In the 21St Century What the Bid to Become an Independent Armed Service Means
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The Philippine Marine Corps in the 21st Century What the Bid to Become An Independent Armed Service Means • CAV MARK A PAYUMO ‘06 As House Bill 7304 currently makes its way through Congress Yet, at the same tme, it also appears that the PMC’s bid and seeks to re-establish the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) as to become an independent branch is also a mater of wild card a distnct and autonomous branch of service under the Armed bet due to antcipated politcal and bureaucratc resistance Forces of the Philippines (AFP), it has garnered both controversy that are likely to view such an agenda as costly, redundant, and and support since the Bill was ofcially submited to the House of unnecessary. While the Marine Commandant, Major General Representatves on February 2018.1 With over 67 years of fghtng Alvin Parreño, is expectedly measured in his statements on the naton’s wars as the Philippine Navy’s sea-going infantry, the maters of natonal security, his treatment of the proposed frst queston confrontng this topic is, “why only now?” There legislaton during the Corps’s anniversary refected the level are two likely explanatons for this. of difculty in selling the idea to the defense establishment.3 The frst one draws on what has been clearly apparent Indeed, within a month following the Bill’s ofcial submission throughout President Rodrigo Duterte’s politcal career: That the to Congress, Defense Secretary Delfn Lorenzana made a public combinaton of his strong politcal will and legendary support for statement to reporters expressing personal reservaton on the the military is likely seen as a rare opportunity by AFP ofcials Marines’ transiton as a separate branch of service.4 in order to pursue much-needed reforms within the armed Another likely reason is more substantve than the PMC services. The Revised AFP Modernizaton Program (RAFPMP), for merely pinning its hopes on the Philippine President’s tme in one, shows what’s possible with the kind of politcs that values ofce, although gaining Malacañan’s support certainly plays natonal security as mutually contngent upon economic growth. a big factor in tpping the scales in favor of the Marines. But at Now in its second horizon under the RAFPMP, the Philippines will no other tme in Philippine history that the PMC’s role as the be spending a yearly average of USD1.1-billion on defense untl naton’s premier amphibious force is being brought into sharper 2022 (in additon to the annual defense budget), bringing 2018’s relief since its establishment in 1950. Today, there is no doubt total defense spending at USD3.7-billion, a fgure on par with the that the emergence of external security threats as a functon of country’s benign rival, Malaysia, that enjoys a considerably wide China’s nine-dash line in the South China Sea has unsetled the margin of defense capabilites vis-à-vis the Philippines.2 country’s leaders, and the search for the right kind of response 16 THE CAVALIER JULY–AUGUST 2018 contnues given Beijing’s persistent gray zone behavior even afer extensively in amphibious operatons alongside U.S. Marines relatons with Manila improved. In the same vein, the obstnate during World War II. Additonally, U.S. Army General Douglas problem of Islamic terrorism in Mindanao appears to feed on the MacArthur prosecuted the war in Korea by leveraging heavily on country’s porous southern borders, and more is demanded of amphibious operatons which was pivotal in his own directon the AFP to prevent another city-siege that seriously damages the of the entre campaign. It perfectly demonstrates Secretary country’s natonal economy.5 Lorenzana’s point how General MacArthur extrapolated from a very simple concept which Army leaders are ordinarily A LITTORAL NATION predisposed to cast aside: That the sea is a vast maneuver space, These security challenges require a response that can not an obstacle. similarly meet the overarching task of guarding the territorial Perhaps a more scathing critcism is based on the analogy integrity of over 7,600 islands of the Philippine archipelago. This, with foreign militaries whose autonomous Marines have invaded in turn, translates to over 7,600 litoral regions that demand countries or were employed in another part of the world as efectve litoral maneuver and vertcal envelopment, in order expeditonary forces. The prime example, of course, is the U.S. to ensure unhampered economic actvity for ordinary Filipinos followed by Great Britain. Thus, one can be led to suspect that by defeatng internal threats, and to deter and defend against the PMC’s agenda is another usual tendency to adopt Western would-be foreign aggressors. This artcle intends to argue military doctrines despite inapplicability to Philippine strategic that the Philippines is, without a doubt, a litoral naton with environment and security needs. Indeed, the Philippine litoral imperatves. However, it is common knowledge that the Consttuton itself renounces war as an instrument of policy, and AFP’s current structural and doctrinal setup do not refect this validates on the surface Secretary Lorenzana’s misgivings that reality. But as experts and foremost advocates of amphibious the PMC may be endeavoring to transform into an expeditonary operatons, the Marine Corps is the one government agency that force as a functon of its desire for autonomy.8 understands this serious gap in Philippine natonal security which resides precisely in the litorals. PHILIPPINE STRATEGIC HISTORY It is further argued here that the PMC’s bid for autonomy Adding to top-level skeptcism is the PMC’s misfortune that and beter complementary relevance to the Army, Airforce, unlike the U.S. and Britsh Marines which were spawned via and the Navy is more than just the structural limitatons that government legislaton or ofcial proclamaton of a monarch,9 Major General Parreño pointed out which the Marines intend to the Philippine Marines appear to have originated from legislatve overcome.6 Rather, the Marine Corps possesses the warfghtng expediency. The 1950 AFP General Order that created the PMC orientaton that can easily translate to a strategic response came even before Ramon Magsaysay became president;10 he mechanism that will give the government in Manila wider lattude was Secretary of Defense when the Order was issued at a tme for engagement and deterrence; and appropriately defend the when the country’s fedgling politcal insttutons were either country if engagement and deterrence fail. This is possible only being established with very limited resources, or recovering from if the government becomes similarly invested on the PMC in the World War II. same manner that it is with the rest of the armed services. Therefore, as an urgent response to the Hukbalahap But as to other reasons why this is the appropriate tme rebellion, it is highly likely that issuing the Order without strong the Marine Corps chose to advance its agenda may well fll up legislatve backing from Congress or the President may have several volumes. It is clear, however, that external threats such as been acceptable, as the costs of a long-drawn-out armed confict China stll has a long way to go in order to close the military gap were increasingly reversing Philippine consolidaton eforts as with the United States, the de facto guarantor of Asian regional a sovereign state.11 At the same tme, as Secretary Lorenzana order and security. These prevailing conditons therefore ofer a pointed out, the Marines were created as part of the Navy’s very narrow window for weaker states such as the Philippines forerunner, the Philippine Naval Patrol, which by 1950 was stll in to restructure its military that will allow the country to remain the process of expansion as it acquired bigger patrol and transport secure and economically compettve in this century and the ships that would become the Navy’s legacy feet today.12 Hence, next. the costs of establishing the PMC via such expedient means— despite having been envisioned from the beginning to be on RESISTANCE TO THE IDEA par with major armed services of foreign militaries13—were As previously stated, any change to the status quo is likely simultaneously low. to draw a certain degree of resistance and the PMC’s bid for Additonally, the small size of the Philippine military during autonomy is certainly not an excepton. But this kind of resistance this period similarly refected the capacity of its ofcials to is not taken lightly especially when the collectve wisdom and view the armed forces in a future operatng environment. As a experiences of those who challenge this idea may add up to over result, the PMC remained excluded in an Executve Order (EO) a century’s worth of insightul counsel. No less than the Defense towards the end of 1950 that reorganized the entre defense Secretary publicly questoned the Bill, and went on to imply that establishment into four major services. Interestngly enough, the PMC’s proposal to be on equal footng with the other armed a separate Philippine Constabulary was promulgated with the services will only make it the Army’s exaggerated force multplier. EO which remains as the country’s natonal police force today; Formerly the Army’s top special operatons soldier, Secretary but no autonomous Marine Corps that’s complementary and in Lorenzana added that the Army can easily acquire ship-to-shore additon to the Army, Airforce, and the Navy was included.14 operatons that the Marine Corps claims to be experts on. 7 The PMC’s exclusion carried over to another EO nearly Although the Philippine Army has never been regarded as an four decades later in 1987, which insttuted the country’s amphibious landing force throughout its history, the U.S.