The in the 21st Century What the Bid to Become An Independent Armed Service Means

• CAV MARK A PAYUMO ‘06

As House Bill 7304 currently makes its way through Congress Yet, at the same tme, it also appears that the PMC’s bid and seeks to re-establish the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) as to become an independent branch is also a mater of wild card a distnct and autonomous branch of service under the Armed bet due to antcipated politcal and bureaucratc resistance Forces of the (AFP), it has garnered both controversy that are likely to view such an agenda as costly, redundant, and and support since the Bill was ofcially submited to the House of unnecessary. While the Marine Commandant, General Representatves on February 2018.1 With over 67 years of fghtng Alvin Parreño, is expectedly measured in his statements on the naton’s wars as the Philippine ’s sea-going infantry, the maters of natonal security, his treatment of the proposed frst queston confrontng this topic is, “why only now?” There legislaton during the Corps’s anniversary refected the level are two likely explanatons for this. of difculty in selling the idea to the defense establishment.3 The frst one draws on what has been clearly apparent Indeed, within a month following the Bill’s ofcial submission throughout President ’s politcal career: That the to Congress, Defense Secretary Delfn Lorenzana made a public combinaton of his strong politcal will and legendary support for statement to reporters expressing personal reservaton on the the military is likely seen as a rare opportunity by AFP ofcials ’ transiton as a separate branch of service.4 in order to pursue much-needed reforms within the armed Another likely reason is more substantve than the PMC services. The Revised AFP Modernizaton Program (RAFPMP), for merely pinning its hopes on the Philippine President’s tme in one, shows what’s possible with the kind of politcs that values ofce, although gaining Malacañan’s support certainly plays natonal security as mutually contngent upon economic growth. a big factor in tpping the scales in favor of the Marines. But at Now in its second horizon under the RAFPMP, the Philippines will no other tme in Philippine history that the PMC’s role as the be spending a yearly average of USD1.1-billion on defense untl naton’s premier amphibious force is being brought into sharper 2022 (in additon to the annual defense budget), bringing 2018’s relief since its establishment in 1950. Today, there is no doubt total defense spending at USD3.7-billion, a fgure on par with the that the emergence of external security threats as a functon of country’s benign rival, Malaysia, that enjoys a considerably wide China’s nine-dash line in the South China Sea has unsetled the margin of defense capabilites vis-à-vis the Philippines.2 country’s leaders, and the search for the right kind of response

16 THE CAVALIER JULY–AUGUST 2018 contnues given Beijing’s persistent gray zone behavior even afer extensively in amphibious operatons alongside U.S. Marines relatons with improved. In the same vein, the obstnate during World War II. Additonally, U.S. General Douglas problem of Islamic terrorism in Mindanao appears to feed on the MacArthur prosecuted the war in Korea by leveraging heavily on country’s porous southern borders, and more is demanded of amphibious operatons which was pivotal in his own directon the AFP to prevent another city-siege that seriously damages the of the entre campaign. It perfectly demonstrates Secretary country’s natonal economy.5 Lorenzana’s point how General MacArthur extrapolated from a very simple concept which Army leaders are ordinarily A LITTORAL NATION predisposed to cast aside: That the sea is a vast maneuver space, These security challenges require a response that can not an obstacle. similarly meet the overarching task of guarding the territorial Perhaps a more scathing critcism is based on the analogy integrity of over 7,600 islands of the Philippine archipelago. This, with foreign militaries whose autonomous Marines have invaded in turn, translates to over 7,600 litoral regions that demand countries or were employed in another part of the world as efectve litoral maneuver and vertcal envelopment, in order expeditonary forces. The prime example, of course, is the U.S. to ensure unhampered economic actvity for ordinary followed by Great Britain. Thus, one can be led to suspect that by defeatng internal threats, and to deter and defend against the PMC’s agenda is another usual tendency to adopt Western would-be foreign aggressors. This artcle intends to argue military doctrines despite inapplicability to Philippine strategic that the Philippines is, without a doubt, a litoral naton with environment and security needs. Indeed, the Philippine litoral imperatves. However, it is common knowledge that the Consttuton itself renounces war as an instrument of policy, and AFP’s current structural and doctrinal setup do not refect this validates on the surface Secretary Lorenzana’s misgivings that reality. But as experts and foremost advocates of amphibious the PMC may be endeavoring to transform into an expeditonary operatons, the Marine Corps is the one government agency that force as a functon of its desire for autonomy.8 understands this serious gap in Philippine natonal security which resides precisely in the litorals. PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC HISTORY It is further argued here that the PMC’s bid for autonomy Adding to top-level skeptcism is the PMC’s misfortune that and beter complementary relevance to the Army, Airforce, unlike the U.S. and Britsh Marines which were spawned via and the Navy is more than just the structural limitatons that government legislaton or ofcial proclamaton of a monarch,9 Parreño pointed out which the Marines intend to the Philippine Marines appear to have originated from legislatve overcome.6 Rather, the Marine Corps possesses the warfghtng expediency. The 1950 AFP General Order that created the PMC orientaton that can easily translate to a strategic response came even before became president;10 he mechanism that will give the government in Manila wider lattude was Secretary of Defense when the Order was issued at a tme for engagement and deterrence; and appropriately defend the when the country’s fedgling politcal insttutons were either country if engagement and deterrence fail. This is possible only being established with very limited resources, or recovering from if the government becomes similarly invested on the PMC in the World War II. same manner that it is with the rest of the armed services. Therefore, as an urgent response to the But as to other reasons why this is the appropriate tme rebellion, it is highly likely that issuing the Order without strong the Marine Corps chose to advance its agenda may well fll up legislatve backing from Congress or the President may have several volumes. It is clear, however, that external threats such as been acceptable, as the costs of a long-drawn-out armed confict China stll has a long way to go in order to close the military gap were increasingly reversing Philippine consolidaton eforts as with the , the de facto guarantor of Asian regional a sovereign state.11 At the same tme, as Secretary Lorenzana order and security. These prevailing conditons therefore ofer a pointed out, the Marines were created as part of the Navy’s very narrow window for weaker states such as the Philippines forerunner, the Philippine Naval Patrol, which by 1950 was stll in to restructure its military that will allow the country to remain the process of expansion as it acquired bigger patrol and transport secure and economically compettve in this century and the ships that would become the Navy’s legacy feet today.12 Hence, next. the costs of establishing the PMC via such expedient means— despite having been envisioned from the beginning to be on RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA par with major armed services of foreign militaries13—were As previously stated, any change to the status quo is likely simultaneously low. to draw a certain degree of resistance and the PMC’s bid for Additonally, the small size of the Philippine military during autonomy is certainly not an excepton. But this kind of resistance this period similarly refected the capacity of its ofcials to is not taken lightly especially when the collectve wisdom and view the armed forces in a future operatng environment. As a experiences of those who challenge this idea may add up to over result, the PMC remained excluded in an Executve Order (EO) a century’s worth of insightul counsel. No less than the Defense towards the end of 1950 that reorganized the entre defense Secretary publicly questoned the Bill, and went on to imply that establishment into four major services. Interestngly enough, the PMC’s proposal to be on equal footng with the other armed a separate was promulgated with the services will only make it the Army’s exaggerated force multplier. EO which remains as the country’s natonal police force today; Formerly the Army’s top special operatons soldier, Secretary but no autonomous Marine Corps that’s complementary and in Lorenzana added that the Army can easily acquire ship-to-shore additon to the Army, Airforce, and the Navy was included.14 operatons that the Marine Corps claims to be experts on. 7 The PMC’s exclusion carried over to another EO nearly Although the has never been regarded as an four decades later in 1987, which insttuted the country’s amphibious landing force throughout its history, the U.S. Army— Administratve Code under the newly ratfed Consttuton at on which the Philippine Army is paterned afer—partcipated the tme and, thus, provided the rules of governance for the

THE CAVALIER 17 AFP. The 1987 EO appears to build on the 1950 issuance and old as seafaring itself and as soon as taking to the sea became an thereby maintains that amphibious warfare will remain under extension of human confict on land.19 Throughout the pages of the Navy’s purview.15 By the same token, both installments of the history, natons that engaged in warfare have learned from each AFP Modernizaton Act are devoid of giving amphibious warfare other: One army’s innovaton would be opposed by another that and operatons due merit as a functon of a 21st-century relevant would lead to systemic changes in relatve military capabilites Philippine military.16 that mainly characterized 16th- and 17th-century Europe.20 In a way, the collectve implicaton of these legislatons serves By the second half of the 20th century, the world came to a to blur the overarching nature of Marine Corps operatons that consensus that revolutons in military afairs (RMA) are real.21 begin afoat and over the horizon far from the shore, and extend Amphibious operatons undoubtedly fall within the scope of farther inland.17 It presupposes that the Navy’s operatonal RMA, which means that its conduct and grammar have evolved expertse is the overarching imperatve to archipelagic maritme over tme while its efectve applicaton as well as military success rather than mutually supportng with the Marines, if not alliances gave way for its popular adopton.22 By the same token, the other way around. Further, much of the Navy’s role, especially the PMC learned from the U.S. while 1798 America learned from in an archipelagic maritme context, begins afoat and will remain the Britsh who organized “twelve hundred Land Soldiers…to afoat with the excepton of naval air and special operatons. be distributed to his [King Charles II] Majesty’s Fleets prepared In sum, the PMC is a product of a severely dated bureaucratc for Sea Service” in 1664.23 It is also common knowledge that policymaking practce, which hampers its ability to meet the countries, especially allied ones, contnue to learn from each increasing demands of a future operatng environment. In the other in order to maintain their amphibious interoperability same vein, legislatve indiference to the possibilites of what an despite language and cultural barriers. independent Marine Corps can ofer in this highly compettve The implied suggeston that the PMC’s bid for autonomy era may only worsen the country’s ability to project and assert only serves to transform the Marine Corps into a Western sovereignty and territorial integrity in all of its 7,600 islands. expeditonary copycat may be missing the point that, the PMC is likely intending to keep up with 21st-century RMA.24 Given MERITS OF AN INDEPENDENT MARINE CORPS that the Philippine military is weak, it is not a remote possibility The concept of amphibious operatons is far from modern that the Commandant being subordinate to the Flag Ofcer In and traces its roots as far back as 1471 BC when the Egyptans Command complicates the AFP’s interoperability with U.S. Fleet- invaded the Levant.18 But the Marine’s existence is arguably as

18 THE CAVALIER JULY–AUGUST 2018

Marine Forces with whom the country has a defense treaty; a amphibious operatons with amphibious assault, the later only major general is too far below the four-star pay grade of the U.S. a category of the former.28 Additonally, amphibious operatons, Chief of Naval Operatons as well as the Marine Commandant partcularly assault, cannot be taken lightly; even the U.S. Army who are on equal footng. Operatonal fexibility (or expediency) in 1942 established its own Amphibious Training Center when as a response to this disparity is no doubt unsustainable over the a seamless Army-Marine Corps training on amphibious assault long-term. cannot be achieved.29 Further, an autonomous PMC doesn’t necessarily mean But in light of the future operatng environment that defnes becoming expeditonary because it is merely a choice that only much of the emerging challenges of the 21st century, there the Commander-in-Chief can make whether the Corps will be sent may be a need for the Philippine Army to acquire amphibious to a foreign batlespace as a landing force. Rather, the geographic capabilites in support of the Marines. Given that the PMC’s small scope alone that is the Philippine archipelago (including its number will not signifcantly increase as a mater of doctrinal exclusive economic zones) may be increasingly proving beyond imperatve, it is expected to be stretched thin that the Army the Navy’s capacity to manage; hence, their support for the will have to reinforce. The Army-Marine Corps amphibious proposed legislaton.25 For another, losing Scarborough Shoal relatonship will therefore see the PMC as the facilitator of all fve to China’s nine-dash line underscores the need to empower the areas of amphibious operatons—assault, raid, demonstraton, PMC and unleash its potental to meet the litoral demands of a withdrawal, and support to other operatons—while the Army litoral naton that is the Philippines. In the current shif to the plays the supportng role. archipelagic maritme construct,26 the Navy will similarly beneft because the Defense Department will now have to match the CONCLUSIONS litoral needs of over 7,600 islands—with Thitu Island accounted In the absence of a mechanism similar to America’s Key for—with amphibious platorms that will upgrade the Navy’s West Agreement of 1948 that gave the U.S. Marine Corps the legacy feet. sole responsibility of “amphibious warfare” and the “amphibious As to further doubts on posturing as an expeditonary training of all forces as assigned for joint amphibious invasion force, Japan’s partcipaton in the 2017 Exercise Dawn operatons,”30 there is every merit in the proposed Bill to re- Blitz at Camp Pendleton, California is a demonstraton that establish the PMC as a separate branch of service. The Navy is Marines don’t have to be expeditonary in order to maximize its likewise in support of the legislaton that will unload it of such potental in defense of its sovereign territory. As the sole foreign burden which the Marine Corps is supposed to handle, owing to partcipant in the exercise scenario where coaliton forces were the later’s dominance in the area of amphibious operatons; the deployed “to restore the internatonally recognized borders of a Army’s supportng role, however, cannot be discounted. The shif fctonal country,” 27 it is not difcult to perceive Dawn Blitz as a from the traditonal “contnental confguraton” to archipelagic functon of Japan’s own territorial disputes with China. maritme orientaton is the country’s response to a 21st-century Finally, there may be wisdom in the noton that the Philippine operatng environment that will fll in the security gaps that a Army can easily learn ship-to-shore operatons, the most litoral naton such as the Philippines demands; instrumental to proximate demonstraton of which is the U.S. Army’s amphibious this pursuit is the Marine Corps. experience during World War II. A deeper examinaton of this analogy will reveal that much of the U.S. Army’s amphibious role during this period is centered around actng as a landing force, (Endnotes) and possibly establishing lodgments in antcipaton of follow- on forces such as what took place in the beaches of Normandy. 1 See House Bill No. 7304 “An Act Establishing the Philippine Marine Hence, the analogy falls victm to the usual tendency to confuse Corps, Defning its Powers and Functons, Appropriatng Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes” (House of Representatves, Republic of the Philippines).

2 Figures gleaned from Craig Cafrey, “Malaysia Announces 5.3% Defence Budget Increase,” Jane’s 360, last updated October 27, 2017; and Prashanth Parameswaran, “How Much Can the Philippines Boost Its Military Budget Under Duterte?” The Diplomat, last updated January 31, 2017.

3 Frances Mangosing, “Marines Chief Backs Proposal to Create New AFP Branch of Service,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, last updated March 16, 2018.

4 Frances Mangosing, “Lorenzana Frowns on Proposal to Make Marines a Separate Branch,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, last updated March 20, 2018.

5 Another armed group, the communist insurgents, no longer pose as much of a threat as it did in the 1970s and 1980s, and Manila’s Bayanihan Internal Peace and Security Plan that began during Benigno Aquino III’s presidency has yielded thousands of surrendered New People’s Army members together with their high-

THE CAVALIER 19 powered frearms. Hence, given the PMC’s nature of employment and concept of operatons, the communists can comfortably remain 20 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “Thinking About within the Philippine Army’s purview for the foreseeable future untl Revolutons in Warfare” in The Dynamics of Military Revoluton, efectvely defeated. See Francis Wakefeld, “AFP: 2,263 Regular NPA ed. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox (New York: Cambridge Members, Supporters Surrendered Natonwide,” Manila Bulletn, University Press, 2001), 2. last updated March 5, 2018. 21 Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, Thinking About 6 Frances Mangosing, “Marines Chief Backs Proposal to Create New Revolutons in Warfare, 1. AFP Branch of Service,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, last updated March 16, 2018. 22 “Why Amphibious Capability?” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, accessed June 30, 2018. 7 Frances Mangosing, “Lorenzana Frowns on Proposal to Make Marines a Separate Branch,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, last updated 23 See Tony Horwitz, “The True Story of the Batle of Bunker Hill,” March 20, 2018. Smithsonian, last updated May 2013; and G.D. Robinson, “Royal 8 Frances Mangosing, Lorenzana Frowns on Proposal to Make Marines Marines History and Traditonal Facts,” Sea Cadet Training Centre a Separate Branch. HMS Excellent (October 2007).

9 William S. Dudley, “The Origins and Traditons of the Relatonship 24 See Frances Mangosing, “Lorenzana Frowns on Proposal to Make Between the Navy and the Marine Corps Under the Secretary of the Marines a Separate Branch,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, last updated Navy, Statement Before the House Armed Services Commitee on March 20, 2018. the Secretary of the Navy and Marine Corps,” Navy.mil, March 18, 2004; and Mark Oliver and agencies, “A Brief History of the Royal 25 “Our Natonal Security Imperatve: The Need to Have an Autonomous Marines,” The Guardian, last updated April 16, 2002. Marine Corps as a Distnct Military Service Complementng the Air Force, Navy, and the Army,” Headquarters Philippine Marine Corps 10 President Rodrigo Duterte, who came to power in June 2016, is the (Draf Positon Paper MC01-18): 2. 16th President of the Republic of the Philippines. Ramon Magsaysay was the country’s 7th President. 26 Our Natonal Security Imperatve: The Need to Have an Autonomous 11 It was a serious consolidaton efort as the Philippines just gained its Marine Corps as a Distnct Military Service Complementng the Air independence from the United States on July 4, 1946. Force, Navy, and the Army, 2.

12 Frances Mangosing, “Lorenzana Frowns on Proposal to Make 27 U.S. Navy Pety Ofcer 1st Class Jason Graham, Expeditonary Marines a Separate Branch,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, last updated Strike Group 3, “Dawn Blitz 2017 Sets Standard for Amphibious March 20, 2018. Capabilites,” Defense.gov, last updated October 31, 2017.

13 Senior Grade Manuel Gomez on his 28 Joint Publicaton 3-02 Amphibious Operatons, U.S. Joint Chiefs of mission on the formaton of the Philippine Marine Corps in 1950, Staf, I-2. “The Filipino Marines do not intend to bask in the glories earned by the Marines of other countries. When we shall fnally assault some 29 U.S. Army Major Joseph E. Malone, “The Army and the Need for bloody beaches, we will start our own traditons,” in “Philippine an Amphibious Capability” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Marine Corps – History,” Scribd.com, accessed June 30, 2018. Military Studies, Command and General Staf College), 28. 14 See Executve Order No. 389, Series of 1950, OfcialGazete.gov.ph, accessed June 30, 2018. 30 Functons of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staf quoted 15 See Executve Order No. 292, Series of 1987, OfcialGazete.gov. in U.S. Army Major Joseph E. Malone, “The Army and the Need for ph, accessed June 30, 2018. an Amphibious Capability” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staf 16 See “Republic Act 7898 An Act Providing for the Modernizaton of College), 22-23. the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for Other Purposes,” Gppb. gov.ph, accessed June 30, 2018; and “Department Circular No. 3 About the Author Issuing the Implementng Guidelines, Rules and Regulatons of the CAV MARK PAYUMO ’06 is an Asia Dialogues Pacifc Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernizaton Act,” DND. Delegate to the Carnegie Council for Ethics in Internatonal gov.ph, accessed June 30, 2018. Afairs. He holds a Master of Advanced Studies degree in Internatonal Afairs, and served as a Philippine Army Special 17 “Why Amphibious Capability?” Marine Corps Combat Development Forces Ofcer following graduaton from the Philippine Command, accessed June 30, 2018. in 2006. The opinion and views expressed in this artcle are solely of the author. 18 “Why Amphibious Capability?” Marine Corps Combat Development Command, accessed June 30, 2018.

19 See G.D. Robinson, “Royal Marines History and Traditonal Facts,” Sea Cadet Training Centre HMS Excellent (October 2007).

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