HELSINKI COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA studies17 THE WARP OF THE SERBIAN IDENTITY anti-westernism, russophilia, traditionalism... BELGRADE, 2016 THE WARP OF THE SERBIAN IDENTITY Anti-westernism, russophilia, traditionalism… Edition: Studies No. 17 Publisher: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia www.helsinki.org.rs For the publisher: Sonja Biserko Reviewed by: Prof. Dr. Dubravka Stojanović Prof. Dr. Momir Samardžić Dr Hrvoje Klasić Layout and design: Ivan Hrašovec Printed by: Grafiprof, Belgrade Circulation: 200 ISBN 978-86-7208-203-6 This publication is a part of the project “Serbian Identity in the 21st Century” implemented with the assistance from the Open Society Foundation – Serbia. The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Open Society Foundation – Serbia. CONTENTS Publisher’s Note . 5 TRANSITION AND IDENTITIES JOVAN KOMŠIĆ Democratic Transition And Identities . 11 LATINKA PEROVIĆ Serbian-Russian Historical Analogies . 57 MILAN SUBOTIĆ, A Different Russia: From Serbia’s Perspective . 83 SRĐAN BARIŠIĆ The Role of the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Churches in Shaping Governmental Policies . 105 RUSSIA’S SOFT POWER DR. JELICA KURJAK “Soft Power” in the Service of Foreign Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation . 129 DR MILIVOJ BEŠLIN A “New” History For A New Identity . 139 SONJA BISERKO, SEŠKA STANOJLOVIĆ Russia’s Soft Power Expands . 157 SERBIA, EU, EAST DR BORIS VARGA Belgrade And Kiev Between Brussels And Moscow . 169 DIMITRIJE BOAROV More Politics Than Business . 215 PETAR POPOVIĆ Serbian-Russian Joint Military Exercise . 235 SONJA BISERKO Russia and NATO: A Test of Strength over Montenegro . 241 5 PUBLISHER’S NOTE The problem of national identity especially troubles unfinished nations and the countries wherein ethnicity and statehood do not overlap or, moreover, wherein the discrepancy between the two is too large. In historical perspective, national identities have emerged from com- munities the members of which would protect at all costs; the same as their leaders they took their major responsibilities were – national. What was probably inevitable once is not enough today. In a world of globalization people belong to many imagined communities – local, regional, constitutional, national or cosmopolitan – that are overlap- ping mostly thanks to technological and communications revolution and rather affordable travel. Sovereignty is no longer the absolute it used to be to the people. Bearing in mind the complexity of the problem and the background against which Serbia is in search of its new identity – the pan-Serbian project that suffered defeat at the end of the 20th century and ensu- ing frustration, and the responsibility for the war and war crimes Ser- bia would hardly admit – the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights prepared this collection of papers hoping it would trigger off a wider debate on the Serbian national identity. Instead in modern times Serbia seeks its identity in the past by invok- ing its “traditionally authentic political identity” – actually, the legacy of the Middle Ages, Eastern Orthodoxy, Byzantine heritage, the folk- lore of its culture and anti-Westernization. The first and second Yugoslavia are called into question – especially the latter which is criminalized through revisionism and relativism of fascism. 6 By wiping off the 20th century from its experience and memory, the Serbian culture actually renounces its greatest achievements. The patriarchal and the modern civilization are in clash in Serbia – at this point, regretfully, renewal of the patriarchal society has the upper hand. Serbia’s mainstream strongly resists the postulates of a modern state: the rule of law, human rights, plurality and tolerance. The majority of right-wing groups and intellectuals advocate “St. Sava identity of the Serbian people” as a mainstay of “all the victories” and “a hope for Serbia’s recovery.” The predominant nationalistic elites strongly oppose reforms of the country and the society under the pre- text of their being destructive to the Serbian identity. But, in fact, Ser- bia’s modernization would undermine their interests that are tied up with political structures. They see the pro-European civil sector and everyone arguing for Serbia’s membership of EU and NATO as the big- gest threat to “St. Sava identity.” Russia – with its growing presence and influence on Serbia’s cultural and political scenes – plays a major role in shaping a new identity. Russia fuels Serbia’s frustration and the thesis about Yugoslavia as Serbia’s great delusion; and so it also fuels the thesis about artificial nations such as Macedonians, Bosniaks and Montenegrins. The influ- ential, pro-Russian, conservative bloc keeps entrenching the “Russian component” in Serbia’s identity; they promote “Russification of the Serbian nation,” argue for the superiority of the Eastern Orthodox civ- ilization, its Byzantine heritage and Slavic culture, and speak of Slav nations helping one another throughout history. The Serbs and the Russians alike, as Srđan Barišić notes in his paper, have closely connected Eastern Orthodoxy with state-building, and in both cases Eastern Orthodoxy has been – in the times of many deep crises – a strong integrative factor of the safeguard of national iden- tity. And in both cases, the period of social atheism marginalized and minimalized the significance of public religiousness, whereas with dis- integrations of once federations in the last decade of the 20th century revitalization of religion began. 7 Both Russia and Serbia experienced failed transitions and exhausting identity wanderings at the international arena, the same as at domes- tic scenes. Russia compensates for these failures by renewing impe- rial ambitions and revenging itself for the humiliation it was subject to after the end of the Cold War. And this is the end that justifies the means, including the mechanism of soft power it has been using most successfully and especially in Serbia. Russia is expanding its influence on the Balkans at the time when all the countries of region are uncon- solidated and vulnerable, have not rounded off their identities yet and are, therefore, prey to pressure. This is the subject matter of this collection of papers the authors of which are dealing with various aspects of Russia’s presence in Serbia. Russia’s today’s presence in the Balkans is nothing new: it logically fol- lows from Russia’s imperialism and Serbian-Russian analogies. The majority of Serbia’s electorate supports the party that is deep-rooted in Serbia’s political tradition. And all this, as Latinka Perović put it, along with the shaky consensus on Serbia’s accession to EU is seen as a confusion; the longstanding process the upcoming stages of which cannot be anticipated for sure without proper understanding of the process itself. And the alternative is possible only when this process is truly understood. Sonja Biserko I TRANSITION AND IDENTITIES 11 Jovan Komšić1 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND IDENTITIES A View on the Nature of Transitional Identity Engineering in Serbia Abstract: By structuring his analysis into four key segments (1) Nation- related contradictions and identity ambiguities; (2) Identity policies and multiculturalism; (3) Transitional identity engineering in Serbia, and (4) Projections of the future and prospects of multicultural strategies, the author corroborates the following thesis: regardless of numerous chal- lenges of multiculturalism and dramatic open issues concerning the eco- nomic and financial crisis, as well as the refugee crisis, the EU policies of identity (both national and European) cannot preserve the advantage of the existing and globally unique civilizational values, nor can they prove their effectiveness in the consolidation of the democracy and integra- tion of transition societies if the power to define identity is acquired (or preserved) by xenophobes and ethno-nationalists. Instead of traditional notions and (ultra)conservative (anti-)politics, the crisis requires new ideas and strategies. Therefore, multiculturalism should be given a real chance. Keywords: democratic transition, identity, nation, ethno-nationalism, citi- zenship, multiculturalism, political elites, Serbia, autonomy of Vojvodina, constitutional changes . 1 For more details about the concept of identity see Erikson’s classical study Identity and the Life Cycle. Namely, when discussing ego identity, Erikson refers primarily to the sense of identity, or “the accrued confidence that one’s ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity (one’s ego in a psychological sense) is matched by the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others”; Erik H. Erikson, Identitet i životni ciklus, Zavod za udžbenike, Belgrade, 2008, p. 105. 12 CHAPTER I Transition in the countries of Eastern (Central and South-East) Europe has marked the new beginning of citizenship formation in the sense of trans- forming the subjects of the regime of “dictatorship over needs” (Feher, Heler, Markuš 1986) into the sovereign holders of inviolable human and civil rights, and free participants in a competitive, economic and political “game in town”. One in a series of the basic tasks within this complex and simultaneous process involving a profound transformation of all social structures and subsystems has been (and still is) the transformation of traditional nationalism and absolut- ist (ethno-)democracy into the forms and contents of