European Lessons Learned: Managing Tunnel Operations and Maintenance Risks Dr. Bernd Hagenah Houston, Wednesday March 11, 2020 Agenda ▪ Introduction ▪ Safety TSI ▪ Freight Train Tunnels ▪ Rolling Stock ▪ Metro Systems (Austria, France, Germany, …) ▪ Safety during construction Metro Baku 1995 ▪ Train with 5 coaches (approx. 1000 passengers ) left station and stopped in the tunnel (approx. 200 m / 660 ft) technical reason – short-circuit initiated fire ▪ Rolling Stock up to 90 % combustible ▪ Driver asked to shut down electricity → reaction from operator too late → fatalities ▪ Doors did not open, panic started, evacuation to neighbor cars → fatalities ▪ Longitudinal ventilation started in the direction of the next station Uldus and evacuation started in the opposite direction towards the station Nariman Narimanov after approx. 15 min direction of ventilation changed → fatalities 292 – 337 fatalities in total Kaprun 2000 ▪ Fire started when leaving the valley station ▪ Train stopped in the tunnel (slope ~ 40 %) due to technical problems caused by the fire ▪ Doors could not be opened from inside – just from the driver ▪ No communication measures on board ▪ Natural ventilation uphill (stack effect) with vair > critical velocity ▪ 155 fatalities in the cars, during evacuation uphill, inside hill station and inside second train ▪ 12 survivors' broke windows to escape and evacuated downhill TEN – Trans-European Network ▪ Road, Rail and Water TEN Network until 2030 ▪ 2015 – 2030 approx. 700 bn € ▪ Common Safety Standard required ▪ Standartisation for equipment and operation concepts required TSI – Technical Specification for Interoperability ▪ The generally acknowledged integral state of the art of safety in rail tunnels – RANK OF A LAW ▪ This European standard shall be applied to all European rail tunnels which are part of the Trans-European Network. ▪ The integral TSI standard – will be considered for the safety concept. ▪ Standartisation for equipment and operation concepts. ▪ Approved and experienced regulation, approx. > 2 billion train km / year ! ▪ Comprehensive / integral safety and operation concept TSI – Safety in Rail Tunnels (TSR) Standards & Guidelines ▪ TSI-Safety in Rail Tunnels (SRT) - rail safety standard in Europe - initially applicable for cross-border traffic ▪ Required for almost all new European rail tunnels ▪ Ventilation not explicitly required Collisions / fore example with regard to Aerodynamics Pressure in Tunnels – loads on trains and equipment vKISS = 159 km/h vrailjet = 230 km/h Rolling Stock Design – EN 45545 ▪ EN 45545 – 6. Fire Control and Management System ▪ Fire detection, signaling ▪ Emergency Light, Signage for evacuation, etc. ▪ Acoustic information / communication ▪ Requirements for extinguishers / positions ▪ Procedures like shutting down climatisation / ventilation TSI categ. B trains 15 min with 80 km/h (50 mph) → 20 km (12.8 mi) Procedure Safety Concept and Protection Goals valid for hot and cold incidents - example ▪ Priority 1: Protection of tunnel users / passengers The protection of life and limb, as well as the integrity of the passengers. ▪ Priority 2: Protection of intervention forces The safe guidance and support during the incident by rescue forces. ▪ Priority 3: Availability of the track Restart operation quickly after an incident. ▪ Priority 4: Protection of the tunnel structure/ asset protection Avoid collapse…. Procedure Examples for measures to meet safety goals (digest) • Prevention - regular checks of system - check of trains before entering the tunnels (e.g. hot-box, etc.) - rolling stock requirements / equipment - signaling (information to train drivers) • Mitigation - no emergency stop in the tunnel (whatever it takes) - emergency break override - motor extinguishers on board • Evacuation - personal equipment of drivers (freight trains) - opening car doors - rescue shelter, sizes of egress ways, signage, etc. - emergency exit • Rescue - communication measures - access for fire brigades - fire fighting points in portal areas - exercises Implementation in Europe Austria ▪ Between Vienna and Salzburg 16 new rail tunnels (approx. 0.3 – 13 km) No mechanical ventilation. ▪ Wienerwald-Tunnel and Lainzer Tunnel (total: > 20 km) equipped with mechanical ventilation due to its complexity (combined single-track double bore / double-track single bore system) ▪ Semmering Base tunnel (27.3 km) is planned with an emergency stop and mechanical ventilation ▪ Koralmtunnel (31.6 km) is planned with an emergency stop and mechanical ventilation ▪ Brenner Base Tunnel (55 km) is planned with emergency stops and mechanical ventilation Implementation in Europe Germany ▪ Between Hamburg and Munich 70 rail tunnels (approx. 0.4 - 11 km) ▪ No German rail tunnel is equipped with mechanical ventilation (just 1 under construction) ▪ Most tunnels are used by mixed traffic (freight traffic, high speed traffic and occasionally commuter traffic) Switzerland ▪ Between Bern and Zurich 11 new rail tunnels (approx. 0.4 – 6.3 km) ▪ None of them equipped with mechanical ventilation ▪ Only cross-country tunnels with more than 20 km length have emergency stops with mechanical ventilation (Loetschberg-Base-Tunnel, Gotthard- Base-Tunnel). Example Loetschberg Base Tunnel ▪ Loetschberg-Base-Tunnel (approx. 34 km) ▪ Double bore single-track / single bore single-track ▪ Cross-passage distance 333 m ▪ Two emergency stops one of them with mechanical ventilation Cross-passage Sliding doors Jet fans in portal area Lessons learnt Example Loetschberg Base Tunnel Lessons learnt from Loetschberg Base Tunnel Operation ▪ Metallic rail dust is an issue ▪ Each cross-passage twice cleant each year ▪ Metal dust harms electronics and causes false alarms ▪ Health aspects for workers ▪ Similar findings in metro tunnels / stations ▪ Good planning shall avoid unreasonable maintenance efforts (design of ventilation plants, specification of doors, using mechanical ventilation during normal operation, access during normal operation, etc.) Example Gotthard Base Tunnel ▪ Gotthard-Base-Tunnel (approx. 57 km) ▪ Double bore single-track with ▪ Cross-passage distance 325 m ▪ Two emergency stops (approx. every 20 km) with mechanical ventilation ▪ 1h – and nobody left in the tunnel ▪ Who talks (other train drivers, incident train, rescue services, etc.) ? ▪ How many decisions → lake of Constance… Example Gotthard Base Tunnel Staggered Potals to avoid reciruclation of Theory: Anti-recirculation wall ▪ warm and rail dust polluted air ▪ smoke in the case of a hot incident Reality Example Gotthard Base Tunnel Example Stuttgart 21 ▪ New underground station with connecting ▪ First German rail tunnels with mechanical ventilation ▪ Complex underground structure ▪ Ventilation foreseen to keep central station free of smoke Freight Tunnels – Simplon Tunnels Fire in the Simplon Tunnel • Fire 2011 was caused by unfixed tarpaulin • Fire fighting with rescue train after > 300000 Gallons of water → without impact. • Tunnel closed for almost 6 months “Suspicious” trains shall not enter tunnels Suspicious trains shall not enter tunnels Lessons learnt from previous accidents (Channel tunnel, Simplon tunnel, etc.) ▪ Screening of trains before entering the tunnels on track (prevention) ▪ Information on-board should be available as well (prevention) ▪ Train stop in the tunnel must be avoided (mitigation) ▪ Fire fighting is almost useless (no positive experience world wide) hot box axle / bearing Preventive measures: Wayside train monitoring systems Preventive measures: Wayside train monitoring systems Over 130 operational installations Testing & Training Design criteria • Factory acceptance tests (FAT) • Site acceptance tests (SAT) Safety / operational goals • Site integration tests (SIT) • Fire and smoke tests Testing Procedures Longitudinal airflow in the tunnel is the most important aspect for the functionality of tunnel ventilation → Calibration of measuring equipment → Signal analysis → Logging of measured values Testing of fire ventilation operation - All scenarios - Failure and fallback modes - Simulation of different boundary 6 conditions21.04.04, Sauges, by mobile jet fans tube Biel, filtriert BiT1-20503 4 BiT2-21104 Querschnittmessung BiT3-22549 BiL-20257 ] s / BiL-21845 Punktmessung m [ BiL-20257 t 2 i e k BiL-21845 g i d n i w h c s 0 e G -2 -4 0:00:00 2:00:00 4:00:00 6:00:00 Zeit (hh:mm:ss) Metro Systems ▪ No General FLS Standard available, focus on rolling stock and operation ▪ France: FLS Metro Standards ▪ Germany, Austria: No FLS Metro Standards Present tendencies ▪ Individual Design Fire Specification (e.g. Vienna: from ~30 MW to ~3 MW) ▪ Tunnel Climate (safety relevant) ▪ Rail Dust Treatment ▪ Equipment with Platform Screen Doors (PSD) ▪ Preparation for fully automatic operation (Vienna, Hamburg, Paris, etc.) ▪ Rolling Stock Fire Protection Metro / Light Rail Systems supply air Aufgänge jet-fan jet-fan Tunnel Tunnel Tunnel Gradient 8 % Gradient: 0 % Gradient: 8 % Länge / length: 150 m Länge / length: 1100 m Länge / length: 150 m Metro / Light Rail Systems Metro Vienna (F) supply air exhaust air filtered unfiltered longitudinal ventilation in the direction of travel 3 air exchange per hour Ventilation Fan Plant Design Aspects Object 050 1P variante silencer l1 = 3 m ▪ For information only - do not apply ▪ Contact me for further discussion Metro Systems Paris Metro ▪ New metro line around Paris (line 15) under construction. ▪ Equipment in tender phase ▪ Since Paris won Olympic Games 2024 increasing priority for north sections supply air extraction supply