Equal Split in the Informal Market for Group Train Travel by Israel Waichman, Artem Korzhenevych, Till Requate No. 1638 | July 2010 Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Düsternbrooker Weg 120, 24105 Kiel, Germany Kiel Working Paper No.1638 | July 2010 Equal Split in the Informal Market for Group Train Travel Israel Waichman, Artem Korzhenevych, and Till Requate Abstract: In this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the extent that proposers request a fixed price for a shared ride and potential co-travelers usually accept or reject the deal. We observe that the prevailing price corresponds to the equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co-travelers. This result is remarkable because the positions of the bargaining parties are hardly symmetric and the formation of the full group is not guaranteed. Using a simple agent-based model we are able to identify some sufficient conditions leading to the observed distribution of prices. Finally, we observed that the probability to accept an unusually high offer is decreasing with the price and increasing when the offer is made right before the train departure. Keywords: natural field experiment; bargaining; focal point; equal split; agent-based model JEL classification: C78; C93; D74; D83 Israel Waichman Artem Korzhenevych Department of Economics, University of Kiel Kiel Institute for the World Economy Olshausenstrasse 40 Hindenburgufer 66 24098 Kiel, Germany 24105 Kiel, Germany E-mail:
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[email protected] Till Requate Department of Economics, University of Kiel Olshausenstrasse 40 24098 Kiel, Germany E-mail:
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