularly the communists, had developed structures and expected an increase in popularity as Ukrainians became dissatisfied with their newly-won independence. Accordingly, they strongly supported the use of the majoritarian, first–past-the-post system, which they felt would improve their chance of winning more seats. Since they had an absolute majority in the Verkhovna Rada2 (See Figures 1 and Figure 1. Political affiliation of Members of Parliament elected in single-mandate districts, 1990 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 354 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 446 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 348 449 337 344 445 438 439 45 47 335 450 341 350 164 48 42 345 219 440 165 443 442 349 339 157 342 343 43 163 444 46 447 217 352 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 158 41 347 351 40 378 336 210 448 372 373 374 375 376 377 332 333 441 340 44 221 212 278 166 353 215 338 406 268 160 220 334 328 346 153 154 324 258 259 260 261 209 384 269 155 161 407 213 388 262 263 264 276 211 386 270 214 360 162 322 392 281 411 223 323 385 156 159 390 413 329 208 330 382 275 358 428 277 273 423 216 71 359 33 222 331 316 317 387 408 28 418 266 355 218 224 318 380 426 326 279 274 383 363 412 73 271 403 404 416 417 272 361 325 389 265 31 203 409 24 35 267 356 23 391 67 362 415 25 422 319 419 427 379 62 34 421 429 327 280 198 26 320 321 364 206 424 229 64 200 29 381 59 196 197 38 102 141 414 410 227 152 207 420 204 357 106 128 130 70 173 32 127 60 405 37 232 53 49 50 51 52 167 175 425 228 72 199 117 97 65 225 226 87 98 126 205 437 27 235 101 103 123 56 202 434 36 233 99 55 172 168 124 171 234 122 68 231 121 430 431 30 69 39 129 57 169 176 435 125 177 432 436 100 174 140 146 201 58 170 433 145 54 91 143 61 287 230 105 144 63 313 182 142 66 150 150 288 107 305 104 191 147 95 194 118 119 120 148 289 291 96 131 132 133 134 286 Communist Party of the Soviet Union 192 (381) 309 108 109 110 111 135 151 190 188 112 113 114 115 116 399 189 310 312 138 292 398 Communist Party of the Soviet Union 290 193 136 137 139 (1) 187 (candidates for membership) 186 293 294 295 296 297 396 298 299 300 301 302 397 195 307 400 74 75 76 77 78 401 All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (4) 79 80 81 83 314 306 402 303 84 85 86 178 179 180 181 282 283 284 285 182 183 184 185 88 89 90 Independents (64) 315 393 394 395 247 92 93 94 244 308 256 311 253 255 304 246 248 254 245 257 252 249 240 241 242 243 251 236 237 238 239 250 Source: Verkhovna Rada website (rada.gov.ua) 2 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 1998. Twelfth convocation 1990-1994, Kiev: Kii <http://static. rada.gov.ua/zakon/new/NEWSAIT/DEPUTAT1/spisok1.htm> Proportional Representation in Ukraine 427 2), the leftists voted against any electoral law that did not include single- member districts. Figure 2. Members of Parliament who belonged to the “Narodna Rada” group (1990) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 354 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 446 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 348 449 337 445 344 45 438 439 47 335 450 341 350 164 48 42 345 219 440 165 443 442 349 339 157 342 343 43 163 444 46 447 217 352 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 41 158 347 40 351 448 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 332 333 336 210 340 441 44 221 212 166 353 278 338 406 268 160 220 215 334 346 153 154 328 324 258 259 260 261 209 384 269 155 161 388 407 213 262 263 264 276 211 386 270 214 360 162 322 392 281 411 223 323 390 156 159 385 413 329 208 330 382 275 358 277 273 423 216 428 71 359 33 222 331 316 317 387 408 28 418 266 355 218 380 224 318 326 279 274 426 383 363 412 73 271 403 404 416 417 272 361 31 325 389 265 203 409 35 267 356 415 23 24 67 362 25 422 427 391 419 319 379 62 34 421 429 327 280 198 26 320 321 364 206 424 229 64 200 29 381 59 196 197 38 102 141 414 410 227 152 207 420 106 204 357 128 130 70 173 32 127 60 175 405 37 232 53 49 50 51 52 167 425 228 72 199 117 97 65 225 226 87 98 126 437 27 235 202 205 434 36 101 123 55 56 168 233 99 103 124 172 171 234 122 68 30 231 121 69 430 431 39 57 435 129 169 176 125 177 66 432 436 100 140 146 174 201 58 170 433 145 54 91 143 61 287 230 105 144 63 182 142 313 150 150 288 107 305 104 191 147 118 119 120 95 194 148 289 291 96 131 132 133 134 "Narodna Rada" 286 (110) 192 309 108 109 110 111 135 151 190 188 112 113 114 115 116 399 189 310 312 138 292 398 290 193 136 137 139 Members of Parliament who belonged to 187 186 293 294 295 296 297 396 (340) 299 300 301 302 other parliamentary caucuses and groups 298 195 397 307 400 74 75 76 77 78 and independents 401 79 80 81 83 314 306 402 303 84 85 86 178 179 180 181 282 283 284 285 182 183 184 185 88 89 90 393 394 395 247 92 93 94 315 244 308 256 311 255 304 253 246 248 254 245 257 252 249 240 241 242 243 251 236 237 238 239 250 Source: Verkhovna Rada website (rada.gov.ua) After the 1994 elections, the position of the leftists changed despite the fact that they performed better in the elections than the Right. One in four leftist candidates won their elections, whereas only one in ten rightists succeeded. The Left felt that this margin of victory was not enough. The Right’s problem was that it could not divide up the districts so that only one rightist candidate ran in each; the result was that they split their votes and allowed other candidates to win with a plurality. As a consequence of the problems on the left and right, the winners in more than half of the districts were non-partisan candidates who nominated themselves and represented no party (See Figure 3).3 These candidates represented the business inter- ests, which had begun to appear in the 1990s.
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