Nos. 65 - 75 January 1962 to April 1963

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

MEETINGS

ENGLISH

CONFIDMTIAL

VOL, 8 UNITED NATIONS ARCHIVES I' CONFIDENTIAL Mneting No. 65 9 January 1962 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY CCKMITTL'E GiJ THE COKGO

Meeting at United nations Heerlruarters, New on Tuesday, ^ January I^b2; at 5 p.m.

In the Chair: U THA17T The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL

Members: Canada Mr. riTCHIE Ceylon K:r. I'lJEGCONAVJARDENA . - Ethiopia Mr. CELRE-EGZY FecVjr&tion of Malaya Mr. I<"PJ--1IL . CLicM::- Mr. PADZIE .. • Guinca Mi-. DIALLO I'*,-. JIIA 1-^. I APIAN Ireland Mr. I.'OLAlNT) • . •• Liberia Mr. BARNES Kail Mr. TA Morocco Mr. TAZI Mr. KGILERUMA Fakiotan S |r 1 '-uhammad. ZAH1ULIA • KHAII Conceal Mr. CIG.GE /Sudan ... -: KJT. ADEEL . •; •-.: Gv/cden ' • Mrs.. R03S2L. ... Tunisia ...-.- Mr./CHIjlIXI ..--... United Arab Republic Mr-. LCL7IFI . ..-.- . Congo, (.Leopoldville). Mr. M!Bbyo-Paul .,

62-00829 HA/b{

The Acting C^RETARY-qi-NFML: Before we proceed, I should like to welcome the representative of Uicrra Leone, who is here with us. Of course, while welcoming our colleaeuo from Sierra Leone, I want to take this opportunity of mentioning that the contribution of contingents to the United liaticnD operations in the Congo docs not automatically/entitle the contributor to E seat in the Advisory Committee. As members are aware, there are other countries which are not rrxn.bers of the Con^o Advisory Ccinniittce but which have contributed very significantly to the Euececs of tfcc Unite! Ilatior?" operations in the Congo. Regarding the question of membership of the Advisory Committee, I will wish to hove the benefit of your advice at a subsequent meeting. In the meantime, of course, I am very delighted to welcome the representative of Sierra Leone. I have asV;ocl you to ccme to this meetly; for three main reasons • Firstly, I wish to consult you about the replies I have receive! to my request to the Goverr.rr^nts of the United Kingdom aud Portugal thit observers be stationed along the frontiers of Rhode:,Is and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic into Kr-tanga, L.bout which, of course, you havo already K<_en so't--thing in the prose« Secondly, there ere a couple of matters ou which there appears to be need for some cxplcriation on iry part, since some questions have beer .v.v;ed. Tliirdly, it is desirable to brin(3 you up to date en developments in the Congo and particularly in Katanga, inasmuch as we have not mot since 16 December. You have before you copies of my letters to the United Kingdom and Portugal about the stationinc of observers and copies of the replies which I have received from those Governments. There is also before you a copy of a statement concerning this matter made by Gir Roy Wclcnsky. This latter text, incidentally, has not been checked against delivery, and I cannot therefore verify its accuracy. You will note that the replies are negative, although the Government of the United Kingdom suggests on alternative in the form of.an invitation to me to go to Salisbury — an invitation which, I have been told informally, would equally cover a representative of mine. It is not at all clear to me what, if any, constructive results might bo achieved from such a visit. It certainly dees not cover what I had in mind in making the approach to the United Kingdom Government. Here I might say that this approach was rv:n.do because we finally had some concrete evidence of illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side, which wo immediately presented to the United Kingdom Government and which Sir Roy Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be described as gracious. EKS/db (The

Tn this regard, I mipht call to your attention'thnt, although'fVlr Roy Uelchnky vigorously tried to explain avny the'crossing of the forty-eight' jeeps at Kipushl, he has never made any public reference to the activities of the Dornier aircraft "based Qt Ndcla raid piloted by one Mr. Wickstcad, probably becauae toe evidence we presented vas too convincing for oven Sir Roy to drmy. I vould appreciate the vicvs of the members, particularly on the British alternative proposal, since I must reply to it, With regard to the situation in Katanga cince the intense fighting in early December come to a halt, there have been frequent references to a ceace-fire. I wish to make it quite clear that cincc the cease-fire of lost October broke down because of the vauton and repeated viclat-lor.r; of the KntarigeGe, leading finally to the fighting which began 0:1 tho afternoon of 5 Escember, there has not been and there is not now my ceaue-fire In effect. There haa been no approach by United nations ofi'.icials to tlie Katar^esc on this question, although Mr. Teiiombe end cor ,- of his collen(ri.?^s hav-^ frequontly alluded to the cubjoct and Mr. Tchcnibe tried to make a cease-fire a condliion for hia participation in the Kitcna tallio. This condition, GO you know, waa reiuced "by OirdC. riL.ere has been vhat micht be ' called the unilateral vJ.tlilioldlr^ 'of fire, or "hold-fire11, if you vioh, by OliUC cince the achievement of CIWCTs inanudiate military objectives in Elioobetlivlllc, "• •which dn fact coincided with the beginning of the Kitcna talkc. This hoe meant only that OUUC' in Elir.abethville \?ould not initiate fire but vould retui^n fire if fired upon. • • •* . • . • • This VQS undertaken for a number of reasons. First'of all, because with the general collapse of gendarmerie resistance in Elisnbethville and the capture of the Union Mini ere compound, "which irao the lact stroc^liold of recistance, the oiaic task in Elicabcthville consisted primarily of "cleaning up", that is to say, eliminating the last vestiges of cniping from private dwellings and other buildinca, ctoppin^ looting by the Katancese, who alone vere responsible for it and not — let ITG repeat, not — Cl'IUC trcopn, as vas reckleisnly end malicj.oualy alleged in come quarters, and generally rectoring order in the city towards reauuption of normal civilian pursuits. With the necessity of thus consolidating itself in l^lisabethville requiring retention of major strength in that area, OITLJC, in any case, could not BHS/

(The Acting Secretary-General) for acne time be ready to undertake a now operation against mercenaries in such other localities ao Krmina-Vllle, Jadotville, Kolwezi und KIpushi, where, according to our Information, the remaining mercenaries in Katanga ore to be mainly found. A bit later on I vill ask Brigadier Rikhye to give you the latest information about the mercenaries involved and tr.]:en captive and the arms and aiLTiunitlon captured by OlfJC in the Elicabeihville operation of last December. Moreover,, it vould have been highly inadvisable for tiie Urr.Vc^cl Nations to initiate fighting which vould have made the United Nations responsible for preventing the mceiin,^ at Kitona of Llr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, or for the United Nations nov to undertake any action vhich vould prevent the Kitona declaration from being implemented,, since, in fact, come of its points are in the process of being implemented. We are pre^nin^; Mr. T;:bo:nhe on point 3 in this declaration concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and particularly that relating to mercor-oriers. It is our hope -chat be vill keep his promise to facilitate the e 11 mi na tic a of rrerce.ncries in such a way 03 to make it "j.i^ce scary T for OriUC to employ furtive:: force tc-.r.irdn that end. I must add, ho ,r:ver; l^.at our plans and preparations lor further operations In areas of Katanga other then rilisabethville vith a vi:',^ to achieving the total elimination of mercca-i^ee are going forward viihoat delay. I feel the need to Gay a word also in explanation of the question of ONUCT s relationa with the ANC; that is, an AJiC contingent in OWUG, on the one hand, and a joint ONUC/ANC military operation in Katanga, on the other. As you knew, Mr. Adoula, in December, after consulting with Mr, Bunchc, offered a contingent of the AIIC to the United Nations Force in the Congo to serve on the same basis as all other contingents, and I accepted that offer. MW/kb _ 11

(Th^Ar11 np; S^cretary~Geriera 1)

Mr. Bunche, in Ms talk vith Mr. Adoula, explained TO him fully, as had been done by ethers in the past, the difficulties for the United Katicr.s in undertaking a joint military operation with the AITC. Mr. Bundle is l.oro and can ar.cwc?r any questions on thin matter and also, if you have any, on the Kitcna talks. I might add that Mr. George Ivan Smith is also here, having just returned from Katanga, and will gladly answer any questions which you wish to put to him. In Gumnviry, Mr. Eunche explained to Mr. Atloula that the basic difficulty about any joint operation was that the United Kationo Force.in the Congo was subject fully to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and the limitations on the ULJG of force implicit in thcco resolutions. There are, of course, no such limitations on the AIIC, the Congolese Government being Tree to employ its force internally towards political ends. Moreover, a joint operation would raise for 01TUC virtually insoluble prcble-.as of command, and would involve the United Nations Force in sharing responsibilities Tor military cbjoctiven, military actions and conduct by troops which could not be creep-table to or condoned by the Jniced Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations Force is composed of contingents given by a number of States, end if it should become involved in fighting for political objectives in the Congo, the Force might quickly disintegrate through withdrawal of a number of contingents. That is how I see the situation. Mr. Adoula vas very understanding of this position and undertook, as an alternatee; to offer a Congolese contingent to serve under United ITations command, Mr. Bimohoalso discussed the contingent arrangement vith General Mobutu, vho was fully agreeable to the idea and discussed with Ilr. Eunche and vith General MncEoin and other officerj at OIIUC headquarters the actual composition of the contingent being offered. The only troops which could be spared immediately, General Hobutu indicated, would be the Third Battalion, which lias been deployed in the vicinity of Luluabourg, and 300 AHC personnel to man the six armoured vehicles which were being provided. It is the intention of the OMJC Command to eir.ploy the AIJC contingent initially in the Kaniina area when it is actually made available. I shall now aok Brigadier Rikhye to inform you about the latest information concerning mercenaries, and also on the responses to the appeals which I have made for additional troops. MW/kb 12

'-_J:5?\T\' : * shall deal first vith the rr.orcenar:LeD . On 20 November, the date CM which the ri-htlr^ ;;t;ir,,cd In Elicul-cthvillo, it van understood that .-t least ::70 i;ier 'eriarle., were in êrv.iv'O with Katui.ri ferries; about L5:G v-^ro ! elieved to bo proucm:, in iHisalcidiville itself. r [l course, tho-e fifjur-r, arc not -iocuraio,, as I'r. Tahri.ibO ' :; Ooverniiiont had taken all posîi-le steps to cc;.ceal ; ho presence of 1 hose personnel. /jiichj them were a f.-o^p of aboirt ~:.irty-ei£ht ]"r^r '')i mr rcenari-1::;,, the uo-callrd "orcnh ^rcup!I wh-< v:^ro tlie âircprir^ ::jr:Lrjj. the f] cht'i n^. It i;eeinn thai, this [;rcup va:~. ^r 'aniued c :..orrc:i::iric3 named Parcn :Mid Hivcr -- ['i-cs-.îahly rrt.r?:"> d« j-'Trrii ,-cnei-.-A LKpervisicn ol' on-.'i callcl CoTcnol l--aulquj_i3 . '.this French croup were r i in 11 lied hy the other m>~rcei;a:r/ ^rcur^ tecnuse, duriijf the whole of the flr 1 hey vere believe;.! to hô rf:;r,r-l^'"..;{ jn Ooi.?5:une Aibf^t, vhich ic junt cut3.'de hliGahGthvill(?_, e,:id to hrr/e ru)-; i.:hj tattle fr::rr. the J r d-ohc . As a ro-ult of thic; it oee;;;3 tacit boi/i re]îan mercenaries a:;:l. Katari[;,cs*j rj Hilary intolll^.cijô service arc rjp*,T nyiinGt t'his froun of French morccnariciG. Hci-o ol' them aro believed already to have DcTb h'at :::}{•_; a I'rov.i.^ce. It ic al;:o T cport od ': hat a ctmrrtle for pnvcr han dovoloped in IC.ru!Jhi Miiong i he rc:r,aJ.nr!':C me rcciinrie:! -- ICiy)ii:shi now bcin^ th1^ headquartori; oT such •-:7:<:-r;.dnt3 oT hatai ;ync [3;;:, ujiuicrio vh;i îi withircw frerr, Ulicabcthvillo -•- c.v d Cclonel laulques ard Coloi-el Huycho had benn accuse , of rocliGtaoririj;; in cr^nînc i.'Lcrcon'-iri^J and b..iyin^, aii'craft. We have received r.ome ii.ioriiiation abci.i1: seine ;.lrii::i >;hioi had :;,ecn nvjlinittcu hy Colonel FaalûeG lo Mr. T^hniabe. jie had nifêr/ted that tl'e United Hationj Force ou^ht to bo persuaded to deploy their trccpc oritjide El i s:\hcthville; Rinco he vac very cure cT lein^; able to del eat i hem if they made such an attempt. Ho had hoped tlv,t tho withdrawal of the ratan^CGo êndariieric tovnrda Kipu.ihi vculd perûnd'.j the United hacicr.r, to follov ;;n that vithdrawai. in adv-'oicinf, Lcvardj Kipuchi^ or,, arj ar^ alterriative_, that the Jnited K^LLcnG m.i.-'ht undertake operations in the dirnctior; of Jadotville.

In I'ai.-t, Mr. Tchcir.hc decided to r :-rjain in EliG:d r. Llsville cind; as he vac ^oing to wtay there vith hie Government, pi.irt cf hir. : • .iii'larrnerie alco staged i ehind to take care ol the Govr.rnmcjit ai:d to rerjain in a;; ir.uch control as possible .f the city. This resulted in splitting the ^erdamerie an'i, ol' course, the United Nations, al'ter irivjn^ f.inlGliod its operation of clearing its ccr.rnur.i eat ions in Llisabv-'thville, did not folio1;/ uj) the vithdrawinc troops, thereby foiling the intents and purposes of Colonel Faulques. 1-W/kb 13-15

(nnnorn.1 TUkhye)

The only course opnn to Colonel Faulques and the other mercenaries now in to harraos United Nations troops as much as possible in the. city of EliGa"hethville ncelf. . It is "believed that an aviation mercenary group of about fifty ir.cn had been organised in December at Klpushi and that now many of them have left, having been discharged and repatriated. This c^oup Included nine FrencLraen. Wo are also informed that a hotel called Edinburgh Hotel in Kitve is being used as a rest hcme Tor the mercenaries. :. The final figures about the civilian foreign personnel captured or. killed in Elic-abethvil Le during the December fighting arc as follows: .captured, 28 -- nineteen of them have been rclonsed since then, ai'tor interroraticn; killed in action, six. • I must make it clear at this starve that all the information, which •^re have teen' able -to [-ather var> only rrcm such areas where our troops are stationed. -However, it is known that in other places, cuch as Kongolo in north Katanga; I3o.ulouirrvM.lle iu eastern Katar^a and Krunir.a -Ville, tiio Kn.tar.gese iorces;-nave mercenaries, although it is difficult to ascertain their excct nimber. There are recent indications that the Kataneose Government if again recruiting new raerc^nari^s. In connexion with thin, on 7 January Jjaticasl Radio of Ldopoldville broadcast an announcement that one Katancese agency is now recruiting mercenaries in the Gouth of. France. It seemed that the agency was located in Toulouse. . • AP/ids 16

(General Rikbyo)

This news was confirmed by a report received from OliUC on 8 January. One United Nations employee,, travelling from Paris to Brazzaville on the UAT flight, B&I-/ in the same plane a group of Frenchmen i'rcm the South of France, numbering between thirty and thirty-five. On arriving at Brazzaville, the United Ilations employee learned from a reliable reporter that these tr.en were mercenaries who had "been recruited recently• /.ccording to this reporter, they were to disembark at Brazzaville where a special plane was waiting to transport them to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia, and from there they would continue their journey into Katanga. It was later confirmed that this special plane, a EC-6, left Brazzaville with thirty-five passengers at 10.lp a.m. on 8 January for Ndola. On 8 January, the National Congolese Radio of Leopoldville rebroadcast a dispatch from Reuters Agency in Paris which confirmed this news, as well as that the French police had made certain arrests at Toulouse in connexion with certain recruiting activities for mercenaries for Katangar You rcay have seen reports in the press about sorr.s arrests made "by the French police in connexion with thcG2 recruiting activities, We are now ^formed by our United Nations Information Centre In Paris that on 6 January the French police broke into a hotel room in Toulouao which was being used by a certain Paul Robagnol as a recruiting centre for Katanga mercenaries. Robagnol is a French citizen discharged from the army after the 1959 insurrection by certain army officers in Algeria. RobGgnol was accompanied by a secretary and several would-be recruits. He had been inserting announcements in regional papers for the recruitment of servicemen and young men free of military service for work in Central Africa. Robagnol and his secretary are being prosecuted before the French courts next week, charged under the French law which prohibits recruitment on French territory of persons for forces for any foreign Power. This information was brought to the attention of the British authorities who have informed us this morning that a UAT aircraft requested permission to land at Ildola. This was refused and the flight instead landed yesterday, that is, 8 January, at Livingston where already UAT has landing rights. This aircraft was carrying thirty-six passengers. The nationalities were nine Belgian, AP/ida 17

(General JUkhye)

one Spanish and twenty-six French. The Spanish and French passengers did not have proper papers; therefore, they were refused permiccion to land. --The Belgian passengers had proper papers;'they were allowed to land and continued vith their journey. The aircraft returned to Brazzaville with the French and Spanish passengers. • On 26 December, the Secretary-General asked Mr. George Ivr».n Smith, who was then in Eli^abethville, to convey his satisfaction on the implementation of the first part of the Kitona' agreement and that he hoped that Mr. Tshombe would, without delay, give practical meaning to point 8 of the declaration by indicating the steps he would take to eliminate the remaining mercenaries in '• Katanga, which could "be done by public declaration that the services of the mercenaries are no longer desired "by the Government of the Province of Katanga, and that the mercenaries will no longer receive pay of any kind from the Government. This message could only "be delivered to Mr. Tshorrbe on 33. December, Although Mr. Urquhart has since met with Mr. Tohombe a number of times, Mr. Tshcmbe has not offered any views on the future of the mercenaries so far. I will now describe the arms and ammunition captured by ONUC troops during recent fighting in Katanga. About 10,000 rounds of various kinds, mostly made in Belgium; some hand grenades; one anti-aircraft ho millimetre Bofors gun, made in England; twenty 6.5 millimetre machine gunc; six 8l millimetre mortars, I understand that a list of captured arms has Juct been distributed to you, therefore, I will not go into the other details of this document. The last point I have been asked to speak on is the present position in regard to the Secretary-General's request for additional troops. In notes verbales of 8 December 19(jl> the Secretary-General requested twenty-six African States to provide troops for the United Nations operation in the Congo. Many of these countries have not yet replied; some have replied negatively. Two countries have given a positive answer: Tunisia and Sierra Leone. Prior to this request Ghana had already informed the Secretary-General that it would send a new contingent to ONUC, AP/ids 18-20

(General Rikhye)

The Tunisian "battalion was airlifted to the Congo during the period 20 December to k jsnuiry. It consists of 5*4-7 QH ranks, Sierra Leone will provide one company of four officers and approximately 100 men. It is our latention. to airlift this company from Freetown to Leopoldville as soon as they have completed their preparations. The estimated tine of departure is about 20 January, For administrative purposes, this company will be attached to one of the Nigerian battalions. The Ghana battalion is now ready for departure. We are working out transportation arrangements and we hope to airlift the battalion between 17 and 20 January, or coon thereafter. The total strength of ONUC today is 15,669. After that arrival of Ghana and Sierra Leone contingents, the strength will increase to l6,420. 21

The Acting ' SECRETARY-GENERAL ; The floor is now open to the members of the Committee,

Mr, mtLERUMA (Nigeria): First of all I should like to refar to the instructions I have received from my Government concerning" thev ; situation' in which we find ourselves, The message is very brief, but it iu comprehensive. My" instructions are that, at the meeting of the Advisory Committee, my stand must • be as follows: (a) the United He, ^ Ions cannot treat vith the G over rune nt of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which is not sovereign, Therefore the Secretary-General ' should not accept any invitation to discussion's in Salisbury, (b) If the • • British Government, vhich is' constitutionally responsible for the Rhodesian Government^ external affairs, dec ires a discussion, it should take place in Hew York, betv/een the British Foreign Secretary and the Gecretary-General or in London if the Secretary-General's preoccupations permit, (c) Tho Nigerian Government insists that the Kitoha Agreement be implemented to the letter. (d) The Nigerian Governnont fully supports the stand taken by the Acting : • Secretary-General. ' ' • '•• . Those are the instructions of the Nigerian Government to me for cnimuni cation to the Advisory Commit i;ee» •' ' : ' The position of tlr 'Northern Rhode si an Government is very unfriendly, as we have seen on more than one occasion. Of course, we are here to advise you, and • in view of the Incidents which happened in Ndolo. and the fate of the late

Secretary -General, Mr8 Eag Haintdrskjold, I feel sure that nobody would advise the Acting Secretary-General to go to Northern Rhodesia to discuss anything at • all, even if it was an independent country. Of course, 'Northern Rhodesia is not an independent country and therefore the"' instruction of the Nigerian Government is very categorical, We read in the New York Times that Sir Roy Welensky is preparing a dossier • of the atrocities and 'illegal actions by United Nations troops, • If that is 'the attitude of the Government of Northern Rhodesia, if they are compiling a -list"' of crimes and offences committed — according to' 'them -- by United Nations troops, what is the purpose of discussing this question with a representative of the United Nations? I do not know whether they want the Secretary -General or hl'sv representative to be taken before a court or what, I do not know -what 'they mean, but their attitude is very unfriendly, • : ' ' ' GR/Jpm 22

(Mr, PTgilerumn, Nigeria) If the British Government feels very strongly that this matter should "be discussed in the presence of Sir Roy Welensky, if the British Government would agree Sir Roy helensky could accompany the Minister for Foreign /Vf:Cal-.-o of the United Kingdom to New York in order to discuss the matter with you; since it is a matter of International importance, I am sure the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom could come here, i^ necessary accompanied-, by Sir Roy ? Welensky, to tell yov. vftat it is all about0 Perhaps Sir Roy VJelensXy s argument will be that the "border is very wide and it is difficult for them to control it, but all the same it is for hin to come and toll you thisj nobody will expect the Secretary-General to £,0 alon>; the "border tc see whether it is wide or whether it : is narrow0 If you go to Sal. .Efoury or to London or if they ccme here to New Yorfc, you will sit in an office a'.iu discuss matters of policy; you are not going to travel along the border, and I therefore see no necessity for you or your representatives to go to Salisbury for discussions, The General AsrjcmhJy adopted a resolution appointing a Corrr.ittee to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Dag EcLiucarslcJold, No report has been produced, this is a very delicate matter and we do not know -what will "be the conclusions cf the reports Therefore, it is very unwise for aryone to discuss this matter in any way with Sir Roy Welensky. I must repeat that if Sir Roy Welenslcy is co-operative, if he wants to discuss the matter with you, he should come with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is a matter between you and the Minister for Foreign _'Affairs of the United Kingdom, not between you and Sir Roy Welensky. In this connexion I should like to raise again a small point to which I have referred sonic tixie ago, namely the question of information. The Prevident of Katanga is in a position to have an office here in New York to obtain information on what is happening in the United Nations arid also to distribute false propaganda intended to mobilize the opinion of the United States masses against the United Nations with a view to discouraging the United States Government from supporting the-United Nations, This being the case, I wonder whether the United Nations has given some consideration to the possibility of publishing a daily paper or Lome other kind of publication to educate the masses. If the masses in the United States of America are unaware of the purpose of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, I am quite sure that many people in Africa do not know the genuineness and sincerity of the United Nations. So perhaps the GR/Jpm 23-25

(Mr. Ngilerumn, Nigeria) Secretary-General may consider whether the United Nations should not perhaps publish some daily paper with a view to educating the masses, I know that there are United Nations patnphlets and documents, and these are ava:ll?Jble to the public, but I have to admit that I myself cannot find the time to study them all. But if there were a paper published by the United Nations exclusively to educate the public here In America an'l all over the world; people might read It and compare it with the Now York Times, the .Herald Tribune, and other papers. All this is with a view to giving information to the people. NR/Jvm .^ ' 26

( M

Another matter vhich is very interesting in connexion with Cir Roy Welensky is this. He does not want an observer of the United Nations to go to northern Rhodesia. We have to ask ourselves whether he has something to hr'.doo If he has nothing to hide, why should he raise any objection? All the Secretary- General has asked is to be allowed to send some observers to see if weapons are sent through Northern Rhodesia to Katanga. That ic the only purpose. If Sir Roy Welensky has nothing to hide, why should he raise any objection? Why should he ask tiie Secretary-General to come to discuss it? What are you going to discuss with him? The purpose is very simple. You want to send some people to be stationed at strategic points to s?e whether weapons are carried to Katanga or not. Go, if he has nothing t:> hide, the answer is very simple: he should agree. But for him to raise inter -national complications, saying the Secretary-General should be invited or a representative should come -- this all seems very silly to us. These are the observations I wanted to raise j Mr. Secretary- General.

Mr 4 JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, after the statement by the representative of Nigeria we do not have to say very much. I ^hl.vk he has brought out all the salient points arising from your statement this afternoon very clearly. I will confine myself briefly to some observations on the three important points that you have brought before the Committee. The first was the question of the invitation to you by the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyas aland which has been extended through the United Kingdom Government. We entirely agree with the representative of Nigeria that the Secretary-General should not accept this invitation. The acceptance of this invitation, especially in the context of the statement made by Sir Roy Welensky, apart from anything else, is not really worthy of the position of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations. Apart from that, there are other implications. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is not an independent State, and we should be very careful, especially in the context of all that has happened and is happening in that part of the world, not by anything like a visit of the Secretary- General to give enhanced political and international status to that Government. It has also to be borne NR/JviD -•-" 2?

• ' ' -' (r/ir. Jha, India) in mind that our late Gecretary-Ge"neral died in circumstances which are still to be cleared-by the investigation-commission. For all these reasons it Is also cur advice that you should not visit the Federation of F^odes!?,) It is understood that the invitation has also been extended to some official of the United Nations. Now, that to some extent might stand on a different footing, because officials might be able to dlecujo matters.with authorities on a de_f

provided you think that there could be at least some advantage in the United Nations official going and seeing places for himself, end I hope that he will be shown the various arrangements, if any, that they have made. We would be glad to leave that to your discretion. There is one other suggestion made in this note, and that is in the last paragraph, in which the United Kingdom Government says, referring to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyacalnrid, that they are, however, prepared at once to extend the existing arrangements whereby Fxed Crocs officials inspect all the traffic going to Katanga from Ndola to air and road communications between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, it they are asked to do so. Here it might be an advantage for the Red Cross to extend this kind of inspection, but we do not ::..-jcw wliat tiny are doing at present. What sort of inspection are they extending to rail traffic? What is the objective of that inspection? Are they authorized, to look into packages and goods traffic and see whether any arras are being carried? Provided you find from further inquiry of the International .Red Crosr. what is the exact nature of their inspection, and if it comes about that that inspection extends to both goods and personnel and can be fairly meticulously done, this seems to me an aspect which c^v.'.

(Mr, Jha, India)

Then we come to the question of.mercenaries. The position there, in spite cf the disclosure that some mercenaries have left or have been forced to leave or thu.t some were not allowed, to proceed, I must confess, seems to be a very alarming situation, and it is on this question of mercenaries that the entire bonr fides of Mr. Tshombe anu of others v;ho are behind him rests. It seenio to UG obvious,_in the light of the latest attempt to send mercenaries there that ail is not over and that uc may, the United Nations may, get into positions -where it may find itself embarrassed or where it may have to take action of the came nature as it was forced to take L. month ago. This problem seems really very dangerous and, as has been insisted in the Security Council and elsewhere, the problem of mercenaries still remains the core of the Katanga problem and ve have to do everything to eliminate and to resolve it. We "would suggest very vigorous representations to the Government of France. It is good to see that they have made some arrests, but that is not enough. I think that it has to assure the United Nations; it ought to assure the United Nations that the United Nations has the right to ask them to get all information as to- the precise measures, anticipatory measures, that have been taker: to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries, and their forward dispatch to Katanga« It is not enough,.it does not seem to us enough that some arrests are made, that some noise, is made and that some action is taken at the moment when . something is found out somewhere; that is not enough. I think that safeguards have to be taken and these have to be sincere and honest and as foolproof as possible. I believe that it is possiuie for every Government j for the extensive aim of the lav and the polic,e,.to see, that this sort of thing aoes not happen at all. II^w, for.example, can some Frenchmen recruit and go en recruiting for months in Toulouse or wherever it is without their having an office or a place of business, without his contacting various people? It surely is not beyono. the capacity of the Secret Service arid the police, the normal police of any government, to find out that these things are happening and to give sufficient information to its Government to enable it to take measures. DR/wrb ;>2 (Mr. Jhi, Inaia)

It is also very alarming that ail these mercenaries pass through Brazzaville, and it certainly grieves us a great deal that there is an African country which has permitted either knowingly 01- unknowingly -- we do not know yet -- the passage of mercenaries through its territory in spite of the clear resolution of the Security Council -- and I am referring to operative paragraph f; of the Security Councille resolution of 2k November read .with operative paragraphs 7 ^-nd 11. Thece really amount tc an injunction to the State not to give any facilities or assistance in the matter of the transit of mercenaries through their States. We would suggest for your consideration that a communication should be addressed to the Government of the Congo (Brazzaville). This is a very serious matter. There have been reports of this nature "before that traffic to Katanga has been going through Brazzaville. Of course, we did not have much proof of this, but this particular incidence is something on which the Secretary-General could base an appropriate communication to that Government. And it is our hope that that Government,like every other Government, will co-operate in the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council. \ve entirely agree with the suggestion made by our colleague from ijigeria that it would be a good thing for the United Nations to bring out some kind of a -weekly bulletin for public consumption not only in the United States, but also elsewhere too; perhaps this aspect might be examined. It "will have the advantage not merely cf putting the correct facts before the public, but also of acquainting world public opinion with the tremenaous work not merely by way of the action through the United Nations force, but even more important perhaps the great work in the technical assistance field that is being done by the United Nations in the Congo. So I "would wholeheartedly support that., and perhaps you will have this matter examined by your experts to see if something could be done in that direction. DR/wrb —-_. '•£>.

(Mr. Jha, India)

V/e see a long list of arms and ammunition which were captured by United Nations troops during the December operations in Katanga and it is not clear to us how an anti-aircraft gun with British War Office markings happens to be in Katanga. One can understand Pelgian arms because these could have been there from before. But there is quite a lot of arras and ammunitions of British manufacture and one anti-aircraft gun -with British War Office markings. This really lends point to what has been said ell along that there has been traffic of these commodities through the Federation of -Rhodesia. However, this is something, especially the presence of an anti-aircraft gun with British War Office markings, which night need further examination and investigation, and possibly proper contacts with the United Kingdom authorities. as regards the question of ANC troops, that is a matter which raises several questions of principles, the juxtaposition and the relationship of ANC forces with the United Nations forces. On this point, Mr. Secretary-General, I am not in position to give you the definitive opinion of my Government at this stage but it ocean to us — and I am speaking purely tentatively -- that joint operations in the sense of two separate armies under two separate disciplines in the Congo would neither be desirable or feasible. There is the question of command. V/'ho is going to command these joint forces, who decides upon the tactics, who decides upon the strategy? Is it not likely that there will be bickerings as to the details of operations? All that kind of thing comes in. So far I speak only tentatively at this stage, but I believe that my Government will not view with favour joint operations in the manner that is indicated or that is suggested by ANC forces. Of course, it is fully recognized that the ANC forces are the forces of a sovereign State and there is no detraction from that position. But on the question of joint operations, that is to say, the two forces acting side by side in the pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations,that seems to us an extremely difficult and in many ways a not very desirable process. DR/urb/gd _._ 3^-35 (Mr, Jha, India)

Then there is the other point about the absorption of a battalion Of AIIC forces in United Nations forces under United Nations discipline. From the point of view of discipline that seems less objectionable, but here again it seems to us that this is in some ways a very radical departure from the principle and practice followed hitherto. The position of the United Nations force has been like that of an attached third force and not mixed up with the fractional armies or even the Central Government„ Co I do not sr.y that that is something which is likely to be harmful. I cannot make any allegation of that nature at this stage. But we feel that that also is something about which you might go slow. You have already accepted that, of course; there the metter roots. But in view of certain political developments that ire going on, the possibility of an accord being reached, although the eighth point there, the point about the mercenaries, is likely to prove very difficult ac far as we can eee. Nevertheless, it seems that perhaps it is best, having accepted the offer, that there is no qui^k effectuation o,- implementation of it. I think that it would be wise to t'juie a iitvfcle mo.ve time to see how things shape up and then perhaps one might be able to decide in the light of the circumstances thrv'; have arisen; there may be some more radical considerations of this whole question of the precise relationship between the ANC forces and the United Nations forces. HA/rh -,,,. 36 • • (Mr. Jha, India) I should like to make it clear "that this is not a criticism of what you have done, Mr. Gecretary-Oeneral. After all, vhat you have done in merely a token matter, involving only 1,000 men, and they could certainly "be used on garrison and guard duty at a place rather remcte from the trouble spots in Katanga. I assume that steps could be taken to ensure that these are a source of strength and not a liobility, as undisciplined forces are sonetimes likely to "be. I have ventured sto 'express some General considerations, and I should like to cay again that these need not be taken as the definitive views of my Government at this stage. •• That is all I have to say at this t?.me> Mr. Secretary-General. I vculd only conclude ly saying that ve fully support, in general, all the actions that you have taken GO far. We ho'-:e that while there 13 this''temporary lull, the posssibility of a political rapprochement and that kind of thing, your 'officers in the field are fully alive to the fact that all the dncgers may not be over and that the indications of various 1: iritis that we get -- the latest' being these attempts to smuggle mercenaries into Katanga -- should be duly taken into account, I hope that the United Nations will not be caught napping if Mr. Tihombe, as is liis usual habi'!:, should break away from his word and his premises.

Mr. BOTANP '('Ireland')'; I have a number of points that I should lite to •••:••,'>-. mention briefly. I should 11 Irs.' to uay,firct, that I fully agree with the case which has been ' argued so cogently by our Nigerian and Indian colleagues against the Secretary- General's going to Rhodesia to meet £ir Roy Welencky. I agree with the reasons which were advanced in favour of that"view. I fully agree with my Indian colleague, however, that the arguments do not apply with the same force to a United Nations official's going to Rhodesia to explore the possibilities of getting increased co-operation from the Rhodesian authorities. I quite agree that there are reasons of principle and protocol against that being done, but I think we should adopt the pragmatic approach and not stand too much on punctilio.' ' I think that, if there is any chance at all of getting co-operation, we should explore it and 'should do everything possible to secure the co-operation of the Rhodesian authorities. The fact that far Roy Weldnsky's attitude is' unfriendly, as the representative of Nigeria described it'— and I thought he used HA/rh •- 37 (Mr. B oland, Ireland) a very charitable term -- should not, I think, deter ust Nor should we be deterred by the threat that Sir Roy V/elcnaky has evidence of misdoings on the part of the United Nations troops. If he has evidence, let us have it, V/e should not be afraid at all to hear whatever evidence he has and to go into it and establish the facts. On the vhole, therefore, I agree -with the representative of India that, whereas it would perhaps be a mistaken course for the Secretary-General himself to go, I would not S'>2 the spme objections to his designating an official of the United Nations to go to Rhodesia on his behalf. Like Ambassador Jha, I ain quite prepared to leave that matter entirely to the judgement of the Secretary-General. The second matter to which I wish to refer is tiie question of co-operation between the United Nations Force and the ANC, or the incorporation of any detachment of the ANC into the United Nations Force» I can only express a personal view on this, because ny Government has not considered it and I have no instructions with regard to it. However, my belief is that my Gc"'eminent would view any propose..! for co-operation between the United lotions Fores and the ANC, or Qnv proposal to incorpoiate detachments of the ANC into the United Rations Force, with considerable doubt and apprehension. At an early stage of the Congo operation, it was made clear, I think, that the United Nations Force would maintain its independence and would not act in competition or in co-operation with any local troops, including the troops of the Central Government of the Congo. I think that is a principle which is worth maintaining* I think that the proposal to incorporate a unit of the ANC troopc into the United Nations Force would mark a new departure, which should be avoided so far as possible* If it is a small detachment, and if it is localized in a particular place, that might not do so much harm. But I think that the introduction of ANC troops into the Province of Katanga under United Nations auspices, at- a time when the future relations between the Province of Katanga and the Central Government of the Congo have yet to be fully agreed upon and negotiated, would be a mistake, and one which the United Nations would be well-advised to avoid. My third point is that I wish to thank Brigadier Rikhye for the account he gave us of the evidence available that mercenaries are being recruited in France and flown "to Rhodesia through Brazzaville. I think that is a very serious matter and that perhaps we have given too much attention to Rhodesia and Angola, and not sufficient attention to Brazzaville. But what I found disturbing in his account HA/rh --. (Mr. Bo.land, Ireland) was that, when the plane finally landed at Livingstone, a number of the pQ^r,cnp,erc were refused permiscion to disembark but the Belgians on board were found to have proper papers and were allowed to proceed. I tbirk it is a pity that we do not have evidence as to what precise papers they had, /s we know, the Belgian Government is anxious to prevent that traffic and is doing its "beet. I think the RhocLesian Government must knew that, and I would wonder what criterion of judgement the Rhodesiun Government ex.crcisei — and I think it was the Government of the Fed^r.-aticn that was involved -- in deciding that these Belgians ' papers verc in crrler and that they should be allowed to proceed. I must say that I found that a rather disturbing feature of the account given to us "by Brigadier Rikhye in regard to that flight. Finally, I should like to raise two specific questions. As you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Secretary-GeLV'ral; there is now a "hold-fire"; there are no active hostilities going on. There are, however, in the hands of the Katanga forces a number of United Nations personnel -- ma,r'.n.ly, I think, at Kipuchi. • Thera are a nuirb^r of Swedish troops involved, I think there are two Norwegians, there ore tv? Irish, and I -Uiink perhaps one or two others. BH3/bg ~"~" 111 (Mr, Bolanfl, Ireland) I wonder whether it is possible to negotiate, consistent with the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, an agreement with the Katp.ngecse authorities for the release of those troops, I would be grateful for any information that you could give me as to the steps which have been .taken towards that end. Finally, I wonder whether it would be possible for us to be piven an account from the map or the principal rcut.es from Iihcdesia into tne province of Katanga, or perhaps they are so numerous that it is not possible to indicate them in the course of a brief demonstration. We hear about the passage of armoured cars, jeeps,, and so en, from Rhodesia into Katanga. Could we have seme idea of the precise road routes that or^ capable of handling that kind of traffic?

Sir Muhammad. ZATPUr.TA KT.IA.N (Pakistan): Mr, Secretary-General, we are very grateful to you an.! to Brigadier Rikhye for your statements and for the information you have glvo-.i us. which is very valuable o I shall not take up too much time cf the Committee ac the questions we have to discuss are very- important and I pm cure there must be many other speakers who wish to express their views on various Expects of those problems, I shall state our view's very briefly. I strongly support the suggestion made by my friend on my left with regard to the weekly bulletin. You will recall that I have been rather strong on the strengthening of publicity, I think this would help us a great deal.. I am happy that, as you are aware, my Government has been able to comply with the request made by the United Nations with regard to supplying another ordnance platoon, which will be ready to be lifted by 15 February, Wow with regard to one of the major questions which you have posed for our expression of views this afternoon, tho main problem concerning Northern Rhodesia is to find a means of achieving our purpose. I agree completely with my colleagues who have spoken before me that this is not a case where the Secretary - / General should himself proceed to Northern Rhodesia for nny conversations with that Government, For reasons stated and for other reasons which could be stated, this would be inadvisable. On the other hand, you could at your discretion take advantage of the indications that have been given to you to find means of BHS/bg

establishing contacts which might .appear, to you to be suitable in order to explore the possibility of resolving this, positive' threat to the achievement of United Nations .objectives in the -Congo, I agree in that • respeofc w;Lth . Ambassador Jha and Ambassador Poland. I shall not attempt to say who or at what level we chould nominate or in what manner, but we think that the . -: possibility should be explored. It wculd.be wise to do so. The situation is such that some: solution must be sought to be found rather thp.n that we chould. stick too much, to technicalities and so on. . : •I too feel rather apprehensive with regard to the suggestion that, the contingents of the ATIC chould bs associated with the United Nations forces* .- -.. On the other hanrl^. I have no rear1. on to triple that you and your advisers are . , not fUlly conscious of those difficulties, and I am sure that you will approach that problem wisely. . • . . • I-orn greatly perturbed with regard to what has been eaid on the cnestion of the mercenaries* I. wish very respectfully to endorse what Ambcsse/lc/r Boland has said. That question is of equal, if not of greater, 'importance than any. of the other problems that you have raised this afternoon, Again, I fcave_r*o reason to doubt that you Ere alive to the necessity of terminating, that source of •-.-...., disturbance in the already disturbed conditions of the .-Congo, .

• • Mrt/GEDRR-EGZY (Ethiopia):. .1 just have a few points; and soijie of them , are in the form of questions. . .With -regard to the .letter from the British . . Government^ I .was wondering whether the , same thing could be achieved by stationing observers on the Congo side of the border in. Katangese territory, I do not know , what the difficulties or the shortcomings would be if that were done, I would be very interested to find out precisely whether we can station control posts on the side of the operation, that is to say on Ccngolece territory. The second point in 'that connexion is that, quite frankly, I find the statement from the Federal authorities to be very impolite and very inconsiderate, if I may say so. I shall have to decline for today to express the position of my Government, and if you ask for it, I shall then have to bring it to the attention of my Government and convey it to you, BHS/bg 43_li5 (Mr. Gobre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

My next point concerns your statement, in which you said -- I did not hear

it very well and I do not want to put words in your mouth -- I believe( , that the Rhodesian authorities never challenged part of your allegations. I would like to get further clarification on that matter BO as to understand the exact situation. Next, there is something that puzzles us about this question of the 1 implementation of the Xitona agreemente We are very much cfrs, '/! that they are buying time once more, in other words they are building up somewhere else. Although one m£y say constitutionally this is the affair of the Congolese, we are very much concerned that they are taking their time purposely in order to have more time to build up their strength end to attack the United Nations once again. We are very apprehencive about this and W3 would like the United Nations to take all the necessary steps to p.void such a build-up. With respect to tLe question of the mercenaries, there is something that puzzles me, if I b.eard the statement correctly. I thought I heard Geneva! Rr.khye Bay that there were twenty-five mercenaries, of which nineteen were released end six were killed. We know that there are a number of T.Tnited Nations troops in captivity by the Katangese or by the mercenaries. If that is so, then there should at least have been an exchange. I would say that the mercenaries should not be released at all, because if you release them they only return. This has happened in the past and it will happen again. But what chould happen is at least that they should be exchanged for the release of United Nations prisoners. They should certainly not simply be released, if I have correctly understood the statement. MW/db U6 QMr« Gebre-ffgzy, Ethiopia)

Then there is the question of the new mercenaries. Thirty-six of thorn are supposed to have gone "back. Of coii^£;«^? it is "bad that, a "brother African country should allow this. I think that tbe matter should "be taken up very strongly vith their Governmeuto In my opinion, passports and visas ere issued "by the Central Government of the Congo, and the Rhode^isu authorities, onse th^y found that this w.ifj not co, should not have left the nine Belgians to proceed "but should have sent ih-?m 'back, 'Ihe issuing of passports, according to my knowledge of the Constitution, io the pxevince -of the Central Government* Therefore, I think that this should "be taken up inLiodiatcdy irith the British Government GO that proper action can "be taken, In connexion with tlie participation of Coagclsnc troops, Recording to ray. recollection, I V33 the on* tfio first "brought this f;uo£jtion "be.fr,i-o the Cornmittee. V,Tc still 22ainb".j.n ou1;- poci^x.^n, but- we agree vith you that the United Nations Force chculd maintain ti';e di3eipl:'.ne« Cf course, it ic all \-ery veil to have 1,000 or

2,000 troops an •; contri"butioji; Juct like ours• or fiat of India, "but I tliinjs it nay "he goiiig too iar and may disrupt tlie. discipline of the United Nations troops if the Force has more then it can handle. On that point we should like to have come information regarding the training of the Congolese troops, I should like to know exactly what is happening in that ro^or-is We have one of our gs.uorels there and I oftsii vor.der vhether he is boiuG used properly — if not, he can join the United Nations troops, . • Next, thare is the cuestion of Red Crocs irr/olveccnt as re^arcio this traffic r between Katanga <:r_d Phodesia<, This pu z:-leB raa0 I did not know that Red Cross people hod the authority or even the me^rrj of doin^ this sort of Job, On the second pace of the statement "by the Government of the Federation of.Rhodesia ve find the following: "*»<» to extend to air and road communications "between • Ilcrthorn Rhodecia and Katanga the preLicnt Errsngeme.nt whereby Red Cross cfs'icislg inspect all rail traffic goinr; to Katanga 1'rorr. IiTiola«Tf On wha.t authority does the P.cd Crooc carry out such work? I am r.lso pus7.1 ed "by a state.Lient on the first page of this satto- dotJUTont, where mention is made of the trade between Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, Again, I feel that such traffic trade should be authorized by the Central Government; otherwise, it should be stopped. MW/db 1*7 (Mr, Gobre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

, I think that there is a legal question involved here "both as regards passports and as regards trade "because, under cover of trade, it is obvious to me at least, one could send whatever one wished, In connexion with the Red Cross situation I should like to have some amplification. Finally, I should like to say that, of course, the United Nation-3 needs publicity, or at least dissemination of exact information. It will "be recalled that ve were the victims of, if I may say so, pome rather dirty publicity on the ptirt cf Katangose authorities and of some other very foolish people who joined them., I vac glad to hear you say today, sir, that all that vns sheer fabrication, as ve l:/n?w all along*

^I^rllP^-^rl^.^ (:~'ongo (Leopoldvillc)) (interpretation from French): I •wish to tha'ik yc^., Mr* Secretary-General, for permitting me to speak, and also to liiank the representatives of tiie countries vho nave spoken "before me. This is the second time that I have attended a meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Congo and I have already had the opportunity of expressing our appreciation of the assistance 'Which the Cosnni uteo has extended to uj., I wicli again to egress my gratitude to the ncmbero for the efforts which they continue to exert in helping us to GoJ.ve our present difflcultiese I have no statement to moke which would be any different from what we have just heard; nevertheless I hiwe a proposal -which vould supplement the series of measures which already hr-ive been toks.ru Day after day a rapprochcm-nt is being observed in the settlement of the political aspects of the situation in Katnuga, 1-Jliile yesterday ve heard, that the eicht points of the declaration had not been recognised by -che. Provincial Government of Katanga, today the I*re3,f3 of IT'^w Yci-k reports that there remains only one last point which must obtain the approval o:? th.e Ann-mo.ly of i:.'.;:a.a^. T^QG there are always evil elements that intervene. Vie are \jell ocquairr'ood with the enemies of our country. You will see how they are trying to turn aside 'bhe intelligent proposals which you make. But anything tbey may do will not discourage us, The Congolese Government conaidsrn that i;h? r^fuca]. of Bhodecia and Portugal to place United Nations observers along the border of Katanga province confirms MW/db 1*8-50 (Mr » M1 B ay o- Paul , Congo (l-eopoldvlll**. ) )

the suspicion of traffic In veaporis frozi Angela fir.d Kbodusia towards Elicefoethville* This refusal is a violation of th'j resolutions cf th>; U.'iitad Nations vLrleh its llornber States are 'obliged to respect. Tne position of the United Klin^a-ora estGniehes us especially since that country IE a permanent cicmber of the Security Council r.nd IB thus doubly oblirsd to ccnply Td.th recolutAons. The United Kingdom ' b.35 fi^iirn^d on ri-'-ny occasions that it complied with the obligations incumbent i:yon Me;;./.::: Stotcia. Tue roouaGt of tao Secretary-Central is fully •wlt'.iJ.n his validate and the rop2.y from that Government constit'ctes a violation of the Charter. The sane applies to tlic p:."ohr,bition of United Itations aircraft from flying over, vliich prohii.bitl.on he .1 "been dee;;'ji;.;.'U:d. The inyltaiion e:;ten'.^:d "by tr?5 Unit eel Kingdom Coyerriiient to you, Mr. Secretary-Ge'^rsl, to vicit Salisbury cannot be cccep-bod» It is by such niethodG that a r-:nid Gad eflicienb solution of the problem before uc is "being cast aside. I vould request members cf the Ccccnittce to consider whether the situation an it slancLs now does not cell foi4 tho convening of a meeting of the Security Council. AP/kb 51 (Mr. M'Eoyo-Pa-ul, Conp.o (Leopoldvllle))

The United Kingdom must have pracsvre brought upon it. It must not shirk before the resolutions of the Security Council, It i-3 regrettable if tliat were to be BO. This could bring about very serious consequences in Africa. The declaration which I have just made shows the confidence which the Government of the Con^o (Leopoldville) has placed in you. With respect to the action you have undertaken vith the Gcverrrncntu of tlie United Kingdom and of Portugal, I would surest, Mr. Secretary-General, that you consult the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Mr. Nyerere, with respect to the possibility of placing United Nations observers under the same conditions as the other two countries with whom you had made requests, since •rang-inyika is also a neighbouring country of the Congo. The acceptance of placing observers in that territory would large!1/ inconvenience the British Goverrjjient. I cor.r;ldcr that this proposal would m^et with the approval of the members present bare. The Congolese Government has noted, not without astonishment, the replies given to the Secretary-General to his request for assistance which he had made for the transport of troops to Katanga. Such a position is one that would justify those who have a lack of confidence in the United Nations; it vould compromise the spirit of co-operation which we wish to see established between the Central Government and the United nations. Th3 intention of the Central Government to have the Congolese troops in the Katanga operation is dictated by psychological motives, namely to give to our population the assurance that the Central Government is taking to heart the overcoming of the Katangese secession and wishes to take part in the activities. The Congolese Government has a sacred duty: to safeguard by all means the integrity of the territory Or the Congo. I would wish to say one further word on the convening of the Provincial Assembly of Katanga. Out of respect for the fundamental freedoms, the Central Government had decided that the Provisional Assembly.of Katanga should be convened at Karaina and at Elisabethville a minor Assembly could be convened under conditions which would be deprived of any guarantees — and this ehows the lack of United Nations support for the reduction of the KatangeGc secession. It should be noted that the presence of troops of the National Congolese Army in Katanga can not in any sense be interpreted as a military operation conducted by it against Katanga. But the Government has ordered its troops to intervene only in the event of legitimate self-defence against the attacks of the mercenaries serving in the ranks of the Katangese gendarmerie. AP/kb 52

Mr. BARNES (Liberia); I should first wish to be allowed to say that my delegation is happy to have back with us here at Headquarters Mr. George Ivan Suith whose experiences in the Congo and particularly in Katanga pave us all pain and distress. Whilst we deplored the injuries he suffered, we are thankful to a merciful Providence that he came to no greater harm and injury. In regard to the invitation extended to you, Mr. Secretary-General, by the United Kingdom to visit Salisbury, I would say that niy delegation would be among the first to encourage any efforts which would have the effect of seeing the implementation of the Security Council resolution with regard to mercenaries, amis and equipment finding their way back into Katanga. However, it does not appear to ine that ycur going to Salisbury would in cny shape or form assist in the implementation of tM-s resolution. I believe that when you addressed the letter or spo!-;c to t:,r_ repv*,tentative of the United Kingdom on this question, you vera convinced that arms, mercenaries and other equipment vere finding their wsy back into Katanga over the borders of Rhodesia. So that, if you are being requested to go to Rhodesia to inform yourself on the conditions there, then it implies that the purpose is to have you fulfil the functions of the observers. Aside from the fact that this would be beneath the dignity and prestige of the office of the Secretary-General, it would be physically impossible for you to do so. Therefore, I do not see any usefulness or utility in accepting the invitation to go to Salisbury if, for the purpose of going there, you will have to be informed of the situation; and the only way the information could be gleaned about this matter is by having these observers posted on the borders between Rhodesia and Katanga. With regard to the integration, if I may use that word, of some of the ANC forces into the United Nations forces in the Congo, I would want to be the lact to object to this arrangement for the reason that you have sought to do so becaus3 of the insufficiency of United Nations forces in the Congo, My Government's contribution to the forces hc.ve not been large for the reason that we do not have a large army ourselves, and so those of us who have not contributed very materially to the operations in the Congo would not want to insist upon any arrangements which would deny any effective operation in the Congo by the use of ANC forces. But I should like to say I believe that the United Nations forces went to the Congo for the very reason that the ANC forces could not execute their own responsibilities. The United Nations fox'ces wei-o requested to go there because the ANC forces were undisciplined and untrained. It was felt that unless AP/kb ~^" 53.55

(^r> P^rnes, Liberia) there vere forces other than the AIIC forces in the Con~o, chaos would continue to exist. Now, I am wondering whether by the use of these AIIC forces it implies that these forces are trained and that there vould be no necessity for the training of the AKC forces. The second thing is that there have been many resolutions of the Security Council to the effect that the United nations operations are not to enforce a, political solution of the situation in the Congo. If the AIIC forces are being used, they can only be used for that.purpose -- for a satisfactory result in the political situation, which means that the United nations would, be brought under criticism that it is not complying with the resolution c.f the Security Council, vhich is, to u.-.iiiy'-.^in law or to restore lav and order, but it is trying to effectuate the restoration of the political situation in the Congo. The third considero.tion is that it seems to me that if you use one faction of forces in ths country againnt another faction, that implies a civil war. So that, the United Nations will be lending itself to criticism that it is participating in a civil war in the Congo by the use of the AIIC forces. It is for these reasons I believe that th^re should be some hesitancy in the uce of AKC forces with the United Nations forces in the Congo, However, I must admit that unless you get sufficient forces from other countries to assist in these operations, you might find it difficult not to use these AHC forces. . <***«-! ef

GR/ids

__ (Ghana): On "behalf of my delegation I should like to make a -few remarks on the points you have raieod. Lik0- others which have epoken earlier, my delegation is very strongly opposed to your accepting this invitation from Gir Roy Welensky. On grounds of protocol and constitutional propriety alone, it vould hardly "be in keeping with your position to accept such an invitation. Sir Roy Welensky is Prince Minister of a non-self -roverninc country who GO foreign arcl international relations are handled "by the United Kingdom. For thor-:e reasons alone, as I have said, it is unthinkable that you should even consider accepting such an invitation, "but over and above that, and more importantly, I think .^.ny positive response by you to such an invitation would give the impression that you were condoning Sir Roy Wclcnksy'c ^liberate flouting of tbo Geci.'.rl'.-.y Cov-ncil resolution. At the Gam: time;, it vould give the impression ttut you v-jre t-,\ing seriously the -- if I may say so -- .ir responsible allegations that he has been making against the United Nations operation. It would also giv^ \.he appearance that the Security Council resolutions were in some vay negotiable, which they are not. On the other hand, ray delegation has no objection to the suggestion previously put forward that you night send a representative to negotiate not the principles but the modalities concerning the stationing of observers along the Rhodesia-Katanga "border. If you were to make a vigorous effort to this end, and if you wore to base yourself on the willingness of the authorities to provide similar facilities to Red Cross officials, I have every confidence that you might succeed. In regard to the question of the use of AHC forces, my delegation shares the objections that have been raised against joint operations. There are various political, military and administrative- reasons which work against such an arrangement. However, ths incorporation of selected ANC contingents in ONUG seems to me to be a different matter. . My delegation has previously suggested that you might examine the possibility of using such contingents in the Force in the hope of alleviating the manpower shortage, in the hope of giving them in-service training, and in the hope of permitting you to disengage other national contingents for use elsewhere in more responsible and active operations. GR/ids "" " 57

(Mr. Dadzle, Ghana)

I appreciate the force of the raiGgivi:j£oexpresse d by previous speakers, but it seems to my delegation that those misgivings could be met if the contingents were directly subordinated to ONUC; if they were used exclusively in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, if they were used in police duties in pacified areas where there would be no chance of their indulging in revenue-ceekin^ activities and reprisals. For these reasons my delegation does not really share the misgivings expressed by other delegations about the incorporation of ;>.NC contingents in the United Nations Force, on the same basis and under the same comiiand as other national contingents. Such an arrangement must, however, be clearly safeguarded by the imposition of the :--ame conditions upon those contingentc; as c-.rs imposed on other national contingents in the Force.

Mr, LAFIAN (Indonesia): Although I have not received specific instructions from my Government concerning the invitation from the Prime Minister of r\hcdesia; I think I shall not go far wrong if I go along with the position taken by previous speakers and oppose the idea that the Secretary-General should ro to Rhodesia, by reason of the same considerations as have already been mentioned. The Indonesian delegation can agree with the suggestion of sending observers to Rhodesia, but if efforts in that direction are not successful I would ask the Committee, and you Mr. Secretary-General in particular; to consider the idea put forward by the representative of Ethiopia, namely to investigate the possibility of sending observers to the Katanga-Rhodesia border but to station them on the territory of Katanga. If that is possible I think it would avoid the difficulties of discussing the question with the Rhodecian authorities. I was a Irctle shocked to hear from General Rikhye that mercenaries are still being recruited in France and perhaps also in Belgium and the United Kingdom, because such actions are obviously in contradiction with the resolutions already adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. I agree with the representative of India that it is not sufficient for us to hear from the French authorities that the recruiting agents have already been arrested in France. We should take a stronger position and think in terms of sending a GR/ids •"--. 50-uO---' (Mr. Lapian, Indonesia) protest to the French Government and to the Belgian Government, and, if it is true that tha United Kingdom is also involved, to the United Kingdom Government also. These actu are clearly in contradiction with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Sweden): I shall he very brief. iMy delegation has already had a previous occasion to inform you that we were not in favour of the incorporation 'of AI'IC forces into the United Nations Force, so I do not have to repeat that now. Concerning a joint AftC-ONUC operation, I have instructions from my Government to sny -uhat we object strongly to that joint operation and in this connexion I would I.Ike to quote a passage from a statement mad>", "by the late Cecretary~Genr>r:-;l, Jor/Das 'i'.-immarskjold, on !;> July 19^0 in the Security Council. I think that wiv:.1; he caid then is ttill valid; "The authority granted to the United Nations Pores cannot "be exercised within the Congo either in competition with representatives of the host Government, or in co-operation with them in any joint operation. This naturally applies a ^fortiori to representatives and military units of oth^r Governments than tha host Covernnar.t» Thuc, ths United Nations operation nuct "be separate and distinct from activities by any national authorities." (Security Council Official Records, Fifteenth Year, SupT)leme:it- for July, Au^ur.t c.nd ' KR/Jpm _._ 6l

Mr, RITCUIE (Canada): Mr, Secretary-General, I think perhaps there

has been s oca thing like a ccn3enous of opinion; if I nay say co; here today vith regard to the invitation forwarded "by the United Kingdom authorities in connexion with your visiting Salisbury for discussions with the Rhodesian

authorities and with the other possibility Of an official of the United Nations proceeding for exploration of the issues involved^ My Governnent is in agreement vith iny colleagues here. We feel it would be quite impossibJ-e and quite inappropriate of course for you to go to any such meeting; "but we also feel that it is quite in the tradition of the United Nations to pursue any opening for conciliation and for negotiation which may "be presented, even if it means departing from the strictly fornvd protocol position;, Thcrei-'-^o wo hope thit tiiis m^yV} possible., j/^Gi-r-vVarly as the United Kingdom communication in its first paragraph cpeal-is of o.lscucL'r.ng "all aspects of traffic1' across the border. We think that this is come thing we shou3_d have another looli at, and we hope that

it m?,y "be possible to explore these possibilities 9 Wi>:;n regard to the other issue under discussion, that of a joint operation in whicl;, AL'C components of the Central Government of the Congo would be involved,

I an afraid we cannot agree that that would "be desirabley for the reasons which have been very well set forth "by others who have spoken before me. We also have very considerable misgivings about the wisdom of incorporating in the Force a unit of representatives of the Central Congolese Governnent AEC, particularly if they were allowed to proceed to Katanga,, Vie think that would leave the United Nations operation open to a great deal of criticism — and in saying this I am in no way derogating from the sovereignty of the Central Governnent of the Congo, of course, but I am speaking only in connexion vith this operation,

j( ^ 2. (Guinea) (interpretation from French) : Mr0 Secretary -General, not having previously Lad the opportunity to state publicly the position of my Government with regard to your policy and attitude in connexion with the operations in the Congo, I am hr/ppy at this time to express the satisfaction of tlic Government of the Republic of Guinea at the fact that you arc determined to respect scrupulously the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the Congo,. as has besn apparent since you assumed the highest poet In the United Nations <> My Governnent and my Head of State NR/Jpm 62 ( Mr« Diallo , Guj nea) have had the opportunity to inform, you of their eyr.ct fool-ings vj.th regard to the situation*. Of course your etl/l.tuCe, :ir0 Score cary--Gcne.rcJ., Is not tlie only decisive elemant in the solution of the Con^o problem, !-%y Government follows with, attention, with interest and with sympathy your attitude and your efforts Gill it hopes that, the autior.3 of your c.i 7'':.csc.ries and the adversaries of the Console* 9 people and of the United Nations policy in the Con^o will not triumph. '

1 aci b'.v-vy to coiTvfirm to you here officially tLrit ny Coverar.cnt; in close co-cpeiv,ilon with friendly Africa Governments^ is followlnc very closely your attitude and it hopes that that atbituda will rnake it pofiDi^.le to contenplate a further exojtilr.Tt,loL of their ov;n pollcieQ with respect to vjat has. "been the r United Nations ooer i'Mon in •I'.'oe Con^o up to nov0

With ie^;.a::.i tc \:;:,at ^v-u nave sc.id totey, MrP GecretcMyêneral, I shall ts very brief c. Firri1!:. of a.'.'.'.'., in. ro^.i.:_-0. to the invilatiori froâ l"ae Federation of Rhcdecâ and ITyacLi(\ancl; t-he r:aôr.ity cf the opiiiioss livvo already ljeV:n expresnec^ and a unanftmous agreement seor;?; to anitirge from the deliberations of this afternoon, I shall Ginrr.ly add two or three more reasons'* The dcleâuion of Guinea of course shares t;;.e point of view of ell the cthors -fco the effect that it does not appear to be appropriate- for ths Soc^.-ctary-Cenci-a."!. to reply afllr-â.t1,ve.ly J;o t.U.s invitation., Howevar, one of the reasons which, it seez.s to us^ has not been advanced GO far is a reason of principle0 Indeed it chciu.d "be recalled here that there is an extremely serious ciiallon^, in the United liitiotis, rGcarding the status of the Federation of Rhodes:! aa Indeed :'i.t will \& recalled that during the flrct part of the oi::tecr;th session ri'.uifirous cVile^-ibioi\s, inc.lucli.n3 my own, found thomss.lves in oriposition to the United Kingdoî Goveriiraant in regard to the exact ctatus of Rhode c-iao VJhcn VTG cal.l.ed for information on there territory; the United tCin^.om Governnieut expressed. Its opposlt:'.ori0 We "believe that an affirmative reply by the 3ecrat;ary-0cneral ar> rerar.lr, the riossibility of accepting the invj.t.;tioa from the Fri-sil/lerit of tl:o rederation Eifj'lit be interpreted as concurring with the position cf the United Kingdom Government, Iliis is only a reason of principle, "but my delegation thought it worth vhile to

Factually the rey.cona are numerous0 The moot eG&ential one appears to us to be the clear-cut anl unequivocal attitude of the Government of Rhode s.ia^ which has already replied negatively to your requejst, Mr. Secretary-Ceneral* -_...^ 65-65 (M^» Diallo, Guinea)

For all these reasons, my delegation fully associates Itself with all those vho have preceded us in. expressing; Jclie "belief that it is not desirable that an affirmative answer be given to the invitation of the United Kingdom. In this connexion, ve wlch to say hov apprehensive we are over the attitude of the United Kingdom, Vie rece.ll that last September It was also the United Kingdom ^ovcrnmerit — and in fact a member of the United Kingdom Government — tJicit acted as intermediary In organizing the fatal rendezvous of tlic Socretary-

Ceueral, Hr0 Eeijjiiar^.-jold, In Mo.1a0 These are facts which are too much present in our minds for us not to bring them out, and the attitude of the United Kingdom, according to ti:e statements of hirp. officials of the United Nations In the operations in Katar^s,, are efficiently troubling0 Tnereforo -'-.Le nr,ture of the reply of. the Secret -u'y-G-eu-,rul in this connexion should l>e "beyond any doubt. With regard to the inci.'cenaries, the role of an African country has been evoked here. Vo were among the flrut to show how the Brazzaville tu:n~':^,ble wac playing an j.nportant role In the Katanga secescion. At the tJme ve were criticised as extrornists^ "but I think it is quite clearly established that BrazisaviJJLs Is playing an Important and Indeed capital role in the Katanga secessions DR/jvm 66 .

(t::r. Diallo, Guinea)

It would be desirable, in the view of the delegation of Guinea, for very energetic action on the part of the Secretary-General to be undertaken with the Government of the Congo (Brazzaville).. I should like very briefly to put three questions. 'The first one is as ' follows: the Acting Secretary-General has told us that Mr. Ralph Dunche being present, he could answer all our questions. Mr. Bunche took part in the discussions at Kitona. Very numeroijs and differing commentaries have been made in the Press concerning those (iincusGicriG. Could Mr. Bunche tell us whether, yes or no, Tshoinbe has in fact signed the eight-point agreement? Because we have heard that the contrary is true, one is finally persuade?, that it is so. I have not had the opportunity of meeting United Nations officials a.nd to put this question 'to tl",.".a. We know very well how Mr. Tchouibe has specialized in retractions, and we think trat it would be useful for us to hear from the primary source j.tself if he freQly signed the eight points of the Kitona agreen:ent. That is my first question. The second question is the following: we have learned from the Press and in fact from this morning* s newspapers that news has come from Leopoldville concerning the first Vice-President of the Council of Government, Mr. Gifcenga.' Is the United Nations Secretariat in a position to tell us exactly what is happening at the present time in Stanleyville? I put this question particularly since in an article which appeared in Th^ Hew York Times this morning, there is a portrait of Mr. Gizenga described by the representative of the. United Nations in Stanleyville, Therefore, I believe that there is a niinimurn of contacts between Fir. Gizenga and the United Nations authorities. It would be desirable for UG to know what is the latest in the situation there. Finally, my p.ast question is as follows. The representative of the Congo (Leopoldv.illa) referred a few moments ago to a lack of co-operation between the United Nations executive and the Central Government of the Congo. I did not fully understand his thought because the exchange of views was made very rapidly. I should like to have some explanation of this, taking into account the satisfaction that we feel regarding the manner in which the Acting Gecretary-General seems, in cur opinion, to have conducted United Nations operations. If the representative of the Congo (/popolcbr^lle) present here thinks that this manner is not satisfactory, my delegation would like to have information on this. These are the three questions that my delegation wished to put to the Secretary-General. DR/jvm """" 67

Mr* JHA. (India): I am sorry to take the floor again and I ehall be very brief. It has struck me as I heard the views of ray colleagues around this table, practically oil cf whom felt tlwt there ras no hnrm In scndf'jig a UN official to look into the question of the frontier arrangements for control through the Federation of Rhodesia, and I was wcnclerirg whether it would not be a good thine for you to take up diplomatically with the United Kingdom authorities that the visit of this official and his talks, particularly his talks with the Rhodesian authorities, should be in the presence of United Kingdom representatives and he should be associated with these talks. It seems to me that that would take care of the constitution'';.l position of the responsibility of t*.-.^ United Kingdom Government and it might also be helpful. But I en just leaving this thought with you to consider; I.am not making any specific proposals. It might perhaps be a ^ood thing because the Government of the United Kingdom, as has been pointed out "by several representatives here, is undoubtedly responsible for the external relations of the y-rderation of Rhodesia, I should plso like to suggest that we should make it clear that the contacts of the United Nations official, should you think that comsone should go there, should be strictly within the framework of the penultimate sentence of paragraph 2 of the United Kingdom Government's note. We do not want this official to be regaled with all kinds of allegations that Sir Roy Welensky has been making and that he should get involved in controversies concerning that matter. We do not think that any of those allegations are entertainable; they seem to be very one-sided and rather wild. I think it should also be made clear in diplomatic contacts with tho Uuited Kingdom representative that the visit, if you are thinking of sending some one, should be strictly within the scope of what has bc-en stated in the United Kingdom1s note, and no notice should be taken of the statement made by Sir Roy Welcnsky on k January 1962- Ambassador Boland brought up a very important point, that is to say, how is it that the Belgians who were in this aircraft were allowed to proceed? Their papers were said to be in order. Hew can the papers of any mercenary be In order? In other words, what lies to be looked into is not the mere paper, the mere formality of passports or visas. 60-70

(Mr. Jha, India) It is incumbent in the context of United Nations resolutions that Member States should go further into the matter and satisfy themselves where they have any doubt or where there might be any doubt that tho persons proceeding to the Congo ere or are not mercenaries. It seems to me that this matter could also be taken up with the United Kingdom Government. Certainly some more information should be secured such as: what sort of papers were there and in what capacity were they going there, whether they were going as Union Minicre officials? Sometimes the cloak of Union Miniere employment has been used for getting mercenaries into the Congo. The last point that I wish to ir.cke was to support very strongly what Ambassador Boland said aboiit the fate of United Nations prisoners with the Katanga authorities? In ivds connexion, I should like to mention here the great concern felt by my Government and my country over the fate of Major Ajeet Sir^h, and I would hope that every further effort would be made to get correct information about this officer, whether he is alive or his whereabouts. I saw something in the papers to the effect that Mr. Tshombe had told Brigadier Raja that he would make every effort to locate Major Ajeet Cin^h. I should like to know if there is any truth in that. In any case, I very much hope that he is alive and that no stone will be left unturned to find the particulars about him so that we would know whether he is alive, which of course would give rise to great rejoicing, or we will know the worst. Adequate action should be taken to see that there is no recurrence of such incidents. HA/wrb """""" 71

RJ[~2i'^^: Ber°re Iwin d UP the discussion; I feel that tiiere are certain aspects or the United Nations activities in the Congo vhich could better be dealt vith by come of my colleagues here. I think that one representative here has asked whether it would be possible for one of us to indicate on the map the routes leading into Katanga from Northern Rhodesia . On this matter, I think the beet person to answer vould be Brigadier Rikhye. I therefore would request him please to indicate on the aiap the routes leading into Katanga from Northern Rhodesia.

Brigadier RrKTrxrE: The routes leading from Northern Rhodesia into South Katanga are the following: first, the road link between Mwinilunga and Kolvezi; second, Kas'ianshi V-.ines to Kolwezi; third, Kipuclii to Elisabethville; fourth, a road and rail li.:k from Sakania to Elisabethville. There are various points o.C entry from the east: Kabunda, a road link; Kiniama, another road link; and lastly, Kasenga, also a road link. These places have been marked, on: the map vith blue strips of paper, and we will leave the map there for the inspection of anyone who is interested.

Mr. BOLAND (Ireland) ; May I just ask one question to follow that up. It has been suggested here that inspectors, instead of being stationed in Rhodesi- > might be stationed on the Katangese side of the frontier. There are,, I think, seven or eight roads there. AS I understand it, South Katanga is in Katangese hands, and it would not be possible to station United Nations road inspection groups on those roads in oouth Katanga -without a major military operation, which would mean a move by the United Nations out of Elisabethville into the whole of South Katanga, including Kipushi and Kolvezi. Am I right in so thinking? I believe the Secretary-General said that there was evidence that the French commander in charge of operations hoped that the United Nations would do precisely that. Or am I wrong about that?

The Acting SECRETARY -GENERAL: Brigadier Rikhye said that. HA/wrb 72

moment, the only point of entry that we control into South Katanga is the one leading into Elisabethville itself from Kipuchi — as a matter of fact; from all directions into Elicaoethville itself • We are, however, not in control of any of the other points, and, as indicated by the representative of Ireland, it would be possible at present to reach those points only by carrying out a military operation, unless, of course, the Kutangese authorities agree to the United Nations' stationing observers at various points. If such an agreement were arrived at, it would be necessary that the United Nations inspection teams should be accompanied by sufficiently large garrisons for th^ir protection — which, again, will have to be related to the size of the Iv~t anger e gendarmerie vhich is located at different places. In fact, it would require another operation, which is under examination at the moment by CiTJC as veil as by the military staff here.

1 The ActJ1ng_SECRg AgY-GKrTERj\L: Regarding another point that was raised, in connexion with the training of the ANC, I think that Dr. Bunche would be in a better position to make a few observations.

Mr* BTWCHE; This question was raised, as I recall, by the representative of Ethiopia. I had several discussions in Leopoldville with General lyassu, who returned to the Congo, at our request, for the specific purpose of being in charge of the programme for the training of the ANC. General lyassu has worked out a detailed plan for that purpose and has had discussions on it with Congolese authorities. He has not been able to go forward with the first aspect of the programme, which is to set up an officers1 training school, because he is lacking the basic core of French-speaking officers, well-trained officers who are capable of training other officers for this purpose. He needs immediately fifteen veteran French-speaking officers, to get started. We have now an urgent request to the Government of Canada for such officers. We tried in the past to get officers for this purpose from Switzerland, and we were refused. General lyassu will need HA/wrb """' 73-75

(Mr. Bundle) considerably more than fifteen, "but he could get started with an initial complement of fifteen. We are hoping very much that we vill get a favourable reply from the Government of Canada to the appeal made directly to the Prime Minister "by the Secretary-General, If those officers are forthcoming; General lyassu will be able to get started.

The Acting flECROTaPY -GENERAL : As to an issue raised by the representative of Guinea, regarding the ICitor.a talks and the agreement, I think Dr. Bundle "will be in a position to clarify that.

Mr. B'.'lTCrir.-j Firrro of all, I think that, although we constantly do so; it is probably more accurate not to refer to v/hat transpired at Kitona as an 1 J "agreement '. I ; was not a joint agreement -- that ±3f it was not something signed by Mr. Adoula and Mr, T.Ghcmbc. It was a declaration signed by L'r. Tshombe alone; although on the understanding that it was acceptable to Mr. Adoula -- and this \:as ascertained in advance. In the course of the discussions on this declaration; which took a whole day and night; Mr. Tchonibe at first wanted to make a conditional declaration; namely, one subject to ratification by the Assembly of Katnaga. This was objected to strenuously by Mr. Adoula, vho pointed out that it would be incongruous for the law of the land to be subject to confirmation by a provincial assembly*

. I:, BHS/rh " 1C - • ' (MiyBunche)

Subsequently, Mr. Tshombe, explaining that he had not had time because of the conditions in Katanga to consult fully with Katanrcce authorities , wished . to append a footnote to the declaration which was signed. This was after agreement had been reached on the eight points, which Mr. Tchcrnbe' was willing to accept and which Mr. Adoula would approve, as he put it, as a minimum statement by Mr. Tshcmbe. There had been other points which had been requested by Mr. Adoula which were dropped in the course of the discussions, Mr. Tohoinbe wished to put this condition of consultation as a footnote on the declaration. . This was unaccepted ,2 to Mr. Adoula* Finally it was agreed by Mr. Tshombe that he would sign the declaration without any condition on it, but that in transmitting it to r.3 ha vould Indicate in a letter that he h^d not had full opportunity to consult an,"1, .would wish to inform his people vhsn hG returned.. However, he did not claim in this letter that ratification was necessary to confirm his E.p;.^oval of the declaration. I have the signed declaration .here and also, the signed letter.. If you are interested I can pass them round the table. They were signed "by Mr. T^licmbe at 2.30 in the morning. 'hc ,J?.et_t-f r__uorQ pa s ned round^tij|,e^t able . ) You may note that the letter transmitting the declaration addressed to me was signed by Mr. Tshombe as President of the Government of the Province of Katanga. His signature appears over this. The declaration was transmitted to Mr. Adoula -- this was also a part of the package — by me in a letter which made no reference to the fact that Mr. Tshoate was gcinj to inform 'his people when he returned. Mr. Tshcmbe in fact approved the text of the letter by which I transmitted the declaration to Mr. Adoula. While the letter is being passed round, I might say that you have seen statements in the Press about what has br^en said by Mr. Tshombe concerning the Lo i f cr/.l am.en t n. 1 o . I would like to emphasise that in the course of the two days at Kitona, the one statement which Mr. Tshcmbe reiterated most frequently and unqualifiedly was his acceptance of the Loi fondsreentqlG. This was the ctock answer if the question were put to Mr. Tshcmbe, as I myself put it to him, "Do you give up the claim to secession?11, Mr. Tshciibe replied, "I accept the Loi fond omen tale" . He made this statement to me on at least three different occasions. He made it at the meeting across the table to Mr. Adoula. He made it to anyone who would raise the question. There was never any qualification vith regard to this. BE3/rh '"•"- 77

Thank you. Another point raised in the course of the discussion related to the functions of the Red Cross units in the examination of foodstuffs end other commodities coring into Katanga. On • this particular issue I think Mr. George Ivan Smith would be in the best position to reply.

M^J^''-~j^: The representative of Ethiopia was quite correct in • - aseua-ii^g that one could not ask the International Red Cross to exorcise any general border control. That was not done. The cases in which we sought the aid of the International Red Cross were strictly related to a number of specific humanitarian functions. They were short of food in Elisabetr. -."ille and a request was made to "o.ring r^i:d? trains in frcin Rhodesia. The United Nations had no way of checking thc-na trains c/t tha border and asked the International Rsd Cross if they would certify that those trains carried cnJy focdstuii's. The same was done with regard to sonic trains that the authorities wished to bring up to carry refugees -away from Klisabethville. We wanted to have some assurance that tL.-,V were in fact empty carriages. These vere the only cases in which the IntvT rncitional Red Cross vas ua^d.

^__SECRE?ARY-GEirF!Rf\L ! Thank you. The representative of Guinea raised a point regarding today's nswsrarcr statements about Mr. Gisenga. Perhaps our colleague from the Congo (Leopoldville) could make seine observation on this question o

Mr0 M 'BOYO-PAUL (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): Vie have no precise information on this subject. Vie got the news from the newspaper like" everybody else.

Tho, Actl-ncr'ljEC^ETARY-C-ETrjRAL: Thank you. The representative of Guinea also raised a question sbcuu the statement wade by the representative of the Congo (Lebpoldville) to the effect that there has been an absence of co-operation between the United Kations reprcsentc.tivca in Lcopoldville and the Central Congolese Government. Am I correct in understanding that your impression is that there has been c-.n absence of co-oporaticu "between the United Nations representatives in Leopoldvillc and the Central Government? BHG/rh ' 78-80

Mr. M'DQYO-FAUL (Congo (Leopcldville)) (interpretation from French): One can only ir.akc a deduction after reading the section of the text which I have read out. It is a text which I received frcra Leor.oluville. The representative of Guinea said that I read it out very quickly and that he did not grasp it, and I shall therefore repeat it. It soys: "The Congolese Government has registered not without astonishment the r^ly Civon "by the Secretary-General to its request for assistance in transporting its troops to K:ito.n£p." There must be a letter from the Central Government addressed to the Secretary -General. I cm unaware of the text of that letter , but I do see here that the Central Government requested, the United Nations to ceal with the transporting of ANC troops to Katanga, and apparently this wr^: refused.

The Acting GSC^TA^Y^GECTAL; Thank you.

- Mr. rJ-3TIEP.TjMA . (Nigeria) ; I do not want to raise anything new. I wish. to support the representative of the Congo (Leopollville) in his suggestion that. the possibility cf establishing an observer in Tanganyika should be .explored. Now. that we are agreed that the ceixUcs of an observer to Northern Rhodesia. is necessary, although we do not think that tiie Secretary-General should go, I feel very strongly about exploring the possibility of sending an observer to Tanganyika. I am quite cure an observer in Tan? r,nyik

. . - Mr, ADEEL (Gudan) : I find among the documents that you have been kind enough' to.. circulate to us an obscure tclegrom from Mr. Gir.cnga to the Prime Minister. I do not knew what it really means. Perhaps it was put here by accident. . •

The Acting nECRFlTARY-OEKEFiAL; We just present this as a document for the knowledge of the members cf the Committee. I shall ask Dr. Bunche to give sane background en this document. 81

Mr. BTTNCHEt It is an interesting letter, "but not a mystery. It was put in deliberately for your information; we have, in Tact, a pliotostatic copy of the letter, and it came about in this way. Cn the Sunday night before the Kitcna talks I was in. the homo of Mr. Adoula, who had just that evening returned from Eukavu. When at Dukavu he had been handed this letter, written by hand by Gizerga, who had asked General Lundula to deliver it to Mr. Adoula in Bukavu, which Cenoral Luiidula did. Mr. Adoula and Mr. Bomboko were discussing the letter which Mr. Adoula had shown to Mr, Bombo.ko for the first time, and they passed it to me. I said that it was a rather historic document and that I would like to have a oopy of it, Mr, Adcula thereupon said that he would provide me with a photostatic copy. I thought he Loci forgotten it, but after my return to New York it u.f.s sent by pouch from Leopold ville. We thought that it would be of interest to Vne neitfoers of the Committee, and so we gave you copies.

Mr, rC'sLLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I do not wish to press the point, but in view of the events of the last few hours and the fact that the representative of Congo (Leopoldville) has no adequate information in this connexion, I would esk whether the Secretariat has any information regarding the situation of Gizenga in Stanleyville. I do not press the point, but if such information is available it would be interesting if you would chare It with us.

The ActJnE SECRE^APY^-GT^TE^AL-s First of all, I wish to bring to the attention of the Committee the fact that the newspaper reports this morning were confirmed by my representative In Leopoldville, This report was that Prime Minister Adoula had told Mr. Gizenga this morning — that is, today — that Parliament had decided last night — which was Monday night — that he should return to Leopoldville within the next forty-eight hoars to .appear in the Chamber and explain his absence and his activities in recent times; otherwise he would lose his post in the Cabinet, This is the message which we have received Just now. MW/bg 82 (The Acting Secretary-General)

Regarding the other points raised in the discussion this afternoon, I have noted that there -is complete agreement on certain issues. The first unanimous agreement is that I should not go to Salisbury on the terms set by Sir Roy Welensky. There is complete unanimity on this point* Thpre coems to be seme cono^nauc of opinion that the possibility of ay sending a deputy to Salisbury should be explored in the context of ths United Kingdom GovernmentTs reply, but not in the context of the statement made by Jir Roy Welenaky. I shall keep this in mind and I shall give very close consideration to this recommendation.

There is also a unanimous opinion as to'the imdeoirability of Joint ;. United Nations-ANC cj-o^ei-:..''i:Lon iu Katanga, If I underrA-cod correctly, all the members of the Coimnj.ttee wbo have participated in the discussion this afternoon are against the United Nations launching operations in Katanga jointly with the Central 'Government fs. ANC at this stage* This, it would be cl>r,crvcdj coincides with ny own vie:;s as stated in my introductory remarks. In tV_3 context -I wish to reply to the representative of Congo (Leopoldville) end to stute why the United Nations has refused to n^lp to .transport the Central Government's ANC troops into Katanga. Since we have not decided to accept the offer of the Central Government, to launch Joint operations, in Katanga, I think that the providing of transport facilities for the Central Government's AKC troops into'Katanga is out of the question^ Tliere seems to be a division of opinion regarding the inclusion of a battalion of the Central Government's ANC troops in the United Nations Ccmicandj which I have accepted at the request of Mr, Adoula. This, of course, has been stated in my introductory remarks. For this, I take the sole responsibility. Anticipating the approval cf the Corrimittee, and having in mind the observations made by the members, I will see that their eaploymont and their utilization under the direct corcmnd of ONUC is guided purely by the suggestions offered by the Advisory Committee. MN/bg 83-85 (The Acting Gecretary-Creneral)

. Another point which has been brought to the attention of the Committee is the need for greater publicity of the activities of the United Nations in the Congo* I have made it clear on previous occasions that I am very conscious of the need to employ all available means of publicity in order to put across to the general public the United Nations point of view. With this in mind we are preparing a White1 Papc-r -- as it has been termed by several Governments — purely on United Nations operations in the Congo, and this publication will be ready sometime riKxt week. It will be ready for the Press in both English and French. It is my intention to have ten:; of thousands of this text printed for ES wide dissemination and publicity as possible both in this country and in Western £uropeB Regarding a r.ur-..-T2J.ticv'. to brine out a weekly paper dovoted solely to United Na-clone activities in the Congo, I chall keep this in mind and, after the necessary consultations with my colleagues in the Secretariat regarding certain aspects concerning editing, financing and distribution^ I hope to be able to present the arrangements at the next meeting of the Advisory Conanittee, As v,o the mercenaries who journeyed from France to Brazzaville and from Brazzaville to Ndola, I have to report that I have launched a protest to the three Governments already — that is/ the Governments of Francef the United Kingdom and Congo (Brazzaville). Replies are awaited.

Concerning the need of stationing an observation group in Tanganyikaf my first reaction is that there seems to be no immediate nesd for the stationing of United Nations observers in Tanganyika, but I can assure the Committee that I chall give further thought to the suggestion, AF/el 06

(The Ac 11nff Sccrctn ry-General)

I hope I have dealt with all the major issues raised in the CcEsmittee. There ia one further point about the necessity of negotiations for the release of the United Nations armed forces in Katanga, These negotiations ore going on and I an hopeful that they will be successful "by resulting in the relecso of the United Nations prisoners now in the hands of the Katangase authorities*

Mr,_ roiLEPlTMA (Nigeria): I am very sorry to take the floor again, but I would Just like to raise the point of the bulletin. I em not only talking about the "bulletin for the Congo and the Katanga activities, but I am thinking of the

United rations activities in gencralc For exampley the Unitej risbions is cioing a great deal of good ^ork in the eeoncnic, social and mnr.y other fields. But "when- tlie question o.f ^i^niu^ the bonds was raised, even in a country like the United States, the reaction of the general public was rot favourable. This, to my mind, is because of lack c£ knowledge and lack of public information passed on by the United Nations. Thon I began to consider, if this is the situation in G corntry like the United States vhere the Headquarters itself is established, what will be the reaction of ether countries in Africa, in Asia and in other places.. This led me to the bringing of this matter to the notice of the Secretary- General so that either a daily, preferably a daily, or a weekly bulletin, written in very simple le.nguage -- not in any technical language -- which the General public can read a?ad can understand, not only in America but also in other parts of the vorld so that they may know -what th'=j United Nations is doing for them. I am quite sure that there ia a £reat deal of ignorcnce GOout the activities of the United liations which are really useful for the interests of marJiind, but people do not know about them. Many people rely on local n-3vspapcra but they do not take the trouble to read ths United !\-tions documents, perLicularly about technical assistance or the other social and educational activities, . The United Nations should give consideration towards the establishment of a paper, daily or weekly, depending on the financial ability -of the United Nations, to educate the public so that it might know the usefulness of.the United Nations. At tbe moment inuny people think that the United Nations is only useful for the small nations and that it is not useful for the big nations. We feel strongly that the United Nations is doing good work for big nations and for small nations but AP/el __ 87-90 (Mr« TfoilerumB, Nigeria ) the general public does not know It. That Is why tile general public in America is criticizing its Government c.nd doing many thing B to discourage the Government in its good support of the United Nations ao in the case of the buying of bonds, Tliis is what I mean, not only the activities in the Congo and in Katanga "but in a very wider field so that the United nations may "be able to educate the public* I krov it is a -very big thing and also th^t it involves a great deal of financial and physical activity; Perhaps the Secretary-General may give consideration to it, bearing in mind the usefulness of the bulletin,

The A c t in^ GECr:^T.AR'.^r^rgpt A ^ . Generally I agree with the contention that the United Nations sliould >.•<; luoro cor>.cerned to get across the United Nations activities sensibly co the nan in the street not only in this country but in other countries -coo0 Put I feel that while there is a real need for more publicity end r/ore information media to be employe;!, ve have to consider the other aspects of the problem too. For instance, another newspaper or a weekly journal put, out "by the United Nations which is primarily meant to educate the public -v.voh respect to the activities of the United Nations will not convert, if I may say so, millions of diohards in this country as veil as abroad to the United Nations point of view, To illustrate my point, if ve published a newspaper in the French language, and we print one million copies and distribute or sell them . in Franco, this will, not change the French Government from its present attitude of refusing to buy bends. At the same time, of course, any publication by the United Nations explaining in very clear terms what the United Katior\3 has been doing in the Congo, for instance, will not influence a man like Senator Dodd frcra his rigid opinion regarding Congo- Ifetangese problems. My point is that there are, of course, tvro schools of thought in this country generally speaking, r,s in other countries. One school cf thought sees the United Natiors as a neutral, if I nay say eo> Asian-African ^loc which should' not be encouraged; rightly or wrongly this view has been held very widely. There is another school of thought which sees tue United Nations ao a really effective machinery for the settlement of dicputes without war. They see the

United Nations e.3 the only hope for the future 0 These people will support United nations activities whether we have a newspaper or not. The first group which I mentioned above, who see the United Nations in tb.elr own light, will not be easily swayed by any publications of the United Nations. OR/MI ~"~" 91

. . , . (The Ac tin p; Secretary-General)

Of .course, I agree with the Ambassador that scr.tf sort of attempt should be raade to present to the public, more concisely .and more clearly, the various activities of the United Nations, but this has already been done through the medium of our United Nations Review which is published every month. I also agrse with the Ambassador that a monthly publication is not enough, so I will Give further thought to the matter. But the printing of a daily newspaper, involving perhaps scores of editorial assistants and probably millions of dollars every year, would be a very difficult proposition for us in the present stage of our development. However, I will give serious thought to the suggestion and perhaps a weekly or forthnightly publication may hs possible. On this I will obtain tlia ro'lvioc of the relevant authorities in the Secretariat, and perhaps I &ay be able to present the developments to the next meeting of the Committee. - ' .

Mr. GE7il?]j]-5G5Y (Ethiopia): May I return to a questiora I asked about mercenary ^s, and their being released. Perhaps I did not hear correctly what was stated.

General RIKHYB; I said earlier that the final figures of civilian foreign personnel captured or killed in Elisabethvillc were: 28 captured, out of whom 19 were released after interrogation. These were civilian foreign personnel, not mercenaries. After interrogation the 19 who were released were found to have had no connection in any way with any of the activities which are banned under the various Security Council resolutions and the other 9 are still under interrocation. We do not yet know whether any of them ar2 mercenaries, or at any rate it can only be established after interrogation.

Mr. GEP.RE>FG'"Y (Ethiopia): Had any of those who were released fired on United nations people?

General RIKHYE; No Sir. GR/hh 92

Dr^ JFUNCHE t I could give an exarrple in ansvcr to your question. While I was in Leopoldville ten Belgian cilivians were brought in from Elisabethville. They had been taken in the Sabena gucct-house in the course of the fighting. Their clothes and shoos were muddy and the troops suspected that they might have been involved in the fighting* When they were brought to J-.eopoJ.vlvil.le nnd interrogated, it was established beyond r.ny question, and to the full satisfaction of our people, that they were legitimate Sabeiia employees — technicians and so on — and that they had not participated in any way in the hostilities. They were promptly returned to their jobs in Elisabethville*

The A^'^'vlJ^^C''^'^!?-''1^1 * w-~h to thank the rcernbers of the Advisory Committee for tholr very valuable and constructive suggestions find observations &n'J. I fesl rea3.1y gratified that generally the United Nations operations in the Congo have been very heartily endorsed by this Committee.

The irsotln^ rose at 60?5 COHFIDKI7TIAL Meeting No. 66 ?)<• April 1962 ENGLISH .

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 2k April 1962, at 10.JO a.m.

In the Chair: U THAM1 The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL Members: Canada Mr. RITCHIE Ceylon Mir. MAIALASEKERA. Ethiopia Mr. GEBR3-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. ZAKARIA Ghana Mr. QUM30N-SACKEY Guinea Mr. DIALLQ India Mr. JHA Indonesia Mr, WIRJOPRANOTO Ireland Mr. BOIAND Liberia Mr. BARKES Mali Mr. EA Morocco Mr. BENIIIMA Nigeria Mr. KGILERUMA Pakistan Mr. luUIDANI Genegal Mr. CISS Sudan Mr. EL CANOUSI Gv;edcn Mrs. ROGSEL Tunisia Mr, Taieb SLIM United Arab Republic Mr. EL-ZAYYAT Congo (Leopoldville) Mr. MBOYO

62-0927^ AE/ids £.5

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; We have not been together officially for quite some time. In fact, this is our first meeting since 9 January. I have not called a meeting earlier because there has been very little to report to you or to discusG with you regarding the United Nations operations in the Congo. During recent weeks, the situation in the Con^o has been unusually quiet and ONUC's attention has been concentrated on bringing together Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshcmbe, with a view to having them conduct talks in order to effect a reconciliation of their differences. It had benn my intention to call a meeting of the Committee as soon as seme important stage in the talks had been reached but, as you know, although the two leaders have been meeting in Leopoldville for approximately a month, nothing concrete has as yet emerged. The meeting today has been called for two purposes: First, the new Commender of the United Nations force in the Congo, Lieutenant General Kebbede Guebre, is here in new York, with us for a few days. He has come for consultations before proceeding to Lecpoldville to assume his command. Seme of us already know General Kebbede and his distinguished career. May I point, out that this is not the first time that the General is tincociGted vith en activity of the United Nations. For fourteen months in 1951 and 1952, he served -- and I might add, with great distinction — in Korea as a Commander of the Ethiopian Kagnew contingent. After the Korean campaign, he returned to his country, where he assumed the functions of Governor of the Province of Ogadan and Commander of the Third Infantry Division in 1955; Commander in Chief of the Ethiopian Ground Forces in 1958; and since January 1961, Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian Armed Forces. I consider it extremely fortunate that ONUC has been able to enrol the services of such a distinguished soldier in the cause of peace. I am happy to present him to you. HA/ek 6

T Acting Secret ary-General)

The second reason for colling the meeting is the presence here — until tonight -- of the officer in charge of OHUC, Mr. Robert Gardiner, He has come to Kew York on a very short visit to have some intensive consultations vith me on the Congo operation: there are some necessary exchanges which can never be carried on adequately by cable. I thought that this would be a good opportunity for the Committee to hear first-hand from Mr. Gardiner about the latest developments in the Congo and particularly the recent talks between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. TGhombe, Robert Gardiner, I may add, has boon meeting the challenge of the Congo vith groat ability and -wisdom. Before giving the floor to General Kebbede and Mr. Gardiner, let me observe that, as indicated in the notice to you of this meeting, I shall have to adjourn ths meeting not later than tvelve -thirty. Both Mr. Gardiner and I have commitments which would make it very difficult for us to stay beyond that time. I hope you will not object to this. General Kebbede, if you have anything that you would wish to eay at this time, the floor is open to you.

Lieutenant r-Gonoral KSBEEDE CT3BRE t First of all, Your Excellency, I express my highest appreciation to you for your kind remarks in introducing me to the Committee. I know 'that my assignment as the Commander of the United nations Forces in the Congo is a very serious and trying one. I am not prepared at the moment, of course, to say anything about what I shall be able to achieve in this most complicated mission. Eut I do hope that, when I have been able to study the . problsmc on the spot, I shall be in a position to make a contribution to the achievement of this Organization's aims.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; I now call on Mr. Gardiner. HA/ek

Mr. GARDINER; Mr. Secretary-General, I am grateful for this opportunity to give an account of some of the recent events In the Congo. The most important development has been in connexion vith the Adoula-Tahcmbe meeting. In order to understand or perhaps to appreciate fully the Implications of seme of the moves ms.de by the participants, we may try to recreate the atmosphere or the background against which these talks have been taking place, The meeting steins directly from the resolution passed by the Katanga Provincial Assembly on 15 February. That resolution, which has already been published in a document, reads: "Accepts the draft declaration of Kltona ... as a potential basis of discussion vith a viev to the settlement of the Congolese conflict; authorizes the Government of Katanga to establish contact vith the Central Government with a viev to ensuring a solution in the spirit of the draft declaration . ..w. (n/5n53/Ac1cU8, Annex I, page l) Tlie resolution goes on to say: "The Katanga Legislative Assembly reserves its right to ratify the final agreements which nicy he concluded between the authorities at Leopoldville and those of Katanga In conformity vith the authority given to the Government of Katanga." (ibid., pa^ p) To the people in Leopoldvillc, this vas a disappointment. It had been expected that the Katanga Provincial Assembly would either reject or accept the Kitona declarations. But the resolution did neither. In spite of that, Prime Minister Adoula agreed to a meeting vhich vould consider as a basis of discussion the Kitona declarations. After an exchange of letters taking nearly a month, Mr. Tshombe agreed to come to Leopoldville under the protection given by the United nations and supported by the Prime Minister. Mr. Tshonbe arrived on 15 March. However, before ve get to 15 March, ve may recall that, immediately after the passage of this resolution and after the acceptance of the idea of a meeting by Prime Minister Adoula, it vas announced that Kongolo had been reoccupied by the gendarmerie. That set in motion a number of developments. Reinforcements vere sent to Nyunzu, Albertville and Kabalo by the Central Government. Therefore, there vas this tension not too far avay from the minds of the people vho vere getting ready to meet. HA/ek 8-10 (Mr. Gardiner)

When Tshcmbe arrived on 15 March, he stayed at the Royale. The same day, Price Minister Adoula had to go to Coquilhatville. There had been in session at Coquilhatville for nearly tvo weeks a meeting of representatives from all tha provinces. There vere serious administrative problems in the provinces, and the provincial representative were trying to develop a coumon approach to the Central Government in coping vith these problems. The Prime Minister felt it sufficiently important to intervene in the discussions and to e:xplain both the ppsition of, end the difficulties being encountered by, the Central Government. That vas the reacon vhich led to this coincidence, namely, the arrival of Tshombe on the 15th and the departure of Adoula to Coquilhatville on the 15th. AW/SJt 11 (Mr. Gardiner) But Adoula returned on the l6th and made contact with Mr. Tshorabe. Here again, the Ministry responsible for provincial affairs ic the Ministry of the Interior, and a few days were spent in trying to determine whether Mr. Tshombe could get in touch directly with the Prime Minister or would go through the Ministry of the Interior. This caueed some delay. But in the end the difficulties were resolved and the first meeting took place on the l8th.. It had "been decided even "before the meeting that everything would be in closed session and that no information had to "be given tg the Press or to the public in any form by either party. We learned later that the first meeting considered four points submitted by Prime Minister Adoula. The principal theme of the conference was to be the end of the secession of Katanga. Then the meeting was to examine the mandates of the delegations and proceed to examine the Kitona Declaration on the basis of the loi fondamentale, and also to consider military action in North Katanga. At the beginning of these meetings the Katangeee delegation made it clear that whatever decisions would be arrived at would have to be ratified by the Katangese Assembly. This led to a very lengthy and inconclusive discussion. In tho midst of this, information started getting into the papers and was also being broadcast. The meeting was not adjourned or suspended, but simply did not continue, while the exchange of charges and counter-charges vent on about the breach of the closed-session agreement. This went on for about five days, and then it was agreed that everybody would respect the closed session and discussions would start. Even during this stage we received reports, made by both sides, of troop movements and accusations of military action, which we investigated. And so again, there was this tension behind the negotiations. At this stage Mr. Tshombe decided to submit certain points for consideration. He indicated to Prime Minister Adoula that he was prepared to renounce absolute sovereignty But in reply to that he wanted to be given assurance about hia internal sovereignty. This formula was not rejected out of hand. It provided a basis for a study AW'sJt •12.15 (Mr. Gardlner) of possible conclusions which could be arrived at by the meeting. And from 6 April to the l^th, the staff of the Prime Minister's office was "busily engaged examining the conclusions which might be submitted for consideration to the Katangese delegation. Cn 16 April Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe met -- not with their delegations -• and Mr. Adoula handed over to Mr. Tshombe the text of the conclusions. The Prime Minister informed me that Mr. Tshombe had undertaken to study these conclusions and to pass on his comments or suggestions foi- amendments. But that same evening, that is the 16th, the Prime Minister left for Coq.uilhatville, hoping that by the time he returned Mr. Tshombe's proposals would be ready. But when Mr. Tsnombe returned from the meeting with the Prime Minister, he indicated that he also would like to go home for some time, and in keeping with our agreement and undertaking we had no option "but to agree to let him have a plane to return to Elizabethville. The Prime Minister was informed of this just before he left. MP/Jpin 16 (Mr» Gardiner) Katanga is a very burning issue in the Congo; and the Prime Minister?s reaction to the information that Tchorcbe intended to go was:TT Ch,no, he cannot leave." That may have been an expression of disappointment or a decision to try to intervene, but tliat was the remark he made to me and to seme of his colleagues who were at the beach with me when I made the announcement to the Prime Minister. We vent ahead to make arrangements for the departure of Mr. Tshcmbe, and he declared that he would be ready to leave on the I0th» Arrangements were made for the plane to leave Leopoldville by midday on the iBth, and the Katangese party bearded the plane according to our schedule, but later on, a message was received that fire engines had been put on the runway to prevent the plane from taking off. This seemed incredible to come of us because of some of .the assurances given,, not only by us, but also by the Prime Minister* The Prime Minister was out of town, so I got in touch with the Foreign Minister and the Vice-Prime Minister who was acting, and we discussed this problem and its implications. We later on met the Minister of the Interior, under whose supervision, perhaps, such measures had been taken. In the course of the discussions, it became clear that it was going to be difficult to determine who had taken the initiative to delay the departure of the plane. We got in touch, by radio, with the Prime Minister, and he suggested that a meeting of the cabinet should be convened and a reasonable decision taken, and that he would be quite prepared to support a decision taken by his cabinet. The cabinet met at 3,00 and sat until about 9«0°j and "the deliberations were inconclusive. I was invited to an informal meeting of the cabinet; I heard the views of the various ministers who were very concerned about the possible effect of the departure of Mr. Tshombe on Congolese opinion. They ehowed no hostility; if I may put it this way, we were, on both sides, equally embarrassed, but decisions had to be taken. So at about 10,00, I met again the Minister of the. Interior, the Vice-Prime Minister who was acting for the Minister of Foreign Affairs. We argued in circles, agreeing all the time, but not being able to decide on the action to be taken. Meanwhile, Mr. Tshombe and his party had been in this plane since 12.00, and some of us thought that we could not delay any further, and so we decided to let the plane leave. We had taken all necessary precautions; fortunately there was no attempt to prevent or resist, and the plane left at 4.00. .17

« (Mr. Gardiner) Looking at the event in retrospect, one might coy that, had the Prime Minister been in Leopoldville, perhaps the departure would not hove been as eventful as it turned out to "be. In any case, Congolese self-restraint and a willingness to explain the grave implications of this situation, although it took a long time, ' made it possible for us to honour our word and to fulfil our obligation. I am sure that this lias not left any real bitterness between ourselves and the Central Government. The Prime Minister, in a speech to the Congolese public yesterday, endorsed'this view, and he has made1 it quite clear that this has not affected in any way'the' relations between the United Nations and the Central Government. Running concurrently with these discussions, plans were being made for the meeting of' the Provincial Assembly in Katanga, An attempt had been made earlier • for the full Assembly to meet -- that is, with members of the Balubakat ond the Conakat; but that meeting took place without the Bclubakat representatives1 participation in passing the resolution of 15' February. Some Ealubakat representatives were in KLizabethville discussing the plans for the arrangements. when the plane incident took place; and I am happy to report that nothing happened to them. It appears that the talks are continuing, and one of these days we may have -the legally elected Assembly of Katanga meeting to express its views on Kantangese affairs.

'The Acting HECRI^ARY-GMKRAL; I am- sure Mr. Gardiner's statement is quite helpful. 'The floor is now open for questions from the members of the Committee.

Mr_» _ BARNES (Liberia): Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary-General, 'I have two questions here I should like to propound. One is directed to Mr. Gardiner, the officer in charge, and the other to you, Mr. Secretary-General. But before I do so, I should like to express a word of congratulations to General Kebbede on his assignment, and, on behalf of ray delegation, to express the wish for the success of his mission. I should also wish to commend you, Mr, Secretary-General, for the very prompt action you took with, regard to the freedom of movement of Mr. Tshombe. It is true that we are all disturbed over Mr. Tshombe1s machinations; but I think he ic entitled to freedom of movement so as to ensure the continuation of the talks between him and Mr. Adoula, the Prime Minister. MP/Jpm 18-2C (Mr» Barnest Liberia)

I believe that Mr. Gardiner, in giving us the details of the recent talks between Mr, Tchcrabe and Prime Minister Adcula, said that, during the course of these talks, information percolated that there were troop movements on both sides; and this information WQS investigated, I presume, by the United Nations representative in the Congo, I should wish to ask Mr. Gardiner what this investigation revealed. This is my first question. The second question is directed to you,Mr. Secretary-General: This morning, at 8.CO, I heard, over station WQXR, the Now York Times broadcast to the effect that Prime Minister Adoula had announced that he had communicated with come African and Asian Governments, requesting assistance to bring to an end, once and for all, the oeccaaicn of Katanga, and that the response of some of these Governments had boon favourable, I was wondering whether the Acting Secretary-General had any information about this news which come out of the broadcast this morning. These are my two questions, Mr, Secretary-General,

Mr , GARDINFR; If I may deal with the first question, there were reports about further movements of troops to Kongolo; and vc have been carrying out reconnaiGGance regularly to check up on movements in the whole of North Katanga, Sometimes we have been able to 'find traces, and on several occasions there has been no indication of any movements,at all. We have had^also, movements into North Katanga from Kaeai>soine of whicli have not led to anything, Gome of the troops got to Gentery, and returned; and so you have these units either moving to join troops to which they belong or trying to establish new spearheads. Wherever we encounter such developments, we worn the parties involved that it might lead to a clash and also make it difficult for the talks to continue in any calm r.nd constructive form. We have warned about, drawn attention .to, and have pointed out the implications of all these movements. TL/rs 21 • • (Mr. Gnrdiner)

With the Secretary-General1 s permission I will say something with reference to the second question. We have been having exchanges with the' Prime Minister. In one of them he recited the events connected with the Katanga secession. Like most Congolese, he is very worried that the recovery of Katanga does not seem to be in sight. • He is fully aware of the fact that Congolese resources; especially at this stage, make it very difficult for him, as Prime Minister, to think of ecting independently. He, needs help. It is in this spirit that he communicated the substance of some of the letters exchanged with me, to a number of tho African countries.

; FECRFTARY-GENFRAL : I would just like to add a few words to supplement what Mr. Gardiner has just said. , In respect to the broadcast news which Ambassador Enrnes heard this morning, I think that obviously it was a reference to Prime Minister Adcula'-s public statement which he made today. We just got The report a few minutes ago and I have not read it; "but it seems that Prime Minister Adoula has addressed personal messages to certain Heads of African States, and only last night I got private information from one of the African representatives that his Head of Government did receive a message from Prime Minister Adoula requesting aid and collaboration with the Central Government to expedite the integration of Katanga into the rest of the Congo. -Of course, I have not seen the text, and most probably the radio news this morning referred to Prime Minister Adoula!s public speech that he made this morning.

Mre DTALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): First of all I wish to welcome amon;$ us today two of the persons most responsible for "both the civilian and the military operations of the United Nations in the Congo, We have listened with great interest to the statement of General Kebbede, TL/rs 23 (Mr. fliallo, Guinea)

I would like to express, on behalf of the Republic of Guinea, our great hope that to all the laurels the Gcsneral has won for Ethiopia, both nationally and internationally, he may add, in the course of his duties in the Congo, perhaps greater laurels which will be those most prominently recorded in history; that is, it is our hope that he will faithfully and completely carry out the resolutions of the Security Council and, in so doing, put an end to the secession of Katanga and bring about the total expulsion of mercenaries from Katanga. With regard to Mr. Gardiner, we have already at previous sessions had occasion to express our wishes for the complete success of his mission. However, 1 do wish to point out that though we Africans fesl great joy at seeing these two eminent Africans at the head of United Nations operations in the Congo and honouring Africa in the high United Nations positions which they occupy, our joy is overshadowed, unfortunately, by one aspect of their position* With all the frankness that we feel entitled to use with regard to these representatives of Africa, we roust express our concern lest the errors of the past --errors dating from the time when others occupied their posts — be continued and perpetuated under the supervision of these Africans who are now in charge of the operations. This fear and concern we feel we must express to the Committee. You mentioned, Mr. Secretary-General, that there had been no official meetings of this Committee since January and, with all due respect, I would gather from your statement therefore that there had been unofficial meetings in that period of time. % delegation took part in no meetings, either official or unofficial, of this Committee since January, May I therefore speak with the frankness I have always showed in our meetings here, and say that my delegation can only express regret that this Committee has not been convened since January. We have not met to hear your views on the situation in the Congo, which you have described as calm; end from Mr. Gardiner's statement -- and if I Gin mistaken here I hope Mr. Gardiner or perhaps you yourself will correct rne — I gather that the United Nations is content to await the result of the negotiations between the Central Government and Mr, Tshombe, Now, my delegation believes the United Nations mission in the Congo is very clear; it IB laid down in a document we ere not discussing here, a Security Council recolution. TL/P9 2^-25 1 (Mr, Diflllo, Guinea)

It seems to me we would be fully justified in asking ourselves whether these negotiations themselves are not to a certain extent in violation of the Security Council resolution, at least marginally to.its provisions, I believe that basically the United Nations Mission in the Congo has one purpose, namely to implement the resolution of the. Security Council, and. with this in mind I am led to wonder about the significance of certain reports in the Press. We have not been able to meet and diocuss these matters with you, Mr. Secretary-General, the better to gauge the state of affairs in the Congo.. On the basis of these reportc, we gather that certain provisions and amendments that were submitted to the Security Council but not adopted are being implemented, whereas the resolutions adopted by the Council are not. I will clarify this. You will all recall that at the time when the resolution of the Security Council was adopted, mention was made of negotiations. We are not members of the Security Council,- but at that time we said we were in favour of negotiations, of peaceful settlements. .We were among those who formally stated that ve could not negotiate with Mr. Tshombe; and the statement made by Mr, Gardiner, wherein he indicated that no effective-results had come from the negotiations, certainly did not surprise the delegation of Guinea. We know Mr. Tshombe and we know hifl background. Thus too/ Mr, Secretary-General, there had been draft amendments aimed at putting an end to the so-called secession of Oriental Province, and these amendments likewise wera not adopted. DH/kb 26

(Mr, Diallo, Guinea)

But when fill Is said and done, what do we see CD a resultf The so-called secession of Oriental Province has been ended vhereas the pertinent provisions of the Security Council resolutions which sought to end the Katanga secession and to expel the mercenaries from there and to stop the inflow of arms and weapons to Katanga -- what happened there? What happened to those provisions which did clearly appear in the resolution of the Security Council? Consistent with this way of thinking; I should like to ask the following question: within the framework of what we have just described, this so-called secession of Oriental Province, we know that Mr« Gizenga was arrested, that he was interned despite the parliamentary immunity which he enjoys. We believe that one of the obligations of the United Nations in the Congo is to defend legality in that country, and we see that the head of the secession, Mr. Tshcmbe, does benefit from official and unofficial protection, and yet Mr. Gizonga is imprisoned despite his parliamentary immunity. We were happy to hear Mr. Gardiner say that the United Nations has defended its honour and that it has assured Mr, Tehoznbe of oil facilities to leave Leopoldville. These problems are of great concern to us, and we must be frank in stating this• I should like to ask one last question. After having made wy statement regarding the situation of Mr. Gizenga, we should like to know exactly where he stands at the moment. What is the United Nations ready to do to redress that situation? I have one final question regarding the implementation of the Security Council resolution. What is the true situation in Katanga itself? Are mercenaries still present in Katanga? Is it true, as we have read in the Press, that a certain Colonel was relieved of certain documents whereby it was proved that this Colonel had bought European arms for Katang- ^nd these arms had been brought into Katanga? These are all questions that trouble and worry us, and because of our desire for honesty, we felt tliat we had to ask these questions in the Coxnnittee. DR/kb 27

The Acting SECRKTABY-G^TIII^AL; First of all, I will ask Mr. Gardiner to anwer these questions and; if necessary, I will supplement Lis statements.

Mr, GAPDINER; If I may deal with the question of Orientals first, we may say that the secession in Oriental ended itself. It was the forces under the ccnmand of General Lundula who put an end to the secession in Orientals. It vas not found necessary for us to undertake any action. Relating that to Katanga, we have been forced into a number of engagements which have not succeeded in putting an end to the secession there, and so OITUC in the field has been concerned with secession in all places and in all its forms and in some instances the outcome has been satisfactory; in others we are still confronted with the problem. IIow, if I may turn to mercenaries, the elimination of the mercenaries has become a continuing concern. Not only do-we get thoce who have been expelled coming back, but also new recruits are reported from time to time. We spend a great deal of time checking up on information about mercenaries ana also making arrangements to apprehend quite a few of them. The example cited by Your Excellency is perhaps a. certificate of our efficiency in coping with this particular individual. In some cases, and I think in several instances, we have been fortunate. I say this net to create any atmosphere of complacency out to give an indication of our continuing exertion in trying to implement the resolutions mentioned, by Your ^ivcellency. ..nd then there was the third question; this particular individual who has been purchasing arms was picked up by us and is under our custody at the moment. The list which has created GO much of a scare is list which we captured whan we apprehended Colonel or Mr. -* I do not know what title he confers on himself -- Julian. To turn to Mr. Gizenga, I have already referred to the exchange of correspondence, spreading over a month, with Mr. Tshombe in which we gave protection, offered protection to Mr. Tsboobe with the approval of the Congolese Government. In the case cf Mi-. Gizenga, who asked for protection on arrival in Leopoldville, he insisted -- I should like to emphasize the word "insisted" -- on being let out of our protection and he went out, and later on was picked up by the Government and sent to this island. Our offer of protection still DB/kb 28-30

(Mr. Gardiner)

Stands. If I may try to "be a little practical here, ve have resources in the Congo, but they are limited resources and we have got to act with caution so that ve can reach our objectives with the least possible losses* thinking in terms Of the countries which have co very generously put their men and material aii our disposal. I do not think that ve do ourselves any credit by offering, shall I say, more defiance than vre can back up, and in this particular case of Mr. Tehombe ve could concentrate our resources and cope vith the situation. Vihen somebody goes into the country, it requires a little more effort to organize a campaign to retrieve I-Ir. Gizenga. But our offer stands and we have not abandoned Mr. Gizenga. One of my continuing cares is to find out, almost daily, what is happening to Mr. Gizenga. Sometimes some of the information ve Get Gets into the papers, such as the report of the journalists who .visited him last week. We have a concern, Your Excellency, I agree entirely. We have also so many other concerns in the Congo but, alas, our resources are such that we must go not only by priorities but by the practical considerations of vhct can usefully and effectively be done by the team you have put in the Congo — and I say "you have put in the Congo" because our strength and our weakness both depend on you. AE/db 31 '• • • (Mr» Gardiner)

* I,should like, to add> if I may, that ve have had to refuse to entertain a request to send troops to South Kasai, for instance. We ore aware that a situation exists-in South Kasai and are using all means at our disposal to deal vith this particular prob_le:n. Eut to send "battalions, which ve do not have, into South Kasai naw -will only be inviting trouble for thG United Nations;

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL: I wish to thank Mr. Gardiner for his comprehensive statement, I should like to odd a few words to what he has just said.;r.eg3rding my uce of the expression "official meetings". It is perhaps necessary, to make clear that since 9 January we have not had any official meetings ' such-ac, this. From time to time, however, ve have had occasion to exchange views at cocktails, receptions, lunches, dinners, on the vay to the delegates' lounge, and ;s.Qi..oru .These cannot, of course, "be regarded as official meetings and discussions. It was in this context that I said that ve have not had any "official meetings" since 9 January* . .. , . JHic representative from.Guinea has.very rightly pointed out tho resolutions of the Security, Council in tfre- context o£ the ;activitica of the United Nations in the Congo. .•; I vant merely to reiterate my understanding of all the Security Council resolutions that have bc^rt passed with^regard to the operations in the Congo. The United Nations can employ force only in three situations* The first situation is in order to prevent civil war. The second situation occurs in a contingency vberr; it ic> necessary to arrest mercenaries. The third situation is> of course, to retaliate in self-defence, if attacked; the United Nations may exercise the right of self-defence. It,is only in these three situations that the United Nations has been empowered by the Security Council to exercise 'force, The United Nations.has never been authorised to employ force in order to impose a political solution in any part of the Congo. I am certain that my interpretation of the..-Security .Council's resolutions is correct. Regarding the present phaoe of events, in which the United Nations has been concentrating :its efforts toward bringing together the dissident Congolese leaders with a view to arriving at an agreed solution of the various problems, it is my feeling that our attempts have not been in vain. My interpretation'of the recent Adoula-Tshombe talks is not one of pessimism. The talks have not broken down AE/db 32 (The Acting Secretary-General) and there are definite indications that Mr. Tshombe will come "back to Leopoiaville in order to resume his talks with Mr. Adoula. With good-vill and patience on "both sides, I em confident that these talks will "bear fruit. Of course, in the event that the talks do break down, there are certain concrete steps which we may take in order to implement the resolutions of the Security Council. In that event, I will convene this Committee at the appropriate time and it has been my intention to request the convening of the Security Council if I feel that a fresh mandate is necessary. In this context I vant to reiterate what I said at one of our meetings in December, that if the United Nations had only the resources and the manpcver that it had last year, it vould "be in a position to implement all of the Security Council's resolutions within two months;.my belief in that respect has not changed, Taking into consideration all factors which presently exist — financial, political and psychological -- the United Nations is. now concentrating on the non-military aspects of the operations.

With regard to Mrf Gizenga, I want to add just a few words to what Mr, Gardiner has said. Personally, I am BO unhappy as is my good friend, the representative of Guinea, regarding the situation in which Mr, Gizenga is at the moment. But I should like to recall that it has been ray constant endeavour to get Mr* Gizenga back under United Nations protection, When Prime Minister Adoula was here, I brought this question up with him at all of our meetings and he reiterated hie assurance that Mr. Gizenga will be sent back under United Nations protection whenever he wishes. The offer of United Nations protection still stands; Mr. Gizenga is aware of that, I am rather puzzled as to why he still refuses to come under the protection of the United Nations, With regard to his health and general condition, as Mr, Gardiner has Just pointed out, three journalists saw him last only this pact Thursday, four days ago, and they reported that Mr, Gizenga was enjoying very good health and was in cheerful spirits. It is worth repeating that one of the Journalists is from the West, one is from the Socialist bloc, if I may call it that, representing the Tass agency, and one journalist is from Yugoslavia, Their unanimous report was that Mr. Qizenga is in perfect health. He did not indicate to them that he wanted to come under United Nations protection. AE/db/bg 53-35

(The Acting Secretary-General)

I wish to add that I am taking steps to suggest that Mr, Gizenga be submitted to parliamentary interrogation, in conformity with the lows of the land, and I am coranunicating this vish to Prime Minister Adoula. Of.course, whether Mr. Gizenga should be submitted to parliamentary interrogation or not io a purely domestic matter, in which we have no say. But I am requesting; that Mr. Adoula see to it that Mr, Gizenga is brought before Parliament as early as possible, and, if it is deemed necessary, that he be submitted to interrogation, as was contemplated. GR/rh %

Mr, QTTAISON-GACKEY (Ghana): I vish to cay how very pleased my delegation is that ve have had an.opportunity of welcoming here the new ONUC Commander, the former Chief of Ecfence Staff of Ethiopia, I am sure his appointment means a great deal to Africa and that, vith his co-operation with your representative Mr. Gardiner, there vill be a felicitous combination of circumstances which will help to ease the situation ve are now discussing. I vish also to thank Mr« Gardiner for the clear exposition he gave us of the Adoula-TGhcmbe talks* I am sure that meetings like this are very useful if only that we may know what is happening, and for that matter I would like to make a suggestion. I think it would be a good idea if the Advisory Committee could meet more often than it has dona. I agree that it is your Committee, Mr* Acting Secretary-General, and in fact it is your prerogative to call it into "being or not, "but in viev of the fact that Katanga is still raising difficulties and that there are so many other problems facing the Congo at the moment, perhaps it would not be a bad idea if you vero to call a meeting once a month at least. Of course, there could be more frequent meetings than that if occasion required, but I think ib would be a good idea to have a meeting once a month so that we may get the picture of what is happening in the Congo. In Mr, Gardiner's clear report of what happened in the Adoula-Tshombe talks he mentioned the occupation of Kongolo and I wanted to ask a question about that. I thought Kongolo was part of the neutral zone which was declared by the United Nations in agreement with the Katanga Government. If I am wrong, I can be corrected, but if that is so I wonder how it happened that Tshombe's gendarmerie were able to move into Kongolo to occupy it. Perhaps we could have an explanation of that* Then Mr. Gardiner mentioned a possible election in Katanga* I am not sure whether we are talking about the formation of a now Government or the establishment of a new Assembly. I happen to know that under the loi fondamentale there should bo provisional elections in all the provinces. What we see here seems to be the formation of a new Katanga Government with the full participation of the Balubakat. In that connexion, may I know what Ccndwe is doing at the moment? Is he still the effective leader of the Balubakat and what is their role in all these discussions between Tshombe and Adoula? GR/rh 37 (Mr* Qnaison-Sackey, Ghana) The third point I want to touch upon is this appeal to African countries, I remember that a similar appeal was made "by Mr. Lumunba in 1960, when he wanted a certain, number of African countries to help him take Katanga, There vas a meeting of African foreign ministers in Lcopoldville to consider this matter in conjunction with a number of other matters, but Mr* Lumumba chanced his mind and the Central Government then said that Katanga vas no problem. I would like to knov the Secretary-General's reaction to this request, because if ve c° into the question properly it would seem as if the logical solution to the problem of Katanga vould be for the Central Government to have a free hand to take it over if it can, I said something like this at one of the meetings of the Security Council in 19^0, when even the representative of the United States felt that ve here could not prevent the duly elected Central Government of the Congo from taking any action, military or otherwise, which vould "bring Katanga back to heel. Of course., this can be considered within the framework of Security Council resolutions .regarding unilateral action by Member States; it might mean that if any African country like mine helped the Central Government directly it vould "be i:oing against the Security Council resolution, I would like to ask the Acting Secretary-General whether, in his opinion, the time has not come to consider the withdrawal of all United Nations troops with a view to allowing the countries which might wish to help the Central Government to do so with a view to bringing about the proper integration of all the provinces we have been talking about. This is icy third question. My country feels very strongly that this problem of Katanga has dragged on too long and although every effort has been made by you and your representatives in the Congo to solve this problem, it neems as if in the end force may possibly be the only resort, I am sorry to use the -word force^ I myself do not like the use of force, but I feel that the only way the Central Government can be sure of getting Katanga back with all the apparatus of the Union Mini.ore intact vill be for them to take stronger action than has been taken in the pact. The fourth point I want to make is in regard to Mr* Gizenga, We welcome the assurances that have been given that his position is being watched by the United Nations and that every effort will be made to cee that nothing untoward happens to him* GR/rh 58-1+0

(Mr, Qnaison-Sackey, Ghan<%)

I was not very sure on your point about a parliamentary interrogation. Are you taking the initiative in asking the Adoula Government to do that, or is it tho Government itself which wishes to encourage Mr. Gizenga? I would like to know the possible consequences of this, because Mr, Adoula -- I do not think I can hide this -- assured me personally that in fact he had agreed that Mr, Gizenga should go to this small island at his own request and that he himself is personally responsible for Mr. Gizengars protection. I am therefore wondering whether a parliamentary interrogation of the land you arc envisaging may not just fan the ashes of a fire that was dying out. I would like you to review this question in the framework, of the Congo aG a whole* I think this problem has dragged on far too long and the more'the United Nations is engaged in the Congo the more the problems that will arise. I therefore feel that every effort should be made to settle the question once and for all. That is why, possibly, other meetings will be useful; every consultation and every concrete effort should be made to solve the problem, as I see the Katanga question, and the other problems vhich are at the moment facing the Congo Central Government. Mr. GARDINER; The position of. Kbngolo, in relation to the neutral zone, IB this: Kongolo has never "been the neutral zone; and when we talK about reoccupation of Kongolo, perhaps VG use terms vhich are not really appropriate. xhe f^en^nrmeriG moved a few miles away, and camped in the "bush not too far frcm Kbngolo; ond when the ANC troops got a ."bit tired of campaigning, they withdrew, and the gendarmerie occupied Kbngolo. That explains, to a certain extent, the events of 15 or 1.6 February; "but Kongolo.is in Q strategic position now, because the A1IC troops are in Albertville and Kabalo and Nyunzu, and movements from Kongolo can be a serious threat to thsm. Then, in connexion with the Katanga Assembly, the Balubakat members cf the Assembly withdrew .in I960; they have never participated in the deliberations of the Assembly. At the request of the Central Government, and in agreement with the people in Katanga, we are trying to make arrangements Tor the full Assembly to neet again* We have had several discussions about the possibility of re-chuffling the cabinet, of. forming a coalition government in.Katanga, so that the Balubakat msmberc. nay be given peats in the Provincial Cabinet. Mr. Sendwe is actively associated -with these developments, and he is else a member of-the Central Government delegation which is, at the moment, negotiating or having talks with Mr. Tshombe. .

The- Acting r^CR^TARY-OF.rrSPAT,; I would like to deal vltfc a few other points raised by the Ambassador of Ghana: His suggestion that the Congo Advisory Comnittee should meet more regularly is a very sensible one, and, of course, because of the conditions prevailing in the last two and a half months, we have not been able to convene any meetings; "but in the future, I shall see that we meet more regularly — perhaps, if possible, once a month, as suggested by the Ambassador of Ghana* Regarding another point raided by the Ambassador, I believe it is .just a thought, and not presented as a formal suggestion, that the United Nations should consider withdrawing all the troops from the Congo and give way to the African States to take the place of the United Nations troops in the Congo, by vay of rendering help to the Central Government to achieve its political objectives. In this regard, I just want to make a very brief observation: The Central Government has never indicated its desire to request the United Nations to MT/db 1+2 (The Acting. Secretary-General) withdraw its forces from the Congo; and even in such an unlikely contingency, my personal feeling is this: if the United ITatioris troops were to be vithdravn from the Congo, it would create a state of chaos; and, of course, I am conscious of the fact that several friendly African Governments would immediately go to the aid of the Central Gove.vnra.entt At the came time, I think we should not lose sight of the fact that Tchcmbe, also, will no doubt attempt to invite certain other friendly forces to come to his aid; and I have no doubt that there would be a repetition of another Korea, Of course, these things have to "be taken into consideration, "but I om cure the Ambassador was just throwing out an idea, not in the form of a definite proposal. Regarding the laat point raised by the Ambassador, about my reference to parliamentary interrogation, I just want to recall that, when Mr. Gizenga was taken out of Stanleyville, the Central Government5 s position was that he had cciEHitted certain breaches of the law in the context of Congolese law, and must, therefore, be brought before the competent authorities to answer certain charges. If this is still the intention of the Central Government, I propose to take immediate steps to request the Central Government to submit Mr. Gii:enga to parliamentary interrogation by whatever appropriate authority the Central Government may have in mind; and then, if he is not proved guilty, he should be released. My intention is that I will take the initiative in encouraging the Central Government to implement this expressed desire on its own part.

Mr. JHA (India): Mr, Secretary-General, I would like to extend, first of all, our very warm welcome to General Kebbede. 1 will "be very happy to see him in over-all command of the United Nations forces in the Congo, a large part of which is made up of contingents from India. I am cure he will receive, in the field, nil the co-operation of our troops as, indeed, he will receive here from our delegation sympathetic understanding of the difficulties with which he is faced as well as deserved tribute for his achievements. We are also very happy to see Mr» Gardiner here. I believe this is the first meeting of the Advisory Committee he has attended as your Special Representative in the Congo* Of course, we have known him before, and have come to admire his qualities, and would like to extend to him our very best wishes for the difficult assignment vith which you have entrusted him. MP/db 43.115 (Mr. Jha, India)

We now meet after a good fev months during vhich much has happened. But, fortunately, the period has not teen one of turmoil. The United Nations has not "been involved in any warfare; and since ve are a body not fretting for war, that is something for vhich to "be thankful. Negotiations have "been going on betveen Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, These have had their ups and downs; and although, for anyone not very closely in touch with the principal actors in these negotiations, it is something of a mystery, it is good to see and hear from you that the negotiations have not broken down and that there are prospects of further talks. It is always good to have these talks going on; and as long as they are-talking, I suppose they will not fight. I would, therefore, share your hope, and even your optimism, that something might cone out of these -talks, something agreeable to the Central Government, and agreeable, also, to the Katanga Legislature, and that, thereby, the main problem standing in the way of settlement of the Congolese question, will be solved. TL/ek U6 (Mr, Jha, Bidla)

I said a moment ago that it is a good thing that these talks are going on, and we have to be patient. But at the same time one must not permit oneself to cast into oblivion the purposes of the United Nations in the Congo ac laid down in the various resolutions of the Security Council. I have particularly in mind the resolutions of 21 February and 2k November 196l, which not merely authorize but call upon the Secretary-General to undertake certain tasks in the Congo. We certainly cannot afford to lose sight of these resolutions. As a matter of fact, speaking for niy own country, our contribution of a large contingent of forces is in the context of the 21 February resolution, which has been more or less supplemented by the 2k November resolution. I am sure too that you, Mr, Secretary-General, and your officers are fully aware that whatever the United IJations is doing in the Congo, is done under the umbrella of theoe two resolutions. They are tfce very ralrjcn c1'Ct::3 of the United Nat iocs in the Congo. The talks "between Mr. Adoula and Tshonibe will probably go on for some time. There is no harm in these talks being protracted, because sometimes by the cheer process of attrition solutions are reached. But provided — and I would underline that — provided that this period is not used by Mr, Tshombe to consolidate his position and increase the number of mercenaries in Katanga, to further the acquisition of arms and also to increase the unfortunate diplomatic support that he has been receiving from certain powerful countries and certain bf his neighbours. This is something that we can never afford to lose sight of. If it vere a fact that the interval that has passed since the Adoula-Tshombe talks were started has also seen a weakening of the forces of the mercenaries in Katanga and a decrease or diBcontinuation of all acquisition of arms by Tshombe, then we would be completely satisfied with the situation and there would be nothing there to worry about. But there have been reports in the newspapers, and we have also had reports from other sources, that possibly this interval is being used by the Katanga authorities for augmenting their military strength and for forming liaisons with the Portuguese in Angola and maybe with others in Couth Africa — and of course Sir Roy Welensky Is always there. I do not know exactly what the situation is. Perhaps you are in a better position to tell us exactly what is the strength of all these liaisons which were established by Tshombe with these TL/ek

various neighbouring territories . There have bo^n reports that the , mercenaries Iv.va i;cc:i frtrei;;; cloned, trorc h.vo bcc;n reports of the _-,: coipt of aniic cy Tîvoor of tho construe Uon cf airiiolch acrcna tho border :!n A^.oln, and FO forth. IT ell that IG aotu'illy hnj rooin-, tb.-n I uu afraid vo hnvo coiîdin-able cau.:;o for ar.rleiy. UG vculd very ir.uch 11.:;e I'd: -jcu, ,lr, Cccrcâry-GGiicral, ii" possible, t^ be ablo to ir.j'.'orm this C:\Er.1, lt;toG 0:1 throe r.r.t!^. ic, zir.u r-crir-yo tho n^n:l-::r:; of U:e Cec'.-rity Cov.ncil c.n veil, by circulating ncir- l;:Ir.d of pr^cr on this euI'JCTl , It, lr» a J. -itter of jrreat Importance, l-^v^nce If th^r:r- rrrortc arc true, tl.on the Innh of tha United Nations is ay be vory :r.uch more dliTicu i t if and wiioii thccse t break cic-,,n. 'Ihc other point vhich io Important in that It van tl^rs hope of tho United I/rtionri, on the ûi.'jtlon of tho êcnuiLy Council reiolw lonn, that Mr. Tr,hcmbe ^.v i.'LJ. not rocoiv'': the he] p of PC- •:.;.- re, ; roat and r?v :•.].!_, .1 r respect of tbn Liivn-:/-:.-.in!; of his ullitary forces nr li?.r, i:.-!lli:- y i-ot( rrtinl. rjl: ,'•;!; j.n vhy In Vl il..; i. ":.'-, '•vi'ion.,.1 of t o I'i.'itci. ]' i ?.ovin ;in r:;hr-L o .i ..-, pl^.r. 1 on thrs r:.-^'''y of- ,:• v;; 3

\: ::it c.r. Liv.-it tjic.:o parh..i of t:io ... ,;u jln' •*oi;r<, of \ lie; ;.ocvjr.t.ly Counrtl havo l:^..c i..;lly v .Of active. IT the pci/iu'.] of nff^cbicv^lr'h.T -~ tu:.d i;nôtii,lior]3 r,r'- cert iijovitahio if BCV.IG k'Jnrl of a;- 1:0 -iônt Is to "bo r;.;:\cl:cd in the u.r.;:.o -- if thio j,.:iind c •; aid be <.3::>ed for ino'l.aL ! ny, l^r. T^hoiuho i;:vi]cr :rro;ij the cupport that ho I;.--- .; rocv ivod frc:i variour. coiurbvios for purpcnrn cor/crriy to tho^,:; of the I'nitGd i;..1. bionn, ...hvin v;j \;-oul.d I:\YG ^"lirerl uc;: Udn(;;; bul. if on Liv; other bnncl li..o -Vv..£.i.-jua conl,.ict.G and chMnnai!} of anractancG I'LIVO bc:;n Gtr::nr;ihenc.t and If o ;i lor. a I. Lo nuppc/t has bc.on ntron^thoncd^ t:,on of course ue vould Gcaln lâvo cause for aiixiGt/, Tn i;hifl cor:::.n:rion J nhonld inquire; vliat 'r,nppc>nod to tho various efforts that the Unit.i-1 liatic ,£j i/cj i;:--.l:.ln^ wlili t;u Govcri:i:,f a IB cf ".irlouB countries :ir. re^-rd to tho l:ivywn sv>i ,.ly of i:'v.:, of t;irc,.^fL and o/ h.illtaiy a3tiictr.ncc to tha Ki.t^rif.i ijovcx.i:f.:..il"., nad ,;i:ut tho cJtr.vJI'.vii 1- a I; rrc-1:." -,t. '.!!•'•• -3 nro n:--ti;or:3 ol coniiM-- . valil.e jnôrt':.. co. J:"k on thonn pointn wo can "be Gr,tjoi5.r-i, t]:-n I vouJ.d i.ny trr, L, i -.01 Jin l;.iicc .In tho crfî-tu to r-oicu a Vi.i.ôtiatcd i.-cAti -••ir- T.G liotucon Mr. /-.('r'-ul:'. and Mr. Trb^Ls j.s ccTicti.li.^ vlu.ch .U; quit;; lci and tLcue ef fox to uhould be continued; but if on tho other hraid the TL/ek

Interval Is .bein^ used for prnp.iri.ng Katanga, for putting it into a pociticn or Creator potential drfl/ineo of the United hationn, then the vhole cituation ha;; to bo carefully review..,!.

r.c\i} ore I'ir.al pot. .it, vith regard to Mr. Glzenf.T.. Rcferi-in^ to the id^a that ycu have pui; for-wavd, Mr. nccretnry-General, I do Let l:;;cil:)ly thc:y lir.vo not u*ot onou li evident-:, or they nn.y conniuor that it iG not politically viGo, thr.it it iiiirht cc.nrjc convxiloicnD or norao Giich tiring. Mr. Gizercn, h;uj boon out of public life for a c cr,ci'lrirable time new. Tiicro iG a ccrSn.lvi amount of concein J.n luany rciniorlco i.bout the vay in vbich he in L-.-'i?^ dctaii:od tin f- ••••l--o but, [''^ ;inrCjCiirr^-<-3. to bo at liberty,, all of v~.yi.ch ir> r.^'i; ,';c£Kithii,;~ 'wbi.ch rcdount':.; to Iho c.odit 01' t:io Co. itral Government. Ihia is ;:-nr. ilv:hv-- tliat ;anny of rn tocL. the c ppori/jr.lty cf irr.prcr;cin[i on Mr. Adoula vhoa

Iia \;: ;. Lore, a'' y^'ir inv.Ltalion? a i^\r L."nti..r; a(-vo. Vculd it i:ot bo Lcllar to vcrk in the direction of persuading the Central.

Govorn: ont_, pe.:.'nuadin^ Ilr. A-.lou.La, (j\if;t to lot jvh'. (J:i. onra 130, to Ic o hi..ii irir. with the mainstream of life in the Congo, tcinc just IL!LO any otlier politician? }v\rldoi)\;ly ho hnn loot Around. Ho ic no lonror in Orinntai Province, and rn:;ny of his Gupportcrc alao, 1 hear, did not quite approve or his coritinuod abnoncc i\-ora the Government, end all tliat l:lnd of thine. Would jt n^t be better to persuade them to let h:ua fp, ju;Jt xorp/:t about iiLn and let h:i.n, function ar> a deputy, aa a ruomber of Parli.aii.Giit and an ordinary member of the poll Llcal party to which lie bGloi-:fG? Thau mlc^t be a better vay. I chare the feeling of our colloacuc from Ghana. 51

(Mr. Jhn, Irulla) Of course, your idea is in the best interests of securing justice for 11:'. G i.:';' r.~a, but on the ether hand it nvi^ht, boomerang in sorsc vayc; it might cuurc di; f icult.i ,2G of otlnr kir.-ls, GO why should tir: Uni.tcd Nations tak-3 upon itself the adept jon of a particular procedure by tl:e Central Government? Would it not Vc better, since they have not preferred any charges against them -- a£ a matter of fact he baa porliorrontary immunity -- to portniade them jur,t to let him quietly mor^o himself with the people of the Conco and with the political part ion there? Thin is all that I wish to say. I would repeat tint we are most interested in tho cuceeos of the Tshoribe~.Adoula talks. We- think that you, Mr. Secretary-General, tool: the right .step, if I ray r;iy so, of afford inf: fir. IVhombe the f ull.es b facilitnoG for t.'o;inC bade to TU-.'r/.absthville. '1'h.Lr- \.\-IG really in accordance wiht the p"'OM.,c that hnd leen {riven to him by you ar;d by the United Nations • Vie ere i.-.l;:r> ii L '. to iv.n.r that ha tv,:;.y b.-; coi/rin^ bcick, ii.at lie In lihaly t.:> cot^o back i o I cop- Idvillc for tal:,u» 'j'!;.':; ci.tou.Ld ceitai;:]y bj cijcoura^:;'!. L".& X voaM £tt 11:2 ...:;. uo tin,, j, as T nr.id cLiMer., like to ctr.^rs t! > roae3city of cc/sijv;: >:hat this interval in in no vjy uced Uy tl.jcc who uic o;.«]:ori "HwG of the United Il^c IOLUS in the fonco and clccv/hLro end by Tcl:;o:.ibe for Ltrcnathcnlng thcmsclveo and for strengthen ine tlic milit;:ry potential of Katanga und ito potential capacity for defiance of the United Uutionc.

\nt''?1-nrLî?n-^T^^r'ri'lÛ/"1Ei: Jn vicu 01" thc f'ôrtnesG of time at our cbinpoonl oiid iu viov/ o.C Li...: iir, t thj.L there aro t'i.o ir.o.-o cpcn.l;crc. on my diet, tho rep"cs'?ntati,ve of I'Ivv--i iti end the ixprcsuv>.ativo oi' Cuiô (f e^polcv/illc), I will iju,f;t dcaJ. very brieily î.uth ivo of tb.e y-jir.br, iai;,od by ÛTibaccador Jha. rii^: first point re."i:iLci: tu his query roc-.ia.in:, 'J';:};:;inbe 's reported attempts to ctrr.vd:heu h.i.J3 positi ;u vii.h 1 ho old of fo:,, bn i'ov/.ir,1; or aulihoriliec. Of course, Iron t''.i : to tJi .; uo 1 '-v •..• b^,cr; r^L.\;i\in^; lnic:u'i..;io_o:i ib;\i, lir» T;;ho!iiLe had attempted tu JC;G;' o rnd h..d cccin-^L sub./L; tit.i;;.i help - .: ,ii L;_ c'.il.rMo, bvit 01 courcc, r,,dci'oiJ^:ulab'ly, such pi'^'cn of iuro..: ;Ttioa WO-.L.: v,^/ J. i t ,'i.cult to confiri.i* \.'i.cjicve^ v;o had LJUU.O ;:j^;'oi.:iat: nl (_". ornd;:. to c-.-îfir.^ t)vi:j JnToiirritioa, thj Ui-itLil h - biono t,,ok npp, prJatc. ncti ,11 >;it;ii th : icicvoid, Govoi r.ênts or authoritioo, ;/'i in cJ I Ctisjc;;, if I j.-^y rn;/ DO, 1)::rc; authoritioa or Governments have been ve.,y co -operative vith tiio United LT:itions» DR/Gjt

ooord point, ahr.ut Mr. Gizcnrf;i, tho position is this. The Central Government believes that Llr. Gir'.enra has c^-.itt.jd certain brcc.cheo of law in terras of Con^olene l;;v. Oi.' course, on this I nave nothing to cay. It is not Tor ine to say whether the Central G-j7crir:iGnt in ri^ht or All I wiGh to cay is that if the Central Governor..! ::;t i.ll i:;nintains that,

i;r.Gir/:::i;:;a has committed certain breaches or Con'.;o].i:;:o law, let him to "before Lhc appropriate judicial authorities un-1 'b^. cuu.dtted to interrelation or trial, whatever the c:inc hiay be. ir the Central Govurrji.-ont now reels that io connot -:,VbGtanliate itfi charges, or that there is nc-t cnsficient Around for the Conti'al (Jovernn ?nt to believe tint Mr. Gir,cr;^:i iiac ccLJii.i tied cert a in breaches of the lav, then bo should be ru leased. So on thin. I air. 'rrliinr; ii .mediate action "by way of requoGtiii^ the Central Government to expedite the due proccco of lc.w.

Mr^nrr^Pn'i/V (Nlccria): On behalf of ny del-cation I wich to :::;;r-cd-r'-o i^/ôl , vLLl, thoLO who contra till :•••."! Cr.;if ::al K .;b,'do Cehro.. tilC i;OW c;'ji^;;un'"" :;l" of the 01110 in the CQJIÔ. I cliould alL>o lii'.e to cziprcca i:iy ivaticfcction a1; ceoiris that tbe oPficerin charge of Oi;U(! is an African, that tile Ccij.i.'andcr c,f CHUG is an African. It is really o i.. utter of Gaticfactlon Tor all .ALricaiiG "because the prolJeni in the Conco, in afldii/ion to its l-eii'i-;; political, liiilitai^, and Diplomat ic,iu ul.,:-.o pGycholoîcal, cad it b'o3.pG to know that

Africans are dr:alin^ wi.th the i,. at tor. I om qviite sure t.hat thoy have the competence and the psychological c. uility to do;::! "with the Con-;olcr,f: becaer.G Africans _,left alono to thcmrnlves wiLlir/uit ar:y outside interference, can settle their problems in a shorter period of tiuic.

l\,J time iii pressing I will be very brief, and would refer only to one or two ti; atter :J. Vlith regard to Mr, Tnhotiibe, I think that the difficulty which took place in tin r, cose b^cauoe of ]dx r.;fusal to eor.ie to Leorv.->J;lvillc vac, from the r.oginnirr,, ciuo to tliQ fact that he had bcevi arreeted in Cocpiilhatville ecmc time o.:o. Jr.;) war> GO intimidated anil thus he .;ae always undei1 tho impreaGion that ) ;Gn GO r if lie crane to f:cepoldvi lie coiiicthin,;; woi;ld hDL I. ' l'i' i« into vac the cource of all the trouble, and now the incident, which, tool: place at the air on his way Lack to Katanga thio tiiuo couo to uo Africtuic an a matter of DR/Gjt

disappointment because thin would, cause another now difficulty.- Ho arc! his supporters m.'.fjlit u::e it 03 -Q prete;:t, cuyinrj that"!!1 Mr". Tnhcuibe refuses to cor.e rack to Lfepoldvillc acrnin, here; is a cool CP.GG, he was detained at the • airport". In any case, ho haa now nana^cd to'fro back to his country. I do not know if there is uny ^irrranucG ho can "be civ"en ir he refuses to come, if the Unite:! Notions can do nnythirrj to "brine him back.- G7 courae, I appreciate vhcit the l.inited i.'ationc io doin:^ in the Con^o, particularly in Katanga, now, but his detention at the airport is a very, very bad C::QJ-,: le, flho iiueotions we have to ask ou.:".;clves have oJ courno been -mentioned by the Secretary-General. I.IT thcfic tulka between jVloula end Tshocitc break off, vji.it will happen? The talks have broken off ard Vic. TLho:nbe rcfucen to come

•bccaucs ho vac i-.iticiidated and he will sa>, "llo, if I £;o uack to Leopoldvill9,

or if I ,vj to mcot the representative of the Central Government, perhaps come tiling niiclit ijnprca to u\2, to my pcrDon"* Then ha ;.Mvl his supporters would *:•'?.vo a v:::y ^>:o,l caê ard that uould lead me to one prch'Jem that wan raised by the r1 preGent':.tive of Ghana when he GUQ^cctcd that African Covcrnmsntc niifjiit replace OliUC in the Conco. h'cre aâin, one would ack the ejection! if African countries or other countries go to the support of tha Central Governai^rt lu replacing OHUC, I- am quite sure that fir. Tolioiubc also haa mr.uy fricndo vno \/ill come to hia -support. As you yourself, Mr. Secretary- General, have pointed out, another Korea would then be created. We know very wall that Mr. 1'choinoe in a very influential person. lie 1mG his nupportcrs Uith inside of Africa and outsiue of Africa. if Africans r;o to the Conô they mucb GO to support the Central Government, "but not to replace the ONUC. With due reupcct to my colleague frc;a Guana I think that it vould bo a very difficult thing for African countries or other Governments to take different sides. Irruma , N1 ..yr la)

At the beginning of hio rpcerhj Mr, Gardiner mentioned one thing vbich vao

not quite clear to r.e. He caM that the Accc^ly in K"Ur;r(^a neither accepted nor rejected the Klhonn ncTce'.i^nlG, Neverthelcso, i'r. Tr.hanbo camo to meet the representative c.f the Central Government. I would I'Jko 1-lr. Gardiner to clarify this pciiit Tor me, with regard to wiiat he really iue;;nt, Ginoe the hour is very late, I chall not c;n £.ny further but will only mention the qucrtion of Jir. Gizenca. The Acting Lcorotavy-Gencrnl has clearly elated that he :LJ about to take r a initiative. It ic gratify inc to UG to hecr this. V,rnat is Important, hcwcvcr, is that lir, Gizcn^n i.e. a political leader and a very vcll-l:ncwn perociu la it wise merely to leave hli;. in a situation that ic fraught with anxiety^ V;e do not know vhat in '^Qiu^ to happon to him. He is second to

Mr, Lurr.iu'.ba and everybody Imcnrs v.hat }iaj:'-pene;l to L.c0 Luim^uba* Now Mr, Gizcn^a ir> allowed to remain in a very certain situation, l/o do noi, know vhother ho still enjoy hi:i parl 'amentary iiiinumity and privilejrcc or vhethor he ;LG conc-idered en ordinary i:/.icea. As Lar> been quito riretly pointed ou-^ ii1 ho j.i concicJcrcd nn ordinary ;.*. i lA^f 1; a ahou3 1 be breu^ht bcTere a ceuvt or p:.v-I:k.:'icnt, end tried. But to lr .ivc him in c.n anxicty-ridOnn situation vould create ii.Illicu.lty and divide rr.nr,y Afrifiuns in whose raindc^ of course^ he io a political leader,

Mr. NrPOVO (Conco (Loopcldville) ) (interpretation from French) : Having heard the report of Mr. Crirdiucr a] id the ctateui-ntr, made oy the speakers wl:o preceded m>>, 1 sliould like to u;nke a bi'icf ,0 totciiicat arid ank what the intentions of the United Nations cue with renmxl to the Ka'carâ pruM.eiuo I irir/ist upon this because the arinfjiiiervt of Katanra v/as Dccomplishcd in the presence of the United Hat ions. and thus, the United Nations may be considered to be responsible for this state of affair So Ihe question of the entry of ormnments into Katan^/i in fundamental because it is as a result ef reiuforein£ his inilitarj/ potential l.hnt Mr, Tshembe believes that lie can defy the United Uations and the Republic of the ('cnô. If the United hatioriG coiiGiderj that ILD mandate is to prevent civil wui^, iL I'.n.yt suppress the caucec oi' .'jiicn Q v.ir; the u.ain eciu;je of cucn a war i;j the ani.a:-:nt cf Katc.nga, which was quito r.:ccs::iv-j. 'i'iie Uoveririr.r.-nt of ihe Cenô cannot tr;i.ei:ite t)ie reariMai.-ient of Katanâ^ ':hich placer, in jeciparOy the lives of the coldiera cf the United I fa ti one forceo, as well «-3j 1hocc of thousrAiids r^f Console JG» Thic ic why wo asl: that the United iiations take immediate ctepa in order to eliminate this potential for armed conflict, AE/j m

- to the question ncorcs to me to be quite cinple. I have been cerr;m.!;;GiGi;cd to fulfil tho ir:r nant^c for l«atan^a that vcre given to UG by the Security Council. We htvc no intention other tiiun that.

Wiv.'h rotprd to the ji.inoruiti.Lii of nrino into I.oLr.:;^n> we have been i;corchin3 for and trying to apprehend thoac people uho bring arms in and to confiscate some of thece ari:i;j, I believe that the: Centr;:! Government it/relf would be the i'iirst to acknowledge; what we. have clone in this rcr.pdet. We have, even 1 1 Duccec.u.vij to a certMin oxtcn'o(1 in prevcntir.^ t.he tronGiî of arri .:; frcm one part oi1 Katr.;j;-a to another. HUG V£:c not a matter in which wo could of ford to be .Icisurcv.y; it i:; a vary r^crioiia threat to uc^ to tho Con(:olen^ population ond to the position of the Governmont. We welcarc the reco^nitica uf the importance of the work that we ai e doin~ in thi;j field by tho Go7err:r;ient . 1 r-hall ncnr turn to the question rec^rdiii;- tho hatanâ Assembly which was rniccd by the rcproncntativc of iliêria, Althourh the A:.Gomb-ly ha;:; been mooting ciiiCc .A; ;.not cf l.Gct ycr.i^ it hns not mot wit.ii all of Itr: member o jTeccnt. 1 / jprr,:. ''}... îaly 'K p:r coht of the r.c:..bc^';;hip ir, rr.aao up oi' I>alvtba rc'prcccvilatives. '.ihoê pce^lc withdrew fi'cm the AcLcnoly in 1>;0, An at LL nipt lo now bein:' i.^nl-j to IKIVC til-., -e Ealuban return to tho Frovijiennl AasorrbJ.y, no that there may be on AjL^.nibly which will be truly rcpreccntative of the vholc of Katanga* This, io the topic to v/hich 1 made reference in rny initial

^rjL-Il '-'^•hJ'^^l (United Arab Republic): I rnnnot becin to put my question without welccraii,(j both LTr, Gardiner and General Kc-budj Gcbrc to thic mcotine;. Since I i.ust be oriel , 1 GhaLl cc.nrino myccli' to thcco words of welcome to them. Wo have hoord that on b April., i'r. Aloula prcc.cntcd certain cc-nclunion^ i'rom their 1 nl !:G to La', Tnhcnbo, 'a.' he word "concluGiona" C'-^vcys that these were unucTGtccd to bo agreed upon. VJhat ic the natuj-e of -these cpnoluGions? I vronder whether ill'. Gardiner would be gotd enouc.h to explain thc^e concluoionc to ust

_i: Tliccc were draft conclucionn which were submitted by Mr. Adculn to Mr, ^i.-.huijibe i'cr hij cciuideraticri and we hope that 1'rcui thcivij if moot of tho rrovirjioiLj are nc^ccd upon, iruy ccine the final conciuoions of the discuGcionc that have thus lar been held. AE/Jpci 50-60 ( l''r,

I ray add that v;e are not taking part in this dincunnion. This document hoc been pocncd from one party to the other 0 - We, have no I received an ofiUcInl t:\xt, sines uc nro not a pnrty to the diccucsion, Jlcv/cv^r, the litfcle that ve havo ho'ird with regard to this document given uc. the iinpreccion that it is quite consistent with the provisions of the 3. oi fund n merru \ 1 2 •

_Mr. ET.-7AYYAT (United Arab Republic): I wlch to thank Mr. Gardiner for his explanation. GRR/ek

l^^^lrT^'L (Ethiopia): First I vnnt you to allow r.e to welcome our own General. I ,-.; i cuvo ;;,y incliruj.l. bon quite froiilily ic to acl: in a c-U*ii ;,htrorv:;rd miinncr thai llr* Gl^cn^a b3 ,.olr:nncd. In rebelling tint conclusion I b;:.GG niycclf upon the following facti. ife has been in prljon :fo.i.v... a Ion;'', >.:liue; no charges h;ive been brought against him; and to 1^:0 tho conclusion is that he should bo raloaGed. If. however wo pro.^cc 1 the other way around, if

\,z QG!-: that lie be prococutcd, 1 ain afraid it ; ri^ht pub tno Ort-vmization ic a difficult position. I certainly nhall not bo able to iinderiitand why llr. Gardiner vill tabe the initiative and nay that llr. Giz^n^i nhoull bo prococated. rarh":po that is juct a manner of spcakinc, but I would bo inclined to say that since no charge: has bean raac'io a^uinut lain, ho should ba rolcrr.ad. That is my inclination. Kn::t I have a munbor of queetlons about the eeriiriby of the troopr., about the veaponn we havo heard are ccnin- in to rntanc;i and vhotner the question is coinc to ba settled peacefully, bcvrcver, since iU in aate I am hoping that we shall have another opportunity ao ;;con au p.ocr-ible to c° in bo thcce matters and I will reserve niy questions for the next iucetin^.

The ^ctl.n/r r^^^^A^Y-n^F^AL: I just want to brinp; out my point of view refm-dirc Mr. Gii.cjjua. lor llio record, I think I should inform the Comraittee that ns early aa 17 Jar-utiry of thic year I addressed a communication to I-lr. Adoula. I will read tho relevant text; GRR/ck 62 (Tbn

"I express the laopo that all procedures errployed in dealing with Hr. Gl-Ciija vill bo entirely :!n accordance vith l.ho lav of your land, tl:at they will te coiJij:J;; tent vlth the uuo pio>?e:Cij of lav, and that hlo rights undor the lav will be i'ully rccp^ctcd." 1'iiis, of roure.o, Ims been incrrr:orat^d in my report to the Security Co^mcil, ( document 3/5055/Add. l/Aiinox ^. In th^ aatter oi' Mr. Glzenr;:^ of courGe; I am u^ing my coed orficcs. It is not rny intention to interfere in tin intornal

ra of a Bovcrei£n Governracnt; ar.d I om not tryinr, to pa^s any jucl^.-.ment on thn rijhtness or tho wron^ncns or the Central GrvGrnmcn^c attitude tcvards Mr. Gi'.:r',r>.£a. All I am trying to do, and all I vill try to do, is just to C^nerato the processes of the machinery of the law of the land "by offering my good officoc. I nn very Grateful to you for all your very useful and positive contributions to the dali'uorcitionn today and. I can assure you once again that in future tho CoiEialttee will meet more regularly.

The mentinn ror.n nt IPJ^ ptin. V ,,v,p

COlPTDF.irTTAL ng ITo, 67 ey Jur:^ EKOLIGIl

UNITED HATT-ONr, ADVISORY COMMITTEE Oil Tlffi COIIGO

Meeting at United Nations IToadquarters, New on Friday, 29 June 1962, at 11 a.m.

Tn thn Chair: U TIIAITT The Acting SECRETARY-GEriERAL

Canada I'v. BARTCH Ceylon 1-ir. MALAT Af;EIvTJU Ix. CEPRJ-EGZiT Tc aeration of Malaya l!r, ZAICARIA

C ulnca l»r. AClilCAIi India. Hr. JUA JnJoncGia Mr. WinJOPRAITOTO Ireland 1-ir. O'CULLIVAII Liberia lli% JOIuIGO'J- i;.:.;li Mr. COULTBALY . Morocco Kr. BLlJTIli-'A rUr^ria Mr. A3IODU Faliic tan Mi-. Muharjrad 2AFRULIA ICIIAN

Uiulan Mr. ADEEL Mrs. RC'JGEL i:,i'. Taicb SLIM United Arab Republic Mr. UIAD Conco Mr.

62-114-370A FGB/ub

in ordnr to the n;jml-crs of the CciPMLLtce up to date en develop:on to in the Congo,, v-.?.rticul,?r;Ly with record to t':o Adcula-Tshci;;!^ tal!:::3 :hi Lo-.vpoldvlLle, Since t,h,.-' c':ll. for 11: LG LicetJ.)\3 un,r; iscuod these taJkn, r.c you knew, or.do-1 early in

•l.-vj r/iv-(.".:\z of .~'u Jun-3 without e^r:!':. fnT.nt, thus ereH.tlnp; a ^.r/^ critical phase :'ci the 'Jrlted i:-itirn3 operation In the Conri. 1'ou ^-11.1. have seen by new the t;.;b of Mr. Gardiner ra report on the Adcula~T:jhcir.l o tn. !!:R, vhich I have dictributcd 03 a C:cu.vity Council rlooiii'.cnt under the cyr.bt.l 3/i.'^;^/Aad'.10. Tlie annraed; l;cvcvoi% vhich -".re voUuîn01112, • are ctill "bain,'; prcccrccd and have not yet been circv..lir,cu. They vi].l '1 ^ cca^letcd ac follow a : the French text, tcmorrov ;]aturu.ay aorniciQj tho KnglLoli text vill "be reaJy en Tuc:.;dc?,y morning tl'.c Ku3f.i.n,n text will to ready on TaoGday afternoon. lir. Rols-Bennett^ the CliuG representative in j-Jli'/ii'^jthville, vho cat with I'r. Gardiner in the cecond phase or the trO!^, ina returned and I intend to oall upon him to pive you firct nî>i in.frr-i:r.tion cur pin: ntary to tin written rcpcrfc ufcout tl:c tc,'Iii:j. It in, I li:ink, n Lit ci^riy to Qttc-r.pt t:o Th Vv/ r.v / concilucicua &a to the cic"iiir:iiicc cf thj i'aliuic cT \'-?ic I,cr^:?TdvilJ«; 1 ,xi;'^ to ciri la C/Ti'£.ciijr;ut« '( icrG is no invwicion for then to rosier-, but u.3 chall r^"-'^ for them to do GO. Tho dccicivo qucati^n, of course, ^jill l-c whether llr. T3hc::.l'2 and his lieutenants in Katc1:!^ will now undertake to resume thoir cecesnionLit efforts. They ir^.y or i.l'uiy r:ay not. Aa ycu know, Mr. Tshrmhe, a'c Ilitonx and en other occar,iona Giucc ti'-'-n, has renounced i;ecc:G::;ion. But what ho viil actually do now remains to "be S'.i'.n, particularly clrice &<:••:?.<* of hia collcaâcc; -- r.ioct notc,bly Mr* Kiraa — have inereuTl.nrLy evidenced a lr.v!: of cymra'thy with Mr* Tshcmhe's rarticiyation In tho tallta end with the so-cnlled cc-iic.iliatory Una he war, puraulr.-r at Leopoldvillo. In-'Iced, there have been ii.d Lc.--,t/iona that cane efforts vcre lf;jns exerted to undermine 1'r. Tchcmbe in Katanga during his absence in Lecpoldville. I Lil^ht add that virile ve vcre hoping th-it tho Loopoldvlllo talks rnlcht end in t.^rccmcnu vo vcro always pi'erared lor thcjir lil:^'j/ failure, despite tiie fact Lhat Mr. Cr:rdinc;r vau cxhi.bitin;- greut skill curl duln^ everything h possible to keep them goiiic and to achieve fruitful result3 for them. FGB/ub 3-5

(Th-

I have cuccested to Mr. Gardiner that he should cnne bore for concultaticns in the r.c::t feu dn.yc since I wr-ald \7inh to have t!:n V:or>cfit of hi.c anai'-ycic in rivin;- thouQhl, to the iimrcdtale luturcj You may Lo cuic that our T.ou^le in the C^.ro h^vc l)cen told to he very much on the alert for any contingency as a ccnoe^aence of the breakdown of the talks. (Th? Acting ncerntnry-Gen^

It Is quite possible that, in the light of d^vo.l < >pr;: :ntc in the few I will, find it necessary to consult you rcrar:ltn[' the cource of action to be tal-:o;i raid even, perhaps, to invite the Security Council to review the entire Ccn£o cituatior. and to con cider the advisability of clurj Tying ond ctreiicthening the ex.'. ?•!-,-; rig irar/iatos end providing certain new ooe:;, i.ou may be cure, of course, that in the meantime we will ecLtinue the policy oi' extending oil possible Goîstarrê under Security Council rcnoluticncj to tl.e OoY^rnircnt in its efforts to achieve unity and protect the territorial integrity cf the country* In this respect, I may rcj.d to you the text of tUe inoccnc.G which waa sent to Lcoôldvillc today in connexion with the occond Qmuvorcary of the independence of the Congo which will bo celebrated tomorrow, t) nt ic, I'jaturclay, 30 June. The text of r.v/ inesc-.i^G^ v/hich is of course cent to both President Kus&vubu and Prime Minictcr .'vloula, roads as follows: "To r resident ICaâvu'ou^ Prime Minister Aclcula and his Government end all the po- -pie of the liopnblic of the Ccn-o, 1 cxte:id, on behalf of the IV.. l.tcd llaticns^ vnvinaot iveelln^c and beet wic-heo en the cccaoion of the iieivublicrs bee ond Lidcpcj' k:;ice Annivercr.ry. !1I nriy toka tiiis op;;oi tunity to o,i";oure ycu that the United Nation?. holds Dtea'ifaGtly to its pusiticn in support of the unity arid territorial jiitcfnrity of the Conô an it wcs r.n the at:tair/.;onb of its indcpandoijco two ycrirs rô» TUo United Uationc therefore wishes to see success attend

the efforts of the Centrr.l Government to dv5cLrste nil dicuniby and to re-catablljjh l.mi mil order thrcu^hout the land, "it it; my most honest hcpc uiat, in the interest of the well-being of the people and the coi-ntiy^ the reconciliation of all differences between the Ccntra.1 (lovcrni.^nt and Katanga Province or uny other provinces will be achieved without further report to force end without much more delay, that thci'.o who would pursue divisive and ccceGGionirjt air- a will cce the folly of their wi yu nnd will in- re a so tho co-operation, c\'C which tiicre liave been recent iridleaticnn, town ids fin-.-ling ocreed solutions of difficulties. "I would wish the Guvorrnnent of tiie lie{iib.l Lc to know that I em even now giving thou;_art to furtiicr measures which ~ihe Un.itcd Hat- ions m:i['ht tcke in D;jsictin,i thu Governir^nb in solidifying the; ccuniry, clroncthening the

administration and iuipr ovine the economic v;elJ.-bc;1ntr of all people. Please bo <••.:.; sured that we in llic United Nations fully uiiderstand your problems and oppi.uud and support your valiant efforts to encure a bright future for a united Congo," AE/ch 7

(Tli'-i AoM.jv; Hr"-. rotary -0->n? ml ) Thnt in the text of my mocnoca. It vas sent this nomine; it ic to bo relcn.:~d tomorrow morning. I -.ay also infcT-n êu that sorr,? time aô the Kntonr^se authorities informed cur pcor.le in Llisalethvill.e of their intention to celebrate the co-called Katanr^se 1 lid.^roivJ. TÛ or: 11 July and to brir. •;;; a thousand CM.- core Katcn^GGC ^cndriru.cn fro;;'. pluooo o-otaido Zlicabothvillo to participate j n l.^ perîe on that date. Our people 1 b.v-'S tr :'n a firmly negative position acînct brin;unr in any additional £erHnnr/:-rie r to Elir 'tethvi"! lo for this or any otnor purf.ocG n»:d; inrood, -we hnve infoiuod itio Katnn^crc nuthciltics ni1 our otion/ ly negative view or cny no-called iadepoii:)Gnc(" aolGrr^li.Gn at all by thorn. wo have r.lco cnllc:-ci tho ru^port of some Coverruacata

v?ith rrprooentc-tiveG in Elicobcthvillc to tiio C;C.Q:; ciTcct. I tli ink it liiif-ht now ba advisable to cnll up^n Mr. Rolz-Bonnctt and, following his Gtatcmcnt, to invite diL»cujL'ion about the situation in general.

1-ir. r^Lj-PFT^1;7.1?^1 (Former OWC reprcccntativo in Ellantotiiville) : It fri 1 cr n .^ £T - pleasure t;c LM here- vitii you thin ^orr;in:;. I rhall try, to the n-axinufn o;it^ .it pojGil'l^ ^ to {3ive ^:cu ;;.;;, ,G details x-ui.ch r --y "bo \i;:ci;vl iu y>')\ir ^:^~>lii^ rnd. interpretation of the report of the OQlcer-in-Ch:!rc~', vhich ia contained in docunont S/>0^;/Add, 10. 1 vich particularly to i..fer t^- certain cvorita vhich transpired in the eourne of the tvo periods oi1 tho air.ci.inaions 'bot^?,:-n Mr. Adoula

end Mr. Tnhcmbc. A3 ,>ou l-:.nov;; during the firct p"\riol of the GO cliLcuccionr,, vhich Ifictcd from 18 I larch tu 10 /-.pril, only the Central CovcinmonL :mi K,"at anyone

dolcL;at j.otiG were preGont. Altlioxich the Off icor-iii-Chrn IQ of OulJO provided general ricsistrnê to laeao mcetincs, he was not present at, the talks Leco.uoe the parties had c:LvroG3ed a deairc to conduct thceo diccusîo.iG Lctv-cen thcnv-elvon . A ^reat pait of thic fir:;t period of the diccxins Louu vac d.:voted to an cxarai.natioa of the re:.:-i active yowjra of tho dele;.; hi ion r, in order to determine i,i!.oblier, in fact, both the Kr-t.niêre delegation niui tuo delc^Cii.i.on of the Coatral Govoinrront woic empoT>,:ei\,d to jnake firm cor.uni ti,.cnr:: vaich, in turn, could be iii.plc.n.cnted without refoience to cny other auuioiity. 'ihe' applicability of the ].r-\ fY'ndr'i.-ientC' '1 •/ to Iv/'t; laiâ \ic^ the other c.aLn euU.ojt. It vac at the end of thic J. ir;;t iLriod 01 the tall-o tluit a «.locur.ent w..ii: nr. i.r.j t..i,ed by Mr. Atloula to l\r. Tc.Tii.be. Qai:j dociuaent van entiticd Draft Ccuc.- !u:riona of the Lobpoldvillc Talks end contr ined the {.anide lines of a posciblc briclîn:.: of tlie dlfferoncoa hctv.'oen the tv<\- parties and an enumeration of certain U< iiatitutional propocala for iite diGtributiun of povcro between tiie Central and the Provincial Governments of

tuC COiv O. MNIfr; j|.!t!

AE/ch 0.10 (nr.joiT^rcr^u)

I believe that e Krief rzziwl end e, mention of tli3 points contained in this droft rr:i.

clarification oi' Uic na.in iuzu'Jo ci. ccatcnt i.cu {sid Uru,, in U:rn; r.ii^ht lead -- if tivo intentions of the Kctorv.cse le^aciG of necking ru agreement crcj ncnuine •- ihis mi/iit cont.ribatG, I repeat, to finding; r.ol.ut Lc^na to theno differences. The ('lr'CVu]i.:fn-c. conti:inlii5 the di^L't conclar: !.ono -which V-TJ r, nl mi t tod ty Mr. Acioula to Mr, Ti-lionibe on j.6 Airil included the following meiu puiuts. In the fiiT.t pJ^ce, a reutr.t.crr.ent of the pilnci.ple of unity and indivisibility of the Republic of

the Ccr.^j vithin it& bc-undtu'.Lcs nc 01 ;O Juno l^^O cn-1, at tho came tir;-; a recognition thr.t unity did not signify that particular conditions prevailing in the various regions of the count,iy clnuld be ignored. In the GGt-nnd place, the document mentioned that the Central Government would under toko to cui^niit to the Lc^Lnl.ative ChamberG, vithin tvo months, a draft of a i'cdejT.l coiiBtil.ution for Hie C-H^J. In tbe thi.rd place, the dcv'uuiont rrsntioned a dlvicion of povors to be inoluo ;d in the, couclltuticri, that is to say, a cilviciou of povcro between the C'^ntrr.l Govcrz;' -jnt and llio proviricinl authorities rf the various provinces of vhat vould beccma the Federal Republic of the TL/kb 11

It ".-jns proposed thnt the Central authorities -would have arrorig their pavers those relating to fcrei-u f.ffainjj armed. forces and c^" iiineric, external and internal security of tho Gtatc, .Lir-ir/i^ration and enL^r'ition, monetary matters, tho -r\r;c: ::>1 and rviGtcr.iG f:yat-;;:i^ the [>_ncral economic [oi. I .%y of tnc country, ooiûjiie .tionc Mid sources of morcy o.r national inte-refj'uj higher education, pucts ; j)a cumriunicationc, as well au bror.! clear; tiDr;. On the oth-r hand, tho p JVCTG i-ccoûized Lo the Provinces vould include the orân.i.2.:.tj.on of provincial legislative and executive cr^.^na, the provincial police; thj o^'c^îsation of provincial services and ad::;ini3tr::tivc cub-division.':, crnication (with the exception of higher cducp.uion), th- 'ranting of agricultural and mining L-oncccoinns, ana i,hc Rciiiinati^n of pcrm/rihrl fez* the provincial Gcrviccs. Thri provincial J..-OWCI'LJ — a, id this IG irriport-uiL, -- v;ould be -cafr-ûarded ly a riaiiGo rpccifyii.^ that Miy law oiaciiding the ul ;triuuLlou of compctcnccj could not become • lYcctivc except with the agreement of all .L'TOV. i.ncial Aj::. ..uîicj . Another point ineluucd in the docuaeut was thud ti.c aiined i'o'^ccs would be placed v-vler thi» control oi1 ti;e Cential C .•vcri.Mc at . Ti.ib tliece nr;:ied fore;.- ,3 vould r.'j'l; be ... 'dliori?. d to incorvcu.. ir* piovinciaJL c.tTairc or la the u^lriter'Aa^c ol pu'nlic order crrepb in t-iie fo.l. loving ccv.es: flrr/l, oa t!iO requcGt of the pruvincJr'l authari tic:.;; uccondiy, if the provincial ôvcirunerita proved to be unable to fulfil their obligations to naintain public orcicr, and this only after ncn-coiTK linnce cf the provincial authorities with a rciju-:^t by the Ccntr::.l GovcrrJiicnt to nu-ct their oblif^tions and r.ftor a ctatcux.ht by the Council of Minintcrj dcclariiin; a ^,tate 01' cj.icrQcn-;:y in tlic region or province; &nd finally, if there VLLS rclusal by the provincial authorities to execute a decision of tho Court oT ConstiiulJon-'llty, a decic.ion which would clearly e:;tab.lir,h a violation of the Constitution by the provincial authorities. : ':ife; nardu were also jnclu-ici' ccnccn-in;^ the riplrt of the Central Uovernr~nt to taê mcacurcs towardc tiie execution cV law:; ar, I ordliiiinccj in the p.-o>rJn:c./. « 'the Central Government, 1ne docv.iiCnt conti.jiuod, would tc empower0'! to cch" f e ceiinln of its

..••'ijjinJ ^"'•i.'.ntive junctions 1o the provincial (_uvcri"ii..Jivl.-r>. -W'itliin the fi-ai;iv:.\:oi U of tlu. lauj au-i intx.vn .tioaal agrees-! :uts tii^nrd by the Central Government, 1 the provincial auol-oritaoG would have chc ri^ho to c, ..lL;e the cervices of loioLcn technicians whoi.i they iiiicht require, .Finally, the 1'v,;/; ueiininn; tLe TeG[-.ective i'ia'inciol doinoJLs of the utate and the provinces, and the: organization oi' the Court of Constitutionality, would be adopted, it was proposed, at the same time os tiie Constitution.. (Mr. r!ol.7.-Bfmnqtt)

These'vere the General features of the document. r,ut at the end were also incln-Jed a number of iLcaGures 'which v?ould have to be taken iranedlately, and tliCcc : ;oo.i:v,i'C j were the follow in?.:; The first wns that revenue obtained from the exploration and exploitation of underground resources as veil UG from agricultural or mining conco-jclone; in any province \.7ould be divided as followo; 7U Pc*' eent for the Central Government and 30 per cent for the interested province. The next j immediate measure vould be to r'-cognize that the Loi fondprr^ntrVl^ •would be applied to the vliole of the Con GO; nlco, tir.it 'the so-called Ij.canccce Constii.r.tion of 5 August ll'':'-0 \;uuld "be vithdravn. Tho jjrovincial govurnr.crib vould also nbctain from e::crc:i:3inG; powers reserved, to tuc Central Government by the 1 n.i fnn- :'"[irn f ;0.r^ in ]:ai biculur thoce rcfc rr:i.nf3 to the aiTned forego £ rid jj^ndaiiVirrie. Luwev«.a^ the Kotan{7ece cendarnicriC; th" ciacuLaent ccncinucd, having cliriii^iied all foreign elcmcnta, v;ould l.e ni.-iint:rjncd in its .present orc"nlzi.;tion •and -vorld be placed under the control of the Central Guvcrrar.euv. It waa aloo f,ur^-::r.i.-?d that OluIC fcioes rhould. be authorized to be c.ationed in Kolwoai, JadvjLvJ.lle and Lipushi, The K.atan;je:-e money would bo v;it};i.li-own and rt-^/1 c.oed by the national money. Personnel of the kurettj, innicratioii^ taxes, cuoterns end telecomrnumcation serviceG would be placed under the authority of the Central ISovernr.avt. a incuber of the Central G'ovcirniiieut designated in concuLtation with the provincial government v;ouia reGJ.de in Llicabethvllle and c;:ercir ^ in Katanga the poweru ret»crvcd to the Central Uovernmcnt "by tnc Lnj i'oi •' iJjHiont-"i q.

l!iit;il cuch time 03 the lr,v defining the respective financial competences between tho Central Goveriuacmt and tlic provincial authorities was pncucd l^y larl;].ajnent, the Central Government vas pr-.:pr:rod to Gi^n a provisional arrcin^arnonD and to convcrvj, vithln a f.::ii''d of one i.ionth, a conference of I i-ovinciul Pretjidenttj \;ith a vit.w of tjctc.rrai.nin3 on equitable dlctribution QJ" public revcauo between the Ltrrte and the1 provinces.

!fwo furthv:i- point r, coiit'iincsl in the docunic-nt vw>:: tliat, cubject to the : faithfu'l. application of the i-iuvcmf^t by Lhc i'jitnn:;:,f;e authorities, tlie Central Goverriii-iit -,/oulrl rcccind. tlie state of e^^.ney in Katr.nca, and that the boundaries of Katanga Province-would be respected unless .thq.K&tangese I'rovincial Assembly agreed'to a change by a two-thirds majority. TL/kb 15-15

This documr-nt wns submitted to Mr. Tshombe a few U.T/S before his departure for E.linacethvi Lie, and whon lu'ôtiritiono berpn a.âin fur the jvourpticn of the tDi.-r.-3 the Office;, in Charge of oi;i JO vmt to Elinrb: I hvil j.c to explore vith the KaLai'^cjo authorities; their ro':ct:ioru; to the dje'urent which Mr. Adoula h-ul present.'. d to til m. "'./e }nd a ccrion of diccunclon.-; v.i.th tlie K/itan;j;e:;c outhoritiec in rAic :bothvil.i .o, and at the t.rni of thc;:-e dicîr^j io^.C' a, id -prior to Mr. TciiCifibe' S return to LeopoLilville tae I.^trn-'je^c cv.binittcd a (:ccu;acnu containing their couritcr-proposG I ;j, a docuir^nt -which they imde avail-itlo v.o the Ofricer in Chv-r^Q on 5 May. I vi.L.1 quickly [;o over the roints contoin .d in the counter-proposals,, because by cont/asti.ii^ them vlth vh;,t i h:,vc r.vui ;r,-.ir iscd 'rein the Central Government' G dc-'UMcrrl , tn^ dlf torcn'jcc vill clourly cinpear. In the fi.r::.t olLce, the IC'ilDr-GOse counter-prc,;:oL,M ir; cnviGnged that there should be a tr-:;:ir3.iticnal pcrio-l. umain^ froi:i the c].,. _:uir' of the agreement, to the

ij.owin^; The; Republic of the Con.ô would be errani::ed w> a t\. dcrrl ctate. The organ;.} of the federation would be a prccidcnt, a feicrr.il. asjcuibly and a federal (TOVCrnrr.cnt. Tho states rncmberc of the federation would, bo ecua.l.ly represented in the icderal ôvernaient. Tne federal Gcscmbly vouid bt: conrpoccci of en cciual nuir.bor of deputies elecrlcd fron each state?. Tho pr-r.'nidc'it of tho federation would coii-mand the arn^y^ but c:,eh ctate would have its own êndarrnerie . The budget of the federation would be fixed by the federal assembly. Each state would contribute an eq.ua! percentage of its own revenues to the federal budget. Ill

( I 'r • .flols-Bc nn?.t> t )

'the fcflerul oubjectn or powers would Tic the following: clr'.plcraatlc roprcsc ntation, it boiii-' uncle rnt.ood ihat each Ctnta voui.cl be entitled to hove it. i ova rcpreri'.ntaticn abroad of ur econcir> l.c nature; th-; national arr:'/; liovcv.::r, tin PJ evident of cL?h Gtn.ie would "be ;:o_,].;re t.ie niche Gt authority of the national army contingent stationed in hi:: territory] the exlerrip.l ;jf:ourlty of tlu.; Republic; the ^.o-o^dination o" the economic cind social roli;?y of t.he i^tKtcu; 1:0:3 tr.l soivicen nnd ccirmunL^atiuii^; IcnLGlation on

:i-.i.'::.on:i'L: eniif^r'-.tiun c,a.i Ij'wnic.rc.Uion; cuclon^ c^rvic/G c;r-!ceruln(j import n; notify ruil cxcivnô ]ioliuy ^3 of Uu: rr.omoiit vhi"n a co-oi-iinatca economic policy v;ould }-\L±VQ por.Mi'.tcd the icunif ic'i'..i en of th j ir.oi.ey cy.v.o;;; vithout clangor to the i conoiuy of the i'..ilcrat.U)n anU cf rhc ino-Lbcr static; tije finnnccLi of the f cdcra-'lon, cub j cot to Lin.! ro':c3'1G reserved to the: PTIOVJ..I.CCG in this field. '.ih'_i:i tlie noc'uraent continued to caiueratc ccrt^.Jn uub.jocts i/n.Lch vould :::: ooiiciU: rîifc pox. oi3 of llic i'odc^T.l nt.-l cLi..cci evil, ioritico. '.flicks) •\,'oro t 10 following: i/ublle voriiG of liatioiirj. .ini.orcû; hi; h^r ecinoation; judiGi;.! organization Mxl proccuurc^ inron^ntioii; h-\Lilc Ic^;:! Lilation concerning oourcc.j of cncr,'"/ and ruincj; ulr, c..a iind Qilira- lacunc of 1 rancportaticn of nation;.'l intoT'':-:it, n:.\d l.c/'.iclation concerning th(? r-jral police. : j •;L :is'lati( n relating to Ihc Cibovc-incrationed matters could be enacted only i-rLtli the n^rcc-ii'iont of tiic- interoGt*. cl. _ states. /i;.:on^; the JVOVGI^J rocervo'l to the eta Leo of tho • rodoration vould be the following: tiie police oi.cl (juntUaT-ierica .of the eta LOG; cut/tcii'S cervices in r^: .;,rd to export ihiUrn; i".Lrcnl Icîclaticn, i xccnt in nab tors rcueivvc:d to the xcdcral uul.hori i, i.cr. j. Jntv.rjinl ncc.urily of the states; liioucy ar.vl exchange policy up to the time v'.icn tho i.ioiiulnry cyitcn vrould be unified; education, vith tlK; cxcepiion or higher cd ieahi.cn; the c:L)po1nl'.".:pnL of urîGtratca; brcadci-atin^;; luinin^ and aci-lcultui-al concecîcno ard, iji fronoral, all other eoiupct ...IICOG not exjjrec>.;ly rcrcrvcd to tho i'c;lcral cui'hur-itic:1., The- docuu; lib contiriuod to cxpi'Cô that the lrc;ji loot of each state would be the femoral a\\- liority \n1!r'n IViat rrt.ato. Tlic of./iclr.ij of the federal services •would depend auinlriistratlvcly on the authority of the President of each state in which they would exercise their functions; the latter would be under 17

obligation to report to the federal government on this cubject* Tartoo, duties and fill ether revenue would bo established and collected by each ctite. Ihc federal author! ciee vould "be entitled to e-GtaVilch rcileral ta::c3 vliicii should net exceed a cert: a in percentage of the ta:-:eo established for CXjJGrtC, Imports, or the c:;ploltai I.on of mineral n and forests. Fc>JVr:,l ta::ec vculd to collected by each state u:;d vould V-c dcr.ocitod by them w.'.tli tlio lo.icrcil authority. Tlic Tefleral authorities vcul-,1 require the a rr ccir.cn I, of eaca irtata in order to cl-lain credits vhich VwULd be choree d e.-ainst the :L-^>:rai "budget. It vac also ct.al.cd that tvo cr rvjrc ctntcG ve-uld iiuve the r:'-:iit to join in order to obtain credits \.iieh they vould rci-ay Trcm their cT/n resourcco. The federal conrt . Ltuticn r-nprovod by the C'hatLber.:.^ the document ^cntinueo, voi;ld be Guhnii tied to a referendum of all Ccrgolc::''.- people and approved by each of the states Kembca j, of the federation. If the ooLDtituticn vac rejected J n the rcfcrcnduin, the text would be submitted oâin to the Chcjnbors for eonGidcration. ri.irjii.3 tlic transition period, the relations between the Central nrvl KatanyeL .. Gcvcrnsicnto vculd be l.!n:i.tod to a nu;: her cf oubjectc viiicli verc •ihen indicated; for exor^ple, an e-xclian^c of ir:.uufacturc:d coeds end a^ricaltural products. Such cojijnereial exciian^c-G v.-ûld be P^M.V r:ned \.:-,r 'bilateral cotupenaalory cperationo of a .nonetary charge ier. 'jlrj co-called V">lo_ I; it'ponnlr: (the railvay over 1hc hubiluGii Rivor, contl.nr.jj to Tort PrJircqui in. L i'ro:n there by river to Matadi), voul.l be re-eol.ablich :d for transport to and from Katanga, and Kutanâ vould undertake to tran^p^rt the majority of the products, as vo].l 03 JJIOJL ci' itr, iinporto couLufj; fien the /Vtlanbic Occau :-.y HUG Vr.i.e ^Ta_t.inpn_ln, Tlio export uutiea would coatiiViio to be collected by h'atarryi iihtil a ..aticractory arraij^c";ont van reached ^n political matters vrith •.,ho adoption of a constitution, and i v . LI the rucpi..etivc financial domains of .;he Centi-al Gove,rn3f:ent and Latar;^, \,\/al i be ^.atahj.i. jlied Ilatanâ vould contribute

i;o the Central Govcmiuoni, a cerLai.n i.e rce.ibc(\e of eu-jLoms duties as well as of other revenue deriving from miner u.1 and foi'usLry exploitation. MW/ch 10-20

It vng alco currêo to a that the ministries of foreign affairs, finance national defence of tho Central (lovciur^nt should lo OGr:u>ned to representatives of Kati.;nr.a; that a coj-:nU,lce of Chief c of ritaff chc-.ild be ectabllshod, vith rcpioGcntativoG of the ;j;c, OlftjC and tho Ketaar;r:, ,'c:i.''.ar:î-.Lv7, IV/r the purpoce of verifying the imi ort of Lr.ms end L.IG retreat o'.' the- /lij i'rom tiie areas which it occupies at precc'iit in Katanga. Concerning .i.Orei^n teclraiclnns, it \;a3 pro)-o.r.ed that Guah. technicianc QG may be needed for the- efficient functioning of the j.-.a; iinictrative scrviccc of Katanga vculd bo freely recruited by tho Matt riâ ruthoril ice. rj jo Govornmeat of Katanga 'would coiiMunicate to tho Central Goverr^snt tii2 naj,.2G or occhnicians so rcoruiced. The ctructuro of tho r.o-cMllod Katanôr.-^ ctato aG it exictc at present ',Tould l)(j ;n?-intaii.ici.l_, as veil as its personnel. Tho borders of Katan^r., as uho^ ".T3ro f i:\od oft 3d June 1.9 0, vould not be modified nxocpl, with the a j re or. out cf tho Kaooipêse Aor,cn;bly by a tv.o- thirds majority vote; end f. ônera'l. political amnesty vould bo enacbed and nil jiolitical prisoners llr.oratcd i^niodLo.toiy. Ttro KatanQCi-'O comitGrpropo.-.aln ^/ere presented to the Central Go vein;. -.oat, vhich did not find tlnm a Guitabl,? br.ais for disounr.uonv Ar, the talks rosuned in

Lcopoldv ille; tlio deloj^ationt? of tho Central Coven-ir , Jt;t and of tho province of Katauc'i n^reod on 25 May to UGG as a basis for discusaion a working document prepared by OHUC. jvm 21

Tha uorkinc docuir.c-nt contained the following rr.nin llnoc: rrrccmont on a docv;r.ent v:bich would in effect put ;.\n end to tlr.: I'. L.:vr" :.::>_ oececiiieii; urjd

'.: Gtiibli r.hr.ent of r.nchinory to .int -- with Hi: lzz.i:t po::ciblo colcy but, ;.t the or:.:? time, vrith the lenet pccciblo diGnrnticn ^-T cervices end 4 institutlonG -- the inte(- ..... -ation of Kc :anca into tlie i;c_rn^bJ.ic of the Conô in the liiilitf^ry, mor.jtary, fiscc.1, cconcrLc cjid oth -r riclîj. Tho pi'OviGif iiol f.;p^n;ln T.ropci cl f.vi- this nocjr,.-! r.ûnu of tulhc contained in t'r.e firot plGc;j the d.L:;cuoOicn of v;]mt wuuld be ct^'',,^'. tlic flnnl conuu unique -- "lint ic, til? bnclc doci:;:;cht of roco;iciliat'Scii, on tli ? bnoin of which the

rr icliinory l;o ef li" ct the i;itc^r:vtic-n V/OLU d be ecn.nbii ched. However ; nftr-r a lone ciiccu.iGion, the ortlcr of tho nrf-vid:i UD:J ciirjn;;c'l , and it vns decided, that i he fircL it/jni cl'.ou.ld be nn cx-er i.nv.ii"- Lori of tl'ie r;:ur,:!ulc3 of the con^nic'r-ienr- to ron.-,trUitc tlic Ki elrincry for iu,plcu;'.ntation, r.rui thnt ot the end of the ' tr.lks 1ho delci itiono i, ..uld cure back to the finnl ccj;.rrii.;:Piqi.io, uraftinc it in the ] iijht (Ji1 i'lair x;;- "vioiio n^rccnr-ncn. T. ;O I iliLC G! ...:;i"i:ocj in nn aiTuG:.;r>horo of a cortnln fcrrrnlity, and ptirhoT>r. of tcijcic-ji -• Ijecau::: j, CUTJ--;.; oltu-r K.a, .,>.;, u nvv..^r r ci' p,. e |. i^f.navy r.'.r.tt/'iro L?.d •' o l:-o di; nosed ui : foi: e::r;,.^lo_, the c.L. i-if ientlc n e, ,"• a c. ,A LCi'.eub u^lcli ';r. Tclj^i-..i;sj liad n,ad e lici'c/re Icr.vi.ii^ liliGnbctHville i-.:vi in v;hich ho n.ado a nirnber ef ocoucni: Ions afijnct tlr:: Coni r;:l Gcv.:iTj^:::nt, ond f J ,:o Lhe qujcbicn of ^cc^rity .or the r. embers cf the IUiunuj;;oL:.3 del-,;, Lion, r.nJ. cf iLeir freed:"] cf iiiovc::,'jnb. './.hose qiicci-ions Led to bo ::o tiled before tlic tr.'ks on :;i:,')Glunce could bG£-ln, • • nd, P.;: I have suid, thiu diycueGion contrJbutLd to L certain at r;;o sphere olv i'orunlity and tension ^t th.o sir.rt of ths tnlkc. Ilovevor, ai'l^jr a cerl-ain tiiv.e liad jacced, and notwithstanding occacional flare-ups, the atrnofiplicrc of the tolKi; ir.proved and indeed there were meetings at which Q relaxed familiarity prevailed. Jvin 22 (Mr.

I nhould also mnke It quite deer thnt the tnlkr, took plnce in an atmosphere of ccrnr. ..etc freedom. There is no truth whatsoever to c,ny r>uc(~ectionn that either deleâîon was not conrai.otely tree to exprecc its vlcwc; and to Give or rcfuce orrocr.cat, Thia absolute freedom vac maintained even during the rcoGt tcnco moments of the talkc. The delecnvicns of the Central Government and Katanga were composed of five iraniborc each, 'rh^ roprocGntativc^ c-j: t;:o Control Covcr:],:ont vrcrn: Priro Minis tor jMonln, Vic3-Fr.jGideut Gondue, and Ministers BoL.boho, i;'i:;:jitatu raid Ilco. :_rho Katonr^co delegation v'au ccriponcd of; 1'r. Tcli.;n.jc; Mr. jobwc-j hie lllnlcter of Finonco; f-'j.-. Klhcnâ, h.Lc MiivL:;tor o::1 Public V.'ui'k.i; and liners. Kairbolo find Ki'ihibaj v;ho nrj I.atunf>3c Mcrboru? j-::irticipntin^ In tho -IclibcrntionG of the UcnGolcr/.j Parli iônt nirl. who h::iV;jr -i.i.ccuG3i'ra enrved connejiiin:^ the raonotc-ry c:c.:;:;:i.!:icion. Having failed to r ; 1 i\\- : h r _ o ."?,;.. "int. en t :.o i.îLlaLe <.;f th-^ inf^ctory cor: , !.: .;I.â; the r;;rr; Lln;3 too ;: up r.rndat-. of the I'icccl cad ccoucinic eorr/iujion, on .: cltji- it, tlu L'^r/Irtc o.C s 1 he trar.nport and cor/.Riurjicr/bicn eon.;.. L^Lion. Py t ;e loiter prrt of June tlio r::':nrlat'.or; of all Uie cur.i'iilGJiion:3 lied been approved, inclii'ling the uionctcry coiLV.ii.GC ion, and rai effoi-t vaG nnde di;rin^ the lont i..c.cuingG to rcFich G^rcement on the final c era; rani quc . • You linvo of course beeu iuforiLQd that it was not poGG.ilile to recoh Gueh ocrccrneat . : i 'i am repcr to which I am Gure you have all seen; it has been ledrned that nfter hiu return to EltcabetlwQlG la:b. Tchoiubc r,;arlo certain • ctr.tomcnt::, jiicludia.^ one to t)ie eil'cct that he did nob consider tin it the talks had been brckon off and that ho \.cai earaetin^ them to reciu^c. Whether they do in fact reGUu.e only the i'uturc will tell. irt".::;;:j:j ,;j-:n(nJ)fMW»[r-

EC/en 23-25 Mr* I'0-1'7*-!'

Thcr.e vcrc soraa of the aspects of the Gitur/fcion vhlch. I thought it would

be uneL\;.L Tor \ ,?u; Mr« Gecretaiy~Gcnoral; and for the i: .colors of this Corri'ii to ki.cv;, If llicrc are any point:; on vhich further claiirication is decircd, I am of course entirely at the Ccipju:l.ttc:c ' s dic,pr,c':il.

Mr. r^ARTOi''! (Canada): I nin not finite clear about these coiranlsBtons that hc.ve now 1- ••cri appiovod, Are tlic?y lunctioiiiiic^ or arc they suspended until tiic tallts are resumed?

comraisciona have been approved; no coicm scion ha.3 a;3 yet been cat up,

Hr^'^irif1!!^: It mlcht bo added en thin point that prior to h-'.c dr-pci.rtui-e from J^opoldville Mr. 'i^h'-irfbd infon.icd Pr. f!;.ii-dir.ar oi'ally tLat it WGU his intcnticii to follow thro\irh on tho nfr^ci'-inb on the mandates which l';fd 'bcr-ii reachc'lj dccpitG tlitj :Cac'u bli.at tharo wny not n^reernont on the final communique, Viicthcr that intention will be carried out remains to be seen, DR/rh

Mr . __ TTT P .Torn A rnTO (Indonesia )t Our delegation is thankful Tor the information and c::pl?.miition5 riven. We tl'.U'il 1o l:.nJ. cr/--:c information -- perheps ue did not bccaiuo I VUG rot able to ivad everything end liste.i to everything available thub I -wrs r.rt f-illy inio-..nod -- airout the deblock in the final c'.-.,.ijuniquf:. It W:..E; EicntioiicJ. here that one of the primary reasons Tor this deadlock was dua to the insistence of the ICatanân allocation that paragraph 6 of its draft bo maintained,, 1 should lirc.t like to hncv iaore details as to wl;at precisely is contained :'n thio ârar/. j.oh 60 Secondly, ve aro rnniclly arriving at the ctar/j v^;oro we vill be in a strong poniticri. We hr-.vo been pat.i.c-nt in this n.atter. I understand that la^'t n.cnth 1 United. i;atioriG .ansiGtanco ctaited to flow in0 Ilovevei , vo are still r/y; able to bring r.rmt a fiill reconciliation between TchniT/i-jc and th^: Central Covernr.ent, My ri.;ccnd ',;ue5tion is th.l^r after all t.ai:3 CAplorabion arm propa.votion, coulcl vuu tell us what the real state of mvind of Tchonibe if.;!' We are patient, b-j-n cur patience iu runn:l n(5 outt Perhapo .he docs not kno\r vhcre the interests of the x^cople lio or T/nere tLo interns 1:3 cf the Gt^te lie. 1 even have the irpression tliat he does nob ^.r.O1/ vh-,:re even hie own Gelf-.li>l,erefjt lica, Oi' coui'ê,, this is a matter of juclfjei.iei.t. What c:ui ^;e do ^.ith such a n-an ar] 'frhoi-.be? I hope I can be (î ];oi:e clarification about this point before ve think about rueaourcs or further steps •which ve should take in this matter.

_ regarding the nr:plificcv';ion of paragraph b, which vat; alleged to have- been responsible i:cr the cucpancion of these trdls, I vill call on Mr. "Kols-Benriett alter :.ry brief ctatefiicnt. P\cr^ardin2 the Ii.r'loiiesian ArabaLGL'-dor1 G referenccc to the. lack of procrcsa, I

entirely agree T/i.th hira. If there ha;; cot- be^n totr-1 lacii of p.r^;;,roGO> there h:i:.j been veiy slow procross towards the achievement of ti.G United nations objectives. For thic ro?tson I have aj-cd Hr. Gardiner to cono here to er.ch.r.vi^o vioys with him cm the m;:t steps vhi".i I have in mind; ho will probably 'oe here this veciicnd, perhaps toi. orrov/. It yill no doubt b,- rolcvant for rae to Day that I an leaving Hew York early next vecli to vir, Lt a few Western European cou.rbricj to huve diticucciona with corue of the leaders cf thcce o.ouiitrior,, kc.Oiiz the iteir;s to i;o oiucuoucd will be the itoru of the COL, -p. 1 feel rather strongly that c-orae of the YJejtern European leaders are in the beet position to exert whatever pressure they can on Mr. Tshombe DR/rh . 27.30

and bis collcr-îca. If they m~c co-operative vith United nations activities, I believe that i-;r. T3boi7:be and hlj coll en rues will 1 o ej/jnablc to re aeon and ccrap3y with the requests of the Central Govorroent aod the ]-.ivblcra of t] ^ Conpo vill be solved hei'ore I GO lon^. It in alco vnrth roc, ll:L:?f, tloat rrir_j Minister Adoula Las publicly offered two scnto in tho Central Cov:erri;;]e:;t to II;1, T~hcn;l:e; that is, ho has asked Mr. Tshcmbe to nanlnate two rccrr.bers c ° hit; Cor/ikab Inrty to jnLn Mr. Aljula's cabinet, and his ceconl oii'e-r vas to 1-ir, 'j chon-.bc hirccelf. Prirno MiniLJi.r Adoula oiicrcd Mr« T2h.^ral;; the i:u;rt of Vic^-rj evident in tiic Central Uover:L:ient. Of courr-e. the oi'ior yn.cs private ana. en.. iid:::}ti;.iL_, but only yesterday Mr. T.:,..->rnbe rca le thia IniOv/n to tl:e public. If lir. Tch.viLbe Gi:d his cellea;;uoG wore roa^T *,.-.) comply with Hius MivrLutcr Adoula's rea:ost l,y ncrrinatin^ two nicnib :rc cf t:i'2 CoijalLat rari--7 in t.he (v-nl/ral f!ab:lnob cuvl y.i1. T;;i ciabc hir.Gelf v.:rc willinr; 1 to rcc-r^t the on'er o^. the V .'u-o-^rouidGncy in th.j Central Coverrir:cnt; I ain cur a that you vill aî'ca T./L'!:h ;;,G b;iat. ]iu.:ro than half r f the; ;'onfclc3o pi'^blcmc v.i.1.1 be solved. If those ofi"cr.j arc nut n.cix.pt'.'d_, I have c:..-rtfun idea;:; in uind and; as I indicated oa,.'"Licr, 1 vraat to ôi tl.io b^noxit of c;i.i ...••;.. '.hianô t.f vlrw:; with GovvJi1.:,: -nt lea : ui". 3 in cor bain ll^jtern Europcau cuii/ioi' '.•..,>, On i.iy return from L'iro;-:'> 'C propose 'to prci'ont tho .c'onaltG of thoco ciol^.1';- rationc to you ond obtain j.;u,r vicars on ;hcm» If i.cccâry, a;.; I indicated in 2.1,7 earlier ^tateuieatj 1

\/ould oven convene a fh:curily Council meeting to f.i.vc :;;2 fr;.-i:h inanclaloc or_, in ; any rr, ;c; to clarify tiaG j^'oviouij jaundates, Thlo is rjy position u : present. C'jncerninfi the Lnbllach bridge, I t-m now in a position to report to the Coir.ni it i.-oe t'nat the rvp"tr.3 T/ll 1 be finished bof )i-e th .; <:aid of Aur;.i;rt. Once this "b-.-i.dco is rcpaLixJ, 1 think tliat tho Uniicd llationj will "bo in a 'p'jfll'fcxon to provide the nrce^cci / 'jGcu-'t for the trancnort of ir. j ocra.lr^ to Hr.tacl.i.. It will be a V'.uy dcciruule ut .'n tow-h/d the achiovencut cf United HationG objectives f An regard:] tlie j]oc:ond ni.ioayticn of the In icn..cl,':.n A:;bac3ador on the utabe of mind o;' Mr. '.r.vlior.ibo^ o.i GJUIOV-; it in very dllficuit to cja I/C^G one's vicvs. A^; I have ladicatc-1 en un earlier ..c,/!-: o;; Kr. aioK.,;/.c ir; a very MiprccUctable man aad a /ery unstable nrin. iVru.-'pu ho hae to opcr.ie in very difficult r-JreuEiLiUrnccc in view of the :vbatc:;.cutc ef l.V. Klr.ba in the laet lovr weoks while l-ir» Tohoiube wai; in Leopoldville. AW/ek

But of ono thin<3 I sm cure: that there are certain Powers, especially Wrctcrn European revere, which will be in a very ^ocd Tvcition to exert sc:i;e prccnurc or, Lir. Tshaiibc ana hie collcacuoo to help in the achievement of tho United Ilatioro objectives, I will new give the floor to Mr. Ilolz-Bcnnett to amplify the. implications of paragraph 6.

Mr. i;nT^-P!Wi?n'_; The reference made at the end of paragraph 53 of document G/iiO^/Add.10, where il is stated that trno aj.rcicimnt could Lc reached on rJ.3 tc.:;t, prii'u:rily on account of the i:atan^-'3:;e cl-.-Jloît.'.on'ti insistence that r-u-acr-:.;}! 6 of itc draft, be naintaircd", refers to tha draft final coiijr/iuniquo prc6C!;-;..:d by tho ICal an^csa dclcâbi^n to the L.ootinc. Thiu draft coi..jauniqne/ in '1'nra; .rapli u, otalT^s that tho Co.:. rnlnnionG crc:iLod chould not .cc:ne into cfiuct until cuch tjrao nG tlic L'ollcvJng mcaciireo are ii.ij •. Lcir.cn t'^d, and it GOCJ on to er;uiE-.>.r.-.Le thc;.u; nir-.a.'jurcr, : to tonnJi.aLo vhat ti:cy call bhorc the ctat^ of vcr in K':t:'a:ra "between tro^yiJ of t.io U:. it-id r.;itioy3; tno Al'jJ aad the Ivat::n(TC3e Ccn'';-':" :ric_, 1;;; May of a •procJoTD, L'ion thai; th>i fit 'its of var vould be fininh^d; tho i:,,i '.iitcnanoo of the: un,L1y C't i'^l-OTrvi iu Ic.;i i'yo^v;:icrrj no of ;X) Jun:; if CO; tue procc ;vation'of the ih^llti'llciial ttructurc^ an -,nll i-.z the ooîrdirtratl^; i;jL:.uctu] cs of h'atauâ ::jid the Guppi'ooGicn cf tiie p-:at o.C Co^ri-il r:vi i r ^\__°--r ^nordirrJr for r:io:u)£a; tiiO r.-a I ntciânco of all perscmel now fvnct Loniiv; lu the iuioCLi uf order nid in t ;e JuJldal branch of the fatan; -r.a^. Govenîcnt; liborty- for irat-nr-i in recruitinc directly all t:v; liocecâry technic Jane which are required for tiie functioning of iis ciuiulaii;tra.i>iva cei^viccc; to G( r,t;a hojtilo acts and intervention jn tha intcrml aff-iir^ of L;ilaiv;a,uiKL the cr: aciâ nt of a dccrcjc on general amnesty. 'fhcê voro the moaiiuroc which the kati.i.iccice proposed.

Mr. An!l-ry\l^ (Guinea) (ir.te^vctdtion fro-i French): My delegation would like to e:rore;;j ils BjM.iijfact ion aU tha tvo ct^'n.ont^ we heard which five ur. a co.uplcte pictiu-e of thr: nitr.aLi.on in tho Cv-n^o c:.. a j-ornlt of the ccmvciaatlana hotvccn the C^.il'-ral Go\orni,;':nU and tlyj ;,roup of i.'r. ri£ho;-.-be. But thoic IK one cspcct of the Coneo cn;o;.;t/j.on which has not been touched upon and my dole cat Ion vould like to ack a question on it. AW/ck 32 (Hr. /'cbl:r'r,

r~fa*e do3X'5 so, I chouia like to f;.iy that ye fully n^ree that if the situatJcu continues to dovolop cs ct i-rocont, one chouk:. cnv:'.3ar:;o, as you said, lir, CJorvatary-Conaral, th->t Ibe Heouricy Council he cc.irod of the problem a(_;aln. /is In 3 licen Gti;icd, 1:1 r^o is of th2 essence oi:d it r>c-":;';s that 3c:::e people arc banking on that. 1 think that the last statement lirv- "by Mr. Itolz-F'tfrnett cleo.rly chova tho stato of nvJr.d of Mr. Tshcrr.oe. Uni> rturatoly, l.e bar. not,

c]-

Hr. Gc;cret';ry-Gci!';ra.l; in order to pose the question that is in rvy nlml, I vould 3il;o to c.3l: the i'ollovJnp,: If 11 July vere to be ccnsiaored in K:itnr.ra nn ii;d.. o^nt]onc(. cliy, and if tlôro vrro any fet: Livitio:; on that day, -what vo:ilcl th-2 atlllude oP the United nations he? You have shown your negative altiti.ac: tc-vrard;j bhn'n, tut could you clarity it? If tlioro \:oro cuch fes tivitiof, f cv^n vithout ocnd:>!\, o.dUit I.oi;'.J.. furf-oc to Slisahothvllle, 7;.-;;-:'it vould the altitucie of the Uiiitcd hat:i,oi.u:; in Katanga be touarOn ouoh an r=v;->nt? Ti ; Gocond ouci.;li<:a — ; lid this is a malt or v:i.^;.i va,3 not touched upon in tha cte Loiijents :;o heard thin ;;K;r,nrp conccrhj.r^ t'.o {/..r^ral turn of ovenb^ iu li:c Co: ô ~- coi'.corr;;j the id'ca c. f i.,*. GirGn^r,. Vo arc a::ior^j tUo;;e -\?l;o c.i"O gravely cc.ncarr.od uhoui, tuc Gituation oi' Mr. Cli7.c-n{;;a inac...;uc;i ar> the Frees and v.'irioiin viir.ourG have provided. jniYji'iiiation that in not very roar;rvu'ii^. I" i iv;.- United lotions has any inioiiii'ition on the condition of Mr. Gizi ijf;a at preGont, my (bjlerntion, and. soiuo oljicrc; I run cur a, vould l-o ir.oct (;,ateiul if tba information VÎQ Imparted to the CoL:uiittec. Tiicre is the quectlon of sricesGlon, hut thlo is n.l:3o a very important question as far as vo aro concerned, and if CCWG riiiaoura •s;c.re prc-.-ed to oc true, I tliiib; that thic vouid only cc;.,plicate furtner the problem of trio ('jii[-o. I tliank you ngnin^ Mr. noorotary-Gonoral, for the ctatomonts that vero made today. These are, the qu.eijtio.ii3 tlr..i^ r:y deiefatiun vunojd to raise. i The Arvi-.lrr ,n"r?^TA'°Y-^^"T7:.>'Mi: An re-arfb: the quoction of the no-called KatanronG iudc^,..nacrco ^liicii i.r. '.uUi'>:.;bo and IIJ.L; cwLL-.;i; UCG i-ropoce to (^Glebr-tc oil 11 .luly, tbc Uult'-d rr.'.Lior.'3 docc not rccof/Mlae thi... ,.t all. Of court;o vbjn I say that the Unitud nations haa an absolutely ne^c.ti\c attitude towards thiu, it AW/cls 33-35

jin-mo not only tnat the United IJationc ic not rol.i'irr to participate in therê projected celebrations In tflisabet.'ivill^ but t.l/it the U.:ILni retime h::u" even rcq'iecttid. thoco i;.:.;:bGr States vhich havo GciiLJular ropr^G^nt.'vti1. c c, in ^HECL' .othvill^ not, to. T particiv'Tite in taiB celebration. Of co:u*r.;e; I do r:ot thlnl; tLevc v lll. te any p.jysical invol\v;j:ont if t-h'i I;."tanne:;o autliorltie,^ I) i:ir;t on ccicLratinc In -their c-,:n vny . Tliorcforo, 1 can in'il-o it ca'bG.'-orioal tliab ti o United I'ations close not rcco£!J:t::o the co-called iTatar-r'^ne intic]:<^r.doMco cay cu* L": l^brations . uc;jnrciinc Jir. GiaGii/^ the latoc-t infcmation *rc h • v'o is tj.at ho in ct1.ll enjoy:! ny t';God h* alth, Bvit ar; I o:-rrlainod to th-n Cc^mitbeo at nn earlior meeting, ti/2 Unito.1 ilati -nc is not in a pociLion to inter^nra in this particular cn^c afosr 1. :?.<" re-r-^v.ted ro." action of my oi'i'cr i,o cone under Un.ltcd ilaticnr: protGcticn* iic'.revorj Lsincc '.he l-arli:uucnt ii'^3 ta;;en certain ant ion roârdiLf; li:i.a iiL.iurlty^ I clo :.ot feol t?iat tho United :Tationn should leîtimatoly interfere in any vay vith re,-ard to iir, Gl'/.er-î's future, ^-ôut his personal pocitioii, all available information indicates that ho is enjoying very ôod health. AT/wb

y^^l-^^-^.r^.. (Ghana): T!:io iicetin^ has "been a vary frood one. Ky delegation vnld lILo to thrTil: y.va very ninoercJy f^r the statasent which ;vcu r--/le at the teniuni:^ erd i'cr l-.r, Bennett'a a^t?,,. ut, I think both of th.. :i need }Tcpei* study, l-'y clele ^tion in not in u- petition to (jive eny ou£-;.;^:-:tic;ns tv, to uhat should Ic the nc::t ctcp, CLisoi'uly ac you, yourself , coLtxr.jlate certain G/jtioiJo -which ;you vculd liha to pub before us scrr:o tiir/a in the lul.uro. I think thii-'o thn Cn.i::lttce ccin only otuOy the pclnto which have "been 2:-idc by Hr. r.omrjtt, e^ccj.iY.'i.'ly the ccnL2tAii.!.rii:^r> i'rcn "both the Central Govcr., ^.:nt and frca Katan^^, 1^ r^-ro'ir, feel that ny del coition will require cciê t:ir,2 to jtudy this vci/ c^.i.'G'iîlly in order to L-.i In Q pôiidon to ccr.ir.cnt en thCi.i and to LCQ 'v?h;jth'-r ^^G ean j!.vo ucofc.l advice to ycu r.3 rec^r^G the next step. Put there are a i'c\7 points vhl.ch I Llic-.J.lrl like to r^lce now and I'crh^^-3 you r.:i.£ht l;o in a p-;ulLl.cn to r;iva nc c r.a cl^riricntian* 'jiie i'irct cue iu/lir. AloiVla, ai Icr the brrr-l-.Oovn of the t~l!;3, caid that ! "How t :G ball in jn -the ^.c\ .. r v,ho United la;-lor;;. I havo tl.:-no ail I can,"

There van nlf:o a i^yji't, t.r:d. lo vaLilG to cp: ;:r,;l tcj cî tain /^riican covntrlc-cj -io h:\-) him ;:*avo thir, Kal ::•-., pichlciyu I 'io rot I-•'./ \)ir..tlv::T you ll.',VO Ci/y civ:.:: ' :-.l;3 to r^l:z t.ri "uiik \,-h. .u ho r ;.vi.d., Th:) 'UtiL 1.; -Li tha ûal c I.',.; 2.C;../'. Ural1. e;.-QCi. !y no '.; ho r::::-ii? I thimc th'lt 1:1 ul'iora coir. tMiJL Action iihj-lit he ic*]nt.r;.,d. }.y rccr\..i point i.; ti.''.t It Jorfl necm ve have 3fôred the lol T thiili. tn V-.j * f. j •-,.•'•• i.:.^(.^ t; .:**e era certain r-\ o^lcionn c.r, r-jj^rns th,3 1 GiitiiG'/iiy c.i ihj '.;,!ti , o.J. (!, /..-.â..-.* .A'. a;.-d the aataciiLy (I Ihc l''rculd:.r:t» X feel ! thnb ; .u the .,.4cuciiJ. 1...^. r;,,o ^.^ K • ,j IH..L li.-'nrd too ra.rh o.bcat t!:o llojd of J'Jtatc. Ho ho.i cci'Uiiu :-• ...'i.. '.;,i :v.^ iiti: »:.JL !• -.Vl" '"•' :: • " *"- '• • "• '-"V-^; xti^ t;ruvv.-:ional

v ClOV-ii"'. , , '\ • - v .. .i, J^V'.'ViUaenb £i, L UO (•!» 1 T :; l.'Ji^ ^.'i.i,;; >hlO ti'.:.,; L' YOU;

5 it: c l l L ; : ] llT* h.:C|..s, • ,. .. .,•-.:.; f-'-:' ;. • IV O »'- -'-./ ^ ^ ' • • ' •' "" - "-' ^' ^ - ; ! : C-i\ i-o 1 " ; i ;j i. (.:-3 ^- ' ;-.••: " M t "''(.'; 'l^. «.'.'"1 C t • • •, 3 *;.v .. - :.... U!.'„',<.,. ,.i en Ic no ci:.:niicn .'.«/ ...'•! *. ^;J^I.L i.•- 'i.i:-a. i'.f.y ha/c Urv.' .i <"••: T ;. ^ ' .-ir • % i.

"by i.hlch sci.;.c actiou c^.n ic iu.Lcu a^-vlnot tho iut'.Lun.;.:ac- Go\ AT/wb 37

1 r'

l-'y third point is tho surnection that the Provisional AnGcrobly of convene. I no to frcn i he rop.cr t contained in drvAuncnt S/5?C;?3 thlt the ALGC.r'b."y did not meet. 01 corner, vhen we arc tacl:linr the riatr.n/â problem vc ch-.uld not :T or cot that the Katanga author! by ilcclf is not an authority an ciivirj^.ji u-drT the ^'5_£.^î;ri!i);^^. The Asr-cr/lO.y haa- not i.iet., As you llÔW t;ie Balul: '..'cat Party Tcr ^ .In^j tiiê has l;ccn xrovr.vtcd from attending the A.'i-c-nc.ly. 'Thorei'orG^ 1 cm wondering what steps have hcen talxn to ijec that the

l-'iy fourth point irj uith respect to the position of Beleium in this entire icGuc. I knew •; :u referred to We G tern Europe an I yoih.1 tour to êt in touch ^r:v;;L a certain Lunihor of ccuntric;;. I ; :oji{;:Lor.) id P.elîurr. hocauce recrivily \;c h:.vo noted th.ab the Central Gjvcrrjjicnt Lr,'i pcr.Ccnned a vo]To~f:'ê; they L,I c now ûtLiiir, alon^; very voll with Icl; 'iiua in the way of dlpLjaaîe rolaticns and iho iaot th^t a numher of Eclc^no are ijii[^pc:;ed to he 10 turning to the (.^,i,iitry« (i:Vjr';.-.rore, ivy (nu:^ticn ir;: h'hal ic rol^' V-IJI'G attitude b-:wara,G *uhl.G j •'•tauâ, tjOco;;sion? It' tl;.:/y i re trer J In;' vl.th Cc.itral GovcriirLont, ti~;::a arc tiioy not La a position to ho.Lp the Ccntr;..i i;^vc;i LJ.. JHG to L,olvc thia pr^hlcm 'by pc,;ijibiy Liihin,^ a pronouncement putting the:ir icc^t dovn ar;d in loot prevailing up^n Tchc.ynVo vjucw they have cnccurai'r' d in the pacit. I thin!; this ic a 'voiy irap.j.rtnnb point. I r.nov that a nir.iher of UosLcrn Eurcpenn countriea also fall into uiis category; 'but I think Belîura'G rclo in this ia p^rc^.icvint. I \ronoor what ciTcrtu cun b2 r, :ade by you r:cT>r to cot liclgiun to play a decisive role in the oolutdcn <".-f tho Katonc"1- problem. 'j.he last pcinb viiici: i uc-uid raico io in roc^rd to the precent situation or troop movements. Uc havoyb yet l"?ard auylhiio; Mx;u., vhnt has haproned to our i-roopj i;. the Conr.o ; vhoro they c.re and vJ:::theif ]n i'act they axe dolns a ucc-ful job. Allied -L.j th:L.; probiî, 01' cournt-, i : i' 3 nance vhich ha.i "been incurre;! by i ,ji U,nlt,:t iicvi" LO/.-'J • '..:h->n one cons Id •"'•••a I IG vhcvi e c-omub of tho citu-ii.ion — t n.; fa<:L that 'tiuro arc troops ro; -.li.jiin.-1; ia tho country, ths fact that there i,; not :.-rjy iorc^- cable colution to lh: vh: Le proLicia rnd the fact that the United Mationu ir; .:t.LU. Ivâvily cn^Z'-d- 1;'1 ^^ tliis — thcjjc r:al;o your point about the Security Council meeting a ôod one. But, as I Gaid, I am not in a AP/vb (!Tr, Qu/?J ron-Hnckcy, Ohr.rn) position to C'.'!rjiit:.:t r.ov 03 y;/;r prcyoGGi. But I feel that with the clarification V'hxoLi you will give rnd ulso the further points which vill cc/tie to Hc'nt later vhen you do meet with us aâin, vc nay be in a position to give definitive advice G3 to what slr'Ulcl be done.

-.,:^^ When Friro Minister Adoula said the other day that t:Tho U.ll is lu il.u hands of the United lut:l or.s", I a^rc.3 v.vtll him, (:•!' courije, it IG up to tho l.Tirto'1 Nr;tiona to tiiinli'cf the mcccurcr; vaich shouTl "be tal::;ri to Jji.plcincnt the rcoolutions c.f the -Security -Jouncil c-rfcctlvely and s- ^cadily. Ac I lir.ve indicated, first c:f c.il, I vuiit to have th^.- ".).:.r.of Lt of diijCUGaicns -"jith certain leaders cf the Governrnon U; in Uectorn ILir; (_.>':? -H com:-; ries, Actua.l.ly, I hr.viro presented rour-iily iay vLe^-s, throuâ tl\a i-cpr of ccrlvixn Cc vnrnncntr? in:;vf. r:;r;.l]y_, vith tlic lui Iiiabior, that I proposed to take up th'.ê qucrtionc yiicn 1 ;',t to Lii'-ir ctipltaJ.:; « T:je:T,forG, ca'tc^ thc:;^ project jd dcli1:orRtic3i3, I l.avc no iiicam of i-rncwln^ ct prei^nt what the results vill U3. I (Vjrtciii."'.'/ ci)n pr-jscut i;!-ic r;- vUii.fi of tb-— r- acir.îationc at tb-.i next i-'ioctrn^ vhich i;.lll -iiilre place, of OOUXLO, on liiy icturn ir:n I.u/'jpo, Vlie proulcm IG, to iny ^/oy ci" th.lrjl:iri^, thr.t t ho .!.*-•» ere cc:voral ccnrji.fl.ci'-rcioiis vhich chculd p;cvern car activitioo in the Coriip* The rao:rt importonb of tnô ccncldcratio.13 is the one cf resources. When I nay ".rccources" I em tiiin'iin^ priir-irily of the financial renoarcos. It vill le of interest to the r.::::-;iboro of this CcDimittcu tli:»t Lhc r':lovc:.nt coi.-jnittoe of t'ha Ii.--;u3o of P.cprGser.'totiveG of the United £. later., vhleh cica'I.G vith each r.at,ler^; .rerjuiucd. itu deli'ticrationn ycGtc-rd-iyj c ^.1 tc.'lo.y ul:;o t^niy r;.re taking v:n this ain.OGticn of the bond iasue.

I hci'/e hocn infCi^-J. tlic,t pcrlia;',.; li. irr.y lake -l.hrco week:: for tht5 H;/dfie CciiUlittGC to ccme to a definite position re^rdine Pi evident Keunedy' c proposal. HF/jpm la (Tne A•".tJ n^ T.r-orotr> r y-Oonornl)

The Senate Dub-Cci.iTiilttee lias pcêd its o;.uc.:rc;.iont; and the House Committee shall I.avc to coma to a clcci-icn coêtiê, ncrhcu::;, in vhc middle cf July* The proposition, ar, you Kiev, IG this: if tho Iku:,o approver Precidont T }'•.'.'i::^: dy G recci.r:,cnegation,the baited Jtatcc will purehaGO 4^ million worth cf b. i;'.-7 plus rcatcihirsj; the other pledced subscripts ::ic. 'rnat means., if other e< v...-•,_'•!C3 .vul c. uhei" courcoa buy cr plod^G a certain Gr-r,iint_, the United Ct'G'oCS IS //. '.,.J: ,l"î GO plv.l^C; or purchase thin amount pl^G ^2^ rl Llion vorth. Tliat is on t>.^ c..:,jr]T,pui.ou that tho Houco Cuma'cbee xOllu;/G t;io JJiio of trie Jenate Ccir.mibtec* T.IUG, iu effect^ tho United. States r:".y buy :'',;>) million, worth of bonds on tjio basic ui v-:"1 million already pleclc/'-u. by cUr:r countries ar:l cUicr source a iô Tar -- that J ?.•; , ->o5 vivMlir)- .--i-t:; ,r'2^ 1'iillioii. .If tho Iloucje CCT. ;i; i.tt'.jc apprc:VG3_, :L-.= Unibed vj-'Mtr;"; will bu .:^^ ...llliun \arbh of bcndc, ai;d the tctal ai.icur.v: pled.-_,3d vrlll be vÔ :;illlcn p].u[j i|'6'; r;:i.]J.ion; foi •, total of '-fi.y.> million; cr^ in anticipation of pi'ojoc ocd plcdôr^ pcrhapc iplÔ uiiaJ.icn or vlu^ i./illlcai, CG a.âinct the expected total of Y.'ICO ,-J.llion, If the UiiLtcd Kntions receiver ijilGO million or ^16^ million in pleigoD or in actual purcha^'.j^. thi3 cam w.ru. bo ruITictcnb icr tho b jitcd I:utioii3 opcr-itionG to oo.")t.i.r\uo uii,,".:. the end of December l^bil* pf^/hnpi:, w.i.di ''bo udcjticn c/x" ccu.o

cconcr. y uioc.euros wo inoy be able to carry on until January or February I.[)6jf but not beyond that. Ly primary consideration^ therefore^ ia that wo h5//o to tackle the problem of the Coi'i^o efi'cotivcly^ speedily nir-". virroroui ly b.:iXr'; toe yoar io out; tl.iu it, a main conci'-Krration. I, parnonclly^ fool thab the United .'ationo GtiCUJ.d. not ccrry en thece voi'y c:-:pcn;"jive operations v;ith an cn.pty trot:LUi-y in c:-rpuetation of sudden v/indfaliG. i-'cr thin prj.ncirnl rcacon, I have outlined certain steps; and these •jtcpr, ;> U3 I ha/e indicate:]; \.-ill bo xlie tcpica cf d.i.;:.c:ucsion;: botwoon r.o and certain headc of Governments; and I will be able to report to you in detail when 1 roturn. ior;arc"!.in£; the question about tho President !a position-v::f>-^-yln_ ihe

Lo_i I-' ,.'lo:';{ nVil.o, cu.' omrGc; ii.y undorGtar.diny, ic th .• t i.-rosido-.b hasavubu can take certain aoticu.,3 a^aln^t- i'.at.-ir,; -i in chc oentoxt cf l;io ! <•'._2^'c.vi''ri'r.-;ntal '. * To cito c.no inntaiico^ ho can t'of iij.it: ly in::i;;b on p:.,yuioi:b ( :.' r\..v<_auoG by Kata^ra to tho Central Goverijinont; he can legitimately. But in practical tormc^ tiiat vrould riot achieve any rcsultu. jvm

la so fav c i? tlio lo(yit:.r:.u-':c: iV^xi-f-'but.^'-i of revenue:: is concerned^ I have ..lô outlined this in riy ne:::, ctcp:;^ lx:eûue in the i-ictiivj; ciLtualion I-.j_ Li .jut Knntiv^.bu wil L not be in n pnfjition to L'djlcve any pr>cit:. /Q ros^lts in tills direction. llenec it is vm -to the United KnLLeMa, with the active co-cieiation cf th-2 ii^pcrt.'Uit iLJii.bers concerned. It io only vitu their c:. RoJ.^-BeEr.ett will be .in a better position to nn-^j^r this qu-j^tj.on, GO I will Give the flour to !,r. rola-Eemi^t.t. i ftoi- my fiir'Lhor brief ctatomen'C. Concornir:^ tlic qucjticii or Bolîran^-. aLtit\v:lc touardn the United '.Tntionr; my fe::lin^ i:j thrt tho BclQi-uni Covcrnncnt f>hov,rc siûi of cioi ;.-:•.- CQ--C.J v.-:'ticn with the U:iitod K'.tio:i3 nctivitios in the ConÔj and. I hc^;a to be cble to elaborate en this at trio no :t ^jetir.^. la connexion \iiUi trcr;p movc:r,jnts, I -will five the fioCi' to Dr. Bunche ulo^r Kr. Kola-Bonnott to v?h-iji I aou cji^7^ the floor to clarify Ambassador QuaiGon-Eackey : j point on the KcitcmêsG provinoitil asDQir.bly.

.-™|T:-":;T (Eejmty Ch?f do Cnbiret, 1'crir.er CNUG reprecon in Ej.iGt3het:iV.Llic) : btrctta \; ji e mado er.rlic-r thlu .sear to cc-iiVone tlio provincial aaG:..ri:bly of Katrai^a with tL-'i full rarticipj-tion oC1 u 1 its E^r.ilerc, including, natiirally, the ir-iuber^ oi1 i he oi position i-rty, the lialuliak:;t. Indeed, the

Gur1;ection careo in the forva of a letter vhlcli wc,3 cd-.;rc^D.-:d by Minictor ci' the Int,.ricr Km.iitatu to the cuthoritics in liliâboLhv Llle, and vhioh w;.;3 aliJO trnncraitted to u::, tlie Unl'lod ^H^tienjj rcvi'e'JoaLutivuj^ in eraer'to proviso accL./caucG Tor t.io r. jotir-r;. r-ene of th::f:e r.-itLcrci c..û referred to, as you will see, in p:.ir<.j£rarh 9 uf autnôut 3/^°q^/Ada-10- The Ccjiiral Ouvc-rivj^caLj LiL'tor its letter to the KatenêGe authorities, alco cent tiro re êcentai. i'voG i'j'jD Leopoldville in crf'Kji* to hove toli;:5 with tnc Ircîdcnt of the j-o'e-rlnoi'.-.! uri^.Jjly. IT-.e^c rCi)re:icutativoG crrived by United rations aiiplauo HI Klicabethviile. rrohocti'Ui \.-;.u îven to them and we put them in toiû wi.th the r-rcâdeiit of the provin-,i-:l asspu?jly, with vrfiom they had tulkc i/ilh tiij view of convening the ac--.. ij' ! y. Howevor, before; cinnvcyinj; to .you tiic aA.Li.jTle of the Elisabethvillo authorities in. rrQ.^:d to ihlc liii-ttci*, I won!'!, i I!;:e ;,o c;ay that the United Nations ir.Ld:..' it very clear thrrt w: \?cro prepared to j'riv.: all the co-operation and nc;3ictLsnce ncccjcary for the1 convening of the4 aasoiubly, iuoYludinr; the of ail deputies into Kliuabcthville. (I r.

lTo wore r.lco reody -- and, Indeed, ctartod preT\'ir:vtion3 --to ensure the security of tho r.e:;:beru of tho. Ircvinjiai j.rcoiijbly arriving in Elisabethville, to prui'ect the n.cCv, inj itself , nad to Quarontco tnat x-o n-^Gtin^n uculd be hold in :'.n i/tniosphi/re cC complete freedom I'-.r all participazitG. hwcvor, the tallM betv;^.m the reprou.mtjîver Prou IôpoidvilJ.e and thj I rocidcnb 'Of the prcvill aaserJoiy were not siiccoL^Tul . 'iha Elioabotiivillc uubhcritloc hold to tha vicu that tlie arcer.bly chcuid be convene a cuter the Li_nciii;:ion or tiic /idouia-Tshcir.bo tclkc:, because at that tir.io ^\.i2 reccnciliatica \!:..ulr'l bs much oc.fdcr, cni the 1 rcorc~iiizati-.i of tli^ provincial C.yvGrnm^nt ::hou.'id alro be ono oi the ctcps to ccr.io aj a con:;eciucnco 01 tho meoti.nr; of tlio provincial aênbly, such roc.rr- iiizatie •• t.o t'il:c effect vitu the particip'.,ticn c-f B:iluba--o.t i-.-.precentotives :".xi -Vj'.o proviiu-ial govcrnirrint. i;'or the GO rc-acoan it waa not poccible to hold ohe niGctinG of tiic provincial aôrubly at that time.

Kr- BUI-If^r71, ( Under- Gccretary): Ac of HO Jnno, the total stroncth of the force vm^ i/,OCo ofilccrG and men. Thoy were deployed by naticrijl imito ao f>. ilovjG: .in Leopol.iville FrovincG, thoro wore, as of 23 Jvne, 1,C90 officers o.nd innn

Of tli..i;c, l^'i'^;} w^:re in tho city or LcopoldvilJ .j, :Lt:;,:.}.f. 'Iliio vao tho ITl^rian Fifth Battalion, a Nigerian police miit, and the 37th Irish Eattaliou \aUch ic in L ;cpoldvi.' lo_, actually la transit. It W.MG held tiioix^ for cecvrity work in connexion with the AdoulQ-Tiihcirbe talks; and then it \;as to move en to

In Matadi, there is n Nicer! an police detachr.cnt of fifty-five^ and the Sierra Leone ccmpv-.ny of 110 i:; GLutioned at Kii.onri raccj. In the rrovirico U^iciitaLe there arc c^O ci ficoir> und men. Thece fic\iroc are nil as ci :.:o June. lh:j.:o arc all in ^LoijlryvilLo where are located th~ Ethicjian IIccidquortarG Bi-ij-'idj and the Ethiopian L'ir'hth Lattalion, total Line 090

in ICaoai Province, thv:i'c aro 9;;^: the lUu-ri; . ;* ilead^u.Mrtera Bricade and the 1,'i^crian Firot Battalion, of £'}'{; and a LiU.rian coiiipany in Port Franqui of L;,y). In Kuvu Province, there are 1/931, conr/ictinc oj1 the Malayan IIoaelq\jorterG Brif^do and Seventh lK:nirr;:i.t, LLatiei.cd at iiul-.;;vu, tctallin^ 7^0, the l-iulayen Firct Reciment at Goma, tr-tu.Llinp, J;7U; the Ethiopian LGtli Battalion at Kindu, totalling 577 i and. an Ethiopian company at Kucon^o totallinc FGD/Jtb

J Finally, :. ~A Kat/er^a province, there are e,Oi,- ;- hi ilayanr: and hV; of who!!! are at All. o.'tvi.l n.c; 7u.V ^"t W^nciu -- that ;,oin<-; the 2', ch U-.-hiopian •-atta.Lion; 5,'/!>*- at Kiifsr.db-eihvillCj consisting of Jhial^rij Il3lccy3n; Tunisian

;.;^j. bi'Uiiopian troops; and l;;,5v '^t 1'pTirino. bat:e, these hc-inf, the lotn Gwedish i?.-tta...io;i_, the1 l;tn Ghanaian Ijattalioil and a i3i;;all Indian unit of rifty-six

I n:i{rlit tcd:o thia opportunity to coy ju.rfc n vonl v;ith rer;ird to the reir.er '.-.bio mv;voe33 that iiao o tten'i"d the eriortc of our people in Elicabethville to li^uid.ite ,ho referee co:no v;lv'.oh, an the Cer n:i'"tee knc'/r^. hud attained a been evacuate ,. -- I'7v011 by brain and. Jo/;Y> by air -- eruV.re.y by C'l/JJ's cvn re.'oui'^e^ and cffox't:; and yilii vj.i';/,:,r:.].ly no inoioent, vhich indicates remarkable orcarizaticnel vori: done by Mr. Cai'dincr and hr. Glueing and their as;

L'''li^^!."1. (J'Klia): VJe hP.vc heard a very full and illvjînatinc; statcincat : 1 by Hr« Iô}.^-j,:.i'.,e1 ;; ..U..L ve h:\vc had r.-.n c.ecû';.t of th..- ir:.portL,i>t rai. ^ that tL-: Uui".A;i i!at..Lo•:-, iu r 1'-jin^ bc'rvrcl |/o suciic-j viitii a vi. .v; to 1-vijiî:-.3 aboub thn ncccjjary a^.'-ecny^nLo which wouJ.d ^c_îb tho UJLJO prohle!;1. to b^ solved hrid tjiC Uiii.tcd Uatio.iG to ulccilûô itGe.l.r from tbo Coi.jT. I believe that it is your

ucjire, Mr. i:nairwîi; aui ib ij the deLiiru of the rr/.'rôra ch this Co,;:ultt9vj »- and certainly it IL; tho Cooirc oi' niy Govcrir.uc^t -- uât our cn^^G^ôut in the COUPO ahoulil come to aji end after th-3 compic-ticn of tho inuiiuntc as coon re

y:u;^iblc» V/C are jyirlj.CUlurly iUtcrestc 1; Of rourr-e. because ve have a large contincent c•[' force- there -^iid, a.-; you arc av/firc, LMr, there have been GCERC d":.]"jiio in oar public circloi; that we cliculd e.i£:\rre that \;c do not become indci initely involved in i ho Coir^. Naturally our t~ oops are not there to etay for ill time. Irh^y vent 'i 1 ;?rc- fer a specific puipo:-^.- under a ^p^cific icGcJ.uticn uC th-;j United h: t.icns, and \;e : re ivih.fi/--ed in ceeine; tho purpocon of the United Il.iiyio i,; i'ul.j. Illt.u -nd the troopi; L tura hoine. \\e are not at all kcea on or happy ab._/ut iu:n ntainiih; these foree^ indefinitely in another country, even though it IG under the United nations flag. FGB/kb

Lil-.e the representative of Ona, I feel tnr-t th-: :;tatci:^nts iriado are CO it that we should really die;; ;vt than, an--: I cou'M at tnlo stace cay JV:ythl; ^ definitive vrLiOiit ^'cttinj tiie reactions o. :.

It ic, of course, <].uite ri;_;ht th'.-t these n>\: -tinti JUG chould take place. After -'ill, the Con^o pru'ulu;: coa only Le solved i. j Ll^.j Congolese and i.y their loc .lo-r.'j. Therefore?, the talks that arc f.oinc on i;.:tw;jc:i the Central Gover ..-H'l Mr. TGl:cin!,o :,re ouLte av:,)ropri'-tc . The only tiii.iif- ID that tiicy h' vc bcvn 1 Coin-^ on DO lu,i£ tn'iL i:::iny c C uj d'.;Lj;;:iir Liiat any'tiiir.'i. ; v/ill ccnio cut en' thci;i; ar.a. bh-.t is vh ,t oaur;c:j :.. cr:K.t do-.il of anxiety ~- tu ;t the United W'l'iions han^ ir. a^i. L 'fomiai "cy^ Locoiiio i;ivolvGa in tnece t.ilK;. .u: 1 ha\c ::;:.id_, tr.o taiha

a:-j ::•-_ illy for the two partio..;, a^. i anything thc: 1. is agreed upon eetwecn th^w --

anything that COCICG atoub aj u result oi' tne tali-.r.; Vi.k.-Laer it is a i'cocrai GyctoM or a centralizou cy.ntem, or a cyatcm in v/aich ti.ere ic a particular Kind of Ginrins oT ^ov/ori; -~ vovlu naturally be acccptal'le xo all of v.o because it is

for \h:ri to acl,iJ.c thc:;e r/vL-tcr c . 'iiiu only tiu.ii[a that ctrihea \\r, ID that,

•ilt.hov ^j;! it i;. o-jite viopcr l^r the United Hut j oa:> , ;j o LJ'ie rc;avioot of the two parllcj, to Icna ita i-:::ori.'iaLal (jclvice anl to lu prc-i^nt at tiic talKG a-Ki cct QG a catalyst, v/e have, I think, to be v^ry t^.re.iul that tiio United Nations involvement, even iudireetly, in DieGe converBCitionj aces not lend a touch of leîtiu^cy to t'no K'-t1 i.â Govc:. nment. rj'hat is vhat vc ere nfrîd. of, becau.se if those trlkc C° o^ a"l o^ in the preaence of the Unload Ilatior.:; and, in the courr.o of lime, nothinc; happausâ kind of £^ttj -MV v;in'l 1 vi.ll l.'ivc icon reached. Tnui. i;; to say that Katanra, ai'tor all,*7ii"L h.ivo lathed en e'-Lu-nl terni:: v;ith i::e Central Oovr,rnment, and I am 13 lire ".alt Tshcruba will ui:;e thrit po;;itic-n, cr eouLd n:;e that position, to establish !:cra. • liind of lo:rl tin^ cy . 1 do no c Lay that anythinr like that has happened, but tnis is a caveat vin.ch must alway:; he rr. icmbei c:l -- that is to say, the United Nations, although tahii;.; part in ;.:cr,i'': \r.'-y i.i these discusjioris, luuat not, 'ii.reet.ly or ly inMliea'r/ion, 3-end any statue of 1>: :itiir.^cy to the inicpcmaent or sn..;i-inde]X:nJent e/iisteiiao c;f the lOvtanâ (lo\ er;:n.ciib. Tnat, in ['act, \;onla be entire.!. y cont/aiy to the reiser arid the spirit Oi u.e Jecur-Lly Council resolutions which have, time and Mâin, laid down in eatep.orical ten.is the Council's adherence to the unity, integrity and political independence of the Congo. FGB/kb kQ-5Q

(Mr. Jhn

Although I r-.'iltc t'.i.ô r^'arl'G I am not si.yln.3 that any cr th^.e tv.r.r,s h--.s K-'^n clone. as a n..- 'vter m1 iYut, I vould say th'it the United I];.tion;; ip.'/olv :..;cnt h\c uce:i v-ry ::.li--lful u-,o far, and I ;. ivc no ccirncrits to hialie, but I _LJ i';JLl tliat I cnonlJ :.v-l:c •--.Lv, tr our poniti jn v:it,h r, .-vai-d to tiie role of tuo ; U^:.- :ea Cation::. It is tint thrrc niiould not be;, ever, t ;citly; any accvjoânê o a ;;-j:it:v:., calvary to thy IKiited ifations recoluliorrj . I \Vc jd not Uj>' 11 out ti\ire ;.1oi;olu.u.'.o;i^. 1'ncy arc very .i: :|;or bant -- thoc^ uf .?! Fc'^ruory end. 2^'- I.-oyoir. 1.; ;-ur'oXculr.ir i;ud, oi' L'OUL'LJG;, ti'ic ourlicL1 oncGt ijiifc tiiio is r:. point -which l..'-^j al\/jy3 to be !:;•:. rue in. i:;.u.rl. If •i.h.^.-o L^ll;o ô volJ., ;Ma if -c:oy rccul ': in come : conclusion, e".. './-oJ.y v.ML be vc.ty l:"-Pi-y i-nd will .,-iu. L the l';:i".f.J. .\'; . .".ji'.o a iiut ii they go vrc ,;v, a^vi. t;i';i\j ii3 i'urtb .r trouulfj^ tl.ca t:i-: Ui-.j.ted lotions .aight be b.lp.:-.::, ,-;.t Gomf luture date. Thorc-rore, v;c have to pi elect ourselves . from any pOGclblo criticik:i.;i. TiiGsc nrc the important matters that have to be borne in mind in connexion vith l,;a :'nvolv'Li:;ort 1hat t: c Uniti I Tationc i:^c xia b:,ri ru-on .at the request of the two pr.r Lies'. ' we feel -viiat ti;fj pr'-Gence of Hv. Cuv.:iii,.r civi I.T. i;oli;-Icra;ott la very valuable in. tho cuiarê of L!:c:;o. convero-.it-u. n.-. . i. cm euro that they ar:, trying to ^ct the tallui "br-ck on the rails and to prevent the parties from drifting apart and ending the discussions. IIA/bg 51

(Kr. Jhn, TmHa)

The vay vo ceo it in that vhat the United I'atinna could do informally is to in: a.Gt on the anno stance- cf certain funcS::; ;ont".l principles, unco those are accented, then, of coerce, the ectsils of tjb:.;3o principles, in the form of trie; c-Gt-.blidimjnt oT a Liui.ual rt-latior^hip between the ccnlre and the states, could be vo-xked out, "bcen.us'.; there rr.any different possibilities arise, l.'v- do not Tccl very sure, even ufoer tliece ôveia.L montho of talJis, that ; thcro ic realty a^:-er; ;i,.;nt on fiind: r.iental prlneJ.pl C.G bcLvecn the tvo parties. r For c:.r,iiiple, :i n tih; Id. i.ona ;-('rexi./ r.t of 21 iJccî.,.: ^r; :L c. is stated th:;b vhc r'/i.-sid.:nt of the Covcrriiicnt c:C the? Prcvinco of Kulanâ accepts the aj.pLication (.>'' '",\\ * Fujidain' .rtnl Lirj, rccor.rrizo:; tiie indiSoolucJ.c \inity of the Rcp.L')1.ic of t...j -'jJ.:;o, re .'.j:',nizeG Proc,Ld...nt Ivr.r.a-Vubn. ...". In other wordc, various impo.''T:''nt and very salutary concliu;io:i3 uerc roachod. "Cut then v;c Tina, i'.ceordinc if) docui::ent [J/;;J^")/Add.lO, that the Katarica people D^c;a tf; have ônc b::oh v.ui that. The b do^-urr.riYi; states: i; ; T':,j i;at iri;-:a dol:r;-tion :.-r.ûcd thot the: l'" . Vorrl^TiontnTo could not "be comi•!•;:• i cd Oj [dicalj.1. ^ In v,'.c".r of ccr.-llt! CT,.I i-liab had co radically •.liarccu :-,..ficc iti; adoption ...". (r>/'"9^1/f-''ir^.\p.j'\:'r-i._.5) ircm a curnory rcadii:;;;, ci.' tho doc-;i;i:cnt, I dv.- -aaL iaiov tiiat that pooltion of tha Katanra Govern;.^nt lv:r, "bc;;.i chuprod. hvluri,'.,i.y they wc.;:t to c,.o the vho.lo picture before t;iey vLII ony vhotlier the J,- ; T'-ivlr^-r-trb^"1.^ i- ^plî^-^'lc* It LCCUG to rnc that tiiat places the Central Goû, uacnl- in a \vry difl'lcvilL position, and Idtanâ thereby ^ct.:; a kind of Llacki .aiiin^ pov:.;r. 'ihe IlniLcd Ifotion;; effort shoiild be in tiio direction of having certain principles l.i !:c Iho nnity ai.d torriLorial intr^rit./ c.f tiic Coii;;o accepted^ havirj the ^r i__Pr^r'i-i -n'nl. accepted, unlosj and u-ibll, "by due proceed! of ecu:;litutiOLf L ehan^^ u cl.\r:r;:;j :i.j laadc in that lav and a federal structure, if ti;at ic iv reed up^n, ici pL'r^mJ.âl e-d, ,.nother fun lemeni al pri]i';Lple ic that there ehnulcl be no parallel pover capable of dcf j ance of the

C;;civJa:.iiieric, etc,, etc. -- ana thercfe/re ho is L:I a position to defy the Central Government. That brings up the Vaole question of the integration of "n(1 the batata forces, and the crzostion of depriving them of their power to oa.intain Ihoco farces, t.vj PCVCT to i'TMi't ' vcapojio or even to r^nivfaeturc weapons. .And, of COUTJO, thoiM: has to be an i;naor''.itiop_al cr.l to ••>( •jc\-;.-.!:'.ori-r

If the £30 p arc a,:c:.pb;: d, then It cc-,.rr.:; t "> 'J.3 that the details the nharin^ of revenues, the participation of the roprc.r^.iitativoa of Ihitunâ and oi1 other Uhi.ts in the CYn^cl Gc-vcr-nônt, the- ::,.:. rir.i of the po;roro of taxaLio:^ the d,..linori.tion o:i: u'v.iictlta-:; of vnrl,.ju,i hinlj i'Ct,-rocu the ceatrc and tiio ct;';;,oG^ the }iie3ticn OL vlicre tlio rc'jidu^ry pc:::..-."^ chuuld rc^t -- ;-.ij all t.:onc r.. .ttora tliore coiild b-o a ôod fioal of cc.,;prc ;- Lr;cft And c.t that ^'ir--^f I -'.hinJ^ the United iJat.lonr; roo.T- (. :.';'j;i1/.it:|'.voo CC'M La p;.V.:y a very key role, a'linoct a dccl"iv3 rolc\, v-y -ihcj.!' ptr..i'a jj.01:. If the: îinc":.~':'r.nl:al prinî.plc^ c?\. accvp co:, then I ûppuco tiie te^ti-al Goverment, cc'j.i.d ai'.-.'ord to be c 1:'. ;;i.le f :':erou3 in the sharing of thcso various powcro bel./ocii iLio ctatca o^d the centre, ilcvover, from vh-at I could ^nth-?r, it ::cr.;'^ ihat th--y have "boon tryir;^ to <'o th .'.::. .: the ov i;r ^, y ; roj.;.:

: i i.' o i.ct ijiovr v.h other in t.rab \ ,ry a, ;r enent cculd be e;:;>cetefl in i.he rear future, but I "lhink it i >z a very difficult i. .,;.u. Aa I ec;bi; U; : United IlationL bo pcrforrj'.jj.^ a vtiy juct rnd CiV/i.'fopriat ; role in tryLnc bo nebn thcr:i to rotr.h i'.arceiacnL. But there can "he ].o bet-up on thooe f ui;c!...-i, nt al principles "which •Mwe be .:i rcneateuly CMfliaoiied l;y tlie Uniteiri'itioii'J o'cciiirity Council, f::.Q I tiiii'ik aj 1 the c.i foi'LS absuid be dire;1. Led toward an unr.oui.:.'.L:lcria.i. acceptance ; c,-'C -Lhoa;; prlnclp"Let';; an .urcoir'hLbio] e\vcry hard on those rrineip.!.'.::; -- buu, one, lao.je prin^ipj.e:; are aceeplci^ \;c cou.Ld advice c /en tnc

Uentral tiovernine.it to TJO perhaps a livblo more (; ,eneroii3 in the details in order to ceo that all parts of the Congo arc satisfied. IIA/bc 51

f (I i.r. 3}-ir\} 3"n 'li a)

I mint apologize -- I know it ic very eacy to £ivo advice in thic matter - and I ?.:.i not ci\ iri/j *uy advice, Lut: I think the pocitio]) of the.United nations is very Jryporta.it in this whole busirrsG, We want to ho protected -- .and, âvon I nay 'Si-j", I IT.-:an tho vholc: of tho United Nation:; -- t;;j.-iinot ar.y kind of ' critici:j:ii later that there v&s aicUi/Lun C.T procure en Uic Central Government, i.'j lic-vo to avoid any indi.fjat.ifn, cv-,n by ir-plication, that tho United I.'aLions lias in rx'me cay equated the Katarâ 3ovorijr.^nt vit'i -tho (/cntral Govcrnirx at, flh.^ro c. i: be no equation in ih.lo Liattcr. The ntlvice o,'. t, ;c 'United ImtioriG Lhru be carccted -- c. t tl;c;ir reûcut.., c\" source -- to tao Ccivirnl Government al^-ays. As a ir,Tt.ter of i';.\c-; 'ohc Urit^'d Ii.:t/.'-.-\a, Q'J.tlio'Yjh .uivi^j; infornal Cditacts Vi'tll 'j.'.jh.v.L'.l':"-. haz> tc bo vc-vy onreful., •.i-.cn it vri ^?u Ictt-:.-!^ to him o^ t.viOorc him fiuvioc-, tiiat the TCJ chovJLd be no concîrrence .in that with the pow?r of the • • Central Guvoririi, nto On -..attcrs ::f detail, an I said, once the principles are accepted -- vhich io vh.:;t iwlio^be ic chiiiln^ iro-%i ^1", the tirno -- much .c.ûld be dor/j by-way or liiccti) 3 i >c, difi ..rent pc'/.uli oC vU.v, .... v r c:?r \/j :i .J.ly DL rove, i'lt'e oCcrctu^y-Gcncral^- of t ,e of crts that 3'ou cro c 'G 1 to ml a in t::a i-ij^-ii^ ixc:-s In ihc L'.v,-ut^c:-n capita' c, Wo ceri-ain.ly j"ecj. ti-.^ 1he Gcvernmcni: 01 i:.el>LiJja haa. a f-rcab capability of ir-ru-oncii-r; Mr, ^chcrrbo -~ and pc-rh:.'^s oomo oihc.- O^-vc-r^.Monio too, V/e havg heaid. it a;.iid for a I.C1.H time

ihat 1'ho (jov«;in\icnt o" ]Vjl.^Lvuii is now veering rounl to (Boater co-operation, ; /ut, / cur:i' tyj f, it -is ta;:?n'.-' j too J/.'nr»;J a ti;:n, I thinl: thab if the ]ici"ia'-•• . n Go'/rj iviide it v'.lcar to the -'"^'nJJjrvn v;^ _ -- and, after all, ihcy have Lcma control over tliclv finances, be. ca.uô thcjo aio ail cleared t.iroi\;U banJiG in liclji\:;'a --- .ji:J if •(.'.•:.y cavo îic r-'(v:ilj auvlce to Tsljuiibe cad told hijii that he has to chare . I!IOSG rc:'r..nucc in a ri.^.nor \.j.:;.!-li in agreed upoii^ ond l::nt he cniinofc cot any diplomatic1', support fr.v.i lk'l^.h;i i o:* nir- iiLi.d cf arL.od r.'.rojoi't -- officlaJ.ly, of course, tuey tiro not C-^'-'C al';" i-i-'tied support, Lub fhcv- Ac no doubt thu'c coino ia f;oinc ^'rcin ili!?.t pai L oi' the \. via to T,;hci.bc -- Uu.n iTK'h couVd be done, and C hope thut yo\ir ci'fortn, Mr. C-..cretrny-Guueral, vj J I in: fjuccecîal in that direction, I think tliat other Governaientc, too, arc in a position to influence IIA/bg 5^-55 (IT. Jhn, India) the TGh'^be Govornnicnt. Thene diplomatic efforts, of rouroe, muct n° on, and lot UG hope Ihn'o they prod-ice Gcir.j rv.-C'.v.rt, DCMO Jr-pa-t. The question ia i/]:at Lhc ;.-i fcur.ticu vrlll to iL notliinr happens and Tclior^be ct.ayc GJ! at Ulir.abcthvi l.lu. I h.jpc- lie vill s° ba,;:!; to Looroldvillo for the I'.alhr;. EirL, lno]:ln.^ at liio p;.itt-.;rn of tlic-ce tall::", or.c carinot roally feel very hor.cful that an /'thin,^ i;ill cc :v^ unt t^r then. fJc;>; L.ir^ IV.nclcijncr.tal ficrr.}o MirGir:^; from tlVjGC tallic -- un

j]ut the1 point ic that tho United Nations, as you hnvo vary richtly cnicl, Mr. Secretary-General, cannot fo on indefinitely, if on.iv for financial reacono* Apart ii era the conr.iucration of financial reasons,, ^nd iiprru:!!';^ in behalf of r.y cvn delegation, .there is alno the fact that ceveral thuum^l uf our troops are tho/re and the truth is thau public opinion in India reflects thab nobody vants to COG thcce traopr, nwny frcra our countiy indefinitely. It io not cur policy to Send forces outside or our country. Of course, ".re responded to tho call of the United r>.tiona at a very critical tirr.e and arc proud that \/e did no an 1 of the "behaviour of our forces in the Conô and cf tho accirtannc ur.d cup:;;crt vluch tncy âvo ic tlic Ibitcu. KationL th^r^. Gt:ill_, tiiat cannot ô 011 indoJ.i niv-j'i. -• . It va:: not intciifl^d thot thcê forccn Ljhculc. veKiain in th-3 Conro indeCir-Ltuly. I helitvo th;-o serious th;ojr;ht must be Liv.=a to tho (iiinition of what i-lionld bo done r.t'ccr a rc'tronable intcr^cl of tiuc if denirnd results are net anhicvod. Uo shall oil I::ive to make thio uocicion but I tivLik that priii.-vii'.y you, I :.;.•<, nccrctaiy-Ccncral, ulil have to coL:ridcr âac chou.ld ':3 done; it i;i.ll be for you to docido vliGthcr 1 oc Cocurity Council should be co;.3.:ltca and, j.f :;o, vJ^t rcv.,o;-,.:uo-.dation you \/;.li !':.,i;e« i"aturnl3.y_, [ ciin not in a pobiiio.i to âi,cj eny LI.; L.. :nt on future rolir.y no'r. !,ro have not ci.vcn tho vutlcr c:^ L.ioh thought GC have yea a^'l your colleceucr; fiv.i day to day. But I do bolieve that ti;:j Gituatiun ic vo;y unsaticiaclory. I oi.i i.yt ; r c n pleaded by the comic r/j--ia th.nt in c°- - --d ' J tiicy n.ecl.; they p^rt, ti.ey meet ar;aia rnd part a sain. One c:^y tho nowLj is very hopoiiil; i:v:j r.'jxt cL':y it ic very Such oveiJ'.s cannot be ollovrcd to continuo iadof i nitc-ly. hcwevor, 1 wlzh i 3 cay l;l:at I asii not j orîuLatic. i;r. Ga'^diner and I-'r.Rolz~.!onnett, who are vo.ey dedicated nnd ablo P'-cpV.^ arc dealing with thcce problca:3 ;.vad have contact with the two parties and J. none thai- they will be cucccncful. o But let uc not I.OGC- Gifjit of the principle;; and the position of tho United i.'itionc in tliij .revttor. l/o can only noô tliat your effort n and those of your collcacues -./ill ûccoed in I:ri.:^_n0 aôut the necessary accord in order that wo may conclude I ho United r.'at.lenG operation in the Conô successfully and thus bring credit to our Organization. • fti« '1'ihlu !•;• AE/inp 57

2£^£:yi!£Jr^ *vic h to thank the representative of India for hia VCM / valuable observations end to oncuro h>i:n that I shall bear them in rdrd. I ;:'_ali mho a very brio.: cc^n-^iu on cci:a or tho aaia po:in';a t&tt he raise 1, V/ith regard to principles, I nra entirely in a. .reorient with him that the United Nations should adhere to the,,! to the veiy letter. By "principles"; I of co-jvoo refer to those principles which oicuuntc: ircu tho various resolutions of the Cccurity Council and the (ieneral .Assembly. It will cc L'.y constant endeavour to continue to adhere to these principles. fo-ardinc; the question of eo-.iatiic the Centrn.l Covnrnracnt with Katanra, I also Gntir-.;ly u;:ree v'.th lii.ui that tho Unitud IJationc r..Ir/i;l,i no I: attc!..pc, to equate th'- 1 i:o.rltion (..!' the Central Oovorninant vit.h that ol' th*- !,at.ii.::ene ai;thontios6 Whil.e it ij truo that Liy vopr-.:-i-nL.ativoo in the4 Co;:;;o par'..-! j.:: pa tea in tl:C ncrot:! ationr. that too.: plac'.., they did GO merely in an ad'/iscry capa^dr/; in order'to expedite the soliitioii of the variouG probloi::..; by peaceful mcrnin^ r.incc matters of conciliation arid negotiation are part of tho li.^.iO.^tc of th'j rcr.olbtionc of tii3 [-ecuriiy Council* 1 wiah. t j otroG3 thrt no j.nfcre^co t:]?.oiild be c!rar,m i'i<'i;i 1 no par LiGJ.];;a1,ic n of i;;y

i'cp/'cl,j:itati.vnG ..1.11 theGC tL'.LJx;in th-- capacity w..Lch v h,a;e jiiot outliut:^ wnich *.;cuid l^jav'l to th 3 fa].rjo c.jncln(;;ion that Iho Unic^d h'aLioi.j has c-nmtcd tho Central Govern...-jnt of thJ Conpo vith th3 co-calleu authorities (•.£ Kat-an^;a, ri;o dminarir.o L;y thotjlibs in thu Giivj^.tion, tae prcblrji.. of the Conô is the problem ^f the cjcecrJ.on of iâi^nâj t);e prociosa c-f th-,. u'atan;;a t3occf;Gicn io prLnarily a problem OL' finances; the p.L'oblci.i of finnp.cjn, in turn, in the problem of Union Plnierej and tho prcb.Leni of >.:nion Liini^r,: ii;, in itc turn,' the prcbieia of Hclîum. That ±z n# intorpraL.?.t,i-;n« !• jr this reason, I nave been taehiih^; 1 he- root of the problem for GOJIO tJ.L:o. Without revealing oho trend of the diGcnscions, tl:e ir.dico.tion3 iJ:;. thj la;iw ro;; days aro hopeful a;.d ^rc i;.ay n^Dvma that, if lolîum oo-cpcrr,los whc.Tohcartcu'iy with the United ilations, tL.i entire problein will adrnlb of an eorly soli uiona Pnat ia why I . :,!]._, if 1 "u.ay, continue to tac^lo this problem ab its core. Consistent uith my thinhinp in this n:attr-r, I liavo Veen in touch with the r.?l2ian G'TverriLiCnt for r-u:.o H..M and have ezch;.m;p,d vi-^-i;- îth the hcl{.Un Foreign iiinistei person..lly on i.ovxral occasion;:. I riiail continue to (-::e}ic.,:i/:>.: vicvrs on bills subject TJh',. a I vis.it VicsV-rn European countries n .:.t. rioiith, 1'ithout inahin^ any conir.iitruent at this Gtaê, 1 may say that 1 am rather optimistic about the outcome of these talks. AE/mp ' 58-60 ' ' fi'ii't

f ( 11 • ?. _f\ ct 1 T i r l_[>Mr r tn ry- Or nor n l)

There .is another relevant factor to be consul r» re Ji in ucalirc with tha financirl problem: .in tha overall pleivire of the Ccn~ > oi:o.rc\iimn. The lut Court of Justice, I an inforir.cclj will co^'j to u ciociicicr^ ^atliin tlic context cT •cli2 General AGKC!-.hly ]'CL]oluuio:i of ' rr!i;r::c, in about ti:-j iiilddlc of July. Hits may i'.ave voiy import. -.at implications re::r.ii'dinLr tlie attitude ox certain Member States to the l.-ond- is8i:;.^» 1 \ri:-h to t>.an!c the representative of India a-;r,in for Ms very constructive Giiccp-tions. Giii^e I have tT.ro tipoal'.nrG on i^y list and tlr* time is running short, it might Le well to hear from tnc-m at thio time-,

^'r, JO'lir'^TT (Liberia): My dole-nation wishes to thank you,, :<;r, Gecrcf ary-Gc:.'-val, nÎ lir. liolc-Buiuiett for tho infcrriation contained in the atf.i.te:..-'jnt.- ?;:ade j:C-rc v-hi:) morniii;;> jii -.-lew of the line of action which you propoce to take in conducting tallcs with rcrtalii European Govoi'iTniont:]^ my clc-lcfration consider.:; that it ic Ta-ei.:-r!:ni'e to co'/'v.cnt lurfchor un the pjor/^riu titute of affairs in the C'jnr.o. V/e thorouj-ily Mi -pro\ .} <.:.f your j .ropoêcl J.inc of action. I^y del oration w i.ll continue to watch vijiilr.TLiy all fîrthcr develop^cntc in the Ccr/j':> unl nonnf"a prcpnrod to leopoud to- your siiia.ions at any tlrro, in the further conr»idoralion of this problem. TL/en 6l

nr._Mahroi^P,IAT) (United Arab ?iOpublic): /.s you said, Mr, eV'Cretary-Generalj, t.hej is running on DO I t:;h'.ill kc very brief. Allow me to arayjcr the question that was put by the /:nbassador or Indor....si.-i, which I think is a basic question, ccar-emii-^ tlie state of nind of Ik'. 'I.-kor.ibo, I think that ikr. Tsho-.-r.bc is cornn3'.^ uJy c. £3,1 net the unity of the Conro and is trying to cicatc an independent state in hatanfp, I cto not believe he i:ili :rive up this idea unions a certain amov^t or prcncure is put on kin. Mr, Tchenfoe- is a very clever inan^ or cine hie a'Vvicerc are very clever and brilliant rien. They l-no.; tliat ti:.:e is in thoir Tavour in this situation

:.,•'/! tl.et they ^ro f/iiniij^ frc-ni ail the::.c ne^^tiablf >ne, Therefore; xinieGE P'- - GiT.v.ro is pi:I; on lir, 'ichor. !:e he will never ri/e up. ;>jch pressure can be arplic-.l in several ric.M';: political pressure, economic preceurc and i;iilitaiy prcosure, pnliLlcally, we l:i.ov: i:hat certain Westcin Po\;er:, arc Lacliin^ Mr. Tnhoi.ibe, There i., no -oubt about tiiat. It is i-i'ue that c-.oi^ c>r i iicjii Gey they ae'o rea^y to eo-opou*te \?el. li the Uiiited Nations aiiel te iuipleii:.'. n,t the United batkeis larjclviLi^nij. Eac 1 believe thae up until now they lave been iv/buuiaivt and iiivo not olio.Ju CMOU^II acoei'Uii^atlon to ! ir.;pler:ent the:,c i'eijolui:.lori3; neL cnle n3 far aa too IcLLoi: ef t.iiora C "JG:; but i.ioi'e especially j.n regard to the r.pirit of tlie resolutions. Thus Totiouit'c still oontinuej to receive politic;..,! eupporb. In the- economic ,n.tua;,ion, ve knov/ tko pocition or the Union RLriierc,

ITow, *:}\o owns bhe Union lii.ui/TcV I believe it ij certain bl;;; Pov/cr^ that own the Dliares of tlvj Union llinibrc -- B^J^'U-m, the United KJnr/lcm^ the United otatco rind LSOL;,.' ethers. ibe main bulk of tiio eliarcc ic in the hands of these counerl.es, and of course if they ie:;.Lly wi.su ee co-oporato \-;ith the Unitr. l Ilation;; ui.der j.Ls resolutions^ 1 thi.i k thoy ca i-do a lot in this matter,

Uho is it th.-at is buying tlv: Li-edu--uien cf tiu Uai^n. iilnlere? Also certain '.Josborn Powers. 'ihcrei'01 o they have a po\/criul means at their disposal for iiii.luenci ^ the situation i.n iiat.-Mira. ;.:.; to mi'ttary pressure,, \;]iij-j I u.iu not trying to :^ake any military plan for tno Uiiite i ilntion;; force-s i..h.:re in the Con^j, .1. ^.;ould point out that if the f advisji'3 of Ik'. .i'sn'>;,.bo l:.new th;d; ,.ho balance of stre;'i0Ch was not with then they would accept the idea of negotiation and would be very mild, and we could TL/cn 62

brinf, this matter to a conclusion. As I undero! 'iri'l it, tho United Ilntlons force: 3 iii the Congo arc xaul-v vho dir: \tvant -i^a oi" not. >win^ cut'i'lHent if:ans 1 1 oi tr: .; ;vnortat.'.,jn- ,j no the: i;:llit::.iy+J ;:itintlo:; vLll f.l *..•;;*. ; bo iiivou;-v.t:uv to I!r. rJ::V.'-i;f.--o. .:Au-t her., lure, no Lji-f' ai certain fo'-'-./irri towers conolnuo to rviippor^ i-Ir, Tc].jj..bc and a:;c:iL,b hii;i Ly ^l.vin^; }d!,i :i : r: aiid a.llc-win,: r;.-,-rccnariGG lo ent-.-T ir.atan,';a, he will always l:c in a strong position ana he vin never Cive i^;, I believe that the approach of tho ^cGrc'oary-^-cnoral to tho problem, the rvprrroach thron^h cjiitmit'. '.':•• covtcvLn h'cGt-.i'ii r:.J"iV-_, Ic a very vise r,:iil r-oun*l one, 1 hcpe he vi LI ii-.icccccl in Ivi.r; talhn rivi I rua very fflarl to li^nr l.r.vt ho is opt_,r.j.Gtic, But if \}i\.z 'iTr'i'oach i'rulir; tu urir;r; a re til solution, then, vu riust bj i'ca-ly to raiso till;; quj:;tLc);i G.,;_faiii. i/i i:.u Urdt-^vl JTaticnr^ olthor in the .^etauily I'ounc.LL or pOiiiaps in the C"Oiv:'T".L /.soci-ib.ly. For many re£ib3Li3 we ILUS ^ thin]: L'bouL tiiij al:;^, Whon I r;:f^:u.i. n) the Go.i-.ial Acneinbly,

1 Jo ,.,^j -jo. nt i.-o ceo t.Vti.3 prcl)] ::i:i aicounocd In a f:!:jj.(i-\

on Hi'. TGac--:O lo i;cci.;ru an p .._;:;: oc: • ;;Vt. Au tiJiJ M/. . ,. v.c Di;a3..l. vait/ tDl vo

Vic a3.no hopt;, r:nd oi' .uuuisc.w'.> arc cure, ttrit he Iru h' 1 or \;j.Il 3iavc d here in the UnLtod Gtai.ec al£-o:. Thcn7 \;hcn \;o ]:ear I.i.cm h.im about the of his taJ.'.'G, \,e way be c.blr,- \o si'binit our advice concerning the next G to be tahen. • • . •

Th° Acj^n^nrr^TT-^Y-rir.rÂL: I would lil:^ to suppleir;?nt vhat the oi' the l;,ji'L.jd ;.i.,i.- MûuMie said with tli~ liifoiTn" 1 1 on th^t lact •year., l^Cl^ Ih1. Tcli'ii.'ioj tv.M hi-j (Xi-llcafÛCL; — that IG, the I'.aL^ncocc. authorities — {jot .'i.>Ol;_,COO,0'JO in the forn oi' revcnuea i'j.'Oin tli.; Union 1'inibrc alone, _ Co it can be seen tl.o.t thio ic tl,e root-cauoc of the vliolc problei;i» TL/cn

LL'§J'Z'::(-''A (Corrr;o (Lcr.poldvllle)) (interpretation from French) : The Tollovi-^ is L]:e position of the Government u.-I' the Republic of the Conr>> in respect of the evolution of the Katanga alTai s, ovo days after blr. Tnh~i:.bc'G c-purturo from Leoyoldvillc to Elicabethville, thus i::di".a,tir.^ tho intci ru]/tion; if not the enu., of tne nerotiaticna vhich the Ccr.bral GovcrimiGnr, had agreed to undertake vith the dissident lenders of Katrine;0-, the Covorn:n:ont of tho Con^;o vlchoG to inforn tho Advisory Ccinnittee

Y'j Government considers L:at the negotiations it has aluays advocated for C-. poc.cefuy solution of tho oord'ltet no lonro; r aro oppropriaoe to oho '.:rcuiortanccs, The Central Government, since tno bcfnnniivj; cl the crisis, r.-uj ;.i tuayo coiydib a GO'orb ion thirûyh peace'.'ul L.o.in:: and ha:; aluayG practiced a policy of r/jii-violenco. It has had recoiu-so eo arja:, only as a last resort, "jib:: ::;: ,ni concorn Ivoo a3.wc.yc "been to end tho oocejolon of the Province of " Dui.'._"r, this tin?. Ivr. Tchonoc, vlth the support of certain forclc- cr.pibalict circles ^'ivj.•:•"..: a.-c (luite veil huoun, has never cc\iscd to am 1'J.niseli, .hcwinf; in ;:.'o.':i: £•:'':• i^; .1 vorl.;:;.b3c rii.iy of ir.orcciia.rior; ^:n.Lcu todpy nuucors in exc.or.c of lu,COO trcopj. lie h^s obrained heavy weapon;, an/.-'-ured cri's, tanhs^ and f ino.H ..y even : ichter i)lano3 oo.d ,;ob planec» !'!;; an.:;:, "which ho ha;:: nallieieusly cji.L'j.ed a y;:ndav;ue.:le5 :J n dirocted by _'.lf.-'~c-aff of a?.l 1:1 nds: by pro'ieccion:.,! Iril.lerj iro;;i bho O/i.,.1, by exbronists fron Algeria and foreign le£;ices, by ro.cists fron b'outh Africa and Southern hhodosi.cie !iy Government ir.usb point out 'that a].l thifi has been .brought into being, that oil thir. ni'':rcojra.:iy r-.rrny hac- Leon created, ^,;it;h -i ]i-.: fu.il kno-ulcdro and before the very eyes 01 \,Iie Uheted. Idvu.I.ChL, The Un't.o. iiatlons operation in the Conô i/ao cojio-.rivod in toiur: . " tlic ouccoL.::rive rcôlnblons of t'he Cccurlty Council and the Gencivl Asocûoly^ in order to i'urnisli mi].i.h.'.iy assistance to the Govero...ont of the Aopu'jlic i-f id:o C-Myo to t'ae <_•.:.L o;' r;afefjuardin^ itn indep'j)-idonco -aio t.^rri. [-..îal intor./ity, Ginco tho nontli of Ju.ly l^rJ, the L.elto L Ilation, Orrj';r,i:'.';.bion liao h.. • to deal uith the :;ituatio.r: in tho republic of tho Uonô, and In oartlcu.l.ar \;;i th the situation cr>o vbcd bocauce of tho secc.osion of h.atan;ri, Tho resolutions adopted by th: various United nations bodies have t.dxn note or tlie fcircri^n influence and decided upon various measures appropriate to the ending of the accession. But after tv7o years of discussion, TL/c__ / n 6^-6,,, ^5 (!!r._ 1 ^VTÎ , C'^nrn (Loo it must be c.c?/J.owledrcd that^ rrart i'ivm the- c^::pul:jioa f-r a lar^c murder of foreign iiiorcerrries, Uic dissident Ico/lcrs or the ^rosiucQ invjlvccl continue to n-Ti thonsolvju and roinforc'^ their ôcitiou. It is reprftttablo to have to ticl.r- "Jl'jdô tharcrui'C, tli:,t/ Lhe raôlvvtioiia hn,vo rvrL been fully applied with record to thin c\ixa of -L-ho Couô. The intc-iîatioiial Orc-'îzation must tal-i'.j r.c,-l:c of tl;i.G failurec Li.t in spito of this situation raid in fIntrant contradicition to the United nations ievolutions, the Central Government ha/; placed itself at 1 r 1 t i-Ii . j c}-rir!be s disposition to ntudy with, liim the possibilities Tor a speedy ruintec;ratio:i without recourse to anus. Hl7/rh

^pivrt froin the situation in tho nocescioniot r-'ovinc;,^ r.y Cc vern:::ont hlG not been ubie to succeed bccauce of the d-layin^ tactic:; oi' Mr. Tchoubc. Ilio attitude rince Tanane.rive is veil hno'.rn. Thin wn:: ono oi the first efforts at rapprochement v'hir-h vu.3 attested at Coquilhatvil le, and ho has r.ever e^ît'Ccd . himself irrevocably ana clearly, T;:c "I'jrty dry." of dincuDi-.io3i.-j ceorr.-d to brii\c a tiaie i^provviiiont in rur I'^lationc; vcrkin^ curjEittucs vjic :;c'o up \mich were to oe ci.tj--u3-,.-jl vith tb-3 explor^ticn ci' t;.o \?holo (inoLit !..>n oi' rcuiilf iccition^ but !ir. T:J.- :nbo had r3fi.iêd to ciyn a final ccr..--'.1.!;-/!^.. •• > On 16 Jo no ho IcTt Lcopoldville tn'ter nfusinG ô :ri.(û Uic r^fvical aiipnarcd to have bncn ri'c^cditntG^ . I!'; had ;'.v>OU:i I'or ror'r,y dc;y^ Lhat he vrnilO.. accept ijothirj^;. and JJJ.G do^^r -'^re ;-.?-msd to bo u, . • owj -tactic. In arvecinr; to r.tnp n.ôtiationc, he vac tryir.j to r'.'.in time to c:-rcn:;inon his si tir.it iun rrlliturily and i'in::nciaU.y, cxhauctin^ the national t.-io:L2r.:iy c,nd. iTicrea;)in;: tho a.i..p;r';i enco oi the United l:':i!:ions. TJ'io Cover? jucnb of tlie CC;I:P;O hao reach- d the c:;iiciur;io:i that the tine for norpti.xtir.r.c; is rnst. iho u-jôsciciilL/fc nv.!;itun -j of the hatârôco continueG. Tho jj:>l'.'".ed iia.-.. er>J :iiU,ct dciinj i ;:.;:. jr;_,...i ;!;.:. to ;;•,;..-•;.•<,• dorr," I/ <'u."-'! d^-t;orr-iine itc ay^rojirifite iuoanij .:u' ac^:.0: eo euûre full and unro.''?rved :h;v_:i.CTJ:.nt:.atioii of itc, rcôluLionc;, T.ê people of the Cun.ô ha/e cii^fci-cd ciiou;^:. 'lie..1/ have i^L-ced t!-.nl:r truat in the United n?/jionn and e:ax:>-:\.od -Crrjin it thj cr.fen;iLa:nU;i{v; of their independence and territorial : -itej-rit;/. i'; ^,:yru.T; th:it foreifn ir.uiuencG:; e::c.?ed th'c Kec.rm and rcrjourc'sr; availahl^ to :,:vj lnt^rnatiorio.1 Organize, tiont Incvitaoly^ the mandate must te changed and tho Orcaniâtioii inuct rive proof of more finuHCSf],

n nn-oria)*. I ^TiG;i to put a rranll cuppler:entary question after liGtcnin;';; to the- v^iy i.-ifon^noive ctatc;i;er.t^ that have been made and the answer;; to vai IOUG nuostioni'V- lor \jiiiel; we die lu^t ;p.\i,tcluJ-« j;j'tcr heerirr^ th : ]e;.;t iiroervi.ntion^ I . -,a net qel^e sui'e whether my supplementary (iuustion ve.c aej.r/red^ Ao I Ivjol: ab i_'ai'a;_-raph 3'<- of the report with

which we are at prer;e.ii; t^jri! >/riied; llier-e app:ar3 to bo a hint of finality in the stblto!;} f./f tie Ceiliv.L (J..iv.-:j i:L:onc a3 regard;] ccnLLnu, . i:-icn of the taJ.hf.;. ±b nayc there 'iUite clearly t^at the i.ata.i.-cco waiibed a i •J'erceice to ctu-jeciuoM b talhs; i,he

Central Gov-ei:.,]jenu re,.;;;:ctcd it ann. would not- have it in the- cejv:.rjni'.!.uo. ijubuc juontly, the iri...e Minister :L: reported to hiv/o L;aid that the ball wao in the court of the United liatione. You caid in paccir.rj, Mr, Uecretary-General, that you agreed with tais. MU/rh 67

It ic not Cor nrj to av;t Lo^nto tto ::.a::y etc-.." vo ' ch you vili no doubt bo cons.ii"1-oriiiC^. 'out i v 10 WOP/ .-i' lor if, in I'ac-b, tr.ro I:; a "better definition of tho Viovo or Inc. Cenlve.l C^v-" uo:;;.. Mb an r^rnrun any nuhoequont tolkc. Th:i « ird.f'i occur in tho "ncantia^ vliilri ;you ai ? on your tr:i o to Mm-opot I ;^a n-jt ^..-111.0 c3.c rih^M-'o thin, I!;/ fl..-le ration vonld li!:o to Un^.r T.'hoilr.i.1 you havo .a mor-* precis':

-Ld-r.i "3 ~oj v.^ther; in ::act_r they vo-.rb to bavo rn^ro t-\lo3. Uo understand their rcoliilLC^ Of CGUrJC > find tllOCO tl:iir;a up to now liavc been futile, but we chuuld Ii:u5 to Iinoi;,

riAT,: In the lirio or Mr. TciioiEbe's ro-1^

DcrormanC'J^ u/ cvuj. ~o; it i;..; n:i •: . j> Landr-a.'.Lo t:^t rrlruo Minister /looula ('"P.VO n int of f in:;~._J"y^ a:J you 1\ .".:;•/ e nai/I^ ro;'-:vrcl.^:ir \,ho p^or.pect oi" i'uta.vo nc^ot-iationc, a:i'l I i'ecl 1 :HVG rrij;.;o Mi.n.i.r;L^r ^'..' ' T I!--- — tic.tior;:: vLth iira 'iubc ov;oe L'\I (,, of courrc, liiu • HKil c.iititu'lo JiJ.l "bo JooCJuiir.ed c:: a rc-olt of the clov • • opi.iont!^ vhtoh :J.T%: ;jtili iiuprcdictrinlc;

I .'ont \/i:.'.a to i.,:\i .j a cori .:r- i.i...-u Loi'o: -; vo -',n jj-'ivn. I cold a r^oront ayo 11: -it too iota'. •- vo.>-.!^ po.i.d by rn't'oi ; • • iixov--- to tlio K.'.'.. . i ;'•, ;oibh':.ol. blon .l:-;:'i yt •--..- -.•••., 1 - (•(>') }'< ..00;C;-JO. Aoti-:? Ly7 tl:iu v^ ;..-.,: ^o, 000 coniitiiv.; l:oi Lho ioiv: i revoiro;,; i-,j.,o::ivca

L;/ i'iiO K:r:ji>--rja aiUJiOiitioo,. (,'!.' cjiircc, tljiu (..-- ...... ,. iluccl i'ov-r;\.;:G Tro-i cthcj.* V r r ; L.OTI ',OD; EM>..':. r?.n 'o;irt£onyi '.:•. C".:.'iico :.-.,•: .ionn on'i otij.-i'.:. : i'i.: L ;•:;... L i I uv:. 11.13 .'OJ..;! 'by ITni.-v^.ii.r-'.'.M,-.- to El ; i:.u,both / . :,.-.G lo.ct yoar vac; ^V^v •;^;7.-'--!- T:ho. .v''-5,f:-'^,00.- VOG the tot J. rove. iioo, oi1 Oxiicli tiê revenue paid ly ;?o ' • m j o ni^ro vdLJ tl:;j i'iourG vhicii I havo ol"-^t oujtod, Onc-G a.. :?,:.-.], ti':-ok yo'i for thin fiuitful discussion and for tiyic very corr'.kructiV'j c-oucio:^ I oi;:J.L look Tuiâru to luocLinc you acîn COILG time late in July on my return i'rora ...uror^r

at l."0 ret,.'..Tif1; Tro. uG

UlttTED IIATin::.-; ADVinrRY CC'IUTT Oil TliJ CO.!1 JO

at Unit<-d KaMrns II"rid quartern, .-nv York on Tuc^la,/^ 2-4- July I>o2, at ;? p

u TiL\:rr he Ac tine uECRtTARY-GEIJERAL

Canada C'.;-7'1.o.'l 1 :.r , I i: I.A'LACL'KERA JilUiioj I. a l/'cdoration of i.'ihcina Cu ! nca

;r . : : i ; . :'. a ; JO- C OGROWARDO JO .^. o \inudVAiJ

-all

i r. Ai' ;.;JL

i -!."G • ' •- :J»-ji-/J-J iiini.j.i.3, IV. ri\;-i.ob -GLIM United Arab Republic Mr.

G2-l6l66 Tho^/\ntirif:J".rn;;r.T/-.rY-rr::irT^M,; K:r:a^:.:c of tlic Conrr.ttt-c, I call upon you once ore fo..- i-dviee — thif: iî..-- in a t:cct dii'Jicult and cliallGiîiig phase 01' Ir:? United Ik:; lonj opcrat1] cnn .in the Ui.^fo. Til': Adoula-rj^hciiibe l:il!r.a in .U o~ -\.10.v ilia h'lvo Ir^hon off vlthout, any fruitful rocul-c. :;?:. Tsh -b^ ct ^ho l-ot i.: !.]•;• :o; ^Tur :d to U:A'O with ar.'.V ciî the i'lniil oo- ";ur.:_o;;o: end L;.ince thin we? 3 ':.;i r^.ôl cui'cMtLjn -V.^r r;^btdn:; ti.c cor.ninr'-ionn to v-or];^ i:r._ Adculr. .:cruGC3 to do rnyUii_n^ in tli^t dir jctio-n until the corâ

Fo." ".-juinc hlr» return to niinr.bothvillG, Ilr, rrr/.K.inbo has civon more thin nnov.c'n c\idOi.cc i iiat hie nc{,ot;'.c..t;li;:;i3 in Lcc-poio.vj.llc tcv;arcic; ending I^tan^r1,1 3 ,.;ccco.:lo:, u-^ro l".o]'.in;'; in nii?.^-..i.Ll.-,"» Vovy :}iTTiiiiv iitly iu the, Lr.c.:: >our>d is the; i:;ni.v? oT n. now conotitution for tha '"'oi'C0' Cr'n.y^oc ,, o.J couv::^^ v:ii..t.; lo c..;C In ruiv.::!.:1?. r, cr :i"tj.tut:i;-;n i;lvt ah uoiilt: clv Ivuu c'.tl 'U. 'it he \ii:;hc:> on bC'h?/li' oi' K'.itP.ry:, beroj.-:; 3v; i: . • :.; L:.;V I'^r:-. cciicr-3L;;,cri

••n f?cc';"... ion. It io r.ooL unll:T:l;"^ in r.(y "yic-';:^ tli" .; :.0.-a: ;i ut.ll t:u:o a:;/ Coop to .\it L...,.'.' y ...... hoirD ^ :; A thlG ::"e;y.ivU ri:i;C.^.i;,^.'e, tljui'-? vonii L.;cm to l;c ucj re;-.! pru^ico

'J...-.J i.,'oyall;I/;:j att'.tiiJ'j ol !J. h ::•;.. '.::0 'ird lUr. v:.'ll-.;.: :'^c:' to^:cir-"lG 01FIC IB anyUixnc; hut iricr -i.'ly, \;j ;,b coifLu hr.vo l;-.,,n n, i.ir^t curious clt...n uctw^cn Gi'iL.U trocô ',";••! vuj (_;cnd;;. iii.orie \;,;j oiuy 'njricvjy c.v«jrv...:l on 11 -j\ 1 • \:i:- n the K-t-uu.-oc Ir.-lc 1^1^ over '.ai: oji.jvjitioa, on cclobratln' ; tK-ir co-c.?Hod IM'J C.L.'V! -.:nce, nt uMch tir:o aiao ;< ? ; i 'oii,"3 I'r.,t;.; . OGO cilici'i] L; i; - x; n .\; k ;i.i':^.icv: l,l.;.ii, tji...:.r \/c.: ••! ia V7o-. th!.c;ji3, F;v:lK2rmorc, u Lkot :.,cilov:,- li.ci'jjut occur- .;d jn J7 .ruly in Lluiabcthvillr: Ti ; 1ien a. ]•"•. •: viiiOd r.nd vici^ :,jy c;'?;tôivc:d aoGuult by thuu-xirv o of ICacaisôi:;;:; \7C :.::.rt and .'ilLdrcii \;.ic uiadc on Indi.xi truupc ot a I'or.d-bljclu 'ihu.;:.- trôv;.;^ ii:Cl',l.ci:U:J ]y^ .;-'.ui»loyo''i :-.-cir:G.rl::.blo r<-oti'ulrt oîd diccipliiiQ under Gxtrcr/.-j provocation, and never i'iic-J. (Mi tho i:-C}\jt T.:]K:. ô ho.G nm? £ono ac far nc to indicate; to Mr. Gnrdincr hifl intention to

'•--•nicy civilian fh;i :3n jL.i'j.tiC'nL) j.n::-tco-d 01 t.:'o:"i-)f:;; r.:j a ;u.\; l/u.:li.; a^yiinijt tlic-

Jjni-ccd I.,;.tionG f^vcjfj, la (.'.url (.;.•.!. o,. ati.i/pi, i\.;r l.lu_: -ai--..i.:/ c.nd. i/oll-l.:cin[: ol hie .v/,i L :o]y!.o; i'or Lo rnoU3 wolJ. l.l^L th:.- United lin.tion;.; ti ,^ ps viil liavo to i)roLjot •t.;./:ir.oGJ.'\/c...;. 'ihi:.; POLJOL; nov; prcblunu i'or the Forcc^and iJUtLi a vory urcat strairi on

-Lii'.i 1 ' , -j • •{••>!•.tii UO_,_.• o » MP/jpm 3-5 (The Acting Secretary-General)

Having just returned from a rather extensive trip which took KG to several European capitals, during which I had the "benefit of a number of exchanges of vievs on various aspects of the Congo question, I propose now to inform you about these disciiGGionc. Since Mr. Gardiner has come to Headquarters at my request for only a day or two of irrcenslve consultations; I shall subsequently also call upon him to report to this Coinnittee on the latest facts about the Congo and on his impressions of the situation and the road ahead for ONUC. (At this point the Acting Secretary-General made some off-the-record remarks*) AW/kb 6

(The Acting Secretary-General)

As you can readily surmise from what you already Know about the Congo, some vital decisions about ONUC are going to have to be made without men delay, I very much wish to have your thinking about them. First of all; naturally, is the question of whether it will be timely and advisable now or in the near future to go to the Security Council in search of a new mandate for our operation in the Congo or for clarification and strengthening of the existing mandate set forth in the Security Council resolutions* Divided counsels are given on this question. I understand also that the bis Powers have differing views about the advisability and utility of a Security Council meeting on the Congo at this time. I an mycelf not unaware that there may be considerable risk in going to the Council now, for if the meeting should be held and no conclusive result achieved, the United nations effort in the Congo would be worse off and I, in its direction, would be more handicapped than now. Only Tshombe could gain from such a result. I know that there are some who take the position that no new mandate or even a clarification and strengthening of existing mandates is needed from the Security Council, on the grounds that the resolutions of the Council already afford me enough authority to have the United Nations Force do whatever needs to be done. I for one — and I believe that there are a number of others -- seriously question this view. It is clear, certainly, that there is no mandate entitling Lie to employ force to achieve the political objective of ending secession. It could lead only to harmful results to try to do this deviously* I entertain your views on the question of the need and advisability of an early Security Council meeting on the Congo. Of even greater importance, from a practical standpoint, will be what I can learn here about the positions of those Governments — especially those that provide contingents for OIJUC --on the question of the need for a new or redefined mandate. It is more vital still to learn what the positions of those Governments really are with regard to the kinds of situations involving possible fighting in the use of force in which their contingents can be used vrithout those Governments calling a halt and saying that their troops cannot be used for this purpose or even withdrawing their contingents. AW/Kb . 7-10 ' - '''*'

(The Acting Secretary-General)

Let me be more specific in this regard. If, let us say, I interpret the original becurity Council resolution of 12 July 1560 so broadly, under the guise of assisting the Government of the C01130 in the maintenance of law and order, OB to esM'.gn detachments of the GITUC Force at the request of the Central Governr.'.e.nt to protect representatives of that Government in their efforts to operate a customs regime in Katanga, cr to control exports and imports, or to protect the installations of the _Union_uinibre and other companies in Jadotville, Kolwesi and Kipushi, would all of the Governments providing contingents to the Force accept this interpretation and permit their troops to be used in its application? In such situations there probably would be fighting, even heavy fighting. AP/bmt 11 (Acting Secretary-General)

You will readily agree with iue, I am sure, that whatever Interpretation may be made of the existing resolutions, or whatever the rr.andate defined, "by any new resolution,effective execution of the mandate will depend on whether there is in fact a United Nations force in existence on the spot to back up the mandate, should this be necessary as a result of overt hostility and attack "by the Katangese. I Ki-ast know, obviously, exactly where we stand with regard to the use that can be made of each contingent of the Force. I would hope to get from you in this meeting adequate clarification on this point. The question of ONUC's relation to the MC is still a difficult one. There is still no indication of a willingness on the part of Adoula's Government to implement their agreement of last December to provide a Congolese contingent to OIIUC. On our part, there is ctill strong objection to enlacing in any military operation jointly with the ANC. There has been, no doubt, some improvement in the Congolese Army, but the United Nations cannot afford to commit itself to a joint military operation in which it would have no effective control over the selection of military objectives, over tactics or over the conduct of the AHC troops, although the United Nations would be held fully responsible for everything that happened. There is, indeed, even a division of opinion on how far we can or should go in seeking to apply economic pressures to Tshombe and Katanga in order to bring an end to the nonsense about secession. I mean mainly by economic pressures, bearing down on the Union Miniere in order to ensure that the Central Government will receive its proper share of the revenue from the exploitation by that powerful company of Katangeoe resources. I find some ambiguity, if not irreconcilability, between certain passages in the resolution of 20 and 21 February 1961 on the one hand and that of 2^ November 1961 on the other. With specific reference to numbered paragraph A-l of the February resolution, no definition is given of what is to be regarded as "civil war", while paragraph 1 of the November resolution strongly deprecates secessionist activity. I know that at the time of the adoption of the February resolution there was no constitutional government with which the United Nations could deal. Now there is a constitutional government with which the United Nations AP/bmt 12 (Acting; Secretary-General) should and does deal, and this apparently with the agreement of everyone "but Tshombe and company. Surely it would not "be realistic to say that the United Nations, in ordor to "prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo", should attempt., even by "the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort11 to stop any Central Government efforts, even military, to end secession in Katar.ga. Granted this, th^ ;j_ueration remains as to how far the United Nations can co and how much it can do in assisting the Central Government to establish its authority over Katanga/ which today, for all practical purposes, means Southern Katanga, not to mention what it is entitled to do whan the Katangese undertake military actions against the ANC in Northern Katanga. I must say also that the Security Council mandate regarding the elimination of mercenaries, which in the November resolution went so far as to authorize the use of force if necessary to eliminate that evil, is no longer very pertinent in any helpful sense. I do not mean to imply that there are no longer any mercenaries in Katanga. There may still be a few hundred. But they are no longer overt and active and out in the open as they once were; they have merged with the civilian European population, have nominal jobs and cannot any longer be readily apprehended as in the case of the substantial number who were captured by us last August. Thus the mercenary provisions of the resolutions no longer afford ONUC a good basis for effective action, as they formerly did. Well, here are some issues to consider. There are others, of course, but the ones I have mentioned are, I think, the basic ones. I invite your most serious views on them. With regard to the question of a Security Council meeting, it is my intention also to consult individually and informally the members of the Security Council. I now call upon Mr. Gardiner,

Mr. GARDINER: As already described at the end of the last Adoula-Tshombe talks, the Katangese delegation very carefully avoided the signature of a final communique'. The last meeting Continued from five in the afternoon until five in the morning and no agreed text could be produced. Immediately after the departure of the delegation, Katanga announced a grant or a gift or a contribution -- that was not made clear -- of one hundred million francs to be paid to the Central Government, and, a few days afterwards, also the nomination of the Katangese members AP/bmt 13-15 (Fir. Gardiner)

for the four commissions. But in nominating these members, Katanga described the commissions as preparatory, advisory, and in no way executive. The original intention in recommending the idea of commissions was to set up todies which would take practical measures for the integration of Katanga with the rost of the Congo- J,,i the absence of a final communique and in view of the very vague terms in vihich the purposes of the commissions were described, Prime Minister Adoula hesitated -- in fact insisted on purposes being clearly defined before the commencement of work by the commissions. At this stage we, that is, ONUC, cot in touch with President Tshombe and suggested that perhaps it mi^ht be a good idea to accept and declare that the work of the commissions is an essential part of the process of integration. When I last met President Tshombe he pointed out that this formula had appeared acceptable to him, but the events or the incidents of 12 July and 17 July had made it impossible for him to act. Ke was not a free agent, he said, and the presence of ONUC forces and roadblocks in Elisabethville constituted undesirable duress. In other words, there is no longer any serious interest in continuing the discussions, in following up the work of the commissions, under present circumstances. RH/ds -16-

(Mr« Gardiner)

I think that the question which we have boon asking ouraeJ.ves in ihe Cccgo is this: are the Katan/gans cerious -when they declare that they wish to discuss and achieve reconciliation with the rest of the Congo by peaceful means? There are certain incidents which perhaps may increase or emphasize our doubts. Buriii;.-, r/ns couvae or the negotiations'in Lccpoldville, the KatonfpriD were at the saaae tims very busily engaged in preparing for the celebration of their independence, a separate occasion from the independence of the Congo. .They have not stopped building up the strength of the gendarmerie; they ptlll ' hold on to. and there is no ind:i.:-i-jion that they intend to give up, the trappings of independenceo In the Local Pre-3G, through the radio and by general pronouncements in Kate.nga, the idea of a State, a country, a nation, is being more and more popularized; in other words, the population is getting more and more used to th? idea of Katanga as a separate State. This process, I may repeat, is developing concurrently with the professions of a desire to end the secession. If we may relate these developments to the presence of OHUC troops in Katanga, we are faced all the time with this tension. If the Katangans seriously want to end the secession or to have integration, then certain measures which we may take— that is, the ONUC forces and the ONUC civilian staff -- should aim at this and should coincide with their professions. On the other hand, most of the measures which we take are sometimes considered hostile by the Kctanganc. This is only one aspect of the tension, We also find out that most of the stories put out by Katanga^ are readily accepted or acceptable and we -- that is, OIIUC -- have to go to some lenglhs to justify every observation we make. Fortunately, recent events seem to indicate that at least some importance is being attached to some of the information that we communicate to the world. We no longer accept these atrocity stories, I hope, without qualification and our version, again ve hope, will now begin at least to gain seme consideration. But against this background we have our daily vexations and provocations, wild and unfounded accusations against United Nations personnel, civilian and military. Not only that: our supplies sometimes do not get across the border. We run very low in stocks of our essential materials, and each occasion has to be very carefully and patiently negotiated. RH/ds -17-

(Ifc, Gardiner)

We ore also now threatened — and it loolis as if we have only had the first installment of this — with the utilization of women and children to harass our troops. This has "been premised us as the now taetic to "be used "by the Katangen authorities. The road blocks, for instance, have ceen criticized in many plar.er,, perhaps without a full Knowledge of the purposes which these road "blocks are r-/ocosed to serve. By the way, we have only eight, covering the principal roads leading into Elisabethville. The Katanojans have produced a map showing twenty-foi:r of them; that map is not accurate and I think that it is deliberately intended to mislead* "What we had in mind in instituting these road "blocks WS3 primarily to .prevent fighting in the city of ElicaLethville. On two occasions we have had to fight our way, or at least to resist interference, from the airport right down to the end of the city. Thanks to the very careful planning ana work of the OKUC personnel in Elisabethville, we can at least now "be sure that civilians will not be involved in any conflict which way develop . in Elisabethville and that whatever happens -- and we hope nothing will happen -- will be outside the city of Elisabethville. Surely, if we take the trouble to prevent fighting in the city, we should not be criticized for doing something with really good intentions, something which may be at least, from our point of view, not only humanitarian, but also very reasonable. In some quarters it has been stated that there is no disorder in Katanga and that the only source of trouble in Katanga is the presence of United Nations troops. It is a little strange and.a bit discouraging to us to have such observations made because in a place like Manono, vhich Is now on the border between north and south Katanga, we form the only barrier between those conflicting forces. If you remove our United Nations contingent from Manono -- and I am sure of this -- you may have a very serious conflict and & very heavy loss of life in north Katanga. Moreover, it looks, if I may describe it in this way, like the case in which we move into a neighbourhood and then somebody organizes a gang to come and disturb us,, and then we are told that the new neighbours .are the cause of the trouble. RH/ds -18*20.

(Mr. Gardiner)

Most of these activities against the United Nations forces have "been carefully organized. Not by the United nations. Left tp ourselves, o-ur presence there will secure law and order, not disturb it« I have found it a little difficult, and I bring this to your notice, to follow the logic of this accusation that our presence ic the cause of all the trouble in Katanga, I should like to submit that the contrary is the case* But whatever the arguments may "be, I think that we, as your agents, should call attention to the fact that it is unreasonable to expect our men, civilian and military, to endure these conditions of provocations, vexations, and false accusations without occasional incidents. What ve have got to do now is to pay tribute to the self-restraint and self-control of our men rather than accept very easily seme of the wild and unfounded accusations of the Katangan authorities. Why do we have these accusetions? "Why are these attempts being made to disturb the morale of the United Nations troops? Why is it that the Katangans want to drag out these discussions indefinitely? In fact, sometimes ve wonder whether there is any real desire to use these discussions to solve peacefully the problemsof the Congo. Sometimes we are even urged to do as much as possible to reconcile the views of Katanga with the rest of the Congo. If we could only know the views of Katanga, we would know what we are trying to reconcile, These are some of the problems which we have to face on the spot, especially when we receive advice «- not always disinterested -. about what should be done, I feel myself that the Katangans or the people of Katanga would like to drag on the discussions, would like directly and indirectly to undermine the Central Government and, with the collapse or downfall of the Central Government, to reap the full 'benefits frcm the consequent, confusion* This is a threat of which the Central Government is very much aware, and vhen people advise that talks should be resumed, that talks should be continued at any price, they should also take this price into consideration: the creation of total confusion in the rest of the Congo, - r|.p"i(ii!ifl|rni" :«t,

(Mr. Gardiner)

Prime Minister Adoula has been telling the people of the Congo that one of his Government's principal objectives is the integration of Katanga. Almost a year has now passed since the creation of that Government and there are no results on that score thus far. That, in itself, is an indication of the lack of importance which may now be attached to the pronouncements of the present

In addition, drastic economic measures must be taken if the situation in the rest of the Congo is to be brought under some measure of control. But these drastic steps cannot be taken by a Government which is weakened by secession on the one hand and by subversion on the other and which exists in an atmosphere of general uncertainty and dissension. These are seme of the seeds which the present situation may help to germinate very quickly; they are seeds which, I am almost cure, those who are connected with Katanga are quid:, happy, and even anxious to sow. Such is the point of view of the Congolese Government. I-should now like to address nyself to the effect of these delays on the OIJUC, First of all, the unscrupulous criticism which is made of any action which is taken can have a demoralizing effect on our nen, who are proud of the traditions of their regiments, armies and countries. Some of these criticisms are so fantastic as to beggar any kind of explanation. There is also the matter of the creation of incidents for propaganda purposes. It can be rather exacting to be forced — not only every day, but practically every hour — to study, to analyse and to reply to propaganda. Moreover, criticisms may lead to some degree of over-caution or inaction. And if, as a result of criticisms, we become over-cautious and do not act, we shall then be described as useless and completely ineffective.. Such criticism will come not only from the people who create difficulties for our operations but also from those who would like us to act. Therefore, we have two arms of criticism converging on us. \Ie must.also consider the financial aspects of this question. I think that llr. Teliombe has been led to believe that if'he can hold out long enough the United Nations will reach a state of complete bankruptcy. But here.you have the United Nations side, you have the direct effect of delay, criticism and provocation on the OMUC men in the field. I emphasize these points in order to pose a few questions. (Mr. Gardiner)

On behalf of both our civilian and military personnel, I am pleased to say that morale is good. But bow lone can we be expected to submit meekly to ICatangese provocations and insults? Some of our meetings require a great deal of patience. How far may ve go in interpreting the tasl: vhich you have assigned to us, not only vith regard to protecting ourselves, but also with regard to stanC;'.::r> fina? And, as the question vas already put by the acting Secretary-General, if ve do stand firm, at what price are ve to do so? Furthermore, is this Connittce prepared to sec incurred the expenditure of that amount of money vhich is required to do so? I put these questions "because Many people in the Congo often come to sympathize vith us. The strange thing is that the very people vho employ us as their agents come to sympathize vith us because their affairs are not going •well. I wish to remind you that ve are your agents and ve are quite prepared, in your behalf, to carry out the mission vhich you have entrusted to us.

The Acting 5?.CRET.\P.Y~GE1';1ERAL; The floor is nov open for questions.

Mr. QUAinON-r.ACIfEY (Ghana): It seems appropriate, at this juncture, to begin by thanking our Acting Secretary-General and, through him, Mr. Gardiner for his statement to this Committee. My delegation is very pleased to receive the detailed report vhich he has so courteously given us. There is no doubt that he has raised some grave issues with regard to a grave situation. My immediate thought is that perhaps the Committee might vant some time in order to study the points vhich have been made by the Acting Secretary-General and vhich vere supplemented by those made by Mr. Gardiner. In that event, ve might perhaps meet again on Friday afternoon in order to suggest the next step vhich should be taken, I may say at once that I a^ree that executive action is nov required. The resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council contain ample directives on vhich action can be taken. I can say immediately that ve do not think that the United nations is required to take the initiative in anything. It seeas to me that the main point vhich should be emphasized here, before ve meet again, is that the United Nations is in the Congo in order to assist the Central Government, As vas rightly stated last year, vhen the resolution of 21 February vas being passed, no duly-constituted authority existed; Parliament vas not in session. In viev of the difficulties vhich existed, the General Assembly and the Security Council vere unable to advise vith regard to firm action. AE/yt 33 - 25 (Mr. Quaison-Saclrey, Ghana)

It seems to me, however, that the resolution -which was passed in November of l$6l — as was rightly pointed out — indicates clearly that the United nations must help the Central Government of the Congo to achieve the unification of the country. One of the means by -which the Central Government would like to do this is "by <~st publishing law and order in Katanga. Therefore, the only initiative which the united nations should take consists of having OIIUC assist the Central Government. I wanted to emphasize this because it is necessary that we not lose our perspective. It is the Central Government, and not the United nations, which must take the initiative in order to maintain law and order, although the United Nations must support and assist it in this aim until such time as the Central Government is itself able to carry out those functions. I have made these points in a purely preliminary fashion; if the Committee agrees that ve meet on Friday, I shall then give a full account of our position. MP/rh 26 •' ' '•******•>"•• (Mr. '•Mai son Sackey, Ghana) As a member of the Security Council, I should say at once, without even consulting my Government, that we do not think you need a new mandate, nor do you need any clarification of a mandate. I think the mandate is very clear, but we think it would "be a &QO& idea to have a Security Council meeting as saon as possible for you to give a report, a clear report, as you have done this afternoon/ indies, ci?ig ^he lines of your thinking, and leaving it as part of your executive function to do this, I do not think it vould be nc-acoGary then to have a debate on your report, or a resolution as such« If I may say so, if I were in the Chair, I would definitely appeal to the Council not to have any debate, but to adjourn after your report has been given, But again this depends upon the reactions of the other members of the Council. However, I ressrva my position to speak again on this -whole issue if ve meet on Friday*

* -y . l_^rP^^Jr^X. (Ethiopia): We wish to express our appreciation for the detailed infonuation — particularly that part of your statement where you gave us the informal result of your consultation; and if I may say so, the questions which you have put to us. Some of these questions, I suspect, have already been answered in the ex-shnnge of letters and telegrams when the troops were sent. I suspect -- I am not so sure — since I did not anticipate this kind of question, and I did not bring them here with me. I will look at them and see whether clarifications are necessary on our part; and if that is required, I can. assure you, we will give them GS quickly as possible and as prorapty as possible. So that I am in complete agreement with my colleague from Ghana, Ambassador' Quaison-Sackey, that perhaps we should be given some time to study the record* If we can gc\i the record tomorrow morning I am sure we will devote ourselves to it and then get the positions clarified, It goes, of course, without saying that frcm the point of view of the position of ray Government, we have participated in the debate in the Security Council in forming the resolutions , and therefore we stand by them; and, although it is not my desire to hark back to what happened in the past, I believe, generally, you will recall that a similar question was put to us at one time in regard to a specific action, and then we said that the operation had to be concluded, because MP/rh 27 ' ' (Mr« Gebre-Rgzy, Ethiopia) ve foresaw then that matters vould end up as they have now. We never trusted the desire of some people to negotiate -- not because we did not want them to negotiate, but because ve knew that as soon as the situation calmed and they felt stronger, they would create more difficulties; and this is precisely what happened, I "believe I said just before, it is a pity that at that tiae people would not a^ree with us to complete the operation and did not agree with us to do the job c once and for all. vhen the opportunity presented itself. I tMnk> fundamentally, it was a mistake. I have said to you personally, and I stand by the statement today, that we regret it very much, because the picture you have given us today is really one "which causes us a great deal of anxiety* Now, as regards the question of the United Nations not "being empowered to take the initiative, of course it depends on how one looks at it. The resolution sayc, for example, that we have to take action to remove the mercenaries. So if there are ten or fifteen mercenaries in some place, it is ray understanding that you will ask them to leave; and if they do not leave, then it is your duty to take the necessary, requisite police action to get them out. In that sort of a situation, therefore, I think the initiative is really given* By that, I mean that first they are asked to leave; and if they do not leave then, of course, action has to be taken. From that point of view I think the initiative is for the United Nations. As you say, it may be difficult, because they may have mixed with the civilian population, and that may cause difficulty. But I hope that closer attention would be given to seeing what they are doing, perhaps making a thorough study, and then trying to apprehend them one by one; because no matter what is said, we still believe that although they may be underground -- they may not be in the open — they are the cause of all the difficulties that exist in Katanga, If you succeed in removing them, we believe that 90 per cent of your problems will be solved, I know that nowadays some people say they are not doing -much; but I doubt that very much, I believe they are still a factor; and I think you should look at the picture closely, see where they are, what they are ..doing, and take them. out* The resolution gives you unconditional authority and unconditional power. Of course, it is not supposed to be done brutally. If you ask one to leave and he cayo, "All right; I am leaving", then that is the end of the story; but if he resists, then you have the authority, and you have the power, to use the troops to get them out, , MP/rh 28-30 (Mr. Gebre-Bgayj Ethiopia) For the moment, these are the brier observations vhich I want to submit, As I said earlier, you have given us quite detailed information. It is grim and causes us a great deal of anxiety. But "before we give you a definite commitment on position, we would like to take a look at it.

Mr. DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): On "behalf of the Republic cf Guinea, I should like to Join my voice to that of our two brethren who have spoken ahead of me, in thanking you most sincerely for the clear and ample expose* that you have presented to the Coirmitteo. I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, not only for your statement, but also for the action which you had undertaken -- an action on which we were very impatient to have some news, Co far we had information only through the Press, but that information itself and what you have just said confirms our conviction that the Secretariat is doing what it can in spite of the obstacles that are bein^ raised, in order to cope with the mandate that was given to it by the Security Council, as well as by the General Assembly. I would wish our brother, your Special Representative in the Congo, to be associated with these congratulation s. It is al-ways unfortunate to say that we were right; but I must note, without any misunderstanding, that the two statements which we have heard are completely in accord with our position which we have defended, and for some time now. We are gratified at this. I do not wish to refer to all of the aspects of the problem that you have raised, the conclusions to which your analysis has led, I should merely wish to refer to two points which appear to me to be at the heart of the problem* It seems to result from your statement that the Secretariat is convinced that the crisis of ihe Congo is nothing other than the question of Katanga. This has been our position since July of I960; and we are convinced that any successful solution to the Congo crisis must take this fact into consideration, must start from this fact. The crisis of the Congo is not anything other than a question of Katanga, 31 (Mr» Diallo, Guinea

The second consideration which I should like to bring out — and which has been dealt with in considerable detail by Mr, Gardiner — io the use which the authorities in Katanga are making of negotiations* They are utilizing negotiations only for the purpose of procrastination and to disrupt the legal and central institutions of the Congo in order to benefit from the chaos vhich vould result* Tiiio v£3 the point of view of New Guinea in this Committee on the day following tha vote on the resolution of 21 February 19^1. But since that vote, it may be s?,id that the situation in the Congo has been dominated by negotiations — seme of vaich were predestined to fail and which actually did fail. This, you have confirmed to us, Mr. Secretary-General. After the failure of these negotiations, there remains in our opinion, another form of action, which would be the uce of force. The Secretary-General has told us that, in his opinion, that would not be the best solution, if only because the means would not be available. Th^n the Secretary-General proposer: as a solution certain forms of economic pressure. We believe taat, by the application of adequate economic pxecsure, a solution could be found. But also on that point, one must talw into account the actors on the stage. There are puppets, as everyone can see; there are men of stone who are acting in the Congo scene. But as for ourselves, wo say that the problem of the Congo is entirely in the hands of a certain number of Powers, My delegation is very happy to note that the Secretary-General, in his contacts, hr;s struck at the right door. In fact, it is Belgium and some of the great Powers that are really responsible for. the Congolese crisis; it is they which cultivate it, finance it and organize it. VJe believe ttat, oacc again, it is necessary for those rowers to be faced with their responsibilities. The United Nations is now at a crossroad; the financial aspect of the question to which tl:2 Secretary-General has referred no longer makes it possible for us to continue as we have; if we do, inevitably the result will be according to the calculations of Tshcmbe, who is banking on a financial crisis, on chaos, and on the fact that the United Nations will no longer have the necessary funds to enable it to continue. This, as the Secretary-General has told us, is a disturbing situation since, even if the United Nations is able to obtain $175 minion — which the Secretary-General considers to be a maximum — that would finance the operation 32 for* Dia.llo, Guinea)

only until jjl December 1962. This seems to us to be a grave situation. Even if it were not necessary to have the mandate of the Secredtary-General. renewed, it would be absolutely essential to undertake new action. Such action, which the Secretary-'General has defined as a series of econcraic pressures, should be undertaken very soon. If the Secretary-General considers that his mandate frcra the Gsn£";;.l /'.,••?£ onijj.y and the Security Council is adequate to enable him to undertake this, new action, I do not believe that there should be any delay. In C'.ny event, I fully share the view of the representative of Ghana that it would be usorful and appropriate to inform the Security Council of the situation, if only to inform the Members of the Security Council — who are, in the first place, responsible in this matter -- of the exact situation so that each one might eventually e^sunrj his responsibilities. I am in full agreement with the idea that the mandate of the Secretary-Goi-^ral is sufficient ani that there is little chance of getting further clarifiestdcn frcm the Security Council, "bearing in mind the fact that has been pointed out by the Secretary-General, namely, that the great Powers are not in agreement c,s to the measure which have been advocated. I should now like to ask a question of the Secretary-General. It happens that the position which he has expressed and which has been set out by his. Special Representative, coincides with ours* We agree with the objectives. That is why I should like to have the opinion of the Secretary-General. It is possible that the Secretary-General will not call for a meeting of the Security Council. It is possible thac, having called on the Security Council, the result would "be negative. As ordinary Members of the United Nations, there still remains the possibility of bringing our debate before the General Assembly at its next session en

Mru BARNES (Liberia); First of all, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to welcome you, Mr. Secretary-General, back to Headquarters and to thank you and Mr, Gardiner for the information which you have given us concerning the situation in the Congo. Mtf/rh 53-35 (Mr. Barnes, Liberia) It ip regrettable that, after two years of intensive effort on the part of the United Nations, a solution tq the Congo problem has not been reached* I aa sorry that the talks between Mr. Adoula and.Mr. Tchombe have broken off and that, as a result, no progress has been made towards reconciliation It is obvious tyjat the events which took place on 17 July -- the assault by Katangese women and children on United Nations forces -• was inspired by Mr. Tshombe and his cohorts in Katanga in an effort to show their hostility to the operations of the United Nations, I think that the Secretary-General has.placed his finger on the basic cause of the situation in the Congo, which is the economic factor. I recall that at a meeting of the Security Council — when my country was a member of the Council — I stated that, in our opinion, the Union Minibre was playing an essential role in supporting the accession of Katanga and that as long as Mr. Tshombe was amenable to the financing of these operations in Katanga, his position would always be strengthened, while the United Nations and the Central Government would be at a disadvantage in seeking to bring an end to the secession. Now we have been told that Katanga received $6§ million in revenue last year, $38 million of which was paid by the Union Minibre. It is evident that until the time when ouch props as these are removed from Tshombe, we shall be going around in a circle in trying to bring an end to the secession of Katanga. I regret that the countries which have vested interests — the countries which the Secretary-General has consulted — have not been able to agree with his point of view regarding the imposition of economic pressures on Tshombe. We, at this table, are unable to impose such pressures. It is the countries with these vested interests which must impose them. "Whether or not this can be done by means of a meeting of the Security Council or by continued negotiations on the part of the Secretary-General is a matter for very careful consideration. RSII/rs 56

(Mr. Barnes, Liberia)

I believe that efforts should be continued on your part with Belgium to bring these pressures to bear on Katanga by paying these revenues from Union, MinierjD to the Central Government. It is only by bringing an end to these payui^r.ts to Katanga that the situation in Katanga will be solved, I •tjhinV: tliat going before the Security Council to secure such a mandate may not be advisable for the present because you have already said you cannot arrive F.-'S any agreement with those countries which have these vested interests in tho Coflgo, but I believo that if you vere to continue these negotiations we might arrive at some solution to this matter. If going to the Security Council would be for the purpose of reporting on your talks on the situation prevailing, tlisn I would fully endorse that you should do so, but to go to the Security Council to receive a new mandate may not be advisable for the present. I tki.nl: that the situation in the Congo will be solved only when Union Miniere and those other concessions operating in Katanga will get to the point of discontinuing these payments to Mr. Tshombe and to the Katanga Government and paying them to the Central Government. Those funds are the props behind Fir. Tshombe, and if they were not available he could not pay those mercenaries and he could not pay the expenses of his Government. The Katanga Government would then crumble. The root cause as I see it for the present is not the mercenaries, it is the economic situation that is now existing, and that is the question which has to be probed. If that could be solved, then I believe that the situation C.G a vhole could be solved. I fully agree with the proposal of tfce representative of Ghana, Mrc Quaison-Sackey, that we should postpone our consideration of the matters which were brought to our attention1until Friday, to enable us to study the record carefully so as to be able to make a contribution to the discussions here.

Mr. MBOYO (Congo) (Leopoldvilie) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, since the last meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Congo little has been added to the voluminous record of the situation in the Congo, On 3 July, the Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs made an RSH/rs 37

(Mr. Mboyo, Congo (Leopoldvllle) important statement on the negotiations between Elicabethville and Leopoldville and on the evaluation of the situation in general. Hence, there is no need to go back" to discuss the question of the negotiations* Everybody can draw the necesra^y conc.lueions. You yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, have had extensive consult :-.-.,ions in Europe, and the Orcc.nication can now determine the new methods needed to carry out the mandate in the Congo, the necessary ways and means, whether financial, political or legal, The last incident provoked by the leaders in Elisabethville only confirm

Mr* Tshon.be's ferocious intentionst These provocations prove once again that in Elisabethville there is not yet any sincere desire to reach agreement with the Central 'Government and to reintegrate the Congo. Quite to the contrary. The foreign financial powers and their agents in Katanga do everytiling in their power to stabilize and strengthen t'neir positions. In the interior, they do everything to undermine the authority of the Central Government, whose disintegration and overthrow they are seeking. They seek to discredit certain . members of the Central Government, including the Prime Minister, Mr* Adoula : himself. Every method, including money, is used to this end. ' Outside the Congo, the financial powers which are interested in the . situation in the southern part of Katanga continue to mislead public.opinion in favour of tiie secessionists and they are acting against the United Nations and the Congolese Government. This campaign is developing even more rapidly now that the United Nations seems to give evidence of hesitation and indecision. At Elisabethviile, they are waiting until the United Nations can no longer be in a position to face its obligations. In the Congo and outside, as well as at EliSMbethville, they are hoping there will be a continued series of crises in the Congo which will only serve to increase the economic difficulties of the Central Government. Mr. Tshombe's aim is to gain time. In addition, as my Government stated at the last meeting of the Committee, the methods which have been used to carry out the provisions of the resolutions of 21 February and 2k November 1961 have not had the results which were anticipated. We do not think that the provisions of these resolutions are adequate to solve the crisis. My Government is convinced that in the present RSH/rs 38 ( Mr^ Mboypi Congo (Leopoldville) situation the resolutions cannot be applied integrally because certein governments have not made the necessary efforts either to accept or to apply thran, 'or el&e because other governments have tolerated actions which are contrary to the provisions of those resolutions. A,-:. •-' ojiiioermenco of these gaps, we cannot say that the ICatangese secession is any nearer to a solution than it was two years ago* I do not want here to accuse cortain countries in particular, I simply want to state that certain governments vhich are giving a contribution to the United Nations effort or to the economic and social development of the Congo tolerate or facilitate the activities of foreign interests in tha Congo- In fact, the denouement is arriving. How could the authorities in Elisabethville have been able to strengthen themselves for so long if there were not all those other factors outsio.o tho control of the United Nations? The pa ['^guarding and the restoration of the Congolese Republic is our aim, and for this United Nations requires concrete jyovisions which are adequate to discourage tlis foreign economic interests which are at the basis of this secession. The Congolese Government aims to destroy the vestiges of colonialism in the South of Katanga and to plac-a this under severe and effective control by the application of the fundamental law of the Congo end the laws of the Congolese people. This would be done until such time as the rebellion was overthrown and this would affect the present limits of the province of South Katanga. In this respect, the Central Goverruaeiiw requests the collaboration of the Member States of the United Nations. In regard to this, the Government of the Republic of the Congo ( Leopoldville ) is not opposed to the convening of a new meeting of the Security Council, but firet and foremost we must be told whether there is any certainty at all of obtaining a solution which would be better than the earlier ones, because, after all, it is unnecessary to convene a meeting of the Security Council if one knows beforehand that there would be no improvement over the existing situation. Is it therefore necessary to convene a meeting of the Security Council for such a purpose? RSH/rs 39-Uo

(Mr. Mboyo, Congo (l-eopoldville)

The Government will take the necessary decisions and will not recoil before any measures necessary for the defence of its interests. It will utilize, if necessary, all the means of communications that may be necessary for the purpose of pr ?/rent,ing the arrival in and departure from this part of the Congo of persons and oaj.;:.p^£-:it which may contribute to the strengthening of the rebellion against the Centt-al Government vhich would be in violation of the laws and regulations of the Colgolese people• T!.:s Government is convinced that these are the only means which would moke possible tha Implementation of the Security Council resolutions and that this would not bs in excess of the financial possibilities of the Organisation. In the prcnent situation this is the only way to succeed. The United Nations must resort to these measures if it wishes to realize the mandate which was entrusted to it, My Government, GS I have affirmed on numerous occasions, is deeply grateful to the United Nations for the civilian assistance that has been g-'ven to it since 1960* Without that assistance, it would have been difficult for it to survive, but without the reintegration of the Province of Southern Katanga; this assistance would be useless and without any future. It certainly would not bear any fruit except in a unified Congo. BC/jpm Ul

Mr. PHAD1CAMKAR (India): My delegation thanks you, Mr* Secretary-General, for the comprehensive statement you have made to us this afternoon. Ue are also grateful for the explanatory statement made by Mr. Gardiner, We are also appreciative of the very considerable trouble that you took, Mr. Secretary-General, in ma&ing this trip to various countries in Western Europe; before you left, you had hoped during this trip to find a solution, or at least to move on to the road to a solution, to this problem* I very clearly remember your words that the problem of the Congo lay ultimately in the Union Minibro. This afternoon you have informed us of some of the suggestions that you presented in this connexion to the Government of Belgium and certain other countries. But I do not clearly recall your having said that any action on these lines must be regarded at this stage as a failure« I presume that we have not yet reached that point and that some attempts on these lines are probably continuing. I assume, too, that if it is a failure we shall be so informed at a later date. As I say, however, I do not think that we have reached that stage as of this afternoon. This is important in the context of what I should like to say later on. In your statement, Mr. Secretary-General, you have raised some very grave issues. I, for one, should not like to make any observations on them until my Government has had an opportunity to see the full verbatim record of this meeting. I feel that my Government ought to .see the full record and not merely what I would be able to send in a telegram today. The important question is this: In the event of a failure of the action that you, Mr. Secretary-General, have suggested during your trip to Wectern Europe — that is, in the event of a failure of economic pressure — is any military action, or any action on those lines, feasible or practicable? You, Mr, Secretary-General, have also asked our advice in connexion with the restricted mandate that you feel is implied in the resolutions of February and November IS/61 -- namely, that OHUC is authorized to uce force under only three circumstances: to apprehend mercenaries, to prevent civil war, and in self-defence. In the various debates there have obviously been different opinions on whether or not the initiative for military action should rest with ONUC. You have rightly, I suppose, asked our advice on this point, both as a Committee and as countries with troops committed in the Congo, Not all the delegations represented here have BC/Jpm 1*2 (Mr, Bhadknmkar, India)

troops committed in the Congo, Some form of advice from the Governments concerned would no doubt be welcome to you, AD I have said, I should like in that respect . to await the receipt "by my Government of the full verbatim record of this meeting, .

Now, within the present mandatef not much has happened for a fairly long time, I believe that that is why you, Mr. Secretary-General, have called this meeting and have v^L^ed the question whether or not a Security Council meeting should be requested, either to provide you with a new mandate or to strengthen the mandate that may be supposed to exist in the resolutions previously adopted. In this connexion there is another question which I should like to put to you, Mr, Secretary-General, I. had hoped that Mr, Gardiner would provide more detailed information on this point. What is the AKC doing? Has it improved its conditions, training, state of discipline and military effectiveness to the point where it could relieve the United Nations troops of a number of duties which are strictly speaking not military duties but tasks entrusted to ONUC on the baois of-the original resolution. — that is, to assist the Central Government in a number of ways, including the maintenance of law and order? Has the AIIC reached a state of training and discipline in which it could take over some of those duties, thereby relieving the United Nations troops for auch operational duties as it migjhfc be necessary to assign to them either now or at a later date? Of course, our hope has always been that it would not be necessary to utilize ONUC for active military action and that, in some way and somehow, a solution in a peaceful manner would be found* But from what you have reported today, Mr. Secretary-General, and from what seems to have been happening, our hopes would appear to be further away from realization than ever before. Ue are in the most serious situation about finances. I believe that on the Congo we have spent more than the total of four or five years of the United Nations regular budget. This in itself is an extraordinary position, We are one of the countries which have so far been able to meet our contribution to these finances, We propose to meet our obligations in the future. Nevertheless, it is an extremely heavy burden on us. We are .one of the " have -not", the poorer, countries of the world. It is not a simple-matter for us to bear this burden — not only in the financial sense but in the sense of our very heavy comnitmentG.. in .the Congo. But pur attempt will always be not to fail the United Nations. BO/*. (Mr. BhacV.iprakar, India)

Ao regards convening the Security Council, it is quite obvious that we can only advise you, Mr. Secretary-General, on whether or not you should go about asking for a meeting. Those of us vho are not mongers of the Security Council obviously cannot take a decision. Such a decision inevitably rests with the members of the Council* Happily ye have a member of the Security Council here, and ho :w-; ^.pressed an opinion. But on this matter^ too. I should like to await instrucii-n3 from ray Government, it would, of course, "be extremely unfortunate for the Congo and for the task that we have before us if a Security Council meeting Were convened with the definite request that you have envisaged -- either to give a new meurlate or to strengthen the present mandate — and then the Council for some reason failed to act on those lines, As you yourself have said, this would make the situation much worse than it io now, I therefore think that this question must be given very careful thought. I. have only one other observation to make. This relates to the incident of 17 July« I should like to congratulate the OPI, or whatever section is responsible, for the very prompt action taken in briefing the Frees, I think that we had in the past been slightly critical of the delays that occurred in briefing the Press on behalf of the United Nations on incidents particularly concerning the Congo, This time, however, we were very happy to note that United Nations action followed as soon as possible after the information was received heret I repeat, therefore, that we should like to congratulate the OPI and Mr. Caruthers, who, I believe, made the briefing. TL/kb k£

(Mr. Bhadkamkar, India) .

At this stage, Mr. Secretary-General, I do not think I would like to make any other observations apart from pointing out that, in my opinion, calling a meeting on Friday -- that is, three days frcm now — might be sonevhat too early, because I do not believe the verbatim records would be able to reach my GovGrnr^-ut by that tine; or even if they did reach them by late 'ihursday, at the earliest; I do not think ray Government would have sufficient time to study them. So with that reservation, I shall be at your service for any other meeting that you might call, The Acting SECRETAKY-GENIML: Before ending the discussion, I shall give the floor to Kir. Gardiner to take up the point raised by the representative of India regarding the AKC question.

Mr. GAPPINERt There has been some improvement in the level of comportment and efficiency of the AKC. In fact, in certain areas, particularly in Equator , we have no United Nations military presence, and in Leopoldville we have what may be described as a token United Nations force. But the AIIC lacks transport, lacks air support and logistics. Ihey are striving very hard to make up these.deficiencies* I think this much we can say. What their performance'will be under trial, nobody can, I think, definitely say at this stage, We can only talk about improvement, and perhaps circumstances will prove what contribution they can make or what efforts they can make themselves independently.

Mr, BHADKAMKAB (India): If you will permit me, Mr, Secretary-General, I would liks to read part of a statement of my Prime Minister, purely as an indication of the state of his thinking at the time. This is a statement he made to the Upper Kouce of Parliament last month; it was therefore made before the trip you undertook and, of course, before the report that you have made today will become available to my Government, I thought that, if you will permit me, purely for the record I would like to read out a small extract from what the Prime Minister said about the situation in the Congo. This is primarily so that my friend the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville) should know that our views have not in any way changed. The Prime Minister, speaking to the Upper House on 23 June, about a month ago, said: . ' • ra IIPIII ii 111 ]«j TL/kb IfJ

(frr» Bhpdkapkar, India)

In the Congo the position is one of stalemate. In December last a settlement was arrived at between Prime Minister Adoula and i-ir. Tshcmbe at Kitona. During this settlement a declaration was made by Mr. Tshcrnbe. It wr^.3 a good declaration, but very soon after he followed his own practice oi" c->^-nC bcLck on his declaration* And there the matter stands now, in stalemate, Mr. Tshombe only believes in adequate pressure with some sanctions behind it. He made that declaration because there was great pressure on him. The moment the pressure was lessened, he withdrew from it. It is obvicus that the United Nations can only succeed in making Mr. Tshombe act up to his declarations by making it clear to him that they will take action against him, action including the use of force if necessary. Unfortunately, he has got into the habit of getting some support from various quarters outside the Congo -- I mean in other countries -- who piously declare that there must be no force used against him, and thereby they allow him to carry on in his peculiar ways."

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; By way of winding up the discussion, I want to make just a very brief statement, I note that our friend the Ambassador from Ethiopia made reference to the United Nations troop operations in Katanga last December, and if I remember correctly he remarked that it was a mistake to end the fighting in December. This, of course, refers to the fighting in Elisabethville. Now, I have no wish to differ with him on anything, but by way of clarification I just want to point out that the fighting ceased in ilisabethville because the United Nations troops achieved the immediate objectives there, and it ic common knowledge that up to now our people are in full control of Elisabethville, Of course, the reason why our troops did not move to other important areas like Jadotville, Kolwezi and Kipuohi was the simple fact that we had no means of transport at that time. So I do not think that it was a mistake for the United Nations troops to cease operations in Elisabethville in December. Regarding the projected Security Council meeting which has been the main point of our discussion this afternoon, opinions have been expressed, and of course I share the feeling of the Committee that definitive advice can be offered only at a later date when most of the representatives here will have the benefit of instructions from their respective Governments. The representative of Ghana TL/kb 1*8

• • (The? Acting Secretary-General)

suggested a meeting,on Friday, but the representative of India feels that Friday might be e little too early for him-, and perhaps for others of his colleagues,to get instructions. P.egardrng the mandate, very useful views have been expressed and the consenv.i-s coems to be that the previous Security Council resolutions have given me an al^qu^te mandate to carry on the United Nations operations in the Congo more fruitfully and more positively. Of course, that will be a matter for further discussions at our next meeting* Regarding the question posed by the representative of India as to whether ray projected steps regarding the economic pressures on Katanga have met with failure, I want to make it clear'that up to now I have not received any official' reply from Belgium. After iny visit to certain European capitals in the last few weeks, the impression I had was that there was no agreement regarding the implementation of the economic steps I had presented to these Governments before my departure from New York. But so far as the reaction from Belgium is concerned, up till now I have not received any official reply. One other point. We are informed'that every effort will be made by the staff concerned to have the record of this meeting out by noon tomorrow, eo that it will be in the hands of the members of the Committee by tomorrow afternoon. How, in view of the remarks and suggestions just made by the representative of India, I would propose that the next meeting of the Committee should take place perhaps Tuesday next, instead of Friday. If it is agreeable to the Committee, we will resume our discussions' at 3 ?•&• on Tuesday, 31 July.

The meeting rose at 5«10 P»nu V W V • »V"V V f

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 69 31 July 1962 ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 31 July 1962, at 5 p.m.

In the Chair U THAIIT The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL

Members: Canada Mr. TREMBLAY • Ceylon Mr. WIJEGOONAWARDENA ' Ethiopia Mr. GEBRE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. HAMID - Ghana Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY Guinea Mr. DIALLO India Mr..,.CIIAKRAYARTY Indonesia Mr. RONODIPURO Ireland Mr. 0«SULLIVAN- Liberia Mr. BARNES Mali Mr. TEAOR2 Morocco Mr. BENIIIM '- Nigeria Mr. AGIODU Pakistan Mr. Muhammad Zafrulla Senegal Mr. GIGS Sudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden Mrs. ROSSSL Tunisia Mr. MESTIRI United Arab Republic 14r. RIAD

Congo (Leopoldville) Mr. CARDOSO

62-16889 AT/yt

The Acting S&RETARY-GEHflRAL: At our last meeting we raised certain issues. It was decided to take up these issues at this meeting since many delegations expressed their desire to refer to their respective Governments Tor instructions, Therefore, I do not think it will be necessary for me to make any introductory remarks and the floor is open to you. I shall be very glad if members of the Committee can come up with concrete observations on the issues raised at our last meeting,

Mr. CIS5 (Senegal)(interpretation from French): Mr• Secretary-General, I think that since our meeting last Tuesday the situation in the Congo has evolved to a certain extent. You, yourself, have indicated that this evolution has taken place. I think it vould bo good for the Advisory Ccnmittee on the Congo to hear your comments on the proposals formulated "by the Prime Minister of the Congo, and what you yourself think about these proposals. This is the question I should like to asK you and I would be grateful if you vould answer it.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; As you probably are aware I received a communication from the Foreign Minister of the Central Government of the Congo requesting me to think of giving to the Central Government, in the form of technical assistance, some three or four constitutional lawyers or Jurists or constitutional advisors to advise the Central Government on the formulation of a new constitution for the Congo, which the Central Government has already drafted. In his request mention was made that the Central Government would be very happy if an African jurist or a constitutional expert could be included, I have given very serious thought to this and actually I am in contact with some Member States with the view to responding to the request of the Central Government. Only yesterday morning I asked Prime Minister Adoula if he would be agreeable to receive three constitutional experts: one from Figeria, one from Switzerland and one from Canada, because in the request of the Central Government there was one condition to the effect that these constitutional experts should be conversant with the working of a federal consitution. These three countries which I have in mind, of course, as you all know, have federal constitutions. I feel that constitutional experts from these countries will be able to contribute materially 1 AP/yt 5 I'fllfll -li'JI' "',!]'! ; i I

(Acting Secretary-General) to the success of the endeavours now being made by the Central Government. Of course, the procedure Is that these United Nations experts on constitutional lav will go to Leopoldville. They will examine the drart which has teen prepared-by the Central Congolese Government. If the recommendation is acceptable to the Central Government it is my understanding that Prim^ Minister Adoula will present this Joo the Parliament for ratification. That is the latest situation.

Mr. TRAORE (Mali)(interpretation from French); "Mr. Secretary-General, my delegation hao full confidence in c.11 the initiatives which you took in applying the resolutions of the United Nations on the Congo. My delegation maintains this confidence to this day. The situation in the Congo is changing with extreme rapidity. Hence, it deoerveo to be followed and studied from day to day. Hence, one is tempted to get a review of the situation either through a meeting of the Security Council or through a meeting of the General Assembly, and above all in the light of the results of your mission to Europe. My delegation deplores the rather unfavourable results of your mission. But we know how much courage you showed in pushing your endeavours there. However, in order to make a deeper examination of the present situation in the Congo, and particularly in Katanga, we do not think it would be opportune at the present moment to call a meeting of the Security Council in order to obtain a new mandate, although the contents of this new mandate has to be indicated quite clearly in order to liquidate the Katanga secession in a radical way. A meeting of the Security Council perhaps would only exhort you, Mr. Mr. Secretary-General, to continue to apply the preceding resolutions adopted by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. Hence, in this light we are in general in favour of a Security Council meeting, but this does not seem to be a particular argument in favour of it if the results were less favourable, because as you said the last time, that would be a victory for Tshombe and for those who support him, namely, the Union Ilinlere and certain other elements. That we cannot accept. That is why we do not think we can recommend to you at the present time to call a meeting of the Security Council. W^ do, however, favour debate on the Congo, but we prefer this debate to take place in the General Assembly of the United Nations, perhaps at its seventeenth session. AP/yt U-5 (Mr. Traore, Mali)

We think that the preceding resolutions, particularly those of 21 February and of November, should be entirely applied; that would be adequate for you to continue your vork on the Congo. As to the sending of jurists to the Congo, this is a rather delicate question and bar, to be studied in more detail since this is a matter of changing the

Lei •forr>Lrentrlg of the Congo; that is a problem vhich is up to the Congolese themselves and up to the National Assembly of the Congo, RbH/vrs • '• 6 (tor. Traore, Mali)

This deserves a more careful study> and should be perhaps a bilateral step rather than a multilateral one, I have some concern as to whether United Nations participation is merited. You, Mr. Secretary-General, have indicated there was a further choice of jurists, mainly from Anglo-Saxon countries. You have suggested Canada, Nigeria and Switzerland/ but perhaps we should add a person v;ho has some understanding of Latin or Reman law, I do not put this forward as a suggestion, it is only an idea which I am putting forward.

Mr. QUAISOII-CAGKE Y (Ghana): There is no doubt, Mr. Secretary-General, that the information which you have just ^iven us regarding the proposals put to you by for, Adoula regarding the Constitution of the Congo has put a new complexion on the issue which we discussed last week. Then your main preoccupation was whether this Committee could advise you on the advisability of a meeting of the Security Council, at which you could be given either a new mandate or a clarification of your present mandate. At that time, we gave our preliminary views on the advifibility of a meeting of the Security Council being convened, and we made it very clear that so far as the Government of Ghana was concerned, a meeting of the Security Council would be useful in so far as you could give that Council a report and also a report on the steps which had been taken to implement the resolutions passed by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. We also made it clear that so far as we were 'concerned, there was no clarification that the Security Council could then give. I could riot then tell you'whether, if it came to the use of force, my Government would agree to our forces being used. I am now authorized to say that should you, within the context of your proposals, 'have to use force, then Ghana troops could be used for the purpose of bringing about the territorial ; integrity of the Congo and the maintenance of law and order, provided, of course, ; there was proper logistic support so that the incidents which occurred in Port Francqui, when about fifty Ghanaians were butchered, would not be repeated. ' It has always been the view of the Government of Ghana that i-ir. Tshcmbe would never acquiesce in any solution of the problem which subordinated Katanga in its legal provincial status to the central government, unless he was compelled to do so. Mr. Adoula's new constitutional proposals, therefore, must be weighed very carefully. We agre"e they are an earnest of his good faith and sincere willingness to achieve a solution, but Mr. Tshom.bels bad faith has been so clearly and repeatedly demonstrated that it would be unthinkable to defer further United Nations efforts to secure a solution simply because of this new development. RGH/vr's 7 (Mr. Quaison-SacKeyj Ghana)

I am afraid we are not in a position to comment in detail on the steps which you hove already taken. In fact, you have told us you have already considered appointing jurists from Nigeria, Canada and Switzerland, Ky delegation is of the view th.it you ore within ycur rights GO far as the provision of technical assistance is concerned, to help the Central Government in any way possible for i;he purpose of bringing about che achievement, of territorial integrity. But we feel that this matter should be approached very carefully. Technical assistance can be given in two ways. If we are going to provide the jurists, then I would assume that the United Nations would pay those jurists. Prom that point, of view, there' is nothing to which ray delegation could object. We fe^l that technical assistance in this context is all right. But the implication of the United Nations itself employing certain jurists to advise the Central Government on the construction cf the Constitution is what must be weighed very carefully. We feel that it would have been better if the Secretary-General had indicated to the central Government which countries could, be approached for such expertise Nigeria, definitely, Canada, as you mentioned, Switzerland, any other countries. The United Nations could then pay those jurists. That is to say, the initiative for appointing them would then rest with the central Government, I say this because if the Constitution was drawn up with United Nations help, with United Nations appointed jurists helping in this effort; and Parliament turned it down or Tshcmbe showed bad faith, the United Nations would be discredited, and we would be in a very bad position. Matters would be complicated further. Therefore, if you have not already taken steps, my delegation would prefer that you did not appoint those experts, but definitely advise the Prime Minister of the Congo to approach the countries you have in mind to supply the experts concerned. The United Nations, by means of the Technical Assistance Programme, would pay for it. This would obviate the great difficulty which would be bound to come one day if the bad faith which has been shown again and again by Tshcrobe was once more shown. Lastly, my delegation would fully support the steps you outlined to us last week with regard to the economic pressures which could be brought to bear upon the Union Miniere, namely, the possibility of having the funds now paid to Tshcmbe frozen in Brussels and that imports should be routed through Iviatadi instead of through Angola arid the Rhodesias, and, thirdly, that the United Nations would give guarantees of protection to the installations which are now in Katanga, RSH/vrs -....-. - B-1C (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana)

'These are the views which I would put forward in a preliminary way, but we G-till insist that the Secretariat should be very careful not to involve the United Nation's in this constitutional issue which has always bedeviled the situation in the Congo*

Mrs. ROSCIiL- (Sweden): On behalf of the Swedish. Government, I would like to express our sincere appreciation Tor the patient work which you, I.rr Secretary- General, Mr. Gardiner, and the other members of your staff have done in endeavouring to settle tha political and economic questions of the Congo through negotiation. It is, of course, to be regretted very much that the talks between Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshorabe were broken off when sane results seemed to be under way. . The information just given by you about the plan which foresees United Nations assistance in the drafting of a new constitution for the Congo nay give'uo reason to look upon the situation a little more hopefully than last week. My Government and the Swedish people, as you well know, take a very great interest in the-Congo problem and they are anxious to see it solved as soon as possible, but solved in a constructive and peaceful way, that is, along the lines on which you and your staff have worked during the past months. AE/rh 11

(Mrs. Ross^l, Sweden)

At the last meeting of this Committee, you raised some important questions regarding our opinion as to various actions which you outlined as possible means of putting pressure on the Tshombe regime in order to bring about the solution of the Congo problem. Since then I have had time to communicate with my Government and I am now in a position -to convey my Government's point of view concerning the Unit?d nations aims in the Congo, as laid down in the various resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. They have already been presented to you, Mr. Secretary-General, but with your permission, I should like to repeat them and thus put them on record in this Committee, The principal aim of the United Nations operation in the Congo has been, and continues to be, to contribute, in co-operation with the Congolese authorities, to the maintenance of law and order and to the establishment of such political and economic conditions as must prevail if the Congolese people themselves are to solve their constitutional, administrative and economic problems. One principle which applies to all United Nations activities in the Congo is that the World Organization must not become a party to internal conflicts and that it cannot be the task of the Organization to impose upon the Congolese people specific solutions of their problems with regard to such things as the nature of their governmental system or the relationship between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments, within the framework of the unity of the Congo, Military forces must not be used for such tasks. Instead, they should rather perform the duties of a police force and, beyond that, serve the purpose by their presence of inducing the different groups in the Congo to- reach agreement "by means of negotiations. The Swedish Government holds this basic view of the aims of the United Nations in the Congo and has given practical expression to its positive attitude by complying with the various requests which were made for Swedish personnel to be engaged in the service of the United Nations and for materiel of different kinds to be put at the disposal of the United Nations in the Congo. The Swedish Government wishes to stress that the continued observance of the principles indicated above is the basis for Sweden's participation in the United Nations operation in the Congo. AE/rh 12 - . • ,- (Mrs. RBsselj Sweden) With regard to the question as to vhether the Security Council should "be convened to discucs the Congo situation at this stage, I should lilie to emphasize that icy Government has strong reservations about the advisability of calling such a neeting. It is our feeling that a meeting of the Security Council could easily result in an increased tendency to seek military solutions which would alter the "basis for the United Nations action in the Congo and deprive ONUC of •its impartial position. In our judgement, the most acute questions now are the financing of 'ONUC, the weighing of civilian against military measures and the economic, rather than the political, integration' of the Congo. I should like to stress again that the Swedish Government fully supports the peaceful procedure which you, Mr, Secretary-General, have followed in your endeavour to "bring about a solution. It is my Government's sincere hope that your •work and that of your collaborators in solving the complex Congo problem will meet with success in the near future. -

• Mr. GEBRY-EQ^Y (Ethiopia): Because I have not yet received instructions from my Government, I have no detailed statement to make at this time* I am, however, in touch with them and as soon as I can, I shall attempt to answer every question which was put to us at the last session* If possible^ I shall do so in this Committee; otherwise, I shall come to your office, Mr. Secretary-General. and present my views to you there.

Mr. ASIODU (Nigeria): I shall address myself first of all to the immediate issues which were put before us at our last meeting and to the questions on which you, Mr. Secretary-General, asked our opinions. On the question of calling a Security Council session, I am instructed to say that we do not consider it opportune. If a meeting of the Security Council is called in order to obtain clearer instructions than we presently have, it might easily result in acrimonious and inconclusive debate, as was suggested by other delegations here, which would in no way help in resolving the situation in the Congo, Furthermore, we believe that the existing mandate' is adequate. On the other hand, if the purpose of calling a session of the Security Council is to acquaint the members of the Council with what has transpired so far, we feel that the latest developments in the Congo provide a sufficient reason for the issuance of the usual type of report to those members. All of us are well aware that once AE/rh 15-15 (Mr* Asiudu, Nigeria) a meeting; of the Council is called, it will not be very easy to limit tfre or to compel members to listen to a factual report on what has happened thus far in the Congo. The second isnue which was raised concerned the measures which the Secretary- General described for putting economic pressure on Mr* Tshombe and his Government in order to convince them to work towards the reintogration of Katanga into the Congo. The Nigerian Government is fully in favour of the measures which were outlined. We are also aware that such action would involve the protection of the installations of the Union Miniere from reprisals and acts of cabotage "by those who might not welcome any change in their present policies. However, we hope that if international opinion continues to evolve positively in the direction of pressure on Mr. Tshombc, it will not be necessary to undertake any military offensive or in any way to involve the United Nations in any provocative military gestures in order to ensure the security of .those installations. We feel that the avoidance of such provocative behaviour is very important not only because of the realities of the situation and the troops which are at our disposal in Katanga but also because it is traditional for this Organization to resist any temptation to "become exasperated with Mr, Tshombe's behaviour and to assume provocative military postures on the part of ONUC troops* The Nigerian Government has always supported the efforts of ONUC fully and will continue to do so. Thus, if we continue in the direction in which we have been working, namely, seeking support among those of us who are already convinced of the justice of our action thus far and who have provided initiative in obtaining good resolutions for the Congo, and also gain the support of those who can exercise decisive influence, we believe that a more satisfactory solution will be achieved. We should not like to have the United Nations justly accused of any military initiative in the matter. CORRIGENDUM United Nations Advisory Committee on the Congo

Verbatim Record of meeting No. 69, held on Tuesday, :| 31 July 1962, at 3 p.m.

Mr. AsiocLu; Nigeria Pa^e 16 Delete first paragraph and substitute: "it is very important to end the secession of Katanga, not only because the diversion of revenues uhich lecitimately belong to the Central Government to the coi'fers of the Central Government would help to reduce the deficit,, but because we also realize that, to some extent, the crippling expenditures of the Central Government in maintaining such large security forces may be expected to fall or be reduced if the Katanga situation is resolved."

Page l6, third paragraph, second lino For "It is now fairly clear ..." read "it IB now fairly current ..." Page 17, third paragraph Delete third sentence and substitute: "Vie think that new military measures ore not called for and would be highly undesirable."

62-17086 MP/rf 16 . • '. ' -- (Mr. Asiodu, Nigeria) It is very important to end the secession of Katanga, no-b only because of the diversion of revenues, vhich legitimately "belonged to the Central Government, or because the coffers of the Central Government would have to reduce the deficit,• "but because we also realize, to some extent, the crippling expenditures of the Central Government in maintaining such large security forces may "be expected to fall, to "be reduced, if the Katanga situation is resolved. Tills is another reason Why we think.that, despite the elements vhich might appear now in the situation,, you should.-continue with your efforts, to see that Mr. Tchcrube and his supporters really see the need to. co-operate in the spirit of the resolutions we have adopted, so as to ensure the territorial integrity of the Congo. Now, however, there is a larger issue to vhich I would like to refer, having given the answers to the immediate questions. It is not; fairly clear that the problem of the Congo is really only the question of Katanga. The Nigerian Government considers that there are other aspects to vhich we -..must begin to '•'•'• address ourselves with equal attention. In fact, it is pleasing to read of the new proposals, by the Central Government, ond the apparent willingness of Mr. Tshombe to accept these proposals in principle; because the mandate, of the United nations in the,Congo naturally talks about ensuring the territorial integrity of that Republic, in addition to talking about ensuring,that assistance be given in sufficient degree to the Central Government, so that as soon as possible they can take over the proper government of their own affairs. This involves training of troops, training of personnel, and so .forth* We do not think that sufficient emphasis or resources are being devoted to this important aspect, because, if we must be frank, we have heard it said so often • that even with the maximum we expect from the sale of United Nations bonds, perhaps the United Nations operations in the Congo on the present scale.cannot last beyond December 1962. But it is imperative that,when the United Nations withdraws, it does not leave behind a situation of chaos and confusion. It is because of this that we think more should be done to ensure that sufficient Congolese will be left after the United Nations has withdrawn, so that they can carry out the government of their territory in keeping with the mandate. This is the full intention of the United Nations presence in the Congo; and we think it is not too soon to emphasize this aspect. MP/rf 17 (Mr. -Asiodu, Nigeria) I listened with great interest to the answer which Mr. Gardiner gave at the last meeting to the question put by the representative of India, Certainly, the picture ve got there of the ANC was not reassuring; and this is just one illustration of what I have been talking about. We believe also that, although this is perhaps looking ahead, since ve have not unlimited resources, and since the contributions of many Governments represent quite a burden on those Governments, the United Nations should begin to think about working out a practicable time-table for its withdrawal from the Congo. This involves speeding up these measures we have been talking about to train tne Congolese to look after their own affairs; because essentially we are there to assist them precisely to do this. Finally, I think I muot repeat what I had said about the immediate questions which were put to us. We think you must pursue energetically the economic measures which have been proposed. We think that now military initiatives are called for and would be highly desirable. But of course we acknowledge the right of self-defence, and everything must be done to protect the Union Miniere installations against reprisals if, in fact, that company and its supporters are willing to co-operate with you in order to end the cessation of Katanga* Lastly, we think the Security Council need not be called, because the results would be far from useful and might possibly be harmful. If it is to acquaint the members with the factual report, the normal reports which were circulated to them should suffice for the moment.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; Before I give the floor to the representative of India, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleague, Ambassador Chakravarty, who has been appointed to this post as Permanent Ambassador to the United Nations. I am sure all my colleagues here will share these sentiments; and we all wish Ambassador Chakra-varty success and happiness. MP/rf 18-20

Mr. CIIAKRAVARTY (India): I must first thank you for the kind vords you have said in welcoming me to this meeting today. It is indeed, I consider, fi great privilege to be a member of tills Committee, Coming now to the subject for our discussion, we have before uo .something , vhich ho.£5 been circulated by the Republic of the Congo, Which Contains Q Copy of the lettor which has been received by you from the Congolese Foreign Minister, from vhich ye learn that they have already drafted a tentative proposal for the Constitution that could serve as a basis for diocussiont It is not very Clear from this first hand-out whether, i;hen the Foreign Minister said that we have already drafted a tentative proposal, that that proposal has been mads in consultation with Mr. Tshonjbe, If the chances of such a Constitution being accepted by Mr. Tshcrnbe are reasonable, I presume that you then will not think it necessary to take this case back to the Security Council for a debate. There is also not much point in taking the case to the Security Council unless we can . think of some acceptable proposal which could be put before that body. In view of this new development, I venture to suggest that the situation that was discussed at Tuesday's meeting has changed, let uo hope, very much for .the better. In that event, we do not think that a further mandate or a reference to the Security Council is called for immediately. If and when you find that these tentative proposals have no chance of being accepted by both jparties -- and I em using the word "parties" in the loose sense -- then only can.,the .question be further considered. It is only then that we need go into the specific questions that were put by you at the last occasion, . I need only say that, in so. far as the Government of.India is concerned, there should be no difficulty in the United Nations utilizing our contingent for • the purposes laid down in the Security Council resolutions. . - IIG/rs 21

Mr* DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): During the last meeting of the Advisory Committee I had en opportunity to indicate the feelings of the Guinean delegation after your statement and the statement of your Special Representative in the Congo. I once again express to you now, I'jc. Secretary-General, the confidence which my Government has in your ability to find a happy and successful conclusion to the Congolese crisis. I speak again today to indicate the Guinean point of view on the precise question which you raised here in this Committee. As to the meeting of the Security Council, we said the last time and confirmed today that we have no objection in principle to a meeting, nevertheless, we feel that the mandate of the Secretary-General is quite edecuate, whether it is derived from a Security Council resolution or a resolution of the Genei-al Assembly. However, J-ir. Secretary-General, we base ourselves on your own statement, namely, that the great Powers did not agree on the programme which you submitted to them. As far as its effectiveness is concerned, it seems rather inopportune to have a meeting of the Security Council now since if the results are negative it would make the situation worse. Although we do feel that there are some doubts as to the effectiveness of a Security Council meeting, we feel, on the other hand, that this question, whatever the issue may be, should be placed on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. .And on precisely this point I should like to know if the Secretariat could provide for the inscription of this item. If the Secretariat cannot do so, I am sure that the African and Asian delegations, and certainly mine, are willing and ready to ensure that this item be included on the agenda of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, the item called "The situation in the Congo"« We do hope, however, that before this session opens the question will be solved arid it will simply be a matter then of summarizing or indicating that a happy solution to the Congolese crisis has been found. However, if this is not the case, and if the Powers which from the beginning agreed to create chaos in the Congo continue their policies, it will be up to us and every delegation here to assume its responsibilities and denounce the manoeuvres which have been taking place in the Congo in opposition to all the interests of the African countries. HG/rs . 22

, (Mr. Diallo, Guinea)

I now turn to the next question which you raised, Mr» Secretary-General, the various ways of exercising economic pressure against Katanga, vhich is the heart of the Congo crisis. The Government of Guinea entirely approves your proposals, although we feel that there are forms of pressure vhich are more effective, Honce, we completely support your proposals in the economic realm, but ire think that you also have at your-disposal — and no mandate is needed for this either on the part of the Security -Council or the General Assembly -- the possibility of .exercising military pressure. I shall explain this. We have numerous military forces in the Congo at the present time. Everyone recognizes that all of the Congo is quiet except for Katanga. Why are troops maintained in the other provinces of the Congo? You mentioned financial difficulties. It is certain that i;e could reduce contingents as presently placed in the Congo and integrate all of the forces, including the general staff, in Katanga• There is no reason why the Commander- in-chief of the troops should be in Leopoldville, There is no reason why the troops should not move to Elisabethville, thus leaving it up to the Central Government .of the Congo to maintain order and security in the rest of the1--1 country. . . -..'•• - - • • ; This offers a possibility of exercising pressure without using force. All of the troops at the disposal of the United Nations should be concentrated in Katanga, with your Special Representative sitting in Elisabethville. We ' think this would be the most important pressure of all. It vould reduce the financial effort and also the effort which the United Nations is exercising in the'form of personnel, and it would yield most satisfactory results.

Mr.'Secretary-General, you ;mentioned the problem of the appointment of jurists to give technical assistance to the Central Government of the Congo in the drafting of a new constitution. - Here our position is very clear. We believe that the drafting of a constitution is so intimately linked with the sovereignty of the people of a country it is a field in which technical assistance has to be as discreet as possible, almost to the extent, we would say, HG/rs 25-25

(Mr. Piallo, Guinea) of being entirely excluded. However, the situation being what it ±s, we do support the Central Government of the Congo if it feels that in a field as delicate as this it is necessary to appeal Tor technical assistance. If that is the case, we would Bay that the Secretariat of the United Nations should exj^cise maximum discretion and should ensure that the decisions are not United Nations decisions and riot decisions of the Secretary-General, t»Ut decisions of the Government of the Congo itself. For this reason, I support the thosis advocated by my friend from Ghana a moment ago. i think that the beet thing the Secretary-General could do would be to snb'Jiit a list of possible candidates to the Central Government of the Congo, leaving it up to the latter to choone both the country anft the man. These are the few points which I wanted to mention in the name of the Government of the Republic cf Guinea,

Mr. CAKDOSO (Congo, Leopoldville) (interpretation from French): I listened with great attention to the statements which were made by my colleagues. It permitted me to acquire a better understanding of the atmosphere here. In the first place, I must state that there is a new element which has emerged in the past few days, and that is the proposal concerning a federal constitution* The situation naturally changes; it has been changing for two years. But there are constant elements involved. Paradoxically, and unfortunately, the most constant element in 'the situation is the instability of Tshombe. We have come to a point where the Central Government proposes and yet Tshombe disposes. He has the time and the money, and he is in a position to keep his word or not to keep it. in any case, he seems to have achieved impunity. Without a desire to form an indivisible nation, all constitutions will remain without effect. The desire to have an indivisible nation will not be found in Tchombe. The mediation of legal experts and functionaries of the United Nations, such as Mr. Gardiner, will also suffer a defeat. This is quite probable* because we have had our hopes shattered too often. AC/pm 26 (Mr« Cardoso, Conp;o (Leoppldville^ ) The Congo crisis can be considered a constitutional crisis, and I think that the proposal of the Government is an effort in the clirection of crecdvinc a constitution which will "be acceptable to the Parliament, But we must say that this crisis is also a crisis of authority. Among the 137 deputies and 84 senators, the representatives of Tshoribo could vote against the "beet constitution in the world, and. the situation would remain the same. That ±5 why^ Mr, Secretary-General and fellow members, I "bring to your attention the statement -which jny Government instructed mo to,make at this mooting,, This statement consists of six points. I V7j.ll read them to you» In the first place, I think that in previous meetings there were proposals which tended towards mediation on the part of African chiefs of state. My Government fcals that this attempt at mediation does not yield any new elements for a solution. Mediation has "been conducted very conscientiously for more than a year "by officials of the United Nations and by Mr. .Gardiner personally as the champion of the Congolese Constitution. A new mediation effort would only postpone a solution. Mediation is impossible when Tshcmbe does not abandon the idea of independence for the Katanga Province, Mediation on the part of the United Nations has been conducted, on all fronts, we must stress, with economic and financial experts, and others. All questions have been discussed. Tshombe is merely trying to gain time to maintain the state of secession. There is no sincere desire in Elisabethville to establish the unity of the Congo. The Advisory Committee must take into consideration that the idea of mediation is supported only by persons who have for two years been maintaining and supporting secession. It has also been advanced by conservative Belgian and English newspapers'that support- foreign influences in Katanga. British circles insist on mediation in order to gain time and to exhaust the United Nations in the.Congo. Ahe Government of the Congo cannot make concessions in regard to the territorial integrity of the Congo. The Government of the Congo knows about • the influence of foreign Powers which is at the root of the trouble and continues to sabotage Congolese unity. Therefore the positions are irreconcilable and mediation between the Central Government and Tshombe cannot bring any results. The maintenance of the suspension of the•fundamental law is not a question-of a central government or Of provincial governments. The population and the Parliament must be heard in this situation. The Central Government supports the : Parliament in the elaboration of a new constitution of a federal type. For such a AC/pm 27 (Mr* Cardoso^ Conpo (Leopoldville)) constitution only Parliament has the necessary competence., Tho Government of the Congo does not "believe in the effectiveness of mere economic measures, and calls for the full application of the resolutions of the Security Council in regard to the Congo, Only the complete and faithful implementation of the resolub'.lons will "be a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the country. This is the statement, Mr, Secretary-General and my fellow members, which I vas authorized to make at this meeting by the Central Government of the Congo. I hope that this statement will he taken sufficiently into account "by you to give direction to the discussion in order to achieve positive results -which will not postpone the solution of the crisis.

Mr, IXAD (United Arab Republic): I should like to join my colleagues in thanking you, Mr. Secretary-General, for theinformation that you have presented to the Committee after your return from Europe. I was hoping that the Secretary-General would be informed during his visit to certain Western Powers that these Powers would implement the United Nations resolutions. But we have "been informed by the Secretary-General that tha Belgian Government did not officially answer the economic proposals of the Secretary-General, while others refused these mild and modest proposals. I say "mild and modest proposals11 because I have certain doubts that such proposals will lead to a final settlement in the Congo. But at any rate it is a forward step in the right direction, and my delegation fully supports the^e economic proposals, We are now facing the fact that certain Western Powers, some of them permanent members of the Security. Council, are refusing to implement the resolutions of the United Nations, For this reason I believe that any attempt to strengthen the Secretary-General1s mandate will fail in the Security Council at this time. But we still have some hope that the Belgian Government and other Western Powers will reconsider their position, arid that is why my delegation is not encouraging a Security Council meeting at this stage. . At the moment we feel that if all other efforts are exhausted without producing any results, then we must go to the Security Council and maybe to the General AsccmKLy as veil if ve find that this is suitable. AC/pm 28-30 (Mr. Riad, United Arab Republic)

Tills question of sending legal advisers is a very delicate question. I hope that these legal advisers will not be described as United Nations representatives. The reason is that United Nations resolutions are clear enough in requesting the full unification-of the Congo and respect for the Loi fon-Iamontale, and any new constitution means major changes to the Lot fonJamentale. Since the United Nations representatives are supposed to seek only the implementation of United Nations resolutions, they should not conanit the United Nations to such action as is highly political and not merely legal. 0+-1 r-ourscj we have no doubt that the Central Government of' the Congo has a perfect right to make any change in its system of government or in the fundamental law. Therefore, I hope that these legal advisors who may go to the Congo will not "be described, as United Nation? representatives. TL/ids 31

Mr. MFSTIRI (Tunisia) (interpretation frcm French): The Tunisian delegation was very grateful to you, h'r. Secretary-General, Tor the •vein-Vole information which you were good enough to ccrnrnuri.icate t; us, £••;. the la&t meeting of the Advisory Committee, on the evolution of the crisis in the Congo. We are equally grateful to Mr. Gardiner for the clarifications which he furnished additionally. It is not wy intention today to rev5.ew all the matters which you mentioned at that meeting; I wish rather to concentrate my remarKs o;a certain points which I wish to clarify, First of all I want to say that the Tunisian Government feels that the mandate provided in the various Security Council resolutions is already adequate to enable CNUC to function effectively in the solution of the problem of the unity of the Congo. To be sure, thin mandate is in come respects vague and, as you yourself have already emphasized, even self-contradictory but it is nonetheless true that the margin it allows for manoeuvring should be adequate, A resolution of the Security Council under the present conditions would, in the opinion of my Government, probably add nothing to this mandate; it could, on the contrary, give to certain countries whose interest io clearly to limit ONUC'G scope of action, the opportunity to interpret this mandate in a restrictive manner which could only make the task of the Secretary-General more difficult. Furthermore, a meeting of the Security Council which did not result in-en extension or expansion of the already-ex! r/kiiig mandate would bo a disappointment not only to public opinion in the Congo but also to African public opinion in general, and in any case would serve to encourage Mr. Tohcmbe in his activities. For these reasons we are not at the present moment particularly in favour of a meeting of the Security Council the outccme of which is difficult to foretell. Only if you have the assurances from the Security Council members, and particularly from the permanent members, that such a meeting of the Security Council would result in a strengthening of the mandate recently given you —. only then would we advocate such a meeting. While we are discussing the matter of the United Nations mandate, there can be no doubt that the task laid down by the Security Council for OHUC can be pursued under that mandate at least in one aspect, the matter of the mercenaries, especially if we bear in mind the fact that these mercenaries serve to endanger any final solution of the problem of Congolese unity. The fact that TL/ids ' 32 • ' "' Wl S

(Mr, Mestiri, Tunisia)

these mercenaries are more or less integrated into the civilian European " population should not, in any case, prevent tha United nations frcm undertaking action against them, "because it would be very difficult to continue to allow hundreds of mercenaries to remain while at the same time wishing to solve the problem re-ju."1 tin^ ?ro:^ tlva existence of a. particularly powerful Katangose gSLiarrc^rio. Mr. Gardiner has, in foct, told us that the Katangesc have not sto-r^a strengthening their gr.ndar:i3iie, and that OI:UG is continuing to work on this difficult task. It is certain that the mercenaries ploy an important part in this veritable army which is at the service of the Government of Katanga in imposing a solution in accord with the secessionist aims of Mr. Tshcmbe. With regard to the use of United Nations troops in situations which could ultimately lead to combat, it is very difficult to believe that the Governments which have supplied contingents would refuse to allow these contingents to be used within the terms of the United Nations mandate. I do not believe that the countries which were willing to send military contingents to the Congo did so on the condition that these contingents should not be utilized in carrying out the United Nations mandate. As to the matter of economic pressures to be applied on Mr. Tshcmbe, my delegation shares the regret of the Secretary-General over the lack of co-operation on the part of certain Governments in applying cuch pressures. Still we do have some doubt as to whether any effective economic pressure could be exerted if the Governments of the territories surrounding Katanga, are not working with us — and it is very difficult to imagine the Governments of Rhcdeaia, South Africa and Portugal, all neighbours and friends of Mr. Tehombe, not giving him all the assistance they can in order to save him, thereby proving that Katanga can make a go of it even in spite of an international blockade which, in the final analysis, can be but a partial blockade. Finally, as to the latest developments involving modification of the Constitution of the Congo, let us hope that we are not once more going to see more of the dilatory tactics of Mr. Tchcmbe, and that this is not simply another effort on his part to gain valuable time. TL/ids 33 ' 1:i"'*""

(Mr. Mestiri, Tuninia)

To summarize, it is our opinion, first, that it would not Toe vise to call a meeting of the Security Council unless assurances hr-v^ been given that such a meeting vill hn.ve a favourable outcome; second, that all the troops sent to the Congo were sent within the framework of the resolution of the Security Council, and that therefore there is no occasion for saying whether or not these trcops should be used to cav?:;/ out t.-nat nacidate; third, that the fir$ht to get the mercenaries out should he continuecl; and ifist; that everything liiust be done in order to k^ep from falling once again into the trap of Mr. Tshoribe's delaying tactics. •PL/ids 3^-35

Mr. BARNES (Liberia)*. At our meeting on 2k July a very grim picture of the situation in the Congo was painted for us here. Talks "between Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshcmbe had broken off. Uo progress towards reconciliation was seen. The Katangese authorities and people, as a result of the incident of 17 July, were shoving continued hostility to the United Nations. The Secretary-G-J'ier.'vL'G :V.yct,iations with certain Governments to secure economic Pi'-issurcn nn Katajagt:, h3/( not achieved the desired result« For all these reason3 the Secretary-Genera.! had sought the advice of this Committee on the desirability of going to the 3ecux"ity Council to secure a new mandate or to get clarification on the mandates alro.ady issued by the Security Council in regard to the Congo. At that meeting I endeavoured to make clear the position of my' Government with respect to a meeting of the Security Council. 'I pointed out that in our view it was not desirable to go to tha Security Council to get a new mandate or clarification of the already-existing mandates, for such a debate'would merely be productive of prolixity without any positive action' and the end-result would be harmful rather than advantageous* We also held the view that if the purpose • of the Secretary-General's going to the Security Council was to report on the • situation then prevailing, we caw no objection to that. Our position in that respect remains unchanged...... How, it cannot be denied that a new complexion has been placed upon the Congo situation as a result of recent developments. You, Mr. Secretary-General • have reported to us today that the Congolese Government has requested your assistance, with regard to a now constitution, by recommending experts to elaborate ouch a constitution* I fully endorse your position In seeking to secure these experts from Nigeria; Switzerland and Canada and I say that, because cince - 1960 the operations in the Congo, both military and technical, have been under the auspices of the United Nations, and while I have no objections to the • Congolese Government itself securing technical assistance, yet if an appeal or requo-t is made to you by the Congolese Government for this purpose, I see no roason why you ought not to acquiesce in it. AW/cn 36 (Mr. "Harnes , Liber:' a )

Now whatever constitution may be elaborated by experts or jurists vill only "be the constitution of the Congo after it h~s been ratified by the Parliament; and the ratification "by the Parliament will provide an opportunity for the people of the Congo to say whether that constitution is to their best interests. So that if the constitution is elaborated by experts appointed "by you, Mr. Secretary-General, or by the Congolese Government, it uiakos no difference. I ther2fore endorse your position and I s-:-o no reason vhy you should not proceed in seeking to secure these experts in the areas you desire. At the meeting on the 2?J-th, I think I also said that you had laid your finger on one of the root causes of the situation in the Congo, namely the economic situation, and that you should pursue these efforts in your consultations and negotiations with governments to bring these economic pressures on Katanga* At that time you said, Mr. Secretary-General, if I am correct, that you had not received any reaction from Belgium as to your approach in this matter. I am not aware what the precise situation is with regard to Belgium's reaction. I would be thankful if you could inform me whether the Belgian Government has made any response to your request in this connection..

The Acting SECPETARY-GEBsRAL: Before calling on the Ambassador from Canada, I wish to extend a very warm welcome to our new colleague, Mr. Tremblay, who is with us today for the first time. I am sure all the members of the Committee share my sentiments in wishing him success.

Mr. TREMBLAY (Canada): Mr. Secretary-General, it is a very great honour indeed for me to join this group and participate in its work. My very first remarks in this Committee are directed at expressing ray Government's support and appreciation for your current efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the Congo problem. We recognize, as you do, the very serious financial situation faced by the United Nations in the Congo and we believe that TshombeTs delaying tactics should not be allowed to continue. With regard to the first point that you raised at the last meeting, Mr. Secretary-General -- that is, whether a nevj mandate or a clarification of the present mandate be sought from the Security Council --in our opinion such a move might become unavoidable at some stage. But we believe that it would be AW/sd 37 (Mr. Tremblay, Canada)

premature to move in that direction before all possibilities of a negotiated settlement have been exhausted. No ono con argue, I think, even on the basis of current press reports, that all possibilities of such a Gettlenent have in fact been explored* As we ses it, the danger of a premature reference to the Security Council is 7ntv« it i.-.'•-j^t roll result in a stalemate that would.weiken the present Urited Nations r>ini:vte ori the Congo, thus defeating the very purpose we have in. min^., or -jbat a public G.ebace in the Security Council et this tims is v?ry likely to result in weakening public support for the United Nations Congo operation. You. also raised at our last neeting the possibility of seeking a stronger mandate that might involve the use of force by the United Nations. On this point I wish only to say that such a course of action would.place the United 'Nations in a most undesirable position. I submit that whatever the outcome of a United. Nations military operation in the Congo might be, it would not serve the best interests of the United Nations. No one can be certain of the outcome of the military operation. If it fails, it would constitute a blow of the first magnitude to the prestige of our Organization. If it succeeds, we should ask ourselves whether it is iu the long- term interests of the Central Government that it be known that its authority over Katanga has been established thanks to an external force and imposed from the outside instead of stemming from the general consent of the Congolese people. If it half fails or if it half succeeds, it appears evident to us that the involvement of United Nations troops in hostilities would seriously damage the public image of the United Nations as a psace organization. Our conclusion therefore is that your current efforts to effect a negotiated settlement of the Congo problem should be encouraged and supported.

Mr. 0'SULLTVAN (Ireland): I would first of all like to express to you, Mr. Secretary-Crenei-al, my Government's thanks for your efforts in solving the very serious problem with which we are confronted in the Congo, which is becoming more and more urger..t_, and I would like to assure you of the full support of our Government in reaching a settlement of this problem. I think that in facing up to this question of the Congo and Katanga, onft should have in mind at all times AW/cn 38-ifO (Mr. Q'Rvil3.Ivan, Ireland) the principles of the United Nations operation in the Congo. In this connexion I feel that I can do no better than endorse fully what has been so well said at this meeting today by the gracious representative of Sweden, vhich corresponds exactly with our own view of this matter. As regards the holding of a Security Council meeting, my Government would not favour the ho]ding of such a meeting unless a clear concensus had previously "been reached between the major Powers. Vie reel that, any Security Council discussion vhich revealed great-Power dissensions or failed to define the future course of the ONUC operation more clearly than the past resolutions, could only encourage Tshorabe and confirm him in his recalcitrance. My Government also believes that all possible means of exerting pressure on Tshornbe should be patiently explored before any course is adopted which might result in active hostilities. Therefore, we hope, Mr. Secretary-General — and indeed we confidently hope -- that you will continue with the negotiations which are at present being conducted with certain Powers in this connexion. We welcome the developments of the past few doys and we also welcome and thank you for the action which you have already taken to encourage and promote these developments. The danger which we all see in this Committee in, as it were, adopting a course which might possibly be less firm than some of the measures vhich have been previously discussed, is that Mr. Tshombe, with his well-known penchant for tergiversation, might profit by the delay which constitutional discussions or negotiations would give him. DR/rl Ifi

(Mr. Of Sullivan, Ireland)

In fact, at the last meeting of this Committee Mr. Gardiner stated, I Relieve, that Tshcinbe had been led to believe that if he could hold out long encu~h, the United rations would eventually reach a state of complete "bankruptcy. My Goverraent fe^ls that it i?i rather important that Tshonbe should be disabused of any such illusion. For this, rca-jon^ vo would surest to you, sir.,, and to the other nurbers of this Corociit^^e t/h^t the -Members of the united nations should be pivparsd to consider special fin.?.neif,l nsasures to encore the continuance of the Cr/JC cparatioxip whatever ths tjacrj.fic.es involved. This is the idea I should like to leave with. ou.

-'ie Acting vSE^EEMY^G-EraRAL: As there a::e no further should like to wind up the proceedings in c, few words. It seems to me that there is a consensus of opinion in this Cosroittoe that at the present moment there should bo no. Security Council meeting. I will take particular note of this. Seme members of th'3 Committee have expressed the view that the item on the Congo should be inscribed in the agenda of the seventeenth -session of the General Assembly. The provisional agenda of the seventeenth session is already out now, so if an additional item is considered to be necessary for inscription;, I would request that a Keroher State of the United Nations should take the initiative. Regarding the query posed by the representative of Liberia on the reply from Belgium, so- £a:v up. to this moment, I have not received any official reply from . the Belgian Government. But I have been informed that very -clone consultations , have becrn going on between the Belgian Government and a few other Governments directly involved in the problem of the Congo in- the last three or four days, and I understand -that discussions are still going on. I. expect to hear further on this subject in the course of the next day or two. Regarding the question of constitutional experts, a Parliamentary Committee of the Congo hlis been working on a draft constitution for seme time, actually as a result of the Kitona declaration. This Parliamentary Committee of the Congo DR/rl 1*2 (The Acting Secretary-General) comprises, to my knowledge, many shades of political opinion in the Congo^ including a representative from the Conaiat Fa::ty of Mr. Tshombe. The Prime Minister's office, I understand, has also prepared a draft constitution and the Prime Minister new wants tho assistance of constitutional experts to put fininhiD'-r touches to it. Therefore, ho has requested me to make available to him three or four constitutional experts with experience in the working of federal, constitutions. That is the position. I want to make it clear that the response to the request of the Prime Minister does not mean that the United Nations is directly involved in the framing of the constitution. What the United .Nations will "be involved in is the rendering of assistance by way of advice and suggestions and recominond.itions to the Central Government of the Congo in finalising the draft constitution which has been draim up by the Congolese themselves. So, of course, the participation of these constitutional experts will not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary-General nor the views of the United Nations. Like all other technical advice in the field cf education^ finance or agriculture -- and, in passing, I should like to say that we have technical experts in the Congo in other fields — the advice to be offered by these experts to the Government of course, does not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary-General. So with this understanding of course^ I have decifisci to respond to the appeal of Prime Minister Adoula and^ as I have indicated earlier, I have sounded out the views of the Central Government regarding the nationality of the experts I have in mind. If he has any other proposals or any counter- proposals, I will be very glad to pay heed to them. Let me'repeat once again that the provision of these constitutional experts in examining the draft constitution of the Congo will not reflect the views of the Secretary-General nor of the United Nations. Thus, regarding the Security Council, it is now clear that not a single member of the Advisory Committee is in favour of its convening. So I wish to inform you that it is my intention to submit a written report to the Security Council about the middle of August. The report in itself will not require a meeting of the Security Council, and on the basis of the suggestions just offered I am not inclined to press for one at this time. DR/yt ^3-^5 (The Acting Secretary-General)

In the course of the discussions this afternoon, opir.iono have "been caressed that the United nations operations in the Congo should go on § uninterrupted despite the new development of last weekend regarding the examination of the draft constitution of the Congo. I a,jree entirely with this view. Actually cur activities in the Congo have T)een going on uninterrupted, and in strict conformity with the mandate given to ne by the previous

Security Council and General Assembly resolutions? I have been going ahead with the measures which I consider to "be legitimate. Only today I have appealed to all the Ksmber States of the United Nations to co-operats with me in giving effect to certain important aspects of the previous Security Council resolutions. AP/vrs h6 (The /.ctinp; Secretory-General)

My appeal, I.understand, is on the way out to the Permanent Missions in New York and, as has been the practice in the past, ve do not release such ccrimunicntions to tho Press before these communications actually reach the hands of the addressees. Perhaps, my appeal will be in the hands of the Permanent Missions either this afternoon _, this evening or tomorrow uorning. It is my intention to release this appeal publicly tomorrow morning, For the information of the members of the Committee I shall take the liberty of reading out this appeal: The situation in the Congo has been, and is now perhaps more than ever, a very serious problem for the United Nations. It is true, of course, that much constructive work has been done in the Congo since the disastrous state in which that country found itself in July 1960. Nevertheless, after more than two years of intensive effort to assist the Government of the Congo, the stability and territorial integrity of the country remain fc.r from established, and the purposes of the United Nations in it, therefore, far from realized. This situation is particularly crucial in view of the lives, effort and money already expended and currently being expended by the United Nations and the financial crisis into which this unprecedented drain on its resources has brought the Organization. Although there are many contributory causes to this state of affairs, there can be no doubt that the main cause is the continuing attempt at secession by the province of Katanga. Until a satisfactory and constructive solution to this issue is found, it will be very difficult for the Congolese Government to face successfully its responsibilities and problems, or for the United Nations to assist it very effectively. I assure you chat no one can be more desirous than I am to see this solution brought about by peaceful means through processes of conciliation and consultation, and the United Nations continues to employ its very best endeavours to this end. Unfortunately, these endeavours so far have not produced fruitful results, and the situation becomes more and more distressing. I therefore feel impelled to appeal to all member utates to use all the influence and exert all the effort which they can bring to bear to achieve a reasonable and peaceful settlement in the Congo, I do not -claim that the blame for the abortive talks in the Congo is altogether on one side. But I do assert that secession of any province is no solution for the Congo's ills, that it would serve no interests other than, possibly, those of the raining companies and certain AT/vi's If 7 (The Acting Secretary-General)

neighbours, and has neither historical nor ethnic justification. I strongly believe that only a unified Congo can give hope for peace and prosperity in Central Africa. In this connexion I note with satisfaction the latest proposals of Prime Minister Atioula for the drafting of a federal type constitution with the assistance of international exports. The situation in the Congo has been aggravated and. confused by an intensive and skillfully waged propaganda campaign en behalf of Katanga which has never failed to poi-cray the situation in a false light. This campaign, having both money and ability behind it, makes it all the mere important to see and portray the Congo- Katanga problem in its true perspective. The United Nations is very much concerned with the cultivation of useful economic activity everywhere. Indeed, much of its effort in the Congo has been devoted to the protection of the personnel and property of the enterpriscc which are vital to the Congo's economy. But the situation becomes immensely complicated when one of these great enterprises is found involved, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in disruptive political activities which can be carried on only because of the very large sums of money available. This is a highly undesirable activity, both for the good of the Congo and of the enterprises themselves. Moreover, the overriding importance, both for Africa and for the world community, of the stability of the Congo and the conciliation cf the conflicting parties in that country cannot be compared with the short-term and short-sighted interests and ambitions, both economic and political, of a relatively very small group of people. Moreover I have no doubt that, in the long run, the best safeguard for the interests of all concerned, including those I have just mentioned, is the successful establishment of stability and poace in a united Congo. I appeal, therefore, to all iiicmber Governments to use thair influence to persuade the principal parties concerned in the Congo that a peaceful solution is in their own long-terra interest, as well as in the interest cf the Congolese people. If such persuasion should finally prove ineffective, I would ask them to consider seriously what further measures may be taken. In chis context, I have in mind economic pressure upon the Katangese authorities of a kind that will bring home to them the realities of their situation and the fact that Katanga is not a sovereign AP/vrs U8-50 (The Acting Secretary-Generr.l)

State and is not recognized by any Government in the world as such. In the last resort and if all other efforts fail, this could Justifiably go to the extent of barring ell trade end financial relations. I olso cppeel to ell Governments to do everything in their power to ensure that bed advice, false encouragement, and every fern, of military and non-military assistance be withheld frcm the authorities of the Province cf Katanga, £uch efforts should include all possible attempts to control the entry into Katanga of adventurers who sell their services to the Katan/rcse Provincial authorities and whose reckless and irresponsible activities have contributed ranch to the v/orselling of the situation. In making this appeal I wish to make it clear that the United nations in the Congo, as in the rest of the -world, is particularly anxious to pi-enerve and strengthen the economic life of the country. This applies as much to Katanga as to the rest cf the Congo, I need hardly add that this appeal is in strict conformity with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly. rm/rn 51

(The Acting decretory-General)

This is the text of the appeal which I am sending out to all the Members of the United Nations, and this vill TDG released to the Press tonorro-vr morning. The Central Government of the Congo has already tciken certain steps in this direction, and I think it vill he of interest to the members of this Committee if I reveal one of those steps. As you are no doubt aware, the Katangcse authorities have "been using the facilities of the Univsrsal Postal Union by taking advantage of their own printed stomps on the envelopes, vhich is, of course, illegal, and I am sure you vill a^ree with me that no part of a country, no province of a country, no state of a country, can print its own postage stamps and use them for universal transport and postings. Therefore, the Central Government of the Congo has brought this illegitimate and illegal system, which has been prevailing in Katanga for the last two years, to the attention of the Universal Postal Union, with headquarters in Berne, and requested it to put a stop to this practice* I have also endorsed this request, and I am sure that the U?U will give very favourable consideration to this request. That is one of the measures which the Central Government of the Congo has taken. I am very grateful to tho members of the Committee for the very fruitful suggestions and observations which have been prepen-tea -co us. Let us only hope that our united endeavours for t.ho aohiovomcn-t of the Security Council and General Assembly objectives will be realized at a very early date.

Mr, CARDOSO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): I would like to say a last word before we end our meeting, and thank you all for the efforts you have undertaken to find a solution for the Con£o problem. I should like to thank you most of all for the deep understanding you have shown in regard to our difficulties and for the tact with which you have approached certain projected solutions* With regard to the designation of experts to help the Central Government, perhaps it might be difficult to find a solution if the Central Government has to make the final choice of the experts. It is my feeling that despite everything there is a fundamental disagreement between those who want the unity of the country and those who desire its bcilkanization, and I think that if the Central Government chose certain experts, that would be sufficient for the secessionists immediately to come out against that choice and to raise questions. Therefore, RU/rh 52

(Mr. . Leopoldville )) I would like you to keep this possibility in mind in the choice of the experts who are to help the Central Government.

The Acting r?CRgTApy-GEKERAL; I thank you very much for this useful advice; I shall certainly keep it in mind.

The meeting rose at 5*5 P«ri. Meeting Wo. 70 12 October ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 12 October 1962, at 5 p.m.

In the Chair: U TIIANT The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL Members: Canada Mr. TREMB1AY Ceylon Mr. MAIALASEKERA Ethiopia Mr. ABEBE Federation of Malaya Mr. ISMAIL Ghana Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY Guinea India Mr. CHAKRAVARTY Indonesia Mr. UIRJOFRANOTO Ireland Mr. AIKEN Liberia Mr. BARNES Mali Mr. GOULIBALY Morocco Mr. TABITI- Nigeria Mir. UACHUKU Pakistan Mr, CILEEMA Senegal Mr. CISSE Sudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden Mrs. ROSSEL Tunisia Mr. Taieb SLIM United Arab Republic Mr. RIAD Congo (Leopoldville) Mr. KA3HALE

62-22^62 TL/nz

Thejteting SECRETARY-GEM^L; I have caned this meeting primarily for the purpose of reporting with a view to enabling you to t>e up to date on developments in the Congo. To do this effectively I must speak with full frankness, and I do eo in the conviction that my confidence will be respected by everyone here. Although come time has elapsed since our last meeting^ and during that period a great cVsal of effort has been expended towards ac/ilGving reconciliation of differences and unity in the Congo, I am sorry to cay that the facts of the Congo as of today would not sustain me in making to you a cheery report of progress* Although the outlook continues cloudy, let me scy at the outset that I still believe tlicr'i the United Nations can achieve its objectives of territorial unity, law and order, and stability in the Congo. To do eo, however, some new efforts in new directions will probably have to be made. I will speak of this later. You are familiar with the Plan which I submitted some time ago to Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tshoitfoe. This was summarized in the report to the Security Council in August, contained in document S/5053/Add.H. For your confidential information, I am distributing copies of this Plan to you now. It has the status only of a personal proposal from me to Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe. As you know, both Mr* Adoula and Mr* Tshombe responded to my presentation favourably, stating that they accepted the Plan, Mr0 Tshombe typically later referred to his acceptance of the Plan "in principle"• I should add that in the exercise of the discretion permitted Mm, Mr. Gardiner considered it more advantageous not to present the "courses of action" part of the Plan Bet out in Phase I through Phase IV at tlte time of presentation of the Plan in Elisabethville. Mr. Tshombe in fact was not in the city at the time. AW/dr 5 (The Acting Secretary-General)

Following this, a rather detailed programme of implementation of the Plan was worked out in collaboration between Mr. Gardiner and Headquarters, with the purpose of converting the acceptance of the parties into concrete actions which would end Katanga's secession, thus reintegrating Katanga effectively with the rest of the Ccn^o and making it possible before long for the United. Nations to undertake a substantial reduction in the military force it maintains in the Congo, Mr. Adoula explicitly indicated acceptance of the programme of implementation, while Mr. Tshombe, although not replj^ins to Mr0 Gardiner on the specific question^ gave basis for assuming his acceptance "by proceeding to nominate the Katangese members of the three commissions called for in the programme. I have asked Mr* Gardiner to prepare a report to the Security Council on all developments relating to the Plan and the programme for its implementation and I would expect to submit this report to the Security Council within a week or so. I need refer here to only a few of the developments in this sphere. About a week ago Mr, Gardiner returned from Eiicabe'Chville, Where he 'had gone at my suggestion to ascertain from Mr, Tshomibe once and for all whether he intended to proceed with the implementation of the Plan. Mr. Tshciabe assured Mr. Gardiner that he intends to do so. This assurance, Mr. Gardiner pointed out last week, will very soon be tested, since concrete measures must be taken in the realms of military integration, revenue accounting and currency. Mr. Gardiner's visit to Elisabethville last week was necessary because very soon after Mr. Tshcmbe's implied approval of the programme of implementrtion, the dilatory tactics with which we have become -too familiar began. For example, Mr. Gardiner had, some time ago, informed Mr. Tshcmbe that the Central Government and OKUC members of the three conmisions envisaged by the Plan -- one on military matters and two on financial matters -- had been designated and would be arriving in Elisabethville in pursuance of their work at an early date. When these members of the Commission arrived in Elisabethville, they were welcomed by. Mr* Tshcmbe, and the Katangese members of the three commissions were designated. The Commissions then promptly began to meet in order to get on with the work. All three of them, however, immediately encountered stalling tactics by the Katangese members. The latter did not want to discuss the progranme for implementation of the Plan, but rather to debate the provisions of the Plan itself, thus attempting AW/dr (The Acting Secretary-General)

to subject to prolonged negotiation provisions of a proposal vhich Mr. Tshombe himself had already accepted. This, of course, was Intolerable to the Central Government representatives and the meetings of all three corrmissions were abruptly suspended. The Plan was submitted to both parties for acceptance or rejection end i'C vas made entirely clear that it was not subject to negotiation* Ho one Of the commissions had got dovn to any serious worfc "when Mr. Gardiner vent to Elisabethvllle on 2 October. In fact, on the very day the Military Commission vas in its first meeting, a United Nations patrol at the Martini track at the airport was deliberately booby-trapped and lost two of its members, as related in the latest report to the Security Council. The ccmnissions have resumed meeting and Mr. Gardiner has returned to Elisabethville in a further effort to get the implementation of the Plan effectively under vay. BC/jpm 6 (The Acting Secretary-General)

The three commissions are now "back at work, and the reports of their deliberations vary from day to day and from good to bad, if I may Bay so« To Siva you an idea, I shall ask Dr. Bundle, after I have finished my statement, to read to you our two latest reports on them and also some excerpts from a message sent in "by Mr« Gardiner after his return to Elisabethville yesterday and another talk with Mr. Tshoir.be, in one further effort to obtain sone concrete st<;ps towards the rointcgration of Katanga. We are dealing with Mr, Tshombe, and therefore you will understand why I risk no prediction about tha implementation of the plan. That will come about, I suspect, only if and when Mr, Tshornbe becomes convinced that this world body, ths United Nations, really means business and there is no alternative for him but disaster. Yesterday he me.de a statement In Elisabethv.llle about his immediate intentions, and I am new having it distributed to you. Whether he goes through with even this remains to be seen, I strike this rather bleak note only on the grounds that it becomes ever more apparent to me that Mr, Tshombe cannot be counted upon to be in earnest simply because he approves something. He indulges always in nianoeuvre, usually with the objective of gaining time. His promising words rarely find reflection in helpful deeds. I think that it is clear enough what he hopes to gain by time, He thinks, in the first place, that time runs in his favour "because the Adoula Government will sooner or later fall, with the prospects that this vill throw Leopoldville and alt of the Congo outside of Katanga back into the chaos and semi-anarchy of a year and a half ago. In this calculation Mr. Tshombe could well be right. Secondly, he hopes that as time passes the United Nations will increasingly feel the heavy burdens of the Congo operation and that,through financial strain and frustration at its inability to achieve a peaceful settlement, the United Nations may at last simply throw up its hands and pull out. This, Mr. Tshombe thinks, would mean a complete victory for him and the interests he reflects; some think he dreams of becoming President or Prime Minister of all the Congo, Here, I think, Mr. Tshombe1s calculation on the United Nations goes wrong. The twin United Nations burdens of financial strain and frustration are very great, to be cure -- the financial burden being almost unbearable -- but I doubt that in the present circumstances it would be possible to get a vote in either the Security Council or the General Assembly supporting outright United Nations withdrawal from the Congo -- the more especially so since I would suppose BC/jpm 7-10 (The Acting Secretary-General) that if such an Issue arose Mr. Adoula and- his Government would make an impassioned appeal to the United Nations not to abandon a country which the United Nations had set out to save, a cause in vhich so much of money and effort, and even lives, had already been invested, All the vniie, furthermore, Mr. Tshombe is collecting his substantial revenues Tram the Union Mini & re --in the neighbourhood of §ko million annually. This he does illegally, since the Central Government receives no part of this intake. This, in my view, is the principal source of Mr. Tshoiiibe's power — he has at his disposal substantial sums of money. With this money he can buy mercenaries, aircraft and war supplies -- and possibly parliamentarians, for we hear that his money is at -work in Leopoldville and elsewhere, and not without effect in some quarters, Tbus, I am bound to incline to the belief that there are only two effective ways of really, getting at Mr. Tshombe; and removing the constant threat of civil war from the Congo. One is overt force, which OKUC at present has no mandate to employ for the specific end of controlling Mrt Tshombe* The other, and to my thinking the more practical, vay is to cut off the flow of Union MTnl£rG revenue to Mr* Tsbombe, revenue which is the chief source of his power. Measures of this latter nature could be undertaken, perhaps, without any new mandate for OWUC, although the steps which might have to be taken by ONUC to make them effective might veil lead to ,a severe fighting reaction on the part of the Katangese. I shall have more to say about this in a moment. It has been said, I know, that in the Congo we must have enormous patience* I think that the record of two and one-fourth years of United Nations activity in the Congo will attest to aicazing patience and restraint on our part, Mr, Adoula too — largely, no doubt, because of his regard for the United Nations and his faith in it — has shown remarkable patience. In this regard, I think we must never lose sight of the fact that excessive patience with Mr. Tshoaibe and his perpetual delaying tactics is generally at the expense of Mr, Adoula and the Central Government and could lead to fateful consequences for both him and his country, HA/ids 11

(The Acting Secretary-General)

I do not mind saying to you within these vails that my own patience begins to wear a little thin. For months on end now, the United Nations in the Congo has been doing everything possible, exerting every reasonable effort, trying every sensible: course, in the attempt to bring about a peaceful reconciliation and to avert civil war. There were the Kitona talks in December* There were the two phases of the talks in Leopoldville frcn March to June of this year. There is the Plan for reconciliation and the programme for its implementation. There is the draft constitution just brought to completion with the contributions of the four constitutional experts recruited by the United Nations at the request of the Government of the Republic, With regard to this, I have been urging Mr. Adoula to make that constitution public and to give Mr. Tshombe and others a chance to study and comment upon it. This would deprive Mr» Tshombe of an effective propaganda counter. Mr. Adoula has now indicated an intention to make the draft constitution available to the provincial Presidents on 15 October.' But no one can cay that there has been any really appreciable progress toward reconciliation, towards Mr* TsliombeTS actually discarding the pretense of separation or secession. To the contrary, as indicated in the report submitted this week to the Security Council,, Mr. Tohonbe has been indulging in a build-up of Katanga's military strength and employing more mercenaries. Mr» Tchombe, of course, denies this, but this time we have positive evidence. It becomes rather obvious that at least some of Katanga's borders Q.£'d the neighbours across them are not unreceptive to Mr. Tshombe's military needs and orders* And, all the while, the United ITafclcas Force in the Congo is being subjected to harassments of one kind or another, some resulting in armed clashes with casualties. These are the harsh facts. They require us to take a good hard look at the future course for ONUC. I feel that we have just about come to the end of the road so far as the course "we have been following is concerned. I think that very soon the United Nations in the Congo will have to assume a more vigorous posture. I do not at all mean by this that we should contemplate any offensive military action, for we have no right to do so under our existing mandate, and it seems to me highly unlikely that we could expect to get one for that purpose; BA/ids 12-15 (The.Acting Secretary-General) it being by no means certain in. any case that we would have the military strength for it at the moment. But I mean that, once it is clear that there Is no longer any hope that Mr. Tshombe -will succumb to reason and persuasion and pursue a constructive course, then we must consider measures that could be taken as next eteps under the existing mandate, uhether or not they have Mr. Tshonbe's favour and may involve the possibility, or even the livelihood, or forceful Katacgese reaction, thus requiring ONUC to fight in self-defence, Indeed, instituting certain new actions may be the only -way of ensuring that Mr. Tshombe -will proceed with the implementation of the Plane In a general "way, I might mention some of the steps and measures that could be taken, vith the expectation that at another meeting in a week or two we might have some indication of your Governments' reactions to them. Without abandoning hope for the Plan and for peaceful reconciliation, there are certain steps we can — indeed, I believe W3 must — take -without delay, for it would be a dangerous weakness on our part and an unjustifiable drain on our resources to stand by passively for an indefinite period while waiting for the outcome of the attempts at reconciliation. The Plan itself, in phases IE, II and III, envisages certain actions which would apply pressure of one kind or another on Katanga if the proposal for national reconciliation should fail. First of all, clearly, in view of our knowledge of the military build-up taking place in Katanga, ve must "be -well prepared militarily to meet any surprise attacks, and especially air attacks, which might be launched by the Katangese. We have to be prepared for the possibility of surprise attacks on Kainina and Elisabethville airfields, which, if successful, would cripple our troops in Katanga by cutting their supply lines. In order to meet such a contingency we are having to reinforce our troops in Katanga by shifting all of the United Nations troops from Kivu Province. This is.a calculated risk with regard to what may happen in

Kivu, but it has to be takena This move could be avoided, of course, if we could obtain three or four, additional battalions for the Force from any source, - if only .for a short period. But, as you know, we have for a long time been unable to obtain additional troops,, despite my strong appeals. This situation may be changing. - • FB/bmt 16 (Acting Secretary-General) One of the direct results of the action of the Congolese Government in creating a monber of new provinces has "been an increase in tribal clashes and comnunal feuds, particularly in Kivu and Kacai. This is a significant and recent development, with only vigilant action by OMJC troops together with the good co-operation which they have "been enjoying recently from the local ANC units serving to prevent large-scale bloodshed and a breakdown of law and order. This points the way to an increasingly greater use of the AIIG in the first line of action in patrols and other activities having to do with the maintenance of law and order in the provinces. It involves, of course, an increasing support of particular ANC units "by ONUC in the way of transport and logistics. This would serve the useful purpose of relieving ONUC troops from certain areas so that they might "be deployed more strategically elsewhere. In order not to create obstacles for the discussions on the plan, the United Nations troops in Elisabethville recently have been extremely restrained in the face of numerous provocations. The time has about come, however, for the assumption of a more vigorous role by the United Nations Force, governed, of course, "by its capacity, with respect to such objectives in Katanga as the removal of gendarmerie roadblocks, elimination of onerous restraints on OIIUC's freedom of movement and stopping interference with (MJC's flow of supplies. There are some direct measures which the Congolese Government might consider taking such as applying pressure on Katanga, which would amount to "blacklisting" certain business concerns which are operating throughout the Congo Republic, including Katanga province. For example, one company has a direct run from Antwerp to West African ports, calling at Matadi and Lobito, It does a substantial business in freight and passenger traffic and has extensive interests in the Congo. Any restrictions on its traffic in the Congo would seriously affect its operations. This company calls at Lobito to load ore for the Union Miniere and on its northbound schedule completes its cargo at Matadi. The company could be warned that unless all loading at Lobito were stopped its vessels would not be allowed to enter the port of Matadi. Parallel action could be taken to delay or even forbid financial transfers, banking credits and other local operations as part of the kind of "statutory" practice so widely applied during the Second World War in neutral countries. FB/bmt 17 (The Acting Secretary-General) Another example refers to three banks established in the Congo and In Katanga. Union Miniere does banking with all three. A warning could be Issued, as a first step, that 'those banks would not be allowed to operate in the Congo if their ;Katanga branches continued to deal vith Katangese interests, and their banking licences could be taken from them. The major airline serving the Congo would "be vulnerable to similar action if it continued to engage in operations to and from Katanga. Any actions of this nature, naturally, would need to be most carefully weighed in order to "be certain that they would not boomerang and in fact adversely affect Congolese interests. We have for some time been considering the feasibility and advisability of assisting the Congolese Government in the collection of customs duties in Katanga, particularly in Elisabethville, through giving protection to customs personnel sent by the Central Government and through our ability to control some railroad traffic and flow of goods. Similarly, assistance could be given to the Government in the establishment of passport offices in Elisabethville and elsewhere in Katanga. It ic recognized that such moves might be opposed by Katangese force, . which OHUC would have to be prepared to meet. I said earlier that the decisive factor is the flow of Union Miniere revenue to the Katangese authorities. In this context I have had some ideas about some courses of action which might be effective in checking the flow of Union Miniere revenue to Mr. Tshombe. Indeed, I may inform you in confidence that these ideas have already been presented to Mr. Adoula by Mr. Gardiner on my behalf, have encountered favourable reaction from him, and have "been carried out by him without public announcement. The general lines of the courses of action to which I refer are the following: 1. A letter from Prime Minister Adoula to the President of Union Miniere reiterating his demand made in his communication of December 1961 that the - Union Miniere revenue is due and must be paid to the Congolese Government. I have been informed this week that Union Miniere officials have advised the Government of Belgium of their readiness to ship minerals through the port of Matadi as soon as the Lubllash Bridge is available to them (this, - of course, would mean paying revenue to the Central Government and could be encouraging). FB/bmt 18-20 (The Acting Secretary-General) 2. The Congolese Government, on its part, adopts an ordinance prohibiting the export from the Congo of any minerals -without provision for payment of the necessary revenues to the Central Government, which could call upon the United Nations and the Government of Belgium for assistance in implementing this provision. 5. Prime Minister Adoula sends also a communication to the Government of Belgium seeking assistance in assuring cessation by the Union Miniere of its illegal payment of revenues to Katanga. 4. A similar communication, of request for assistance is addressed to me, in my capacity as Acting Secretary-General. All of the foregoing could, of course, be usefully reinforced by a resolution in the Security Council — I repeat: all these steps envisaged in the foregoing outline could be usefully reinforced by a resolution in the Security Council — which vould endorse the effort of the Congolese Government to obtain the revenues due to it; call upon all parties concerned to take measures to prevent any continuance of the illegal payments by the Union Miniere; and authorize the Secretary-Gen-eral to take all necessary steps to implement the Security Council decision, including, if required, the protection of Union Miniere installations in Katanga. Action along some such lines vould in effect give to ONUC a better and more flexible mandate than it now enjoys. Steps of this nature vould apply to the Union Miniere. They might provide legal pressures, both national and international, vhich could veil be decisive in persuading them to "begin to pay to the Central Government the revenues vhich are its due, vhich, of course, vould be at the expense of Mr. Tshombe. I think that ve can count on earnest co-operation in ouch a course of action from the Government of Belgium. Since I place special stress on these actions aimed at cutting off the illicit payment of revenues to Mr. Tshombe, and vish your views particularly on Mr. Adoula1s communication to me, I am distributing to you now, for your strictly confidential use, a copy of that communication. DR/pm 21 (The Acting Secretary-General)

There may be other courses of action -which ONUC could follow, but I submit that actions along the lines I have just indicated could be taken, only after a most serious review and appraisal of our military capacity to withstand a possible Katangese reaction in the form of military attack. We cannot risk the disaster of a military defeat, and before I make any new move I must be absolutely certain of our strength, of what we can count upon in the way of numbers of troops, their Governments1 willingness to have them exposed to the risk of fighting defensively, the adequacy of their weapons, air support, transport and logistics. Mr. Christophe Gbenye, formerly Minister of the Interior until dropped from the Cabinet in last summerTs shuffle, and member of the MIIC-Lumumba party, was arrested by the Government in Lcopoldville this week on his return from a visit to the United Gtates under the auspices of a private organization. Mr. Gbenye, incidentally, to the best of my knowledge, did not visit the United Nations while he was in the United States* Mr. Adoula has indicated to Mr. Gardiner that "certain politicians" -- these are his words -- from Kivu and Orientale provinces had been in touch with Mr. Tshombe through his representative, Mr. Niernbo, and were plotting a new secession. This is said to be the basis for the arrest of Mr. Gbenye. Mr. Gizenga continues in detention on Bulabemba Island. I understand that he was visited by Ambassador Diallo Telli of Guinea during his recent trip to the Congo. I apologize for speaking at such unusual length. But since this is in the nature of a reporting meeting;come length was unavoidable. You will readily realize that I have said some things here that I would by no means say publicly, for to do so at this stage could be damaging and even rash. This is no time for rashness, C<,uite the contrary, the Plan must be given every reasonable opportunity to succeed, within reasonable time-limits. We must avoid doing anything which would expose us in the least to a charge of responsibility for the failure of the Plan. On the other hand, we must look ahead and be prepared for the new course that must be followed if the Plan effort fails and there is no reconciliation and unity. Thus, much of what I have said here is looking ahead in anticipation of a possible need, and I trust that my words and views will be kept strictly within this context. DR/pm 22 (The Acting Secretary-General)

Before concluding this report to you, I wish to advise you that, as you may hnve noted in this morning1s prsss, the so-called American. Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters is at it again with another propaganda splurge, based entirely on untruth and wilful distortion. Although I know you will wish to report to and ascertain "the vievs of your Governments on the points I have raised with you today, if you have any immediate questions, reactions, views or suggestions, I invite you to present them now.

Mr. BIJNCHE; Ac the Acting Secretary-General pointed out, these are samples of the most recent reports we have had from Leopoldville and Elisabethville on the work of the three Commissions having to do with the implementation of the Plan. I will also include some excerpts from the most recent message we have had from Mr. Gardiner since his return to Elisabethville yesterday. This was received late last night. The first is a cable on the "Preliminary Draft of Measures adopted by the Revenue Commission11. It reads as follows: *1. Centralization of the control of customs receipts "A. The Government of Katanga signifies its agreement to the centralization of the control of customs receipts. I5B. At the beginning of each month the Customs Directorate of Katanga will send to the General Customs Directorate of the Central Government a statement of gross receipts for the preceding month. "C. The Katangese Government signifies its agreement to the establishment of a neutral control commission consisting of three technicians from an international organization, the United Nations for example, to be placed at the Customs Directorate of Katanga: one technician attached to the Central Tax Collecting Office;' one technician attached to the Customs Control Office; one technician attached to the Customs Inspection Service. DR/pm 23 (Mr. Bunche) "2. Restoration of commercial traffic Commercial traffic will be restored as soon as possible "between Katanga and the rest of the Congo, and more particularly the Xatanga/Matadi traffic. Katanga's mining products Will be exported through the port of 1-latadi, to the full extent of transport capacity, GO long as the outflow of products is regular. The Central Government will endeavour to persuade carriers to ensure the smooth flow of traffic. of ftrocs customs receipts "A. The Customs Directorate of Katanga -will pay to the account of the Central Government with the Bank of Katanga the share due to it. "B. It will be obligatory for the paying-in slips of the Bank of Katanga to mention the numbers of the customs documents referring to each payment. These clips will be sent regularly at the end of each week to the Monetary Council at Lcopoldville. "C. The Bank of Katanga will advise the Monetary Council daily of the total amount of sums paid in and the balance in the account. "D. The Government of Katanga will open an account with the Monetary Council at Leopoldville into which will be £>aid its share of the gross receipts from all exports of Katangese origin leaving through the port of Matadi. !!E. It will be obligatory for the paying-in slips of the Monetary Council to mention the numbers of the customs documents referring to each payment. These slips will be sent regularly at the end of each week to the Dank of Katanga. "F. The Monetary Council will advise the Bank of Katanga daily of the total amount of sums paid in and the "balance in the account. "G. The Central Government's share of Katangese customs duties, both import and export,will be 2 per cent of gross receipts and 2 per cent remaining in Katanga. 11 ^• Royalties from mining concessions in Katanga "A. The Government of Katanga will pay to the account of the Central Government with the Bank of Katanga x per cent of the royalties from mining concessions in Katanga as and when these are paid in. DR/pm 24-25 (Mr. Bunche) "B. The paying-in slips of the Bank of Katanga yiii be sent regularly to the Monetary Council. "C. The accounts vill be audited "by the Monetary Council*which "Will assign to Elisabethville one or more auditors who will have access to the documents necessary for the exercise of this control." MVJ/gws 26 (Mr, Bunche)

The Secretary-General pointed out that we get "both good and "bad reports. The second one is an example of the latter category. This was a cable received yesterday giving a sumnary of the meeting of the Military Commission on 10 Octobers "The Military Commission met on the morning of 10 October. The mee

wMch was scheduled for 9 a0m,, started, only at 9,^5 because the Katangese delegation was late. "The delegates first discussed the minutes of the previous meeting. Mr. Yav -- the principal Katangese representative — made a number of remarks on minor points and criticized the inaccurate recording of the minutes. Agreement was finally reached on all points of'dispute after more than one hour of discussion, and the minutes were retyped accordingly. "Turning to the discussion on the proposals submitted by the Government at the previous meeting, Mr. Ncalula, vho is the representative of the Central Government, asked Mr. lav to state his Views on the proposals. Mr. Yav did not give his views on the subject, but, instead, went into a long harangue, arguing that the original conditions as proposed by Mr. Ngalula and the counter-proposals by the Katangese delegations should be discussed rather than the new proposals. Mr, Yav further stated that certain points in the Central Governmentrs proposals of 0 October were outside the Consul 3 sionls competence. Mr. Ngalula considered his new proposals as a compromise between his previous proposals and those submitted by the Katangese delegation. Mr, Yav could not accept this view, Mr, Ngalula asked whether or not he accepted the counter-proposals, but Mr. Yav did not give any reply to this question. "Further heated arguments ecsued, most of which were not in relation to the conditions for a cease-fire. "in reply to a question put by Mr. Ngalula as to what was meant by the return of troops to encampments, Mr. Yav stated that Katangese troops should return to North Katanga, for example, to Albertville and Kabo.lo. "Mr. ITgalula ended the meeting by stating that he would never accept for discussion any conditions for a cease-fire which were in violation of the U Thant plan," MW/gwa 27

(Mr. Bundle)

Today, however, just before coming to this meeting we received a somewhat more encouraging report on the proposed arrangements for the taking o£ oaths or allegiance -- this was an agreement reached "between the two parties. !!2hG un.dersigned, Joseph Ngalula, representing the Government of the CO^GO, and Joseph Yav, representing the Government of Katanga, have agreed upon the following: "(l) The Commander-in-chief of the Katanga Gendarmerie,, accompanied by two full-ranking colonels, will take an oath of allegiance to President Kasavubu at Leopoldville on 17 October; "(2) The oath will take the usual form as follows; tlfl swear loyalty and obedience to the President and to the laws of the Republic of the Congo.' "(3) Tha Government of the Congo hereby undertakes to guarantee the safety of the officers and to permit them to return as they wish; "(4) The United Nations will be responsible for all arrangements regarding their transport. "Drawn at naisahothvllle on 12 October 1962." Finally, I have some excerpts from a cable received late last night from Mr. Gardiner, who was in ElicabcthviilG again,following his talk yesterday afternoon with Mr. Tshoinbe, which took place immediately after Mr. Tshombe had met with the Consuls and issued the statement which has been distributed to you. Mr. Gardiner states: "I met Tshombe at 1*1.25 hours to 17 hours this afternoon. He and his colleagues ex-pressed a violent reaction to the Security Council report on mercenaries and alleged that they were being falsely accused in preparation Tor a possible United Nations attack on Katanga. I reminded Tshombe that I had written him on the subject and that he had dismissed the Issue as another illustration of United Nations bad intentions. I invited him to refute the MW/gws 20

(Mr, Bunche)

report paragraph "by paragraph if he thought the account I had. given was inaccurate. Alter a lengthy discussion, he and his colleagues agreed that they Would prepare their own. report and submit it in a month. I offered to transmit their comment or rebuttal to Headquarters and; if possible, cutest its publication as an annex to the report; we had nothing to fear; cur sole desire was to let the United Nations and the world at large know the facts about the mercenary situation, "Ou iay arrival here I met the Consuls, who had been called a few minutes before by President Tohombe and Given a communique setting out what Katanga had clone to cxecuts the U Thant plan, Katanga had cLecutled to pay an advance of $2 million against contributions she will be called upon to make under administrative arrangements being discussed by the Revenue and Foreign Exchange Comnis&lo^s. I pointed out that, from the text of the Ccimunicjue, the payment did not seem to relate to the requirements of the plan and suggested the following redraft, which is to be discussed with Tshombe tomorrow11 -« that is today —•: 111 Katanga has decided to place at the disposal of the Central Government immediately a sum in foreign currency equal to $2 million as an advance payment against the receipts and foreign exchange which Katanga will pay to the Central Government in accordance with the measures for allocations of receipts and foreign exchange now being prepared by the Foreign Exchange and Revenue Commissions. This sum provides backing for the non-workable documentary credit opened in favour of the Monetary Council.! "l have been informed that the Revenue Commission had finished its work and that the Katangese had suggested contributions of 25 per cent of total revenue, 30 per cent of mining revenue and 30 per cent of earnings of the portfolio. This question of percentages is the only one on which agreement had not been reached between the Central Government and Katanga. "in connexion with foreign exchange earnings the only point accepted here by the Katangese has been the unification of procedures which, they suggested, would require some time. I pointed out to Tshombe and his colleagues that this was unsatisfactory and would have to be re-examined MW/gws 29

(Mr, Eunche)

before my departure.' Tchombe had already informed the Consuls of the decision af Katanga to open the Lubilaoh Bridge on 17 October and. to direct the transport of copper via that route to 1-iatadi. The Katangese seem anxious to post tcoops on their side of the bridge to prevent the bridge being used for the invasion of Katanga "by the Central Government* I observed that this would raice certain difficulties, Which might be solved if, on the other side, the Central Government also decided to station troops, or that both Parties refrained from having troops in the.area and entrusted the protection a^d neutralization of the bridge to ONUC. "Tshombers communique stated that radio-telephone communications would be started with LeopoldMlle on Saturday, 13 October, but the Katangese complained about military aid being given to the Central Government by Belgium and the United States-" He concluded by saying: "Tomorrow" -- that is today —'will decide'for-me whether the Katangese seriously intend to go through with the plan."

The Acting gEOR]T,TAP.Y-GH^ERAL; As I stated earlier, I presented th£se new statements with a view to obtaining your reactions. I suppose that most of you present here would prefer to refer this matter to your respective Governments for directives. In the meantime, perhaps there is some immediate reaction which you would like to offer.

Mr. WA(MTHJ (Nigeria): I would like to ask a question about this oath of allegiance. The Commander-in-Chief and a few others are to come to Leopoldville to swear an oath of allegiance; the United Nations sees to their safe passage to and fro, and the Central Government guarantees that they will return. What happens to the rest of the army? To me, it does not make sense. Is there anything else besides what has been read out to us? roes the whole thing depend on whether the army will be incorporated in the oath by the others? Or does it only apply to the officers while nothing happens to the rest of the army? MW/gws 30

The Acting SECFJ^ARY-GTOTRAL; Among the three Cofflzsissioris now in operation there is one dealing exclusively with oilitary lastters. Of course, this Commission has not concluded its deliberations, but one of the provisions of the items discussed in the Commission refers to the tailing of the oath of allegiance to the Central Government by the Katangese Gendarmerie — the Katan^ese armed forces — and, of Course, as a preliminary to the successful integration of the two armies, it was suggested "by the Central Government that the Coisinander-in-Chief of Katanga should first of all take an oath of allegiance to President Kasavubu in Leopoldville. I think that was the substance of the news which we received last night« AP/ch 31

(Thfi Acting Secretary-General)

Mr. Bunche has comething to supplement what I have just said.

Mr. HMCHE: This is following the pattern which was c/lorted with regard to the Army in Orientale Province under General Lundula. General Lundula came to Leopoldville at the invitation of the Central Government to swear an oath of allegiance to the President, Mr. Kasavubu, the President being the Cciraander-in-Chief of the Congolese Army. Following that, the entire Army come over, under General Lundula1 s leadership. As a matter of tfac-.t, nothing more was ever needed. That was supposed to be an initial step, but it proved to be the only step that was required.

Mr. WAGHUKTJ (Nigeria): But the Katangese situation is not the same — because in Katanga there are the Belgian military advisers. That was why I said you need a bigger step than the one in Orientale. It is not enough, to my way of thinking, that only these officers can swear an oath of allegiance — and then they go back and swear it was binding only on them and on no one else.

Mr_._JKJNCHE: This is simply a first step taken by the Military Commission. It is a step that was taken at the request of the Central Government. The Central Government required this as an initial token of the intentions of Katanga. It was proposed by the Central Government, not by anyone else, and is therefore in conformity with the wishes of the Central Government.

Mr. WACHUKU (Nigeria): Will we have an assurance that the United Nations and the military authorities will assist the Central Government to make sure that you have the type of oath that will .be binding on the rank and file, and not only on the officers, because the Katangese situation is not like the one in Orientale at all, from what I observed in the Congo. With regard to the bridge, we are told that the Katangese authorities said, "Well, we are going to post our own troops on our side of the bridge to prevent a possible.invasion by the Central Government of Katanga." Well, if this oath of allegiance which is being sworn AP/rh 32

(Mre TTacMru, Nigeria) Is genuine, what is the necessity of thinking of invasion by the Central Government? That IB why I feel you should do more* If the assurance is that once the Commander-in-Chief has sworn, like General Limdula, that night help the others to come in, naturally. The monent they have sworn, on 17 October, they should consider the two armies as one. The thought or invasion "by the Central Government of Katanga should he ruled out. But the mere fact that they even mentioned that they are going to post their ovn array to prevent invasion, • suggests that there is something fichy about the swearing of the oath* So^ there is som^ evidence already indicating that something better.should be done. . The Central Government may be genuine about their intention; but knowing the type'of persons we are dealing with, I think we should be more discreet than that. I am not a military man, but I am a simple man in the public life of a country.

The Acting GECI^TARY-GKNRRAL; Mr. Bunche has a few words to say-on this* . . ..-..--.

Mr. BUNCHE: It is not a very simple problem actually, because this Military Corcraicrjion and the Government will have to reach a decision on the size of the army that will come into existence. It is not just a matter of simple integration of what are estimated to be 18,000 Katangese troops into the Central Army, which itself is already too large, whose size we frankly do not know -- . ; estimates run from 20,000 to 28,000, The economy of the country cannot-bear an army of this size. There will be a very serious problem of what the size of the integrated army, the reorganized army, Is going to be — and that is going to take very considerable negotiation, obviously.

Mr, TTACHUKU (Nigeria): I only asked the two questions for enlightenment * As far as my delegation is concerned, I think the proper thing is to have what you. have told us -- and we expect that the verbatim record of your statement vill be Out coon. Then, you will give us some time to consider the natter for our respective Governments. It may be that we will have something to say about the position. I will support your suggestion that we try to ingest and digest what you said before we contribute an opinion on the whole matter. AP/rh 33 v 'rv Wa :huvru, Nigeria) We are very grateful to you for beinc frank with us. My delegation is grateful that you have put this to us. There ic only one request I would make if it is possible. You made reference to the fact that the Constitution is now ready and that Prime Minister Adoula is sending it to the Provincial ^ovornmcnts. I wonder whether it will be possible for you to obtain a copy for us, confidentially, so that when we are mailing a contribution we should "be able to make a contribution in the light of the Constitution that has been drafted, because that is very pertinent to whatever comments I am likely to make on behalf of my Government, I know that an effort is being made to have a Federal Government. Looking at it like that, the pcvers of the Central Government that are enumerated, it seems to me, are insufficient. It may be that rcore things have been added to the Constitution that has been elaborated. If they are there, there will be no necessity for any comment on those things. That may help me not to say some things I might say by looking at the plan itself, as it is.

The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL; The verbatim record, of course, will be ready tomorrow. Regarding the availability of the Constitution itself, as Mr. Adoula has made known to us, he will distribute the copies to the Provincial governments on 15 October, that is, on Monday. By that time, of course, the Constitution will be public property. That is my belief. Therefore, I will see that we get a copy of it and make it available to the members of this Committee,

Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India): Mr. Secretary-General, we are all, I am sure, grateful to you for making this factual statement and taking us into your confidence about vhat has been going on in the Congo. This is the "U Thant Plan" which ve have now seen officially. The first question I should like to ask ie that there are certain dates mentioned in this plan. How far are these dates being observed or kept to? That means, are ve very much out of date, or are we keeping to the time schedule very carefully? The second question I should like to ask is that if the time schedule has already been broken, then, with respect to the other phases, do they follow automat!cally1 AP/rh 3^-55 (Mr* Chalrravarty, India)

The third question I should like to ac^; is that you have Eaid, I think Mr. Eunche hac said, the distribution of Union Miniere profits and taxes will be handed over to the Central Government by Mr. Tshcmbe'c eoverr.'s./nt. Is that a very dependable source of revenue for the Central Government, loiowing Mr. Tshombe's attitude? Or vould it not be true to say that the Central j| Government would be completely at the mercy of Mr. Tshombe, whether these funds ,| keep on coming or not? EGII/nz 36

Your statement has been a very depressing account or what has been going on, and all that one feels is that during the ti:re tlis United Ilatioiic is considering those pirns Mr3 Tshombe is coins on Bt^i^hthorrlnc h unsold, o.na +?:.'. :* tmo n~y well come when the forces that you have at your disposal i:ay be ccripletely inadequate to meet the objectives you .may have; not to mention taking any active steps, 'they may be incapable or even defending tiie-TncelvcG*. That, is a very sei-ious matter, particularly for those who have contributed forces to the Cor,go« I would like to know something on that.

The Acting _5?;CRgTARY;-GET]ERAL! Regarding the tlrae-table, as you will no doubt have seen from the Plan of national reconciliation, it vas Prime Minister Adoula Ts intention to make the constitution available "to the Members of Parliament by September. Of course, he did not indicate what date it would be in September, and since ha has now decided to make this available by 1^ October it is actually two veeks late, I think it follows from this that the other steps to be taken also have to be considered in the context of this de.lay; which was unavoidable. Regarding the iioplementation of the other steps, too, there was no definite deadline, and I have indicated them in terms of weeks, but these are also now delayed in turn, so, generally speaking, the whole ccheduie is two weeks behind time* Regarding your question about the revenues, as I indicated in my statement this afternoon, Prime Minister Adoula has requested me to take certain steps, and I would like the benefit of your advice and comments on the steps he has outlined, particularly those to ensure that the flow of revenue from the mining companies in Katanga goes to Lcopoldville only. If I have to comply with the request of the Central Government, perhaps, as I indicated in my statement, a reference to the Security Council might be necessary because the implementation of the steps requested by Prime Minister Adoula might encounter certain forcible resistance by gendarmerie, and in such an eventuality, of course, our forces have been authorized to exercise the right of self defence. So all these factors have to be taken into consideration, RGH/nz • •• 37 (The

One of the major factors, of course, is the adequacy or the lack of adequacy of our armed forces. On this, also, I would be obliged to get the benefit of your advice* Just as a matter of information, I should like to say th'at there is no'./ at least one Member state which has confidentially assured me of a very substantial military assistance, if necessary.

Mr, CHAKRA.VAETY (India): We will certainly refer these matters to our Governments, and come back with such advice as we can. But it occurs to me, just speaking on the spur of the moment, that the figures you have quoted with regard to the gendarmerie, and the amount of training that they are getting under competent mercenary officers, lead to the conclusion that you are probably already undermined and probably outmanoeuvred. But, as I would cay together with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, we are not soldiers, and we do not know. -You will have to depend on your military advisers. If you are able to get some contributions of additional troops from some Governments, wou3.d it not be wise to have them before you are put in an embarrassing position where you cannot defend yourself? Normally, what happens under nonnal human instinct is that when the forces against which we stand are overwhelming, then we generally submit, without any bloodshed, but when we feel we have a sporting chance of victory, that might lead to a really very sanguinary conflict. That is one aspect I would request you to consider in consultation with your military advisers. On that, I am afraid I cannot be of any assistance.

The Acting SECTRETABY^GEllERAL: As to the prospect of getting some substantial military reinforcements, I think that our decision has to rest on the advice of this Committee at a second meeting*

Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): 'The report which you, Mr. Secre'tary-General, have given us" is very clear and very serious, and I agree that it will require some cogitation on the part of our Governments before we give our clear suggestions or advice. RSH/nz 38-^0 ( Mr o Qua:l son- 13n ckey, Ghana )

Before I cair.e to this meeting, I received Instructions from my Government to state a few points, but those, in fact, you have covered in your report. That is to say, ve agree substantially with a numbar of the points which you have mad 2 in the report you gave us this afternoons, I'y Government is very much concerned, first of all, by this federal Constitution;, not that we are opposed to federalism as such, but ve are always afraid that a federal constitution in those cases where a territory is being carved up into a number of provinces might load to certain results* That was why we were disturbed to hear this afternoon that already there are tribal conflicts as a result of these divisions, and we would like to have more information on the extent of these conflicts and as to how far thoy EI-.T effect the body politic of the Congo nation,* On the basis of that report, we will be able to eay more about our position* Secondly, we are concerned by the fact that, as of now, in spite of the Security Council resolutions, we still have secessionist activities backed by outside interests relying en mercenaries«continuing in Katanga in defiance of the Central Government of the Congo, Vfe are also concerned that for more than two years the Katanga Government has illegally annexed tfce resources of the Congo and has prevented certain revenues due to the Central Government from being paid. Therefore, we feel that there should be consideration by all Powers, including the great Powers, that this activity in the Congo should be brought to an end, effectively, permanently end unconditionally* We request you to take immediate Steps, in collaboration with the Central Government of the Congo, to prevent by force if necessary the illegal exports from the Congo territory, including Katanga, of copper and other minerals on which full duty has not been paid to the Central Government. BHG/dr Ifl

G c n -Sach e , Ghana )

Then I am to request you, Sir, to maintain the position necessary for the enforcement of this measure, that ic preventing this illegal export, until such time as you are in a position to let toe Assembly Know that witJi lae ogreenent of the Central Government that all secession activities are at an and and that the Central Government itself is able to collect without hindrance the taxes due it from Katanga. I also wish to say that the Secretary-General and the .OrJUC Commanders, in the event of resistance "by armed force in Katanga to these measures, -which in fact include those that you have outlined, should take immediate steps to disband the Katanga forces. Sir, from the background of what I have just said, you will see that in fact we agree with you on the steps which you envisage. My Government is prepared- to support you through thick and thin, and we would appeal to all Governments, especially those which have troops in the Congo, to consider this very carefully. But then, as I have said, this is only a preliminary reaction on the part of the delegation of Ghana. We shall study the report which you have given us. My Government will, give me full instructions and we shall then be in a position to give our final views on your report.

.•• . • Mr, WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Mr. Secretary-General, our delegation is grateful. for your clear statement, which is very serious in character. We are grateful, because you have given us the real picture of the situation in the Congo, Our Government is following the developments in the Congo day by day. We are concerned about .the situation in the Congo. For the time being, our delegation is not concerned about the revenues or the export of the products of the Union Mini ere; neither are we concerned about the future structure of the unity of. the Congo State. But we are concerned about Mr, Tshcmbe. If you remember, Mr. Secretary-General, at the last meeting I put only one short question to you, namely, what, in your opinion, was the state of mind of Mr. Tshombe. I did so because we were dealing with him directly and personally. Wir.lopranoto, _ Indonesia )

Now, from your clear and comprehensive statement, our delegation comes to the conclusion that Mr. Tshcirbe is a dangerous man. lie is dangerous "because it is our impression that he places his personal interest above the interest of Katanga and the people of Katanga, "but even more than that, he places his personal interest over the interest or the State and people of the Congo,, including Katanga. For this roMvon alone, llr. Tshcinbe is dangerous,, In listening to your statement, Mr. Secretary-General, we came to another conclusion, which we held at the beginning, namely that Mr, Tshcmbe is an instrument of the Union Mini ere, That is a powerful organisation -- I do not know whether it is with or without the backing of the Government -- which ic playing a role, and a dangerous role, in this matter, one which I can describe in our vocabulary of this time as neo- colonialism. I cannot say that Katanga is a colony, because it belongs to the Congo and the Congo is a sovereign State. But the whole business in Katanga is typical of neo-colonialism. I understand that trie whole United Nations is condemning colonialism and also neo- colonialism* For all these reasons, now is the time for the United Nations, and especially for you, Mr. Secretary-General, because iyou are in charge of the implementation of the mandate of the Security Council, to act and to act vigorously. I understand you have your Plan and you have informed many Governments of the problems. But Mr. Secretary-General, believe me: you may have a good plan, but what is the backing of your Plan? In my view, it is not $200 million or $100 million a year -- that is not the backing, The backing is military force. This is clear because Mr. Tshcinbe himself in all his activities has developed a backing, and that is the military force of Mr. Tshcmbe. He has not decreased the number of mercenaries. On the contrary, he has invited mercenaries to return, in addition to the many who have been there from the beginning. Therefore, against this background and against the military build up of Mr. Tshombe, there is only one answer, and that is the build-up of the United Nations forces. I cannot see any other way. In my view, the matter is simple. BHS/dr (Mr. Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

Mr. Secretary-General, if you accept the line of thinking that force can only "be met by force, I have to state clearly that it is not our intention to be Qggreasive. That would be the biggest crime for the United Nations and for those Members that are sending troops. The United Nations must not 1)6 Stigmatized as on aggressor. If seme Member States are gains to send troops again, ve do not vant to take part in any kind of aggression, but rather we shall take part in the defence of legal rights, in the defence of the unity of the Congo, in the defence of the integrity of the Congo State and, above all, in the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism. That is our only motivation if we are going to take part again in thio action. I think that Mr, Tshcinbc will understand this language, especially if you are going to ask for a new mandate or a "broader mandate from the Security Council. At the same time, and even before that, you mu&t do something about a build-up, about strengthening .your military forces; otherwise, the Plan will remain merely a plan. TL/jpm MS (Mr, Wirjopranoto, Indonesia)

I am not authorized, Mr, Secretary-General, to state here to you and to -my colleagues what my Government is going to do in this connexion; but what I would like to suggest to you is that, besides this report, which ¥6 shall send immediately to our Governments with our recommendations, you could/ from your side, take some initiative in the cense of sending requests to certain Governments vhich, in your opinion, might be able on short notice to send military forces, and to get together the details of these natters -- the number, the date, and perhaps "Whether we can expect transportation -- because that is very important. I would 11 ka to make another suggestion; namely, that once all this has begun, you fix a time* If I am not mistaken, it is your intention to take this matter to the Security Council in perhaps one or two w^eks. I think that within ten days or two weeks, perhaps you will have more material concerning not your own problem, your plan, but rather the military problem, the military reinforcements, This is important, and I think that this information will also be useful in the debate in the Security Council, and I hope the Security Council will not ha split, oometimes the Security Council is able to take a unanimous decision, bub sometimes they are not able to do BO; sometimes they are not strong enough, in fact impotent. Bat if from your side you can say to the Security Council, "On my part I a.T. prepared to do this, this and this, VThat is the opinion of the Security Council?", this will facilitate the decision of the Security Council, and I hope they will unanimously support you. Furthermore, this language will "be understood by Tshombe and the Uni.cn Mini ft re.

The Acting BE(T^?APT-GIi?]^gAL ; On this I want to make a very brief estimation. According to the estimates of our military advisors, our existing ONUC forces in the Congo are adequate to cope with the existing sit^atiou there in the context of the existing Security Council resolutions. They are, of course, carefully watching the situation and they are confident of their ability to defend themselves in case they are attacked. They would need, of course, strengthening in some directions if new responsibilities aro to be imposed on them. That Is the main point,, My present thinking is that I do not want to think of reinforcements at this stage without the clear advice of this Committee and perhaps, if necessary, a fresh mandate from the Security Council, because any attempt to reinforce our fighting forces in the Congo might, among other things, involve a tremendous additional expenditure. As you all know, this has been one of my obsessions for some time. Certainly I will keep your observations in mind. TL/jpm

M^M-MS (Liberia): I did not want to say anything today, Mr, Secretary-General, "because the report that you have itade here will necessarily require very careful study before anyone, I believe, will be in a position to make any construct! contributions to the debate in this Advisory Committee. I have just baen handed this Plan of national reconciliation, I an sure other members or this body are in the same situation. 1 have noted here in this Plan that in respect to the question of constitutional arrangements, the establishment of a federal government for the Congo is envisaged* I would like to ask whether the other aspects of this, report, dealing with revenues and foreign exchange, military arrangements, amnesty, and the rest -- -whether the implementation of these other aspects is dependent upon the establishment of this federal type of government in the Congo.

Tho Agting_5EGRBTARY^QENBPAL: Ac I said, three commiDsionc are now functioning to .implement the provisions of this Plan, They are working ,' •. ; collectively, but one is not dependent on the other. The commissions are proceeding on the assumption that the Plan has been accepted by both parties, as it is our understanding that both Prime Minister Adoula and Mr. Tchombe have accepted the Plan, In the three commission5, the Central Government> the Katanga provincial authorities and the United Rations are represented. They are participating in all those commissions, which are proceeding on the assumption that the Plan is to be put into operation without waiting for the constitution.

Mr. COT.TLIDALY (Mali) (interpretation from French): My delegation thanks you, Mr. Secretary-General, for the statement you have just made, which has given us very interesting information concerning the development of the Plan which you have proposed for the solution of the Congo problem. Your.statement, to which we listened with great attention, gives proof that the Congo problem has not yet been solved, and that, on the contrary, there have been new developments I which require our closest attention. My Government considers that the Congo is an independent State. Therefore wo would have preferred not to interfere in anything involving its constitutional structure,, .But since we had to do so because of the situation which we all regret, we feel called upon under these circumstances to make certain observations we deem appropriate. TL/jpm 1*0-50

We are not yet familiar with the draft constitution which envisages the creation of a federal form of eovernniGnb* But en the basis of documents which we have received and which corre from certain pcllticy,!. parties i.^ '•;'"'? CC.U^QJ we Know that certain people in the Coiigo .v£,ve c:rpr2Psed mny i3scc.7at;.ons concerning this draft constitution as proposed. Ifoder these circumstances, my

delegation anxiously awaits the circulation ci" ths drai*t const! txit-Ion; which you have promised will take place. I recall, Mr. Secretary- General, that at our nest-to-the-last Liaoting you indicated that, in view of the fact that certain Governments seem to oe openly giving support, directly or indirectly, to the Katanga Government -- and it is this fact that has enabled Tshoaibe day "by day to stiffen his position -- you would communicate with these Governments and asji tt.ein to review in a more objective fashion the situation in the Congo. I would therefore like to know whether, within the framework of your Han and in view of the statements which you have made this afternoon, and also side by side with the measures vhich you

have envisaged within, toe Congo; you are also contemplating some action with respect to those Governments whose support, direct or indirect, to the Katanga Government is one of the determining factors that enable Mr. Tshombe to persist in his will to secede. AW/IOs 51

(Mr , CovTAbalyj fo? i )

Now "because of the importance of the documents which you have communicated to us and which should "be "brought to the attention of our Coverrânt^, I would like to ask whether you intend to have another meeting of our Cuît'ê oefora the Security Council meets so that at the next meeting wo could voice the opinions of our Government -with regard to there projects vhich have "been submitted to us« My Government was one of the African Governments vhich at the beginning of the Congo crisis sent troops to support the United Uations action in the Congo, but because of circumstances beyond our control, and vhich were especially motivated by the orientation and the use of United Nations troops in the Congo at that time, we' were led to call for the withdrawal of our troop o from the Congo* Taking into account this new plan that you have submitted, Mr. Secretary- General., we will coEJii-micate with our Government and draw its attention to your deeire to have a further military strengthening in case the situation would required further action by the United Nations troops , and the opinion of our Government will be communicated to you shortly.

The L A cting _SECRETARy-OEI7EIiAL; On the first point, of course I have " been in constant contact with the Governments primarily connected with the Congo 'and particularly those Governments which in my opinion exert, soma influence on Mr. Tshombe. These contacts have been continuing without interruption, and of course I can assure you once again that it shall be my constant endeavour to continue this practice. Regarding the holding of the next meeting, as I have indicated earlier, I am sure the members of this Committee might like to refer this question to their Governments, and I shall be glad to get the benefit of your advice regarding when we should meet again. My guess is that it should be at least after a period of one week. The verbatim records will be made available tomorrow around lunch time, and I should think that at least a week's notice will be. necessary. Of course I will be guided by the Committee's advice on this matter. AW/ids

Regarding the reference to the Security Covnc.il meeting; of course I made it clear in ay statement that, If the Implementation of Prime Minuter AdoulaT3 request is to be put through, the question of whether a reference to tho Security Council will "be necessary or not also has to "be decider! at the next meeting • Therefore, I will be glad if raeiabors of the Committee could indicate to me what should be the beat time for our next meeting. There is the suggestion that -we should meet ten flays from now* It has been suggested that either Monday, 22. October cr Tuesday, 25 October would be suitable. So let us meet at 3 p0ra0 on Tuesday, 27) October0

Mr, ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya): Mr, Secretary-General, as I gather it, the essence of your plan. Is to deny to the Katangece government payment of revenue by the Union Miniere.. I would like to ask a technical question about the collection of these taxes. Are they Just handed over by the Union Miniere to the Katongase government, or collected by the Katanga se government? If so, at what time are the taxes collected,, because that is the essence of your plan to deny the revenue to Mr. Tshombe. So we would like to know how these collections are made, and at what point are they collected?

The Acting; rECTET^jRY-GEJjlJlR^; The Union Miniere has been paying its taxes for the last two years directly to Mr. Tshombe 's government.

Mr. ISMAIL (Federation of Malaya): I am trying to draw a parallel with our Government where we have a lot revenue from mining and where it is the duty of the Central Government to collect the revenue, and we levy the taxes at the point of export. This is quite an important point,

The Acting SECRETARY -GEI1ER\L; The Central Government has no officers at the point of export because, as you know, Mr. Minister, the point of export is only in Angola * Now they have of course agreed to divert their export to Matadi, which is in the Congo. AW/ids 53-55

Mr. WACHTJKU (Nigeria): There-are two additional questions I would like to bring up so thfit the information I may require will be fuller. I notice that in the report we concentrated on the Central Government and Katanga. la the present position the Congo State is composed of six provincesn Kstens?! is one of them. There are five other provinces and the assumption is that the Central Government has control over the other fivec, Nov will the Acting Secretary-General "be good enough to supply us with information as to the state of affairs, broadly, in these five provinces so as to enable us to be able to assess the extent of control vhich the Central Government has in these five provinces and how effective it is, and this could be related to the problem of solution of the question of Katanga, particularly vhcn v;e read that Northern Katanga itself is now under control of the Central Govcrnrjant. If we have a report about the other side, I think that -will help.us to understand the picture. My other question is this.. Of. course we have been talking about reinforcement and military strength, I remember that in the report vhich was accepted by the General Assembly come time ago, it -was recommended that the Congolese army should be reorganized and retrained.. We -would also like to know to what extent the Congolese Army, vhich was supposed to be over 25,000 or so, has been retrained and regrouped and reorganised. Bsaauce again whatever we may do, the United Nations forces are not going there to stay. Ultimately it will be the Congolese Central Government troops that will keep lav and order in their own country. Therefore, it would be useful to my delegation to understand how far this question of retraining and reorganizing has gone, and to see •whether the Central Governmpnt is either strong or weak in tlie ce.se of maintaining law and order.by itself. With these two points, in addition to the questions I have asked, and also as regards the constitution and the various reports, I think that in ten days' time we should be able to have a fair idea of the situation so as to express perhaps constructive opinion on the nature of the solution that we may think will be effective in the Congo, bearing in mind the present situation. EC/bat %

The Acting CECPEmARY~aElTERAL; Regarding the first question I would say this: The Central Congolese Parliament has recently voted to have seventeen

new Provinces. As a result of this decision5 there arc now tuar.-vv.-one ProvinceG, Our information is that, apart from Soubh Katanga, the .latf find order situation in the Congo is comparatively stable, and there is a general feeling that the AIJC is in a position to look after this problem. Of course, when -we think of the Congo ve have to think of the situation in relative terms only. Hence, when we say that there is law and order in the Congo, apart from South Xatanga, ve mean that although lav and order has not "been completely restored, in the usual connotation, there are very good reasons to "believe that the ATIC can very well handle the situation, even without OHUC. The second question related to ANC training. It will "be recalled that I made this offer to Prime Minister Adoula as long ago as January of this year -- nine months ago. I have even gone ahead with the plan to enlist certain instructors from certain French-speaking countries. The response has "been very encouraging. But, for reasons vhich, I think, are more political than anything else, the Central Government has not "been able to accept iny offer. I think that Mr. Adoula • and his colleagues in the Government are thinking in terms of African instructors, if available. Of course, my offer of training the ANC stands. I have made this known to Mr. Adoula on several occasions, and it is up to the Central Government to respond to it. This aspect of the problem has never "been lost sight of, I thank the Foreign Minister of Nigeria for bringing these questions to my attention.

Mr. COULIBALY (Mali) (interpretation from French): The Acting Secretary-General in his statement mentioned the arrest of Mr. Gizenga. Now, when Mr. Gizenga was arrested the United Nations said that it wanted him to enjoy humane treatment and that it desired the safeguarding of human rights in relation to him. At the present time is the United Nations concerned about Mr. Gizenga, or is he being left completely in the hands of the Central Government? EC/tint 57

The Acting r-ECRETARY-GENEii/VL: I have repeatedly made personal requests to Prime Minister Adoula to see to it that Mr. Gizenga receives treatment in accordance with the law of the land. On purely humanitarian grounds I have several times requested him to see to it that Mr. Gisenga's healtil and security are not endangered in any way. Only recently, as I have already stated here, our colleatrae, the representative of Guinea, had an opportunity to vicit the Republic of the Congo and he saw Mr. Glzenga personally. We have also made repeated requests to the Central Government to try Mr. Glzenga under the lav of the land immediately or to release him. To the best of our knowledge, Mr. Gizenga is receiving reasonably good treatment. Eefore the meeting adjourns, I should like to reiterate the appeal I made. I want to stress once again the confidential nature of the statements made at this meeting and of the documents distributed,, I am deeply concerned that we should do nothing here to upse'I: any applecarts, because we are passing through a very delicate stage of our operations in the Congo, and I am sure that I reflect the views of all the members of the Committee vhen I say that we should, all of us, give the Plan every reasonable opportunity to succeed. . - We shall meet again on Tuesday, 23 October, at 5 p.m.

The meeting rose at 5*10 p.m. CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No, 71 6 November ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TIE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New YorK, on Tuesday, 6 November 196?, at 5 p.m.

In the Chair: U THANT Tne Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL

Members: Canada Mr. TREHBIAY Ceylon Mr. MALAIASEKERA Ethiopia Mr. GE3RE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. ONG Ghana Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY Guinea Mr. DIALLO India 14r.. CHAICRAVARTY Indonesia Mr. SOSROWARDOJO Ireland Mr. AIIffiN Liberia Mr. COE Mali Mr.. COULIBALY Morocco Mr., BEKIffivL\ • Nigeria Mr. ADEBO Pakistan Mr, HAI©MI Senegal Mr. DELGADO Cudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden Mrs. ROSSEL Tunisia Mr. Taieb SLIM United Arab Republic 1-Ir. RIAD Congo (Leopoldville) Mr. Bomboko

62-2^58 BC/gws

The Acting SECjRKTAJg-GETJEf^L! Members of the Committee, we last met on 12 October. Meetings scheduled on two subsequent occasions postponed -- In the last Instance for unavoidable reasons well known to you, I regret any inconvenience that you may have experienced "because of these postponements. At cur last meeting, as you will recall, I made an extended statement which included references to a number of possible actions on which the Views of your Governments were. Invited, Since then, there have been some new developments in the Congo which your Governments may also wish to take into account in determining tiicir views. The most important of these new developments are dealt with in a letter to Mr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe which Mr. Gardiner has recently dispatched on my behalf. I am now circulating this letter to you on a strictly confidential basia, since it is in the hands of the parties and we are awaiting their replies before releasing the text of the letter. It is my intention to include this letter and the replies to it in the report on the Plan to the Security Council which is still in preparation, Mr. Gardiner will be talking to the parties about their replies before they are actually formulated and sent to him. He will be going to Elisabethville again for this purpose, probably this week. We are giving the Plan every chance; we are sparing no effort to make it work. But obviously this cannot go on indefinitely. There must be a limit, a time-limit. It follows that if the replies to Gardiner's letter are not satisfactory; if Mr. Adoula should be negative, which is not likely, or — and this is much more likely -- if there is no clear action by Mr. Tshombe to take the necessary moves to ensure reintegration> then obviously the Plan must be abandoned and new measures must be adopted. At that point I shall of course want to consult with you again. Aa the letter indicates, the time for the implementation of the Plan is rapidly running out. I am inclined to regard 15 November — that is, nine days from now — as a reasonable deadline for receipt of the replies. BC/gws 3-5

(The Acting Secretary-General)

Mr. Gardiner was informed yesterday that Mr« Tshombe is "st^yJug" the letter. Just now Mr. Adoula is preoccupied with the reopening of Parliament. Moreover, as you will note from the text which is just being distributed of the address given by Mr, Tshombe on J November at the "burial ceremony of two KstdLJi-c-se polioecen killed in an incident on 1 November by Tunisian soldiers, Mr. Tshonibe still chooses to talk like the head of an independent State. More information about the incident of the Katangcse police will be given to you later. HA/ids 6

(The Acting Secretary-General)

Since our last meeting also, Prime Minister Adoula has ^presented the draft Constitution to the Presidents of the Provinces, who vere invited to ' a meeting in Leopoldville for this purpose, although Mr. Tshcmbe decided not to be represented, reportedly because the invitation to him referred to the Province or Gouth Katanga. The Congolese Government rao.de available a limited number of copies of the draft Constitution for distribution to the members of this Committee on a confidential basis, and you have now had them for sone time. Incidentally, an informal ^n^lyeia of this Conetitution by our legal experts in the Secretariat, in terms especially of how it meets the constitutional requirements of the Plan, indicates that it is entirely adequate in this respect. It remains for the new Constitution to be brought into effect through its submission to Parliament by the Prime Minister. As you know, Dr. Bunche recently made a short visit to the Congo, at my request, to undertake seme intensive consultations. In a moment, he will give you some of his impressions. Knowing that the Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo came here more thna a week ago with the primary purpose of addressing the meeting scheduled for last Tuesday, which unfortunately had to be postponed, I think it would be the right thing to do to give him the floor for any remarks which he may wish to make at this time. Before I do so, however, I call on Dr. Bunche for a brief report.

Mr. EUNCins i I may say at the start that I derived encouragement from the observations made and the consultations undertaken in the course of my six-day visit to the Congo. There were certain positive factors in the picture there which were responsible for this. First of all, the ONUC organization was stronger in leadership, in planning, and in its contacts and relationships in both the military and the civilian echelons. Mr. Gardiner, General Kebbede, General Prem Chand and General Klintberg make a fine team and work together most effectively. HA/ids 7-10 (Mr. Bunche)

Secondly, the ONUC operation no longer has to diffuse its personnel and its energies all over the vast territory of the Congo in trying to get a government established or Parliament convened and protected* The AIiC is much improved in discipline, in leadership and in reliability. It is shoving an ability to take over frcra ONUC., in a number of areas, full responsibility for security 3^.;. Tor the maintenance of law and order, with ONUC providing only limited logistic support to the ANC in these areas. This relieves the United Nations troops for concentration in other areas where they are most needed, and particularly in Katanga, I may say in this regard that the ANC conti?;>gent, winch was made available to the United Ifo-ions Force seme months ago and which is stationed at Kaaina "base, is working out very well indeed. According to the reports of all our officers, there has been a steady improvement in the performance of this unit, in the pride and industry of its personnel. A third factor is found in the fact that Mr. Tshombe is gradually being hedged in. In this regard, attention may be called to the situation in North Katanga, which is now mostly under ANC and OIIUC control, with only three cr four pockets of Katangese gendarmerie remaining in that area. The largest concentration is in the Baudouinvil.le area, where some three battalions of the gendarmerie are deployed. There is a sizable pccket at Koagolo also, but this is completely surrounded — and has been, for some time now — by elements of the AUG. In South Katanga, Elisabethville — as you know — is completely under United Nationo control,and also Kamina base. What io not known—there have been no public reports about it -.- is that today, in Elisabethville, the Central Government has customs and immigration personnel who have come there for the purpose of setting up, under ONUC protection, customs and immigration offices.

t FGB/vb 11

(Mr. Eunche )

These personnel have come to Elicabethville With the consent, albeit perhaps a "bit reluctant, of the Katangose authorities. Indeed, just yesterday, the Congolese Minister of Defence, with a number of Congolese military obcervers/ came to Elisabethville, and the KLnister of Defence hw-i scAfT.dv.lcd a confersnca with Mr.- Tshosfce for yesterday afternoon. The military observers are to form the Congolese elements of the mixed military observer teams that arc to be deployed in North Katanga* In this context I also might make passing reference to a conversation I hod in Leopoldville wi-uh Mi% Ngtilula, the chief Congolese representative in Elisabethv.i'i.le for several v^iks when the comjp.Ljsions "were meeting in connexion with the implementation of the plan. MX-. Ugalula informed me that • he had a free run of J51:lfa.obebln^lle including the African communes, and that he encountered no hostility on the part of the African inhabitants of that city, ' There are three strategic points in the south of Katanga vhich have still not been penetrated by United Nations troops or personnel, though Kolwezi and JacLotville have on occasion ber-in visited by one cr t\jo United Nations officials; Kolvesi being most recently visited — juct last veoli in fact -- "by Mr. Kathu accompanied "by tvo officers. These three strategic points, of .course, are Jadotville, Koluezi e.nd Kipusiii, and they are the heart and the nerve centre of the mining industry of Katanga, of the province's export rout03,-arid therefore are. the main source of Mr, Tchomoe's revenue and, consequently,of his power. The mercenaries remaining in Katanga are largely concentrated in these localities, and also the Katangese air force, vhich, as the Committee knovs from the recent report to the Security Council, has been built up* ONUC, the United Nations Force, must gst to all three of these places. We hope that it can be done -without fighting, and I think I can say that there is sound basis for that hope. If the United Nations Force is strong and veil prepared, ready to fif/nt if it must but never to initiate fighting, it is the belief of all competent observers that I tallied to in the Congo, United Nations and non-United Nations, that the United Nations Force vill not be challenged by the Katangese and vill never have to fight again. FGB/vb 12

(Qfr. Bunche)

ONUC I found to be strong and secure in Katanga > and especially in Eli ca"bc thville and Kamina base, and I may say it is getting stronger, I nicy say also that in recent months OMJC has been deliberately quits restrained in its actions in order not. to hamper efforts under "way towards peaceful r~,ccr:.'::U ;.c.tic:ic Thero are also, of course, certain negative factors in the picture. First and foremost is the prolongation of the Katanga crisiD no-w for two and a quarter years. This suits Mr. Tsliom^e's purposes admirably. He constantly plays fcr time, jn f?,ot« Secondly, -chc-rc is the possibility always of an Internal political crisis which cou'.d threaten to throw the Congo again into chaos, though I must say that Prime Minister Adoula seemed to rns to be quite confident and in good spirits -when I last, talked "with him a •week or so ago* It must be mentioned on the negative side, of course, that the economy of the country is in "bad shape. There is a most acute lack of foreign exchange. There has been considerable breakdown in the distribution system and in essential services in the provinces* Before concluding I should mention, I think, two other matters •which have come to the attention of the members of the Committee in one way or another. One is the recent incident involving the Tunisian soldiers. This was an incident involving Tunisian soldiers and Katangese police which took place during the evening of 1 November in Elisabethville, According to a preliminary report from the CIj'UC representative in Elisabethville a group of Tunisan soldiers went to a movie on that evening, and there they were molested by Katangese police. The Tunisians called their batallion for protection, and during an ensuing altercation they fired, killing one Katangese policeman and wounding another who, it appears, later died. The Tunisians asserted that they acted in self-defence because they were attacked, The Officer- in- Charge of OIIQC, Mr. Gardiner, has ordered an immediate investigation into the incident, and that investigation is now in process. By the terms of the Status of Force Agreement with the Congolese Government members of ONUC are exclusively subject to the jurisdiction of their own Governments and not to the jurisdiction of either the Central Government or the authorities of Katanga. The attempt of the Katangese police to arrest PGB/vb 13-15 (Mr. Bunche)

the Tunisians -was, therefore, vroug. In the interrogation — ve have just learned from a cable that carae in shortly before this meeting — the Xatangese Police Commissioner had acknowledged that he attempted to seize a sub-machine gun from a ^v^-ji^ aergeaut immediately before the fatal firing. IThf, other matter is the reopening of Parliament. The two Chambers of Parliament met at nine o'clock yesterday morning, 5 November. The Senate, -which did not have a quorum — only thirty-one members ucre present vhile -the required quorum is forty-three; -- immediately adjourned until this morning, and at this morning's meeting it did have a quorum* The C..';uiaber of .Representatives, the lover Chamber, had a quorum at yesterday's meeting but did not have one at this morning!s meeting. Yesterday the Chamber elected a temporary President and appointed a commission of GL^X to check on the credentials of the alternates vho had come forward to take the places of former representatives who are now serving in provincial governments and assemblies. On the eve of the convening of Parliament President Kaca«-Vutu nc.dc a statement over the radio in v/hich he called for the adoption of a federal constitution and a new financial lav concerning the division of revenues between the Central Government and the Provinces, He aloo dismissed the rumour of an Lmtnont dissolution of Parliament. RSE/nz 16

Mr.^POMBpKO (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French); Before dealing vith the very specific questions on which I would lite to retire a statement on behalf of my Government, I should like to thank the Acting Secretary-General for having E£u:Le this meeting possible during ray brief stay in New York. I realize that the attention of this Organization is now turned towards the Caribbean where tlierj is a threat to international peace end security. Although this subject is not directly concerned with our present meeting, I must say how much my Government appreciated your rapid action, your indefatigable efforts, your Skill, intelligence and energy in dealing with this serious problem* We found again proof of the courage which you shoved during the crib.lr in the Congo. Indisputably, the situation in the Caribbean should have priority in the United Nations over the older problem of the Congo, but, nevertheless, I should like to focus your attention on the particular mission which my Government has given to me, which is proof of the importance which it attaches to what I am going to say. I should like to focus attention on the urgent measures which must be taken to ensure the fulfilling of the mandate of the United Nations in the Congo. For the twenty-eight months during which the Organization has been in the Congo, during which time it has borne burdens which are unprecedented in its history, I never doubted for one moment that the personnel executing the mandate planned on accomplishing the task which had been given to it in the shortest possible time. Nevertheless, there are serious reasons for believing that unjustifiable delays have been created and that, instead of bringing the Organization nearer to the accomplishment of its mandate, a certain tolerance or even negligence has kept it away from it. In speaking about the present situation, I would not like to dwell on how far we are from realising the goals set out in the United Nations resolutions. This Would be too pretentious, because the elements are tremendous and the situation is still very uncertain. Eut I would like to say, on behalf of my Government, that the Organization is still far from accomplishing the goals set forth in the resolutions, and the very basis of the United Nations would be threatened if that tack were not accomplished* The Government of the Congo asked for assistance and aid from the United Nations at a time when its independence and territorial integrity were threatened. It had confidence in the Organization and accepted its decisions. RSH/nz 17 (Mr. Fomboko, Conpo (Leopoldville)) Certainly it "benefited from considerable technical assistance, but^ on the essential rmttern, so far RS t-iie tsrrlfcori'i.! integrity; the exercics of sovereignty on the entire national territory, and the end of foreign secession in Elisabothvllle are concerned, no progress lias "been achieved. I do not intend to deal vita all the "background of t<22 question, since the members of -'^Is CoisDittee know that background, the peaceful attempts by the Governi'ii^nt, -since the conferences at Tananarive, Coquithatville, and Kitcna, and the negotiations at Leopoldville, The results of these attempts to .reach a peaceful solution are limited to.premises'which have not been kept and to an attitude on the pai't of the teL-ji in Elisabethville to try to go,in time and "by all n?eans to perpetuate tfcs secession. We jave fcund only atfiJ.ling tactics, and these stalling tactics practiced by Tsho:nbehave finally discouraged all those who believed that negotiations foraad the only way-to follow, and you yourself, Mr. Secretary- General? were obliged to adulttea'ti-ivti ho f this. Tsboinbe and his masters or.ly yield when they feel themselves under heavy pressure and we believe that for this reason ycu have finally worked out a Plan for the reintegration of Katanga into the Republic of tha Congo. We accepted and supported this plan because, on the whole, we believed that it was a valid programme to re-establish national sovereignty over Couth Katanga and control over the foreign companies in this region. The public statements made in favour of the Plan in Western capitals have encouraged us, and statements that have been made in public have also given us hope. However, neither .certain western Powers nor the- great - mining coc-'panies were ready at that time, and they are still not ready today, ' to put an end to Katangese secession. Neither the British Government nor the- ••• Belgian Government have given us the collaboration which is especially necessary for .the implementation of the Blan. Their attitude has only encouraged Tshcmbe to delay the execution of that Plan or simply to refuse to agree to certain * -•-. - concrete points in that Plan. _ - . • . So far as the Congolese Government is concerned, it has .done everything possible to. implement the Plan. In the first place, there was the question of - the provisions of the Constitution. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, the Congolese Government has finished the drafting of this Constitution, with the help of United Nations experts in federal constitutions. The Prime Minister has ccnoiurilcated that draft to the. Provincial Assemblies, and the draft has also been submitted to Parliament., . This is what the Plan asked for, and .this is what we have done. RSH/nz 18-20

(Mrf Bcmboko, Con^o (Lcopoldvllle))

Tlie second chapter of the Plan concerned financial questions« The Central Government was asked to work out a financial law containing previsions for the division of income, A draft has already "been -worked out and submitted for the approval of the Chambers* In his address on k November, President Kaca-Vubu recommended that the Chambers should examine this bill urgently. He said: "In order to give to the Provinces the material possibilities for survival., it is necessary urgently to enact a financial law providing for a division of the revenue between the Central Government and the provincial bodies. The law will put an end to the difficulties between the Central Executive and the Provincial Executives, it will make it possible, for the Provinces to carry out on a good basis their budgetary plans for 19t>3«" This is what President Kasa-Vubu stated in his address, Still in the financial area, iimnpdiate steps — I would stress the word "immediate" -- have been provided for. Indisputably, the most important aspect of the problem is the financial one, not because for us it is merely a matter of money, but because it is the monopolies and the tremendous income derived from the mining areas of the Congo, which have enabled foreign companies to maintain . the secession. This is where foreign financial interests are directly concerned. The authors of the Plan correctly understood that this was the crux of the problem, and that is why a revenue division commission should be set up immediately. The Central Government appointed representatives and sent them to Elisabethville, but Mr. Tshombe's representatives limited themselves to bringing up again for discussion the validity and the interpretation, and the special provisions, of the Plan. They declined to discuss the terms of the divisions which were provided for in the Plan. Tshombe was satisfied to pay $2 million to the credit of the Government, on an account in London, of course. , He tried to show in this way that he was giving a kind of gift to the Government. This dishonest gesture was described by Tshombe as an indication of good will, but the Central Government did not recejLve it. The Central Government has demanded only what is legally due to it. The Plan is, clear on this point, and it should be applied faithfully and straightforwardly. GRR/gws 21

( Mr «• B onb oko, C on £Q (Le opol Avi ll.e ) )

In regard to foreign currency, for the unification of reserves and for the exchange of currency a second ccmmisaicn was to be set up im^-Iiately, Representatives of the Government were named and information was supplied oy the .Central Government, but. instead, of co-operating in the implementation of tha P3.an, Tshonibs gave only evasive answers which wera equivalent to a refusal. EG stated that he did not have any foreign exchange and ha refused to send the funds he was ..supposed to. The Acting Secretary-General's plan did not provide for .thase exeepcionc. •Prime Minister Adoula in accordance vith the application of the Plan recalled, the legislation on the control of exchange and the obligation to pay foreign currency to the Central Government. He particularly requested the collaboration of the Belgian Government with a view to obtaining its support vis-a-vis the Belgian companies in the settlement of the question of exchange. • Belgium has not yet even deigned to answer our request, although as you all know that country had publicly stated that it was in favour of the Plan. Mr. Adoula also requested he3.p from neighbouring countries in the area, but neither Portugal in Angola nor Great Britain in Rhodesia have followed up this request. The third chapter of the Elan stated that the Central Government should invite the UN to request the IMF to instruct its experts to work out a plan for currency unification. A few days c-.go I learned that the experts had gone . to the Congo, but they had not yet arrived when I left. To consolidate his secession Tshocibe and all those who support him have set up.a veritable army, although they call it a gendarmerie. This group of • mercenaries have great power. No durable solution can be found as long as Tshombe remains at the head of this illegal army. The Acting Secretary-General understood these dangers, and that is why his Plan attached great importance to military problems. First of all there was the provision that all military units, para-military units or gendarmerie should take an oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic. No officer, either then or later, has ever given an oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic, no matter what rumours have been circulated about this. On the contrary, Tshombe wanted to drag the Central Government into vain and pointless discussions. GRR/gvs 22 (Mr* Borcboko, Con^o (Leopoldville))

Secondly, a military commission was eet up and the Central Govom-nent, put its delegates at the disposal of the provincial delegates of South Kat^ca* Here again there vere no results "because the Katangese negotiators age* in put in doubt the very principles of the Plan- The Plan provided that the Acting Secretary-General should appeal to the Prime Minister and to Tshorube to stop any movement of troops, this in order to facilitate the reintegrating of the Katangese gendarmerie into the army of the Congo* But Tshombe demanded talks with a view to concluding a limited cease-fire, thus transforming the very spirit of the Plan0 There vas no question of discussing this; it was just a question of acceding to the Acting Secretary-General1? appeal and above all of stopping the movement of troops even in South Katanga. The United Nations was to verify compliance by all military units, but it was not able to fulfil its mission, because Tshombc forbade it to go to Jadotvillc and Kipushi in South Katanga. The team, in power established bases there as well as refugees for all mercenary soldiers. with the assistance of the United Nations experts we were to set up in thirty days a plan for the integration and unification of all military units, para-military unite and gendarmerie within the Congolese units. Here again Tshombe broke his word. In the third and last place, a period of two months was proposed and was accepted in which the integration and unification would take place. Not only was this not brought about within the sixty days, it has not yet even been begun. We are wondering, therefore, what was the use of insisting on the Plan, on which we placed a great part of our confidence, if it was not to "be respected. Fpur points remain to be analysed. The first concerns representation abroad.. When he accepted the Plan two months ago, Tshorabe agreed to abolish his Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the missions which have been established abroad. The countries which had received his envoys also publicly agreed to aboilah the missions, I must tell this Committee that not only do the missions continue to exist in Brussels, but foreign consulates in Elisabethville continue to consider Mr. Kimba as Foreign Minister, This remark applies to all the consulates in Elisabethville as well as to the consulate of Belgium, which is maintained there in spite of our protests., lhat consulate has never received the exequatur of the Congolese Government. GRR/gd 25 (Mr. Eomboko, 'Congo (Leopoldville))

The interference of these Consuls has "been particularly evident daring the last few months of negotiation in Ulicabethville. They attempted to influence the parties, including Mr. Adoula's representatives. It is impossible to deny their complicity in the working out and in the signature of the so-called cease-fire agreement. On the other hand, the Central Government has acted in conformity with the by establishing, on the airport at iillisabethville, immigration services to deliver passports, to the Congolese living in that part of the country, as the Acting Secretory-General and Mr, Euiiche have ,just said. The second point concerns the umnesty. A legislative text is "being drafted, "but vc must emphasize here that it is only political offences which will be the subject of the amnesty. It will be impossible to allow to escape unpunished those who have committed common-law crimes. In any case, the amnesty can only come into effect if the Elisabethville provincial authorities definitely renounce secession, In the third place co-operation with the United Ilations was encouraged. I do not think that anyone can doubt the intention of my Government to collaborate, but one cannot say the same thing about Kr. Tshombe. Lastly, the Central Government was to be reconstituted. The offer made by Mr. Adoula to Mr, Tshombe and his party is still valid, and at any moment we are ready to ensure the representation of South Katanga in the Central Government, Here again we must emphasize that there is a precondition: Gouth Katanga must be integrated into the Republic. We do not wish, as we say in our country, to put the crocodile in the boat. You know that we had agreed that the Katangese parliamentarians should core to sit in Parliament, although at that nooent Mr. Tahcmbe had not yet renounced secession. What did these gentlemen do? They created in Leopoldville a centre of subversion to bribe the members of Parliament, destroy the Central Government and even attack the United Nations Mission, That is an experience which we cannot forget and uy Government cannot agree that members of the Conakat Party of Mr. Tshcube join the Government unless Mr. Tehocibe really gives up his idea of secession. GRR/gd 24-25 (Mr. Bomboko, Conp;o (Leopoldville))

I said at the beginning of my statement that the Congolese Government had accepted the Plan "because it Relieved that Its faithful application would "be able to settle the Katongeso problem. Furthermore, the Acting Secretary-General's propocals both explicitXy and implicitly called for finaneCB and honesty in the epplicetion of the Plan. QH/rh 26

^... Congo Theopoldvllle))

As far a3 Implementing the Plan is concerned, the author l-tiec. o:? Elisabethville have "been quite faithless, Apart from certain Dpoetac measuresy which were really negligible, they have not contributed f,o CO lilt 5 on of ths problsin, They hcva Bent seme copper for export via. Lcoyoldville while the other experts are still going through Angola ancl Jthodecia, Since the first 'two vagonloads were sent, there has not "be3n another which passed through the national route. This ahows that it is only for purposes of propaganda that these two vagonloads were originally sent, and as for the construction of the "bridge, Mr. Tshcmhe was psrmit^ad to mofce a speech on it, to say that he had "built it. But the "bridge war. "built thanks to the collaboration of the United Nations and the Central Government;, Mr. Tshombe took advantages of the opportunity to slander the Central Government and even the United Nations, They claim to have opened communications with Leopcldville, "but in fact, no progress has "been made, Belgium is still maintaining its radio and telegraphic ccmmiinications directly with Elisahethville, thus ehowiug its contempt for the Congolese Government, They cay that they are ready to open the airport at Elisabethville, but when we try to do it they arrest the aircraft crews which are flown in and the United Nations does nothing, about it. Mr. Tshcnfbe is only trying to play for time. The dispatch with which, the Plan should have been applied point by point is the very essence of it. It is not by chance that the Secretary-General, envisaged immediate sanctions. The programme often uses the term "immediately". This does not mean in the future, but immediately; that is to say, ao soon as the indispensable conditions are realizable. When we say "immediately" we envisage an action to be taken at once. It should not be held up any longer than necessary except to give the orders and to take the measures for excluding all discussion on the substance of the problem. As far as the military aspect is concerned, delays of a month or more were envisaged, and accepted, Eut if any delay is not respected, the Plan will be pointless, The report of the Cfficer-in-Charge of CMJC, Mr. Gardiner (S/505J/Add,l-2), and the commentaries and explanations, as well as the information provided by the Secretary-General, leave no doubt about the exceptional seriousness of the situation. M//rh 27 (l-Ir. Bomboko, Con^o (LeopoJ.dville ) )

My Government ic rarticulnrly a\rarc of this seriousness be~o.u\;e of the fact that, at the moment of the implementation of the Secretary-General1a Plan Mr. Tshombe and the Elisabethville authorities seemed to reinforce their position by means of military equipment in a more alarming way than at any time since 19^0, While the Central Government; in conformity with its desire to receive the crisis by peaceful means, took upon itself the task of inplementing one after another the points in the Plan Mr. Tshoinbe has been violating the promises and commitments which had bean mads, taking advantage of the patience of the Central Government in order to continue to arm himself. I have no intention of prophesying the future, but certainly Tshombe's intentions are resistance and opposition to the unification of the Congo and refusal of the Plan and of the Federal Constitution. In a word, it will mean the failure of all our efforts. Indeed the growth of the air force of Mr. Tshonbe could be of strategic importance. The quantity ond quality of his military aircraft, as well as his arms and aranunition, give him an apparent superiority over United Nations forces, if not indeed the power to paralyse all actions of the United nations. This is an indication of the dangerous possibilities in the development of the situation. Not only can the United Rations be attacked or continually harrassed, but also can be deprived of any means of effective action. It will no longer have the necessary instruments for the realization of an eventual economic pressure. I would say then that if effective measures are not taken immediately, the Organization will experience a grievoue failure in the Congo. An urgent plan must be drawn up assuring a logistic support of economic pressures. The Secretary-General can continue his consultations with the Belgian and British Governments with a view to obtaining supplementary and more positive efforts than in the past for the implementation of the Plan. The acceptance or adherence to the Plan will remain a dead letter unless t,hese Governments forbid and prevent the hostile activities of private companies against the Congo. The two Governments could exercise effective control over the companies which are transporting or providing arms and financial resources for the purchase of such arms. It has always been insisted that the Central Government should have discussions with Mr. Tshombe. In general, it is not with Mr. Tshoinbe that we should hold discussions because he is not the one who is really responsible. Those who are really responsible are behind him. They are the industrial MW/rh 28

ropoldvllle)) companies operating in our country* It would be a good thing to invite those companies to "begin discussions frankly with the Central GevernmoTrt. In spite of all the appeals which we have made to then/ these companies do not wish to respond to our offers of discussion. They refuse because they know very veil that they are the foundation of secession itself. My Government does not. "believe that the Itelgian and Eri'tish Governments are incapable of doing this. The nations of the Ccmncnwealth could study and adopt a pressure policy which would be effective QG fnr as the United Kingdom and Rhodesia are concerned. Their intervention could also make a positive contribution to the solution of the problem, as vas the case at the time of the Suez crisis, for example. The Organization could give clearer and more substantial support than it has in the past to the Central Government in the military field. The General Assembly couli decide on measures to be taken with regard to South Africa and Portugal, which are directly and overtly encouraging Katangese secession, since up to now Portugal has not replied 'to the demand of the Central Government regarding the transport of copper. The Security Council and, in its turn, the General Assembly, could authorize the Secretary-General to use the best possible means to institute an economic blockade against South Katanga, for if the use of force is condemned as a means of resolving the Katangese crisis, force could be shown/and applied, if not utilized, to assure the effectiveness of economic measures. The presence of the United Nations Force and its reinforcement would have an indirect effect in supporting the resolutions of the United Nations, In conclusion, my Government, although it continues to attach importance to the Plan which we have accepted, and which we cannot renounce, requests the United Nations to apply this plan immediately and without delay, no longer discussing with Mr. Tshonbe, because when the Plan, was presented the question was simply whether Mr. Tshcinbe would say yes or no, Gince that time, Mr, Tshombe has been given the chancp of getting cut of it because he was given the opportunity of discussing it with us. There have been times, as I have indicated in my speech, when Mr. Tshombe even wished to place in doubt the principles of the Plan which he had already accepted. What we want is to invite Mr. Tshombe to carry out, by concrete, positive acts, what the Plan asks of him, which is to MW/rh 29-30 (LIT* Bc-'pbokOt Congo CLeopoldville))

make his contribution to the Plan, The Central Government has already done its part, as I have indicated to the members of the Ccmnittee, c.Tcopt 3>or two or three questions such as questions of the arancsty nr.d reconstit-ution of the Government. The Central Govcrnjnevit has put into effect "what the Flan has asked of it, except in these cascp, ML-, Tahombe muat understand that he must put into effect -what he has promised. It in necessary above all to finish with these

decays and not to go on discussing eternally0 We must fix a date so, that if Mr, Tchombe goes beyond it, sanctions will go into effect because Mr, Tshornbe always counts on the fact that, through discussion,. one can continue to the end

of next year without any measures having been taken0 This is the only condition on which we arc prepared to support the Plan and to carry out all that it demands of us. The Central Government Jias confidence in the United Nations and that is why ve have agreed to the Plan, What we ask now is the faithful application of the Plan, BC/ids 31

(1>lr- Bcnboko/ Congo (leopor.dville))

As regards, for example, the stopping of troop move.T.rats^ the C^rV/ral Government is prepared to do this. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Minister of National Defence is now in Elisabcrhvillo, But. these

troop movements should not relate only to North Kaluga0 Troop ir.ovememts must be stopped throughout Katanga, including South Kat-?.n#i. Indeed, troop movements could be stopped in the North but the bases wouD.d be left at Mr. Tshcmbe's disposal, and he vould continue as always to supply and reinforce his positions in North Katanga. Furthermore, it is incredible that the United Nations has not so far been authorized to penetrate the very bases of the rebellion of Katanga — that is, tho bases of Kolve?,!, Jadotville and Kipushi. That is where Mr, Tshcmte has stockpiled his war materiel. That is where, as is known, . all the mercenaries are hidden. These hotbeds are in the process of being consolidated, and no action has been taken to destroy them. Go long as they are not destroyed, it will be possible for Mr. Tshcmbe to "be the stronger because he will continue to arm and reinforce his military effectives* He will, therefore, accept no peaceful solution because he will believe that his force can oppose that of the United Nations and that of the Central Government. I think that in Katanga we must give a demonstration of force so that we do not have to use it later. BC/ids 32

The Acting SECRETARY-GflNBKAL; I thank the Foreign Minister of the Congo for his very useful statement. At this stage I would make only one cerement* I agree with the Foreign Minister that ve should not await indefinitely Mr. Tshcmbe's reply regarding his acceptance or rejection of my r.V>zr* As I said in my earlier statement today, I have set 15 November — that is, only nine d^ys frcm now — as the deadline for the receipt of replies. I have corvt-ysd this information to Mr. Gardiner today, and he will convey it to Mr. Tsnornbe — most probably this week, perhaps even on Thursday. I am sure that members of the Congo Advisory Committee will agree with me that a definite deadline should be set at this stage and that it will serve no useful purpose to await indefinitely Mr, Tshcmbe's reaction,

Mro CIIAKRA VARTY (India): I have asked to speak only to try to undo the mischief which has been created by certain speculative reports that have appeared in the Press. Some of my colleagues here have been asking whether it is a fact that, as has been stated in the Press, India has demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Indian contingent of troops in the Congo. I wish to avoid further speculation by making this short statement. There is no truth in these Press reports. All that happened was this: I came to see the Acting Secretary-General yesterday with the specific object of handing over a certain communication. I naturally took the opportunity to ask him about the situation in the Congo, particularly because our good friend Mr. Bunche had returned from there so recently. But I would like to make it clear that the report that we have asked to withdraw our troops from the Congo area is not correct. I must, however, also make it quite clear that India — and I am sure that this applies equally to the United Nations as a whole — would not like to keep its troops in the Congo indefinitely. We have made it quite clear on various occasions, including those on which I have had the privilege of seeing the Acting Secretary-General, that we would not like to keep the troops in the Congo a day longer than is absolutely essential* Vfc hope that a settlement in the Congo will be achieved very soon, enabling us to withdraw our troops. That is a hope which we have always expressed and which we continue to express. BC/ids 35

'• • ' (Mr . ChaKravarty, Trivia)

I would also like to use this opportunity to say that it is G very depressing account that we have heard fr era the Foreign Minicter of the Congo. I can only repeat what I said on the last occasion -- namely, that the time which has been laid down must be strictly edhered to and Mr, TshCube should not be giver. CLM opportunity to delay by interminable negotiations. Ccrr.:.n^ b^ck to the Press report, I would repeat that we regret this report, particularly since it is going to help nobcdy except, perhaps, Mr. Tshcmlie, who may think that others might withdraw their troops — sane thing which would be entirely to his advantage.

_ In the first p.lace, I should like to associate myself with the view expressed "by the representative of India that the account to which we have just listened is a very depressing one. But J. must say that it is not a surprising one, because, although we have not had inside knowledge, we have all "been following the Pi-ess reports on what has seemed to "be going on in the Congo. I am not sure, Mr. Secretary -General, just how much discussion you would like today. You have, just informed us that you have now given a dead-line to Mr. Tshcm'oe and Mr. Adou.la for the full acceptance of your proposals. I assume, therefore, that we ought to wait until the expiration of that dead-line, and th«n meet to give you our advice about what should he done. • You have, Mr. Secretary-General, also circulated for our information the draft Constitution which the President of the Congo has submitted to his Parliament. That draft ic . the . result not only of the efforts of the Congolese thcirselves, but also of the efforts of certain experts when you have been pleased to appoint. We have received only the French text of thlc Constitution* It is a document, of real importance to us all, even though it has been sent to us for our information only. I therefore took the opportunity a few days ago of asking you, Mr. Secretary-General, as you are aware, whether you would not be kind enough to procure for us an English translation of this document so that we might be able to examine it with intelligent interest. You explained to me what the difficulties were — that this is a very important legal document and, while you had good people who could translate it into English, no translation would carry the authenticity of the French text. I ventured to observe that, i. <• in, EC/ids 2^-35

(Mr. Adebo, Nigeria) vhile I understood the difficulties, I still thought that tho;ia of us vho do not speak French should be civen an English translation of this dccunant» I oaid that we would be prepared to accept the translation w:vth the reservation th3t it is not an authentic text, that the only authentic text is the French -•„ *^^-^^ I vould therefore like to take this opportunity to press that request, I hope that my non-French-speaking colleagues will associate themselves with it. HA/gd 36 Nigeria)

I should like to say that I have not proceeded to express concrete views -upon the happenings in the Congo just now, for the simple reason that I am not cure that this is the time to express them, Should this meeting decide that this is the ti:n3, then, if the Secretary-General does not mind, I would have to ask for the i" cor again.

The Acting SECRSTARY-ll^RAL; Cn this matter of the Constitution, the original French text, of course, was distributed to the members of the Congo Advisory Conxiittee at the lest meeting, and I gave much thought to the advisability of getting some Secretariat members to translate It into English for the "benefit at least of the members of this Committee. But I felt that it was rather risky for members of the Secretariat to attempt to translate such a document as the Constitution of a country. Members of the Committee will no doubt agree with me that the Constitution of any country has to be drafted in very meticulous language; not only does it require skilled translators, but only those who know something about the Constitution will be able to handle that sort of activity adequately. However, since the Ambassador of Kigeria has suggested that the French text alone should be treated as authentic and that the English text should be treated as unauthorized and should be distributed simply for the convenience of the members of this Committee, I will see to it that English copies of the Constitution are made available to the members of this Committee as early as possible. V7e will try to have them available by Friday of this week. While on this subject, I also wish to thank the Ambassador of India for his statement before this Committee. I am cure I am voicing the sentiments of all the mcir.bcrs of this Committee when I say that India's contribution to the United Nations effort in our search for a peaceful solution of the Congo problem has been extraordinary. iJvcn in the face of the greatest calamity, if I may say so, facing India, the Government and people of India have been most magnanimous in assuring the world that they are prepared to permit their armed forces under the United Nations to operate in the Congo as long as the United Nations considers their presence necessary. ilA/Gd 37 (The Acting Secretary-General)

This statement by the representative of India will give assurance not only to the members of this Committee "but to the general public, which, is much perturbed, I understand, by the rumours circulating in regard to the Indian Government's prospective attitude. I cjn sv-rc that the members or tliis Committee would wish me to convey the Crav.eful thinks of this Committee to the Government of India for its very thoughtful and magnanimous attitude regarding the continued operation of the Indian forces in the Congo under the United. Nations,

Mrt RIA.D (United ^.rab Republic); I want to thank the Secretary-General and Dr, Bunehe for the information they have given to the Committee. After hearing the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Congo, I think it was a wise move for the Secretary-General to fix the deadline of 15 November for a reply from Mr. Tshombe If I may be permitted, I would like to propose the adjournment of our meeting today. Perhaps we can hold another meeting after 15 November, when we will hear the reply from Mr. Tshombe, I have another reason, also: I know that Mr. Rueggar, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, is here in New York now and is awaiting a meeting with the Secretary-General. We are all aware of the importance and urgency of such a meeting, which I understood was to be held at about four o'clock. Since it is now half-past four, I propose that our meeting be adjourned,

The Ac-Vj.nft S^CRETAP.Y-GEMAL; Thank you very much for that very kind suggestion. However, I have the Ambassadors of Guinea and Ghana on my list, and I should like to know whether they are agreeable to the suggestion just made by the Ambassador of the United Arab Republic. Actually, Mr. Huegger arrived just before I left my office and urgently wanted to see me. I tentatively arranged to meet him at five o'clock this afternoon, but it seems that he wanted to see me earlier than that, if possible. Therefore, if the members of the Committee agree, and particularly if the representatives of Guinea and Ghana do not object, I should like to adjourn the meeting now. HA/ed ; . ;. 38-UO

Mr. DTALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I have no However, it was said Just a short time ago that the Foreign Minister, of the Congo has been waiting here for a week. Would it be possible to ask whether the Foreign Minister of the Con^o will be here when we again take up the discussion on substance? Exc-j;:t for that consideration, I would have no objection. It simply seems that, fron the point of.view of courtesy to the Foreign Minister of the Congo, who is directly concerned in the matter and who has been here for ten days, it might be a bit indelicate to adjourn the meeting without beginning further discussion.

The Acting LSECRETARY-GEFERAL; I wonder whether the Foreign Minister of the Congo could give us some indication of his travel schedule —•• how long he proposes to stay in New York,

Mr. BOI-IBOKQ (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): This question is very important to my country. Even if I went back to the. Congo, I would return here if there were a meeting of the Advisory Committee after 15 November. My presence at that time would be necessary. ' •

The Acting SECHETARY-GENERAL; I should like to remind the members of the Committee that the Parliament is in session in the Congo, so the Foreign Minister is very keen to get back there as soon as possible. FGB/nz Ul

Mr. QUAISCTI-SACKEY (Ghana): Vfe have an habitual courtesy which ve . show on such occasions, and we shall never oppose any move for en adjournment* In any case, as has "been indicated by the. representative of Nigeria, nevr documents have been circulated and. you, Sir, and Dr. Bunche have made stc.teir.cnto vhich need reflection on our part. Therefore, I also assumed that there was going to be ar.?J,>ier moot ing to enable us to give our concrete vievs on the statements vhich 1':^'. "been undo* I think, however, that I should ask one question, s;Lnce the reply to it might be very helpful to my Government when I report to Accra, You, Sir, said that if the replies from Mr, Adoula and Mr. Tshombe were negative then it was your intention to abandon your plan. My question is as follows. Since the plan vhich you have put forward -- and ve have already spoken on this —• provides for various kinds of coercive measures to ensure the reintcgration to vhich ray Government has already agreed, why is it going to be abandoned? And, if it is abandoned, what new measures are being envisaged? I think that these, are pertiment questions the answers to vhich might be helpful to my Government*

The .Actin/* SECRET/VRY-GrNERAL: Of course, that Tri.ll be the subject, of our next meeting, and I think I shall be able to go into greater detail then. If Mr. Tshombe says "No" to the implementation of my Plan, that is, the United Nations Plan, then I shall give reasons to this Committee why that Plan will have to be abandoned -- with, of course, the agreement of the Advisory Committee on the Congo — and J shall present an alternative plan which I believe will be equally effective. At this stage I do not want to go into details of why I want to abandon the Plan under certain circumstances because ve are running into some practical difficulties, but I am sure that the alternative plan which I have in mind, and vhich I propose to present to this Committee at our next meeting, will be equally, effective and will, I believe, render the solution of the Congo problem easier.

Mr. QUATSON-SACKEY (Ghana): Thank you, Sir. FGB nz

Mr. ADEBO (Nigeria) : I am very glad that our colleague" from Ghana made that intervention because I think it is very important that 'what is knovn outside this Conmittee at the conclusion of this meeting should not be such as to give encouragement to the people in the Congo vho arc not looking for a • settlement. I-Jhen you opened the discussion, Sir, you said that you vere giving information to us on a confidential basis. I have never been sure hov much is tiii.-..y confidential in the United Nations/ "because after every meeting of the Advisory ^oionittee on the Congo reports have appeared in the Press attributed to "very reliable sources", 'and whenever there has been any mistake at all in those report3 it has been of a tendentious character. Therefore, I vender vhether it will not be necessary for you to devise some statement -which you will release to the Trees telling it just what has happened, but telling it so accurately that there will not be distortion. If the thing is kept confidential it will in fact see the light of day, only it will "be a garbled account and might do us harm. For example, if it is published that in the event of your receiving a negative reply that is the end of this Plan that would be an achievement for people who do not want the Plan to succeed. On the other hand, if the point was that if they said "No" to it then you were going to put to us a revised plan of a more effective character, that, in my view, would be psychologically an advantage. Therefore, I would very much like to suggest that, instead of publishing nothing, we should publish something which I am sure we can trust the Secretariat to produce with great discretion.

The Acting G^CRETARY-GENI^AL: I thank the representative of Nigeria. Just to allay such speculation and, perhaps, distorted accounts of this meeting, I have already arranged with OFI to release a short statement. . • I should like also to request the members of this Committee — although, of course, I know that such a request is not really necessary — to keep the target date of 15 November strictly confidential, because Mr. Gardiner is going to convey it to Mr. Tshombe on Thursday only, at the earliest, and to the Prime Minister too. Go, before this information gets to them, and particularly to Mr. Tshombe, I do not want to give the impression that we are leaking it deliberately at this end. My request to the members of the Committee, therefore, is to keep the proceedings of this meeting strictly confidential, as before, I thank them for their kind co-operation. The meet ins rose at ^.35 P»*n. * *•"•'

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 72 13 December ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITrj..Du ON TIIE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, Nev York, on Thursday, 1J December 1962, at 4 p»ra.

In the Chair TJ THANT The SECRET/^Y-GEl'E

Member's: Canada Mr, TREMBLAY Ceylon Mr. ^yLAlASEKT^A Ethiopia Mr., GiJDRE-EGZY Federation of Malaya i-Ir. OIJG Ghana Mr. QUAISON-GACIffiY Guinea l-'t. DIALLO India Mr, CIIAJC^AVARTY Indonesia Mr. GOSROWARDOJO Ireland Mr. B01AND Liberia Mir, BARGES Mali Mr. COULIBALY Morocco Mr. TABITI Nigeria Mr, ADEBO Pakistan JJT. HA1-1DMI Senegal Mr. CISSE Sudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden Mrs. ROSGEL Tunisia Mr. Taieb'SLIM

United Arab Republic Mrf RIAD Congo (Leopoldvllle) Mr. IDZUlffiUIR

62-29^67 AW/Jpm

AL: Since our last meeting on 6 November, I have talked vith all members of tills Committee, individually or in small groups, about the developments in the Congo, An extensive report to the Security Council on the Plan has been circulated in document S/5033/Ad&.12 nnd Add.1, and we have circulated to the Committee in recent days certain letters pertaining to the developments in the Congo. Others are being handed to the members here today. By theGO various means the Committee has been kept informed and given just about all the information we have. There was a good deal of Frees coverage, including speculations — before the 3_ocal papers closed down because of the strike, of which you arc 0.11 aware — about the various new plans, such as the co-called Spaa1.: Plan and the KcGhee Plan, and so on. There is in fact only one plan, and that is the Plan of National Reconciliation which I have sponsored and which the Conmittee received a long time ago. It was also reproduced in full in my report to the Security Council. Mr* Cpuak and Mr. McChee, as you know, have no new plans, but they did advance some ideas about procedures and implementation. But these did not prove feasible. Wo are therefore going ahead with the Plan in loto and we are now in the stage of calling upon States to give effect to the pressures envisaged in phases I through IV of the Plan. This can be seen from the letters that have been distributed to the Committee. Now as regards the letters, it will be noted that they take different forms, according to the party addressed. One letter which has.been distributed is the letter of warning which Mr. Gardiner has already sent to Mr. Tshoitbe. As yet there has been no response from, and no public comment on, this letter by Mr* Tshombe. (The Secretary-General)

Another is a letter frcm me to the Government of Belgium, vhich was delivered on Tuesday afternoon, that is, 11 December, at the sane time, the letters frcm me to Portugal and the Union of South Africa were delivered. My letter to the United Kingdom was delivered on Wednesday afternoon, 12 December — that was only yesterday. Lnte yesterday afternoon I received from Prime Minister Adoula a communication informing me of the identical letters vhich he has sent to countries vhich are importing Katangese copper and co"ba3.t in varying quantities. These have gone to the Governments indicated in his letter, which, I understand, is already hefore you. Also "before you is the letter, -which I an addressing to the aarcc Governments in response to Mr« Adcula's appeal. The letters, calling upon certain States to take actions of one kind or another, spring directly frcm the Plan. There ore, of course, other actions involving pressures vhich the Congolese Government itself can take; and that Government will, I am sure, take them in due course. On our part, as you know, there are non-military steps outrside the Plan as veil as under it, such as I outlined to you in our October meeting vhich OI'JUC can take and will proceed to take one "by one. In other vords, we are now in a phase in which all the pressures available to us will "be exerted on the "basis of careful selection and planning and with every effort made to avoid armed conflict. If, however, Mr. Tchombe should elect to order his f;endarr.ierie to attack us, we will defend ourselves fully and hit back to the full extent of our capacity. The United Nations troops are alerted and are being prepared for any such eventuality. Members of the Ccmnittee will be interested to learn that Mr. Tshombe now has access to what goes on in this rocnu In a letter of 7 December, which

Mr. Tshcuibe addressed to Mr9 Mathu, our representative in Elicabethvillc, concerning the fighting at Kongolo, he quotes a passage from-the confidential suirji:c\ry of the seventieth meeting of this Committee, on 12 October, circulated to Members of the Security Council for their confidential information. Typically, however, Mr. Tshombe missed the point of the passage* AP/dr U-5 (The Secretary-General)

The Katangeoe £^l2£!ii££;^ at KongoXo, who had "been surrounded "by the AKC for a long time, have left the town. With the concurrence of Mr, Adoula,. a detachment of OIJUC is being placed in the town and a Nigerian xird-fc Is now enroute to Kbncolo for this purpose. The aerial activities "by Katanccse planes in North Katanga seem to have ceased. 3eCQUCe Of the 103S of the Ethiopian jev, fighters and the Indian Canberra^ -- under the circvcnotances of -which you are yell awe.re -- the CMJC fifth-cer piano i'orce is now very weak, consisting only at prenen4: of three Swedish jet fighters — only three. However, four adiir.ionul Svcdinh jet fighters -- tharJ^ to the very great- oense of co-operation and •jniorstan/.U.n^ of the r S'jr-'llih G j/'/erniarrrit -- are being added to the : .'ovee0 The llthiopi an lighter crevs will orj roon r^^iirmiic to take over J;he F-66 airci af t which the Units! Nations is . obtaining- VTc r:av^ just "been infoi-ned -- of course, not officially yc,-t -- that the rhilippi/:c; Government v.-.ll provide six jet fighters with crews. An£ there is good re-.-'i-on to hep-"; ror i'avoura'bJ.e action on an urgent reguoat for additional jet f j.;-r>ic,erG and oro^-j. /node to Iran. The indications are that the response from Iran

Abovi; niddv/., just at lunch-time, I received a message fron Mr. Gardiner, transmitting the text of a letter, dated 12 December, from Mr. Tshombe, addressed to me, The text cf this letter has been distributed to you.

Ac /Jirct r.Ir'.>'C.'?> ac you will see, it would appear to be an encouraging development. Y:j';3 '-.;:'. 11 n-.-9*.!.'.^' understand, however, that in view of our experience with Mr-, TLhomb:;, we 'it~,v .,'»„•- :1 5, I "bcl'.yve, will serve to bring you fully up to date. I, now, of co-uv?--, v-' I ,.onie ^iiy cocments the members may wish to make. TL/rh

Mr* MRNES (Liberia): Thank you very rcucb, Mr. Secretary-General; for "bringing us up to date on the situation prevailing in the Congo, ife are now about to enter, I think, the third year of the Congo crisis, and prospects for the settlement of this question do not yet seem to "be encouraging. We seem to be still Tar from our goal* On C1, previous occasion I expressed agreement with your position that the solution to the Congo problem -would be found in the removal of the economic props from "behind Mr* Tshombe, but that it wac not vl!;hin the competence of the members of thic advisory £roup to do that "because none of us, no far as I knew, was exporting from Katanga any of its mineral products; that If Katanga was to "be brought- to heel; it -would "be necessary to ge.t the cc-oporc.-cion of countries cuch as the United States, Belgium and the United KinguC.'u in imposing these economic: sanctions by stopping the exportation of copper and GObait from Katanga,, I think our views on this situation are unchanged. What we rrust do is to continue to seek the co-operation or ta-2 support or the agreement of the United States, Belgium and the United Kingdom to stop the purchase of these products from Katanga* For as long as the Union Miniere is permitted to carry on its operations and to pay to Katanga the proceeds of these operations, so long will this unsatisfactory and unsavoury condition of Katanga continue, I have seen the letter you have addressed to Belgium. I just glanced at it here in the document. I do not know what is the reaction of the Belgian Government as to compliance with your proposals, I do not know what is the position of the United States in this matter nor that of the United Kingdom. I was wondering whether you are in possession of any knowledge of the reaction of these countries to discontinuance of the purchace of the products of Katanga -- something which in my view would go a long way towards solving the crisis, I must say very frankly that ray country has been doing its best to contribute to the solution of the Congo problem, TJe have made available a few of our forces and we have made our financial contribution within the limits of our ability to do so. But this is imposing a great strain and burden upon us, and I am afraid that if the Congo situation, continues we may not be in a position to continue this contribution, I would therefore ask you, Mr» Secretary-General, TL/rh 7-10

(Mr, Burros, Liberia) whether you are in a position to let us Imov whether the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium are prepared to co-operate in the plan of national reconciliation vhich Mr. Tshombe has, through his usual machinations, tried to destroy.

T^^ ,nECRETARY-GF.TTER^Li Of course, my letter vas handed over to Belgium on th? nth, that is the day before yesterday, and I am sure you will egree with mo that it is too early for the Belgian Government to respond officially to this request for economic pressure and for taking certain steps in the implementation of the United Rations reconciliation Plan. Also, I do - not tbi'il; it vculd be proper for me to reveal to thia Ccr.£nitt-;;<3 t';cs unofficial an«l informal response vhich has "been indicated to me "by the rtrmdri^iTC . • Representative of Belgium, I thirj.i it -would "be more advisable for me to reveal this re^ly only vhon. I receive it officially. However, I can say at this £'!:?.ce •fcha* the Belgian Government has been co-operative with the United Nations in the Implementation of this Plan, • As regards the United "Kingdom, I handed over my letter only yesterday and so far I have not received any reaction from London-, I have not receive:! any response, or any indication of the nature of a.rerponse, from Portugal and from the Republic of South Africa, to vhich I handed over my letters on the llth, the scvie day I sent ray letter to Belgium. Abcy.?:b tha prospective duration of the United Nations operations in the Congo,' I T:J Confident that this view is chared by the members of this Committee, fiat it 13 very difficult to anticipate when the United Nations can start disengaging from the Congo militarily. The indications, however, are that, the- . U-,iftcs\ ...TAUions will be at its peal: of strength, militarily, next month, as I h-"r-j 0-j.i '.ined M-id indicated in my statement earlier, Co I should think that f-.-i T.Jn:i.-."j. Nations will be in a position to implement the terms of the General Ar;6errbl;y n,nd Security Council resolutions satisfactorily in the next three r/i'.'T'/hE • That is my assumption. Of course, it all depends .on the unstinting Co- \porTf-v,/.'r. of the Povers directly concerned vith the solution of this problem. PK/en ll

Mr . QU/vISON*SACKKY (Ghana): I want to thank you very much, on behalf of my delegation, for the progress report you have given. I see in the letters vhich we have juct received two that are very impcrtaTt. . One IS from Mr. Adoula, informing you of the embargo which the Central Government of the Congo has decided to place on copper and cobalt exports from South Katanga, ana hie appeal to certain countries named in the letter. This was on il December. Then, on the following day, Mi,-., Tshem'oe made this offer* Iii view of t./ie s "oeps taken by the central authority .ana the provincial authority, do you thiril: there is going to be a clash? I nean, do you foresee any conflict within the next few days? Because, of course, if the embargo is to be enforced, certain countries riuct co-operate in thio, bub in view of the decision which v.hc 'Joverr^ne-.t ha a made, do you think that Tshombe's offer will be considered at a.1.!1? Would it i...ean the withdrawal of the decision to carry on with the e:t,b 3.1-^0?

Y--^NKc;M): Thank you very much for this question. I do not think GO, because Prime Minister Adoulal s letter to me, dated 11 December, was received here 3.ast night. It was strictly in line with the Plan. Mr. Tshcmbe-'s letter, addressed to nie, was dated yesterday but I just received it. Of course, Mr. Tshombe's letter, if read carefully, has certain "ifs" ond "buts", if I nay nay so, and at the same tine, Prime Minister Adoula has not seen it. Of course, I have asked Mr. Gardiner to bring this to the attention of the Prime Minister. First, I think it will be necessary for us to get the Government's reaction to Mr. Tshombe's proposal, the new proposal, which at least on paper is a very big step forward, in my opinion. However, I do riot see any link between Mr. Tshcmbe's letter and the need for Prime Minister Adoula to withdraw his request. I think the Plan must go ahead,

Mr. QLUIfiON-SACKEY (Ghana) : I asked this question because I intended to follow up with this: It seems to me that it is very important that your Plan be enforced, thoroughly and completely, yet from the report you have given us, I do not understand the actual steps that you are taking to enforce the Plan. Perhaps I was not attending closely enough. However. I want to be quite clear PK/en 12 (Mr. Quaison-Sackey, Ghana) in my own mind exactly what is going to be done to enforce this plan ana if you enforce the Plan fully, how fast -we can achieve the objectives of the United Nations?

The SECRCT; 0^ -GENERAL; On the implementation of the Plan, I have ' suggested certain steps, immediate -steps, concerning the frontiers of Northern Rhodesia and Angola and, to some extent, tlie Republic of South Africa. Thecc three countries are primarily concerned -with the embargo of copper and cobalt from Katanga. Therefore, I have addressee, a request to the United Kingdom, Portugal and the Republic of South Africa to J;ake the immediate steps necessary as stipulated in the Plan. On the bac:' c cf Prime Minister Adovla's request, I am going to make appeals to all the Governments' concerned, perhaps tonight, or at the latest tomorrow, to comply -with the wishes of the Central Government of the Congo not to buy the copper and cobalt. It vill involve, perhaps, a few more countries,, for instance Went Germany., possibly Switzerland, and a few others. This will be the PC?.-:: end stage. The letters will be cent tomorrow at the latest. There-fore, if the countries primarily involved are willing to co-operate with the United Nations, I have a feeling that we will be able to solve this problem in a very short time. If not, perhaps a Security Council involvement will be necessary,

Mr. AT^BL (Sudan): To carry further the point that was raised by -• the representative of Ghana, according to. the documents we have here, Priuc !•?.'. v.d?te:r Adoula has addressed identical letters to certain Governments aoVJng tl-.,;:TQ not to accept copper and cobalt into their countries. Of course, Pr-/.7ie Mr.l/nier Adoula asked you to -take some supporting action. 'As you have juct indicated, you are supporting him by having correspondence, also, with these particular Governments. Is there any way, by means, of the Security Cc'irai.'i.- physically to support this embargo? For example, by stopping the f.U-v* out of Katanga of these minerals? I think that would be more effective than merely addressing these appeals to the Governments concerned. The SECRETARY-riENERAL: I think this Implies both measures: the stopping of the flow of minerals out of Katanga province and at the same time asking the Governments concerned, their traditional customers, not to buy these minerals. They are, I am sure, in strict conformity with trie provisions of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

^J__^SEL (Sudan): As I see it, the first step would "be more effective. If you can stop the flow from the country you might be relieved of the necessity for taking any other step.

I°r??l/i^Cl£^^AI': Ve have to see how this -— -T1' step is implemented by the countries directly involved. As I have indicated, the first step is concerned only vith two countries directly > llorvhorn Rhcu^nr.n, vhich for that rjvrpccc ic the United Kingdom, and Angola, vhich for that pui-poge is

Portugal, c-nd;-,o some extent ^ indirectly, the Republic of South Africa. We have to see the response of thene three Govsr:.i.nents .

i>Tr * QUA I r ON - SAC K T^Y (Ghana) : It is very difficult for me to speak at full length unless I ask questions. That is why I am anxious to do so. If Prime Minister Adoula has made an embargo on exports, I assume he intends to take action to enforce this embargo. Supposing he does? He has not indicated it in this letter. ^Supposing he takes sudden steps to implement his embargo. It means there will be a clash. Suppose tomorrov there is a clash? In that case, are you going to support him as you have indicated in your letter? That is the point. DB/gw 16

The SECRETE Y-flTSNERAL; It is a rather hypothetical question, nnd I will not go to the extent of assuming the inevitability of a cl&sh» To ccme down to the practical measure, if the Prime Minister of the Con-o, in conformity with the stops new taken, • asked the United Nations to give protection to the Central Government officials dealing with immigration or custcms or revenues proposed to be staticiii/1 somewhere near -the borders — for instance, in KipUGhi -- for the effective irrQlsrcentaticn, cf these steps, if he asks the United Nations for protection of these officials, I will respond to his request.

(Nigeria): Like my colleagues who spoke before me, I want to express the appreciation for Nigeria to you and all those associated with you for tho efforts you are making to solve this unfortunate problem. It is a (,r<;s.-v pity that, as you have pointed out, what we are doing e.nd feeling hars is not confidential end shortly after ve have finished here, certain parties KCV bo aware of then whose -interest is to sabotage your efforts and cur efforts. For that reason, I would like to refrain from pressing you further ou the details that you have in, mind. What ve have already had orally from you and what ve have gotten f ran the documents that you have circulated . cncng us,, makes .me feel that at this time ve do mean business. The last time we .were asoeiublcd here, I made a brief s.'or-och in order to stress the importance of our showing, to all concerned, Vi^-t on these occo.sions we do mean business, I stressed -the importance of our preparing our plans very well, of making quite sure that all of the assistance that is necessary would be forthcoming, and having made certain of that, of going ahead with the implementation of the plan regardless of the cojr,Equ3Uces. I said, "regardless of the consequences , Mr. Seerr . La'ry -General, because I know you are a man of peace, as everybody Imovs, and tha/G you will do nothing offensive and that you will be deploying the forces at your disposal only in defense of actions which are essentially peaceful-. As you have clearly indicated here, only if, in the course of such action, those officers who are implementing this programme, who will be peace officers, are attacked, under those circumetances will the fire be returned. . • ' •,TOWWW:fl"1 DB/gw 2.7 (Mr, A.debo, Nigeria)

I do not see how, upon that "basis, there can be any objection to any part of the plan that you propose. Nigeria has troops under your ccinsand. Like every other country which has ever contributed troops or any other form of assistance, we are very anxious that the situation in the Congo should be brought to an end as soon as possible but ve are eiually anxious that this end should "bo a successful one frcm the point or view of the United Nations and its prestige aril also, more importantly, for the long-term interest of the people of the Congo as a whole. We hive no doubt that the stage has been reached when half measures wil.l not do and I am very mucla impressed by the cc'Lipralienaivfi nature of the measures that you now propose. At ru i;arli-ir meeting, there was come reference to a poc:;i"blo abandonment of this plau in such an eventuality. I am glad there is no more t£.l£ of such a thl;cg because this plan, when you first produced it, was approved by everybody, w.3 approved by the Government of Adoula and, ve were made to understand "b~j Tshcnbc himself that he approved this plan, so that if we now proceed to implement it fully, I do not see hew anybody can object. Unfortunately, certain Powers,vhose assistance is vital, are not represented here but you have, I an sure, the support of all of us here, who are your advisors in this matter, in the appeal that you have addressed to those Powers, and we are very glad that in one or two cases, at least, the response is believed likely to favourable. Nigeria supports you in what you are trying to do and we are prepared to support you all the way, within the mandate that you possess and we hope that it will be possible to accomplish the United nations mission without bloodshed. We have naturally not been able to read, with sufficient care, the documents that were handed to us only a few minutes ago. The letter of Prime Minister Adoula is quite easy to fellow but I must confess, perhaps due to my lack of sophistication, that I have found it a little difficult to follow the letter frcm Premier Tchombe. Certain parts of it are hardly ccmprehensible to me. It may be that on a further reading of it 1 shall get to understand precisely what everything there means, and I would hope, in the interests of all of us and of the Congo, that Mr. Tshonbo is sincere in the very forthcoming gesture that his letter here seems to reflect. DB/gw 18-20 (rrt Adebo, Nigeria)

I apologize for having spoken at greater length than I had Intended when I started speaking; but, to etna-up, I would like to assure you that in carrying out this plan in the way that you have proposed, you h?-vo the support of Nigeria. I will be reporting this vhole matter to my Government and I have no reason to feel that there is any portion of what you have proposed that they will take exception to. However, may I stress once more that when we have put a hand to the plow, we must see bhafc for once ve carry out this plan to the end. I wish you the "best of MP/sJt 21

Mr. BIAioLO (Cjuinea) (interpretation from French); Just as the speakers who preceded ns, I would like most sincerely to thank you for the very fine Statement which you rrnde about the situation obtaining in the Con£o. I would like to tell you, particularly, how satisfied, ivy delegation is to learn that you have taken a firm decision to pursue the implementation of your plan. In that context, Mr. Secretary-General, cominc back to vhat you, yourself, said about the letter dated 12 December, addressed by Mr. Tshoiiibe to the Secretary-General, I would like to irake two or 'cl'ree snail comments: You, yourself, said that this letter contains Cc.rtain if's and but's; and even a hasty reading of this letter authorizes ^ delegation to look deeply into it. For alrr.oot thrae years vs have had this matter in hat.:!, and we Yj,va seen that, each tima an important initiative is about tc be t~J:cm, Mr. TsL-oribe undertakes sons spectacular initiatives, giving the impression that h= was in favour of lessening tendon* That is why niy delegation Is very happy to hear you say that wo should not be exacfreratodly optimistic about any initiative from Mr, Tshombe. If Mr, TsiioEfloe is convinced of your determination tc implement your plan, then it is cults normal that Mr. Tchombe once again should take some initiative which would somehow delay your action. We have read through this document rather hastily, and there is a bit of irony in the fact that this document, coming from Mr, Tshombe^mentions African solidarity, that if any point in Africa van threatened; the whole continent was threatened, and so forth, and all other manifestations of nationalism which we were not accustomed to hearing from i-Ir- Tshocibe. But I would especially like to emphasize two points. This is the last paracraph of the paper: Fir. Tshombe speaks first of all -- and a.l>:ost on the saire level -- about his Govermcn*,which he calls the Government of Katanga, and the Government of -- he does not say "Government of Congo": he says "Government of Lcopoldville; he puts them on the sane level. Secondly, he asks the Government of Leopoldville to ratify the cease-fire agreement, I recall that, during previous meetings, it had been indicated -- and, I believe by the Foreif^n Minister -- that the Central Government of the Conge did not recognize this cease-fire agreement. Thus, this is a very skilful manoeuvre. Ke is iriaking us think that he is undertaking soiice friendly overtures, but he imposes conditions which, obviously, are unacceptable to the Central Government, MP/sJt 22 (Mr» Diallo, Guinea)

That Is -why he asks the Central Govermr£nt to ratify an agreoirent which the Central Government has not wished to recognize. But there is even more here: .He asks the Government of Leopoldville to promulgate a general acuosty law in conformity with your plan. Here I will stop a moment to put a few questions, if you will allow me. At the mordent; we are without newspapers and, therefore, do not have the latest news; tut I thought that President Kasavabu had promulgated an amnesty law and that certain arrested members of Parliament had le.t't prison. I would like to ask whether, in the fivst place, it is tr-raci that an amnesty law ha a been either voted, passed, or promulgated; and whether, on the taois of that amiss ty law, 0.11 the polTtical leaders have "been re Leaded. We have heard many .-co-Tours, in this regard, in th-?. corridors of tn<-: Unite0. rTduicnn. I ve^ld j.ik-" to ask a second ruastxon relating to the first: I would like to ask tli.'r o~eretartat Fh^bh?r it is in a position to tell us whether Mr, Glcon.^a eventually licnefitted from this amnesty lav and whether he is at liberty or wh^Lher ho is still under detention. Thirdly, we have heard that the central Parliament of Conco requested the suspension of the execution of your plan, until such time as they have debated the matter, end that the debate is just about to be undertaken in the Congolese Parliament --if not already undertaken. Since the whole policy of the United Nations is based upon your plan; and if the Congolese ParliariBnt asks that it be implemented, then my delegation would like to kr.ov vaat is the exact situation at present. If it is true that the Parliament is i^iicd of a motion calling for the suspension of the plan until such time as the Parliament has taken a decision on the matter, what will be the repercussions of such a position upon the United Nations policy, since this policy is based entirely upon your plan? These are the few questions 1 wished to put to you, I believe the replies will be ox' interest to the whole Committee and will allow us to see the situation with more clarity. MP/sJt 23-25

The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Thank you very much for this very useful intervention. In connexion with the amnesty lav, as some Members of the Corralttee sre no doubt avare; President Kasavubu has icsued an amnesty proclamation* This proclamation calls for an amrecty covering all political offences. That is the eccence of the proclamation. It appears in our docuirer.t B/5053/Add..l3/Add.l, dated 28 November 1962, with the caption: Proclamation "by the President of the Republic of the Ccn~o, dated 26 November 1962. According to our information, Mr. Gir.erea is still under detention. Although I c.ra avare of the rumourB' afloat in the corridors and elsev^are, we have not been able to establish the assvmption, fact or rumour tJi^t Mr, GiBenga has teen ralaaicti. Our latest infomation ic that he ia still uiJ.d.Dr detention,, because h? £ parliamentary iirimiinity has been lifted by Farliamfjiit. •

Reg£i--:-.ir.g the next question; on the prospective cistate in Barlicmjnt in Leopoluvllle, on the United Nations Plan of reconciliation, the so-called "U Thant rian"^ it vas brought up by a member'of•Parliament approximately a fortnight ago. But I understand that, due to the•pressures of-other members of Parliament, this debate vac held in abeyance-, because there was a general feeling in Parliament that the- generation of such a debate in Lebpoldville at this stage would not be helpful to the central Government, and would damage the objectives of the United Kations in the-Congo. That debate, therefore, has beer postponed sine die. RSH/gws 26

(The Secretary-General)

Therefore, I do not see any early prospect of a resumption of the debate on tliis Plan in parliament. AS I have told the members of the Committee, I sra going ahead with the implementation of my Plan from phase I to phase IV vith vigour and determination.

^v_I_rO£7K3UIR (Congo, Lecpoldville) (interpretation from French): Sefore this UK?. o vine is adjourned, I should like to maKe a statement on "behalf of ny Government about this meeting. The text of this will be distributed later, but first of all I should, like to read it out. The It^-'c time you convened a meeting of the Advisory ComirdtteQ on the Congo, Kr. Secretary -General, you cave us a very complete picture of tna process achieved in the implementation of your Plan. Today, you have given us an account of the progress ?r.ade Binco that time. The position of my Government hoc been set forth in the letter which Prime Minister /-doula addressed to you on 12 November 1962. Thic letter gave details of all the actions which hove been taken in the unstinting support which ray Government has given vith regard to the implementation of your Plan. I would only like to add a single, recent foct vhich is significant, that is, the declaration made to our nation on c6 November 1962 by the President of the Republic, Mr. Joseph Kasa-Vubu, vho renewed the proclamation of the solemn amnesty vhich he nade to Parliament at Lovanium in July and August of 1962, vhich affected all the sucessionicto, whatever their political offences, vho were ready to rejoin the great Congolese family. The president, in the came spirit of fraternity vhich he displayed at Lovanium, stated, in particular: "I proclaim a complete and general amnenty vill be granted to all those who return to our country, to this great Congo of ours, vhatever the political offences thoy may have committed. We hope that they will all return without exception, and we await them with open arms, with peace in our hearts, so that all the nation's sons may work together, hand in Viand, to build the country, as the people wish, as the members of our great family wich, in concord and prosperity." This is one more proof of the good will of the Central Government. I chould like, however, to go into further detail on the various points in the application of the Plan, because, in the view of my Government, what is important RSH/gwa 27 '

( Mr._ Td7,unu:iulr, Congot Leopoldvl-lle ) today is to note without any equivocation the violation of the commitments entered into by tiie Provincial Government of Couth Katanga. Uhat is important Is not to discuss why such and ouch a provision or the Plan has not "been I'Uplei-ieuted by those in power in South Katanga, but to take the necessary measures which were provided in the Plan to ensure its full implexcntation. I said last time that the various points of tha Plan were to be implemented at a certain time or immediately. Today, I have to note that not onJy has the Plan been violated and its implementation hindered at Elisabethville by Mr. Tehombc, but that the Plan does not any more even receive the indispensable support of those who conceived it. Since there was a plan,, there was prepared, as a last resort, an vl-:;ircate programme of measures which this Organization night take in order to ensure respect for the national Lioverc.o. gnty and the territorial integrity of the Congo. If today the implementation of this Plan has been delayed,, so as to compromise the validity of the Pisa, it is only the foreign financial companies which conceived and support this socer.sion which profit by this delay. This can only give encouracv-irerrb to Mr. Tshombs. As strii'dng proof of this is the fact that he sent a so-called "extraordinary plenipotentiary minister" in the person of Senator Yova, in order to set forth the complaints of Katanga, Quite recently, in expelling from the Congo, the Italian Consul at Elisabethville, a measure which is obviously only within the competence of the Central Government, the South Katangese authorities have given one more proof of their ill will and of the grave danger constituted by this attitude., . On the basis of these facts, we can only conclude that there is a complete absence of any intention to put an end to the secession. The negative attitude of Mr. Tohombu justifies the position of those who no longer believe in these simple promises and declarations and who have advocated concrete and energetic measures. A demonstration of force is indispensable, for so long as Mr. Tshombe maintains his military superiority over the United Nations forces in South Katanga, he can afford to mock at the Organization and at the Central Government. He will only bow to force or to a demonstration of force. At the moment,- he is-convinced that the United Nations has other preoccupations and that it no longer has any means of exercising effective pressure upon him, and that.they will be easily forced on the defensive if they try to station a force to support an economic blockade. RSH/gws 28 (Mr. Idznrcbuir, Congo, Leopoldville)

Mr. Tshombe openly threatens the United Nations by proclaiming that the application of sanctions would mean a new war in South Katanga, This war, vhich is so strongly supported and prepared by all the reactionary causes in Europe and America, was announced in those same quarters even "before the publication of the Plan. Since the Plan has "been allegedly accepted, this has been repeated in on ever more menacing tone vhich has created an atmosphere of intimidation. As an example, I can quote an article by Mr. raul Struye, President of the Belgian Senate, in an editorial of the famous L'"."bre_I3_fO ^!Q'^> on •*•? November 19&2, entitled "Cn the eve of a new offensive against Katanga". Moreover, tho ElisabethviLle daily :_,; essor^du Xzrte.nfri published, although I do net want to say that this w.i3 albo written by Mr. ttruye, a series of articles of a similar nature. \7hat has H.VC;?, rise no.ct of all to iry indignation is that after Belgium had officially anu. pu.blicly accepted the Flan, official persons of that country are publish!1:^ ciu a high le-/^]. attacks and criticisms of this Plan. Eowever, ^-j Government is pleased to acknowledge the realistic and courageous attitude r.dcpted by tho foreign Mini'-tGr of Belgium, Mr. Spc-.ak, but it wonders if Mi-. £paak v;.3Lll receive the effective cupport of the whole of the Belgian nation. To g::.ve aome indication of certain reactions in Belgian quarters, I will quote a letter of protest, which will be found as an annex to this statement, from L'Anioalo Oaa Arvr.:! OTIS do la Force Publique du Congo Eelpe, which was addressed to Mr. Spaak. I would like to read this out. "L;Amlcale dec Ancicns de la Force Publique du Congo Beige, -at a general assembly on Saturday, 8 December 19^2 at Bnnnels, gave me the honour of expressing to you the concern it felt when it saw the Belgian Foreign Minister associating himself with the United Nations and certain other States in an atteir.pt to deprive Katanga of the right of self-determination. tli.rhe Association believes that the well-understood interest of the Belgians requires that its Government should also defend Belgian investment's in Katanga. "it also believes that the interests of the Congolese demands that Katanga should not be engulfed in the chaos of the rest of the Congo, but rather that the only region of the former Belgian Congo where order reigns should give an example to the other regions and serve as a crystallization for a regenerated Congo." Jllllji'h Vfifj RSH/gwa

(Mr.Idz \ircbuir. Congo, Leopoldvllle)

Perhaps I should say, degenerated. The letter continues: The Association, which comprises members vho have fought to save Katanga and also members whose husbands and fathers have been Icillod for Katanga, does not understand how a Belgian Minister can at-the present time assist J.n the destruction of the Katangese State." BC/Ji Jl (Mr. I<'zr,

Belgium, moreover, has just replied to the letter of Prime Minister Adoula concerning the collection of customs duties and the assistance that P-elgiuin might "be able to furninh-to the Congo in that field. Belgium's reply came after that of the Union Mj.niero du ITaut-Katanrrn.. That cany-any refuses to pay customs revenue to the Central Government: it maintains that c!e facto authorities are at El.'.gatethvillG. It is easy to disdain responsibility after having created, inctalled and supported these so-called de_ facto authorities. Kor has the Tkilcian Government go.ie much further in its prcoilced "co-operation" and in its "spirit" cf good friendship for the Congo. Its reply is full of contradictions. It agrees that the Customs Office in Belgium siio-u.lu. collect, In favour of the Congo, taxes on goods destined for anywhere in the Ccn^o. It promises its support in the implementation of any mec.~-::ren t!v3e-.ld^:'. upon by cotnnon. e.r;-r.-eer,.'.ent:T between the Central Covcrrjj.eut and the men in powor in South Katanga. And It yuts all this forward while stating that it would equally apply "legal" decisions. I wonder, then, if the Belgium Government is not applying o^.r laws anil regulations, those which we inherited from Belgium and those whfeh we have adopted since independence, "because it regards them as iliesal. How can anything be clear from the Belgian attitude? In any case, the "favour" as regards the collections of the Customs Office must not "be overestimated. That is not the essence of the problem. This duplicity of policy is also evident in London* At the tine vhen the Secretary-General consulted London on this subject, the Plan was accepted as a whole, including the sanctions to be taken in case there was a refusal to implement. Today, those two Governments do not wish to hear anything about economic sanctions. Everyone is aware of the importance of the financial interests at stake. British and Belgian circles ceem to place their financial interests above those of the African peoples in general and the people of the Congo in particular. We are confronted by a new kind of colonialism. The question which arises for us at this time is the following: Is the international Organization also to bow before this colonialism, yes or no? Will the Congolese finally be able to make their own laws, or are their affairs to continue to be managed from (Mr. Congo" 7 fr:c~p^Tiville ) )

London, Brussels or Ihrie? At this time, when the Organization must put into effect its guiding principles, are injustice and force to take precedence over right? If after twenty-eight monthG of the United Nations presence in the Congo,, the efforts of the Secretary-General to implement the United Nations resolutions con "be sabotaged to this extent "by those very countries which approved the resolutions, wa might draw the conclusion that colonialism and capitalism are still the Casters of this world and recognize that "by approving on the one hand the United Nations intervention in the Congo and by sabotaging on the ether the efforts of the Secretary-General, certain Powers only wanted to play a comedy at the expense of fourteen million Congolese, Unfortunately for the Congolese, this comedy is really a tragedy. I hope you will forgive me, Mr. Secretary-General, for having us^d those words. It is not my intention at all to wound you or anyone else in i,his room. But if I hc.ve used harsh words it is because the problem of Katanga c-m cast doubt on the usefulness and the very foundation of the United Nations. The United rations has proclaimed certain principles and has inscribed them in the Charter, The United Nations has fought, and with success, to defend those principles. It has made a large contribution to the liberation of the colonized peoples and countries. Now, at this moment, it is powerless to deal with a handful of irresponsible men who want to continue to exploit the African. We are watching, helplessly, the operations of mercenaries of all nationalities and the actions of international murderers. The people of North Katanga are bombed in broad daylight, under the very eyes of the United Nations. Were we, then, wrong to request the assistance of the United Nations? And are the people who place their confidence in the United Nations wrong, too? Is the Organization which we know as the protector of the weak and small nations to become an instrument in the hands of a few powerful nations? Those are the questions which we ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, since no one can question the fact that the international Organization assumed the responsibility of intervening by replying favourably to the appeal of the Congo twenty-eight months ago. BG/Ji 33

(l lr . Id ?. vimbu i r

For its part, the Congolese Government has Its responsibilities to the people of the Congo. The various resolutions adopted so far "by the Security Council and the Assembly are sufficiently clear and precise. In my Government's opinion, the mandate which you have received, Mr. Secretary-General, is complete and satisfactory. It is up to you to ensure implementation and, to that end, to use all the means in your paver, It is up to you to put an end to the equivocal attitude taken by certain Member States, an attitude which is compromising the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Council. The Congolese. Government ban sent to seventeen countries a letter in which it rskn them to place an embargo on copper and cobalt coring .t'rcn Let the United Nations carry o-.ifc its task in the Congo. The Central Government remains determined to carry out its tack. Success in Katanga will demonstrate to all the peoples of the world the usefulness of our Organization.

The SKCROTA3Y-GITORAL; In Implementing the Plan, I shall certainly keep in mind the very useful observations just made by the representative of the Congo (Leopolciville) . Are there any further observations?

Mr . QU.AT.10N -flACKEY (Ghana ) : 'If this is to be our last meeting before Christmas, Mr. Secretary-General, I want to wish you in advance a Merry Christmas and to say that we shallt fa t ch developments in the operation of your plan; you have our support and we hope that you succeed.

' Thfr SECPETARY-GflNERAL; Thank you very much for your good wishes. Of course, they are reciprocal. As things stand at the moment, it does seem that this will be the last meeting of the Coraraittee before Christmas. I very Lvach hope that at our next meeting I chall be in a position to report substantial progress in the implementation of the Plan.

The meeting rose at 3*20 p.m. u

CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No, 73 20 March 1963 EUGLIGH

UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE OK THE CONGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 20 March 1963, at 3.30 p.m.

In the Chair: U THAMT The SECRETARY-GENERAL

Members: Canada Mr. TREMDIAY Ceylon 1'ir. UIJEGCOWEUARDE1IA Ethiopia Mr, GEERE-EGZY Federation of Malaya Mr. IIAMID Ghana Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY Guinea Mr. DJALLO India- llr. BIIADIOVMICAR IndDnesia . ..-. • Mr. FAIAR Ireland Mr. B01ATID •Liberia / Mr, JOin-IuON

Mali . . : Mr. COULICALY Morocco 1'jT, BENIIIMA Nigeria Mr. ADEBO Pakistan Mr. Senegal Mr. Gudan Mr. ADEEL Sweden I'xs ROS3EL Tunisia lor. Taieb SLIM United Arab Republic Mr. RIAD

63-05819 TL/tt 2

The SKGPETagYrGli]NFRAL; I have called this meeting to inform you and to consult with you about the arrangements that have been proposed to me by Prisie Minister Adoula with regard to the modernization and training of the Congolese armed forces, the nKC. AS you know, the MC, frcm the very beginning of the United Nations involvement in the Congo, has posed certain serious problems for both the Congolese Government and the United Nations. Indeed, the condition of the AKG has been a vital factor in the course of Congo events since the first week of the country's independence. In the early stage of the United Nations Operation in the Congo, efforts were made to assist the Congolese Government, on its initiative, in the training and reorganization of the AITC,so that it could take its place as an effective and reliable arm of the Government in the maintenance of law and order and so that it could be organized in such a way as not to be a crippling burden upon the finances of the Congo. General Kettani of Morocco, who was the first Deputy Force Coirmander of the United Nations Force in the Congo, was entrusted with the initial United Nations step in this direction, and he was followed in this function by General lyassu of Ethiopia. For various reasons thece early attempts of the United Nations were never very effective. The general political situation in the Congo until August 1961, when the present Government come into power, was reflected in the condition of the AKC, which was to all intents and purposes split into three rival factions. Even after August 196! the continued secessionist stand of Katanga and the difficulties in Oriental Province made it extremely difficult to institute an orderly and effective programme of ANC training and reorganization. F '•" .

BC/jw

When Prime Minister Adoula visited United Nations Headquarters in February 10G2 — Juct over a year ago — the reorganization and retraining of the ANC was one of the most important of the subjects which he and I discussed. At that time; Mr. Adoula outlined for ir,y benefit the delicate and difficult nature of the question, from the point of view of supplying proper cadres of officers,, of reducing the size of the force and of altering ito state of mind, especially in relation to the civilian population. He wished the United Nations to give what assistance it could to his Government in facing these problems. I acted accordingly, and several countries responded favourably to my request to them to supply French-speaking officers for the training of the ANC, and particularly in relation to the establishment of an officers' training school. We found it very difficult to recruit French-cpeaking officers for this purpose, but succeeded in some degree, although they v/ere never called upon. In view of the latest developments, it may be noted that at that time -- over a year ago -- Mr. Adcula strongly emphasized the desirability that most of these officers should be recruited from African countries, although some of his colleagues in the Government were understood . to hold contrary views. " • ' -'" In addition to these exchanges, other studies outside the framework of the United Nations have been made of the requirements of the ANC. In particular, it may be mentioned that some time ago I was informed that the United States Government had cent a mission to the Congo under Colonel Green to study the best methoda of helping the Congolese Government in this sphere. The plan for assistance from various countries outlined in the third letter before you, that from Mr. Adoula datei 26 February 19^5, is, I surmise, at least to some extent, based on the findings of Colonel Green1s mission. Ac you will note from tha copies of the correspondence before you, I have been in correspondence with the Pritna Minister since 20 December 1962 on the practical meacuzes to be taken to train and modernize the ANC. This assumes added significance now that th^ro is a hopeful prospect of the integration of all soldiers in the Congo into the national army. BC/jw U (The Secretary "

I would not have called this meeting if what was involved van simply a q^r-fition of bilateral assistance by various eovernjjontn to the Government of the Conro. ir it were juat a question of "bilateral assistance between the Governments concerned and the Central Government of the Congo, there would not, I think., be any need for this meeting. However, there is more to it than that, for there or. 2 obvious implications with regard to selection where the United Rations is involved. You will note from the FriKe Minister's letters that he is anxious for this scheme to go forward with the collaboration and co-ordination of the United Nations. That is, the United Nations is asked to provide something in the nature of an "umbralla" for the programme. You will note also that I have asked, and the Prime Minister has agreed, that the composition of that "umbrella" -- that is, of the co-ordinating group -- should be broadened. The details of the functioning, of this co-ordinating group remain to be discussed and worked out with Prime Minister Adoula. In view of these facts, I wica to have the advice of the Committee before proceeding with the practical implementation of the programme. As it now stands, then, as you will note from the correspondence, the Prime I'linister has proposed that the necessary assistance be sought from the countries he has specified. He has had assurances, I gather, that these countries will provide the assistance requested. The Government of the Congo alcrio, therefore, has made the selection cf the countries from which assistance is caught, This is the prerogative of the government of a sovereign, independent State. The financial responsibility for the costs of that assistance, you will also note, rests entirely with each assisting country. For my part, 1 have asked that the composition of the group to undertake on behalf of the United Nations the- co-ordination of the programme of assistance should be broaler Than the group of nations actually giving the assistance. The Prime Minister accepts this broadening. In order to get the programme under way — and there is obvious urgency in providing this assistance to the ANC — it would next be necessary for me to send letters to the countries from which the Prime Minister seeks assistance, BC/jw 5

indicating the nature of the Prime Minister's request; the ccir.position and function of tlie co-ordinating Group, the financial responsibility end otter necessary details. It will be appreciated that there ic a close relationship between the training of the ANC and the phasing out of the United Nations Force in the Con^o. I would nov seek the advice of members of the Committee on this matter. DR/rh 6

Mr. GEBnE-FG?.Y (Ethiopia): I just want to know exactly what is involved. I have read this, but it is not quite clear in ray mind what is involved* I think that if we are to give advice and if ye are to get in contact with our governments, I think that some time is needed. I have read thio now and I read it before in some other connexion but, quite frankly, I cculd not attempt to convey the views and opinions of my Government before some time lapses, in order to Gee what is involved on our part, I see from your statement, Mr, Secretary-General, that you wish to convey to those countries that have been mentioned in those communications what the role cf the co-ordinating group will "be, what their functions will be and what their financial responsibilities will be. Therefore, it seems to me that before we come out with opinions and advice, we will have to know in more detail what is involved. If I may say so, we will have to examine the reraests more thoroughly. In conclusion, for my part I an in no position today to express views on this,

The HE CRRT ARY - G'flNERAL : I was also under this impression before calling this meeting because it involves a very important principle regarding the United Nations involvement in this particular operation, and I felt rather strongly that perhaps one meeting would not suffice because you just received the copies of the correspondence exchanged between me and Prime Minister Adoula, and you also just heard my statement. Of course, in most cases I believe that a reference to your Governments yill be necessary. Perhaps we might be benifited by your initial reactions, and my anticipation, of course, was that another meeting would be necessary to give you time to refer this to your Governments.

Mr. ^IIAinON-SACKEY (Ghana): From our point of view this is a very good meeting. The idea is good because, apart from the responsibility of the Congolese Government itself, 1 should have thought that there is an over-riding responsibility which has always rested with the United Nations in regard to the possibility of the Congolese themselves having an efficient army which can maintain law and order. So from the aspect alone of the maintenance of law and DR/rh 7

(Mr^j^iipon_ Sacfcey, Gtona) order and the continuing commitment cf the United Nations operation in the Congo, this problem which you arc now bringing before the Coir.:i]ittee is a very vital one because on it depends the future of the operation, whether there should be a complete break from the country; that is to cay, whether there should be a withdrawal of ti.e United Nations troops from the Con-o or whether there is going to be a scaling down of the present operation. I thoucht that all these factors hinge on the problem as to whether the Congoleoe authorities could, with the backing of Iheir own army, maintain lav and order. That is why I feel that this is a very important problem. For a long time, as you yourself, Mr. Secretary-General said, when you made your introduction, it has been insisted upon that the traininG of the ConGole3e soldiers and their disciplining and regrouping should take place quickly. I think that most delegations which have taken part in the Congo debates have all stressed this, for about two years now. The first point of course is that, "by all means, there should be a national army; there should be no room for divisive forces and no region in the Congo should be able to have any group of soldiers behind that authority and that any array you have should be a national army. So this is a responsibility which you, Mr. Secretary-General, will have to face, and 1 am very happy that the Prime Minister is aware of this problem. The second problem, of course, is the size and standard of training of the array. But that of course must rest with the Congolese authorities. I want to dwell largely on the question of the maintenance of the Congolese army because this ic a problem which my country has been considering. As you know, we still have troops in the Congo, and my Government has authorized me to say that GO long as you have need of cur troops they will continue to be there. They have authorized me to say that on no account should there be a withdrawal if such a withdrawal will mean a resurgence of conflicts in the country. I am also authorized to say that in cpite of what we are telling you, we feel that a scaling downrar. yb e necessary. But we want to be assured that if there is a scaling down, then the authorities would have a sufficient army which can control the country throughout its entirety. lie feel that the problems wnich are raised in the letters here are of great portent, and I agree with ray colleague from Ethiopia that of course it will require time for us to go into them in detail. But I want to say at once that I welcome DR/rh 8-10 (Mr. '.••nruson-Sackoy, Ghana) the idea. My Government welcomeG the idea of international technical assistance as sought by the Congolese Governmentjand in fact ray Government would like to be associated with this. It GO happens that we have troops in the Congo just as does Ethiopia, Tunisia and Nigeria, and we feel that there would be no harm if Ghana is associated with this. I am authorised to say this. I am authorized to cay that we, like other African otates "which are prepared to help, have facilities -which are open for use by the Congolese authorities. Of course, ve are doing so bilaterally also, but we felt that we should bring this to your attention. We are very anxious that the tack upon which we have enbarked should be successful because it would be disappointing if after gaining this success in Katanga, there should be a comeback* There should be no going lack. We feel that you, Mr. Cjcretary-Gcneral, should continue with your efforts and therefore we support you on the organization of small international technical assistance. In a preliminary way I would agree with you that it is of course left to the Congolese Government if they wr,i'it to seek help from Canada, Israel, Belgium, Italy and Norway. It is their prerogative to seek whatever help they want from whatever country. But because of the fact that they want the United. Nations to be associated with this idea, we think that certain issues are raised which make it difficult for us to pronounce on this, without prejudice to the sovereign right of the Congolese Government. They can go ahead and do this. But if they are going to associate the United Nations with this kind of bilateral assistance, then of course a caveat must be entered for obvious reasons. To give one example, we find it very difficult to see why Belgium, for example, should be' brought in at this time. You know that,after all, this whole problem was created by Belgium; there is no question at all about it. I am happy to see that the relations between the Congo and Belgium have been normalized. But even so, it is difficult for an international body like this, which has had to commit itself in a gigantic way for . yoars -- nearly two and a half years --in the Congo because of Belgian intervention, that Belgium should be brought in like this and their support asked for in getting them involved in a programme like this, I mentioned Belgium as an exanple, but I am sure other delegations may raise other countries also. i3o the mttor of bilateral assistance poses a problem. I am very sure that when we ha,ve had time to think it over against the background of the sovereign rights of the Congolese themselves, we shall be able to hammer out something that will be acceptable to all concerned. HA/rs

Ici: After the intervention of the representative of Ethiopia, I really have very little to add. I think the problem "before us is extremely important. It is' connected with many aspects quite difficult of solution by us now without instructions frcrn our Governments. I vich only to add this : The Secretary-General has kindly sug^es ted that the co-ordinating group should be "broadened and that sore Africans chould be added to it, • Ee mentioned, among others, the name of Tunisia. .While I an extremely grateful to the Secretary-General for his suggestion, I wish to make a reservation until I can consult F.y Government and tell the Secretary-General what possibilities Tunisia can bring to this co-ordinating group* 1 also wish to say that another meeting will perhaps to necessary in order to allow us to express the views of our Government on all the issues involved in this project. Naturally, we all support. thic kind of assistance in order to bring about a unification of the Congolese Army.

(United Arab Republic): I agree with all ray colleagues who have asked for another meeting in order to give us time to consider this important subject, but I should like to raise a question for clarification. The representative of Ghana has given us an exarcple in regard to Belgian assistance to the Congolese Government. There is no doubt that the .-Congolese Government has a complete right to sign any bilateral agreement with o.ny country. But the Secretary-General mentioned that such agreements are supposed to be under the umbrella of the United Nations. I therefore really wish to knew what will be the responsibility of the United Nations here. It locks to. me at first glance as though responsibility will be shared between the Congolese • Gove.L-rjrent and the United Nations. But here the United Nations hao no choice. at all in the question of the selection of countries, and. I am wondering what will happen in the future if mistakes are ccmnltted by the Belgians, for example. As has been mentioned, there are ro mar.y resolutions that have been adopted, . - calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops immediately I'rom. Katanga, and so on; there are so many resolutions asking the withdrawal of the experts and the military forces and even the irregular forces. Of course; we hope that nothing HA/rs 12

(llr. Knhmoud Rlad, will happen in the future, and we hope that relations "between the Congo and Belgium will be improved. But suppose that seme mistake happens in the future? Who will "be responsible? Is it only the Congolese Government that will "be responsible? It is, of course, up to them, when they sign an agreement with any ether country, tn t£.ke the responsibility. But what is our responsibility, as the United l.ations, in this case, when we have no choice at all end £re simply faced with a list of certain countries? I really wish that the Secretary- General would give us some, clarification about the responsibility of the United Nations in such a question.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL : Before I give the floor to the Ambassador of Congo (Lecpcldville), I want to make a very "brief observation* Ihc problem, to put it in a nutshell, is this; Th::-;a are o-aly tvo possible courses of action. The first course is for the Central Government of the Congo to enter into purely bilateral negotiations with the prospective countries — countries which are likely to provide instructors in certain specific fields of ANC training — without United Nations involvement. The second course is for the Central Government of the Congo to make soundings, if necessary, with the prospective countries, with a view to securing the necessary technical training, and then to ask for seme port of United Nations umbrella by way of co-ordination, The Central Government of the Congo has resorted to the second course* The Central Government of the Congo wants certain countries to provide training in particular fields for the AIIC, and then the next step is that the Central Government of the Congo wants the Urited nations to "be involved "by providing an uiubrclls. — SCCG sort of co-ordinating function. Thereby cur task is rendered a little more delicate. That is why I have tried to secure advice because of the delicate implications, as I said in my introductory statement, since the United Nations is to ba involved.. If you study Prime Minister Adoulars original letter of 20 December you will find the terms of reference for these instructors, HA/rs 13-15

(The necretary-Geno?ral)

As I have indicated earlier, I realize that it will "be very difficult for raost of the members of this Caimittee to offer any definitive advice, I would therefore propose, if you agroe, that, after we have exhausted the list of speakers for this afternoon, we should arrange to have another mooting* when the members of the Committee will be fully "briefed,

Mr« irZUMBUIR (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): I have asked for the floor not to give any sensational Information "but rather to express a point of view here which may make it eacier to understand the decision of my Government, Ilia representatives of Ghana and the United Arab Republic have expressed the point of view — and I think that this is the generally understood view- that the Congolese Government has tbc» sovereign right to enter into bilateral agreements providing for assistance in such a question as the re-organization of the army. AP/el -16- (Mr. Idnunhuir, Ccn^o (Lecpoldville))

It 13 obvious that the example given us of aoma difficulties that follow and that may be due to any specific relationship that may exist "between Belgium and the Congo might be considered as mailing tlie matter complicated. But if tnu United Nations were to be willing to set up the umbrella, it might obviate difficulties not only with Belgium but with other African countries as well. But may i say that we ou^ht to be more realistic and see this problem as a function of a certain evolution, as a part of the Goodwill end the efforts that we have all made in the solution of the Congolese crisis. On this level I think that there is a certain optimism. Obviously, mistakes may be possible, but if we are always to be afraid of the possibility of errors, it will be very difficult to get ahead on anything. I think furthermore that rather than examining the problem now, a better solution would be for the delegations to become acquainted with the documents which they have not had the time to study, p.nd as the Secretary -General caid, these representatives can contact their respective Governments; this will allow them at eonie subsequent meeting to have more specific and more interesting views on the subject matter itself.

l?EiJ5™ML (Guinea) (Interpretation from French): First of all, I should like to associate my delegation with the request made by my colleagues who have spoken before me about the advisability of having a meeting later, and the time between today and our forthcoming meeting be used to enable representatives to have more detailed knowledge of the documents that have been circulated to us and to consult our Governments. But I think that forthwith I may suggest that certain questions could be raised for the consideration not only of the members of the Committee bub also for tiiG Secretariat, As far as my delegation is concerned, I cannot conceal from you, Mr. Secretary-General, our embarrassing position. Cur difficulties arise from the fact that it seems to UG that there is some confusion here and this confusion deserves to be dispelled. It is true, as all the previous speakers have asserted, that no African representative would have any notion of disputing the independence and the full sovereignty of the Conco. It is for the recpect of this independence and sovereignty that the African Gtates here, and also in the AP/el -17-

(llv» Diallo, fl.ulttqo.

Security Council and In the General Assembly itself, have always f ought. But the problem today seems to us to be changing in nature} and this is the specific point that 1 would like to raise in tiie hope that the Secretariat will clarify this issue, if not today, at leant at the tine of our next nicotine. It seeir.s to us that the terms of the equations have been turned upside down. As a matter of fact, the United Nations -- and you yourself, Mr. Secretary- General -- can act only within the framework of relevant resolutions, both of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. Now 'these resolutions have net at all remitted, but on the contrary, have ruled out any possibility for bilateral arrangements within the framework of the United Nations. V;e have from the very outset envisaged only multilateral international action under the guidance of the United Nations, and all the resolutions have appealed to Member States and to all other States to refrain from intervening outside the framework of the United Nations. The question therefore that I am raising is as fellows; lo ycu not think, Mr. Secretary-General, in the existing circumstances that we irust either redefine the mandate of the Secretary-General or raise the whole issue afresh? The Government of the Congo, in the exercise of its full sovereignty, made an appeal in I960 to the United Nations, practically against Belgium. Today, if I have correctly understood the situation, we are going back to the status £uo of July 1$K:0 in the sense that as a practical thing, — s::d th:Ls would appear as a result of letter No. 3 which you yourself hive cited, Mr. Secretary-General -- that Belgium is going to deal not only with the question of technicians for the

ANG General Staff and for the various units, but also the question of bases; gendarmerie and various military schools. GartGz'.nly, i"*"- is outs:".de the framework of the United Nations, it Is the sovereign right of the Congo to appeal to any party that it wishes to. But I might ask: Can the United Nations provide^ an_un;brel.] nj1 ___And_I_think_thi s is a substa.ntiYc.---i a sue-,-. this is an issue which affects tne mandate of the United Nations and your own mandate, r'r".~ il-^rotary-Oen^rnl. The question is: Is the United Nations empowered under existing resolutions to patronize, to act as a godfather for bilateral action between' the Government of the Congo and some other government? I think that the Security Council or the General Assembly should AT/el .10- (Kr. Dla.llo, -G

speak out on this issue before we go.any further. There are so many resolutions which already exist which fully empower the Secretary-General to do a certain amount and authorize us, as the Advisory Body, to deal with international assistance provided to the Central Congolese Government, end therefore it seems to my delegation that we have no legal basis to serve as an umbrella for bilateral \} co-operation between governments, and more particularly between the Government I of the Congo and another government. I think that it would be a violation of jjthe resolutions of the Security Council which request all States to refrain from • • ij intervening in the Congo unless they act through the United Nations. I would I' have been quite pleased to see within the framework of the normal mandate of the t ': United Nations, that the United Nations should suggest to the Central Congolese i Government, on the-basis.of research that it had carried out, that certain particular countries should help, all of which would fall solely within the framework of multilateral and not bilateral co-operation; and then the Government of the Congo, as ic only proper in tlie case of co-oporation, could accept or refuse sach assistance or could n&ka -suggestions. Tut, I am very much afraid that here wa are dealing with a question of bilateral co-operation, which I think is fully possible between the Government of the Congo and with any'of the Governments mentioned here — Canada, Italy, Norway, Israel, Belgium and even the United States — but it does not seem possible to me that the United Nations should be able to provide an umbrella for bilateral action. What is more, Mr. Secretary-General -- and this is a second point of inforir-ation with respect to which I should like to be informed, if not today at least at our next meeting.; we have been told that Prime Minister Adoula, at the outset of your discussions, hoped to see only African Grates participate in the reorr'^nization of the Congolese National Amy, and you quickly sketched for us, Mr. Cocretary-Gcneral, the fact that some members of his Government were not in agreement with his view. It appears from the document that we have received today that no African State is provided for here. This, of course, again is fully within the sovereign right of the Government, of the Congo to make such a choice, but, on any assumption, African States at the present time are in the Congo with troops. You have been kind enough to suggest that the basis should be enlarged and that we should make appeal to African Governments, I must say quite sincerely that I am AT/el 19-20

(Mr. Dial3o, Guinea) very much afraid that when the African Governments learn that the Government of the Con^o has not proposed'a single African Government and that it is on the suggestion of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and not on the "basis of the clearly-defined will of the Government of the Congo to appeal to certain African States, I think this will create a psychological atmosphere which will norrcally not make it possible for African States to intervene. But I shall not pive my views on this point; yet the fundamental issue I think is as .follows: Shall we redefine the mandate of our operations? Does this not seem to you to "be necessary, that it should be carried out "by the competent "bodies, that is to say, either the Security Council or the General Assembly? RGH/pia 21 . . (Mr. Dlrillo, Guinea)

To you "believe that the existing resolutions enable the Secretariat, at least the Spates represented hare, to provide an unbrella for bilateral co-operation between the Congo Government and another Government? rihese are the two qu3ctlons which I think are very important and which should not be-passed over in silence. They are prerequisites for any discussion ve nay have on this question.

The r.ECEETAKY-GENERAL; By way of a preliminary reply to the very interesting questions posed by the Ambassador frora Guinea, T would just cay this. Regarding the possibility or the legality or the propriety of purely "bilateral assistance negotiated between the Central Government of the Conco and any particular country, there is no bar in any of the Security Council's resolutions in operation. Therefore, on this particular aspect, I do not think that a fresh mandate or a clarification of the previous mandates from the Security Council will be necessary. I have been advised by my competent colleagues in the Secretariat that JJie Central Government of the Con op is quite competent to negotiate for any bilateral assistance from any country. A question arises when this assistance is to be put under some sort of United Kations umbrella, as the Central Government of the Congo has requested. That is why I am seeking your advice, and, of course, I will deal with this much more fully at our next meeting. Regarding your second question, of course, for the first time I revealed the fact that in the course of wy discussions with Prime Minister Adoula last year, in February 1^62, he indicated his desire to get the African countries involved in the provision of the military training pregrammes in the Congo. Also I was in formed un^rcL'icirJLiy at jom'j later stage that there was no general agreement among the members of the Cabinet. That is why I indicated this in iny introductory statement. The development I presented before you today, as you all know, is new and, if I may put it, as you have just indicated, it surprised rr.e also to some extc.nt, since no African countries wore to be involved, But, of course, I have no strong vie\7s on this question, and I will be guided primarily by the advice of this Committee. ••pi'l"'

RGII/pm 22

I may also irention in this context that last winter I tried to get the assistance of African officers for this particular type of operation,, "but without much. success. Therefore, I will have to deal with this question much more fully at our next meeting.

Ch'.ef ATTvro (Nigeria) : I am in the same kind of difficulty as that facing other members of thic Advisory Committee. I became aware of the nature of your proposal only a few minutes ago, and I have been trying to divide rr-.y tine i etween reading this correspondence and listening to the contributions of my follow members of the Advisory Committee. I would like to appeal to you, Mr. ^o ere tary- General, that in future we might 'be supplied with these documents a reasonable time before the meeting is to be held. There may, of course, be occasions of great urgency when you cannot possibly meet this requirement. For instance, at the time when the military operations were in progress, had you required advice on any aspect of them, it would have been unwise to suggest that vou give us plenty of notice of the facts, but tho time of most urgent emergency has now passed, and I would like to appeal to you to help US to help you by letting us have these facts well in advance of the meeting which is called to discuss them, 'lhat is a very important matter because, as you realize only too well, we do not represent our individual selves, we represent Governments, and it is very difficult to make a useful contribution without having had the time to look at your proposals and also time to comsult with our Governments.' Pe cause of this difficulty, I find myself unable to make a contribution of value to today's proceedings, and I must reserve the comments of Nigeria until a later opportunity. 1 would add only this, Nigeria's position in relation to the Congo is well known, Iligeria is prepared to give as much assistance as lies within its power to ensure that the Congo is put in a position to take its honoured place in this community of nations. Leaving said that, Mr, Secretary-General, may I ask if you will be good enougn to say a little more concerning the implications of the United Nations umbrella for this operation. I ask this in order to be able to properly inform my Government so that when we return here 1 may be able to make a useful contribution. RS!!/pm 23-25 (rhlor Ade"bo . 171 p;eria'

It is indicated here that the cix Governir.ents which are going to supply assictance in modernizing and training the army vrill ue responsible Tor their own costs. It is not indicated exactly what the technical assistance micdon,

vhich includes these oix countries with the suggested addition oT three othersy will LO doin/-;. Also, I do not find any reference nnde to ireeting the coots involved in their operation. I wonder, Mr. Secretary-General^ whether you vould fill in these gaps for tr.e GO that I may "be in a position properly to inform ray Government. AW/he

The n^C^ETAP.Y-GUI'I^o^L; Regarding the prior circulation or relevant 'documents before the mooting, I agree with the representative of Nigeria that for the purposes of providing more time to the me inborn or thin Committee to study the documents I think we should have distributed them earlier. But in this present case, as the me-.iibers of the Ccmmittee will notice, some of the documents had been released in a Security Council document; as fin appendix to my report to the Security Council, and the last one was received only yesterday, after the request for the meeting went out on Monday. That is the letter dated 19 March from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Ccngo. In future I will see to it, if they are important documents which require a thorough study before the ccrnreneement of the meeting, that the members of the Committee receive them at least twenty-four hours ahead of the meeting. Regarding the second issue raided, concerning the nature of the so-called umbrella, the points are not yet cloar. What the Central Government of the Congo has been proposing is some sort of a UN directorate asG'uning the co-ordinating functions. But with regard to this particular character of the United Nations operations, I have "been in consultation with our representatives in Leopoldville and it will be of interest to the Committee to know that I have asked General Kebbede and General Prem Chand and other military leaders of the Congo to ccLJ3 here during the first week of April for further consultations. By that time I hope that the nature of this umbrella or co-ordinating function will be much clearer. It is also my intention to call a meeting of the Congo Advisory Committee while they are here, perhaps in the early part of the second week of April. We have tentatively fixed the date of 3 April at 3«3>0 p.m. Wich regard to the costs, it is my understanding that the countries which have premised to provide the instructors for the specific character of the trainii.g involved will bear all costs for the provision of the services. Regarding the costs for the maintenance of the co-ordinating conmittee, we have not coma to any definite conclusion yet. AW/ht

llL^ZI!!7?:-^ (Morocco) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary- General, e.t the beginning of your statement you 'were good enough to sum up the background of the question of the technical assistance and the military assistance of the United Nations to the Congo. You mentioned that one of the first plans of this military assistance had been prepared in co-operation vith General Kettani, who at the time was the head of the United Nations forces in the Congo. May I offer ECHO clarification to the effect that at the time vhen General Kettani contributed to the preparation of that plan, the United Nations operation in the Congo was in a certain phase and wr>,s going along an orientation which at that time clearly precluded any possibility of foreign military assistance, leaving that responsibility exclusively vithin the United Nations competence. General Kettani then left the cnrmand of the United Nations forces in the Congo -- for reasons which my Government explained both in the correspondence with the then Secretary-General and frcm the rootrum of the United Nations — and the framework vithin which that military assistance is now envisaged has no link whatever vith the ideas expressed in the original plan of General Ketto.nl. I feel that it is important to point out to the Ccronittec that the reference to General Kettani's participation in the original plan has no link or liinchip with the plan which my Government will examine once all the information is available and once it has been communicated to it. Ihis will in due course allow it to ccme to a decision. Secondly, the representative of Guinea raised certain fundamental aspects of the problens that arise frcm this plan. Mr. Secretary-General, I have listened vith satisfaction and gratification to the assurance you have given us, namely that the competent advice which was given to you sets up no contradiction between the previous plans and situation, and the possible mandate that the United Nations may asaume in the new framework, of this plan. I am sure that the communication of such an interpretation to my Government will be one of the basic elements on which cur attitude will be linked. I also wish to associate myself with the statement made by a number of our colleagues regarding the total frcedcm of the Congolese Government to address itself, for the formation of its amy, to those countries it considers to be the most adequate and the moot indicated to give it such assistance. AW/he 28-30 (Mr .^ fle

Put at the sano time I vould also like to associate myself vith those vho have asked questions, specifically whether the list of countries contained in the letter of the Prime Minister will not give rise to problems — not among those countries -which have thus far participated in the formation of the United Nations forces and which Tor psychological and political reasons cannot oppose the niove. But does this not raiee a moral, .political and psychological problem for the United Nations if the troops which have participated since the very "beginning of the crisis in the Congo, in the re-establishment of order there, and which have carried the United Nations policy to success, are completely excluded? Whereas, technically, within the fracewcrk of the re -format ion of the Congolese array, it might "bo able to give some assistance since they have establish a certain continuity in their relations with the Congolese arny. ThlG also leads to another question. Why exclude these forces which have led to the success of the United Nations? Why exclude them frcm the re- eGtatJliEhncnt of the Congolese army IM peace when they worked there during the crisis? My Government will doubtless nek a question of that nature. That is vhy I veul

(Mr. Berhima, Morocco)

The United Nations chou].d consider how deeply it is committed in the Congo to take en this second phase of Its work, a phase which exists in a completely recognized juridical framework. Is it then going to require Member States to take a political stand tb.at they might be ready to take Individually vis-a-vis the Congo within the frcraework of solidarity, and within the framework of African fraternity in the case of the Congo, in a case that might arise tomorrow in new political circumstances, although perhaps in identical juridical circumstances? These are the general questions that I wanted to raise at this preliminary stage of our discussions in the desire to obtain clarification and to request further information that might assist us in taking the most favourable stand with respect to the future of the Congo, a stand that would be in keeping with the principles for which we originally committed ourselves as a Member of the United Nations and under which we stood shoulder to shoulder with you in your policies in the Congo in an effort to ensure the success of such policies.

The SECRETARy~GE?vERAL; Regarding the political and psychological issues involved, I think we had better not take those up at this meeting. I Lhall give further thought to the very interesting observations just made by the representative of Morocco. With respect to General Kettani's attempts to train the ANC when he was the Deputy Corunander in the Congo, and other allied subjects connected with it, I shall call on Dr<, Bunche to make a few observations*

Mr, BUTTCHE : I shall be very brief. I can affirm that as the representative of Morocco has indicated, there was no relationship in substance between the plan of General KettanL and the present programme as proposed by Prime Minister Adoula* The only relationship that might be indicated is that in each instance the initiative was taken by the Congolese Government in the exercise of its free and sovereign will. In the case of General Kettarii, Prime Minister Luv.iurnba, on behalf of his Government, submitted to me when I was out there as Special Representative of the Secretary-General a formal request for the services of General Kettani to advise and assist the Government in retraining and reorganizing the Congolese army. Initially, as a matter of BHG/dr 32 '•• •— • • (Mr* Eunche) fact, Trine Minister Lumunbo wished the full services of General Ivettani, that he be transferred "i'rcj his popition as Deputy Ccimionder of the United Nations Force to the Government'of the Congo. General Kettani and I thought that vac inadvisable, and an arrargement was worked out whereby lie would continue to cerve as Deputy Gc-XLiand-sr of the United Nations Force but, at the same time, vculd perform thin function for the Congolese Government. He did vork out a plan which did not call for assistance frcm outside nations "but which, through the channels of the United Nations itself, would set up a training pro^rarane. A mere extensive programme was later worked out "by General Jyassu of Ethiopia. Neither of these plans was acted upon by the Government and consequently there was no fruit deriving frcm this work.

Mr._TREMRLAY (Cannda): I should like first of all to welcome the agreement that has been reached to broaden the basic of the participation to the ANC training scheme. We curcclvos thought that it vac very important to have as wide participation as possible,, and we are very glad that this has now been done. As we understand it, the broadening of the participation'to the scheme means in effect the establishment of a co-ordinating group that •will be responsible to implement the scheme. This is a new development and it is a very important one because it means, in effect, that we will have to define very clearly the role of the United Nations vis-a-vis the scheme when the time comes to know exactly what will be the status of the co-ordinating Group. I think that at our next meeting it will be quite important to have a little more information as to the functions and relationship of the co-ordinating group with the Unite.! ITatlonG. For instance, it is conceivable that this co-c.vdinating group would be primarily responsible to the United nations. I assume that the co-ordinating group would be headed by a Director. Where will the responsibility lie? Will it be a responsibility vis-a-vis the United Nations1*' Will there be some responsibility vis-a-vis the Congolese Government? Will thire be responsibility to both authorities? I •chink this is a very importont point in order to reach seme conclusion as to the attitude that we might take with respect to this new development. BKS/dr 33-35 (Mr* TrcrnhJoy, Canada)

Another aspect of the problem is the relationship "between this co-ordinating group and its Director vic-a-vis the national training contingents that will "be provided by some nations. For the success of this scheme I think it will "be very important to know exactly what will "be the position of the co-ordinating croup vis-a-vis contingents which will "be provided by national governments and vhich I suppose would feel primarily responsible to their own governments and not co much toward the authority superimposed within the scheme itself. Another point is the fact that although Canada is mentioned in the correspondence, I want to make it clear that there has not been any bilateral negotiation "between my Government and the Congolese Government. Indeed, we have always assumed that any contribution that we would make to the A ICC training scheme would be under the aegis of the United Nations, At our next meeting I may be in a position to elaborate on this point , but I want to make it clear now that ve do not fall under the category of the "Mlaterals". We still believe that our contribution would serve its best purposes if it is effected under the aegis of the United Nations,

L: I vant to clarify one point raised "by the representative of Canada with respect to the functions and responsibilities of the co-ordinating group, if there is to-te one. It will act solely under the United Nations, on behalf of the United Nations and be accountable to tta United Nations* -.

Mr. TPEMPLAY (Canada): And paid by the United Nations?

The SECRET ARY-GKIT^AL: As I have just said, we have not cleared this with the Central Government. TL/jw

_ (interpretation from French): The question that you liuve just nut before us, Mr. Secretory-General, is a very important anl delicate one, and you can readily understand th.?t at this juncture it is not ponsible for us to make any suggestions along the lines that you have indicated4 I have just loafed very quickly through the correspondence you have had with ti:-3 Congolese Government and, a P£i°^£; I am not In a position to rive you any opinion on that correspondence. But I should like, nevertheless/ to obtain certain information GO that I can properly inform ray Government, and I wish elco to make a few observations for your consideration. It seems to me that the United Nations troops were sent to the Congo with a very well-defined mandate; in a specified context, for the accomplishment of a certain number of objectives, having regard also to the situation obtaining at that time in the Congo. Among these overriding considerations thore was .-above all the matter of the defence of th2 sovereignty and unity of the Conrjo, both of which had bcoa jeopardized. It was in this context tt-.i-ii a godly number of countries, including my own, gave their sanction to the dispatch of United Nations troop3 to the Congo. - . • . It voulcl appear that today, in view of tl.a forthcoming withdrawal of United Nations troops from the Congo, the Congolese Government -would 'like to proceed to a reorganization of its army, and, within the framework of its sovereignty, as has been explained, it intends to appeal to a certain number • of countries, which it has mentioned specifically by name, and request of them certain assistance which I think is being requested in a purely bilateral sense. You will therefore understand, Sir, that, having due regard to'the initial mandate given to the United nations troops, it is a very delicate matter indeed to suggest that the United Nations Organization undertake the task of co-ordinating the activities which a fully Independent Government has requested within a framework of bilateral arrangements. In order to enable livy Government to give you suggestions at our forthcoming meeting, I should like to know what, from your point cf view, might be the competence of this co-ordinating body. It seems to me that, in the light of the reply you gave to my friend from Guinea, you have already consulted your experts and have therefore examined the problem from the various possible angles and with a view even to the various possible consequences. TL/jw 37 (Hr. Coulthaly, I-!a?.i)

Now, If this ic 20, Sir, I chould like to know what, in your opinion, would be tlici nature of this co-ordinating bccly. To you think of it ac being fully ccmpeteut to intervene in th2 programme of assistance and in the canner in which thic assistance is provided to the Congo? After all, if there is to be a co-ordinating bccly of the United Nations and if we are to be called upon to pronounce ourselves cu the advisability of Getting up such a body and on its sponsorship by the United Nations, we mur>t be able to know exactly what will be the powers and functions of this body. Will this co-ordinating body be rrrponsiblo for preparing a programme? Will it be to a certain extent responsible for the possible actions of experts coming from various countries, experts requested directly by the Central Government and coming without even the approval of the United lotions? After all, if at the preliminary stage we cu\e our consent to the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo, it was because these troopc wore all undor the authority of the United nations and it was the United Nations that was fully responsible for all their actions. I should like to kno.w whether, at this second stage, the United Nations will alr;o have full responsibility, as it did earlier when we gave our support to the dispatch of United Nations troops to the Congo. Obviously, I understand full well —• this is the right of the Congolese Government and no one can deny it -- that the Congolese Government can appeal to any country whatsoever for technical assistance; but 1 nevertheless believe that the fact of asking that this technical assistance be co-ordinated by tho United Nations arid even placed under United Nations responsibility, does give rise to a very delicate problem. We should therefore like to know, Fir. Secretary-General, what your ideas are in this respect, at least with regard to the co-ordinating committee* It Goem3 to i;.e you have examined this question in detail and, in the lignt of this exchange of correspondence which I have rapidly glanced through, it would seem that the possibility of co-ordinating tiirough the United Nation s this technical assistance has already been tacitly accepted and that you are in a position to give us come details concerning the role that this co-orlinating committee would be called upon to play with respect to the over-all competence of the groups that would be provided from outside and sent to the Congo for the task of re-organizing its army. TL/jw 30-1*0

-CT-'NlT-^L-, As I stated earlier, I am still in the process of discussing and consulting with ny representatives in Leopoldville regarding the functions and responsibilities of this projected co-ordinating body. First of all, the question is whether the Congo Advisory Ccrnaittee has any views on the necessity of the co-orciinr.i;iiig body, Frcm the correspondence you vill see that I have made certain surest ions in the way of the expansion of the co-ordinating bcdy, if there is to "be one. .']o the issues "before this Ccirmttee are, first,'whether the Committee has any views regarding United ITtiticns involvement in this whole business; and second; whether the Ccrcmittee feels that the United Nations should be involved by providing Gems sort of "umbrella" or by constituting this proposed co-ordinating body, and if so, "what are to be its functions. On the second question, as I have said, I have been in consultation with my representatives in the Congo (Leopollville); and ve have not ccne to any definitive conclusion. IJhen General ICebbcdo and his colleagues come here in the firs I week of A;.ril, I think we will be able to present a detailed programme and de-tailed functions to be entrusted to such a body. ?ut before that, the most urgent question is to get the feelings of this Committee regarding the necessity or the propriety of United Nations involvement in such an operation. Then the second question ccraes only after the first question: If the United Nations is to be involved by the provision of an "umbrella" or by the formation of a co-ordinating body, what are to be its functions? Go far we have not come to any definitive conclusions regarding both issuej: the propriety of the co-ordinating body and the functions to be enjoyed by thr.t body. I hope I have msde my position clear. BC/tt ia

£!l'-I1!7'™!1!?! (ConCO; Lcopoldville) (interpretation from French): I thinl; that two points should be made clear. Ceveral representatives have referred to the United Nations presence. But I do not believe that the correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Government of the Congo relates to the presence of United Nations troop:: in the Congo. This correspondence relates particularly to instructors for the army. Kow; in an ar^y; the instructors do not constitute a Force. In this respect, African countries must recognize that, particularly as regarus military academies and related fields, they themselves must call on instructors from other countries — European ana others --to train their own cadres. Thus, it is not a question here of forces ac such, but of instructors of a ni^her rank. If some African countries feel that they have a sufficient nur.bcr of such instructors, it is perhaps vithin the I'crpeter.cc of tho Government to enter into contact -with those countries. But,, within the framework of the objective of the letters exchanged between the IJC'oretary-General and the Central Government, I do not think that we should ccnfuse the question of Units 1 Nations forces vith the question of instructors vhich the Central Government has requested of some European and other countries, I-'artherriore, the financial aspect of the question must be borne in mind. The Secretary-General himself has rightly emphasized this in stating that the countries with which the Government lias entered into contact -- and there have been only contacts; no agreements, properly speaking, have as yet been signed -- have in principle agreed to assume the costs connected with the presence of the instructors. f r

BC/tt

(Mr. Idzur.buj.r, _ Con^o (L^opolrlvill.fi)

When one sees the difficulties involved in the agreement of certain countries to finance the United Nations Operation in the Coneo, it is natural to wonder ii' a supplementary tack should be imposed on the United lotions. That is the an pie from which the Central Government views the problem. Can it really thin): of involving the United Nations in supplementary expenses involved in the presence of instructors vho will be given the task of training cadres,especially technical cadres? This will be rather c:rpensive. Another point has been raised by some members of the Committee — that io; the political consequence;! of their attitude towards the Central Government. I believe that I may say that the Central Government is aware of that problem. It has no intention of adopting an attitude which could result in difficulties with other countries. In any case, members of the Committee may be sure that this ur.vect of the problem will be brought to the attention of my Government, which will take all the necessary measures. BC/tt

M_r_._jTnnpj30N (Liberia); The Government of Liberia fcas consistently supported any loimula that would brine a rapid conclusion to the Con^o stalemate. I am sure that my Government \;ould velccme a contribution by any government or group uf governments to relieving the strain on the Organization °^ ^G eccnonu c burden , AT. has be*. n pointed out here, certain economic, political, legal and social problems are involved in the new plan before us. That is why my delegation shares the opinion that at this stage it would be premature to state any firm position on the part of the Government of Liberia. We should have time to present the matter fully to our Government:; and receive instructions. Hence, we s;:all be very pleased to make clear at a subsequent meeting our Government's position on the new proposal.

Mr. r^L\D?{/\RKAR (India): My object in speaking at this time is primarily to obt'iin clarification of one or two points. Like other representatives hero, I shall vi;;h to consult my Government; and the clarifications I now seek will help me to communicate accurate information to my Government. I take it that the guiding document, as it were, for our meeting. today is the Security Council resolution of LI February. There can therefore be no argument about whether the United nations should or should not be involved in tendering the proposed assistance to the Central Government of the Congo. raragr.-ph 2 of part D of the resolution is quite clear on this point. We are well past the stride of arguing about that. The reGo.lution. has nettled the point -- unless the Council would wish to amend it. The United Nations is enjoined in the resolution to tender the necessary assistance, in consultation with the Government. l'ij second comment is this: It seems to me that there is an analogy here — although not an absolute analogy, since the reorganization of military peisonnel and forces ic involved -- with projects that nave been accepted for many years now un_i.er the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund. Of course, theic is a major difference to the extent that those projects relate to civilian af lairs arid the present proposal relates to military affairs. nevertheless, 1 think that the analogy can be drawn. Once a project proposal is made by a country, the United Nations usually approves it, if it is a worthwhile uc/tt Mf-i*5

(Mr* BhndKamlrnr, project, if it nas come chance of success, if the funds are available. After that, the propr.r United Nations -authority — the Muna^iro Director in. the cac-e of the L'pecial fund, the CoiTxiiGsloncr of .Technical Assistance in the case of the E:-:p~nded iro^raErae of Technical Assistance -- procecas, .in consultation with tue country cor;2e:rncrly to locate vhat arc called the experts . The decision to cir.pioy experts froii a country or a £roup of countries and the location of the o::pertc are usually matters of consultation between the country receiving the assistance and the United- Nations authorities concerned. In that sense I see an analory with the present case. Go far as iny delegation is concerned, we are convinced that there can be no GUCCC33 in this matter if the arrangements are not definitely approved by the Central Government of the Congo. Obviously; their Irishes must remain paramount. We are dealing here.- vith the letter of the Prime Minister dated _ 20 Deccrr/cer 19^12. In that .letter t!i-» United LlaticnG is requested to acsict in a ten-poj.rro Dro;Trairjiie. one Tiolnt of vhich relates to the orranization of a snail -L — . l .' J -- ^-J inter:-vatioj>il technical acciGtance mLsoion and to the provision or securing of certain experts. Now, I take it thai: there can be no objection on the part of the Organization to rendering such ascioLence. We have discussed at some length the composition and the role of the international technical assistance mission. At this sta^e, before we have had a chance to consult our Government,, my delecation would have no special views on this matter. I wish merely to elicit some information on one point. According to the letter of 19 March 1963 from tiie Prime Minister of the Con£;o, it is the Ccngcleso Government's hope that "the nations participating in the technical assistance prD^ranune will agree to defray the costs arising from their contributions and that the United Katlors will bear the costs connected with the international technical assistance mission". E'R/rs ^6

(i 'rr "nhfidkoupkar, India)

New I shculd merely like to ash, Mr. Secretary-General, frcm vhat particular fund would thic cost be borne. Would It DO part of the general GNUC opcrG.ti.Gn3 expenses programme or vould It "be ra*"t of the expenses of the Ccn^o Fund, which of course so Tar has "been geared to civilian assistance only? Or would this cane out of any provision- that you mny wich to employ under the unforeseen and extraordinary expenses provision,? Ihus, ii' I knew the answer to that point, It would help my Government in putting the matter in the proper perspective.

The__SECRET/CT-GENEPAL!On this question of the provision of funds, cf course It is the hope of the Central Government of the Con^o that the expenses connected with the provision of instructors will "be borne by the countries which provide these instructors, and, regarding the costs relating to the operations of the co-ordinating body, it is the hope of the Central Congolese Government that the United Nations will bear these expenses. But on this, 0.3 I have stated ear 11 or, we have not made any decision. Of course, if the decision has to be made, I think that, logically the funds should be frcm the GNUC funds, not frcm the civilian operations. By way of winding up, if I may, I just wont to clarify one point connected with the principle of the United Nations involvement in this operation. It will be recalled that in a letter dated 20 December 19^>2 frcm the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, he made this very clear in paragraph 2 on page 1 of this letter. He stated that: "the Government of the Republic of the Congo requests'friendly countries to furnish the requisite advice and technical assistance with the co-operation and co-ordination, of the United Nations." This is a very significant sentence. To this I replied, as you will notice in the second letter dated 27 December 15^2, that I accept this request in principle. Go the idea of United Nations Involvement in this type of technical assistance has been accepted by me on behalf of the United Nations because the understanding was based en iny discussions with Prime Minister Adoulo. last year in February 19^-2, (The ^Secretary-Genera.!) as I Lave outlined very briefly in rr.y opening statement. But when I received the request -from the Acting Trinio Minister on 26 February 15^5; when Prime Minister Adculn was in Belgium, specifying the countries which the Congolese Government expected to approach, I hid the feeling that a direct acceptance of tliis proposition r.i^ht have seme implications, as I have already uncle clear in r.y introductory stG,tc:nent this uftcrnuon. Go tlint is tue reason vhy I have' called this Advisory Committee Meeting, to offer advice. . 1 -want to make this very clear. Regarding the United Rations involvement in technical assistance programmes, the United Nations has accepted the request of the Central Government. But the problem arose only when certain countries were specified. At this point I decided to seel: the advice of this Committee. Of course, details have to be worked out later on. In the abnen.ce of further speakers I would cu^gest that ve meet again early next week. I understand that the minutes of this meeting will be made available to the menbers tomorrow. I was wondering whether Monday would not be too early.

Mr. ADERL (Sudan): Before we rise, I have a very humble suggestion to make: that in your discretion, if you find the time and opportunity to widen the basis of your consultations on thcce issues among the Members of the Organization outside this Corrjnittee, you might do GO. The issues involved are very important and very delicate. I have in mind especially the members of the Security Council. May I, with diffidence, suggest that you give further thought to the point'raised by the representative of Guinea regarding this aspect of the concept c,f t/ie umbrella, vhelher the concept of the umbrella for bilateral agree.Mer.i'.s, especially in 'the military field, is envisaged by the lelevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. DR/rs

rAL: I ^ very appreciative of the suggestion just r.kc.0 by the representative cf tlie SuJan, "but I r.n cure that yca-wl.ll agree with ir.e that the issue is very urgent. We have to find a ccmpromise botvcon this . urgency and the need to have cans sort of elaborate formulation "before we meet* Cf course, the Sscrct^lt/t will try its best to ccr.e up with ccrr.e concrete papers "before the convening of the noxt meeting, in that case; perhaps Tuesday or Wednesday. I was. wondering whether Tuesday the 26th or Wednesday the 27th might be convenient.

!ZI15LL^I17112 (Nigeria): I era cure that we all want the Congolese Government to "be able to get oa vlth this or any alternative project as i:.oon s.s possible. But frankly, I do not see how I can be in a position to give the views of rr.y Government if the date is as early as the Secretary-General has in mir.d. You indicated jujt no\j th 'the Secretariat^ in addition to these papz-rs., will endeavour to c-vo us concrete proposals which I hope will also be in writing Until we kncv the nature of these proposals^ how car. we really derr.'ind adequate instructions frcm cur Govornmenta? So I do beg that we chould be given enough time. If we are not given enough time before the convening of the next meeting, I think that you may find, to the cirbarrac of all of us, that we have to have an ad. j ourr.ir.cnt of the meeting in order to get instructions, So I would beg that we should adjourn for at least about ten days •

^NFTl^L: I think that it will "be difficult for the Secretariat to prej-^re a detailed plf/a regarding this projected co-ordinating bc'.:y. It will be difCicu.lt because even with a detailed plan we have to get the views of the Central Government also and perhaps it raay take seme time. Of course, we are new in the process of consultation with .LecpolcLville, but I do not think that we will be able -l-o come up with a specific plan of co-ordination, if there ±3 co-ordination, in the ncrct fow days. Perhaps we will formulate BR:/rs U^-^O (Thq Secretary-General) with ccice sort of general principles underlying the operation of this co-ordinating "body. So without fixing a date, I would propose that vetry to die tribute some relevant papers on the subject under discussion early next week,

• Mr, OUAjqC[T.-nACICT((Ghana): I do not know whether in fnct the Congolese Government wants an answer immediately * Otherwise I was c°inC to say that if we have a meeting en 3 April, we will have ample time to consider this matter very carefully, and the su.^rostion made "by the representative of Sudan about wider consultations ia a coed one. Between now and 0 April we would have time, as it were, to have this matter so soaked completely in the minds of people "before we have a meeting. But this is left to you, and it depends on whether the Congolese Government wants an immediate reply or whether we can have time to consider the mattert HA/ria

Tho _ Hfl G PK T.A 11 Y - fTT^F AL : Of course, the Government of the Conpo has been pressing me to expedite this ratter o,5 much ac possible. However, in view of the opinions expressed bore, I will transmit, my o\m personal appeal to Prime L!ini:;ter Adoula, explaining to him that the Advisory Ccr.mittec wants some time to £ive thought to the matter,, especially in viow of tlic fact that the Secretariat r:ay need a few dr.y^ to prepare the relevant documents. Therefore, if the members of the Cciunlttee agree, we will leave the date of our next meeting open, and I will see to it that you are in possession of .the relevant documents early next week.

Mr. _ GTlBUfl-flnr/y (Ethiopia): Could the information include what is expected from the countries concerned? That is rnally very general, and I ara cure that many countries would like to have sonic detailed information on what is required of them, because that may determine whether they are in a position to Give what is aslied.

nilL: Ir we Set the noceccary information from the Congolese Govei'maent Ly the time we meet, I will "be in a position to furnish you with the information, I do not know, for instance, the number of instructors from a particular country that the Congolese Government has in mind.

Mr. TP.^MPTJ'iY (Canada): I should like to explore further this point about the nature of the contribution that is expected from certain countries. Are we to assume, Mr. Secretary-General, that the precise contribution mentioned in this correspondence between you and the Congolese Government represents the final word? Or is it perhaps subject to some other digestion from the Secretariat, so that, by the time it reaches Governments, it may have a different nature ?

The rililC^TARY^'PlNFR/iL: The position is just tentative. The Congolese Government has expressed the hope that this will be the case. If the Advisory Committee advises me to rp ahead with this rcquoGt, I will, of course, have to contact the Governments concerned, I take it that the representative of Canada is referring to the contributions?

J HA/rh 52

^j^^j^^y, (Canada): The contributions requested from individual countries. l!y question was circply whether the details which are Given here -- for instance, ''Canada, ccrninunications" -- are final, or whether perhaps the Secretariat will have some aucgeationn to inake which racy change the nature of the recommendation made "by the Congolese Government.

The r?:c uETAT^Y-Gi'TP.r! /\L; I do not propose to make any counter- suggestions on this aspect.

Mr. CQIJLIBALY (Mali) (interpretation from French): Since you have drawn our attention to the urgent nature of this question, Mr. Secretary-General, 1 vac vcndering whether it wr,c your intention to have us make relevant cufT^nctionG at our next meeting. If that is the case, I think it vrould "be useful for you to schedule ether meetings. If you give uz cone information at the next meeting, Gome delegations may not b^ able to speak out immediately on the appropriateness of this co-ordination -- alco having regard to the relevant nts made by the representatives of Guinea and Sudan.

Pr°POGe "t° rcakc "tne relevant documents available seme time next week, possibly early next week. By that tine, we will be in a position to decide when we should meet. Before the meeting, of course, you will be in possession of all the- relevant documents.

The nootinrx rose at 5*25 p»ns CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 6 April EKGL1SU

UNITSD NATIONS ADYISCI7Y COMMITTEE Oil 'IRE CCKGO

at United Nations Headquartern, New York, on Monday, G Ajjril 1963, at 3.30 p.m.

In the Chair; U THA1IT The GL'CKETAKY-GFi'EML

Kenherrs: Canada : Llr. TU^-IDLAY Coy Ion Mr.. W1JEGCOIEUARBEM L'thicr:La llr, V/crAJO FoJaration of Malaya Ghana llr. fi Guinea l.r., I'J India Kr., C Indonesia Mr, GC :;iX -W/OvTOJO Ireland Kr, HOi'AMD Liberia llr, r;:^ Mali la% COULIBALY llorocco Mr. 01 DI BABA liigcria L!r. AfyJO. Kr. HA'IDANI Mr, nuo Sudan Mr.. A1XEL Mr 3. Pv,?JGEL Tuniciia Mr, Tciieb GLIM United Arab Republic Mr-

63-07814 RSII/tt 2-5

The r?ErRETARY;-GEm?AL: A.-3 you will recall from my announcement at our lest meeting, the main purpose of today'3 meeting is to take advantage of the presence at, Headquarterc, at my invitation, of I/t. Gen. Kebbede Gebre, the Force Commander in the Congo, and hiu senior military colleagues a I Know you would wish to meet them all. General Kebbcde Gebrc you already know, since he has met vith this Committee before. I now introduce to you General Ixbbeder s colleagues: Major-General Prem Chand, General Officer Cor.vmanding Katanga Area; Major-General C.R. Ksldager, Air Cciiir.anMer; Brigadier Reginald Norcnha, the Ccn.raander of the Indian Independent Brigade; Brigadier RoA.O. Ogundipc, Nigerian Contingent Commander;

Colonel NoL.a licdereii, Swedish Contingent Commander; and Lt, Col. A.G. Palmquist, Ccmmar.der of Swedish Jet Fighter Unit. It had also been my intention,, on the basis of the consultations I have had since our last meeting, to convene a Committee meeting before this one for the exclusive purpose of continuing consideration of the question of the training of the Congolese armed forces. When, however, it became apparent that many mernbere would riot be ready to discuss the matter definitively, I dropped the idea of an earlier meeting and decided to take up the matter at today's meeting. That accounts for the informal documents we sent to you last week. However, last Friday, 5 April, I received a message from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Congo, reading as follows: "The Central Government of the Republic of the Congo attaches particular importance to the question of the training of the Congolese National Army, Given the difficulties which seem to have arisen during the meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Congo, the Prime Minister has decided to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Justin Ecinbcko, to participate in the next meeting of this Committee. It is, therefore, requested urgently that this meeting be postponed until Tuesday, l6 April. (Signed) Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo." BH3/ek 6 ( Tb c J3e c r n tn,ry-Gener cOL)

I felt,, of course, that since this question of training is one -which concerns the Government of the Congo so intimately, 1 could only agree to the Government's request for a postponement of the discussion. We vill net, therefore, discuss the training of the Congolese craed forces this afternoon, Tho date of the next niGGtinr- of the Committee, uhlch i;ill bo for the purpose of takir.c; up this subject, vill depend upon the date of Mr. ramboko's arrival, but it will probably "be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, 16 April, This mecns that the meeting today vill new be as I had originally planned it; namely for discussing matters of mutual interest, exclusive of AIIC training, with General Kebbeds and his colleagues. As you know, I invited General KabbecLe and hi3 senior military colleagues in the Congo to COL.G here at this time for consultation because I believe that <.:e have reached a po:!nt -where a thorough reappraisal of the military situation -would "be most useful. I ain very clad to have the opportunity to valcoijjc General Kebbede and hia senior military colleagues here in llevj York c.nd to express to thorn parsonnlly, and •through tliem to all menders of tiio Congo force, our. very great. t.ppreciation for the servicoa they hnve icnderecl so loyally to tha United Nations in tii2 performance of their moet difficult and unique task in the Congo, I -would vioh then to convoy these uords in turn to all the officers and rucu nov cervin;j or •who have served the United Nations in 'the Congo* ^cldcm, if ever, in history has a military force frcm so many countries been concerned uith so cci'^p3.ox arid delicate a responsibility. In spite of all tha diffJ.cultieo and dangers they have perfcrmed their task vita a skill, delicacy and restraint vhlcli must bo almost unprecedented in the annals of military opcrationc. 1'V colleagues and 1 in the Secretariat have followed their activitico ulth the greatest adiniration and gratitude, and I linow tliat our feelings liave bcon chared by almost all of the clelegaticiiG here in New York. 1 believe that they have showi in the most striding manner how professional, coldiero from many nations can vork together in applying the military art to the scouring of peace. • In doing this they have made an historic contribution to the development of peaceful institutions. BHS/ek 7-10 (iho Secrrotary-Genoral)

I would now like to call upon the Force ConiT.ancler, General Kebbede^, to Sive to the C;

Lt.-Gor\c'jr,l K ^"DTDF! nTDlvvl: Mr. Secretary-General; honourable members, gentlemen; ny first duty cu:l pri'/ilGCG ia to thnnl: you, Mr. Cecretary-Goneral, for th-2 honour you have accorded i:.c and the rconLbcra of ray party in inviting UG to rr.cct you hero in the United Nations Headquarter3, I accept this honour not alone on a personal bar:ia for rays elf and those vho have acccirpanled ir.o, but also aa a tribute to the entire United ilations Force in the Conco vhom I have the honour and privilege to represent. Throughout the tragic period vhich reached its climax in Pecenter and January, \JQ l:ad many difficult problcKS, and I should now like to avail myself of. this occasion to acitnouledce OIL: indebtedness to you, Sir, c.nd also to Dr, Bunche, for the wonderful way in which you helped us to overcome those problems by your Great moral support, your wise guidance and with material aid. (Gnnornl Ifebberle)

The quick reaction and prompt response we received to our nnny queries and requests will remain one of our happier recollections of a period which -was not altogether diotincuishcd for gaiety. It was, therefore, this leadership and support from Headquarters in New York that enabled us to discharge our responsibilities. v;e in tho Congo have benefit-ted from our experience there. The scrfpe of our knowledge has "been enlarged and new horizons have "been- opened up in the international field. . - Ca behaJ.f of my colleagues and on iry own. behalf, I should also like to express ray thanks and appreciation to you, Mr. Zecretavy-C-eneral, for introducing us to the distinguished members of the Congo Advisory Comnilttee. It is a great pleasure and honour for us to have the opportunity of being, in your nidst. ' I will row try to give my appraisal of the situation, as I have been asked, Cir, by you to do. The induction of the ANG into Couth lOitanga is one of the items about which I would like to speak. As you kno.r, cccn after the ex,fiction of the military operations in Jouth Katanga, the Government of the Rcjublic of the? Conô rera;20bed end very stror;Lly insisted that the Secretary-General arrange an early induction of the ANC into that area. Cn receiving instructions from the Secretary-Gcnr-ml to this effect, wo arranged for the immediate n?ove of the ANC battalion which hod been with OKUC in Kaicina. This AHC battalion is now located in Eakinia and l''.Oi.iiirrtti'3f on the l;order of Northern lihodesia. As we nee it, the induction of the AI-JC into South Katanga in considerable strenctn "before the establishment of proper CGiu-i:anJ and lopistieal support may lead to serious trouble, and from this standpoint we insisted th :it the induction be carried out on a planned and phased basis, in the interests of tiie Central Govcraênt rind of the I cited Notions, we L_:iintain that the i'.KC in ocuth ICatr;nâ should be under United Nations command and control in order to avoid any complication during the emergency period. In keeping with the desire of vie Central Goveinn.ent to continue induction prof:rcj:;ively on on increasing basis, detailed dice unions have been held by United Nations authorities with the Congolese nutLoritles. i-inal arrancomenta were arrived at in Eiisabothville betweca ILLs Excellency Minister Ileo cad Colonel Boboso, representing the Central Governic-jnc, and Mr. Mathu and my representative, on behalf of CHUG. The arrangementa which were made are as follows: 1* Four companies of the A.NC which were moved from Albertville to Elisabethville will ircve by road to Kolwczi and Jadotville respectively„ -* The balance of two infantry battalions frcn Albertville will move by road alter all their arrangements for transport, regular food supplies, accommodation and other administrative masters have been i'ina.lised. CiftJC has on its part indicated its willingness to assies and co-operate in arranging a speedy and smooth move ci the AXC units into Couth ICatrmâ. 3. The Congolese Government has agreed to ensure sufficiency of transport and equipment, regularity in issuing food supplies and sufficiency of officers in Congolese units and sub-units. k. All ConsoleJG troops in f-outh Katanga will be under CWJC ccrmand, in accordance with the wishes of the Congolese Government. This will ensure the "best co-operation between OftUC troops and the AIIC towards achievement of our mutual objectives. 'lac integration of the Katanga Gendarmerie with the ANC, required under the U ThnnJ plan, uas been souiouh^t sic-./, ,'i'ho need cf i.inalizin^ this phaê oi' the U Ti??.nu plan Is obvious, and towardi] thio end diGCuoslcnj have been held with the Congolese authorities, who assure us that ir.oasures are in hand to speed this up. The second item I would like to explain is the 1133 liter of reduction, of United Nations forces in the Oonco and the consequences thereof. From 25 February up to the present uomeivt, the Force underwent the fo3.1ovinc reduction: Sierra Leone Continuant - one company, 121 men; Tunisian Contingent - 1,0^6 LIOU; Indian Brigade Unit - ^,000; Malayan Contingent-- 770. The approximate total is 6,920. AiMitioiio since last December arc: -one Indonesian infantry brigade headquarters, uwo battalions, one anti-alrcrai C. l^^tr.lion and one Indonesian reccrmîsjance batta.l.iun; total 2/'.:iC> men. T<..e acc.\rvL reduction since 2^ February is jjkt.sO men. In the near fuLure trie Force will be farther reduced during the rot'.iticn of the Cwedir/u and Irish Ccatiêncs and v.Lth liio -repatrintion of two F/thiopian battalions and part oj.' the i'hjilippinc aj.;l Ir,:-.rdan crews. Those reductions will take pI'.CQ throuâout April. Furr.her i'eduction of the Force for the mere reason of scaling, down should be seriously considered and should be, related very closely with the training and modernization of the AKC. TL/gws 13-15 femoral Kebbede)

Now a few words concerning.problems facing the United Nations Force in the Congo. The United Nations Force in tlie Congo is a niulti-ncxticnnl force comprising contingents frum twenty-one different nations, topped by a Headquarters containing officers from all thoce countries. This fact brings up many problems, mainly due

to' the? difficulty of making difi'erent organizations; with different concepts end procedures and using different languages, work together at the Game time in the same t'ick.. lifferent organizations present a problem when units have to be employed in the field. . Such problems as strength of sub-units, different airimnition, diff.ere.nt radio equipment, and so on, can be very embarrasGdng .for the Force. It is poc^lble to solve them as long as there is co-operation from all parties involved. In order to achieve co-operation there noist. be a cotonon working language, which is in itself a problem. Another important point to liecp in mind, is the peaceful Liiscicn assigned to the United Nations Force. It is not a rec^lar military riiesion in vhi^h you hnve a definite encry and procedures vhicii are standard in almost every army. Peace-keeping opcrationo place the Force in between conflicting parties in order to prevent clashes, to maintain law and order, and to avoid war through being present, rather than through fighting. IIA/pm 16 ( 0 o n r r a 1. KeVo f. d e)

New, es to relations between United Nations Headquarters end field headquarters: Due to the die Lance involved, ccttiumi cations play a ^'ijcr role in the relations between New York Headquarters and the field.* Evnn tlrough radio teletype is need, there ore always delay a due to the necessity of coding cind decoding and time ali.T3rcncej3« 'lac procedure vrUch in being used is DcnievUat satisfactory despite the Q^ovo-nontioried drav? jacks. However, a very important point to be taken into ccnciuoration Is that the Force Cciaz^.ndor shculd "be ol2.ov.3d freedcm of decision un>1er definite directives to avoid -J:h2 delaying time rector "between events occurring during a crisis and the decision that has to be taken with the concurrence of United nations Headquarters, In a?iy cillltary operation; it ic veil known that the opportunity of Q decision is a Enjcr factor for success*

Therefore, GUC!I problems d^rand study and concentration so tliut-; in the future, acticn can "be taken when nocesnary vi'fchcut delay. T5ii.rj can "be achieved, through further improvement of ocm-niuivLcations and Gtn.ndii.ic opei-ating proccdures0 The present CNUC deployment it; ac followG; In Leopcllville, you hove one infantry battalion frcn Nigeria nnd one rccanr-aiGGance couatlron maiJiied "by lrl.L-U peiLionne].tt in Stanleyville, there ia one Ethiopian battalion, to be repatriated in April. In Luluabourg, you have one battalion from Nigeria with the Brigade Headquarters, and one company from Liberia« Now, as to Katanga Province: In Gector A — Albertville, Baudouinville — there are two Indonesian battalions with the Brigade Hcad-'iuarters, includinc 1-Icnono, In Gector B, the Elisabethville area, we have the three Ethiopian battalions (cne of which is to be repatriated in April); one armoured cqr.ivdron; one Indonesian auti-aircraft battery and one Indonesian reconnaiGunner battalion in Jadotville. In Kciaina, wo have three battalions -- or.e Swedish, one Ghanaian, and one Congolese -- rnd one anti-aircraft battalion IraU'.crway.

In IColwe?.i7 we have one Irish battalion, i/rom this deployment, it is clear that emphasis was given to South Katanga, 'Iho situation in the Gorge can now be considered satisfactory<> Ho major incidents have taken place during the lest two moi:ths0 Ihe norale of the OIIQC troopa is high, and the United llatio.ue Force has reached a point at wM.cn it con look forward to a peaceful situation. UA/pm 17 (Gp^prel KeKbede)

I should now like, to say a few words "by way of appraisal of the ANC, the Congolese National -Arny. The AIJ'C !.ias progressed clowly toward being an organized national force. Both cadre and troops ore trying hr.rd to improve their ctm._dards. The future of the AKC can "be rated as optimistic, provided that reorc'jriization and training on a large scale tike place a^ ccon as possible. Cthorwir>e, the United nations responsibilities for maintaining law end order vil.l hove to continue for longer than JotJired, Even though tae AKC leaders are doing their test to train their officers and reorganize their unite, ouch training and reorganization, should be assisted a. id co-ordinated in oro.cr to permit mere j ositive and faster results* In conclusion, inny I be allovod to cay that civilians and military alike- of the United Nations operations in the Ccn^o are very conscious of the iimen.se burden of responsibility and worli borne by you_, !>:TO uOcretary-Genoral, ard your staff in guiding and directing tho efforts of the greatest and most cuccerJBful international peace organisation known to hlEtory. 1,To wich you a continuance,, in tbo future, of tho great CUCCCG;; vhich hnrs characterized your elTorts in the pact. We pro/ Cod, the Alml^lity, to give you His blerLilngj dedicated as you ore to the ccrrcd cause of humanity., And \ie assure ycu, «ir. that, as leader of the march ulcng the rugged road to the haven of \;orld peace, you can count on the unfaltering loyalty, understanding and full support of the United Nations Force 3 in the Congo « Long live the United Nations •

Caving neard General Kebbede's statement, you may perhaps have a few iiuetstlona to put to him and his colleagueD, If you do, I should like to request you oi.ce again to confine your questions to the military aopectc of the Uuited Notions operation in the Congo, in keeping vith the role and responsibilities of the Force Cciunander in the country.

-V:1T'TIvI (Tunisia): I "wi^b at this stage only to say a few vordn on behalf of the- Tunisian d^legaticn. After the few w.rdc of velcoii:e with enrich, Mr, Dc^.Tetary-ilen-jral, you presented the Force Ccinaaiidcr arid his senior offi.c.;r, I wir;h only to add the uclecr.c of my own delegation and to associate iny delegation with the homage and the tribute you have paid to our forces in the Congo

., , j HA/pm 18-20

(Krc___rqim, Eunlsta) and vhat thsy have done for the United Nations. Thin historic peaceful miEsion •io certainly something of which we are all extremely proud? Cn behalf of rcy delec^tion, I wish to than!-, oil the representatives of the United rlationa Force vho are pro sent here Tor their devotion cni their effort,o

in earring the United Nations mission in the Co.nô to complete PucceGS4 I think that ell of TJS around this tabla vrill a^ree that the coal of the United N&M.CUG operation in the Ccaô, \fnicli vac priisorily alined at freeing that African State from a ivy foreign interference nnd at strengthening the Ccrô "by" safeguarding its independence aM-1 itc full territorial integrity, han now been achieved.,

Those are the l^vr vor^o that I \7i5>i to Lay at this tiiae, and ocain/ on behalf of Tunisia, I vtsh ^c thank the members of the Force here present.

Mr. I'HZir.CT^p. (Congo^ Lcopoldville) (interpretation from French): On other oocatiou;:, I have thanked the United Nations for its efforts to restore P2QC;e to our country and to nairvbain itc territorial integrity, and i thinlt

this i^ Q very solar.! cccaalo:\ .in cr.rl oi* itcelf3 I c?jcultL 113:e to addrcoG myself to the Ccnjuander of the United llationa Forcea cni his of.1 Jeers end to tell them thut I am nut inse.u^itive to the' actiona tiiah 'they have carried out. Ihey have been the artiaAua of peace-In my-country, and they may bo sure that the population thab they have saved frci:; "both material and moral difficulties is deeply grateful to them and will never forcet the effort that they have made to bring this about. That population idll for a lcr£ tine treasure the xinderctandlng of vhat peace ic; pGrticularly cincc they vere. deprived of it, they vd.ll perhaps bo better able to underctancl the importance of peace and to make their contribution to the fiual objectives that all of us are tryir.g to attain* Cnce again, my thanks to you, General Kebbede, and to your staff as veil* EC /he 21

^-L_^J^9ii-JiArMI (Ghana): I should think that, having hoard the brilliant and. clear exposition of the Ccir-rander or OIUJC, all of us here ffiust feel optimistic about what is happening in the Congo GO far as the military aspect is concerned. On behalf of my delegation, I should like to thank General Kebbecle Tor this opportunity to hear at first hand an account of the iLilitary aspect of the operation as it nov stands. It is not ray purpose to indulge in mutual congratulations. All of us here have troops in the Cor. go, and if we were to start congratulating ourselves vo should merely "be log-rolling. My purpose is to rei'f.-r to a point which Ge-n<-ra.l Kebbede made in regard to the sensitive area ol.1 South Katanga. When the General referred to deployment, I sensed an absence of any OI1UC coirnitment in Kivu and Equator. In ny opinion, this means that those areas are free from difficulty. I should therefore like to ask General Kebbede these questions. In saying that the troops have been deployed to be centred round the area, of South Katanga, does General Kebbede mean that he is afraid of a resurgence of vhat happened in January? Ices he think that there is a danger of coir.e armed iriEurrection in South Katanga, and is that why he thinks that 01IUC chould be in that urea, at least for come time? Secondly, is General Kebbede certain that areas like Kivu and Equator, where there are no troops, will remain tranquil and that no upstart politician will try to organize armed resistance to OKUC? Those are two questions on which 1 should be grateful for some clarification.

Dp : In answer to the first question, I would cay the following. It is not because we believe that there is an organized force to oppose that \;e have concentrated much of cur forces in Couth Katanga. However, although the mercenaries who were operating in that are- a very actively have aiean v/ared a-ci-V G know that they have vanished on the other side of the boundary, we ,-:uv not sure whether they are not still on the fence -- that is, waiting to see what will happen, with the hope of coming back later if the United Nations force pulls out quickly. That is one factor which we cannot overlook. DC/he 22

(General

Furthermore., although the gendarmerie -- which, of course, are the arzr.ed force In that secessionist country -- have vanished and disappeared with their weapons, we do not know whether they have hidden their weapons cr t;:.vo\m xl-.«--ra into the tush. Therefore; until we have collected their arir.s a:rl i.itscrat'jcl them into the AliC, we must consider that they ccnstitute a threat -- not as an armed opposition, but as bandits operative for their personal benefit. The-/ nai^h't use their weapons in disturbing the law and order and security of the area. Moreover, the people in the area are hostile, because, as the representative of Ghana knows, they have been Vjid be :r;iiiy '^in^s for at least two years which have crystalized in their ninds . ' It -v.111 ta'-o them a little time to adapt themselves to the channel situation.- Furthermore, they may still have seme doubts about their Icyality; in other words, for a while they may have a dual loyalty. In addition, this is a very highly developed area, widely celled and industrialized; it is a sensitive area. i.vvt is \,;rj we will "be able to take the decision to reduce our force very considerably tUere on'j.y waen we are i Lilly satisfied that the situation ic no longer dangerous- and that the gend^.rrccrie have been integrated in the ANC and can no longer become trouble -inn hers. I turn new to the second question of the representative of Ghana. The United Nations denuded the 'equator area long ago, because the situation there is favourable. As regards the Kivu area, we have recently withdrawn from Kindu, and since then nothing has happened; we hope that nothing will happen in the future,, either. We are withdrawing the Kalnyans from Kivu without replacing them. There is strong opposition from the administrative personnel. They would like us to keep a United Nations ' force there, even if only a token force, because they do not feel that the time is ripe for withdrawinc completely from that area. However, our resource's 'do -not xjeimit us to keep such a force there. We are therefore obliged to withdraw and denude that area. 'Jliero are two reasons for this. 1'irst, uf course, wo Lave to try to pass the responsibility to the local authorities and to the Central Government security force, so that they may learn to be responsible for keeping law r;,r.d order. Also, the people livlnc in the area rauct become accustomed to having confidence in the A1IC. The second reason is the following. If an emergency arises, we have prepared a unit which can be BC/he 23-25 (r.cneral Ketfoede)

ized on short notice to intervene. Of course, v;e shall follow the terrfernture of the situation and, if need "be, we shall be able to intervene and stabilize matters.

Mr, QUAinON-nACKEY Ghans: I want to thank General Kebbede for those very useful answers. AF/rh

. J a™ sure General Kebbede will agree with r.y assumption that General Prcn Chand may have a few vcrds to supplement vhat the Force Commander has just said, since General Prem Chand has teen in direct tciv.h with the area in cur diccuccion. I give the floor to General

General .. FT^MjFJIAND; I can speak only about the Katanga part of the operations. There, as the Force Commander has said, we shall certainly have "I'D deploy our forces, as they have been today, for come little time, becau.ee the ex-gen-'arraerie, although thoy have been dicnorced, are ctill around in their villages, During the lar G two rcontho, although ve have not had any r:ajor inci^i.ents to deal with, there have been a i'e;: crr.?.ll incidents alone the :"a,jor hi^h-ijayc and in Dor.o outlying parts of Katanga Province of a few people l:ei:i{T shot up, a few people "being held up and cone banditry-type raido. The ex-^enrlarmerie were paid off for three rncnthc and that money will eoon be (;pne, They will have spent the amounts that they lrj,ve soir.ctirne about the end of y\pril and at that tin-j there ic the possibility of a few core of these incidents urisino That is what we have to vatch. Ue have to patrol these areas. We have to look at the so highways. rlhat is why it has been necessary to deploy these units in the centres of communication so that they can go out in company groups and pltitoonc to patrol these vast areas. It is only when it is possible for the Central Government of the Congo to integrate the e;*~ gendarmerie into the AKC, and once the men who now do not have very much to do have either been tahcn into the armed forces or have been given some other alternative employment, that one will really -De j_na position to reduce our strength and to take away the units that we have in centres like Jadotville, Kolwezi, Kilpushi ar,d 'around .ITli AP/rJi 27

!_'!'_•_I)IALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should li"ke very briefly to associate niycelf with the words of thanhc and congratulations which you, yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, and, after you, our t'.ro colleagues, the Aab a reader c f Tunisia and the Ambassador of Ghana, have paid to the hirhor officers and their leader, who have "borne a heavy responsibility, in tcfcolf Of o\;r organization, of co-operating with the vurot challenge over to face tho United Nations, Tho Members of the Ccnvnittco will certainly recall that at the time of the first contact', -which this Committee had with General Kebbedo, before he tool: over hi:: post in the Congo, in behalf of icy Government 1 said how deeply our feeling::, wre divided and how much we were dislurbed. to f'~e that in the highest posts of responsibility in the Congo representatives of Africa and Asia should be appointed to fill thes3 posts, v'no, of courr^e, had won their ranks in their national Covc-iY-Sents and Who, in accurainc these responsibilities in the Conro, rai^ht create a considerable challenge for us, I then had the opportunity to wirui General Kebbede, as Head of the Uil Forces in the Con^/i, and. also the Cpecial il:-!-!'' -sentati\'e of th'.2 secretary-General, a::> head of !';he entire operation, who is an African brother; to wisii also, through these two high personalities, to all >,ur Afriean and Asian brothers who were assuming responsibility in the Congo, that they would find a new consecration, infinitely ra^re difficult on the Congolese teiritory, of the values and merits which they have brilliantly displayed in their own countries. 1 said that we would not feel .at all embarrassed if their tasks v;ere too heavy, to speak out very clearly, as brothers, on their behaviour on the peliticai plane* 1 am all the mure at ir.y ease today when I find nryself in a position to convey to these brothers of nine, and through them to all who, like them, have borne this heavy responsibility of conducting the operations in the Congo, our thanks and our congratulations for having been able to discharge their duties with nonour and dignity and in a period of time which even the nost optimistic of us could never have eirpected, and they have been ebie to bring the situation in the Congo to a point where the leader of the military operation can tell us today that this situation may be described as peaceful. AP/rh 28-30 (Mr,

I will certainly have a good irony questions to put, "but I shall refrain from putting c.ny today, having recard to obligation.!: that I cannot divest myself of, ccr.aaitmenta that I have outside this room today. It is for that reason that today I shall content myself with putting only two questions, First, nay I ask the United Nations Ccrnmandci1 or the Special Representative of 01IVC in Katanga, 'whether they are in a position to tell us vhat proportion of the rebel ceadarjierie arc to be found in Katancaj scattered about in ti-.-jt area — I think that this information "would. "be very useful indeed — and I chculd also lire to know 10 what decree this rebel Gendarmerie arc atill organized, or are their units car.plotoly scattered end "broken up? !//• second question is as follows: General Kebbede has told us that the situation in the Conô may be dosciibed as peaceful. On the basis of this very ii!iport;?.nt stale-Lieut, "which we will h:;ve to c--:anino when we ccn;o to aUcuaa at cur iio::t i:.x..Gtin2 tha subject r:ir/i..T,cr that you, Mr« Scjcretary-Goneral, have anked U3 not to touch, upon today, c.:m General Labbcdo — on the ta:;iD of the- ccicc iruportant end., "or us, very encrjurajjiii^ atatc:i.ciit, having rorard to all the circumatoncos and thG situaiJ.on in Katanca and having reâra to all 'tiic factors pi: tiie situation, co;.iplicated as they are and sojr.ot.imes fluid — tell us ii1 the United Nations Cotinicmder now is in a position to state what pro^ranime lias been worked out for the vithdraual of iiiilitary forces frcir: the Conô? A related question to tiiio: Joes General Kebbcae thini: that this new situation, vhich has been doscribed as peaceful, vculd make it necessary that the existing terms of refer onco, i:u the basis of which the armed forces in the Congo have be on operating u.jder the control of the Secretary-General, should be reviewed, or does, he think on the contrary that this nandate as it stands is sufficient to cope with any situation that may arise, despite the fresh facets of the situation, 3i • " - - , f • * (Mr. r-iallo, flu'lnn-i)

Those are the fov questions I should like to pu5 today. In the in tn.Jb-.inc the floor, I van tod to congratulate General KeKbedc and the high Staff Officers who aro with us today and_, through thorn, al^o to congratulate all the forces which, on "behalf of the United Nation L;, have "been atle, vlth honour and dignity and in a relatively short time, to fulfil the tremendous hcj:ej VG had placed in them,

Before I give. the floor to General JCebtede, I v.?nt to intervene urlofl/ on the very important qucrA'ions vhich have just bron raised by the Au-.basca'lor of Guinea. L'ts firct qucation relates to the 1 r^t iy-,ilng of inforrnabion 2'cra.rdin^ tiie Katanc'ece f^T-arrrn^-^ ^^ courre; on tris I vlll request Gencril Kubbede to anowor. liJ LJ ,'joconrl and third o'.iOGtions deal vibh the pha^lnc-out proc^anuro of the United ITo/Lon from the Corr; •> and to the necessity of revioving the Uocu-J.ty Council and General A-j.o:r1nly rnnlates. On thoco coc'-sr.d ana. third ite;i:.n, I voi^Ld rcqncct the '

A:.: "•.if.âclor f coî Guinea not to OVLc:Lt"i'CplIorj at tLld ;riietiu(i "because I am si HI in the prococs of die cussing thorn \.rlth the roi"cy/Cor^r;?.nc!c?:. aud othei* oenior officers fro":i the Conô and., of courco, vltii my other relevant colleagues from the Geoi-etariat. I vi.H deal with thei;e two aspocts, tho j.Lanhuy-out pro;:~'-i.nirije of the Uiiited Nations froir. the Congo and tl;j need to review the mridules of the Security Council and General Asccnibly resolutions at a later , not at this inoeting.

(Guinea) (interpretation from. French) : I entirely ac^ee

VTlth your prc^ojal; 1'ic. Geci:etary-Jv ..;cral^ vliicli is a better one, and 1 vould wish to transfer tho GO questions which 1 addro:;Ged to Force Coiarander to you. 1 have no objection to the aeply being deferred.

1 I ^i11 Cive tho floor 'to General Kebbede, to cive information regarding the cxiatinc status and strength of the Katangese USH/ec 32-35

Concrn.1. KFpr^rj^: As I initially explained about the situation vltb regard to the GX-KitanG^ne rnn^rr.orlo, there is no such force in existence

that ve i:nav of as a flfrhtiirj i'orc.i. However ; the strength of the KataMfjrjpe {v^-v-i^rle, according to our information, was supposed to be lG,CCC. Thia does not mean that this is correct, hut ve hive taken this as the figure, and va baaed it on cone inforiration vo received, locally au:l from COK.G of the docuri-iuts vhi-h, of course, f;,ir.not ho fnJly reliable. .Upvevor, W2 tanaci the strength of the e.x-Katan£ese rcjn.jrUiT'jncirijp at rouc'aly lO,OCO. So far, vo have .Lisanr.ed ahout 7,000 fv^v-i.r^-!-,. This i:.canL> thnt, 10,CCO to-ll^OCO rnnrtriri ha\^ 1. ceu dislanderl and {^0110 bacJc to their 'coionini tic G and to their tribes and have i.linappearad, boca-aco they cannot live ''without any aclLilnistratiVQ support in tho huch for a lon^ tlir.R. Therefore, I cannot (jive a poriciv-j answer as to "/nether or not this i'icure of 30,000 is ccn-cct. Hovrevor, this' is the fieuro upon vhicn vc have bacecl our C::^lculationD. Wo' Know also of now recruits vho have not received itucli trainins and vho er.miot "be considered ao u fJ.GhtinG; unit oecuuso the otaivu.ril of trciinirnr. ^nd their fithtinc capability is very poor. It ia true that vlrr/ In,ve been dicbandca, and tlicy arc no Lx>ro to he concidcrod ac a fi^htin^ elo..;/int, However, if they found the occaolon to do so and if the situation vas favourable, th^y rdbht pocsibly ra.Ll.y, but whether or not they will corrc back with their weapons, as I said initially, is also not certain. As ve know that iiout of their -.reaponB have been thrown away and that r,oir.o have 'been collected. even during the fiira of the operations, VG can cay that roughly there any be about Y,OCO to 0,CCO p^nt^.rrQis vho have vanished into the bush, Therafoi'Qj ve now have the situation fully in hanu, V.Te control all the cencitive and important places. There lias heon 1,0 harjperin^ of freedom of ir-ovement since we secured it, LO that we can say for sure that if the Integration programme is r put :1nto practico, vlien the r^ndavros will hav o rct'3ict.;.u-cd voluntarily to join tjie ;uIU -- uo j'ar the figure ia not very inrprusBi'/o, it io cnly cloco to ^,^00 it would encourage others to follow tiioir excuri>le and this also could very nxich t reduce and minimize tJio ey."iT°n:i; \rn:^r.:'.e situation with regard to those staying behind on a wait-and-see basis. GER/nz 36

iiLi-^Ji^Jj? (Guinea) (interpretation from French): 1'ay I, through the Gecretary-'Jeneral, very sincerely thanlc General Ket-bede end cay that his reply Is fully satisfactory to DIG. If I may be ollowec; a final word in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding, I vlsh to reaffirm that the congratulations and gratitude which 1 addressed earlier to the hifhor officers from Asia and Africa I wish to address also to the entire Force, aJ.l the officers and. soldiers i'rcn every continent end every region who fought in the Congo under the

United Nations banner0

l (India): I had really wanted to ask two questions but one has already been answered by General Kebbede and the other, according to the Secretary-General, should be put off until the next meeting, I have therefore no rjeotiono to anli tut I would like to take this opportunity of welocrir<;3 General Kebhcdc and hia ccr.ior colleagues and thanking thera for the information they have given to this Coicnittee.

Kr^^ir.o (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I would like to associate myself with the vclecr.:e extended to General Kebbed.e and hie collcagueG, 1 particularly uelcoir.e the spirit of co-operation that hns prevailed ar;.ong the superior officers, because I know that without a spirit of co -operation it would not have been possible for then to discharge the functions entrusted to thorn by the United Nations. 'me question 1 wir.h to put has perhaps been super ceded or iray have become obsolete, but for sonic time we tallied about nothing but, eonclarmoG and, especially during the crisis in ijntanga about mercenaries, a^cl I voulCi IJ.ke to know whether thir, problem has now disappear^! altogether. VJe have heard that the gendarmes have1 been dispersed, 1 ut that it is i eared that they might' renew their attack. A slrr.i]ar situation mi (Jit be created by the n.erceirirics, and this would be a situation with which the United lotions would have to deal. Rumours are beiii(j circulated that the mercenarios have not entirely abandoned their aims, and 1 would be grateful if the Cocucander-in-Chief could give us some information on this point. GRR/nz

.: 'The Question of the Ecrccnaries has been and ctill seems to be notorious to everybody. However, as far GO we know the mercenaries ctill inside Kutnnca are not what, they used to be before. Previously they Were organized into a fi^htin^ element end formed a irobile force equipped vith automatic and h.;avy wer.pciiG, and vith explosive mines to destroy so on. They have done their job; I think they have irade their money and as their purpose of course was that, I do not think they would lilce .to coutinuo to expo a c themselves to dai:(.;;nr. If they do GO it means that they are not lilting business. Therefore1 we assume that the mercenaries have disappeared. Perhaps comefcr.v e disguised themselves as civilians and are trying to make ends uiect by working in a £ a race or in r.n office or doinc ccmethin-3 to use their professional chill. Wo do not thirh that those who havo left the country have any possibility of coining back a^,ain. \Te control all the air bases and all the tovn-0 t-i.d villaccs, I L.oan ii^jjortant plocec. I.Vke Ko.lwo:;i; Jndotvil.le and T'lpuchi L-:.:ccpt the Pil''-lo. VJe centre! all tho ipirortant hideou^G cf the irsrceruiricc no I cca i.GGure y; -u thcc tijc^-o arc no r.c-rccnr.rio.; i:o\r op-i^tin^ in K.utaun;a evt.u In

•:.he Lu..;-; btcai.Ge c^rcLiiarieG carmot L.tay in the* buch; their motive is not r.ti-tins to force thorn l.o rral:,G the cacrifico of ctaying in tlrj jur^lc ,w.".Li.:Out cuppllo e and without prc per care. I can therefore acsuro you tUit in ^outh Katanc- they are not os they were before; LI I caid, they have dica:^. eared, ec.no out of the country, maybe they are han£in;j; around or. are in the country dicguised as civilians, 1 hope this answers the queation.

If no other member wishes, to take the floor I want to Gay \\ZM ^.ratiiyin^ iu is to uote the c::t.i'oord I nary \raiuicJi oi' tlie 1'celinc^ e;:pre:;jcd by Ike lumbers 01* tliic Coiiijittoe to the Force Comiiiandcr and his ccmor eollou^uec of CilUC. This fooling 01 appreciation and gratitude is riiared r;ot oaly by the neiuberG of thia CoriiiiitLec but a.l^o,I'aia sure by other l-.'ciiibcrG of the United. lotions in cenercl. A a I xrado It clear in iry opening Gtatcu:,;nt, the nc^t i^Getinj will ta.:o place on Tui^day, Io April at 3.30 p.m. to dJ.ucuja exclusively tiio training of the /U.G. l;c ht:nc that me I'oreicn Minister of the C.>;iEoles^ Coverr.j'.^nt, l(r. i^ru.oko, will be tblc TO participate! in it. the uute is tentative and depends upon the arrival of IV. Brifiboko. Kci^bora will be notified in tino, and I thank ,you once ac;ain for this very useful meeting.

Trn n:-iet.]7:,^ rose at 'iJir) p,m, o. 75 1963

UNITED 1IATTOU3 ADVISORY COI/MITTEE CU TIB CUiGO

Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, N'SW York, y on 22 April 1^6^; at ^o p.i^*

In thr; Chair U TIIANT The GECRr/j^\HY-GENERAL

Mombors i Canada Mr.. Ti^-in Ceylon Mr, 1 Ethiopia l-lr. V;OPAJO Federation of Mi-. ZAT11 Ghana Mr, QUMGGN-GACICBY Guinea lir. DIALLO

I'r. rOLAIIJ 1-Ir. L(J£ 1-fili Mr. I>lCi:o l!orocco IT. jjEiinn ccr la l-Ir. AJJLLO In'.. IIAHrYi

Sudan

Guedcn i'J.TVt 0" • lvU^..">io.Pf^'^PTl Tunl. •:',.!. a Uidtcd Arab Republic Mi-. HEAD

Conco (LGopoldville) 1^. BCMBOKO

our IIA/ek

Before proceeding-; vith our main item of business for this ir.c^tint:, I \;i.Jh to present to you A^fbancador Wax rorcinville, •wko Ls to ta!:e over froia Mr, Uarc'.irer as Oi'ricer-in-Cviarc" in the Ccn.jjo "when, at the end o,' the r.onth, Mr. Gardiner finally leave .1 to assume his duties as Incentive r>e.^retary of the 1'conrmic Coranicclon for Africa. As you knoT.i, Mr, Gardiner 'a departure from the Ccn,;o has been pending Tor scir.c time "but has Lad to bo delayed "because of developments and circumstances there. Mr. ")orsinvillo_, I am sure, ia krown to all of yen. 'Ike announcement of hie ar;.ointn:ent uas made last vneli, lie can "be vith us for only a fev minutes this afternoon,, c:'.nce IIG is Icavlnr: for the Clon^o 0:1 a ni:: o'clock ilic'ht this evening. I Ini'jw you all yil.1 join r:o in wir.;lrLn,r; him well and in au expression of confidence th.at lie \; ill discharge, the heavy responsibilities of i.he Conc'o acni^nn.ent vitli distinction, Kr, F,T, Liu; vho c;nly a few days oco coi.ie tacli from tar: Con£O; Tjill be returning to Leopoldville i;ith Mr. Torsinvillo on his fourth tour of duty vi i tii OI;;-0, ^ince, t':z I have said, Mr. Dcrsinville hnn only a few minutes to spend with us this afternoon, I will cive IrJu the floor before vo proceed vith our other busiiiess, so that he i..ay iii\Le vhatevcr remarks he visues.

Mr. ropnTNVILT.n (interpretation from French): I en extremely moved 4 ! at the very .i.ind î/ord.s 'chat you have expressed, Mr. ;Jccre '.M-y-C ^n:>r:tl_? arid that you 'jcre lilnl enough to use in introducing IT.Q to the ralvis-oj-y 'ÔT^.i Ltee. I lâvo jio uoabt re;v-.irdinL; the trust you have placed in ire, a, A! I think that the best \;ay of answer iiiij you ^/ould be to sr.y tht;t I have had an example, that cf iry predecessor •-» of any future predecessor, I mlchb s°-y, since I am not yet in the field — o,nd that I sliall eridouvv-ur to carry out the task that you have entrusted to me in the same way in "which it has been ctuiled out by Mr. Gardiner, a "way that has earned for nlm the ^rentes 1: praise lrc;:.i all. 1 \;ould have lii'.cd to be prcsr-nt at thiu cntij'o vaeetinr;, but that is impossible "because of my iri.vlncnt donarture. iiO'-'jvvo:*, I Lôv that I T.-;ill be kept up to d;^ce recardin^ the results of your discussions this afternoon, and I ma/ say that the d.ir.;otive..: thai/ I receive i'ror.i you u.:.ll be carried out to the letter. I vish to liiarik the Advisory Corn.raitt.ee and to say that 1 shall endeavour to fulfil ih'j trust tjiat has been placed in rr:c. I think that will be the best ;;ay to reply to you, i > . T:CIT. " nv.ViJ n id.thdô'.j . HA/ek 3-r

^rZ:Ii: VJc now reauine our discussion of the question of tho retroLninc r..nd modernization of the Con^olcc^ armed forces, and in particular the role of the United Nations iu this pro^ramn-.c* Ac you lmc\if I postponed tlii3 meeting for one vcc-K in order to alloy tlmo for jrore informal di^cufiSiona r.n thia important subject, and. enpocially co that the mecbers of the Ccw;nittee voald have tho opportxirilty for informal cxcUouc03 c'f views uith Miniiitcr Do:::l)olvo, I "b^licr/c th:rc these iniorr.al diacussiona have at least nerved to clnar up some mi sunder utandinG's. It vca my hope, of course, that they \jould find a solution to this problem, vhicli is on urgent one "both for the Ccn/jolGGe Government and people and for the United Nations,-•which still has continuing responsibilities in the Congo. C/jw

Kerrfbers of the Committee have received the letter of 16 April addressed to ir.e by Fritte Minister Adouia, which seeks concurrence in an interpretation cf the relevant provisions oi' the resolution of the General AsEe.tr.bly -- paragraph 6 of resolution l^'f'f of the fourth emergency session, adopted in f.>?pt ember 19^0 — as not imposing, in the present and very much changed circumstances; a limitation of his Government's freedom to seel: the assistance it way need where it may deem advicab.le. The real practical senso cf this interpretation, of course, would be in its application to States providing the assistance requested. Even under the resolution, the Government of the Congo is free to approach any Government for assistance* The restrictive burden of the resolution really falls on the [States thus approached, for the resolution requires such requests to be made to them only through the United Nations "during the temporary period of ralitary assistance"; that is to nay, GO long as the United Rations Force is in the Congo. Granting Mr. Adouia! s request presumably would make it easier for States to respond. The view is strongly held by some that only the General Assembly could make an authoritative interpretation of its resolution. It, follows that 1 cannot in my reply to the Prime Minister's letter give him the satisfaction he seeks. Ear,ed on my talks with l-'r. Bcmboko in the past few days, I can say that it is correct to interpret the Prime Minister' s letter as not insist;' vig upon a United Nations "umbrella" or co-ordinating machinery for th«. modernization and training programme. Nor would the Secretary-General be called upon to make the requests for assistance, In other words, if the Congo Government decided TO co ahead, as is it.3 sovereign right to ao, with the training programme as previously outlined, the United Nations would not be held responsible for that training programme or for any implications of it. It emerges frcin the informal discr.snions thai: no one questions the right of the Government cf the Con. 7,0 to perform all the functions and have all the prerogatives of a sovereign utate, end no one wishes to limit those prerogatives, On the other hand, if the United Nations is called upon to play a co-ordinating function in a programme of this importance, or to make the requests, it 7.10 clearly is within the discretion of the United Nations to decide whether such n role is suitable or not, rcore especially in the light both of the cpirlt ur:l or the letter of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions governing ir,8 presence in tha Congo.

it ±3 also true, cf cource; ' thet the problem of the resolution does, in fact, have the 'effect of limiting tho freedom of choice of the Congolese Government by imposing a restraint on Grates willing rn«l able to provide the aid. It n.u3t be borne in uin.I that it is essential that the Congolese armed forces 'be luOdernizcd ai:d tiaincd without delay, more especial!) y in view of the U kelihocd oi* the departure from the Congo of the United Ikiticns Force by the e::-l of l>o;}. Indcad, thcco t',;o events have a practical interrelation. We have : Iso to consider the inevitable political, iraplicationo f. loving frcin the relection cf particular countries to carry out tii.i.3 procrerrir:.G. As I underctand it, the Covornii'enL, cf the Cor. 30 ic anxioua that vldê CI'lUC is Gtill in tli2 COUGO ulL BJ£Tnl.i.'if:ai;t îd to the Cov/c3nY-:cnt of th-j Cjr;;:o should be requested through United K:'Li-:na cl.cair.els, :alli;o-. :,;;!* in tiris CUL:G it Is prepared to renounce tv;u i. ja of th^ aid buiijg uOninioto.cd uyiucr a ihiitcl Kations co-prdirutir:;; Lsc:V'':u1.pm. Ine probl:r;i_, therefore, ic to duvica, if poi.;cible, a foraiula by which tl.o r^cas of the Co.iôlcce Government; aj stated by IriL.e Kin Inter AdouLij can bo reconciled both with the tertrr?, or the intent, of the recolutioris Governing the United Kations presence in the Congo and with the views of the members of this Corrmittee. In the cource of the informal consultatiohn, the sugrjection vac often rcade that as a Ghort-tern nciiûro — that is, while the United Nations Fore? remalnc i.j.i the Congo — tho .nalitcry r.i'aining assistance rormired might he sought exclusively from thoje ccu.itritju olreaciy providing military aid through having contingents in the United Mi-uôno i'orce. I should now Ij.kij to h:\ar tlie views of the members on the question before us, In that eunuvixion, I ueei: 'il:.e advice of tha Coir:r.itwC

I>. rnj^pnKO (Conco (Brazzaville)) (interpretation from French) : l-'r. Gecretary-Gcnerul, I thank you I'or fivlnc r:o till LI opportunity oi' iraking iincvn the points of view of my Government on this ir::.iter. As you know, rr.y Government attaches particular importance to the solution oi" the problem, of the training oi' the National Conrolese Arny and you runt understand why we attach such Great importance to this point. You knov that a .11 rr.odem States, without well-trained police forcer,; ladling an cf foe Live arny capable or protecting both jorcons and their roodo, T,,rouJ.d he unable adequately to fulfil tiieir dutietJ. You l^riow as well as I do that the difficulties confronted by the Con-o began by the dissolution caused hy the hrealvclo\;n in ths services cf protection O.C order. This vas due to the mutiny vhica tool: rlaco in c>ur army, the army that vc inherited from the rclgians^ arid that at that time,, as you also Imow d.I.l not fulfil the conditions whereby as an indOFondent State vs vould be ab3.3 to UGO tho AUG. I do not intend to giv.j you an account of all the event E which I know you will roi: imlier. But if 1 have mentioned this at the outset ; it was in order to shou you ve cannot ui-Klerta.rG anythinc if the ConcoLoce Gov.ernrr.cnt decs not havo adequately d Lscipli'r.c.I forces of or dor and effectively end coi..ilctely trained personnel. After so muca efi'ort rr/xdc "by the United Nations in the Congo with tiio assistance and collaboration oi" tae Congolese Government ^ it is not possible for us at present to consider a procranne of development, a pro;j-ai?j;:e of economic growth, unless vo have services and forces capable, of replneing the United flaT-ions; bncaus(2<; the United Nations forces are not expected to remain indefinitely in the Congo. J.Vut in the course of ny ccnvercaticns and 5n the course of discussions that have tal'.cn j)lace, two objections have been raised to the procraiur.e that the Console se Government submitted to the Geeretary-Cencral. 1:he first of these objections has a le£ai aspect; tills is what the. riecre/i: ary-General has just pointed out to you, p.r'.ragraih 6 cf that General Ansembly resolution of 19eO, io the one that is adduced, liut when this resolution is interpreted, the circiuastances surrounding its adoption seem to "be forgotten. I/hy did the General Asseii'ibly adopt that resolution in the first place? AP/ec . . . 12 (Brazzaville))

According-to the Interpretationo given'it would appear that tfco Congolese Government la not granted the i'leodorn or tho richt to organize a& it ivaes fit either an arisy or a police force, obviously vith the assistance of any country it uiay desire to turn to. But uhat were, thoce surrounding circumstances? I know that all of us vero witnesses to the cvon.tr>, .and far "he it for me to want to give you afain the utory underlying all this.. However> I (1,; have to stresc certain facts of which I laiov you arc veil avr.re, First of all, thr; I'Ganons whereby the ".Gcurity-Council and then, uftar the veto by the Soviet Union, the General Assembly vaa i'orcc'i to ir.oet and ultinntely .. rif'.rv/ted this resolution; you know that at that r;r);r.'.n-.t r,ho clrcumctancGO

obiainin^ ±u tha Conô vcre chamcteriLcd by the aeccsuica of IQ;tacî,.. Thai; "beinc tho case, there vas a rccicnation of the Contral Covernn:::nt in . • Lecôldville and there vao a very confuted situation in the country. This cc: fusion taroatGncd tho collobora'; i.on botvccn. tho United Nations and..tho

Co^crol Govc-rnmont Itcolf • A:ro::j otnara; there vcrc unllatîal interventioaa on x..:3 part of certoin States i\irallcl -with tho Uni lod Hut ion a operation 1^ the Conô, nainGly, the Soviet Union that £ up-plied ]/J ar-.es o,r:d certniu military rit-1'l.t'l, o.ad the Ecleiano vho t>cnfc voapons to Knni.. 5ic- ci:id to Couth f^sni. If we consider the intervention of Statea that participated in that General AÊctibly at that t:noj, \;,.i CGR that stress ^,'aa pla:od on the lack of collaboration betveen the Congolese authoiitiea and tho United -Nations Secretariat at that nioir.ent. jAirtharnioro, it vas vary dancorous at that rnGr.-:nt to allow States to arm the political factions, parallel with the United Nations operation in the ("onc°^ and thuu further complicate the work of the United Katicns in the Conô. This, ti:oreform,.was the reason for that resolution. And at that time it v.tis folt that In iho licht of the specifically and. acutely dangerouij L>ituation that obtained; it cf;vild'not he allowed to

States to cairy out unilateral action tliat nl^ht hn,; : or, hinder or ciairac^ the United Nations operation in the Conco. That resolution was precisely intended to atop the situation bein^ aggravated by such unilateral action. AP/GG 13-15 (Mr. Bcn^olroj rcnpp (Brazzaville) )

Therefore, it Is quite justified to ask the following question: To these circumstances still obtain today? I do not believe ti:e circumstances do prevail now. Furthermore, are wo afraid now that the Centra.! Government of the Republic of the Con^o might undertake parallel activities vith the Unite! Nations? I do not think tnis applies either, and for a nunber of months now it is obvious to us that between our own Government arid the IViited lotions there is a very fruitful and close collaoorat ton; there is a, collaboration that I could describe to you here primrily by stressing the fact that the Central Government has implemented the ijoeretary-General' s plan. I shall save you from hnaring all the i'r.cts involved, but you must realize that the Central Government has, as far as it was possible for it, tried to abide by the terms of the plan. You know that even on the strength of the request that wo sent the Secretary-General, we did nob want to act separately, for such action on our part rdight place the Secretary-General in an invidious position ro^ .rdinrs the fulfilment of his mandate in the Congo. On the contrary, v/hut voro the aimo sought by the Cccfcolcse Oovernicont? Well, the aims were the following: 16 (Mr. "P.^T-iVi^i'oj^Conpo (Loopoldvl 1^ oj))

'As I said at the beginning of my statement, you are ell cvore of the fact that the United Notions troops will not he 3 la tinned indefinitely in ti-u Ccnco. The iiouicnt will ultimately arri\e v:ioii thece troop:, will have to withdraw, Therofore, it-is inJicponjable that we Mhould, as from this moirent, bonin. to anticipate t-hlflon to authori;:e the oCcretary-Genercl to take the necessary steps, ih. consultation with the Government of the republic of the Congo, to provide the Governi-oat \.\ith such culitary aujiotoncc, as may "be uccosj:;r.y, vnitil, throL^h the eiYorta of the ConôleGe Govornnifcnt with tlio' tov^hoical a^jjib'taiice or tbo United IlaticriG, the national security forces may ue able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tables.11 • • -Therefore, the Concolese Govei-nrEont is the only one recponnible for the setting up of these sec'.uiity forces. V,re certainly do not v/iiih to pass the "Lack co i\jias this -responsibility iro concerned. \vo went to be the ones to do this, end this re. oluticu reco^nLzes that it is our responsibility and that we will have to deploy our cj.ToriJ, with the technical assistance of United nations. l.e are not a siring the United Nations to replace the Console cc Goveim:ent in that respect, so that the United. Katic.ns, instead of the C'onôlesc Government, would be i..:0 one t-ntrustod vilth th) organization of the :jcourity forcco. VJliut wo havo sought ii1. not to ask the United Kaîon-s to replace the Concolese G^'Vernuieri't:, not to a^k tiic United Nations uo take the };olitical rcopcnsibility on it..j ov/n ;iiioulOcrs, but-rather to n,;k'thc United Nations to £ive us LiJ.3 teclriical assistance, and only that. But we have noticed that there have been those viio have said that our request implies a political responsibility 17

feeing loft to the Secretary-General. Well, ir.y Government, through Its Prime Llnister, has tried to solve tui3 problem, and I shall explain how in a few ECU:... nt 3. But let me now ^o back to the objections vhich have been, raised. The second of the objections raised to the programme suggested by icy Friir.0 Minister rests on the choice r.ade by my Government of certain States. I icol that v;e should rot Lave been Judged on this i.::

Those are the principles on which our choice of count ri en has rested. There are other imperatives and reasons for this ci:cice, and you Lncw them all. I do net think thut I or, here to explain the rennc-na which led ny Government to make T/'.O choice it has, bub I mat reassure especially ny brothers of Africa that tr!.G choice made by iry Covcr.:rr-rvt-. do CD net cu'fect el.tl.cr our fG2l.i.r>£n or duties wii;.>i regard to African soJ.i-.lai.Uy, nor does the choice in any vîy imply a rc'itioal stand or trend hy iha Congolese Govcrnr.cnt.. Per example, • we would have lihod to have; concentrated cur choicG only en our .u'rican "brother rerub.lic3. 'ic ; know perTectly Wv2.ll t-iat alter the tra^cJy which v/e unacrvont African solidarity has l:oen active and 1 hat solidarity itac Lf hac allowed us tr achieve cur naoional unity. Cu uohalf of uy Goverr.u.^nt,, may I reiterate our thanks to c::r brother republics who hastened to respond to the appeal i'or help made by Ey Government. Bur -1,,1.-: also know that, all in oil, wo are in the came boat. We have all to renfrom; the-GriiLe dii..;..,.culcles. The needs of the Conô are. trenonctc.i.ii, in vi'-w of the L.LZQ of the i/m'ito? y th^t we poôC3S; .-ind really we comict try i'u- dier to exploit cur brctiier iopuulico when v/e know perfectly well tint they also are underline ."lmil;.ir dif aleuLtiec. This is the r^'auui wiuch led i.y Governarjnt to ir.nlie it-n clicice, and it was no"o only hocau:3e cf tiie dif ficu3.ticj cf which we know, bub alao the fact that we ourselvuo are f croud to act now_, hecaune if we do not; then it would l;e the Congolese 3tate that \;ould tnrnlO.e, eince if we do not have 'the security fo.-cea it will not stand. Wo are ruled by that pre^Gin^ need at the uionent, and ve iiave to reacli n r.-ipid solution. T..'e have tiuêa to countries thai, could L,ivo us spc.'cdy und cfj-'octive auu-lGtarice in order lint we ii.uy ac oreedily eiucrê fi\;:i our difficulties. ",.e have, together with t-ho oecretary-Generol, outlined a i^rocrarcLic for the v/ithdraval of tl.e United Ivaticn.i forces from the Ccnô, and their presence in the Conco ia au extremely expensive matter for the United Nations, DR/he

Having clarified this point, my Government wrote a letter to the Gscretary-Gc'Tieral, nr.d in thai: 1-tter the I'r.!ux: Kir:.i;,\ter of the Repj'blic of the Genre, Loopcldvllle stated that in view of the dli?f:kultion that hud arisen ccncjr-ruing The nature of the aid that the United T::rt:r.cns could give; uc -- w;;e,t has been called here "the umbrella" — that in view or the necessity and urgency in order i'or un to V.i ablo to act — bonauce ue do not h'.'licve that this particular case oi 1;he oir^Gnir.atiG;, of il:c forces by the Console3,1 Govcri.nGiit ca,n be placed within the IrLir.eworL: of tiie resolution xnat has t'Ccn cited h-}i\\; l:ecauc;e: vo con:;ider thab the aim of

that resolution var: not to prevei.o the Confjc-lene (iovc.rmnent/t which collaborates effectively with the United nations Secretariat, from setting up t:;^ nnccDcary forces of order T,;li:Lch would pciir.it it, to carry out its ohli'.ations .13 the Government oi' the LState — ve renounced tiiat umbrella in hi at lett'-r_, tut ve alc:,o anlied tiiat we be alJowed to organize and tiCflcmizG eu;:1 ariry and that we receive as ouickly ;.,L; poociblo aGnictatice frcrn .;ountrl ;c villii.^ to rive ciioh a^aijtance to us GO that we will ba able Lo full11 cur obllcationa. 1'hat ic the last request of iny Governr:.ent because we do not believe, in fr;.i;t, that the resolution can prevent us from or^anizin^ our forces ourselves, a L.I the more so .jince the EG forces are nol intended to o.ppose the action o_ the United Kationc in the Conso. That io the point of view of my Government. 1 reserve my right to speak later if it becomes necessary. DR/he

Clmnp.: Mr. Secretary-toneral, nay I pay at once that n:y dele,r itlori ie very naipy th-vt at Icr.G Ir.f-t it h:i3 been possible for vcu to r- -place Mr. Cardiner and Uat you have nc v/ c:-:r.:t AubasGador EersiriviJle, a man of (7re^t quality/ a L:rai of G'.lid vor'fch vhr.-m we havo er:Lo to knci; In the? United IT;Lt.!.c.-:j for a irrm"ber of yenrs. T.-7o ore very certain that he vill continue where Kr. G .rdiner loi't oil'. I eu cure Ihrvt lie will 'be at To to co-operate vith the

Ccnccl-ce authorities and that he vill he able to hrin3 to fruition the ei^.r.bic tu:-k *.;hich ti:': United Rationj cLilnrlied \ipon thi'ee yc-iu a ar,0* ':.o'are ir.^etlr.;:; this Qf'cernooii to dtccuca a very ^ericus nnd delicate problr-mj

I l:rv:.; that a ni-jiibor of concaltciblr.aia have already tr.lien place and Lhac ycu; 'Jir; know ihe vievrs which uy deler^clon hol'.is on L'JII:: Incjiio vhieli we are discuGainc ti'iis -ifternoo.i. lat i:.ay I vnint out o,l: once tlv.xt my delegation, together ^d.tli all ry colleanes; oci.:jclally Iroi.. Africa, have r,evc:r on any occasicn Cppccecl the idea of tho tjalning of tlio ^cn^cloô arny. In fa^t, *;e h:..ve insisted that this is voiy vital, thai; in fact U;c vcay training of tiivj Ccncolccc army \;ould enable : tin :.;ited lla;:icru; to dl;:en^:i;yG ir..^';lf fro:..i tho Cor;;;o. I Ky-;-lf, if I m^y ca/ i?o, ;-. :,\c on many uecusion::; uuhed ^lo;.;!.] -. nj ai) i-o \;het r::.r tho Con^Lese iui.iy vc.0 telnj, trt;in-?dj I hive douo tliu t.irc-'.i^hnut the Ifict t:;c yani.\j.' 1 i::-vo been asking the^3 ûentioriu: Uhat. the i;t;j;-u3 of the ConôleLe ci'i.y vaf;, v;ere they bein^; traiiic.i and v:.\at about their discipline? rihiG has ah;.-iyc been our preoccupation for a very lo :^ time, ar. or .ÔGinj', it. I vant to cay very clearly here thac 1 ai:i not, ev^re of tnj.a ccan:i tu :c.i\ ly the African Gtateu. Ac le-u,t, Gha..'a ID not in any collusion vith any other'otates in opposing vhuc we think cliculd In fact i-ako p.Uteo, Uiat is, the training of the Conôleac aiL.y. Wnat i'j more, we have oeen told th?'.t ve aie opposed to tho eovereicn rights of the Coucoleee. Here it scenic to nc that it vould be pertinent for me to refer my DR/he 2} (Mr. Cuglnon-Sack^y, Ghana)

Colleagues in this Coinnittee to the ctatencr.t which I nacle in the General Assembly Mr.'••:! luckily, the privilege was riven to :::.o '::>y the /ifro-Acian nroup cf :L:u voduclnr, reGoluti.cn lV;"'i- r.r.d I there e-:plc.i,lnecL i:i -v-tail this very pn.ra{T.roph vh-'-h he. a Icon invoked by Ira'me Minister Adruba cf r;hc Conc'/V If I nay he permitted, I cheilld. like to quote briefly vhat; I rbi i. say en that occar/ion bee-rune it T.;ill h^.lp a lot in clcn.rirj i''.:o r/Lr ci/ocut this npontion of "without prejudice to the sovereign rights ol trio Iw:pri'.U.c ci the (vOnt/j": !II th.Ink tliero iri^nt 1-j rriiic1 nl^fivmr •:.!,- ut tho phrase, 'Without pre.ju'-'ieo to t'iie sovcr^i^n rifhto 01' tlic ;\opi:L ic of the Cor./TO1 . T'r.e spencers ; ! Cave !:unh thought to tvi.G p ir: f,!_, irhich ij (lcr,:i.(_T;ed merely to reco^nis*-

•t:he e:'it;teiiC'3 cf the tjevereit-;n rifht:; of the ";•:• public. V/t: feel thcit there chcula V.3 r.o doubt r.t all n.^ 'CO ^ne rovr rceL/^n rir;ht^ of the IL.r.utlic of the Ccn^o, c;:pccially ac il hn.r, n'-t yet l,..;cc;.:e a !v L.tcr f?t/.ite v/ithin our Or^riniza'oicn. 1 thin!: ti:;;!: in a i:}r,rlui.::.on nieh ac tlris it is not ^^ronc for the General Ancenibly i;o nt.-ite clrai'3y vhr^t it: its intei;t:ior:. V.'j t!,o on TO cay that chero clieull L,: no provision of ^LTIIG, whether

directly or inJirootly} or .u' oth-r r.:..itci'ia.lr: e-j" var and iclli'cary _[ ci"oOnn^l, or otK:r aLGiclMnc'j r.:?r wilitaijy puriocc;;, during the teirpor-:.ry I'erlc'•. ^-f L:il.itL: .y auciijbunco tiirouîi ti:e Unli^-l ib:.tion.;. Of cci.rci _> 1 thiiji1. i.7-c c, ...1 a^ree 'J'.at the help uir'.ch ve arc îviny to tj;o Coi-fo ILL; or Ly tciLjowry ai.'i. Is not a :-oi.tiniiJ rijj ccn:.:.rtnx-nt. ^r';ry L.:COQ 'i i.e hepi.iblic ci' tiie Cc>n-jo nuct b;i: able to stand on its C'.zn f'?ct and mi:;b be Ll:d^. to nr.in tain lav and order, nnd the United h'o.Lions rai.:t tJ:on v.'ith'.'Ji'irv/ itc i'cuceo -- I mi ciiro v.Lth the appre of the people to who;-; iielp the forces i.ero nent." . (A;;'_: • ôÔ^pp.rin._ !'''. -. IhiL; intciprotation wac a conjcncuG reai-h^d in i;he AL;G( :.:^.i ••- bccuurjo thor. vas no disG''ritinL* voue becr-uno ;-,r on c^ftor rhe intix.'âc; uicn of t::e draft rer>c laci %..' Lth this e:, vilanuticv:, ^;e \/e;:o 'bio Lo appeal to the Jo vie t Union to vitl.nl raw its oraft rGcolu.;;Lcn, vhleli va:1 very otr^nc and vhLch \}[-.^ no't in co^foriiiity vith tiie tni:.' ii:/^ th; .1 of thr Afro-Jî,1:!! frcnp. L'o th...j IE e.i.e^r evn.'lenee tiiat even before

Lhe .b'.publio or the force b,,.>:1..^o a l-''.j;iber ru fbe 0;r\; ..ni::ation wo wr.ro in; l:;cii;o

On t:,cce [;o~verei(ai rl{;:J;ts. ,..i.) i.:ov7 iuiL^h uoro caa vo op a~ainnt ;:overol/';n1.y now that the Con^o :u; a iiciiiber 3Late of the Organisation:'1 '.Ihic iu ihe fact vhlch 1 feel 1 must point out L;O that there should "be no misunderstanding as regurdG cur stand. DK/hc 24-25

^ he ck . to the trn.irir.c rio~rccr.rce, you hive jvnt mnd^ a state/Trent which ir.u<;t i. ,2, taken note ra'. You said U-Mi; i.-he CcrôlûQ (.!';vor7'.:r.c.int*o c.3olrO is to f.o aiv'-i'.-. wit]icut the United IT-itl* ••:;:; i:i..i;i-c Ma. it4 thut in so, thenvrcro, then thoro is no rcGpoiiribllil./ un your rart awl tl.urolorQ v-j h;,'-o no responsibility an your udvicors if \.hcj aro prcr(ircd to ro choad i/j.'thcut, th^ umbrella of the United L'ltlens. Put even there tlu-re nri" Oi::;_:::rn. I h,->.vo J.l.ctcned to n:y v^ry côd frior-'l Mini n tor Prmbolro vhrm J a;l;;:i'rc frreat.ly. lie Ju'if.; knfv;ri my vievs i?nd I''.y ccviutry'c vievs for 3- oars becaunc i^ have been ?.n clc^.? co-operation and collaboration for yearc and therefore he knows where wo stand in natters like this (i'r. Quglnon Hncl^y, Glnng)

All ve vxnt to avoid is hrivirir-; the Unitod Katioi.D blamed that even in their presence tl. i COUCP hc,3 turned :un..G a NATO 'tr-an cr a Warcav bloc* . It ic true that IVj 'icalatnnce \.'ilch is bo inn; nrvv-ht is only technical,, b;rb there ;vro poliiionl ?cau:.:o of the future. To sun ..-'arize exactly '»;liat orrr positicn i::^ ran.y I cay that vc fc\Lt ctj-cn^ly that a multilateral a. op roach to Lliiu problem vrr.s vital, rurinr; the ci:ort terra, the cix or ,:,eVGii months th;.it the United UatioriG vlil be ther:^ it :Ls pcsniblc to }j.-wc the cfficerr, of tno Coiiôlosc An:;y trained. 1 clo not thin": it is a q,,io:;r,ion of training the vholc ai^ny., because al'-fccr all the i\rmy hau been in e;ii..3tence all this time. î;at ;LJ important^ a3 far as I have ucnn able to gather from the military export::; in the Ccnô,, ic that there should be ;;u.Violently trained oxfie jrj vl:o cari coniand the ii:;,iîn':.i:ion and have the ('.-•-.iJideucG of their o^rn people. If 1 rn.r.y tD^-ov In ci ^rorcl -- after n'f 1^ the Ccii ,âl 01 A/nc Conc^t^-^ --''i-'iv/, Cci^-rul Ilobuuu, va.o trained by the United i.at.lons. I aiii cure thau ho has been able to carry out ML; functioi.tj "co the catiafaction of the Central Government of the Conr.o. My Govcrniiicnt foci::, tiiul; it would be possible for thic- multilateral r.ynroach to be undertaken. A lot of e-"pcrience has already been gained by tho;:,o hicli-rankinc officorn vho o.re on vhe spot, and therefore 'cheir opinion, L.-b/ice and counsel should bo culicited, within the purview of the United liationo,.in getting the Concolece Army in chape and trained uo that they id 11 be able ~o maintain law and order. From the pru^rcîc which the Government hao put forward^ ve Lave the ir.picssion that tlioy mnt a hichly developed an^y with' paratroopers, and co cn_, uhich t., u_i is a lon^-tcua aifair. If the Unit/û Nations in £oinc to rcniaiii in the ConcP indefinitely, it is certainly (,.)in^ to be a drain on our resources and it ia rpinc to ai'fecb the Conôlcoe tlirnselveo in the exercice of their Go\ereif.nty. AG lone a3 the United Nations is there, people vill talk about the Conrp. r r (i'r. Onn.).non-. 'ir:]' ;y r Ch^rn.)

Therefore, ray Cover orient thought it vorAd bo ..loscibXc to firnl a solution vithin tlh_ froiacuorlL of cur Or; p::a.:ation. Ue surfT.t that oven LGV they khc':!/'! roecnrri.de':'' their position end icn.i a co-ord:;.:in.ii.;j<: body c.f non-aliened countries. M'. th a iY.v coir.vbrieG li:.:c- C'an-U/o._, vhich r.v>j al.n j - in the Ccn QO helping vi/! h v L'. ,( iials and GO on, it chf.'U'Ul r ? pos::;il.'lo i ;r 'i PJ o:"rc'!:::i]c tc l?e Let up wiiicli V..11 h.avo noii-r/Li:\ned couriti :L< 3 ^.:"> i'u.r.i b'lcn^ 'i-i]i.Li would nyt put the C!ni-,fo in any di-'Ticultiorj, It -.joule.'1, holp "Lhoco c-±' ur; :.-v.j are oi' the opinion tlir.-L the C' 'n^olecc have GUiTcred too lone only to 'be cnr'uiH'cci in another rcourconce of

ch'J.OS. Them fore, our jiropcsal in that the Congolese Government should reconsider 1 p itc posit: 'on. Of ecurce T;O ai;c, -.ivin;;; you f/'lvico, 1'Jir, c.nd tbc-roforo it L '".nuld r/;b "be tai on as intnrrcrcvi :c in rhrLr sovcroi:-n ?i;-ht:;, VJ^ lir.ve no intenLion 01' doing \iiat. Uo are ri^in^; ndvic.-e becau^o you v.,\nt advice. He think it

should "be possible for i.r.û to t;o aher.d under the United Ikiticns ui.Jjrella. This r'j'ild "bo f^no if you had a na:i-ali;';iod coi'^r; of He ;ber Ctates helping.tLei:i to "by :in the. r ari:\y» Un tncroroi'o Lamport t:hG i'loa o •,' a chart-terra ci[i]_Tcach to i.;io pivoblc-D, ii period c.i' L,i:: cr o^/cn n:oyj^hc>, I.'.-icn there ia no .['car of o. i-...::urcener: of the ;:,ii:ucuJ.Gii \rhich occurred in Kat:: :û and Couth Kacax,, t/-:en 're ;:,:•;; cure that there Trill be GI ability in the Conf; >_, then the United nations troops can withdraw and the ('onfrLese /Inuy CT;; t.^-.e over. May I conclude by cryirr- t;:at 1 an hopeful xh'it it is possible for this to be done. I cm sui'o that it ij possible to nave_, for e:-:.aivjple, vnat is place in K.Tbanâ; that in, the Joint patrols, uhich I understand are vr-ry ijell. 1 an cure it is possible t.; ha :e this -while the training Ojs the officers foes ahr-ad. Therefore, I vould fj,p')(:al arain that in spite uf the letter which the Priê Minister of the Conro h -s \/ritben and concerning vhich an interj rci/Ltion lias, be en {j;iveu l.-y the nini;.ter frcra the Ccngo, it •\;oiild be possible for the United Katicns uinbre! lri to be f;iven and for a iîiltilate, al approach t•:• be fcllo^-cd vi bh respect i.o training vithin the six or seven ir:onths during vhich the operation will continue. 1!^__JTW^T.AY (Canada): K:\y I say at the cutset that Canada has been r.ost satiro.'i'-'d by :ho pi1,, "res::-: made Ly (T7JO this year in the Cenô, Ccccccicn h.oo b-en ».- .ried and lav and order have PO'-.VI restored to the point vhore it bao Kom po:jG'ihl;: to beyln a ni'jiil'icrint ccalln.; down of OhTO. However, these ruihic'.'OTCents remain dependent <_ n the ccnbinued pr-ronce of an OI'TCJC force. Ui..'or pre.;cut condition:;.; if CL'UC vero to 'be vitho. 'awn lav and order nrl^lit. cr..?:-il: down and the dancer of cecoGcion :::L^-])i; ro-cn./i^c. Thir; ic a dcvolopraent vbich -\:e ,::I1 wich to prevent. Cnrrida. nhareLJ tbc VLCV expressed by tlie r- ;;-roscnt<.;bive of (]].\ana at our la:.rb iiieotlnr; but one thai OiHJC rbould not be ';i'lhdraT,rn until thore ic no fi::.rtbcr dan;y;r of a brcalido^m of law and order in tbe Coiop* It L[•.;.; been recocni-ed tbat tbe key to tbe final -withdrawal of OITUC ic the retraining uf tJi<; /\1

Moreover, the roir.ninlr^ trooprc will be required for the nnintennrne of lav o:v! or dor and tlu. voi'crc- cc ^:u:c^. ..rated in cuui-r r-.:; 01' potential dlctu rbance, ah-re it voul/1 be iL.dcnlrnMi; to i-c.vc untr:Jir:f.:cl AliC ui;itc, I "believe there? are ali:o iîpa'/taviG ouei'lioua of principle vhich make thic approach, in our opinion, "beta h-practiâl a.vl Yiridorirab Ic. '.y.irdly, it haa lven ryopoacd that countries contrltnitinp; to QI3UC slioultl provi;io o:fiico.;r3 ff;r tL'ai'.nir.;. .1 i::'.:lo}-at'..iid th::'o i'.i c ; Tee civ a irainviD^; rr< -/'.ramp "\.")u"!..l i'Onuire ôre Lh;i,i u !.'>,; : Ired Iv •. :":ci.i-rrr:i:i'i-. li;;-, c.;.pc .'leno^: 1 o.rj.'j.cer in^ truc'Loro. My .ii.O.âtir'ri ::CG :i-;.it ,)Ccni ;•;:;• ju.v-V; 1 that 'it ,;:-uLd b;; ..iOf:::iL5].c to i'ir/1 thi.'J i.urnocr cT trn'nod l;'ror. •rii-r.p .- L: LI ^ c. J. Tl^'crs I'-r^n t/ic co:.?':\:i''Lcc conti'liûtix'ifj to i.:u/'o Withouii Ljucii a -;voup rT c-i'; i.e. crG tl'.ij ?i[ ;^c'j.cli /oiill iioo pi'oviao the 1 ci'i i>'::U.ntj co-Oiclino cc. ,\ <.nd >:aio:: 1 .-.,:. inir^ c !;.^ :L,.; icn-j.Li'Cil in ti.o Crir-;o now. : i-. ,urthly; it ha:: i^c^n nri.^^Cotr'd tliut r?':j\.,iiô::;cjj a; ini^ht Lc :i:acic.! bilaterally by rh 3 CorjyoJA'^ ^ Govei'un^nnt j c -.- i /Înl. :''> Tiv.G prc^ :).:al XG rccoâizsd {.-.r, I'--rov:l.-Mn^ the "boot to:!lui:i.f.'.al GoluLiou of tbj iiyo^.u.ji or no .coat to tê Uiuted

:••:•';.•...-_, vhicjL it; rv"; cov.rc^ p. ^,-; •..- ...:-.porti.., G o'J( . - ijL« ]Ic',:cve.r; It L-J;-. bcrcri >u\ - i. That "i!iG Co?vrr'.:.c£jo G^vc,/! r.j-r •: v, ".ulft r*rj 1.} entitled under G&LCial AiJaenfljly iXo^lolion lV/4 (]J.;.')-I7) to :/:;• .,-5 i.UT;; U1T' T^ ' .L J n L "« r.i.'h ±3 pro". l.c.n iG ^;d;:;ed L,vj;>l;i.,...i. LJ.y in F^jr.c HLniatcr Adoula1 o letter., to the 1 r>ccrcv....;ry-Gcr- ral tji L.> /.j.r11. 1 -la ink That iiK:iLOv:r;j; o..' this t'rTanitt':^ tl'O'ula (_;lve ''•arc^-:! ôi:ciruration to the implicr.i .,i.c no c.J (jvir ôtniv'^ objections -co the Co]:;"o.U:ce Govt rnaici/ii n::.i:iij^ :i. u- :-"'j.^. r l^nt arravj;;:: v.o.its i.\..r trainlr:^ the Al'I^. (]er.c:-=\L y\nsci.iid.y roGoluticn l^V-:- (l "-1V) \;\s nuo;. :.cd i.rc;.i tiirniri/; to lovers outside ; cf the Conô and ucv-kli.^ ti.-olr ûp;: ;.;'t« It vu::. r^cc ^;i. . zed .then that this would int',.i..;iiy ihe <..'.:: ir.li.;.^ divi;:;j.o:"j li; the Congo and it aj.GO threatened to carry the coj.d var p.yîcal.iy into '\.'.''\v f.',-r:;pj.

1'ortunatcly, \:1. th tho ent:n;]. L.ai,.; out of the Hentrnl .Government nr.d more recently vith tho enulrp; of Guco^cion i:i Katanpa_, L^O r ItiurcLoxi in the Cor^o has chaijjc-d ccmpleLejly, 'i'Lere is now a sickle Central Government recognized AU/tt 32 (Mr. Tr r mb 1 . r y ^ _C r< n .

the Conô. There is no toiler of the cold war beinc "brought into the Cor.ô thrown appeals from cei'.fliotiijc Cor.ôlcr.o p/roup:::,, In other vords, the equation ';hich General Ass early resolution lV^ ( f'j-lV) was intended to prevent no Icn-cr e;;iats. fn the co chanced circumstancer,, for th:i.r> Crrrrritttoe to object to tlie Gccret;3ry-Gen<-ral rec^mîii;; that the Uooo;) Lone uove.njic.nt 1C Iree to make its u'wii orran.^ciiici.tj for uiliiaiy HLîGiance vcu Ld aôjab »;o rlaaln.^ a limitation on Coi:-*c .i.^3e covi..roigiTi;y. I-Iy Covcrnw.-jDt noniuid', rn tnat the United Nations should bo c.::t rciaely carerui -co avoid putting itself in tlie position of liirdtir/3 the Dcvoro.ir;nty of nny ^tato to vhor.e aT-?jc:;J. it ronponds. Ihe result of such a restriction on the oovoreif'nly of t..j Coracle so Govcrnr^.ert ni-,;at bo the cicvolc i'laont of a feelii:^ of i er,c:i t-^:. it on the part of 1 he CorKplece people and Gov'*:r].i,:oiio, It in relevont that in all our jicaco-kccpli^ or.crationr, in ^hiui the Uni.v:.vi elation.:, haj "bcî involved {'ror:t caro ha::i been i.' ken to avoid ony limitation of \i:o aovcreir^jLity of the hocr, utacu 'j'lio naaic c-OLêri'i accounted for the rt.ir.v'ic-ticn ii. parrj^rr;,a 6 c.j- Gene. •:•! Ar;;j.-::;bJ / rrûiutlon l^Y^ (i'-S-Iv) that the Cip.jal v/ao raauo vil];oiu; prejudice co Ccij^cleL:^ uovt:rLlc;aty. .For the [\c od of cur Organization new* and in the fiu,nre, it ic iraixa'-cant that the Cecretory-Ccnernl Liiould feel hit;;,'jel.l to DC in a pnjitLon to recoo,uiZG the fact tLn t the Co::golcjc- CenLral Goverr: .nont roircinr; free to make viiat arrangements it docma neeescary i'or the retraining of ito icrceG. Mr. Secret .nry-J one rcl, I think it is importnnt at this meeting that ve should also cci.Gidcr the corMOvjuencea if you nhould decide that you ere not in a position, to reply affa .ii'iatlvoLy to J'rlnie Uini:stu:* Aclcula's letter, More valuable T time w'juld be i.oGta E, oil mo;iLh « acfiy in ^ctti/ •-?. up a trainii:-:* ccherr.o an the Coj"~o ii.cans tb.ut Oir'JC \;Lil ha/e to remain one month more. It ii; desirable, vc thinJ:, in the nroadcr LiJ intevesx^ that CIJUC should Le \;ithdraT,m ac acc>n as thio can be dcuc aaL'ely, ri;;:oi.-e is ;;!GO_, hovevor, a .LO.; j;or problem vhioh the t\iY->rini/..ition fêos ao ct rcoult oi' the heavy expenditure on CNL'J_, a p-j-jblem yhich liaa vide and CJ'av ° .political iTrplictitiunc, fj.na.l.ly, if ve fail in taic Coniiittoc -LO reaeh come ^.:oncli.i3ion, it oo-ciiio to my delegation that this rni^ht lead to the problciu beinc raiced in another forur,, W'" I-••'•"

AW/tt 3>25 ("r. Tr^mhl ny, Crnn'1 n)

Apart from the further delay vhich this vould. entail, ny delegation vonhd greatly re^vci, a debate vhlc;i could only result :in tiio re-opening of old \roundc. ..'.! 1 01? XIG in i.hin Ccraaitt,:^ are c.,vnre of ho:;- nucu en,i* Gr^anination c\ifxjc-rcd t year of the Ccnjolenc oper'itien* Ve hope very much ttatt in 1:hir> concluding rha: a 01* the Ccr ;ol^?:e cperaticn Q r-;v public debate can bo L.VG I -"-jd and nri'ar^r./.a-nts can be nrxlc \:h'I.ch iri 11 pen:.11; the 1'inal end saLiclactory . conjlii'jicn ol' Hie CIUO operf!;icn in the C'cr ;o« • . !"r. Secretary-','ciicral, I bvvc nnoiinn al; nonnil clcrably CTGB^IC length tho.n IIQG boon my practice ia liic .Aflvlsnry Ccr'ir.ittC'-, > bccc 1:^0 I believe a oiti:.ati r-t:

ha.:, arlcen vh'.eh may do hair\ io c:ur Ov-';ani;-.'it L^ n4 be arc raced \rLih a citual.ion .•hirM callc, I thini'L, for Uie exorciLio cl' rc3t.u.int by all 01 U3. Ac I rioirU.oncd ! .•-•..• •:.v }_, ;.i;y Hjvc>ri:uient i'uvou:.r.d CM arruii^^iiicrrb 1'or lroini! C v?i.i.ch voul'l have

rrc-v Ldcd fc,.' L':or.,o ('^-CT.b'"..'.rlin:; rolo J:^T •;':;'• i.^.iit-:' 1 UatinncB Uc tujve Lcceptrd

thn': nnlor tho eirci^.jtnncc,-. ,:hi- is nob i vacyl J.cah i.c6 In thic citurtion, pciliQpo 1.',,. C;i'7.y OT"''o;)^c:;:'jnt:j po^oible crc urr--i:'2.^c:.~oijbJ "wliiL'ii are not cc^pbctcly

I. ';,•.; i.: J.'.. i I (.1'-,, c i"^'j '*.•-> L i >y O i. 111 / n Canada :, oho no special role in the Corô. Ir,( ôd, in vic\r c?:f my co\mtryT c limited r.i'.J Ll.ii'y rcr.;oi;rc:i3 and. it.s o^lctli ..-^ o-' rîi -i. nbrlo (-XCC, it'ls not clear 'hurt Canada could ]_vovide the no^saary ri jcj.abisc:! p:^ ^cnr;-:i. 1/o f :..vc cc.\u3iiications troiniiv^; to 'iiic /hC. Our ruidli;^ int.crect J^ to flyia that collision vaio'i -'Jill be moot helpful tu tl^n Orrruizution. bo ijliarc t:ii.i conccr^ i.-Lta till Me:lor Status. Canada in concerned also 1.13 a contributor, both finaiiciol'ly and rr.i.'l itari3.y, to OliUC. The ^. on.).e:-i cf training v'o^-'o:1 cije i'orccc is only one ac^cct of iho Coi-obese problem^ in vhi>?ii (.'nnada ha::; a direct interest through its ârbiGiiîlcii in OhÔ, ci:id jh.-uLd r.ot, •:,::c!c-?:d be cor.:'idcred in ioclr.vtion. Abb^-i,' e::Luii ).d.n^ abb j/rnpo.-jai:;, ;\/ Goveri.i.LOU'^ li<-G eui. o. to ihc CGUcXui3ion thnt our er^nisatic a could bu3t be U2uv:;d by the Con.î'J.e3o C-cvernir.ent i;,::l;.i.ri

__ (United Arab Republic): Mr. Co^rotary-Goneral, in your opening ci'itcin^nt. ou the .v.Glh of 1: ;:t I-'arch, v:hilc you uc-ro îvi:^ uc f.;n account ci' the virus of the ('.'overcoat of the; Cohô vith regard to t].c Koderriih'aolch :»r I the trail::; tr^ of the Congolese nrnoa fore'/a, you Gu.-pht the advice of the i:.n .bers of the Cc:.T.:i.vtee on the imv-lvcr.'-iit nf the UnLtr-d 1'. clone in such a pro^;rnnr.;o v..:reby Ih.e Ornani::riLion »;ouic provide an !'u;::';rclla" to co-orairnte the- fiinctionc ol the inrtrucbor Lcnnis ci:oL;cn by the Consolejc Governmeni: on a bilateial l^\zi?. \;ith certain o'thcr Crsvcri'.-r.cntc,. Tc',/araj i..]ic end ct the rr.cctinn you inalcat'.. .1 t::,;C tiiC i .oat r.rôn't qucr/tion \.[CG Lo (;c.L the J.'eoli:if"G of thin Ccir.niittea r(-'nn-^d.inE t: o neaenrlty or propriety oi1 United. lotion; involvcr;:r:nt in Luch an cnerai,ion. hii.ce tnat moer,ir!(;:; thi:; iiiiôitant question r: in Leon under constant consideration iu ];.any vaya and i'roiii dii'lt-'rent an^Lei:. On tae 17-h of thi;; n:onth ve rc^t:ived a copy of a letter addressee, to you^ fi'oni PrJ!".o Minister vvaoula^ vitii rvr.':.r-i to vlufii you e::proGoed your deGii'e to concutt viish th;.: Advicory Ccrr.nii'btce en your initial reaction^ -irjd vJiich you r<;?raidcu ac lij^ritii:^ more ccriouu attention, la iact_, tiio contents of the letter culnihathd a uholo scries of discu;;cionj ru.'-l a^jpro^'diGS to this iôot c.cd.icatc question. Tho x'rirae Minictcr^ in Ida letter,

"Reportc reaching nic concerning the delil-erationc of the Advisory Ccrrmittoe indicate That the chief objection unieji hac f.iven rise to the rcluftancc oi' the ci-eatcr rart of the African mcmberc of the Advisory Coirmittae flows frei:: the fnet that the procedure under which the assistance of the Europoari countries listed has bc^n rcciuested and/or offered in not in h> eping wi'îi resolution 1^-7^ (KG-IV) aclopto-d by the General Assembly in Ch:p,,:mi-er I'XÔ and is nore psi'Licularly at variance with paragraph u of the said ruGo.ution". Prime Minist->r Adoula ei,rcludod by saying: "But I also appeal to you to confirm the validity of my interpretation of the Jonerai As:jci,:bJ.y!s resolution mentioned aaovo LO the effect that it WL ul 1 i>e .ijithei- Just r.or in accord 'w^th tiê'true intent of the General ;,ssei:bly to intororct i'cs par:v;iapn C> as now h:iposinc a limitation on i.^y Goverin.,ent! s i/reeu T. t" se^h t-..ie assistance it may need wherever it may deem advisable. Indeed^ it is notevi that paragraph u begins with xhe vords: 'V/itliout prejudice to tne sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo ....'" TL/Jpm yi ' L'Tv IU-d; 1Talt

Consequently., the rcaJn issue before the Advisory Ccnmittec is vhether the Unit'.vi Hatirr;:^ in arciotin^ the Gov^rjiir.cn!, oi tiie L.'NTÔ in the modernisation and •u-ninLnf, of in.- Conâeca iîivjd -r,r'ccj <.a;ccrc.iiny to ^::e -prccrarnne that tint Ihncriuiiont h ..s cvnuittcd, will or ".ill r.of be in.eom. oiir.ity v?ith tlio provicionn oT 'LU3 rcGOlationL: auoated b^ tl.o i'caority Council ^--a the Goncral Assembly „ T. wish <.A.v:a chc outset to ^ uixc ;uhax, n.y Grv. crr.iii'nt Iiac always uupporcr.cl the nece^Jity ol rcndei'in,^ all ):iiids oi a-oi^tanoo to tin. Goverrrr.:-!;! of tho COMS/D; r in L • rb^ my dciec^tioii ic o.^.c cj±' -Llic.^c v;:ic:i; cdncu July l-S'-'"^ have: ui\ .-ec.; -Uvj Ci /;.. .i::ation to iciM ltr> a::jj.Gtor.:'.(j i;i aj.l fiol.ciJ, a.oi th:_t any a.cc.Lctor^c Eiiould

'c.v 'L.i'OU^li tjie Ui:itc:l LLitio.'i::. Cur i" '^"lil^a'tion. hoj oert':. :.i.riy; either ir. it:; ;i, :• 1 riuirtcrj or ia ~i!:e XiLci ••., ho. .^j r/: : i-.oco ;LrTOi'U::';i; Du:u.{.n .in rcilizrlr;1; rnd :;r:' ,i.;'.irdin;; tl'ic ind'..-o en douce ai^l '(.c-ri'ltori'vl t;il;c^;rit,y ci1 ti;e Concc^ viliiin ico i.c'.r?.,' uiid liiiiid^te un-Jcr tl>~) dii ,t rt .nu rcr.olu'C.i' i>n. .it.irtncrnco'-c, 1 vich t;:- i,:"!:^.: it ci.f.ai1 th-i i; no one, either durli:^ our :;:•:-:. i> i.::.^ en i; i larch or later in the coerce oi' t::..i priv^aG cohverGa'Cio.'!: l;ao (.:Tr^-cKGca any •,\L-l!;!.on "which vould dcro^rite fj.-c:u

•rl'.cj ]);.V). .i.cn ilc'ilj A;| i.i: rn :;" ; ;c.. v..r>nt ac .;-.:.;!:, CJJY •. ihj future of our Orc-ni'-rt'.nn, n :•;;•; o 1 ;; : in .: uir.il.Linj a p'.Klioy, v:oaLa a pr :-/lc^.;j i .... ; -ilut:! c -/. 1^:.- :: {>j:~-r.;-d o«- ;•.'::.. c;\.'iiy withV j. iiero.'.'crj tiic i>ui:'ier. io L:oro c,:.' xhc U,.i. c:d h.iCJ.oi;:; tn.'ra of t;.c i.,,/c°« It in a prolti.c-in in which •w.:; c':x':a,c- a i^'cr-oJont^ cu..:.I j...;eo;.l a i .j;:c x.Li.,ntal ;;ii,.:,; V/e bcliv.-vo tii-ru .;;.; lonr; aj \hc United I.'-itlOi.j o^-.iratioriG ia t.h-j f:on^j have not c.v;viG to MI enu, the rc;;(;laLion3 of the ; '•.JCU..M, ly Council c.inci tlie General : ,i^:;r,...i'ly r<-rr;.in vaiiu. i' ur i.haiiLui'O, uy uelL(_a\,iu,i: Cf^.jldcrc it inipciative that Uhti-. the til ,3 coV'.OJ 'uiicn tiio o.j,^.: auioiiG OL' "bh'-j uaitc- liatir.rjc }];.:ve coacca, rl.l. ; ac'\:,ir.:r.c, eit] or by tai.;; Crc. '. nizai L^IL a: Irj nnuivldual Go/eii:.. ^.ntG; should coi.ip.< y ; •u i^ii "ihc cxi^tin^ re. oiuti'M,a . !«..iour:il.l.y; ho^c ui tiicLiC acLioL:; should lead to any i'ln/ure io oI)Lf:';:o L.') jao- tiic iJnLLcd iJ.iti.. i.^.

aj j. h:.\e iiKîti-. 'acd uari'.or; t..u GOVL.I. :.':nt of the Conco vishcfl you, Mr. L •.cretary-G'jiicraJ.j, to concilia âat a ccitain re3O.;.utloh i;a^ Uccomo invalid. j y cl. Legation cannot onaori^c i;uch u ri-cpaeut^j i'or no cj.,;.a-n cnn invalidate or nuliliy any reôluticn or i^:ciaicn c,.cc.jt in tho can.; \/hero It is the one that dcciai.I uyon it — • aj:^ ia YUJ.G â;:;^ io ia t.fjC Uunui'aL A3.a.:.:biy,

iiavinc caid t)-nv 1 wj.nii to refer very briefly to that resolution -which was adopted on 20 Hiupt ember I!A/J. It is evident that the purôce of tliat recolutioii \;ac to channel all military asrviGt-inco through the United Nations in order to ulJ.rv tno LJra.t;ai. 1,'ati.ony CciEi.ana, ao long en it coy;iJ.:.nues to e::ist, to hLove fell corP rol in 1 no field. It iu e^rally evident luat t ho intent of this resrlvjt-ion VUG^ and CGI tainly ;;till IG, to unbare tnat the ILIC of any assistance Should 1 e in ronrorrnity \;ith t^.e provicianG of the Unite.! Ilatic'iiG rocolutiona vith respect to i.i.o Coii£(-. Mcrcfjvor, in our ord nion^ tliic j.)ropo3'.-i Dclicrê or "umbrella11 îve r-.!c-c to a very doiicate prcblcn:; ior aucii an action vouid be lacking a lira ai..U

ereiore, after careful ntr.dy c:C the Icrpl implications of the United Naticns invclvenrnt in th,, Conrp* ^ith record LO a purely bilateral operation, to v- Lch 1 c Lroady rei'crre:!, au \:ell ac the political repercussion;; of cuoh

;.,dvi:,able fc ; 'i-:ie Unitv-d Ilulions ho dra~w up; i:. ô:.:;.v l.t.alic-n vith th:; Coi'.r-' -i.eco Gov:::',.]nent, a plan for tlna, i!urpn,;o to be effected ur ler tlie full su,'ervi.L,ien of t:.e United natlona Ceii.i;.-i::d* 1'' delegation earnejtiy appeain to tho Government of tae Conô to eensider ail the proeiemn taat 1 ave bc^n raised -in "uiê course ef l..e discus J..: ons, an-d tlie serioua repercur»:;iozirj un tne future of the United ; lâti'Mis if s /.cl:i a j_)retJL'ao..e \;ere to be irpl'-aueuLed. hiiese are the vie'us ef n.y Govcrraient en this question, and -we- earnestly hope ahat th--- Cenôli.-je people, nr.w 'that ti;:: iîited. h itiono liao successfully restored, the independence and secured the unity of tho Conô, vill live in harrr-ony and prosperity. IIA/j

_/-T!T7r>0 ( Nigeria): The cnbjoct tint we ore diconscing now in co important ti at I iava to crol<\;ize for o^ni^G thc:;o remarks with a rclerer..ce t .; Mr. Gardiner ci:d Uic cervices in the C::i);,r. JIr..;;over, I cio 30 bccp.use I a'.;i i:i a position to appreciate the eminent nuaiiti.crj OL' Mr. Caruiiicr, who I'ii-c. L. curved 'th.;; United r.aticii3 a IO^T; ti.v.:a aô ar d thcu went £rci:i there to nerve I:L ,eria, *;L',Te i:e iîêiv.a-favvire of a oi;a'ilty tint we still rc^rrbcr. rrom

» ' :I'G; }\Q vent i ac!l to iii o cv;n country tro r • r..k>r ciunlly ctoriirc cervl.cea^ t.ii v,.: n nnrr.-? br.el: to LJOTVO xhe Unltr-l Katio 17, a^aiu. I'i;c.u-t to put on record IT-' u_ reciation of th;i i;ervlcon tl.LU l.r. Garcli, ;._•;: V;us rondoj od in the Cor.^'.o &t i- -, :\.G of really ^rcut peril to the I:,ii.t.L'i ],'a-;/'onr^ and I alco want to }/.;.aco on r.j ;ord our ^luhc:-) xiiat li.Ls service.; to ;;ho ;>?.nnomi:: ConirriLccion fcT /ifrico. may r> .njlt in t:,at rocloiinl c rGL ii.i • ^.ticrJ c 1:^cci..lr:/';; n re:1.!, force i'or (jocd on tl o

/r"rican coivLj.ncnt. I alr.o vicii. oo pcy );.,,' iO-rjuctn iii.d ex^recc my L;o^^ wichcs to IJr. Carainer1 £j Giiccc;;;:^r^ i,i.c Arr^r+r-rÂa? ci !I'..iti. 1 ; Uhoii t;cu liro' / biai.v;hl, to QI.-V Mti.cm.lon,, Ir. :. ;)crGt.Qry-Genora.l, the p.'cpor:"ln of tl:o (" )n::ol...LC Covrv:ir:?o.Vii> IO.L- I,};-; t.rj.i.i.'ii: ; Gi:.l n:"-:k:r;: iii.ti-- a of i-i - ior:.;e:v 1 ujT.. .'iiic.'i :! 'i'out very i.:\:-"b c. .r:". nt; be ..;iL.e triOGG wcrj obv.'Oii.^!,/ I'i'i pcoalo of nu ii^x'iLant choractc:.' cuH it v-.ar; en-.^.uLial -co corcul.t on:.;1 a Ct.'.'-.-a.-.riiiient l.-oi'oro '.^.prcjcin^ ua tjiniuiit -At LjUl;::c..-.:ucrit private r^Gtln/c vhlch cr.rtain of u.3 hud \ ith ycu_, I •',.'.13 n.-i.-iulo to ncld v.-:, y n:uch to o;:e y-roil:, Inary cc . ,i.cnts I i.ad i:.-.id'i i.iitil I iiad received J.i!C,,;'uct.ûr; from L.y CoverniLCnt. 'i- ii..] tructioric IIQVG nov^ co;:.o_, r.ii 1 trny are to '1,110 i'G.'1 lowing oi'fcct: '.L'ho f'-:r/ci-nr:.:n-i, of -cM Fou- r;;l ion of Idr^jriri i i?c jû:i.i:cs, us ao the other Covornuiont o rcrrc^cnted hore, t-Lc ûvero: ::iu,./ uf xi-.o Ccnro. ID EfLso i'oelu trit it is ro:;t .u2. t .cat tr.:rt th;.: /:KC Lôuil 1 b,- 1'atr: incd Qi.d me 'lea'nizcd. It fools that tiiut projoat irjst be I\-:!:G:I in i;a.. i nii rû «-G poncfole. II feols ti..vt roco^.nitiori of tne .icvorc • .^r^y v.-f the C. nyo ir.v.xt be acLuu.^d to carr,y vith it a iv^coîii'tioii that the Coayole,:.'j CovcJ.'iiii.cnt I.:,G tiic ri^ht to decide i/ho eh.: 11 i'^lyy it. V/o I: ixô lictencd to 'the e::^lcmtion of the A^biGScdor of Ghana ar. to the boc!:Qround 01 t:.o r.,oOiution ui.ucr Viiicn uo t. re i:iv Ci.-5rat.inj. if OLO did rut Icr^w that baokcround, one; would wonder how the roco.lution was phraccd as it was. I have been in tne United rations only a short tir/j, hut I nm no longer surprised th.it our r,:rDlutic iaj aro diifjâlt LJ centime. I.i fact, I alwu.yr; fool that ti:a:c who • n\ i't tiaau are to to '.'••airraLulnccd lor haiuy ahle to produce aryiihir^ taut recei'. OG a âyerify of i:l;e \vtec in thir, cyr:.d;. Organisation. The tc-::t <;f ou_' rczo3.utic.>ns is uco.'.yn''el to r.r--ft the o :.ca ..a.oM vdLch has called for thci/;. d:. a-efore, vhen t;lr.ea c^.aaya, we l/ivc to rcodr.sidur the poniticn. It i;; clear v : to ';;he hi(y rjan (iovaanninav that ta:j :ir;v;n }:a.c ri'a-ôd since -chic recolution van -racno 1 ry the ;J^vv^rad Aj^cr.My ai,d that :" tru.c I, •jor.plicncc v.!.th the aea/us ci' i.Ui reGoiution, uii/houb a c; drit od accoi;.j;.-':riat--ô.i oa bciai sidcr, wouJ.d result in -:; iijijoca Lolo t-Ltaat..'.on both for tr.e Cc'r.v aluno Covernricut end. for Id dnited .datioac. hor r'vj.L j'i a ;:•.:: ^ I find i;y_,caL in cuyycrt of the appeal va.y a was "o eluûont'-y ]::a/.h: by —::•: a^j ra.^ca'ua Live of Canada; that, tiuuL; d.av.uif1; cl'iaayrd, we -..Arao cdaaya viaa th-r.:a. ihat ..art of t.,/.i acf;'oa of rd:j dd,::ô'j.oco Ccvcr^Hont that invited criticism waa fa;j ;.;r: .a: i-iû v.f tiie cc-intriej wh:;-a \XTO in J'V.d'i it. J Gubniit thai. V;j •:• .a::-.;t r/'.y 'Cr.'Vu WG '•'êcv^vaaj X'.1-.- ;:,o:."'a:'c;d.:y, .-^.y d c -w. ' taj C'Drr-doc'.; Gave . r..; rd; ...... >uu a.?.aj convey..::,_• 1 //o lu . "a \ ra r'.j.^ i..; y.-^. a.;, c thd~- .dK/.t a::, ic od'r as, /','. 1 cell; /o, droi.1 «.•• '.IIT.;' id;n whi.ca ;.CJ-G h.-d; la p;...-.,. lous Taâ.vi-dc cc^..:ulda ;a.c, ;;

.:.•.:.a co:ixicus.L; >rhich havo uc.oa L.;V.^O i'.cre, cant cveijLj^uy is yicyareM ta c^,i.i.;uU-j

"Lh_it» Cn the other hsnd, 1d:e Cov-"%rr:ment of PlLC'eria fooln that the V?r" cod rations rai r.ot abdacase it; rouptaiijili].:! iy in tuj (,'•.)•..,.; uni. 1 \;e nave witl'diraun ou.:.- iV ] •••-0.1 f rci. T::.a i.'onyo* j. -'c a ii...;'i, ro/.o;)., ld.y«..a...a •-•..;• hi/yiny that -;;dc und'-roj l.a \:vu ad not i o.rcp'.ovr.vl altoy^taca: hue that, a;; a ira;:a.t uf dincu.jsicô btlwccn you, > 1;-.% i'coi'otaiy-Gc.':X'a.l, aral id'ic •d oi:^;olci.:r: dovoij.n.âa^ u ra:hc.....: would he vrv,'i'hc:.i cut wnicn would, c«;iid.La\ia to a:a:uciai,.: T:i:- d/ilicd havi^na With i.atu cporatiou. L;o have been ; Lvlny ti.oii_.ht to the •y\,; ibj l.;d y cf auua a aehc'.^, raid I would nou lihu to pui, for^.L.!^ w.:at a re ay ...'.:.: .a'icaa, d'i:e rcruûtieiii c\. ;..0 dL-puei:':'.-rr .!•;•..r; rcoac: ''diahL,iiC rrcjudia^ to ;;,..e ::uv\..,rciyn riyrifcn of the r.epubj.ic of the Conrjo, cello L.^^.i;i v,.i.l ;'JtaL.c."'> to i'c.d.aia f..^;,i ia-a v...... ;.a t and inairuci, proviGl.cn •;•;

a:'j::3 o:.- othar laateriai,... cd •.. r anu ]:dlit;..ry y-:.a ,;oa.K'dl MI-J. othar i.jr.:i;.a..a'v .,

fur ml'ii.ary pui± .^v .;; in id:: Co, yo ui.:ria_; t,.a . •'::y;;:a_ry ierjc.d of .iidu.it.. . y ca^oiut ..aac thiauyii t.:': Uni\':v?. h.;tiora;_, oaccpt i ax; taa rcquect of tao i...... ~\:c.(. i.afion,; i,hrou.'h 'the dacr,jLaiy-C^ .iovn'1 —1J- (< V'ir-i"l a ••^rr-\-^-\ of -i :-i-. r IIA/Jw ItfJis ( fh! ^ f __A -1 c b o, III r c r I a )

If vre rcc'cgnizc the. novcreirn rights of the Cor:r;oler,e Government; and if vo vn'.ch to -help, I surest that help can be given under the terms of this resolution. DC/clL /yVvjo, Hirer la)

The rc:.;clutlon provides th-vo requests for ancietancc to the Corsô must to channelled '.-hrouji lha 3cc.rotar;r-G:j-.v:rnlo At; tec cutset, the Congolese Government v:aj ,:.rorarc \ ô to r-hanaet tMe r-vr.ic..;tr;. hut t..j secretary -Genera:. "H..UJ j_:-Lr.cod in a eMhhhicult position, "because ho vas .i-.jaro teat the nature of the rcn/!,-jatr; \;a3 cue-,, a.; to attract erj.ticitjia irr^ t.:e ',.cr.;berc; oh Li.:i jvlvLsor/ Oor-:.-! b uc^:^ r^.;in.-j to the: uolitier.l. iinp'j.lcaticâ . "... 1^ T., :-rc po^.il'l)le Tci' the /• :"/ijr ••/• u, /.i:p.L-i.c •.:• t;, au.v.l:i:j the rcnre':/iiy-C!oi::f rr.l tii;:;ii •;.... c request; «:i.' tlio Co-iôl •-:; .1 (.'^/cv.v^nnv,, :'r-"r:.':-d jj- accf.-rciai^c1 v.'lih its st'veroi^n

'.•i..v..L'L not Vi :•.:! t)i:i ..-. f.lLl'ii..-iii.ty« :...' I1 •,;:.:! CM the I- .il'^od iiatlcao v.,.'\\i...i !jr: able \:o [;^. ->vj ('•:.; ti j co-crli.iir:. tic n lor i'hi ;j ;..:::";'. .jtauce, l,':.rc.rj.a \/ui:Id i^c In a :"o:;ition t° 2 nocih., ..'H-'L tha;; the i'oquc;>t':; oi' the ; •C'o. ^lc^:5 i. ov\-;rn:::o:-t jaL'^LhtC'l .h.rou::i tao i.'cx-^-'jtai-'Jeui^.val, nnoul '.i "be so

1 thci ;forc ihirh th; •., ta: •".Tr.i ct: -e i.h.yht lv..-: i In atteritio?i to t'vj nature Cj.'C en n'e.'r(- ;.,.a;G .';c:::ei.r-2 ".elc: i .;; ee'jry \:ie "1:1 -.: : .i.ih: of iiiO Adviccu'V Ch!i..h. oh :G

1 1 ; ;KiLt, I "bolj jv«.> to l.c: a i/haci.icM . c::/ an.O'i.. 1 mh-::.;.,u it i'c /; tlh-i c:onr;luc:r<.iu.ui of the Cor.jci.f. ,;c Cove; • ruiicnt_, \;...o r.joc:.v/La:;ay-ot..rjcr^l ..'..hi the other uioiuV'cr^ or cL,i

. ,,a;:.t it ia very inv^rtant that the Ur/.i/vcd ITationn chouLcl not "ho invnl'/ed iii taij Oi-hrahicii in a ;;j.y. wiii<'h \io^(A. ;i:a--;. it accci^: .rcapoiiail-dlity for ;.:•.: i'.. j: riling i^.at it e.'..iuld i.ot cout"v.\L, h" h.c ^ - : i ^ -.. o ,, h ru-o the C'c.n^c^uoe Cc^crnn^eirt

IIL.; the uiuc-otcivjd jlût to u>jl.-:.j'o tho CLIOLLI...!..^, i; a it vj.oiiCL. to nooiat itv IMC :;,..tM--G oi' i;:e ; y.;< I Li?.._.( '. vimb^'c J.ia c.âi. ".•.'c i^'oav . : . . r::i.. •>. bo niu-.i a;"i to leave i\> floaV th;;.'., tiie ri.v.-ico 01 the i'U">t 'j. '_jr.':>l \Jitii tiiC C!;;;iy.« :..,. o. uovci;:r!t.iit» i Gia:nit u:at •!!'j. a pc/i.nt wuaLd co i, ... yt :'.L \,r: \. _. ,e tv: treat i i : . =•. . ee-^Ta I'rc; : tne Conôicae. j le, y>.J..!;;eni. Liu ti.c i.;.r:.e v,:.y a.; ., aic..:xs I ui* tr ehr; Lc:..i . aaî^ v.riice are troa l".;.d» In

a..;ji;;t iu "t hu cu-o.. aiaatic ;>. of th«.: aid L'Ji-^hL Ly \.h . C'jn_olc:.c (Jover;u;;civt :i'r; - the uiio.erent euuntriea, ihcac exi-crtj would 'be selected by tae Cecretary-Gene-ial I3C/ cic i[7 (n-i.ftf ArVho, IT1 >rU

in consul tr,t ion \:ith tho Hor^ol o::o G over indent. Since ell, hunrin "beiri^s "belcr:;; t.i jjartici/'.ur nations, they yr -:l,d l-n rTtlca-L;:; of ..articular nations. Avid, wlLCe tlio Gocr;>tary--GonGVQ.L hue \',3 that it :!.:, HIT \i-.\i i:t;-jo thirL tlvn Ccvicolc ;o Co.orn.'...eiy'i-, should be U;.J.J:>.G a.;d in iii.'.c ro..To«:t I 7 jy^yle vhcia the African countries o-..i trust to hnvc no active othj^ tiirm tac 'i-L-U to clvo ^ciaianca to lae .. C- " ^.Golc^G (^ovonin:o ib, In ^111 ea;ni: -.•..-,, in coi.jaLt:J:.Lcn -jitii tho Gov-erii^cux. of. the

Cc: _o; t-x,-.t ih(j liui, oi-' c-:^r.:rt.v. ccal:.;:5.r.j 'ilu: n,?.:û:' >.-r êOj^c vho not C'lly <_..-C e."..^crt3 "but are selected i_\.:;i tho r.vii.j'cpriaâ cci,iV:iie:.i fraj cur point of vieu a:;d ircra '-.lie point cr view cu t;:a (': i y-l ;::o CovcriL Tat. i.ow^ I.owjvcr c-'-rouilly t]'.c:.;o c,'.'::r'i !••;:; -^J'o cr:.e-:t'jd, it uill "bo ceccnsary to i::r.'"G it clear that they Co i:c I cur-:;-,- ti fi niic::.,^ or .he United I,;;.t.Lcnr; a'- GUC.J^ tl ..:•.;•& tliey a::j ncnt tl:cre an c^r::^;'!,:^ and tlif;.o ti.e ; i;uGon i;,:y "wo -eel t:.3l/ "ihla aero Ci" oriT/iyr^cnt io r.ooc3âtv i^ "t^— conilirjcd prcjenco of the United ITa^.t.ons

I''v..-,co in 1 lu Coij v(.i« r'ii^c. j.a jl'olo vnry firrly th;.,t tho TiVrltod !Tat;-cn3. cannot vanli its hynrlc o.C t] ,•; (..'..i'^u : :> JA. ii;j cu: tr.o Ij.;..-. L./1 l..^/'.^,);.; --,,:'; o :>.:> "; ; •. ..rjt le: pl^;;" thad. \;j , ..,./ 'L j L-.. ; -3 '1.0 C^vo i.i^Ljij.vi anco ci a J.M. .. ;••:„..- ;jt^n.'le to t"-v.- Cjiircler.'o Uovrciu;,.::'ii, \:i;.:c.i" •'.;:!..• I oiia'blo Ti.lG ; :'a:.,.;i.t ioLj.'i. y :r:',cd 'i'O 1.^ cci .pl.LX. d.\.'i..Lii the .rjru:io oudcoc:, i.^ lias foi'tunaxcl y ;.itiono,:d cu:.' c..- -^r ^.j lit th:: rill. •;,'.. y - /.^ hciX'»

tir.i'j.3 roqulr.i a cL;;:y*:d ..^;;t ^-' a r ra :..:/' r. out. fj :i or the Coii;;o« r Gcc;,.i.'.l; ; \;o .i.'vc-]. t!:..t tan ^r.vorci;:,! ri^Lt or ti:c CcLôlcGe Govemicent to docioj wiio L-iiall h-, .i.p i~i, .;jur.'«. 'DC i:y.::\.yi1 rc'i, '.LhirOLir, ô ic-.l thr;:, ihi,; rc,',r;-l't'i; ' .1 carrier1, vith it tho rcco^nitiion o:!.' thd rJ.-';dt ,";i tho Cr-nyo.Lc''o ,'^jv. ,:ii:,.>.. :.T; i;o t:l c, ^c ti:.: ; it^b c.i' those v.'iio i;ill a-^ ita Wo il:ol^ Jio\;,/v -:.'_, (,::au "i...i 11,... i,od Ka'Li, ;:3 i:.u:.;t !.a iLvolvod in 13ij ;J i-: : ration -- ri:.3t^ b^cc.^-.! vs urc -11.1. ni: •: -:.u.::.i to r ;c.ict i.:-.r; Cc^^x-'lonu ôvor^-

L^d; uoeonJly, oecaujo ex trio cÂ.tiûud baited itati^raL. presence in the Cl::.,_;o, Fourthly, ve feel that vo should h-3 able to find a formula vhich yill enable the (.'unc^lc'ij; Government Ln the selection of thour; vho \;iil aLro.at it* For that ro^non, vc nif^c^t tuat an I'r.bro'Lia oi; ,-j. G I Pf : ru:.t 1; i.nd i^-cn the cno crl;înr\l.i..y L;U;;J;OG ccd u:L:;ht be provided in tv.o Torn ol1 the Goloctlcn by the Secretary-General^ in ,';-n3ultaoion \:itli tho C!r-.n.ôl.2.]e Coverrrant^ o\ '.: eo-orclinntion cci:ii:iittco o.s? : > (.:•'. r-^' ut3 to 'i^.'sint the Corv lc.3o Ccvorn.r:jj.:.' . r'.ri r c--ordina"tln{; 'the holp.it rorolvo3; jv:;'l uo proviac a lii :: DctVi.cn -l:!':^ coiitiiiucd oT;..sa;C:.: 01 the United nations :!n the Ccr"-j and t;:c anxiety ox the Co,j-jolc;:c v.o bc^;.n to cxcrciô their full co

I -would appeal to tho other nonpars cf tho Advisory Ccmnittco not to dvoll on ihLiTicult.icJ 01" i.nterpiobl:!^: t]in rejoin lion . \\:. inujt be constructive r.nd prc-u.ice oOi: 'jtiiin^ vhicii vo 11 holn Ih'i CrnL,ulc::e Cover indent; -\7ltiiou fc putting tlic Lni1.3d Nation:: in ?:.;i inipo^r-ibLc; po::i tic.:io I have r.o doub'b tiit/i: vi. at 1 h;,,v.;: GU^r^jDt'.id hH.n its ov/n cnn^s^ but, vith

C.T'. Tit rG3.i\..ct., I v/ould i;t:b;;ji.t t'i'irih it !.;:» a pi ..optical fiU^ê.-cticn, and, if any cue i;l: i.e3 to Criticize it^ ~.i ^;oi;l'i L,\J i:j.u tc pri.;uiicri s-ciôl'/dri!-; £,'i:3e. To bo a. CM ptable ou.^ rolirtic:-!! IT.IJ.JW L '--v'-' ac;ji:, banr/.: "LO trio CoMôlcoC (.ioveruir.ont without plc.'-in.^ any jJcttc^n on its Govo;;vd rn ri;jhi,-, \;!.iic.u vc ;vJ.l a-ckiK/.'-'lorl^c. It ILLICO at 1 ne sarix; tiae aaf cjcuard. tho united I-Iations ;'rc;-.i involvement In i,uch a \;ay that it \jill have recpcnaihi^lity for mattera over -which, ac the United Hati one, it has no control* AI'/Qh 51

I-?r. "^'J.A0. (Trulonoria ;; T vlbl be brleC, but before cp calcine on the matter vo are a* hsidorLn;; now, I rli<~i Li like to av~.~-.::!.?.;. '. nysclf with the previous speakers who have expressed choir h\(>i ay ; r: ei.••.-.ion for the work done by I'r. Cardinor, and to associate r,:yo?lf with those "who have expressed the eonvi;rtb"n 'ih.at i-lr. rcrsLnvii.k; will do n ftcd job there. hr. i:'ccreo.'iry-r,c-Lier:il, I rervut that I have to eyer-.rs dirGp-roirit:r.ent. tecauee of the intei ereu rtion t.iat l:r;:3 b<;r.n [:iven t~o the letter cf ri'iii-e Minister CyrilLo ..doula. I ;:ii ia;;her oistre.srid that IT; in no:, an official iu7-.TOT-_v.^-.it::.ori, and in iVct I v;ou].d 1 Lhe to o^-rosi tae hci' that this i.iLei ;-rt;Ljtion u.'iy be enahred. Of cc arse, ti.Ls is uhe f'.rst letter in which IVi-c h'.nistcr -.yrille h^lc^la oxplniLvd his plan to cone.Lv.de -- not yet c-;r.e] v.lv 1 -- bi.L.iUcral ayieeuicrts -- this request taat L..e United ITatl :/ir> should of v/i..e Cj.e^o ha:; subihUvtcd a i;e^.oi'a.:uU;". from WivLch I ,Jho.;ld lil"c to menticn c-..rtain salio.'it points ti'iat in iry opinior. can "be used iy us. ir. ti:o first place, f:.;r .li::s!.i.;ico, .1 should lihc to (pi)tc T./hat is ::a.,d ih para^iaph •'•>; "it rr-st n" so re Clare.' el.ear l^hot. the C'or.cofe-jc (Jovci'it'.x-nt has not imde a :;hlnal '-.' . res ^;:Icv;i.ve chc^.ee, '! This re.'.'.:.-rs to ".ho si:: eoiuitric:s that have been ch-r'on. The choice is not yet final ai..d is nou restrictive. This is in the r-eitor tndum of the Foreign Minister. Ihe seccij.1 saj.ient point is that the Foreign i-ILr.ister made it quite clear that: "Any other offers with the same characteristics will be studied with

That is, that ai.y offer coming frcn otlier countries will be -studied with in Lores; by th'.; f']Iovce"'i:.-ii^1it oi' feu Ce.e,;e. rJl:.?p., and f,ais u very inr:ortaht, spcaliln^ of what I -would call the Adoula plan, t:..e Gover..:;. eit says; "it is pre- are! to discuss the rcfalltles of its replication and to include in its j.: :."e any are.o.ienLS the ,' '.•ere::'ary--n..--iier".l ;-'- .'it wi::-i to suryesl:." I rcr-'-ju, "a:ie/'. ;,n^nts t.io Jeeeetary-feneral :.:!.,-fit wL;.h f . su^;yj:;t:i. I thick this is very imrortaut and tlilo isay be the basis of Action that the Cecretary-Ccneral iwiy carr/ out. i-r. Pnlnr,

In that ornr.rx-'on, I should li!:e to read pr.vrn/=;ru':.h 6, the vhole cf the - ']. h, not only that par1: that bar; 'beer: quoted in the letter of Priina t.4:1 JitL.-ul?. . Thi- oarar-ravii- rra^ , as I'clLo:.;:

tbe Cc -.!;•'«•>; calls uyon all bah: to r'ji.rij.n ire.. ;;l?c dir !•• 'i.-'virji on of- cr'/M or oti'or r-^-L^r ln; oJ i,-.''jr avid i.:L Litany : 'jcnnc:l and ; N o.'.-ior Q..J: '. .: r,an--o i'or );.;' '.'.:L t Try j -v;. . :-: .',^:.^ in. I:]IG Or/;:,~'j dv.vln, '.ii te:..'j r .vary T-'-rlci ni ii;;r.:'.v.?..rv li.'j^l^'/jn1-.: til •cii ; roq-if-:::^ of the IV.ltca I:'i'i,:--;T (: ::•.:./ in^ 'HU tUo purjor.^,; of 'l^.

rc::o.br:ic;i, r:ai;:; paragraph '> .::. .y ci.by re. er .0 t::-3 :.L.] •. h.:ry a^^i^LaLCe thaa 1; now 1;::--•.!•>£ car:,-11 e.O oat eedor C'bbU. /.nyh'w_. th , 1: inter;-.i'.rcai Ic : c^/a be c'.veii to f It. bib ti:o;i '.':.:; r<:.ool'.b_:;n ..i' Ib J'ulv .l;-.0j \--\ (/[-r-, ;..L /o T:ara(jr(?.yh 2 Etatea; 7^^ •.-•" to .::Uo:;.< \:1 :,e Lhc C'je fet",ry--\b?vieral '„ j v.,.:c h.:; v.Dcc.-G'inrv

H n a;er:;;ary?" — t I.J ; co)ic ..iii.; , ^.. L cc»u-jj; ;.:';i)': — "i^A.Ll; thr-^-urii the >..\'':r-\-^ o "" the Cor^;ol°ae CVve ;•:•;•,..:• at \.ith the techrv.o.ei. a.'r:xcLcnCf: of tho U.-,:.tod- II,. heu.:, !I — ti;..it la .,- ..Lue c.l.j.ir h-.'-e -- "ch^. i-^.b/-,a^ c.-n-.irity

:'\j"'3C3 in.: be abl?, jn the opinion of tiio Gcvoiui? .;u; to i:ct fully their

I .;'..'.-.-v.ld like to interpret t'i'.!.;i part o:p the rei/ol-xt-ioii an f'ivinr! the United Nation- ia.ot CD .y thv- dv:-,.;/ biio in j.'^.:.t t: .o i'-C'--- to u . J :ivc.lvo! In ti-aj.nln^ and rc>orc;a:i:L:.iia^ the Co.iC-1-^o iv.r-y, TlvLfv lo Vi-^j! ii/i'.ni'o'v-.o .iu ccnnexion with T.;:iat a-13 bc;u p?;opo.:^d v..:i\y ab.'Ly ,;.y the :'-rir ::,;e:iir, tvlvL. ri Iv; ;.::•;.".a. I u^oe in GGUC;; ; ro.>p-jc.. 3 v^bh :iK; p.for.o:::!.'! r.-idc 'by 1.1;^ ;; •_•r^Lriy-.^tj.vc o- K.rr,erlu. But c>n the L.;.;r,iJ ) L' tl\eje •i>..ro rt;L^: i.-isLinf.i.j mid . :\ t!;^ bar.;.,; ,.->i' V.IG /C'rd'..:.. tr» thai: havo been e Ive-j.c ^ I by th-'? j.1;::'.-:;.' ; I.;.:L;:I..^' •.;::.' "c. .e Oinr.-;, 1 tl. irj;; 1::-t t:j: United IJaLioiiJ '"Oiil.i ;-o able uo provide an u:jbrell'i lor \,'uicli t.i? liriltei Kot.L_oc TJ.i.ll lave a reopenJibility, if the United Ilatiuiic \/ould be ^Lveu a aay in the selection • 53-55 (fir. TnInr,

of ti;c ccdimtrles that have to provide asc.tGtonoo: J.n this case, Instruction. In Ti.it caL'Cj I thirl: vc vill i.: ^L'::.:;oiit bct.ii tiu: ro:v

K-._]"-:*:;;•'A (horncco) am euro you will alloy a.; to ray tribute to .-. y-ca-iry ; v.^yr ^y ; 1'o.r iho otarUv and th-j clo iuino-3 with • :.;h i: ha:' ct:pc;;::c:: utyj qic. n of the :; aJ at .2 a.* hr; in t;j ; at r; ;>:yp~ct of the a.it'."..- 'iyv..L :yy.'u:ycl.y~i^ y .• i." I?./. •", CO1".- "LJ •*.! :!..:> C. :: r..L CT:. j _, ICOL'/ r. re 'Iho

C y'1 i"] P;jO C""r v : u he l'a"i L1? -r"1 '1

Tor:

LO.VI.J or. '.'ii-v :''v:. a aiy," i^cjy.ny;^ OL' .j,y:l^ he my lv\ve h.iro«vurod. T I:l:i:.:yt., :r ;.o;;^:^--o J.ijou:" ::l'Li. ,,vil tJ:.:.ib rluoo tlo t''.r .•: ^"L tl:.~ Ccnrro3.cco crirl:; :••!/ i'/..lc y,iioi haj DJ.. ; I.I l-y/cj,j ^in^:^,: yL a c jni]t:ir.i: cmnirn npocir.ica.Uy

'vn o ^c^jj iiroil ci' tl.o Ccnro, nc cc •,;-•.., r . \rov-u

;rG^/hat chadovy, or at Io'i3t, tr ./i; va:j i;i.>i a3 clc-.j.r. laard r jj l i:a;al;ioa iLalo 01' the iioc-d to pToyo.ru-1 -ch'-/o cove_yl; a'f-y nj,o' , and I j;iu:t :;yy t1 t [a.,' pri-acl to ::,^\ that thorn ;-V;'a \;e arc ci.ually f;nacoraL.d at..: on r« ..y.tli >:-,.;. oi' it. laa y''.oD.i.;.'.ii of t..:o so vnT'ji, i ity oi' i.;''j v"> :r a auc.yL.i'./a tiiao Is ci:adl';ii[/,ed or doubtod by any Maul zaoion. I do nob holicve, RSII/eo

oi.th.or, that, it in doubted "by anv country ovrtoido our Organisation. It ir, l:no\.Ti that v:ic roooiution to \hiieh r^ rur'n:ce har3 1'Oey nad-.: f ^c;j not eonoiot raerely oi' on-': p':rt that ial-:ec into aooonr.i I ho oyre3t:v'le1.>:h :.atvi'o of the Congolese ." "ivoj. -.- hynty , lo it t"o'r a t'0.".p^ r,i: y ->r ;• jo:'i: O.GO.;: p-«.: iod . ",'h-ri o v/oroif nty i.:::..-. L\,, no pclitli.a.1 jituati.;:, v, yy. c*;or it iLr.y ;.e, e^n ler'uly hrirn it anl from J- ? lJ 7 4... ^i^

.'ot the- M;her i":.:.'t oi' I'v, L'cr: VLul.•.on ori-cit;:n oL:l:: r;ati ^ru v/hio'i arc iiv>r:::;,;..nt ca tho 1:nit•;.•:! lia.t'1 ov.n, ; .. I \:!;0_i tc:'j.."j ,. po::'j.:r].G qai;:o ju...; tiriably, vrc invol:". iho c.y.'io l;ci:oo ul' ci *:c,7 o:Lt:;;i.'ti<"i:i in •; .^r- Cnn;^, -,/o r-'/rhap;.: rorjnt tu dr^w 1.?yj i •-^c.jsary f>-)uc:liuy;.on^; :i;yl t'j :..;•:. v;1 ;o th-n: tlri.y yyv.r :;itu-itioii that iyvy L:ivo ::.trc-L'..;'jd the ncr/orcrL/^ity ol' th'j C.'::;";o h:u in :.:';;• v/,.. y to restrict or c:.:panci the rospr !..3ioili1 y of tho united I at:v''U;i. Tho \.v;o y;i.:'c:;: cf the rosolution arc1 •::lo;jf .. ; linl.', I, and i-'' t.oduy v;o t::y to o;i,ro. one ncv/ i..tcrprctciti.cn to the prov:h l.ciu tl i.t -i]:pniv ntly have croato;i c:ndiJ.ioML; for i.hio r oriifontation of tho UOYLT; ;-,cri^y -!i "i----1- Ocio/o, it .1.3 ubriorj t n:L tlv.; rcuronjibility of th-': Tjnitod ilatir;.i.j j;:u;3t I.IP oyn-nino:I fi'oin t.,c :.•:.•.::.i. alrndnciiiit. • .7 all t.'.L.Lo, 3. LA yn. thct vrs iy.ivc to ohoooo 1 c/uv;ccn tvro C'lternativco. Either V:G ac-j'ioualy ocoinidor that 1 he jtat^ oi tho h:;U at present \7.\J.1 cJ.lc^v; ccciu'o.ly ;:.nd. c".lor to bo niaintnlncd In too country vithiri tho : orthocr/iinf; 01:: nionti.::, tlyit '.3, \inti.L th.c oiid cf tho ro:;nonc 1 bility of tly-: "h.itod liations operation in : tho f!,.;yo;o, anl in that cano, a irony 0::-poa.i fcjr i'oroi: n I'orcoo anl tho intensive •i.raining that wald. to carried out iy ;ii:: ]'0\-('rn \;.y.L.iA. bccor.io a prerequisite „ •:'.vr ii' luring thouo s^x n.oniho too reopoi:sil'ii..i/[ • cC i; o o'nitol I,o.ciorio that has '(;ccn (O'^rriod -;o, c v/itii GDCOO;.;.; conlh \--o C3nt:i.nucd Lain factoriiy liutil tlio :i!o::.cnt v/jun tiio \;LtV .•.li'T-val c;f Iho "hii.toJ ..ationo tj-jo?.; .vo^ ; t' tlio r-;;litary invo].yc::::'nl ..;i the :Jnitod ii itioni'j iy. tho Coryj.i^Lic ;;ituai±on C^-v"c" "^-0 Con;;o.Lcu'C CJovernr.om- '?iitij'o [VuodC'Hi to turn to \.o.ai,ovur iovo^ro ^,t i.i.r:y cho- 'C and to have whatever ;::ili'tary roij.ey it iii.cj. V,o iiuv^: no oh.jo^tioi: in p; incipie bo tnis and no objection ovon ii it i3 made in i_-o fojLi of a roMucot. 50-60

I -,-ould like to acl: those coil -y;ur:T> of ours v;ho havo t?:i-jcl to strops tiiti ::rrnrcr.;, .contra iiotiau bctr/oon th'j a.:;vp-I iiaiior:"' j.nt'-ia -n+ioa and iiic- ;-.v,T':rH n.iy ci' 'iv Coiirc -\.iot nor n~<^' vi^ly V.,,.i^Ci prricl, to ar';::r'ic rccr^r.L'ildlitio.s, ar:d :'-::":^ .:;..; i; iliti;;.:. oJ:' a :;.ilitr-::-y i;-\tu:;:o, it orin 'bo aG"ooi:i ted \v.Lt]i iho (.••:•_ or ci::o of .'ii.1 ::. :c-r^ i..ynt' :.u a-vtrv flo'.i^r.Lc ; -vr,c.!;io r;r.d can i^i.d Itoclf thTOii^l.. co:;:c i;:.rro-U ratio :; Lti..LLtion,.!:jl;coQ i1]') in ;"G;.; :e v/n^- in a ncrj situation v.iiich in:plicn f ^ z-::rt ;"'.}-]. riilii:;,:';}- j;,;uj..ncc in :n jJ.'':- ' :>:";i c\)iir; i;ry. '.'.".' --.ro not ii. a,.;T viy ^T'^t; 'Ll> rr ;; i;:;V:-c ^ !-':;0 f'-^-..rc; trrirlr: of the military orn^ai-L ;j.:-, cf a-.y At:iC':!i cci;:.ir.i/. I ;...:: try:_Lp;: 'bo t !•::!:.!': a libtlo 'vi.rhcr end 1 : -: , T r .; v ,--..., ^£ .\-faQ . ,itu:J cior . fii.'d: .' i^:it :ri'O : .H a f c .7 -:;:-!:;; in t]y Ccr;;o \vlicn thin

1 ':.-• )lic;;/ ihat v:il.:. cre.'it.p an ii::'!:' .!.':; c;;. in iho hc--.rt r/f :.j'r i.c.-.r:. !i! r:;r. sum tiio ;"on;;o J.^= .3 not v^ut tidy iiiibaicUice, rut it io ono v.'iiich i-Iio African otatca have • to prcv-.mt. • . ' . . IP- PR/he

I-*:*. Sroretriry-uereral., I cono.!. li-i tr- Cv. ;;,->..: i.oi'u r^v.r-. "/--t-y vt i. ••:'•• -<- c..,..v i'o:::al re:; I"ri'.. 1.lor.s vich th ••• 'J: ::-.:! I.Vtvi.un.: CO-CM.r ra "ica v];l,.!h ;; ;ut '. bo ] nitoci tu br!r.£ a ryldile^JUi l.r, :;:•--.: n - ii'- :v <;;.:••:;•!• 3 r'- tho Ccr.j-. ]^r.o C.-./•. rr.3 ."nh, \:i-! t entire frced-:ni tc chcoce, and ino

o^urtri...'j '. ..a\- -i'iio Corr-•>!,-•• ::• 't. ; .-• i- :r ._ :: ]--.^ ";.o.j^n.

j". t,:iii •: •chL.i; tr.o Unilî.:. ;.'-.r. i.-;:4j :.:;;ou '/.i. 1:.' i.;or- L'idcly aware or its I'^rltion. It ::ncnld ] In../ c, '3r> ;j.lc::,' role t ...,;i tlir.I, "i a. ;:.:TO !::t::d IA::::/;TI. i.hr>ô' shru"1.:- 1- -'-'"• J' -'-"-Cj. :.c < IrMr, 0:1 -i.hO' cov:rci( ,w,/ •. t it'-: C< r ;<;., 1:\-, tl-- lT::itcd tatjona ;:v-s/;r::e 1 - v i !:}.".. lc:i a L'..-ricui3 IK :::i:ri. Li:.'.:;vi'. j. jorr-j..-; ir i .-j rntr:.::. ol' ry c)''J.e; v;:vl. or. t .(.re ir: .:0 :'oelinc '.dviUL uevcr oT hrîn-- to r-.vji; r'.ct r-^ ].:'.::::'..'. Cf..; .("::•.'.ere sov-.i-oi^rity.

'.;.j .'."O :r,-.uuh,/r.3 c i? iMic Cc...- ;.t:;. :G ;\r.^ \.:.._. LV fni-> 'b",:,a ci; v- ::^~. hero \/e l^-.v-'.- tc fLv T-:;r .j.,Ivlcc 'cl.rvt is a^Ved c r' u:1.; fur ^ hs \r;:\ ^rc^ -,;c ar'.- fiv.':!^ t:i:i.L; ;..dvice in a j:'.^;; L .•..:r/Lr-j.'o.':.'2 ^ray. rovc1;^!^ tiilr i'or ^:.: ii:;- t') :;iir:'-"ii:-vi Iho t'.ilt-l liationc pr.:f:'..rco 1 .i:^ t.i-, Oor.s;''j wi-i ;i i\..^tlci! l-.i:.' vl -j.l^n'ro .-.rnd r.t . r.'oi'--.. hceo.ur:c the -v\.;ry nr:t:i;rc- 1 1 o/ t..uj ,...;,Ji tJt:::ic,: t 'it ±:: IVQ'J. -i, o;. th'.: Ur.i ,/..! I.'a-; icn;., I'al].:; intj a very Gp-^ , .;d .','jr.LOUi;. j'lold iio'fc C:iiy I :\ 1. ; cl:r,*o L- M rr .' -t >. j? ~::n<; C^:ir":''; tut. al^'O in U.o "v-ry •.Vv,lu\:l>3n or r.r.^cd llatin.-r, r^::t.>L:.,iyo i.a 1:1:o :iabui«j :;ince "by its dorinitic.n r 1 the Ur.it^d .ici";ioi"!!3 in u ci\ il j. , ;t;jt ^no--. 0;- .'n::j.;;;j.(.'.:!.rn. IT ;;j:e C..'J.L h: :iu tlh; -;T;;~> h;iG i.;;.dod u!/d t iv/e:''. :ynty roturno to the Co-n^o, then the rr-oeptior.'iL enti ?:o 01' uh-j U:.. i.ti.d HVclcrii: T, j.i.L'L. a y 'pr,:r;rr.c^ in the Conr-o 1'allc ,,:, 1 ^.<:cm-3-: U::Llcj;i; aad ^nru.-rj.-;!:.; ,:.y. 1 Jo i:C", ueleicv^ tL^t 'tLr--? ic a Gtnylc dolc/;:;.tion -ori) which, aLLacuyh ,^....tir;:y t.c> ^.Lvc1 i..^ i'.'jr-._p i.li t.'K; u^GeG^:uy :;ix,.:i U-'^t it lia.3 no do:ru\j -i ;> rj'i^.ict; y;.,c ::;,vor-.;if i.t;',. vjon.td ii^hl'Jy givo advice

tiiat vc.utd "ivj -ur, oeri:-iiri. r^rr .k;_,_L il.rcicn a;..,;. \.'hio:': ;.:l:;;it loo. 1 £;r:rr.c p'-v.j_lc

'.;ho:.-j rai:iil j.c<« :,i^u:) vu e;...i i'cre ..:.:c. , T r,.;i ;.c i; referr-ir;;; to o::e cc.unti-y or /..;.•:'-i.hor. 1 rr::t,ht i^o i'urtiior cui-i Jay thab tl.c ± olit.i.crj.1 colour oT the ciiojcc- lo

loi'L to the UC\!L ^. AJ :i.i African country vo do not by nry !r.'.-c:r.r. ir-.tcnd tn iinpoce a choice- upon it YlUiOurh OIL:.' couiit.^/'j lt:-ll.r;;:, aro y-..ll i.oov/n ru i. :./e 'Lviiev^ it is rai/unr -iLirlciilt to h;wo. a ^c!.o..i:L.,li.:i-. v.ov.iJv-y roLn. . c,od t I:? C. po.,ixdor; in th^ Coti-^o; : 1 1 t:, C'vuntry aotli!^ n,G ar' -nu i.a co.i viJ ;..ti jiu uu k;! tne- L uc'^io^Li oi' "che United liatieno then at the same time "becomes an arent of tlie Unitoa i!alions. DR/h<

TTo are forced to iralzc a reservation, tut the C:jnp~> tlpfirately hac the entire ''roe;! -i ct' choi :G anl t:x?n alco cho cc-uuccrxjart of aG^uxxnc the recpcncibilitioG .:•...oront "in tha1.", cholco.

t;^_r' 'T\ (Liberia): Cino.e this cv.bjo^t vrr, first brought to cur attention •y c'iolo-.^ti^;: ., .j f;tV'->ri It f^ori. .j.-j c

:•:-.<•-:'•:.•:-•:; in 'h^ A-lvj.^or.y C-- .xLtti..-.-• vliica ";cv- 1-Id c-:. thic cuhj^ct, 1 had

.. >2c,.u :,!' th, :i.ftill:.v. t!:••:'; '. TO V. •.. oo u.; .

>.-?: v. •.-..__. \r:ticrc. '1^ r:-.:,.L ^ 'r-1 ::;^v\ _.:!. u".. I/.-: ^ to ..u "Irj J ate^.iL or

t ••• ':•':. -~>^. I'p/'.'inj; ii'.i!..!. r.!i:.L:::? "t1. > . V'j.uh 1 .-".'.;a -u tl1,; ?.;'•.

'l/.cC-''' -- c...-i vca 'y iii o; •'.'. ration \;^ : ' L :> ot - • cv .':-.*..' :u;;' i ./ c:i.v nc;\i^ : [-^ ;.;, ;.i .!. .Ll.,2 licur, cT LC.,i'.:"',ii! rrr, ti..u.b r; ;, ; it r-> :rn to ; 1:1, ouly the Iriii.c.jiir.^ tenches : to it? • id t'^ib ii'j ^.'lul; r,.r;f ^ ^ to -, . • ro^vj^t v!u.ch ij -uhc UnLtca. li'atjonc ui.br,- L1 :... ovor t'uiij ti'a.I.ninf; v^'-'C--1^-"" • '• ':.M, thca, it hcii: :.. i:.;;;c.'. i. vu ,:.:.. :ct, r\rd th:it ]/-'~"tJve ar.rcct van the

o;-p.ln-L...i,.i.--.'!.i thr.i; V'i \.c •..'•.: I...-OM.,.; L,. •. .d t •.->_, t. ., to v;r. :,3 tn L . ..:.r tlic c;xper.Go i... tin.,; .;l.LU,if. :al ] o.:; one: oj . !.:;.i,y w::. L ;. in to t:e ^ry^o;. . .L ' ••••c cilice \ecri : v : ,; ;yc :M\V. '< •/ ::,, u;;I. :.....!.<. :d vita the c.^-la::.--. .i-=n.i tjiav- tl.: .-o. •:<..; ~n L Ln:..,t^r o-. v,ho Uonco lt : c i^-jj L.'Ch uii..'(..(;i C^°' i/ contc\::i,. j a:vi tii:j i/idiviua:;! ijui.iucto 'i>;iat GCLIC oi' u;: ,.;AO iv : utth l.i,.i. t. ;:.tvjvcr i lK-3 my Govornr.cnt ii'ay "roroco by \,'r\'r nl' rylvico tf~> you, l-:r. il-:. ..^u.iry-i . ...i:--'r;.J., J. 1 r.ve ctr.^ i1^ i-'ll° I^-'ii t vnjrc I rc'^'i-t c-huvi there is hardly laiy T>c.:.:it en vhlou advloe ID to le :\Lv(. n. DR/he

'.""••••» only other tiling irv/n i:)i.1.ch vf nn.ît le authorize;! to alvlsc you voulc! "bo vh- ..hor th'.ro-i;.; a _VMVU ••:;:•.{•, of t:o C;.;vrii.i::.?:nt of thu C'on.-'O, vhich Is to lo (_'i von li f h/,c ?. . .:. Dr.ciry .'•; rr:ort ;.iir-;o i ::-.;; V'^cr. :. COMO;:. t .-I. I- hT.L'_ -,;':•;,!; I cin G :^-; tât iv.qv.cr;!: ; ? 1 ..^.j t ri *7.1t]:f' .\.i.-;i. T "L T;iT, .-.:!'cT;: .i ;;; 'i.t.j :'.i. 10 ^.;;i':i ;.».'. -jan i-i"? coi'or^l. '^! riylirc of 't ': : C! ••. ovr'.rwi. .. oT t.h.e co]'{"o lo c'io i,hn'!".^ vl':''ch .if-bvê;;," <._;•;"• civic n or Clonicr.1:; . '.•:/\t 1 • Irij b:^' GaC(".: t.i.cre it; o:;.i cô tiiin"' 3e.it 1 ?.v :.. Govc'rr:nc:v'- to advic^ or: cr:'?! .'..uv-'JM.rrjJ., Jilt in to nr o G •>.'!'' I:;; .• .vr.-i.^j •'.?]! Lc... 1.-. li.'^ only l:;i.-u<.; t/i:i;; \.T: r:L,;v.'. Lc cc. -ef.. rn';cl x,ith h". r-^, y''iij

;.?. '.' ,r-; vary '/-ne^al woul'L,, in yci,r wlcc.A.r:; l;h^n lc-.,v • it iu the Govc.-;.r: oj/c of ;y.: '.;•. •.! -;o L.O ' o.Lii,': \;il . iiri iun L'ove:'ei'":i :.'j' r-'-itG '; j cnrr/ C'ut itc nrorr:.j:..:o c." it

..-ion a^'.n, there hriri peon a ro:-orv:vrien vMch the Coverrrr.cnt of tho C'oi^o h-i3 ir. >•.-.•:-; ai-d v iicli ch ? Foroi;;a Mir..'cc-r oi'1 Ihio C-:>;»; o ]:,-r; Loon ihllc t: confiim, ; i .::i".•'!. t .,t i.:; th'tc ',]](: Coi,;:o 1 ::>::. j . :: r.cor-,'al/Lcn to coc •: 1 .•; .hnic^.l ^sristaiice i'rcin

iiib'.y or to "i ;io -r: [iropri.v^cj body. Then 2!cu n^;::1: 1\ - over^ r.t tho mc'nciit, there is no other point on vhlr'h c i,\i. to cui.viL;e ou. *!?< I*

Mr* Gins (Senegal) (interpretation from French): The delegation of Senegal, on instructions from its Government and within the framework of the customary consultations, wishes to state the following. It is for the Gcveriansnt cf the Congo, exercising the' rights conferred on it "by its international sovereignty, to appeal to any country of its choice with respect to obtaining military assistance. The delegation of Senegal desires that the Corgolese army should be in a position to ensure law and order* Thic must be achieved without delay, and in any event before the complete withdrawal of the United Nations Forces/ It is perfectly true that such a result cannot be achieved without external assistance and internal effort, In order tc assist in ensuring J,he maintenance of law and order in ~::he Congo and in order to make it possible for this friendly country to emerge from the present condition of uncertainty, Senegal is prepared -bo support United ifetions action in the Congo by contributing whatever amounts may be needed in view of the situation. The first question that was put to us at our meeting on 20 March was to ascertain whether the United Nations could cover "bilateral military assistance, in which ths sole choice of the contributing countries voulcl be' left to the Government of th-s Congo* My Government took a clear-cut stand on this question* My delegation has very serious doubts regarding the possibility of the United •"• • • • '-•••:- -•-..»'• . . :"•.••-•-. •••.,;' . . • ..-.-• Nations to authorize a request for preferential assistance addressed to certain countries designated by name. The confidence which the United Nations should inspire among the people of the world, and in particular in this troubled area of the world, requires that our Organization muct be prepared at all times to prove that it deserves this confidence by avoiding the adoption of any measures that might jeopardize this confidence. The question now is whether the United Nations can authorize the Government of the Congo to implement the programme that it has submitted to us. The Government of Senegal has already stated that the Government of the Congo is sovereign and that, within the framework of its sovereignty, it may appeal to any country. However, any authorization given by the United Nations would at the same time mean United Nations responsibility, a responsibility which my Government does not wish to assume. (Mr. Ciss, Senegal)

The United Nations authorization would also "be tantamount to jeopardizing the sovereign rights of the Congo* My Government, as we have already stated, wishes our Organization to assist the Government of the Congo in the necessary end urgent training of the Congolese army. We "believe that the United Nations does have the means to do this, since its presence in the Congo is a reality. The time "between today and the complete withdrawal of United Nations Forces offers an opportunity that should be used "by the Government of the Congo to request our Organization to render the necessary assistance.

Mr« DIALLO (Guinea) (interpretation from French): First I should like to associate myself with those who have spoken "before me to express to Mr. Gardiner the gratitude which his action deserves as Head of the United Nations Operation in the Congo. Mr, Secretary-General, you were good enough to tell us at one of our previous meetings that "before taking up his new duties in Addis Ababa, Mr. Gardiner would come to New York* I therefore await with pleasure the opportunity ~LO meet Mr. Gardiner at one of our future meetings and to express to him our warm wishes for his success as Head of the Economic Commission for Africa0 At the same time, I wish to Join those who have spoken "before me in, requesting you, Mr. Secretary-General, to transmit to Ambassador Dorsinville our friendly wishes for his complete success as Head of the United Nations Operations in the Congo. With respect to the question "before us, my delegation deems it essential to express our "bitterness and regret at the campaign not only of the corridor rumours, which were mentioned "by the representative of Ghana, "but also at.the Press articles about whatever we may do or may fail to do, or may say or may not say. This can only lead to creating divisions among the African representatives on the problem that concerns us. It is no longer possible to go through United Nations corridors without having various officials and newspapermen speak to you to ask you where the crisis lies. These people are so insistent that in come cases they have persuaded some Africans that there is indeed a crisis* I think it is our duty to protest most energetically against these tendentious rumours, the political purpose of which is clear to any impartial political observer. (Mr* Dlallo, Guinea)

What is more> shortly "before entering this conference room, the question. , ... vas put .to me. whether I was one of those who absolutely wished the Congo to "^ placed under United Nations tutelage. I believe that, in a certain maanar of speEkin?. ,«ao»r>^ languacc. use I *TI. this CcBEaitt^s, consciously or jio-c, has cca-Lr to the cor«fu.iioiDi r . AM/rh 71

{" • r • TV: 'il 'i n, (]ni

T;o spealc of n author! zinr," the Government of the C..'nyo, 1?o spcal: of rero'Tjizinc; th? sovereignty of tho Co.n y. Ue urn happy that frcrj tho firs day vo have re ianincd laithful to the attitude tl.ab wo vero ar/orr; those- vho for i:ho indepc ..denoe and severe 1 ~y.iy of the uor.ru, For us lo 1:3 not c, c^uc r ; ,'•'? ''T'lco^niti: ;i" c»f t; u Govcroi;: !icy o." ti:o Co?i;y_, I:CCM ..CC cmycuc vho i'-jniK. iizon o*" thr> citcnG tho :;<: -,rc_oi Tit^ of -Glv: C':^i..o i.liorcty throatonr, the

:;ovorî._nty 01' Oait:oau /nd thio ir; j:ot culy t/iin i'-.; z i.t :.on of Cuincaj it IG thj ]\.:ît.ion :;hic:i h,i:i teen corr.-iL1 .^Mbly jjtntoLi, •.•npoo.LLd c.nd rcai'firmod "by 1 -'-.i'rir^n ropror .-i iv.vtlv.--;: :1 n tho Lrili:.-! Jiat.lo !:, 0 Kro L)Ccrc'ta:y-Gîi-..'r^l^ t.irou;; i y:ni T,;C ]I:,TC "been cîzcd for nore tJicn a month vltli a ;. .i!>3tion: ti'.at oi1 cr;;; tyinr; t'riron;-;h TJii Ui.ited IJ-itionr, aa iu::brella i'or m.ilito.ry V L'i atcral orcrauiohG ^j c?:;tc:.;platcd hy t":e Gu\rc:."VJ:::cnt of the '.Icr.rr'. It ic ''ly ii;tenti.on to be v----;y brief _or \Jê c;_...jle re.'icon th..1., not i L.nly in the cc-j-rsc of oui' pe.::t ixoi.^:iy;; T/.ii; h v e-j fo.:-orly li..Id here; but alGu iji the CCV.TGO of nuuieroun n'cc l:i:.•••:; in ^rivc'-e con:, altnbienc,, tho pocition r >..•! ?vy ue'Tervjo, v; hciLi Ijuei: ri.;,'>"'. .^ very elca,r_, r.hd indeed v v.;u. ;/purue!Lf^ ; i lir. He;-.rotary-Ccnoi'alj, lih^ our b'voth ::r.; tho ro];^ ;..:Jenbe,uivoc of the Conô^ r..ra : pcrf;..i' ;ly a\;a, . : of our vci.-y r-ic?,r ;":• •':.,.vJ:., !•"•./]..lci;i::_ on all th.ico '.;.isou:::,!:-':::, tho I'inif'ter e>f the Conro m:iee ]:novn -- first j.rivuucly^ and then hore, ^../i.ciju'.y c..i.l ofi ieiiiDy -- thai his G j'/ei'iiiuciJt - : •would ronounc? •• tho UGO oi' the irriib^" Li,;iu flv;2 o:.;,.. c.f on thin ylano v:i "./Mild bo oni;i'i;lod to ce.y that i,hoi'e i^ no ivi ;:.r a orooicr.^ and C.G tho representative of LiboiMo caid o -while r./o_, the ].roll_e;:: arirjoiir viuit o.rs wo in iY?.au cliLioucoinr? (,n this level my dclec.r.tion ^r.iid lll:e to r:;rr un:n, yo seriounly fear that, this i.'omrnittce i:; c;oiny be;, ond its toros of jeforcneo,, liany substantive ututci .'/iibs h<^ve been i.:. :dc and 1 feel sure Lhat bna C^1'..:.iittcc has ylvea fall iioteht-a.on to -i ho vc-j.-y cor.ip.LeLe and cxâast Lve st'.,;x:-: ;•• n., Lado Ly tne representative of Cae.idu, The prc.hloi.i vhieh he has raised -- ;\ad h: :.G not t'lo only one that has raised it -- is one uhLch ve ralrvtain is not. uiLnia the ca-rpctcnee of this Advicoay Coonittee. ,'!ucli a probleoi ic indeed in.thin the competence of the Uniteri Ilation;,_, bivu at 'other levels. 1 vould i.u uiiee vish to say that in so far as Guinea is concerned at these other levels Guinea vill not for a sin, le inctâ', hesitate in ascuininn; its full recponsibilitics if the problem were to be raised by anyone vho wishes to do so. 'iliiiiisii^'i.!- ATJ/rh 72 (hi', ri.r>,llo, Guinea)

Thus...the Congo huvinr; renounced the use of the- u..-;;r lla, vO.vb rci-ain^? Practioal.lv, wo arc :;ul;od to interpret tho Gcir>rdL A.-.ri,mbly recolution* In.your :• :;id-;:;ont, l!r. nocroLary-Con^ial, you started by cay r>c that ^ou did not i^l ^V'"'.':. fcj. do £:j« I wi:;h to i.tc:t:i m./ "cii^t yo-ar poGitl'-.n iu fu.Lly in accord ',;Ltl: vhc position vhlcli the rjprocont'itivoLj uf Gur.io;.! have always advocated, Tf t'.rio re^ diioion :LG to be int.^ri^rcted, tlien •vre .FAIGL aodrecs ourselves to

Ecivinc; nald ohi:i,.Mrr oecrcta:ry-Gc??icral; it cocuc to ny clo3.ccatlon that t;ie '• on::o ]''L'- '/jc; vor:o:J'-_jou th^ :i!::biv'lba, and you. yourc^lf having slate', that you ave r.ot in a po3-l.tj.on v-o interpret thi x'oi-olutio:^ the A'dvir/^ry Comitbcc •? ?. ^T.': .;oT7"l of a quoc/tion 01. -j\Leh normally, und-^1 its toirjc of reference, ^ it cm îve a valid '"jpini^n, AG regard" iho laany detonation:: liore \rhioh havre raised tho proVi.^rp. of the choice '. ? counbrioc^ and ctrip.^ ]î•;/;;].cnr., I thinl: ti:ai. Ihoco clelcjationc vou]/! do bc-!toi: tj v lit u:ioil u, i o rolevrint orpins, nuch ac th3 General AUGO. \ iy or i/i^ f'ccur-ity Cowicil, havo :, coi1- ct. L'/.cd o..' the natter. ;i:';oie 13 still one* t::1tiy 11•.:•;!'- I hc.T:o \o ;oy, '!>'• :ai''^:: f'C:":in.fj.ion ban boon i :> ri 1 ; cifc:'," ':c'. . pe" •'"> 'r;3 delitorat :• !.y; en t-iio pro' -1.o'. ia T l...lie/e Jhcu; The Goverrjrienb ci* T! > Con.O'. :-il:e rny oyn and lire ;''.! ("ovovî ioat: r-'i'^-jnontr-a hero is jov. 'Voi^.i aii.d that tho proMeui ;L,i no'u at uj.J- c^n.j of \.iic ucvcrv;i;r.ty oT tiic

Cont;v.c Uh?.- T73 n,re. .'Li.[.'.cuc£.;in[j; hero is the United Ihiîona cpcration only. Iha i'1onr;o an a sovereign t3tai:e ••- and this ha:; alvay:; "been our volition -- r;:"y do c.3 it TrialieD. 15ut if tho C:-n[_p ca:ir.^t do vono it viu-bjc1 for the inainLenance of the United I.ratio::3 opoâti'M:, ii1 tlie ijonô tai'.ers an attitude \;hio:i the United Kations doomu incoiupritiblu ^jlthtlir- contiriur.'cion of the United Nationr. ope:;.ition, then it io u^> to the United Nations to take the appropriate Ltti'^lOo Therefore;, the problem docc not arise in respect of the sovereignty of , the Coiujj. The ]-ro"blen aricoc in respect 01 th^ continuation of the United ITationc; operation.in the Conyo. And onco ayain thU; problen ia not within the competence i'f this Committeej it is vithin tv:.: ccinpeooiice of other United Nations organ.? - -where ve \;ill take our full i'ecpGr.r^'d.uîtieG as ye do here. AW/rh ' 72- 75

rrt-ArT"_Tl (rjUC— 0: You, r:r» ^ccrcta:ry-'li:oe;:c,l, anci the mergers of the Crrmitteo •vr.il.1 no doubt appreciate the cpeciai i-olciticnchip the Sudan has to the Ccr.(.*o. Eocrmso of tho clooo tlr.s between the C.ji-j-joLcno and the GueVêoe ~;-o<"ple.j end b ^caune of our ccr:n -n frontiers vith the Cone/j^ \-. 3 alvuyu rcjuid I'-.. j.c'j^"l'Jy and tho ctîlLty o •[' 11. o f! ):i o £.3 nn ij-'.c'.irr.iicf? c:? cur own [;oc^."ity Mna '3t-xl:,ility . And T.;. hdv^ an o::â:;'.^^cl ;.;vl ^joll-0. '.. cclplirecl an:.Y ic orio ci' •i'!:c chief i.r:c;bruiaei:tD of cecurity r.r.d rtaMlity in ;: country « V/e therefore have every c^r.^tLthy for the Ccnfo'c ccnôrn vith oho cpccdy and effoctivG rotâinin^; o.n ! :.;od.:-rrn.L:«a\:irn of their a::::.:;-c A-^cordiiv'lyj vo have nlvayG cnds.TGO'..!. and r,r.ppo."tod the plea that the Conr-vlijf.e Cjvornr.eni: cliould be '!;•;:' I:: hod 'by the U;-\it'.--d Hat ion 3 in rrorânininr its ariiiy and brinr'.Lue; it iriCe;: ':: ;1;(:er ui^cirline. hut in our view The it'ieal vey in vhirh ::uch ^./Giutanoo shviid re r-jr:.'!' -:iod vov.'l.d be; throurh i.:u'L-Lilatr.ral Unit-vl ilcvb/oris e.rrciiiêônbD. [.'.,iîi c:-rar\;c/:r'nLLi côuld iidve- Leon inibir.tcd long :iic_, but for ::oire rcacon or arotii^r this (..id not GCXI& to h:r/o Loon niado- r:crr:iblG, 'lov vo aicc coined ;;;i' 'Lhe ;pro^.o::a'l. cvf tho Cciiroiooo Govurr^rucnt, '\;ivi;:n ia the :.-uV;ject of our dicn icsi^n oo-.'e t:.'iiny. -Lhcrc cannot, of ccurce, L'O •:. ;y chaootr of a doubt n; io t-:- Can ;;;:•. !.o ê v>. vornT-.,,-;-it ' o i all ri^ht to uccl: c;c.si::tQnc3 L..,^J any country or i/oup of oo;riby.Ic^ ",i..Lc.i ar:: pijou^vci to hoô.;. i'hi.; anooct of the matter is neoor in >oieoia.oii and t:i2 loco ve talk about it the hotter* Eut tlj-3 difficulty hero 0000:0 to no to rooiac :• n how to reconcile the Conôlooe Crvurnraeut'G proposal vith tno u/iitod ]]ation'> pccition ac prescribed by i. Me United ITritionc. rocolut ion.., oop ^ciciliy Gen,;rr,l AooÔubly -roofjlution (Ko-IV)o The arrui-ent is bolri,;; advau.vod that the i'c:.ôiirahlo change in oirooiaotancoG cinco 1'joO should JucLi.fy a libei'til ir.L ji-protntion of that re solution o My delo;/alio:i i-7i.ll rofrain fro, a participating in each arûoentG ciraply becauce wo do not feel that vo aro competent to do co. You yourself; Mr« GGcretaiy-Goneral, have dealt adoquatoi.y with thio point. TL/jw 76 '' ir

Afi I have just cald,' tho boi.it vay out of thin diiTLculty of rec'oncllinc the Con.;30*0 needs vith the United lotions position vouLl be to resort to th .> .ccncc;;^ of multilateral Unitc-i I'atior.i nrr<-nvj:;7.:c:nts on Lh«j responsibility ' ci' tho fo :;'^tcr>r-;"j.:erti.' If thjre piovG to be any difiiCij.ltios .vn the way of v.ri_-."le:L-:i]tin^ this, thon \"o foci that tha prooo:;:-! sub:.. L o tod by Ghana, that ir> to say o'f cc-T^t^ing the celccoion to the riori-?il:'.^n^d coiuitrteG; may be £iven cor*ai«L.:ration 'as a GGoond-ber/i: cholr-e. Altorjiativcly, ^rid by vcy of oortprociise — ar.d thin i:iay be a in:vlificution of Lhe nu;;f;ectj.ori ir.rj'.ca r.y r>y colloague, the ix_.-- ^'..-. "tative of Ni^aria ••- ;.lu ir.uttcr of co.i.cotii.^ in.^ructorG iron ciroitj all the countries that are prftpan.d to liel]^ should, in the first place, be lefc to "c'i''3 d.'i 'ci'C'tioii ox tiic »?oc'.''io"tcij.'y-'L'.~.^'.c-rril• iJG j.nov t ..ao in e.xercini,n(j ijfiat diocreLion the Secretary-Gen:::, ul can to fully relied up^n to take r.ll ::^levc:nt foetorj -- political; poyeholujic'-1 L aiu'. othevs -- into eonaiderutioru .Tiie •'J3cj.'s-'c?vy..GenGrQlIs selection will of course have to be subject to the approval

of t'-i.c Con^cTo,: i Govern ;.ant. Luch r,n arrar.^cvicnt, orio vnuld hcpc; would satisfy t)ie Coi:-..olc.••'••» ^•r;Gi'Jwnntta dsi:xrG3 Lnd would nob be at variance vith

f.rj.r: is :. -:cJ.y on idea -I am 'tl.rowjng cut for your consicloraticn, fiir, and that c:1 the C. i.'lttoc. ' t a;-.: (^mbol.ilen^d ô do u-3 b;/ tho :;taton2nt cl1 the foreign ii.Lnister of the Conô, i.iade a :.;hort tii.:0 nô, thiit tho list proposed i:ac neither fj"..•>:.! nor restrictive. 1 t.u;, of cource, contributing the.::) rc;..arko--; on the lijsinriptlon that ait, Lîto^ :\atioiu uonid still be as::ocic:t3d vith the jnlO tiv.lining. But if, as you have jointed out in j-our opening statement, the •' Con'£clu;je Government no longer insists on sucii association, then these points may not even arise. TL/jw 77

:-r..rJf'O^ylii (Tunisia) (interpretation froei French): Jn the course of the last rfy-Gtii30 oP this advisory Cr:.i:iitee, 0:1 20 ihrch, you fiiprecsed, Pr. Goorcrtery-oVneral, a de:;ire to knov our vif.wc ref.r.rdinf, thn e>: char; rye or* correspondence betvreori the United rations and the h yveuiiiint, op tee Cc;]ryo on <:-h .- rroLlci:. of the r^trainirp of the Oryolesp; h'ati-,r-il r\rey. Fror: the sted cry.eirb /hat you i;.nde at thai, lest rjicctlry vo fyrtrorcd t;eit, the Priir.e Minicter of lire Conô, LPr. Atoula, after having written to you in February of lyip of hin desire to see the instructors of the Gonyolesc îrcy recruited from mong Ail lean Si:atoc_, ha;; nci. aecPied to C'niii3;:u il:Lo tan!:, to ci:: countrlo.u and on a eilat.jiT.l i usis. i'-^vcvei'j IL ;e;yr>ars tnat tho CoiyelcsG Gevc::i:eiit, in ce::...ultatic i with tLio tiPOC' scrvi H.:.; in 1.e'-'p^'b.ivlllo, ire; conceived of a parîciT.at.,on by thr Ujyltod i.ati.ons in ihls t LJ.LIU:IM.I r-lcn of iiilitr.ry assistance. It is on this role of tir. Pnited hat Ler.s -- e-nich y.-u GO \/ieoly terui c.n ^Lnie.'cila" -- that you ar.h.ed us te foe.us e:ur often:;. Lon ana thai- o..1 our re::yecirive GovernrcGnts. j.t is tnere.i'oie co feet role of the United nations tin, ve v/'lrh i'o spîd^ for our con,pr U. nee r'-r-is t'hcr • en id cnu.la not pcrihio us to ;_ ass jUv 'fc-,:..Mil ci.- the choj.eo t!"'.t \}:.o r;>re\j].(.:ce ('.'ovfrrrneni: his d,,:.cid';d io irake. it '.s only in r,-..> far as the plan f>;.r reor[ e:.i.:eti^n of the AlIC concerns the univ.^d habio"- thac ve c-'ei I'-ass j''.K!f,^;--;-^t on inao j,.'.un.

•j'ho TeyiiGian Governio..!n, nes ti. ...^fv re; :n the ej.^lit of the resolutions defLniny tie role of the Um.tud Ihitior-Sj ;:d/vi, i.ed tii-, p.! an for rcorrynii irivu.-n of the AiIC arl Sdie role vhi.cn \;oure rail 1 o c-ur Cryenization in suciya T.r':>yra!Tme. I vise. 13 state at cnee tha o tl'ie 'lunisiai Govorni":.ont has aluro/s velcoLicd with satis-; ac-irion all efiorus n..;io to nain aid re^. yanise the-Congolese 1 haiional /.iii/ and i;nl:c ci it a sLi:onp and dise en Lln.ii body. Puoii lei aii..y is a ne<'et:r.ity for the naintenareo uf c-rdei1 iii a ouun;, 'y s.o vast as the Coryoj am the i::a.i.ni_nance of o.voor is cert'.iinly one uf ir . c^serniial principles that have inspired the operation ci the bailed nations i i the Gori/jo. in.jrej.ure ve hive ooi;,;iderei the plan for the reorganization of the X11C vit,}i i'uil ; yu-aihy; but after a. losi oereiul stvxly^ 'idr.! Tun Is Lan Govern:,ênt can e:i ress un y in attitude <..>i yreai reserve vitn rcp.urd to ihis plan, and parfieu.l.uii y vitli rey r;i 10 ih.j role that the Unii,-,. ;. I!.\ti(jns ia asiied to pioy. first of ail, we rust very idiihily say that u have serious doubt;; concerning the compatibility of this plan viih rhe relevant reso.Luuicus of both the oeeurity C^.uncil and the General hiSv.ûly,, We have in mind particularly resolution 1'V^l- (Eu-IV) of the General Assembly adopted at its special TL/Jw 78-80 (irr» aôlrl, Tun In In) orirt TV:O resolution of 21 February lû-l of the f'oni:riiy Council. Generally cpoal.inC; bb.: pl.aii ruaa 'coairc'ry to tbo principlâ tL".t incplrod the o l^v *. i.ationc in itLi act! .a: in th,3 Con/po. Tli;; twn; >;.'.'•d uJL'^ or thot operation" •?f t\j baited i'litionn in fa (Vn^ v,a] to prevent cha^c, in th,..t country internally, ^nd oat email y, to d'tc îpaô the rpeeti-o of the call âr. • •

- .; da >•.: i; vich to £O ^-^to a 1 .)ii0 jtatcF.cnt ;ioo.rt tiiiG ncv; but it ic ' ri 1 j ' •^•-r^ ;.v cl*'.. v t. '"' (.1)3 b-i..la ;orl'-. L uncirlaa'::: Gi:r,'o;;ici Wo.a net cletermin^d by : !.;i.-- Lirirp.o' or it .•;-;•'-; pk p. .^ '-boi;o ' Via w i • .-r;\:.rv_d th-j Url'LoCL ... iilon-io At id th'j choice of : 1 Gh<3 :.:':•: ônt:' "L' ,iwir:0 r^,_.:iorico }..<;;, CJ:.'':/ L'.if -"! tj ci:;' !.!;.'.'i'icultie:rju ihcco i;:!.:; coiint;:le3 all bolor.£, to CD? particular croup 01 n^L.'.c':^, or,p?cia.l ly powcriul 'oripn •rilil:\r:ily G; â1::!]!^, natiour. v ho ••. interc-Gt;;, r:-t Icaci, for ir^::t of t'-'-'r., ("O beyond thc3 fiO':i/u,rc oi' thf;ir o;,rn cour:;. .'icz , di t'alt> r:;j-i.m: vc nurt re '^11 that tr.3 .. ..:e:v.tai;; -aoncr-il^ vl.ou ut 1\:° >/c:".i'"lv: :.Mf; oi t,l: ~. l-'.ltcd Ira'-ior:.;: a., .ion in Ui> Co:-yM )'•:; h. .1 -:;o ^ppâl to'othc^- ooiJi'/oric^j tnc>n tli'ji:c- oi' Africa and Asia to rarLici.oc.te vi ilie opcixition, IUIT^.L! in ills c-1-.....i.co t':> cor.nt.',1^;'::; of \Joctcrn l.'uropo ",/r.oô .uTiQj.'f.i'-^j Ler.': n.uch 1.'i,:j "'••. .^0.-,;._,, r jvt:; L .-i^c r:uch r..j .Ti'^laivri end Cwc:;en. ' "' uo not 'v..}inl>: it r.cccr^.".^y i/.» rcon':vi:. L',\-j \,Vi: i 'i,,h .• Cc--:.;,:-'l-oG novorn* jiit id ^T'olrcly i. .:'; tc L.-1'J u! alovdr c'.:v•;_.-, j it/ r!•'••-•;..iv,'.-;-,, .[.Lrl; 'tl-.o Ii,.it^:l I'ati'...-•,'•! dc.:o i....;t r: joy tht. rir: Iv/tiU::''? •-.: d . V: U.nlr^."! 1 jx,.'.,a:;, ; ii;f, i,• Pe^.r In i..Lnd cuca Li.c i.e. conoi .... ration- !j.-- r.csr.ror^hJ o- ia L-. j i'cnry o.locrj. Vfn'">.;;• -:'':r t) o clioice of cci iitri^'^ T L t; : ..o e. '.ot iice l.-y\T th^: Uniu;;d . ,L.ii: .,; could [v:'-'L\iy ca.i \: ..br.:.!/;..'• to ci Vil'i ..ci'al aid obvi'',i,.jly conceived and piv;.:v./-_\l ::rLnl";o it cell L.nd. V: ra itt; lolu would bo noitl. •"• to in,;>ly the : Ian non c;'f'...î voj.y 1,0 conta/ol jt; but Licrcly to co-ordinate itc ii/alaliticc and ohx^ aSM::.ic a d'.j^ .:> oi:n r«-:r:o;i;';iLi.l i. l'.y»

a rcadir * oi' the dooui: :at jr.:: "arc I by ta'-; ;.;•. cr _..:'. :.'iat en the role of that co-oi.Vi.natinc, body uhieh j;.u; bf:on cialod iho "n ..1 ••o.._.l; u Lad vhleh vould be orrio/i ,;J..'iy c,_ Lie I Ua.a'-C'^1 .'.'oavos r:o •."iouot-w..£:tcov:vcr ro:.;Tirdir\-; c'^Lo point. The • fact iaat the eapeaaca, vôuld uu aLrcctl.y boi/ao by thj ccintr.i.butu,^ counlrioj iai.l.D '.oijpletoJy to i>:aaGPia u;j, i....r it only in-.--oa^ :G tbo uoof/adcnco of t:a./ o_'orc.t m — dopOi.\dc..-.o \;n:/::Ii ;iou... = - thur; b;.,coi..o lco...i -•- on \}:..c LLX Covorr-;.:ntc ' ooLCC; ^. d« To j.y li'U:: that i c •-> a'd i.na't iv.n oj,' tno oix rr\-aiato bij.,.icc;.ial. op :.a aclafiG of a;:;:•.stance vcaild bo necor.;::aj /, t/Vio I..L..J Uil^:'' i,^v-l(. :::; choiJ.d no't no;_iU;!;.; en :h a xolc; o^honrico it would joo :ai .iiê thj pr:rir.:.jVU.ojj i;ai,ch taa at tiio vory b:a:..i:; of it" oi.-ciro vfilicy in the C,^. ;../. '1--..J d;il,.:.i i.,.Moaj ;.;la./i:l.d not include in its .!:er:po.,':Jhi.iatica tachi.a.cal and ua'Ujrial a,.;jj ;;t,j-.if.c of a i;:ilitary natuivj, tcvdin t.iiV.i i in, aîiah'y cleponaent on tho authority -of six countries all belonînc to a oiij^la i.uoolO(jical bloc. v/o have already o:rlni:ic-d to you, Ilr. Ld-cret--:ry--0 — oral, outride this hall, our doubts an l ij.iaLiiss. Buc; :;inco vût tir.e a new e.i<:..,;iont has been brought to i. • T; and vld/t is the lcd;to.r Od.' td.3 rriir.c Minister of the Conco, aated i-O -l/.'iL I.d'/eri>meiioG coi.':cer:ir:(l tm.it voulc. unuoriaLc •,,110 tj.'a i.nin^; ci.' the AI.'C ar.d it_;

:i.'.vinf; r.viid tiiin, the rmat ccr:i.p.lcto rcar>rxuraa?e."i niuot lie f^iven to the Con~0'.cGe Gowri'ment th;i.b none of i;.::j -~-i any '^.'a^ r;mi !.C.!.°;CG the Goverc:fr;^''d/ o^ the c;.,.:do. I cjy "idiij i:^ca\;::o cei duin r'-^La:;(..^ o >.'' i.:;... lettci' ci' the Ir.u::: liir.iir.tcj •<>.rul'l ''.<•: ad oil': to believe il.r.t iie j.c net cnciroly cori-" au:'G

•^•,:.d. ,.; . <..;, the- ^ cjtr Lot j.--nn v.ir i: l.ho Ij^.t: ' Iddd.^.:; \.c;;!.-i. pJ.Mc;.; iv;oi- i.L.c.ll' vouM, r : r I ci:i -.;,.nviiiccv_, be nc'.idior uh justified ru.-r îL'U)l .ruLj. ..y a .; the l-r'.Srne .hLiccod i:ru; cN.i.icd th .n. Fuj. i,;;, .•/iV.o;::. .•, It .1 c nou n ni :c^î^:. : o/. the United I.'atj'-.iis * b.'iri--; riblc 'i.u refu.:.vj the Covoi'îucnh od ti.e Conr o ''t/ho rii.lu to judr;:e by it^cii1 as ';.o the \r-.j in wh.;.cii it vould doi'cnd ti..e nation* Li inicroot1'^ as ota-ccd in the letter iroin l -.'ime Mii:i.)ter h.'.u/u..a. di, by cc laiou r. /:..-•.; orient, the idea of th^ urrbrclln wan created and the : nettii 0 u_;_-; oi' b.L'l.atoraX ;; j; ; i.:.a.,.u.,;c \.--L; i'ir::..L.i.y out ..u.'!0t one: L/yiiu xno v: :.'i.h wou It".. Lo ,)j o>i I/..) iriiiiiui C..(';;;U^_;UL; of v.d'd.d ;.'utr;cL.n tho Uover,...i'-,nt of tho (.'-../;'; ,o and ^ûr.;, 1^'^ I:;1. .d:î\..t '. ;.y-C;o :ci':il, tc.- i'ind a forrrula i^;r xh'j rooi/L'î L'-'ia'biu,; of 'Ln>.. ,,;.d; a i-,. ji-;;/.i:.-z«t. i.«;n ,.-, .r;:.i.n t.iG Uai.ted hdtJoj.:i;., !:i;u].(f .:3G\,.i;C . •. i'Olo iôr-..; ill .hc^ .j.n." vi. i,h I ho .' ...... oa ...L-di i.-L/ic-;J i"o iia^ •.i:jGUii..i..u ,.

'fhio : vjiiuiila i.irjb, of >...uuroo;, LM.: L; ro: -;oll.

c 01 the Gcuoral .^L^t u.uly c.i.c. cl;o !_:•<_•..• wity CoiuiiMl. uo believe ti/.U" cunh a fo^... ilo c:au bo foiuvi, and i.h-: uuvo: ; '/.cnb o_, 'fitru.. i.a . ..v ready "lo L.M};O concrete c.;nd co:-;3tructivG Guo;;>.;otiouL; aioij;;, choco lin.'f^ Ucich o.i the i.;odu.Liti'; -j end on the financing of the reorganisation of the AKC under the z^vc, of the United Nations. HA/jpm 82

If, however, the Congolese Gov^ri^ent prefers, in the free exercise of its , full and complete sovereignty/ to turn to bilateral assistance from six countries/ as foreseen.in the plan, then ve should speed up as far as possible the process of divorce of the United Nations from the Congo, divorcing ourselves of our responsibilities and withdrawing the military apparatus existing in the Congo* ..... We -wish to velcome all the efforts made to bring the United Nations . ...- participation to bear .in the plan of reorganization of the AKC. But w.e are. forced to note that it is not possible to cover by an international responsibility a prograimne of a military nature and of a bilateral character. We vish to express to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and to the Congolese Government the gratitude of the Tunisian Government that it was thought to include Tunisia as a participant in the co-ordinating body that at one time vas envisioned.

MrvpTCKO (Mali) (interpretation from French): A few weeks ago, within this same room, v/e were seized of a request from the Government of the Congo, which wished the United Nations to provide an umbrella for military assistance to be received frcra certain countries. It will be recalled that on that day our Ambassador, Mr. Coulibaly, who is now at the head of a special mission of the Conanittee of Twenty-four in connexion with discussions with the Government of the United Kingdom on the question of Southern Rhodesia, defined our stand on the question. This initial request of the Government of the Congo has been followed by a letter from Prime Minister Adoula of 16 April 1963* and your interpretation of that letter has been confirmed by the. very clear statement of Mr. Bomboko. We would now like to state our vie\c on two specific points. First of all, the Republic of Mali, when recognizing the Republic of the Congo as a sovereign State, recognised its right to request assistance, in any form .or manner, from any source that it pleased. Inasmuch as we consider this to be valid, we also consider it inappropriate to ask the United Nations to provide an umbrella. We believe it would be better for the Government of the Congo to appeal directly to the erperts it wishes to co-ordinate this assistance, since it has already decided to ask for military assistance without the intermediary of the United Nations. If the United Nations were to assume the responsibility of an umbrella, it would also have to decide on the countries which are to supply military assistance, that is to say, follow the same procedure used at the time of the crisis in 1960 in the choice of countries to supply the military assistance. IlA/jpm 03 (Mr* Dicko, Mali)

So much on the first aspect. W-; would like our position to be clearly understood. It is explained, on the one hand, by our respect for the sovereignty of the Congo, which is and must remain the master of its own affairs, and, on the other hand,, by the fact that if this request is satisfied it would represent an embarrassing precedent for the prsrjtige of the Organization, -which, as ve all know, is undevgoi.ag a financial crisis • Secondly, y.v;/a your interpretation of the letter of the Prime Minister of the Congo dated l6 April, and with the official statement of the Foreign Minister, my delegation believes that the problem takes on another aspect. In "brief, ve must now consider that the Congolese Government withdraws its original request for assistance from the United Nations for retraining of the Congolese army. If that is the situation, my delegation believes that our Committee is not in a position to take a decision. We nevertheless, believe that it is the duty of this Committee, given the United Nations presence in the Congo for the maintenance of law and order — and the forces would be retained until.the end of 1965 — my delegation believes that during this period it is no less important for the United Nations forces, with the authorization of the higher bodies of the United Nations, to assist the Congolese Government in the retraining of its v:T

on the delicate task htj has accoia^li^lied vith intelligence and in a rvay that is an honour to the United Nations. We congratulate Ambassador Dorsinville, who, I am sure, will dcacrve our complete confidence in completing the mission. At the same time, I should like to launch an appeal ,to the Government of the Congo that it re-examine its request, and I welcome the Foreign Minister and thank hisi for his explanations. At the same time, I should like to express to his Government the sympathy and effective solidarity of the Government of Mali;, which will spare no efforts in. everything it does to strengthen the unity of the Congo and of Africa...... • . • ' Mrs. ROSSEL (Sweden): The Gove^anont of Sweden considers the training of the AKG to be one of the most important and urgent tasks in today's Congo. As a cousequen.cc?, my Government is o.f the opinion that we should make use of the most expedient ways ar*c!. means at o^.c clcpocal. Discussions on principles should thus not be allr,v:ed to dslr.y limited measures that can "be handled by the present OHUC personnel? The main task facing us seems to be to create a well-disciplined cadre of officers whose principal object chculd be directed towards maintaining order and security. In line with this reaconing, my Government believes that the planning for the training of higher units and special branches of military units should not "be considered at the moment. We believe that the training should be concentrated on providing lightly armed compasy units, such as "battalion units and necessary transportation and signal units. We feel it desirable that the training should be co-ordinated under United Nations auspices, in close co-operation with the Congolese Government. 'CIius, the instructors ought to have United Nations status, possibly as technical assistance agents. The participation of countries should, we feel, be on as broad «-. basis as possible, but at the same time — and this goes without saying — with all due consideration for the wishes of the Central Congolese Government. We do not want to suggest any rigid geographical distribution, and we definitely do not want to make suggestions that might lead to a controversy. A procedure of the kind I have just mentioned requires that so long as ONUC remains in the Congo the United Nations should hold a firm hand over the ANC training, and that training ought not to have the mark of any nation in particular. The financing of the ANC training should, as a principle, take place under the auspices of the United Nations, possibly as a project of technical assistance,in accordance with the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. Within the framework of such technical assistance, the Central Congolese Government could, we feel, make its contributions in the .form of emoluments in kind, or some similar arrangement. BC/ah (Mrs. Roagel, Sweden)

My Government has deemed, it appropriate to call to the attention of the Congo Advisory Committee the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 1.h July 1960, regarding the request for military assistance addresced to the . • . Secretary-General by the President snd the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo'o • Paragraph 2 of tho -operative part of that resolution states that the Security Council: - "D:?cidej3 to authorise the Secretary-General to take the necessary • steps, in consultation wr.th the Government of the Republic1, of the Congo, - to provide'the Government with such military assistance as may be ,. . necessary, until, through.the efforts of.the Congolese Government,with_ the technical assistance of the.United Nations, xhe.national security forces may be able, in the.opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks." . • Aa regards the States that should render military'assistance within.the framework of United Nations technical• aosieuance, ay Government is .of the. . . ••-. opinion that, in so far ao the ANC training is conducted under the auspices of. the United Nations, or with tho United Nations as a co-ordinating tody, a number of quite relevant and realistic considerations have to be taken into account. I am referring to the fact that this matter, ao well a£ all others relating to United'Nations assistance to-the Congo, must not appear to have arisen out of - consideration for a large Power or a group of large Powers; It is indeed necessary to make a point of avoiding political complications.that might render difficult the constructive tasks facing the United Nations.in the Congo. The planning of the structure of the military assistance to the Congo, in the form of technical assistance, must not lead to a situation in which these basic conditions regarding the over-all United Nations activities in the Congo are put aside. The Central Congolese Government seems at present, if I interpret correctly the Prime Minister's letter of 1.6 April 1963 to the Secretary-General, to indicate that military assistance for the training of the ANC is sought on a bilateral basis. For reasons of principle we find that procedure doubtful. 90 (Mrs. Rossel, Sweden)

Bilateral assistance of a military character, with OIJUC still present in the Congo, signifies a questionable nlxture of military assistance under the United Nations, on the one hand, and military assistance from individual States, on the other. There might "be certain risks of a negative political effect if such a procedure vere to be applied. As has been the case before, all that has been said here today and all the suggestions that have been made will be carefully studied by my Government.

Mro_CHAKBAVARTY (India): First, I should like to join in the expression by other speakers today of appreciation for the excellent manner and great success with which Mr.Gardiner has performed his difficult task. ONUC's loss will no doubt be a gain for the Economic Commission for Africa. We also wish every success to Mr. Dorsinville, whom we have known here as a valued colleague. His past experience makes him. eminently suited for this delicate and difficult task. To revert to the matter under discussion, and especially to the question of Prime Minister Adoula's letter of 16 April, I believe that no one c^n contest the fact that the situation in which General Assembly resolution iVfV was adopted, on 2C September 19^0 — that is, nearly three years ago — has changed, fortunately for the better. The representative of Nigeria has explained this with very great eloquence, and I do not wish to repeat his arguments. The important fact is that there has been a material change in the situation, and the resolution which called upon all States to refrain from the direct furnishing of military-type assistance to a Congo then on the verge of civil war, and without an effective Central Government, cannot possibly have the same meaning today, when there is an effective Central Government, with which most of us have diplomatic relations, and when the territorial integrity of the country has been restored. If that were not so, then the opening phrase of paragraph 6 of the resolution — namely, "Without prejudice to the 'sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo" — would have had no meaning, and the phrase need not have been included at all in the resolution. AP/ec . °1 (Kf..Chakravarty, JncUa)

Looking'at It from another point of-view, unless there had been a change in the circumstances', no scaling down of the Unitad Nations forcao vould have beon possible, This then is the-clearest evidence that circumstances have - changed since, tha resolution vas p?.3ssd in September 19^0. While we have-no difficulty in recognizing this pa^ont fact, we find considerable difficulty in- advising you as to uliat follows therefrom. -I do not think I am called upon to advise you as to the Intrepretation of resolution lij-7^-- In. fact,'my delegation would like to reserve its position on this questiono We feel, however, that for our purpose, it is sufficient to recognize the fact that circumstances have changed, that we recognize the sovereignty of the Congo, that we recognize that they are entitled to'ask and obtain any aid through bilatcrial negotiations. Since the aid is bilateral, there can be no question of United Nations participation. In fact, as- you have said yourself, Mr. Secretary-General, Prime Minister Adoula1 s lottor can bo interpreted to .-: ••• - rccan that he does not press for any United ]rations participation* Again, the resolution is either still applicable* or it Is not, The Governments who my be wining to extend such aid are the -best judges of that fact and as ?;•.•• ve:celga Governn-ents they are entitled to take whatever action they may consider appropriate. All I can say is that ray Government does not want In any way to stand against the wishes of the Congolese Government -as a sovereign Government to obtain bilateral aid« We seek no role 'In the Congo and are happy that we were able to make our contribution to the United Nations effort with both n:-3a and money. We recognize the sovereignty of the Congo with which we have been maintaining diplomatic relations from the very beginning. Wo fully appreciate also that the phased withdrawal of OUUC must inevitably coincide with the organised training of the A1TC, as tho latter cannot be in a position to take over the responsibility of maintaining law and order without having been sufficiently trained before complete withdrawal of ONUC. We have therefore always been In favour of proper training of the AHC, TT

AF/ec (Mr. , India)

In theoe circumstances my delegation, I repeat,, does not propose to raise any objection to the Congolese plan on the technical ground that the resolution may perhaps only be revised in the changed circumstances "by the appropriate body. While speaking on this subject, we would like to know whether you, Mr. Secretary-General, and your advisers have evolved any compromise plan safeguarding ONUC's position and have been capable of attracting some measure i of general acceptability, I think this is also the time when ve might give consideration to the wider question of the imperative necessity for advance planning here at Headquarters to ensure that dioongaGomsnt from its raoponoibtlities in the Congo follows an orderly pattern. Now that the United Nations disengageicent can be said to have commenced with the repatriation of a substantial portion of the United Nations forces from the Congo, thereby marking the beginning of the end of the period of temporary United Nations IE-illtary presence in the Congo, advance planning is very necessary with a vietf to decide when and in what phases the disengage riBnt should ba carried on* With the phased reduction of the strength of ONUC, there must be a simultaneous reduction in its responsibilities for maintenance of law and order. ri'he area in its charge must therefore be reduced correopoadingly. Integration of the Katangese gendarmerie with the AKC in accordance with the U Thant plan must proceed par! pasou with the reorganization of the ANC. There will' be a law and order problem if the gendarmerie- which has been paid up to April, I understand, is not given some oxnployi&art* The United Nations should not permit itself to be faced with an embarrassing position and must now ensure that the initiative at all times remains in United Kations hands. •

Mr. BQLAND (Ireland); In view of the late hour, I shall be extremely brief, but I would like in a sentence to associate myself with the tributes paid to Mr. Gardiner. He rendered most distinguished services to the United Nations in the Congo. I should also like to associate myself with the good wishes and the expressions of confidence in Ambassador Max Doroinville. His wisdom and his long experience are an assurance to us that he will discharge his new mission with the utinoat success. • Boland, Ireland)

Like my colleague of India, I would like to return'to Mr. Adoula's-letter to.you of.16 April* In that'letter Prime Minister Adoula put forward two points. First, he asked, you to agree with him that in the changed circumstances, General Assembly resolution 1^7^ was now unrealistic. Secondly, he asked for soica form of United Nations Involvement in the arrangements he has in mind for the training and organization of the ANC. I think it is clear now that the second point need no longer concern the Advisory Conmittee.' We therefore come back to.the first point, and that is the relevance in the circumstances of today of Assembly'resolution iVflj.. I quite agree with my colleague of Canada, and other members of the Committee who have expressed the same view, that it is not for this Committee to interpret an Assembly resolution. • That is a matter for the Assembly itself, and pending any determination by the Assembly itself, it is a matter for the interpretation of the individual members of the United Nations. It is for them to interpret it. .. I would like to recall that Assembly resolution l.k"k was adopted at a very early stage of the Congo -operation, and the United Nations Jurisprudence in regard to the Congo operation did not cease with resolution iV^i-, Ac' my colleague of India pointed out, the concluding words of paragraph 6 of resolution lVf4 limit the operation of that paragraph to the carrying out of the purposes of three previous Security Council's resolutions, none of which referred at all to the reorganization or training of-the AN'C. Go paragraph 6 of 147^ (ES-IV) has a rather limited relevance to what we are talking about here. But, as I say, the United Nations jurisprudence in connexion with the Congo did not come to an end with Assembly resolution iVf^ (EG-IV)*' It canB up again. The question was rather further extended in connexion with the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961, which GO far as I know, and I hope I am not wrong on the point, was the first resolution that.referred to the reorganization and training of the ANC. That resolution, as members of the Committee may remember, is in two parts. The first part contained a paragraph, A 2, which provided for the withdrawal of foreign military .personnel and mercenaries. And in B 2, that resolution: "Urges that Congolese armed units and personnel should be reorganized and brought under discipline and control ..." (Security Council Official Records, l6th Year, 9^2nd meeting, page 19 document BSII/tt (Mr. Boland, Ireland)

That resolution was the subject of an agreement with regard to its implementation "between the then Secretary-General and President Kas and I do think that the members of the Ccumittee vould "be well advised, if they have to interpret for themselves resolution 1^7^ (ES-IV), to read the text of that agreement on g3.neral principles which was reached between President Kasa-v\ibu and the then Secretary-General. This was the first time a resolution had been passed dealing with the reorganization of the ANC. I have the text of the agreement before me, and I would like to read out the opening words. They are as follows: "The Republic of the Congo accepts the resolution of 21 February taking into account that the United Nations affirms its respect for the sovereignty of the-Republic of the Congo in the implementation of that resolution." That was the first resolution that referred to the reorganisation of the ANC« It goes on in paragraph 2 to say that the aim of the resolution of 21 February — which, by the way, reaffirmed resolution ikfk (ES-IV) — that the aim of paragraphs A.2 and EU2 — and B02 is the one which referred to the organization and training of ANC — is to eliminate all deleterious foreign influence. I think that some member of the Committee said earlier that the aim of resolution 1^7^ (ES-IV) was to make sure that everything in connexion with the training and organization of the AKC should be channelled through the United Nations. According to this agreement, that was not its main purpose. Its main purpose was to eliminate all deleterious foreign influence. I will not read further in the text of the agreement except to read the penultimate paragraph, which is as follows: "The Republic of the Congo recognizes the need to reorganize the National Army, it being understood that this reorganization is to be carried out" — not channelled through the United Nations -- "under the authority of the President of the Republic with United Nations assistance and on the basis of proposals made by the Chief of State in his letter of 5 March 1961 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations," RSH/tt 97 (Mr, Boland, Ireland)

I do not think that we are entitled in.this Committee, in examining this question of -what arrangements the Government of the Congo is entitled '•••• to make on a "bilateral "basis, to confine ourselves simply to General Assembly resolution ikjk (ES-JV)0 "We must go on to the Security .Council resolution of 21 February and to the specific agreement.concluded "between President Kasa-vubu and the Secretary-General as to the sense.in which that resolution was to "be interpreted, . I do not want to delay the Committee, but the conclusion that I 'draw from all this is the following. Mr. Secretary-General, I think our duty here is to give you the most helpful advice that we can. In regard to Prime Minister Adoula's contention that circumstances have.changed since General Assembly resolution 1^7^ (ES-IV) was adopted, I do not think there can be any doubt as to the answer. It has changed completely. That resolution must be read in the light of later resolutions and also of 'the change in circumstances and, in particular, this agreement on general principles which was made between the then Secretary-General and President Kasa-vubu. I do not know whether, in replying to this letter, you need go ±>.n*ther than to say simply.that, .but I would think that you would be in danger of going .' beyond the decisions which have been reached and the agreement reached by your predecessor with President Kasa-vubu if you were to go so far as to ^say that either General Assembly resolution ik^k (ES-IV) or any later resolution limited the sovereignty of the Congolese Government to the extent of depriving it of the freedom to make such arrangements as. it may think fit for the. training and - organization of .the AUG.

Mr. WODAJO (Ethiopia): First of all I should like to associate my delegation with the words of thanks and appreciation which have been extended to Mr, Robert Gardiner for the.highly valuable services he has rendered to the United Nations and to everyone of us. May I also extend the.good wishes of my delegation and my Government to his successor, Ambassador Dorsinville. RSH/tt (Mr. Wodajo, Ethiopia)

May I seise this first opportunity to Indicate the vievs or my Government on the question on "which you, Mr. Secretary-General,have sought our advice. Firstly, my Government is of the opinion that the Kind of assistance Tor which the Congolese Government has asked In within the scope of tre present mandate of the United Nations presence in th.3 Congo, Secondly, my Government agrees with the Govev-iniDut of the Republic of the Congo that United Nations association, United Nations participation in the training of the Congolese army is preferable to any other kind of bilateral or multilateral arrangement outside the framework of the United Nations. Thirdly, in our estimation the crux of the problem is how should this United Nations association or this United Nations participation, which we all desire to see, should be evolved and elaborated,, I think that the more we address ourselves 'concretely to this proposition, the better the progress ve will make» We believe that the United Nations association should be based on established United Nations principles and procedures, and in this respect ve believe that we can learn a lot from the various United Nations technical assistance programmes. There are certain fundamental procedures an^- principles which give to the various United Nations technical assistance progr&flanes the international character which they all have today. We feel that this Committee should keep addressing itself to the question of how we should elaborate a United Nations programme or United Nations participation in the training of the Congolese army, with all the procedures which would safeguard the international character that a programme of this sort should assume* DR/rh 101

•' ' • (Mr. Wodgjo, Ethiopia) The question of the request of the Government of the Congo "being incompatible with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1^7^ bas been put forward. In the view of my delegation, we do not feel that it is the better part of wisdom to address ourselves at this juncture to the continuing validity of this resolution under the present circumstances, if we can elaborate a programme of United Nations participation which could safeguard, as I have suggested, established United Nations procedures.. So we feel that there is scope., that there is opportunity still remaining for you, Mr. Secretary-General, with the advice of the officers of the United Nations, . concerned with the Technical Assistance Programme and.in conjunction with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to work out a. programme of United Nations participation in the training of the Congolese Army. We feel that such a programme could be made compatible with the . resolution of the General Assembly and with established procedures of the : United Nations. I must confess that my delegation.has been hampered by discussions that revolve around two abstract concepts^ the concepts of co-ordination and the umbrella. Unless we give meat and substance to this. ,. concept, I do not see how we can discuss.,in .great detail, as we did, the .. compatibility of these concepts with the United Nations resolution.

The SECRETARY-GENERAJ.; At the commencement of this meeting Mr. Bomboko indicated his desire toraali e a statement to clarify-some of the points raised in the course of the discussion, and I give him the floor.

Mr* BOMBOKD (Congo (Leopoldville)) (interpretation from French): I must say very sincerely that my delegation is disappointed with the way in which the debates on the very important problem for us has been carried out. From certain declarations that were made, it appears that many representatives are basing themselves on feelings and CD nsiderations that are quite alien to the interests of the people and the Government of the Congo. To hear some delegations .ppeak here, one might believe that this problem, which is vital and which they know to be vital in their own countries, is a game. In fact, I have seen proposals made here which do not take acount of the existing realities, realities that we are all aware of and which we have felt very DR/rh 102

(Mr• Eoroboko. _ *-. Leopoldville ) )

closely. There have even been cone delegations which have talked about "the balance of forces" in Africa as if our Republic had the purpose of setting up an army to conquer the rest of Africao I do not think that that is our aim since from the very beginning we have very clearly defined our position, pointing out. that if ve asked for an array it is not an army of conquest, it is merely a ssiiirity force that ve need to maintain the integrity of tiis territory and also to protect persons and their possessions. Many people here linow full veil, because of Press reports, of the degree of the tragedy that besets us, and many people knov full veil that without the sacrifices of the United Nations, the sacrifices that many countries have been willing to make so that the Congo would be reunited would have been in vain and useless because we would have fallen back to where we were* Despite that, I Gee that solutions are proposed hastily without bearing in mind that this is a basic problem that bears on the lives of about 15 million inhabitants. Thus I shall not go into a cLLscussicn of feelings and emotions; I shall merely refer to facts and I shall say that the solution by which officers would be sent to Europe or elsewhere to be trained is a so.i.ut.ion that does not bear in mind the fact that an entire army needs to be trained, an army that must be a useful tool* You knov that we have done this already? In fact, we have already sent 330 young Congolese to train in Europe; this training took from six to eighteen months. Even at the present moment we have 300 Congolese who are still overseas undertaking military training. We have ninety young Congolese at cadet schools and forty-five young Congolese who are about to leave to attend that same cadet school. On the other hand, there are thirty Congolese who are being trained in European military academies so that they can become officers. We have already made an effort but we are certain that this effort, despite the 3^0 young men we have trained for three years in Europe, is not sufficient, that it is necessary that these 3^0 young men, plus the cadres that, we can receive from abroad will then have to train our soldiers in the Congo„ It is not because an officer is trained that you can say that you have an army. If we ourselves have succeeded in training only 380 yoUng men in three years, how can the United Nations manage to prepare and train an entire array in six or seven months because some delegations have said that the date of 31 December 1963 would probably be the target date for the United Nations presence in the Congo. (Mr. Borcboko, Congo (Leopoldville)) Such proposals do not "bear in clnci. the facts, They not only set aside the facts because.General Kebbede Guebre himself pointed out the difficulties that he has had regarding the command of the United Nations forces in the Congo. I could read out certain declarations that were made by General Kebbede: "This factorings up many problems, mainly due to the difficulty of making different organisations^ with clifferent concepts and procedures and using different languages, working together at the same time in the came task. "'Different organizations present a problem when units have to be employed in the field* Guch problems as strength of sub-units, different ammunition, different radio equipment, and so on, can be very embarrassing for the Force,", (T^th meeting;, UN Advisory Committee on the Congo, p. 13-15) We know that the United Nations has had a difficult time in co-ordinating military activities in the Congo because of. the diversity of the countries that are represented. How do you expect the same United Nations to undertake the training in record time of an entire army and in that same record time to give it the entire structure that c<:\ army needs in order to replace effectively the United Nations forces when those forces leave our territory? I think that this is also ,an unrealistic attitude, all the more so since our requests to the United Nations for the reorganization of the National Congolese Army is not a new one. The representative of Ireland, for example, stressed the agreement -with President Kasavubu. But there is a letter from President Kasavubu dated, I think, 6 March 1961 in which we had already asked the United Nations to take up, together ^ith us, the solution of these problems. 106

(Mr. Boiuboko, Congo (Leopoldville))

You know full well that the Organization has encountered many difficulties, of which we all know. The United Nations was to come to the Congo only to help us to keep order and request the Belgian troops to leave. But it had to wage war, although there had "been no question, of fighting when it went to the Congo. It had to wage war, and we know that any war, however small it may "be, involves enormous expenses. Hence the United Nations has had to spend a fortune there to carry on that war. This complicated the situation and "because of these difficulties -- and ve should like to pay a tribute to the United Nations for its action -- the Organization was not able to help us to reorganize the army. It 'is only now that we see that the United Nations could do so. But in the final count it is the fifteen million inhabitants of the Congo who must foot the bill. Today some people are saying: "The United Nations should try to reorganize the Congolese army", but they do not even think about who is to pay the bill. That too is a problem which should be borne in mind when the subject is discussed. ' I can tell you here and now that my country, who.33 economy is in a critical situation, will in no circumstances be able to bear the expense of modernizing the r^my. Furthermore, as the representative of Ireland pointed out — I >•*.£• President Kasavubu' s agreement in my possession, but I did not want to quote it because I had no intention of starting a pointless argument — nevertheless, since the reorganization of the army is being discussed there is one question, and it is the question which was raised by the representative of Ireland: can anyone tell me where this resolution which is being so much talked about refers to the reorganization of the army? It is not even mentioned. What is mentioned is military assistance. What does military assistance mean? We must first agree on the meaning of the words. Can the fact that we have military instructors be described as military assistance which is a danger to the United Nations? I do not think so; if that were so then the teachers we have in our schools and who come from countries which -- as some have -.said--- belong, to a certain bloc, would have to leave the Congo because they might teach imperialism and colonialism to Congolese children1. I do not believe that this can be regarded as an obstacle. Since teachers come here from certain countries, who not also teachers who could provide military training for young Congolese? Where is the difference? I wonder. r BHS/ah 107 (Mr. Bomboko, Congo (Leopoldville))

It is the resolution of 21 February that referred to the reorganization of the array. I am a co-signer of the agreement concluded between the President of the Republic of the Congo end the Secretary-General at that time. It was Mr, Gardiner's'mission and tho.f:e vho came to the Congo and tried to reconcile the sovereignty of the Congo with that resolution and with the obligations of the United Nations. As a result of this effort at conciliation; we finally arrived at what 1 stated at the beginning, namely that the reorganization of the army falls completely Within the competence of the Coagolso-a Government, and that the reorganization of the army; since it has an institutional character, must be carried out under the authority of those nominated by our fundamental lav. We cannot abdicate by saying, "We have aeked for the assistance of the United Nations and therefore it is others who are going to take our place in reorganizing our army". We agreed with the Secretary-General that this would be done under the authority of President Kacavubu. For the moment, we are asking for technical assistance and, in due course, for materiel. But we do not intend to undertake military operations^ It- Is only to organize our security forces. Perhaps I have not expressed EyselC correctly, for French is not my mother tongue. I understand that when one speaks of military assistance it means logistic sup^rt, the "building of military bases within the framework of a military offensive,, We are not asking for military assistance. We have not asked countries to give us logistic support; we have not asked for military equipment to undertake military operations. All we have requested is technical assistance for the training of Congolese youth so as to improve the cadres that already exist with a view to maintaining public order and protecting the people. This is what we seek. We do not have, as some of our colleagues have indicated, any hidden desire to upset the military balance of Africa, if such a balance exists. I do not believe that there is a military balance in Africa. Nobody has created armies for conquest. If such military dreams did exist in Africa, the Congo would have the right to create an army for its defence. But I do not believe that such armies of conquest exist in Africa . I think this is an erroneous interpretation of the desires of my Government. BHS/ah 108-110

(Mr. Eomboko, Congo (Leopoldville))

If we really wish to turn to juridical considerations, then we must bear in mind the agreement signed -with the Secretary-General which gives UGj in recognition of our sovereignty, the right to reorganize our army. I unj.'r.t stress the contradiction -that exists in some of the statements that were made, Cone have said that they recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of the Congo, while someone else has said, "While recognizing that sovereignty, we state that the Republic of the Congo nevertheless has no right to choose the countries to which it will turn for assistance in training its army". Then we were told, "We wish to save the Republic of the Congo, because it is going to fall under some type of NATO trusteeship". I must say that all of the African countries represented here who have struggled to achieve their independence have one common phenomenon, and a rather curious one, namely that during the period when we struggled for our independence we were thrown into prison and we fought against the colonizers: yet once independence was acquired, we collaborated u.lt-h our former colonizers. Even those who were imprisoned, either by the French, by the English or by the Belgians, finally collaborated with them. In the armies of today, there are officers, western and others, who are there as technicians* Why should there not be confidence in the Republic of the Congo? Why should our behaviour be taken as some shirking of our obligations and duties as a member of the African community? Why should we be accused of creating a danger in the- heart of Africa? Mr. Secretary-General, I beg your forgiveness for having raised my voice. But my people and my Government consider — and I must stress this point again — this problem to be basic and vital. We must press our views when we say that the sacrifice in human lives made by those countries that have assisted us to recover our national unity will have been made in vain if we do not now undertake the modernization of our army so as to discipline it. and make It: effective in order that once the United Nations has withdrawn its troops from the Congo, we may then1 truly consolidate the work that it has done* This is all that the Congolese Government wishes to achieve. I must state that the Congolese Government vail not go back on its position. If obstacles are put in our path for the training of our army, we shall shoulder our responsibilities on this level and on the African level too, . AW/he 111

Mr_._SIDT-EATA (Morocco) (irv'-errrctation frcm French): First of all, I vish it to "be recorded in the records of this meeting that the delegation of Morocco associates itself in full with the expressions of congratulations and gratitude vhich have been addressed "by all those who have spoken here to Mr. Gardiner, who has "brilliantly represented the United Nations in the Congo. We al^»o associate ourselves with the congratulations and tribute paid to Ambassador Dorsinville on his recent appointment as United Nations Representative to the Congo. Having said this, may I "make it clear that the Minister 1'or Foreign Affairs of the Congo has'just referred to a sentence in the course of the statement made by the delegation of Morocco; that is to say, our concern to maintain a balance of forces. To the extent that this reference was addressed to our statement, I vish it to 'be made clear here that what we said a while ago should "be understood as follows: that the presence of a group of nations having a specific and defined policy, placed within a large African territory such as that of the Congo, may have implications which could jeopardize not only balance in Africa, but balance throughout the world. ' I wish it to be placed on record that that is the way in which tile statement made by the delegation of Morocco should be interpreted. As for saying that we have any concern for the existing balance of power in'Africa, this is' hardly relevant in the case of a country such as ours, which has always desired to see all the...principles of co-operation, friendship and understanding prevail among all African States in a spirit cf ipeace and brotherhood. 112

^n^.?I^™^^I']J:{:::?iLr Du-G to the lateness of the hour, .1 will confine myself to a very brief remark by way of winding up this cUscucaion. First of all, I want to thank all the members of the Committee for the very useful, helpful and comprehensive statements made in the course of the discussion. Of course, it would be very difficult, if riot impossible, to surjuarize or eci&lytfa the sense of the discussion. It could even, perhaps, be dangerous for me to attempt to analyse the feeling of this Committee. The expressions have been varied and far-reaching; but if there is no consensus of view in this Committee to guide my thinking in response to Prime Minister Adoula1 letter, I can assure you that my reply to Mr. Adoula's letter will be elided. primarily by the mood of this Committee. Of course, it will take some time to study very carefully and very closely the records of this meeting, which I consider to be very important because the matter under discussion is very important and, if I may say so, very crucial, not only with regard to the Republic of the Congo but also with regard to the very character of the United Nations involvement in the Congo. At the risk of oversimplification, I may say that two points emerge out of this discussion. The first one is that there is a general recognition of the fact that the Government of the Republic of the Congo is sovereign, that the Congolese Government has sovereign prerogatives in the discharge of its duties and obligations. The second point also emerges clearly: that there is also general recognition in this Committee that the United Nations has certain definite functions to perform in the Congo. Therefore, to solve this problem satisfactorily, we have to endeavour to find a formula which does not damage these two concepts, these two points. I wish to thank you once again for this very useful- discussion. The meeting is adjourned*

The meeting rose at 7«25 p.m.