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Nos. 65 - 75 January 1962 to April 1963

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Nos. 65 - 75 January 1962 to April 1963 UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO MEETINGS Nos. 65 - 75 January 1962 to April 1963 ENGLISH CONFIDMTIAL VOL, 8 UNITED NATIONS ARCHIVES I' CONFIDENTIAL Mneting No. 65 9 January 1962 ENGLISH UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY CCKMITTL'E GiJ THE COKGO Meeting at United nations Heerlruarters, New on Tuesday, ^ January I^b2; at 5 p.m. In the Chair: U THA17T The Acting SECRETARY-GENERAL Members: Canada Mr. riTCHIE Ceylon K:r. I'lJEGCONAVJARDENA . - Ethiopia Mr. CELRE-EGZY FecVjr&tion of Malaya Mr. I<"PJ--1IL . CLicM::- Mr. PADZIE .. • Guinca Mi-. DIALLO I'*,-. JIIA 1-^. I APIAN Ireland Mr. I.'OLAlNT) • . •• Liberia Mr. BARNES Kail Mr. TA Morocco Mr. TAZI Mr. KGILERUMA Fakiotan S |r 1 '-uhammad. ZAH1ULIA • KHAII Conceal Mr. CIG.GE /Sudan ... -: KJT. ADEEL . •; •-.: Gv/cden ' • Mrs.. R03S2L. ... Tunisia ...-.- Mr./CHIjlIXI ..--... United Arab Republic Mr-. LCL7IFI . ..-.- . Congo, (.Leopoldville). Mr. M!Bbyo-Paul ., 62-00829 HA/b{ The Acting C^RETARY-qi-NFML: Before we proceed, I should like to welcome the representative of Uicrra Leone, who is here with us. Of course, while welcoming our colleaeuo from Sierra Leone, I want to take this opportunity of mentioning that the contribution of contingents to the United liaticnD operations in the Congo docs not automatically/entitle the contributor to E seat in the Advisory Committee. As members are aware, there are other countries which are not rrxn.bers of the Con^o Advisory Ccinniittce but which have contributed very significantly to the Euececs of tfcc Unite! Ilatior?" operations in the Congo. Regarding the question of membership of the Advisory Committee, I will wish to hove the benefit of your advice at a subsequent meeting. In the meantime, of course, I am very delighted to welcome the representative of Sierra Leone. I have asV;ocl you to ccme to this meetly; for three main reasons • Firstly, I wish to consult you about the replies I have receive! to my request to the Goverr.rr^nts of the United Kingdom aud Portugal thit observers be stationed along the frontiers of Rhode:,Is and Angola for the purpose of controlling illicit traffic into Kr-tanga, L.bout which, of course, you havo already K<_en so't--thing in the prose« Secondly, there ere a couple of matters ou which there appears to be need for some cxplcriation on iry part, since some questions have beer .v.v;ed. Tliirdly, it is desirable to brin(3 you up to date en developments in the Congo and particularly in Katanga, inasmuch as we have not mot since 16 December. You have before you copies of my letters to the United Kingdom and Portugal about the stationinc of observers and copies of the replies which I have received from those Governments. There is also before you a copy of a statement concerning this matter made by Gir Roy Wclcnsky. This latter text, incidentally, has not been checked against delivery, and I cannot therefore verify its accuracy. You will note that the replies are negative, although the Government of the United Kingdom suggests on alternative in the form of.an invitation to me to go to Salisbury — an invitation which, I have been told informally, would equally cover a representative of mine. It is not at all clear to me what, if any, constructive results might bo achieved from such a visit. It certainly dees not cover what I had in mind in making the approach to the United Kingdom Government. Here I might say that this approach was rv:n.do because we finally had some concrete evidence of illicit assistance to Katanga from the Rhodesian side, which wo immediately presented to the United Kingdom Government and which Sir Roy Welensky has promptly denied in phraseology that could not be described as gracious. EKS/db (The Tn this regard, I mipht call to your attention'thnt, although'fVlr Roy Uelchnky vigorously tried to explain avny the'crossing of the forty-eight' jeeps at Kipushl, he has never made any public reference to the activities of the Dornier aircraft "based Qt Ndcla raid piloted by one Mr. Wickstcad, probably becauae toe evidence we presented vas too convincing for oven Sir Roy to drmy. I vould appreciate the vicvs of the members, particularly on the British alternative proposal, since I must reply to it, With regard to the situation in Katanga cince the intense fighting in early December come to a halt, there have been frequent references to a ceace-fire. I wish to make it quite clear that cincc the cease-fire of lost October broke down because of the vauton and repeated viclat-lor.r; of the KntarigeGe, leading finally to the fighting which began 0:1 tho afternoon of 5 Escember, there has not been and there is not now my ceaue-fire In effect. There haa been no approach by United nations ofi'.icials to tlie Katar^esc on this question, although Mr. Teiiombe end cor ,- of his collen(ri.?^s hav-^ frequontly alluded to the cubjoct and Mr. Tchcnibe tried to make a cease-fire a condliion for hia participation in the Kitcna tallio. This condition, GO you know, waa reiuced "by OirdC. riL.ere has been vhat micht be ' called the unilateral vJ.tlilioldlr^ 'of fire, or "hold-fire11, if you vioh, by OliUC cince the achievement of CIWCTs inanudiate military objectives in Elioobetlivlllc, "• •which dn fact coincided with the beginning of the Kitcna talkc. This hoe meant only that OUUC' in Elir.abethville \?ould not initiate fire but vould retui^n fire if fired upon. • • •* . • . • • This VQS undertaken for a number of reasons. First'of all, because with the general collapse of gendarmerie resistance in Elisnbethville and the capture of the Union Mini ere compound, "which irao the lact stroc^liold of recistance, the oiaic task in Elicabcthville consisted primarily of "cleaning up", that is to say, eliminating the last vestiges of cniping from private dwellings and other buildinca, ctoppin^ looting by the Katancese, who alone vere responsible for it and not — let ITG repeat, not — Cl'IUC trcopn, as vas reckleisnly end malicj.oualy alleged in come quarters, and generally rectoring order in the city towards reauuption of normal civilian pursuits. With the necessity of thus consolidating itself in l^lisabethville requiring retention of major strength in that area, OITLJC, in any case, could not BHS/<Ib 7-10 (The Acting Secretary-General) for acne time be ready to undertake a now operation against mercenaries in such other localities ao Krmina-Vllle, Jadotville, Kolwezi und KIpushi, where, according to our Information, the remaining mercenaries in Katanga ore to be mainly found. A bit later on I vill ask Brigadier Rikhye to give you the latest information about the mercenaries involved and tr.]:en captive and the arms and aiLTiunitlon captured by OlfJC in the Elicabeihville operation of last December. Moreover,, it vould have been highly inadvisable for tiie Urr.Vc^cl Nations to initiate fighting which vould have made the United Nations responsible for preventing the mceiin,^ at Kitona of Llr. Adoula and Mr. Tshombe, or for the United Nations nov to undertake any action vhich vould prevent the Kitona declaration from being implemented,, since, in fact, come of its points are in the process of being implemented. We are pre^nin^; Mr. T;:bo:nhe on point 3 in this declaration concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and particularly that relating to mercor-oriers. It is our hope -chat be vill keep his promise to facilitate the e 11 mi na tic a of rrerce.ncries in such a way 03 to make it "j.i^ce scary T for OriUC to employ furtive:: force tc-.r.irdn that end. I must add, ho ,r:ver; l^.at our plans and preparations lor further operations In areas of Katanga other then rilisabethville vith a vi:',^ to achieving the total elimination of mercca-i^ee are going forward viihoat delay. I feel the need to Gay a word also in explanation of the question of ONUCT s relationa with the ANC; that is, an AJiC contingent in OWUG, on the one hand, and a joint ONUC/ANC military operation in Katanga, on the other. As you knew, Mr. Adoula, in December, after consulting with Mr, Bunchc, offered a contingent of the AIIC to the United Nations Force in the Congo to serve on the same basis as all other contingents, and I accepted that offer. MW/kb _ 11 (Th^Ar11 np; S^cretary~Geriera 1) Mr. Bunche, in Ms talk vith Mr. Adoula, explained TO him fully, as had been done by ethers in the past, the difficulties for the United Katicr.s in undertaking a joint military operation with the AITC. Mr. Bundle is l.oro and can ar.cwc?r any questions on thin matter and also, if you have any, on the Kitcna talks. I might add that Mr. George Ivan Smith is also here, having just returned from Katanga, and will gladly answer any questions which you wish to put to him. In Gumnviry, Mr. Eunche explained to Mr. Atloula that the basic difficulty about any joint operation was that the United Kationo Force.in the Congo was subject fully to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and the limitations on the ULJG of force implicit in thcco resolutions. There are, of course, no such limitations on the AIIC, the Congolese Government being Tree to employ its force internally towards political ends. Moreover, a joint operation would raise for 01TUC virtually insoluble prcble-.as of command, and would involve the United Nations Force in sharing responsibilities Tor military cbjoctiven, military actions and conduct by troops which could not be creep-table to or condoned by the Jniced Nations.
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